At a Capitol Hill press conference in November 1992, a reporter asked President-Elect Clinton what he would do to "stop the sale of arms from this country around the world." Clinton responded:

"I expect to review our arms sales policy and to take it up with the other major sellers of the world as part of a long-term effort to reduce the proliferation of weapons of destruction in the hands of people who might use them in very destructive ways."

Two years, several wars and more than $50 billion of U.S. arms sales later. the White House released the results of its review of conventional weapons export policy. Advocates of both arms control and arms exports had worked to influence the content of the 6-page document, released on February 17, 1995. The arms industry won. "It's the most positive statement on defense trade that has been enunciated by any administration," gushed Joel Johnson, one of the weapons industry's chief lobbyists.

Arms controllers' hopes for U.S. Leadership to restrict the trade were based on faith rather than reason. During the two years of the policy review, the Clinton team continued-and in many ways accelerated-the Cold War pro-export practices of the Reagan/Bush administrations.

In fiscal years 1993 and 1994, the executive branch (and Congress) signed-off on a staggering $100 billion of government and industry-negotiated arms deals. Moreover, the administration actively assisted industry by subsidizing marketing activities, lobbying foreign officials to "buy American," and financing several billions of dollars of sales.

The "new" guidelines call for business as usual: "the United States continues to view transfers of conventional arms as a legitimate instrument of U.S. foreign policy-deserving U.S. government support when they enable us to help friends and allies deter aggression, promote regional stability, and increase interoperability of U.S. forces and allied forces."

Instead of restraint, the policy emphasizes openness in exports. Instead of limiting sales and technology on a regional basis, it promotes "responsible" exports: the U.S. will export only to those countries which it favors and discourage exports by others to those it disfavors. Instead of de-commercializing weapons exports, the government will now explicitly consider the impact on the arms industry in deciding whether to approve a sale. Finally, export decisions will continue to be made on a case-by-case basis, meaning export of anything to anyone is possible.

MARKET TRENDS

There are several annual sources of information on the international arms trade. Each report measures something slightly different. The varying data can be confusing; however, all sources seem to agree on two points. First, they show the arms market is shrinking, due almost entirely to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of subsidized arms transfers from the former Soviet republics. However, this claim is based on the accuracy of past U.S. government estimates of Soviet arms transfers during the Cold War. If those estimates were exaggerated for political or other reasons-as were estimates of Soviet military expenditures-then comparisons of today's market with that of, say 1987, are shaky. Moreover, arms sellers have an interest in suggesting that the market is in decline: it implies that the problem of the international arms trade is taking care of itself.

The second point of agreement-this one indisputable-is that since 1990 the United States has overwhelmingly dominated the market. Proponents of sales often claim that the increase in market share is not due to an increase in U.S. sales but simply to a shrinking 'pie." This is not true.

U.S. dominance is attributable, in roughly equal parts, to bullish American marketing during and since the Iraq war and to Russia's near withdrawal from the market. Since 1990, U.S. sales activity-through both the government-negotiated Foreign Military Sales program and through industry-negotiated sales licensed by the State Department has spiked.

In a report issued last July, the Congressional Research Service estimated that Third World countries purchased $20.4 billion of arms in 1993. (The report's definition of"Third World," excludes Turkey, Greece, East European countries and all former Soviet republics.)

According to the report, while U.S. Foreign Military Sales agreements increased only slightly from 1992 to 1993, U.S. market share rose from 56% to 73% of all Third World agreements. The CRS report actually understates the magnitude of U.S. sales, since it excludes arms sales negotiated directly by industry but licensed by the government. In 1993 the U.S. sold weapons to over 140 countries. The Project on Demilitarization and Democracy calculated that 90% of the U.S. sales went to countries that were either not democracies or that were human rights abusers. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait were the leading U.S. customers in terms of dollar volume.

Meanwhile, non-U.S. suppliers often cited in the American press as irresponsible "merchants of death"-made marginal sales by comparison. Russia's sales fell from S 11.8 billion in 1990 to $1.8 billion in 1993. Iran, Syria and the United Arab Emirates were Russia's largest customers.

China sold less than $300 million worth of arms in 1993-less than two percent of the market. After peak sales of $5.8 billion in 1987, it fell from the third-ranked seller in 1990 to sixth place in 1993. China was also the third largest arms importer in 1993, buying $1.3 billion of weapons.

At $2.6 billion in sales, the largest European suppliers (France, Britain and Germany) together accounted for 13% of all sales made to the Third World in 1993. This is down from $7.5 billion-29% of the market-in 1992.

BUYERS CALL THE SHOTS

Surplus arms production here and abroad has created a buyers' market, allowing customers to receive sweeter deals. First and foremost, buyers are extracting better price and financing pack- ages from sellers, dramatically reducing the macro-economic benefits to selling countries .

A second demand is for the technology to produce weapons. Increasingly, manufacturers are granting licenses to recipient countries to produce sub-components, components, or entire weapons systems. A prime example is the $5.2 billion Korean Fighter Program deal of 1991. In order to make the sale, U.S. industry was willing not only to send manufacturing jobs overseas but also to risk the creation of new competition in the near term. The security risk of helping to establish new weapons industries abroad takes a back seat to pressures to make the sale now.

Buyers are also demanding higher tech weaponry. In the past few years top-of- the-line systems previously off limits (such as American F-15E "Strike Eagle" and Russian Tu22M "Backfire" bombers, modern European diesel submarines and supersonic, sea-skimming anti-ship missiles) have been placed on the auction block. This, too, is not without obvious risk to the sellers. Military and intelligence officials repeatedly point to the increasing availability and sophistication of conventional arms as a prime threat to U.S. security. The Director of Naval Intelligence, Rear Admiral Edward Shaefer, testified last summer that "the overall technical threat and lethality of arms...being exported have never been higher." CIA Director James Woolsey testified on January 10,1995, that advanced conventional weapons "have the potential to significantly alter military balances, and disrupt U.S. military operations and cause significant U.S. casualties."

A mix of dangerous security strategies, outmoded diplomatic rationales, and false economic calculations conspires to convince U.S. policy makers that massive levels of arms exports make sense today. Added to the mix is industry's desire for high profits and organized labor's desire to maintain high-paying jobs.

"RATIONALES" FOR ARMS SALES

Arms exports continue to be used, as during the Cold War, for both stated and unstated strategic reasons. Recipient nations are said to need U.S. arms in order to take responsibility for their own defense. In reality, the U.S. uses exports and joint military exercises to gain access to overseas bases and to establish the infrastructure and interoperability necessary for U.S. intervention.

Interoperability is a hallmark of the doctrine of "coalition warfare," which the U.S. built up during the Cold War to contain communism. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the U.S. has intensified and expanded military ties around the world. According to Pentagon planning documents, instead of arming allies against the Soviet bloc, U.S.-led coalitions are now arming against "regional instability" and "uncertainty."

Furthermore, according to the new arms transfer policy, U.S. arms exports will promote regional stability. The policy statement does not specify exactly how weapons will do this, but presumably it refers to either: a) the creation of a balance of power; or b) the build-up of deterrent capabilities of U.S. allies. However, weapons are more likely to undermine peace and security than to maintain them. Moreover, the geopolitical landscape is so volatile that predicting regime stability and the steadfastness of alliances is impossible. Former U.S. allies-and recipients of U.S. weapons and military training-in Panama, Iraq, Somalia and Haiti became foes.

A third strategic rationale cited in support of arms exports is the need to maintain weapons production lines in case of a future war. The recent spate of mergers and acquisitions in the U.S. arms industry has not reduced output significantly. Production lines for many of America's front-line weapons-e.g., F- 15 bombers, F- 16 fighters, Apache attack helicopters, and M-1A2 tanks remain open, now only for sales abroad. In other cases. the government is approving new production lines solely for export.

Proponents claim that arms sales allow suppliers to gain and maintain ' influence" with recipients. Sellers in the past applied conditions-at least in theory-to weapons purchases. In today's market, however, the buyer is more likely to influence the seller than vice versa. Besides this dubious diplomatic rationale, the U.S. government continues to rely on arms transfers as a one-size-fits-all fix for almost any foreign policy situation. Need to "reward" allies for participating in Desert Storm, peacekeeping in Somalia, or enforcing the no-fly-zone in Iraq? Send weapons. Need to seal a peace agreement? Send weapons, and forgive past military debt as well.

ECONOMIC "RATIONALES"

After the Iraq war, it looked briefly as if the international arms trade was going to be held accountable for enabling, if not fomenting, Iraq's aggression. But the arms export lobby in the United States quickly and effectively headed off the backlash by emphasizing the "jobs" factor. However, while production of most major weapons systems is spread strategically across nearly every state and most Congressional districts, relatively few workers are employed through arms production for export. A 1992 Congressional Budget Office report estimated that sizable reductions in U.S. arms exports to the Middle East, America's largest market, would affect less than one-tenth of one percent of the total work force.

But everyone pays a higher Defense Department (DOD) bill because of these exports. Weapons proliferation, instability and warfare in the developing world are used to justify this year's $150 billion Pentagon request (this excludes $40 billion of other military spending). The development and production of next-generation U.S. weapons are justified now on the basis of weapons being acquired by Third World nations, including those which the United States has sold. Lockheed's lobbying campaign for the F-22 fighter is based on the proliferation of very capable fighters, such as the F-15E, F-16C/D and the F/A- 18.

Moreover, arms manufacturers receive vast government subsidies. Taxpayers underwrite the research and development of weapons and employ a Pentagon sales force of several thousand people here and abroad. The DOD spends public money to market U.S. weapons at overseas arms bazaars and nearly $5 billion of public money is given away each year to allow allies to pay for U.S. weapons purchases.

In Belarus, Ukraine, Russia; and China the Clinton administration has aggressively promoted and assisted the conversion of arms industries to peaceful pursuits. While visiting Beijing in October, Secretary of Defense William Perry said that it was in the U.S. interest to "help these countries resist pressure to mal~e weapons even beyond their needs." However, the administration apparently does not consider this advice valid for the U.S. The Clinton administration's conventional arms transfer policy doesn't refer to conversion and downsizing the U.S. arms industry.

CLINTON'S FAILURE

Over 30 wars are raging around the world today, almost all of them being fought with imported weapons. Given its market dominance, it isn't surprising that U.S. weaponry is finding its way into combat in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Kashmir and Somalia to name a few.

Lacking the courage to take on weapons corporations and the Pentagon, and the vision to devise new security paradigms. the Clinton administration has failed to seize the opportunity afforded by the end of the Cold War. Rather than seeking to reduce reliance on force-and building up reliance on the rule of law-the White House has ensured not only much more warfare to come but also killing and destruction at much greater levels.

The long-awaited official policy makes plain that any change in U.S. arms export policy must come from the bottom up. No progress will be made on the issue of limiting the global arms trade without significant grassroots pressure.

UN REGISTER OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS

On September 1,1994, the United Nations released its second annual Register of Conventional Arms, containing data on seven categories of arms imports and exports during 1993. The Register was established in 1991, in response to the Iraq war, to help identify "excessive arms build-ups."

Eighty-one UN members submitted information for the 1994 report.

The report demonstrated the U.S. dominance in the arms market in terms of actual equipment deliveries. In 1993 the U.S. delivered nearly 2,400 tanks, 832 armored combat vehicles, nearly 300 artillery pieces and 100 aircraft, 75 attack helicopters, and 2,900 missiles and missile launchers. The U.S. exported ten times as many tanks as Germany, the second largest overall exporter. Russia delivered 120 tanks, 350 armored vehicles, 14 artillery pieces, 33 combat aircraft, one submarine and no missiles.

Turkey and Greece-which have had very tense relations of late were the leading importers, with most of their equipment coming from the U.S. or other NATO nations.