Published by the Federation of American Scientists Fund No. 40 (May 1999)

ARMS SALES MONITOR

Highlighting U.S. government policies on arms exports and conventional weapons proliferation.

Ten Ideas for the 106th Congress

 

Listed below are ten straightforward ways the 106th Congress could reduce subsidies, improve transparency, and strengthen accountability on U.S. arms transfers and military assistance. These steps would also help strengthen the U.S. government’s position as it engages other countries to undertake similar reforms.

  Eliminate the Defense Export Loan Guarantee Program. The Defense Export Loan Guarantee Program (DELG) was established in 1996 to provide $15 billion worth of guaranteed loans to qualifying countries for the purchase of U.S. military wares, theoretically at no net cost to the U.S. government. A December 1998 General Accounting Office (GAO) report outlined several problems with this little-used, money-losing program, but the Pentagon insists on keeping it functioning. High fees designed to cover administration costs and the risk of loan defaults have discouraged countries from signing up. With only one customer since its inception, the DELG has not received enough in fees to cover its costs. The defense industry’s solution to the financial problems is to lower the fees, passing the costs on to taxpayers. Yet with over $10 billion of foreign military debts forgiven since 1990 and $14 billion currently owed, the U.S. risks losing even more money through this approach. The best solution is to shut it down.

 ‚ Prohibit offsets on exports financed in whole or in part by U.S. military aid. American arms manufacturers use "offsets" to beat out foreign competitors for export sales. (Offsets are side deals in which U.S. companies agree to return economic benefits to the purchasing country, usually in the form of co-production or marketing assistance for the importing state’s goods.) Congress appropriates $3-4 billion in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) grants annually, nearly all of which must be used to purchase American-made arms, meaning there is no foreign competition to beat out. Yet recipients of this U.S. military aid still demand and receive offsets on these sales. Permitting offsets on sales financed with taxpayer funds is grossly unfair to the general public, which already pays for weapons development costs and the purchase of the weapons by foreign states. Furthermore, offset co-production agreements hurt American defense workers by sending all or part of the manufacturing work overseas.

 ƒ Repay taxpayers for public funds expended to research and develop weapons which are exported abroad and consolidate responsibility for collecting those funds. U.S. weapons makers benefit from federally funded research and development of their products for the Pentagon’s use. Congress should require fees on all export sales of major military equipment to recover some of these costs, which also subsidize the price of exported arms. Not doing so robs the Treasury of hundreds of millions of dollars per year and constitutes a major form of hidden aid to foreign militaries and U.S. defense contractors. Currently, such fees are required only on FMS sales and are often waived. Yet even this modest attempt at paying back taxpayers is failing. A 1998 GAO investigation found $183 million in outstanding FMS fees because the various military agencies failed to follow proper procedures. Those responsibilities should be transferred to a single agency to ensure that all fees are collected.

Amend Section 655 of the Foreign Assistance Act to include data on commercial sales deliveries and place the "655 Report" on-line. The "655" annual report on arms exports includes delivery data on government-to-government sales, but provides only export licensing information on direct commercial sales (DCS). Without information on which goods were actually shipped, Congress and the public have no reliable information on total U.S. arms exports. In addition, for complete transparency on U.S. arms transfers, the entire "655 Report" should be put on a government web site. An electronic version would cut down on the paper and time used to provide the report to the concerned public.

 … Amend Sections 36(a) and (b) of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) and Section 655 of the Foreign Assistance Act to require notification and reporting on offsets. Little information is available about U.S. arms exporters’ offset agreements with foreign customers (see idea #2). Such deals reduce, directly or indirectly, the economic return of U.S. arms exports. Descriptions and values of offset deals should therefore be made public at the time Congress is notified of seemingly lucrative sales. They should also be published in the year-end "655 Report" which tallies U.S. arms exports. Greater transparency on offsets will help belie the myth that arms exports are always good for American workers.

† Hold hearings on arms export licensing, end-use monitoring programs, and conventional weapons proliferation. Congress regularly holds hearings on the threats posed by nuclear weapons and the export of information technology, but has not examined the threat of conventional weapons proliferation since 1994. Meanwhile, the U.S. has been exporting arms of ever-increasing lethality, many into regions of tension and conflict. Since 1994 the U.S. has agreed to export more than $36 billion worth of government-to-government arms sales and has issued an estimated $95 worth of export licenses for conventional weaponry. An increase in Congress’ oversight role could also contribute valuable information to current efforts to reform military sales programs and revamp the Export Administration Act. See related articles, pages 3-4.

 ‡ Amend Sections 36(b) and (c) of the AECA to require congressional notification of all small arms and light weapons exports. Under present law, Congress is notified of all arms exports worth over $14 million for "major defense equipment" and over $50 million for all other conventional weapons. Small arms and light weapons—the leading killers in today’s conflicts—usually fall under these thresholds, denying Members of Congress the opportunity to oversee this category of exports. Congress should therefore receive notification of all proposed small arms, light weapons, ammunition, and explosives transfers, regardless of value. While lowering the notification threshold for all arms might overwhelm Congress with large numbers of spare parts notifications, requiring notification of small arms and light weapons would place reasonable and much needed oversight on these transfers.

 ˆ Amend Sections 502(b) and 581 of the Foreign Assistance Act to include military training programs not primarily designed to train foreign soldiers. Military training programs for which the official primary purpose is not foreign training—such as the Joint Combined Exercises and Training (JCET) program—often escape the restrictions and oversight placed on traditional foreign military programs. But such programs usually include training for foreign soldiers in lethal combat skills, and some foreign soldiers trained in these programs have been implicated in serious human rights violations. Amending these sections of the FAA would subject such programs to the same human rights criteria and reporting requirements as other foreign military training programs.

 ‰ Standardize U.S. arms export systems. The United States is the only arms exporter with two separate channels for selling weapons abroad—the Pentagon’s Foreign Military Sales (FMS) or government-to-government program and the State Department’s Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) licensing system. Reconciling the DCS program with FMS reporting procedures, degree of oversight and attention, and funding mechanisms would create uniform arms export policies and stricter scrutiny of all U.S. arms exports. Reductions in bureaucracy and redundancy would save taxpayers’ money. See related articles, pages 3-4.

 Š Ratify the OAS Convention against Illicit Manufacturing and Trafficking of Small Arms. The OAS Convention, signed by the U.S. government in November 1997, is a crucial first step towards stemming the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in the Americas. Hundreds of thousands of guns, rifles, and light artillery, most left over from the Central American wars of the 1980s, re-circulate through the hemisphere on the black market, fueling the drug trade and political and economic instability. The Convention will impose stringent, uniform standards on weapons marking (at manufacture, import, and export), export controls, and import and export licenses.

 

For more information on these ten initiatives, contact our office or see http://www.fas.org/asmp/topten106.html.

 

Hague Appeal for Peace

From May 11-15, over 7,000 people from around the world came together in The Hague to promote an agenda of peace and justice. Nobel peace laureates Desmond Tutu, José Ramos-Horta, and Jody Williams joined other experts and leaders to speak on the themes of conflict prevention and resolution, disarmament and human security, international humanitarian and human rights law, and the root causes of war.

On May 11th, the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA) was officially launched in The Hague. IANSA will facilitate the collaboration of activists and non-governmental organizations working against the proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons. For more information, see IANSA’s website: http://www.iansa.org.

 

Foreign Military Sales Reform

DoD Cozies Up Closer to Industry

In the last year, the Pentagon’s Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program has come under heavy criticism from the defense industry and press for excessive bureaucracy, high cost, slow processing, and financial mismanagement. Traditionally, FMS have accounted for the majority of U.S. arms exports, but customers increasingly prefer the State Department’s Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) program, which is quicker, cheaper, and entails less oversight (of course, FY 98 FMS sales were still a healthy $8.6 billion).

The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), the agency in charge of FMS and military assistance, has responded with an ambitious plan for reform and improved public relations with arms producers and sellers. After conducting extensive consultations with industry representatives, foreign customers, and government bureaucrats, the DSCA has concluded that the American defense industry faces "international competitors who are aggressively supported by their respective governments." The DSCA seems to have committed itself to equally aggressive support, promising to process arms deals faster and more easily. This effort coincides with the Pentagon’s "Defense Reform Initiative," an "ongoing program to apply key lessons from business and industry" to the DoD.

Missing from the reform activity is concern about the risk of making the U.S. arms sales process too "user-friendly." Catering to weapons sellers and purchasers risks interfering with the DoDs’ critical evaluation of which sales threaten national security.

From its rhetoric, the DSCA’s certainly sounds more eager to facilitate arms sales than to worry about restraint. For instance, a white paper on "process transparency" discusses the need for foreign governments and industry to have more insight into the FMS process but never mentions a corresponding obligation to make the arms sales process more transparent to the public. Furthermore, the DSCA’s "Strategic Plan" identifies the U.S. government, foreign customers, and the arms industry all as "stakeholders" in the reform process— but not the U.S. taxpayers, who subsidize arms sales, or the world public, which is threatened by weapons proliferation.

The DSCA Strategic Plan is online at: http://www.dsca.osd.mil/StratPlan/stratmain.htm.

 

Arms Sales on the Internet!

As if Amazon.com wasn’t good enough, soon it may be possible to browse major weapons systems online.

One aspect of the Pentagon’s Defense Reform Initiative is the DoD Electronic Mall, an "Internet based system providing ‘one stop shopping’ for the DoD warfighter to quickly and easily locate and order items from commercial electronic catalogs." Hoping to provide the best in modern customer service to its foreign arms sales customers as well, the DoD is planning a "pilot program for integrating Foreign Military Sales into the E-Mall" for June 1999.

 

You can celebrate all of this at the official U.S. "Defense Security Cooperation Reform Day" hosted by DSCA at the Alexandria, VA Hilton on June 10, 1999. It costs $120 for the general public; but there are discounts for industry representatives, and government employees get in free!

–Anna Rich

U.S. Export Control Reform

Export Administration Act

The Export Administration Act (EAA), the law governing exports under Commerce Department jurisdiction—including "dual-use" goods which have both military and civilian uses—expired in 1994. Since then, export controls have been extended every six months by presidential emergency orders. Efforts are made regularly to rewrite the EAA, but each time they get bogged down by controversy. Sen. Enzi (R-WY), chair of the Senate Banking Committee’s Subcommittee on International Trade and Finance, plans to introduce this year’s version of the EAA, but there is no reason to think that it will fare better in 1999.

Export administration has, however, become a politically charged issue. Last year, to industry’s dismay, Congress transferred licensing authority for communications satellites from Commerce to the more restrictive State Department Munitions List because of concerns about satellite sales to China. Recent allegations that China acquired sensitive U.S. technologies further fueled Congressional anger at the administration and concern about export control.

In recent Congressional hearings, government and industry representatives all called for major reform of export controls and the EAA. From the administration’s perspective, operating under emergency orders threatens the Commerce’s export authority and creates extra work. Outdated EAA rules, like restrictions on high-performance computers, force the agency to "devote time and scarce resources to controlling a ubiquitous technology."

Industry lobbyists voiced similar concerns about excessive bureaucracy and restrictions, threatening that "if we do not revamp the export control system, we will weaken the very industries that produce the technology on which U.S. security depends." Manufacturers also decry what they think is a U.S. tendency to adopt "unilateral" sanctions and export controls. But industry lobbyists criticize as ineffective the administration’s existing attempts at multilateral export control, the 33-nation Waasenaar Arrangement. This mechanism is supposed to establish common controls for conventional weapons and dual-use items among arms exporters but has trouble making decisions.

 

Arms Export Licensing

Meanwhile, the State Department’s Office of Defense Trade Controls (ODTC), which grants export licenses for items on the U.S. Munitions List, is facing its own problems. With only about 20 licensing officers processing 45,000 licenses each year, ODTC is awash in paper, making it difficult to get licenses out quickly enough to satisfy industry and thoroughly enough to satisfy arms control advocates. Last fall, Congress granted ODTC more money, but the agency has not yet seen the money or hired any additional staff. The Aerospace Industries Association, a leading defense lobby group, put "modernization of the export control system" at the top of its list of priorities for 1999. (See #9 on the ASM top ten list).

 

ASMP Recommendations

A revised EAA should:

 Other export control suggestions:

 

Rules and Regulations

The U.S. Government has taken the first steps to bring U.S. small arms export policy in line with the model regulations of the Organization of American States’ "Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and other Related Materials." New controls on exports of firearms were published in the April 12 and 13 Federal Registers and affect the Commerce Control List and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations.

Part of the new OAS regulations repealed the "Canadian exemptions," loopholes that for decades allowed U.S. arms manufacturers to send weapons to Canada without going through normal licensing procedures. Official investigations found that U.S. weapons sent to Canada were often re-transferred to countries barred from receiving U.S. arms, such as Iran. The new rules also require OAS member countries to produce an import certificate to purchase U.S. firearms (in addition to U.S. export licensing requirements). The Senate has yet to ratify the OAS treaty.

The Bureau of Export Administration has also revised the Commerce Control List to implement requirements of the Wassenaar Arrangement, the association of key arms exporters charged with cooperating to prevent conventional weapons proliferation. The new regulations, published January 15 and revised March 5 in the Federal Register, adopt the Wassenaar Arrangement’s list of "dual-use" items (exports with military and commercial uses) and requirement that participating states notify each other when licenses are denied or approved. –Anna Rich

 

FY 1998 U.S. Arms Transfers

 The United States sent or agreed to send arms to 154 countries during fiscal year 1998 (countries which received less than $1,000 worth of weapons in all categories were not included in the list below). For information about specific items sold, please see the ASMP website or contact our office.

 Foreign Military Sales (FMS) "agreements" represent Pentagon negotiated government-to-government arms sales and include military construction. FMS "deliveries" indicate the amount of weapons actually shipped during that year and include surplus U.S. weaponry given away or sold at substantially reduced price. Direct commercials sales (DCS) are negotiated between the industry and recipient country; the State Department issues export licenses prior to all such sales. These figures for DCS deliveries are estimated by the State Department based on the value of licenses issued; they likely significantly undercount actual DCS deliveries (see ASM 39 for more information about estimating DCS sales). Data on FY98 DCS licenses authorized should be available in mid-June.

 

All amounts represent dollars in thousands

Country

FMS

Agreements

FMS

Deliveries

DCS

Deliveries

 

 

 

 

Africa

 

 

 

Benin

1,552

10

 

Botswana

599

578

852

Burundi

 

3

 

Cameroon

 

329

101

Cape Verde

 

117

>.5

Chad

100

443

>.5

Cote d’Ivoire

 

342

7

Djibouti

 

366

 

Eritrea

916

349

91

Ethiopia

10,159

569

 

Ghana

1,200

18

338

Guinea

338

336

 

Guinea-Bissau

 

184

 

Kenya

591

3,944

100

Lesotho

 

20

 

Madagascar

 

10

 

Malawi

569

125

 

Mali

672

54

 

Mauritius

 

5

10

Mozambique

 

22

 

Namibia

375

464

64

Rwanda

60

2

 

Sao Tome & Principe

190

   

Senegal

 

4,005

23

Seychelles

 

58

 

Sierra Leone

 

15

 

South Africa

 

421

4,723

Tanzania

24

 

1

Uganda

618

451

1,002

Zambia

 

2

82

Zimbabwe

 

145

50

Sub-total

17,963

13,387

7,444

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

FMS Agreements

FMS

Deliveries

DCS

Deliveries

West Hemisphere

 

 

 

Antigua & Barbuda

2

341

1

Antilles

 

 

256

Argentina

5,093

7,298

25,626

Bahamas

60

47

 

Barbados

7,642

514

14

Belize

18

67

152

Bermuda

 

 

114

Bolivia

454

 

384

Bolivia (counternarc.)

1,120

7,035

 

Brazil

24,618

43,560

22,584

Canada

96,760

118,890

112,301

Chile

1,371

2,110

5,737

Colombia

8,653

 

5,217

Colombia (counternarc.)

2,034

8,748

 

Costa Rica

 

138

327

Dominica

 

307

1

Dominican Republic

116

324

1,003

Ecuador

3,548

1,761

2,040

Ecuador (counternarc.)

76

345

 

El Salvador

7,723

7,016

1,631

Grenada

 

497

7

Guyana

 

3

29

Haiti

531

606

22

Honduras

3,315

4,659

878

Jamaica

217

591

77

Martinique

 

 

6

Mexico

1,313

2,722

21,321

Nicaragua

 

 

9

Panama

 

16

1,553

Paraguay

116

193

45

Peru

4,220

1,013

2,479

Peru (counternarc.)

472

928

 

St. Kitts & Nevis

 

216

89

St. Lucia

 

234

9

 

 

FMS

Agreements

FMS

Deliveries

DCS

Deliveries

St. Vincent & Grenadines

 

289

>.5

Suriname

 

 

34

Trinidad & Tobago

303

388

136

Uruguay

462

902

1,765

Venezuela

5,968

30,853

54,569

Sub-total

176,205

242,611

260416

 

 

 

 

East Asia & Pacific

 

 

 

Australia

216,233

343,623

238,304

Brunei

 

47

4,906

Cambodia

1,516

878

1

China*

 

 

750,000

Fiji

 

 

2

Hong Kong

   

611

Indonesia

283

5,212

10,694

Japan

348,039

419,892

86,024

Korea, Republic of

266,929

955,848

242,398

Laos

435

732

 

Malaysia

970

72,581

29,161

New Zealand

13,830

10,879

35,772

Philippines

3,425

41,832

37,064

Singapore

150,343

236,109

17,408

Solomon Is.

 

 

78

Taiwan

440,921

1,489,671

200,000

Thailand

43,659

151,626

412,252

Tonga

 

23

 

Sub-total

1,486,583

3,728,953

2,064,675

 

 

 

 

Europe & NIS

 

 

 

Albania

 

586

1

Andorra

 

 

7

Austria

1,603

22,209

4,992

Belgium

20,580

193,849

30,683

Bosnia-Herzegovina

168

5

17,667

Bulgaria

3,523

79

408

Croatia

 

 

1,591

Cyprus

 

 

2

Czech Rep.

5,886

2,404

65,175

Denmark

10,476

159,079

18,737

Estonia

5,243

580

252

Finland

1,820

165,581

141,621

France

20,621

44,899

71,607

Georgia

1,499

 

95

Germany

258,718

1,440

200,644

Gibralter

 

 

1

Greece

531,357

414,397

47,608

Hungary

5,648

2,090

1,956

Iceland

 

1

5,544

Ireland

 

 

3,341

Italy

94,816

43,061

86,024

Kazakhstan

1,746

 

367

 *All licenses for China indicate commercial satellite exports.

 

 

FMS Agreements

FMS

Deliveries

DCS

Deliveries

Latvia

4,696

1,140

253

Lithuania

4,081

740

315

Luxembourg

742

1,808

5,703

Macedonia (FYR)

10,516

1,940

 

Moldova

781

3

4

Monaco

 

 

2

Netherlands

193,582

346,729

104,946

Norway

79,945

129,115

42,969

Poland

9,615

2,027

5,589

Portugal

18,049

22,579

7,361

Romania

4,883

1,887

91,470

Russia

 

 

16,204

Slovakia

5,039

1,118

1,636

Slovenia

5,735

174

2,706

Spain

67,256

135,505

87,303

Sweden

2,388

8,652

95,956

Switzerland

8,925

106,897

75,386

Turkey

240,518

541,204

201,000

Ukraine

1,133

35

14

United Kingdom

96,175

109,945

869,045

Uzbekistan

1,579

 

1

Sub-total

1,719,338

2,461,758

2,306,186

 

 

 

 

Near East/

South Asia

 

 

 

Algeria

 

 

32,304

Bahrain

286,253

62,831

6,755

Bangladesh

31,708

1,055

886

Bhutan

 

 

10

Egypt

1,026,540

611,796

33,972

India

5

48

 

Israel

628,399

1,617,819

21,819

Jordan

16,689

48,587

4,847

Kuwait

92,357

324,858

29,081

Lebanon

7,865

8,054

175

Morocco

2,114

7,300

6,826

Nepal

 

 

422

Oman

1,972

5,970

849

Pakistan

37

68,879

 

Qatar

 

633

2,098

Saudi Arabia

2,340,532

4,307,585

20,137

Sri Lanka

3

98

1,410

Tunisia

2,282

5,623

35,937

United Arab Emirates

69,822

27,112

4,345

Sub-total

4,506,578

7,098,248

201,873

 

 

 

 

Classified

629,950

 

10,000

International Orgs.

35,300

100,677

28,836

 

 

 

 

Total

8,571,917

13,904,213

4,879,430

Sources: FMS deliveries, 655 Report (Defense Dept.); FMS and DCS deliveries, Congressional Presentation documentation (State Dept.).

 

FY 1998 Joint Combined Exchange Training

The National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal years 1992 and 1993 allows U.S. special operations forces (SOF) to train under the Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) program in foreign countries. Such training includes instructing host government militaries in lethal and non-lethal skills. Controversy has erupted over JCET missions in countries where the militaries are suspected or known to have committed human rights abuses, such as Indonesia; U.S. law currently does not prohibit JCET training in nations where human rights violations have been reported.

 During FY 1998, a total of 168 Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) events in 84 countries were conducted. Total DoD expenses to support these missions were $12.4 million.

 

JCET Report (costs and expenses in thousands of dollars)

Theaters

U.S.

personnel

Host nation personnel

No. of training events

U.S.

expenses

Host nation incremental costs

Host nation support costs

Total

expenses

Centcom

199

623

13

954

0

0

954

Eucom

1,712

10,264

70

3,512

61

16

3,589

Pacom

1,143

2,653

34

2,732

339

93

3,164

Southcom

642

2,713

51

3,092

816

755

4,663

Total

3,696

16,253

168

10,290

1,216

864

12,370

 

Countries By Unified Command

Centcom: Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Jordan, Kenya, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar.

 Eucom: Austria, Botswana, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Cote D’Ivoire, Czech Republic, Denmark, Equatorial Guinea, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Guinea Bissau, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Rwanda, Spain, Swaziland, Switzerland, Tanzania, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Kingdom, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Pacom: Australia, Bangladesh, Fiji, Indonesia, Korea, Republic, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritius, Mongolia, Nepal, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Tonga, Vanuatu.

 Southcom: Argentina, Bahamas, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guyana, Honduras, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad, Uruguay, Venezuela.

 

Selected JCET Activities by Country FY1998

Country

Purpose

Cost

Argentina

Human rights, airborne ops, marksmanship, demolition, medical, survival, operational planning, field training exercise

$56,000

Light infantry tactics

$86,000

Bangladesh

Small unit tactics

$59,300

Belize

N/A

N/A

Bolivia

Foreign Internal Defense, airborne ops, air infiltration/exfiltration, resupply airdrops

$23,000

" "

$123,000

Foreign internal defense, sortie generation, safety assessment, air ops assessment, aircrew training, maintenance training

$50,000

Patrolling, battle drills, searches, medical, mine awareness, convoy ops, check points, marksmanship

$45,000

Botswana

N/A

N/A

Bulgaria

Foreign internal defense, maritime ops, small boat ops, navigation, beach recon

$6,000

Cameroon

Light infantry, immediate action drills, first aid, marksmanship, patrolling, movement techniques, reconnaissance

$39,400

Chile

Light infantry tactics

$79,000

 

Close quarters battle, room/building clearing, pistol/rifle marksmanship, team assault skills, command and control techniques, medical skills training, breaching techniques, language training

$127,000

Djibouti

Foreign internal defense, first aid, marksmanship, small unit tactics, survival training, patrolling, immediate action drills

$174,000

Small unit tactics, squad and platoon tactics

$91,000

El

Salvador

Patrolling, reconnaissance training, raid/ambush, human rights training, operational planning, marine maintenance course, small boat ops, helicopter water infiltration, airborne ops

$40,000

Light infantry tactics

$74,000

Close quarters battle, room/building clearing, pistol/rifle marksmanship, team assault skills, command and control techniques, medical skills training, breaching techniques, language skills

$79,000

Maritime ops

N/A

Equatorial Guinea

Peacekeeping, leadership, operations orders, small unit leadership training, land navigation, weapons school, movement techniques, leadership development skills

$70,000

Eritrea

Small unit tactics, concealment, advanced rifle marksmanship

$104,000

FYRO Macedonia

Small unit training, marksmanship, squad size patrol recon, ambush drills, raid, special ops plan, tactical decision making process, deliberate planning process, operations orders, warning orders

$117,000

Greece

Foreign internal defense, air ops, personnel and equipment airdrops, nvg low level, air intercepts, nvg takeoffs/landings, inflight refueling, coastal threat penetration

$36,000

""

$6,000

Indonesia

Combat sapper-demolitions safety, firing systems, calculations/placement, expedient demolitions, engineer reconnaissance, construct defense ops, mine warfare, obstacle breaching, field training exercise

$93,000

Mountain infantry training

$79,200

Foreign internal defense, ground/air communications, helicopter landing zone surveys, outdoor survival training, movement to contact, ambush, raids, fire support planning, area/zone recon

$14,000

Air ops, weapons fire, marine ops,

$65,000

Combat sapper operation

$52,000

Kenya

Democracy seminar, command and control, mission of the military, law of warfare, military discipline and justice, civil-military relationship

$52,000

Infiltration

$16,100

Korea

Foreign internal defense, helicopter infil/exfil, fast rope, day/night fly-away, rescue/security team, static line airdrops,

$5,000

Foreign internal defense, helicopter shipborne ops, water infil/exfil, helicopter air refueling

$4,000

Latvia

Foreign internal defense, nvg low level, personnel and equipment airdrop, self contained approaches, nvg landings/takeoffs, assault landings

$56,000

Lithuania

Defensive military ops in enemy held areas, building fighting positions, crew served weapons, small unit ops, patrolling, mission planning, op orders, command and control, leadership training

$46,000

Foreign internal defense, maritime ops, patrolling, navigation, recon

$8,000

Infantry tactics, weapons training, marksmanship, patrolling

$49,000

Malawi

Light infantry, immediate action drills, first aid, marksmanship, patrolling, movement techniques, warning orders, recon

$56,000

Maldives

Foreign internal defense, small unit tactics, patrolling, immediate action drills, marksmanship, demolition

$44,000

Small unit tactics, marksmanship, demolitions

$10,500

Morocco

Foreign internal defense, equipment airdrops, air intercepts, assault landing, inflight refueling, self contained approaches

$22,000

Mozambique

Peacekeeping, leadership, operations orders, small unit leadership, land navigation, weapons school, movement techniques, leadership development

$51,100

Nepal

Medical training

$60,900

Oman

Foreign internal defense, unconventional warfare, perpendicular survey, parallel survey, chart making

$67,000

Foreign internal defense, long distant transport, small graft operations, launch & recovery, underway weapons firing

$58,000

Papua New Guinea

Small unit tactics, ambush, raids, fire support planning, area/zone recon

$74,400

Paraguay

Airborne ops, medical training, patrolling, marksmanship, grenade training, airmobile training, hide site construction

$88,000

Poland

Foreign internal defense, maritime operations underway, patrolling/navigation, recon, marksmanship, medical training

$19,000

Scout swimming, marine ops, maritime navigation, beach reconnaissance, small boat ops, language immersion training

$36,800

Qatar

Small unit tactics, ambush/raid

$78,100

Romania

Unconventional warfare, winter operations, survival, movement techniques, small unit tactics

$7,000

Rwanda

Peacekeeping, leadership, establish/operate lodgements, convoy escort, route security, secure an area of operations, maintain a zone of separation, monitor borders, manage civilian movement

$77,900

Sri Lanka

Foreign internal defense, sortie generation, safety assessment, air ops assessment, aircrew training, maintenance training

$0

Foreign internal defense, maritime ops

$155,000

Foreign internal defense, small arms tactics, movement techniques, immediate action drills, raids/ambush, warning/opord, combat first aid, leaders recon, marine ops, medical operations

$213,000

Swaziland

Infantry, medical,

$82,300

Thailand

Foreign internal defense, inflight refueling, halo airdrops, static line drops, leaflet drops, high speed bundle drops, fighter intercept training

$211,000

Marine ops

$143,000

Foreign internal defense, inflight refueling, halo airdrops, static line drops, bundle drops,

$211,000

Tonga

Small unit tactics

$87,300

Trinidad-Tobago

Light infantry tactics

$114,000

Foreign internal defense, marksmanship, communication, mission planning, human rights, water survival, medical, patrolling, boat handling, board and search, prisoner handling

$24,000

Uruguay

Close quarters battle, room/building clearing, pistol/rifle marksmanship, team assault skills, command and control techniques, medical skills training, breaching techniques, language training

$48,000

Uzbekistan

Mountain operations

$0

Vanuatu

Small uniot leadership, patrolling, mission planning

$6,100

Venezuela

Marksmanship, close quarters combat, medical, breaching, command & control, linear targets, building climbing, sniper training, integrated assaults, human rights

$14,000

 

U.S. Foreign Military Training

Training Transparency?

Section 581 of the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act of 1999 requires a joint State-Defense Department report on all military training provided to foreign military personnel under programs administered by both Departments during fiscal years 1998 and 1999. The administration is required to provide the foreign policy justification and goal of each training program, its cost, the number of foreign students trained and their units of operations, and the location of the training. In addition, this report was to include the operational benefits U.S. forces receive from each training activity and the U.S. military units involved.

The Section 581 Report issued in March fulfills the letter but not the spirit of the new law. Though training programs are identified, only the bare minimum of information is presented, and the justification for these programs is not elaborated upon.

Yet close examination of the 581 Report reveals some troubling trends in foreign military training. For example, one finds inconsistencies between program descriptions and the types of units assigned to perform the training. According to the report, a number of countries are scheduled to receive training in humanitarian demining in 1999. This program uses a "train-the-trainer" approach, which trains local personnel in a three-step strategy of technical assessment, specific site surveys, and ordnance removal.

The description of demining programs, however, lists the participation of Civil Affairs and PSYOPS (Psychological operations) units in addition to standard demining units. One of the objectives of PSYOPS is to influence the thoughts, emotions, and motives of foreign governments, organizations, groups, or individuals. These units achieved notoriety in past conflicts for their "effective" use of psychological manipulation techniques while assisting host nations to defeat insurgencies. Whether the U.S. is teaching these techniques or employing them, they don't seem at all relevant to demining activities, which leads to the inevitable question: what are they doing there?

– Keith Tidball

 

U.S. Training: Impact on Chiapas

(Reflections on an ASMP trip to Chiapas, March 1999)

The new annual "581 Report" on State and Defense Department training programs details the millions of dollars spent to educate foreign soldiers in U.S. military strategies and combat techniques. It does not, however, describe how such training is applied once the students return home. Mexico provides a damning example of the negative impact such training can have on human rights and the resolution of internal conflicts in recipient states.

After the 1994 Zapatista rebellion in Chiapas—Mexico’s poorest and mostly indigenous-populated state—a series of negotiations took place between Mexican officials and EZLN (the Spanish acronym for the Zapatista army) representatives, with the Catholic church acting as mediator. After several rounds of talks, both sides signed the San Andrés accords on indigenous rights and autonomy. In early 1995, the Mexican Congress duly authored implementing legislation, including language to amend the constitution to recognize indigenous rights. But President Zedillo of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) rejected the text, offering another version that differed in critical ways from the San Andrés accords. This attempt to unilaterally alter the provisions of the accord was not accepted by the EZLN.

Understanding that they could not win a political battle against the widely popular Zapatista movement, the Mexican government decided instead to seek a military victory. It stationed about one-third of its military forces in Chiapas to systematically harass and intimidate the indigenous peasant population. The pretext for the military presence was the worsening of inter-communal conflicts, which are themselves the product of Mexican strategy. The Mexican military created, armed, and trained paramilitary groups aligned with the ruling PRI party, militarizing existing tensions and exacerbating disputes by—for example—giving both sides unique rights to the same land or natural resources.

Mexico’s shift in strategy paralleled a significant rise in participation in U.S. military training courses. The number of Mexican soldiers trained at the infamous School of the Americas (SOA) more than doubled from 1996 to 1997, to 305 students, or a third of all those enrolled in the SOA. Mexicans also made up about one third of the student body at the Inter-American Air Forces Academy in 1997. Counter-narcotics training also shot up in 1997 and 1998, with $13 million budgeted for training of Mexican soldiers (around 2,500 students) in 1998. Yet as Representative Blunt (R-MO) pointed out in a House hearing on the Chiapas conflict last July, "… [U.S.] training [to Mexico] is focused on counter-narcotics, though clearly that training is transferable. If you are trained, you are trained."

According to human rights workers in Chiapas, high level Mexican officials were instructed in the strategy of "low-intensity warfare," a title which belies the physical and emotional damage to its victims. The Mexican government adapted U.S. training guidelines to the situation in Chiapas and labeled the tactic: "irregular warfare," a term which reflects the departure from Mexican law. Mid-level officers were taught the techniques of this counter-insurgency strategy, including the creation of paramilitary groups and other forms of psychological warfare.

Since 1995, peace negotiations have remained at a standstill while violence has increased in Chiapas. Paramilitary troops trained and armed by the Mexican military have intimidated, threatened, and killed villagers not aligned with the ruling PRI. The government’s tacit support for this approach along with impunity for their violent tactics culminated in a massacre of 45 unarmed men, women, and children in Acteal in December 1997. This long and brutal massacre took place over several hours while police stationed within earshot did not intervene. Paramilitary groups in the region continue to threaten the survivors and prevent them from harvesting their crops, despite the augmented presence of military in the area.

In sharp contrast to this violent approach, the Zapatistas have chosen to build civil society support for their cause. In March 1999, 5,000 Zapatista delegates conducted a national survey on the peace process. Over one million Mexicans responded overwhelmingly in favor of the San AndrJ s accords. However, the results of this democratic process carry no weight with the Mexican government.

–Tamar Gabelnick

 Middle East Arms Proliferation

Cohen's "Door–to–Door" Sales

In March 1999, Defense Secretary William Cohen turned into a door-to-door salesman, marketing defense equipment to nine Middle East countries "in the interest of promoting security and stability in the region." This trip resulted in the negotiation of a number of arms deals, detailed at right. However, as described in an earlier edition of the Arms Sales Monitor (see ASM No. 38), large infusions of arms into the Middle East may in fact destabilize the region by accelerating the high-pitched arms race and increasing mutual distrust.

Secretary Cohen explained in a press briefing in Egypt that not only was the U.S. eager to sell arms in the region, he had to comply with the requests of friendly Middle Eastern governments because otherwise they "would take it as an insult" and seek another supplier. Meanwhile, some in the Arab media accused Cohen of "exploiting the issue of the so-called Iraq-Iran danger" in order to sell more arms in the Gulf. –Keith Tidball

  

The "Doors"

The "Deals"

Bahrain

27 AIM-120B (AMRAAM) @ $386, 000 ea.

Egypt

24 F-16 aircraft approx. $1.2 billion

200 M1A1 tanks

Patriot 3 surface-to-air missiles

Total package: approx. $3.2 billion

Israel

50 F-16 C/D approx. $2.0 billion

Anti-missile project discussed

Jordan

Early warning systems discussed

Mobile units for border security

Kuwait

Early warning systems

Oman

Early warning systems

Saudi Arabia

AIM-120B (AMRAAM) undisclosed number

United Arab Emirates

AMRAAM/F-16 package previously negotiated

Qatar

Early warning systems

Communications equipment

Armor pre-position facility

Naval port facility

Note: These deals were negotiated but have not yet been finalized.

 

 Legislative Update

The Good...

 

the Bad...

 

...and the Scary

All this despite the apt warning of Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Susan Shirk, who said in her April 14 testimony: "Neither the P.R.C. nor Taiwan would be served by over-emphasis on military hardware [...] In this age of highly sophisticated weaponry, I think we are all sometimes prone to equate security with military capability. But a durable peace will rest less on arms than success in addressing differences through dialogue on a mutually acceptable basis."

 

Recent Government Documents

100 Companies Receiving the Largest Dollar Volume of Prime Contract Awards "(Top 100)," Defense Department annual report, http://web1.whs.osd.mil/diorhome.htm.

 1999 Report on Foreign Policy Export Controls, U.S. Commerce Department, Bureau of Export Administration, March 30, 1999. http://www.bxa.doc.gov/PRESS/99/Repts/ForeignPolicyTOC.html.

 The Anti-Drug Effort in the Americas and the Implementation of the Western Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act, House International Relations Committee (HIRC) Subcomm. on the Western Hemisphere hearing, March 3, 1999.

 Annual Report on Military Expenditures, 1998, State Depart., Feb. 19, 1999. http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/98_amiextoc.html.

 Colombia: the Problem of Illegal Narcotics and U.S.-Colombian Relations, Nina M. Serafino, CRS, updated March 1, 1999.

 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1998, State Department, February 26, 1999. http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/1998_hrp_report/.

 Drug Certification of Mexico in 1998: Arguments For and Against Congressional Resolutions of Disapproval, K. Larry Storrs, CRS, March 20, 1998.

 Drug Control: Update on U.S.-Mexican Counternarcotics Activities, T-NSIAD-99-98. 13 pp. plus 1 appendices (3 pp.) March 4, 1999, http://www.gao.gov/monthly.list/mar99/mar9917.htm.

 Ex-Im Bank Oversight Hearing, HIRC Subcomm. on International Economic Policy and Trade, October 7, 1998.

 Gun Shows: Brady Checks and Crime Gun Traces, Treasury, Justice, and ATF Departments, January 1999. http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/report.htm.

 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 1998, State Department Feb. 1999. http://www.state.gov/www/global/narcotics_law/1998_narc_report/index.html.

 Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) and Human Rights: Background and Issues for Congress, William C. Story, Jr, CRS, January 26, 1999.

 Mexican Drug Certification Issues: U.S. Congressional Action, 1998-1999, K. Larry Storrs, CRS, updated March 12, 1999.

 Mexico and Drug Certification in 1999: Consequences of Decertification, K. Larry Storrs, CRS, March 4, 1999.

 Sanctions Revisited, HIRC Subcomm. on International Economic Policy and Trade hearing, September 1998.

 Security Assistance Management Manual, Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, December 30, 1998, http://web.deskbook.osd.mil/reflib/MDOD/004dm/001/004dm001doc.htm. Purchase: 937-255-2994.

 Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, CIA, Feb. 9, 1999. http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/bian/bian.html.

 The United States Role in Kosovo, HIRC hearing, March 10, 1999.