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(Issue No. 2 , April 1991)



Arms sales presented to Congress                      

22 March  According to the Washington Post, the Administration
notifies Congress of "plans to sell $919 million in spare parts for
existing weapons and engineering support to Saudi Arabia." Citing
Defense officials, the report says that "no major Saudi weapons
purchases are in the cards at least until late summer pending an
extensive Pentagon review of the post-war military needs of the Arab
Gulf states." Sales of US helicopters to several small Persian Gulf
states are said to be "in the works, and sales of US tanks have been
under discussion." Unnamed officials say Kuwait is going ahead with
its purchase of F/A-18 airplanes planned before the war. 

   The Post also reports that the Administration has notified
Congress it plans to sell Israel another Patriot missile battery for $350
million.    According to
Defense Daily, the Israeli Patriot sale includes one Patriot fire unit,
with eight launch stations, 64 missiles and related equipment, spares,
services and training.  

30 March  The 30-day Congressional notification period for the sale
of 46 F-16 aircraft and associated ordnance to Egypt expires, without
Congress invoking a joint veto resolution.

25 April  According to Defense Daily the Pentagon today notifies
Congress that Turkey is seeking to buy 150 Stinger missiles and 319
reloads for $33 million.  

Speeches, letters, etc.                                  
22 March  Rep. Jim Moody sends a strong letter to Secretary of State
Baker opposing the Administration's proposed change to the ExIm
Bank bylaws which would permit the bank to guarantee loans up to
$1 billion per year for commercial military sales. The letter, signed by
93 other Representatives, reads in part:

   While the stated purpose of this policy change is to finance
   arms sales to NATO countries, the Administration's sug-
   gested legislation leaves open the possibility that the ExIm
   Bank can finance arms sales to any country, even less
   developed countries, if the President determines it is in the
   national interest.

   Before giving such authority, we should remind ourselves
   of the role we, our NATO allies, and our friends in the Third
   World played in arming Saddam Hussein. The policy of our
   government and its agencies should be to gain increased
   control over the proliferation of arms, not to reduce that
   control.

1 April  In an editorial in Defense News, Rep. Richard Gephardt 
describes his findings during a visit to the Mideast in March: "Defense
Minister Moshe Arens and [Prime Minister] Shamir accept[ed] the goal
of limiting or even halting conventional arms transfers to all countries
of the region." He stresses the need for cooperation in working
toward this goal, noting:

   The region's access to weapons has been the key factor
   making all of the other issues so volatile. Thus far, the
   Administration has signaled that it intends to continue arms
   sales to our gulf war allies and to use up to $1 billion of
   Export-Import Bank credits to underwrite such transactions.
   Both of these positions are insensitive to Mideast political
   uncertainties and invite substantial Congressional criticism.

   I hope the President will instead join with the Congress in
   imposing a temporary ban on any American arms transfers
   to the Middle East--a pause to which other principal supplier
   states must be asked to adhere. The vast preponderance of
   weapons received by Middle East countries in the late
   1980s were sold or given by the five permanent members
   of the UN Security Council--the United States, Britain,
   France and China. Once the United States has established
   itself as an example, American sponsorship of a Security
   Council resolution to suspend all shipments of military
   suppliers to the region would be an ideal basis to start
   Administration-Congress cooperation.

4 April  Five influential House Democrats (Fascell, Gephardt, Hamil-
ton, Obey and Gejdenson) send a letter to President Bush, urging him
to declare a unilateral pause in arms sales to countries in the Middle
East and Persian Gulf. The initiative is often misconstrued by other
Congressmen and Senators as "unilateralism," doomed to failure, but
they clearly state: "We believe a temporary pause is necessary in
order to facilitate multilateral negotiations on agreements to restrain
the flow of sophisticated conventional weapons systems and other
weapons technologies into this region." 

6 April  Rep. Anthony Beilenson writes in a letter to the editors of the
Los Angeles Times that instead of a one-year moratorium on arms
sales to the Middle East, as a previously-published op-ed had
suggested, "the United States should lead the way to ending all arms
sales worldwide." "It is," he writes, "dangerously shortsighted not to
apply the lessons of the Gulf War beyond that one region." He
continues: 

     [I]n addition to the $20 billion worth of proposed sales to
     Middle Eastern customers, the US has weapons deals
     pending to dozens of other countries in Africa, Latin America
     and Asia--for a total this year of more than $13 billion in
     arms sales outside the Middle East. In recent years, we have
     sold tens of millions of dollars worth of weapons to such
     impoverished nations as Somalia, Senegal and Niger.

     We need to encourage leaders in developing countries to
     spend their money more productively than on buying
     weapons. Since 1960, the developing world has increased
     its military expenditures more than twice as fast as its living
     standards. Many of the most impoverished countries in the
     world spend more on armaments than they do on education
     and health care for their own people.

     Even the Soviet Union is realizing that arming the world
     damages everyone's long-term interests. Over the past few
     decades the Soviets have engaged in far greater levels of
     arms transfers to Third World nations than has the US or
     anyone else. Yet now, as [the author] correctly points out,
     the Soviets are circulating proposals to achieve supplier-
     instituted controls on the sales of offensive weapons.
                                           
     Real progress toward halting arms sales however, will also
     require the support of Germany, China, France, Great Britain,
     both Koreas, Israel, Brazil and others. We must convince
     these nations that there are better ways to provide gestures
     of friendship and assistance than to supply sophisticated
     tools of destruction. We should ban international arms sales
     and end the escalation of regional arms races.

10 April  Rep. Romano Mazzoli makes a speech on the floor of the
House, entitled "Arms Sales to Promote Peace is an Oxymoron," in
which he offers support for his colleagues' call for a moratorium on
arms sales [see 4 April], and proposes going even further, saying
"what is really needed ... is an absolute total ban on sales of arms of
all types."  
 
17 April  Sen. Joe Biden delivers a speech to the Senate on "China:
Rogue Elephant on Weapons Proliferation." In his speech he outlines
the recent allegations of Chinese involvement in a Third World nuclear
program, as well as recurring claims of Chinese missile sales to the
Middle East [see Clarke testimony on 23 April]. Included in the record
are several of these press reports.   

19 April  Rep. Larry Smith sends a letter to Secretary Baker, protest-
ing the resumption of shipments of military equipment to the Syrian-
backed government in Lebanon. In January the State Department had
directed the completion of a $3.9 million order of non-lethal items
which had previously been paid for and then suspended.  

Notes from some relevant hearings                   

8 April  The International Economic Policy and Trade Subcommittee
of the House Foreign Affairs Committee holds a hearing on US export
policy of dual-use commodities to Iraq between 1980 and 1990.
Under Secretary of Commerce Dennis Kloske and Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense William Rudman appear as witnesses.

   Rudman explains the limitations of past policy: "Following a
1985 Administration directive, the Department of Defense reviewed
a portion of dual-use export license requests to a small number of
non-Communist countries including Iraq. Under the directive, Defense
review conducted by the Defense Technology Security Administration
(DTSA) was limited to an assessment of the risk of diversion to the
Soviet Union or other COCOM-proscribed destinations. In other
words, under the directive the national security impact of potential
military end-use within these countries was not a permitted basis of
denial of a license."

   Kloske's prepared testimony reiterates Rudman's main point,
saying "export license applications for sales to Iraq received the close
attention of a number of agencies. Yet, the basis for denying those
applications was narrowly drawn by law and regulation. Unless a
proposed transaction met one of the standards for its rejection, there
was no basis for not approving it. Under such circumstances, the
Commerce Department approved license applications destined for Iraqi
government, military, and research activities. This was consistent
with our treatment of Iraq as a free world country subject to certain,
well-defined export controls."

   But by early 1990, he says, the existing regulations were
recognized as inadequate with regard to countries of proliferation
concern, thus the Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI) was
developed. The EPCI denotes greatly strengthened export control
authority concerning items of potential use in chemical, biological and
missile programs.

9 April  The House Foreign Affairs Europe and the Middle East
Subcommittee holds a hearing on aid to Israel, Lebanon, Greece,
Turkey and Cyprus. Thomas Dine, Executive Director of the American
Israel PAC testifies on economic and military assistance to Israel;
Walid Maalouf (National Alliance of Lebanese-Americans), Tanya
Rahall (American Task Force for Lebanon) and Monsignor Robert Stern
(Catholic Near East Welfare Association) provide testimony concern-
ing aid to Lebanon; Andrew Namatos (Namatos & Namatos) and Dean
Lomis (Chairman, American Hellenic Institute PAC) testify on Greece;
and Major General Elmer Pendleton (USA, ret.) of International
Advisers Inc. testifies on behalf of Turkey.

   Concerning arms sales to the region, Dine says:

   While the military defeat of Iraq has removed a tremendous
   threat from the region and should reduce the need for new
   arms sales to the Middle East, the opposite is occurring in
   the wake of the Gulf conflict. The Arab world appears on
   the verge of another arms-buying spree, funded largely by
   new oil revenues. 

   Later in his prepared testimony, after describing possible weapon
procurement plans by the Arab states, he says:

   Mr. Chairman, the Arabs purchase these arms from dozens
   of different nations around the globe. Our country [the US]
   has been a major supplier, selling billions of dollars of
   military goods and services to avowed enemies of Israel.
   American sales of new weapon systems to hostile Arab
   nations have had a particularly profound impact on the
   military balance between Israel and those states because
   American technology is often superior to that of competing
   weapons. These sales have significantly raised the cost to
   Israel of maintaining its own defenses, exacerbating the
   strain on Israel's economy, and barring any changes in
   American policy, will continue to do so in the future. Now
   is the time, together with the other major conventional
   arms suppliers--Great Britain, France, the USSR, and China--
   to limit further arms exports to the region.

   Still, Dine calls for the full $3 billion in economic and military
assistance to Israel, saying that "any reduction in aid will send the
wrong signal to Israel's enemies."

   In the Q&A Rep. Meyers asks Dine whether AIPAC would
support a cutoff of military aid to Israel as part of a cutoff of military
aid to the region?  Dine responds: "If the US declared an arms
moratorium--say for six months--then I would include Israel in that
moratorium. If I were a member of Congress, I'd go ahead and
appropriate the [military] aid--and see what happened." Dine express-
es support for the letter by Hamilton et al. to the President urging a
moratorium on sales. Meyers says she very much supports a cutoff
of military aid, too, but, she asks Dine, isn't it better for the US to
continue supplying arms rather than someone else, as is likely to be
the case if the US unilaterally stops? Hamilton interrupts briefly to
clarify the letter's content: The letter proposes a short-term, "60-90
day" unilateral  pause during which time we would try to negotiate a
multilateral moratorium, he says. 

   In the second panel, Andrew Namatos lists the several billions of
dollars worth of weapons and aid recently transferred or pledged to
Turkey as a result of its participation in the Gulf war, saying that the
7:10 military assistance ratio has obviously been violated and is likely
to upset the delicate balance between Greece and Turkey.

   Lomis, in his prepared statement, supports $350 million in FMF
for Greece requested by the Administration and argues--"in recog-
nition that a military balance must be maintained between these two
US allies"--for a 1:1 aid ratio between Greece and Turkey. Opposing
the Administration's proposed $700 million economic and military aid
to Turkey, Lomis says: "with the end of the Cold War, we can and
must discard our double standards. We don't need any more Noriegas
or Marcoses and we must not wink at human rights violations in
countries like Turkey." He says that the US needs a new arms
transfer and finance policy--one which seeks to maintain regional
military balances at the lowest possible qualitative and quantitative
levels:
 
     Our new policy should be based on the principle of minimum
     deterrence or defensive sufficiency. We should seek agree-
     ments with the world's arms exporters that permit countries
     to acquire only the armaments and military systems neces-
     sary for their defense. We armed the Shah and created an
     army for Khomeini; we armed Hussein to fight Khomeini and
     then we had a new monster to deal with. Do we want to
     create a new Frankenstein in Turkey: Israel rightly calls for
     arms control agreements for the Middle East, and Turkey
     should be included.

     He notes that Turkish troops have occupied more than a third of
Cyprus for over 16 years. He cites President Bush in his address to
Congress in March saying: "The Gulf War put this new world to its
first test." Cyprus, Lomis says, is the second test.

      Pendleton, the Senior US defense representative in Turkey from
1982-86, says, regarding Cyprus: "Some have tried to make the
Turkish position on Cyprus parallel the Iraqi position on Kuwait. Of
course, this is nonsense. The Turks, as one of the guarantor countries
on Cyprus had/have certain legal responsibilities and although it would
be ideal to resolve all of the Cypriot issues, it should be a matter of
pride that Cyprus, unlike Lebanon or Northern Ireland, has not
suffered the same loss of life and destructiveness of personal property
as the others have done."

      Concerning the Turkish armed forces he says: "Turkey has shown
over the last decade that it is willing to make tremendous sacrifices
to modernize their armed forces, but the task is great. If Turkey is to
carry out implied responsibilities, it needs the help of her allies around
the world." The Turks, he says, have modernized "a good part of their
tanks" and are working on artillery, infantry fighting vehicles and
helicopters. "The co-production of F-16 aircraft and integration into
the Turkish Air Force have gone extremely well. The receipt of F-4E
aircraft under the Southern Region Amendment program has been
very helpful." He "recommend[s] that the 7:10 ratio be eliminated
once and for all. I believe we should approach the aid problem on the
basis of military necessity."

      Rep. Owens expresses "concern about the breech of the 7:10
ratio by the immense amount of armaments in a de facto way being
delivered to Turkey." The situation, he says, "bears careful analysis,"
as the 7:10 ratio "has served us well as policy." 

      Lomis states that if Turkey is moving at all toward resolution of
the Cyprus problem, it is because of US press and Congressional
pressure. The only difference between Kuwait and Cyprus, he quips,
is "petro oil vs. olive oil." Pendleton says in response that he does not
believe that the 7:10 ratio is responsible for progress on Cyprus.
However, Lomis notes, since the 7:10 ratio was put into place,
Turkish forces have not launched an offensive in Cyprus. Prior to the
imposition of the ratio they attacked twice.

      In close, Pendleton takes exception to the statement in Lomis'
testimony that supplying lots of arms to Turkey is creating a "new
Frankenstein." "Turkey," he says, "is our friend."

10 April  The House Foreign Affair Committee's Subcommittee on
International Trade and Economic Policy holds a hearing to examine
the ExIm Bank's programs for FY92, with ExIm Bank President and
Chairman John Macomber testifying.

      In his introductory remarks, Chairman Sam Gejdenson says:

      I welcome the Administration's proposal to provide financing
      for sales of defense articles. Exporters of non-defense and
      defense goods are equally entitled to access to commercial
      financing. Without such financing, US defense exporters will
      continue to lose sales to their international competitors or
      move manufacturing offshore in order to win sales. Further,
      as our defense budget shrinks, it is vital for the US to
      maintain a strong industrial base and a skilled manufacturing
      work force.

    In describing the Administration-proposed arms export financing
program, Macomber stresses that it is merely a pilot program, to be
reviewed in one year's time. The program would provide the Bank the
authority to guarantee or insure up to $1 billion in commercial loans
to NATO member countries, Japan, Australia, and Israel for weapons
purchases. The most controversial feature of the proposed policy is
the inclusion of a Presidential National Security waiver which would
make any developing country eligible for ExIm financing. Currently,
Macomber notes, "the bank is legislatively prohibited under Sec.
2(b)(6) of our charter from financing defense articles and services to
LDCs, except for a limited waiver added in 1988 for cases involving
exports to be used for anti-narcotics purposes." Any recipients of
ExIm financing, he stresses, would have to meet the Bank's standards
of credit-worthiness.

   In the Q&A, Rep. Bereuter says that he has "strong reservations"
about ExIm Bank credits for commercial military sales. He asks
Macomber to outline the current Presidential authority in this area.
Macomber responds that the President now has the authority to use
the resources of the Bank to guarantee loans for countries "other than
developing countries" to which arms sales are not banned. The sale
of military helicopters to Turkey last year with ExIm financing could
not have been made without other legislation passed by Congress (the
Dodd Amendment to the FY90 Foreign Operations Appropriation
removed prohibitions on a one-time-only-basis against financing for
arms sales and services to Greece and Turkey). Bereuter requests in
writing the current rules governing what the President can and cannot
do under the existing legislation.

   In response to a question from Gejdenson, Macomber says that
additional authority has been sought to finance arms sales, so the
new program would not detract from the Bank's ability to finance
non-military sales. 

11 April  The Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the
Foreign Affairs Committee holds a hearing on Soviet Policy in the
Middle East. Sovietologists Mark Katz of George Mason University
and Galia Golan of the Hebrew University and Peace Now (Israel)
provide expert testimony.

   In his testimony entitled "Does Moscow Still Matter in the Middle
East?," Katz says in answer, that, no, in the short run Moscow
doesn't matter so much in the region. "Moscow," he says, "is no
longer willing to pursue a Middle East policy which Washington
considers objectionable." Even the conservatives and military--who
might prefer to keep Iraq as an arms customer--realize that Iraqi arms
purchases would not make up for the lost aid, trade and investment
which displeasing Washington would incur. He concludes his
testimony saying, "The Middle East will undoubtedly present many
serious challenges to American foreign policy in the short-run as well
as the long-run. Competition with the Soviets for influence in the
region, however, is not likely to be one of them."

   In her statement, Golan says that Soviet post-Gulf War policy
will depend on the strength of conservative elements in the country
(chiefly the military). The balance between progressive "new thinkers"
and conservatives will determine whether there is a return to
"competition" with the West in the region or continued cooperation
and even collaboration. The four goals of Soviet foreign policy in the
region as she sees them are: good relations with conservative Arab
states for economic reasons (just received $4 billion in credits);
improving relations with Israel (mostly to better US-Soviet relations);
achievement of an Arab-Israeli settlement; and the establishment of
regional security agreements. 

   She notes that "everybody (the US, USSR, Arabs) seems to
want non-conventional arms limitations--while Israel has agreed to
conventional arms transfer limitations." This, she says is because
Israel has its own arms industry, and for obvious reasons cannot
agree to unconventional arms limitations. Thus, she concludes, the
US and Israel seem to be working at cross-purposes.

   In the Q&A Golan says that in February the Soviets concluded
an arms deal with Syria. Rep. Hyde describes this as a $2.2 billion
sale including 48 MiG-29s, 300 T-72 tanks, SAM-11s, SAM-13s,
SAM-16s, early warning and command and control equipment. [By US
price-standards, this would seem like a lot of equipment for $2.2
billion.] In light of this sale, Hyde wonders whether a unilateral arms
pause such as called for in his colleagues' letter to the President is a
good idea. Chairman Hamilton notes that the US continues to sell
arms to the region; the Administration recently presented over a half
a billion in sales to the Congress. Indeed, Rep. Berman says the letter
was occasioned by the shift in Administration policy from mid-
February to post-War, as presented successively by Secretary Baker,
President Bush, and Secretary Cheney before this Committee. In the
latest expression of Administration thinking on the subject, Cheney
said that arms control in the Mideast is adverse to our national-
security interests, he notes. The reason for the letter Berman says, "is
that conventional arms control is not on the [Administration's]
agenda."

   Berman wonders why, if maintaining good US-Soviet relations is
important to the Soviets, as both experts have testified, the US can't
make arms sales control vital to the continuation of those good
relations. Golan says there is a vigorous debate in Moscow right now
about arms sales controls. The bottom line she says is that "they will
go on selling as long as the US goes on selling." In fact, she says the
proponents of continued sales (the military) use American arms sales
as justification for their continued arms sales. If the United States can
prove to the conservative elements in the USSR that multilateral
control of the sale of weapons to the region is viable and possibly
even beneficial economically to the Soviets, and if they really thought
we were serious about it, she thinks the hard liners could be brought
on board. 

   Katz agrees, but says this will only be achieved if the Ad-
ministration makes it unambiguously clear that arms transfer control
is very important to it. Moreover, he thinks the Soviets will only stop
selling weapons in the context of a multilateral agreement. It is vital,
he says to have the Soviet military on board; without them it will be
difficult to assure that they will in fact stop selling. In many ways, he
notes, "the US military and the Soviet military are tacit allies right
now--both depend on arms sales" to further their goals and keep
procurement costs down. He also points out that the US wanted the
Saudi-financed Soviet sale to Syria as much, perhaps, as the Soviets
did. Berman agrees, saying "It obviously didn't bother us [the
Administration] too much." 

   In closing Berman notes that "it seems to me that we have a
heck of a lot of leverage on these suppliers if there is a high enough
priority" assigned to controlling arms sales. 

11 April  The Subcommittee on International Development, Finance,
Trade and Monetary Policy of the House Committee on Banking
conducts a hearing on the Administration's proposed ExIm Bank
reforms.  ExIm Bank President John Macomber testifies in support of
the proposal to allow ExIm financing of up to $1 billion a year for
commercial military sales. The four non-Administration witnesses--
Rep. Jim Moody, John Gentling (on behalf of the National Foreign
Trade Council), James Cox (on behalf of the Coalition for Employment
through Exports and the National Association of Manufacturing) and
Allan Mendelowitz (Director, International Trade, Energy, and Finance
Issues, GAO) all oppose the ExIm Bank's administration of such a
program.  Macomber explains that "the principal reason for putting
[the financing program] into the ExIm Bank is to assure that these are
indeed commercial transactions." 

17 April  House Appropriations Committee, Foreign Operations
Subcommittee hears testimony from representatives of 55 different
organizations on the FY92 foreign aid bill. 

   Holly Burkhalter, of Human Rights Watch, gives a "state of the
world" report in testimony on "Human Rights and US Foreign
Assistance." She makes many recommendations, one being that
Congress delete the Administration's proposed International Military
and Education Training (IMET) funds for Sudan, Somalia and Liberia.
She wonders which force in those warring countries would receive
the US military education training. Citing continuing serious human
rights concerns, she also recommends zeroing out the Administra-
tion's proposed $3 million FMF and $300,000 IMET request for Zaire.
After outlining appalling abuses in Sri Lanka--many attributable to or
exacerbated by the government--Burkhalter asks the subcommittee to
limit aid to Sri Lanka to humanitarian assistance only. Regarding
Guatemala, she notes that 21 human rights activists have died or
disappeared since 1988. She applauds the Administration's decision
to suspend military aid in 1990, and "strongly urge[s] the subcom-
mittee to not only zero out military aid for Guatemala (including some
$12 million in military aid which is in the pipeline from previous
years), but also end ESF [Economic Support Fund] until there has
been a sea change in Guatemalan human rights." 

   A report by Human Rights Watch which summarizes the organiza-
tion's concerns regarding certain FMF recipients and analyzes the
Administration's annual report on human rights in FMF-recipient
countries is attached to her testimony.

18 April  The Western Hemisphere Subcommittee of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee holds a hearing to review the Ad-
ministration's FY92 foreign assistance request for Latin America.
Assistant Secretary of State Bernard Aronson, AID Assistant
Administrator James Michel and Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Inter-American Affairs Nancy Dorn provide testimony.  

   In her testimony, Dorn says that the $280 million the Administra-
tion is requesting in IMET and FMF for the region for FY92 will
"strengthen US national security by supporting Latin American efforts
to consolidate democracy, stimulate economic growth, develop free
markets, combat illegal narcotics production and trafficking, resolve
conflicts, and improve national and regional security."

   Dorn calls Latin America "the least militarized region in the
world," citing the low percentage of GNP spent on military activities
and notes the decline in the number of men under arms in several
South American countries. "Arms imports to the region," she says,
"went from an annual average of $2 billion in the late 1970's to less
than $1 billion in the late 1980's."

   Concerning the Latin American drug wars she says: "the Andean
Strategy is the cornerstone of the President's [national drug control]
program. ...The plan emphasizes developing host nation capabilities
through training, materiel, intelligence, and technological support.
...Let me assure the Committee that we do not contemplate a large
US military presence in the Andes, nor do we seek to create large,
new paramilitary forces in the region. Our goal is to assist the
democratic governments of the Andes so that they can defeat the
narcotrafficking organizations themselves." She notes that 51% of
the Administration's foreign assistance request for the region will
support this plan.

   She later notes: "Although the focus of the US effort is counte-
rnarcotics, not counterinsurgency, Colombian and Peruvian insurgents
are involved in narcotics and, along with the traffickers, have created
a militarized situation." Dorn concedes that the likelihood of foreign
[Soviet] intervention is greatly reduced, but says that indigenous
insurgencies continue. In this regard, she says, "we will maintain our
support for civilian, democratically-elected governments confronting
insurgencies." 

18 April  The House Ways and Means Subcommittee on Oversight
hosts a hearing on the execution of US export control programs. Six
panels of witnesses testify. The first is the Administration panel, with
Henry Sokolski (Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Non-
Proliferation) and Peter Sullivan (Deputy Director, Defense Technology
Security Administration). In the second panel, Stephen Bryen, Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense for Security Policy from 1981-88,
testifies. In the final panels, special agents of the US Customs Service
and others testify on three well-publicized attempted export violation
cases.

   Sokolski and Sullivan testify that the US export control system
is working. In his prepared statement, Sokolski says: "I believe we do
have the tools to make our export control laws and agreements
effective. In fact, with the increased concern about proliferation,
additional laws and regulations have recently come into force both
here and abroad; and control priorities have begun to shift toward the
security problems posed by exports to destinations outside the Soviet
bloc."

   "As you know, a number of militarily useful technologies and
pieces of equipment made their way into Iraqi hands. Some have used
this fact to argue that export controls do not work or that our export
controls were a failure. What these people have not focused on
sufficiently, however, are the clear instances where our export control
efforts did pay off..." Here he is referring to the case of the Argen-
tine-Egyptian-Iraqi Condor II missile under development since the mid-
1980s. To prevent the production and deployment of the Condor II,
"the Administration cracked down on US exports that might have
supported the Condor, urged other supplier nations to do likewise,
and discussed our concerns with the customer governments of
Argentina and Egypt." Specifically, he says, guidance and staging
technologies were blocked to these countries. 
   In closing his prepared testimony, he says: "As for controls on
the export of conventional arms and related military and dual-use
manufacturing technology, the Administration is now reviewing what
additional steps might be taken."

   Bryen testifies that the export licensing system is non-functional:
specifically he says it is poorly administered, our European allies
export unfettered, and a multinational control entity similar to
COCOM is needed to coordinate all of the various export control
regimes. As proof of the failure, he says that prior to 1985 the
Pentagon saw no dual-use export license requests for Third World
countries. During that time he says a great deal of "military type
equipment" was approved for export without DoD knowledge.
Sokolski's responds that the Pentagon now receives more requests to
review dual-use licenses than previously.

23 April  Senate Foreign Relations' Europe Subcommittee holds a
hearing on the prospects for the formation of an arms suppliers'
cartel, the subject of legislation on which Subcommittee chair Sen.
Joe Biden is "now working and will soon introduce." Two panels
testify, one pro- and one opposed to the draft legislation, which Biden
says would "call upon the Administration first, to develop a plan for
halting the flow of unconventional weapons and controlling the
transfer of advanced conventional arms to the Middle East; and
second, to make a good faith effort to convene a conference of the
key supplier nations for the purpose of establishing an effective
operational system of limits and controls." Biden cites several reasons
to think that a suppliers' arrangement could work: the Gulf War has
opened new windows of opportunity, placing the US in an ad-
vantageous political, military and moral position; key supplier states
in Europe have shown some willingness [and even some initiative] to
control sales; "supply-side arms control is a success" (here he cites
the NPT and COCOM); and the current balance of power in the Middle
East favors our allies, so "now would be a good time to stop where
we are." "By building a coalition now for arms sales restraint," he
says, "the President can avoid having to build another war-making
coalition."  

   Richard Perle and Richard Burt testify against Biden's legislation.
In his statement, Perle says "Programs that ban weapons sales may
actually lead to greater insecurity." If "successful" such a regime
would leave our allies more vulnerable, because our adversaries will
surely cheat and we won't. We should avoid arms control agreements
that treat all countries alike; rather, we should draw up a list of states
who's leaders are unreliable, and restrict sales only to those coun-
tries. Perle admonishes the Congress for lifting some COCOM
restrictions and calls for them to "take action to restore the COCOM
system." He, not surprisingly, expresses pessimism on the likely
success of arms control in the Middle East, and discounts the
desirability of it. "Weapons don't cause wars," he notes, "but may
enable them."

   Burt, who is now in the process of leaving government service,
does not favor multilateral restrictions on arms sales either. Conven-
tional arms transfers are tied very closely to regional security arrange-
ments, and thus they require a case-by-case analysis, rather than an
across-the-board rigid policy. He is skeptical of both region-wide
control arrangements and freezes on the transfer of certain types of
weapons. After citing the need for more weapons sales to some
states in the Gulf, he says he does not, however, favor returning to
the pre-war status quo. Thus he likes the provision in Biden's draft
legislation for greater transparency and consultancy among arms
suppliers. He thinks it is feasible and desirable to institute a regular
exchange of information on arms transfer plans. In the realm of
unconventional weapons, he thinks that the US "can afford" to be
bolder than on conventional arms. In fact, he favors a proposal for a
missile-free zone in the Middle East.

   During the Q&A, Biden, who is the only Senator present, asks
Perle how he can support the COCOM model for restricting exports
to certain destinations, while claiming that a suppliers cartel on arms
sales can't be effective? Especially, he asks, when you're talking
about large, completed products vs. smaller and less immediately
dangerous components. Perle, not exactly answering the question,
says that a distinction between "friendly" and "unfriendly" countries
must made. Also, he says, it's one thing to suffer leakage when
you're talking about components and subsystems, but very different
thing when you're talking about weapons themselves--the strategic
balance would be dramatically upset if leakage occurs. To this, Biden
says, if we don't do something to address the problem of arms
proliferation, these countries are sure to get more destabilizing
weapons. "So why not manage it" and attempt to control the
proliferation? The US will continue to be the guarantor of our friends'
security in the region, so he doesn't think that there is much to lose
even if the plan failed. Perle again says that he thinks sales should be
proscribed only to "actors who demonstrate unreliability" such as
Assad, Kaddafi, and Hussein. The problem with that, Biden says, is
that all of the other suppliers would not agree to embargo just those
three states. 

   In the second panel, former Ambassador to the Conference on
Disarmament James Leonard, Andrew Pierre of the Carnegie Endow-
ment for International Peace and Mitchell Wallerstein of The National
Academy of Sciences testify more favorably on the Biden initiative.
Leonard says that arms control in the Mideast is possible and very
desirable, but difficult; must be multilateral; must proceed step by
step (ballistic missile disarmament is first limited measure which could
be undertaken now, he says); must be comprehensive (cover both
conventional and non-conventional weaponry and take account of
weapons produced locally as well as those imported). On the last
point, he notes that Israel developed its nuclear capability to offset
the build-up of Arab conventional arms. Most importantly, he says,
nothing will happen until the US makes it unequivocally clear that it
wants arms control in the region--the US leadership will create
receptivity if it is serious. He thinks the US should put all major arms
transfers "on ice" while the Administration looks at long term
possibilities for policy changes. Whereas Burt and Perle separated
arms control and security, Leonard thinks the two are mutually
supportive.  

   Wallerstein testifies on the uses and limitations of dual-use com-
modity export controls for limiting proliferation, detailing the findings
of the recent National Academy of Sciences study (Finding Common
Ground), mandated by the 1988 Omnibus Trade & Competitiveness
Act, which he directed. Multilateralism is the key to success, he says;
"the panel found that unilaterally imposed foreign policy export
controls have had the largest negative economic impact."

   Pierre supports the Biden initiative, seeing reason to be optimistic
that an international arms transfer control regime might now succeed.
He notes the Soviet Union's very positive overtures in this area in the
past months, perhaps dictated by the realization that no-one wants
to buy their weapons if they can get Western, especially US-made
weapons. France, he says, may be the "toughest nut to crack," as
their military-industrial-complex is the most entrenched. As much as
50% of French armaments industries' output is exported. But even
there, in light of the Gulf War experiences (French soldiers faced Iraqi
French-made weapons and France will likely lose the $5 billion Iraq
owes it for those weapons), "considerable soul-searching is going
on." This might result in Parliamentary oversight of arms sales, he
suggests. Britain, he says has already gone a long way toward
converting its arms industry to consumer goods. He notes the
leverage available over the other major suppliers: China, Germany,
Brazil.  Moreover, he doesn't see any urgent requirement for arms 
sales to the region--none of the countries there depleted their arsenals
except Iraq and Kuwait, and the US has credibly demonstrated its
ability to safeguard the security of its allies there. Thus, he concludes,
"now is a good time to work toward a one-year moratorium" on arms
sales to the region. 

23 April  Sen. Bingaman, Chair of the Subcommittee on Technology
and National Security of the Joint Economic Committee convenes a
hearing on US policies on arms trade and non-proliferation. Two
panels provide testimony. On the first are the Administration
witnesses: Assistant Secretary of State Richard Clarke, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Commerce James LeMunyon, and Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense Henry Sokolski. The second panel
contains critics of Administration policy: Stephen Bryen (now a
consultant, formerly Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Trade
Security Policy), Paul Freedenberg (now a consultant, formerly
Undersecretary of Commerce for Export Administration), and Gary
Milhollin (Director, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control).

   In his opening remarks, Sen. Bingaman sums up the problem,
citing a just-released CRS study which he had commissioned:
"Strategic and economic interests have at times prevailed over non-
proliferation considerations, as in the cases of Pakistan and Iraq.
Trade policies designed to enhance the competitiveness of US
business in the global market place can be expected to conflict with
robust export control policies." He says that the report finds that
export controls alone are not enough: "We must also be prepared to
employ incentives and sanctions, as well as arms control and
diplomatic initiatives to reduce the underlying motivating factors in
regional arms races." In the meanwhile, he sees plenty of room for
improvement in the existing export control policies. "Too many
sensitive weapons technologies have slipped through our own net and
those of others, and in this business almost is not good enough. Too
many countries with whom we have friendly relations have been
actively transferring sensitive weapons technologies to others." In
closing, he says, "Our experience with Iraq should teach us how
costly it can become when sensitive weapons technologies spread."

   In his summary statement, Clarke says that within the govern-
ment there exists a vastly improved capability to deal with prolifera-
tion issues. Citing the EPCI, which has been in development for over
a year, and the interagency Policy Coordinating Committees that have
recently been established, he says that the US "has gotten its house
in order." Of US dual-use export control policies, Clarke says "We
have a system in the US of which we can be proud." He testifies that
the Administration is concerned about the threat posed by "overly
large" build-ups of offensive conventional arms, as well as unconven-
tional arms proliferation. But we can be proud, he says, that we faced
no US-made weapons in the Gulf War--"The United States has not
been the problem." 

   In the Q&A, Bingaman asks about the $1.5 billion in US exports
and 771 export licenses granted for goods to Iraq from 1985 to
1990. Didn't these items contribute to Iraq's military capability?
Clarke says those were commercial items that may have had a
military impact. But much more importantly, we did not send a single
weapon to Iraq, nor did we allow any of the other purchasers of our
arms to re-export US-made weapons to Iraq. He reiterates, "The
United States and coalition forces did not face a single US-made
weapon." Dual-use items which may have been exported to Iraq from
the US were not, Clarke says, the cause of Iraq's offensive military
capability. "If the US were the only source of supply to Iraq," he
says, they would not have been able to invade Kuwait. 

   In his written testimony, Clarke says that the strengthening of
the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), imposition of stricter
export controls and sanctions, and the reorientation of SDI toward
Third World missiles, have turned the tide on missile proliferation.
According to a chart presented with his testimony, the MTCR has
expanded its membership from the original 7 members to 16, with
Switzerland, Sweden, Finland and the Soviet Union also adhering to
its guidelines. During the recent MTCR meeting in Tokyo, he says
"the partners made significant progress toward adopting a revised,
updated Annex of controlled technologies." This work is expected to
be completed at a technical group meeting in May and put into effect
by December. 

   Concerning chemical anti-proliferation, Clarke says: "in the Con-
ference on Disarmament, we are intensifying work on a comprehen-
sive global ban on CW, which is the best long-term solution to CW
proliferation." The Administration is "also developing a series of
proposals to ensure that the Biological Weapons Convention Review
Conference in September will result in measures to strengthen the
convention."

   As to COCOM, he says: "you can expect us to be very cautious
about diluting the effectiveness of COCOM by proposing the addition
of proliferation issues to its responsibilities. ..."encouraging countries
--in many cases friendly, non-aligned countries--not to develop
weapons of mass destruction is a somewhat different task than
controlling the sale of strategic goods and technology to countries
posing a potential military threat to members of COCOM."

   Bingaman asks about Chinese adherence to the MTCR, in light of
persistent reports of Chinese missile sales. Clarke reports that
privately "They have said they will `take into account relevant
international parameters' on missiles and not sell intermediate range
missiles to the Middle East." Publicly, they have taken the position
that they were not original parties to the drafting of the MTCR
guidelines, therefore, have no obligation to abide by them. The several
reports over the past years of Chinese missile sales to the region have
not been borne out, he says; the Administration has not yet seen
proof of a sale to the Mideast of MTCR-range missiles by the Chinese.
Clarke refers only to complete missile systems and not to components
or technical assistance to missile programs. "We have concerns about
Chinese performance on export controls across the board," he notes.

   Clarke is asked to clarify the Soviet position vis a vis the MTCR.
The Soviets have asked to formally join the MTCR, he says, but
because of the sharing of sensitive intelligence among the MTCR
members, having the Soviets formally join might not be desirable to
the US and other members. There is an "ongoing dialogue with the
Soviets which we hope will result in their joining" the regime. 

   LeMunyon "respectfully disagrees" with an earlier assertion by
Bingaman that US export programs are in "disarray." He says the
United States is taking the lead internationally in export controls in
five areas: East-West strategic trade; CBW proliferation; missile
proliferation; nuclear proliferation; and supercomputer exports.
Concerning nuclear export controls, he says: "In February 1991, 26
countries agreed to establish a working group to develop a control list
for dual-use nuclear-related items. A technical working group is
scheduled to meet in May 1991. The United States will use as a basis
for this negotiation the list of 60 commercial product categories of
items with nuclear applications that Commerce has controlled
unilaterally since the late 1970s." He also notes in his testimony that
the President has set 1 June as the deadline for establishing a control
regime among all suppliers of supercomputers [US, Japan, Britain,
Germany, Italy, and France?] since they are of concern for both
proliferation and strategic reasons. 

   Freedenberg and Bryen strongly disagree with the Administration
witnesses' assessment of the effectiveness of the current policies.
They both outline the need for a centralized, over-arching anti-
proliferation organization to coordinate and administer the various
anti-proliferation regimes. Freedenberg addresses in some detail the
difficulty of turning COCOM's orientation from East-West security
concerns to this task. There is, he says, an objection by the French
and other European governments to turning COCOM into an anti-
proliferation organization. "The fundamental obstacle is that North-
South technology transfer is based more on the foreign policy goals
of particular countries than on national security of the COCOM
countries as a whole. For example, the United States differs from
Japan on its policy towards Israel. In the recent past, it has differed
with France over Iraq, Germany over Iran, and Italy over Libya. Similar
differences exist among those countries with one another. If the
members of COCOM cannot agree among themselves who the `bad
guys' are, how are they ever going to get together to enforce an
equally stringent technology transfer policy regarding these `target'
countries." Further, he notes the importance of Soviet and Chinese
participation in combatting the proliferation of missiles and non-
conventional weapons in the Third World. "These countries [USSR
and China], however, are far less likely to cooperate if the regimes
reside within the structure of COCOM--an organization created to
thwart their objectives. Similar problems would exist for Switzerland,
Sweden, and other neutral and non-aligned countries...." He suggests
that the most effective course of action would be the establishment
of "a new, consolidated anti-proliferation organization, with a strong
central secretariat domiciled in Paris."

Legislation introduced in the 102nd Congress       

A bill to amend the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945 to permit the
Export-Import Bank to assist in the export of certain US defense
articles and services/a bill to amend the Export Administration Act of
1985 to establish a program to provide loan guarantees for the sale
of defense goods and services                                     S.306/H.R.729

Sponsors: Dodd, Bond and Lieberman/Gejdenson 

These bills would amend relevant legislation to permit the ExIm Bank
to finance commercial arms sales to NATO-member countries,
Australia, Japan and Israel, but fall short of Administration-supplied
language, which contains a Presidential national security waiver that
would allow sales to any nation--even developing nations--if the
President determined the sale was warranted. No-one has yet
introduced legislation containing that provision.

Status: S.306 was introduced on 30 January and referred to the
Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, where no action
has yet been taken. H.R.729, also introduced on 30 January, has
been referred to the Banking and Foreign Affairs Committees, which
have both held hearings on the legislation.

Mideast Post-War Stability & Arms Restraint Act of 1991H.R.1343

Sponsors: Levine, Berman, Kostmayer, Gilman 

This bill requires the President within 90 days of the enactment of
this legislation to seek to establish an international commission,
modeled on COCOM and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, to limit and
restrict arms sales to the Middle East. The commission would be
made up of the Permanent Five UN Security Council members and
other major supplier nations, as determined by the Permanent Five. 

   The commission will then "negotiate supplier nation restrictions
on the sale or transfer of sophisticated combat weaponry and the
technology of conventional arms production to the Middle East"; seek
"to maintain a balance of power among major military powers in the
region"; coordinate with the chemical weapons and missile export
control groups; and "address other areas pertinent to limiting the sale
or transfer of arms," such as verification, economic impact of
restricting sales, and regional confidence-building measures.

Status: On 7 March this bill was referred to Foreign Affairs. 

A bill to expand the limited prohibition against the financing, by the
Export-Import Bank of the United States, of the export of defense
articles or services          H.R.1635

Original sponsor: Moody

This law would amend section 2(b)(6)(A) of the Export-Import Bank
Act of 1945 to read: "Notwithstanding any other provision of law,
the Bank shall not, except as provided in subparagraph (B), use any
funds or borrowing authority to participate in the extension of credit
in connection with any agreement to sell defense articles and services
entered into with any country." 

Status:  The bill was referred jointly to the Committees on Banking,
Finance and Urban Affairs and on Foreign Affairs on 22 March.
Hearings have been held by both committees on the subject.

A bill to prohibit arms transfers to certain countries unless the
President certifies that a state of war does not exist between such
country and Israel and that such country has accorded formal
recognition to the sovereignty of IsraelH.R.1708

Sponsor: Schumer

This bill would block the transfer of defense articles, defense services
and design and construction services to Bahrain, Yemen, Iran, Iraq,
Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria,
and the United Arab Emirates. It would also prevent the President
from authorizing the re-transfer from other countries of any US-
supplied weapons or services to these countries. These restrictions
could be lifted if the above-named states formally recognized and
ended their state of war with Israel.
 
Status: H.R.1708 was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.
International Cooperation Act of 1991                           S.956/H.R.1792

Sponsor: Administration

This bill, which proposes sweeping changes in the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961, is an effort by the Executive branch to end the
Congressional practice of earmarking security assistance. According
to a State Department statement, the legislation is designed "to
restore the President's authority" to use foreign aid "to advance our
national interest, rather than permitting it to remain hostage to narrow
special interests."   

   As part of this bill, the Administration is lobbying Congress to
repeal the Pressler Amendment, which bans military aid to Pakistan
unless the President can certify that that country is not pursuing a
nuclear weapons program. According to the Washington Post,
President "Bush offered his `unequivocal assurance' that repeal of the
[Pressler] amendment would not weaken his Administration's
commitment to preventing nuclear proliferation in South Asia.
`Satisfaction of the Pressler standard will remain the essential basis'
for deciding whether or not to give aid to Pakistan in the future'" in
a letter accompanying the proposed legislation.    In the FY92 Foreign Aid proposal, the
Administration requested $214.5 million in security assistance for
Pakistan, even though last year's appropriation was cut off in
October--as mandated by the Pressler Amendment--because of
concerns about Pakistan's nuclear program.

Upcoming hearings and committee action           

The State Department Authorization is being marked-up by the
Foreign Affairs committee on 30 April. The Foreign Assistance mark-
up is beginning in the Foreign Affairs subcommittees on 1 May, and
should be taken up by the full Committee in late May or early June. 

The House Armed Services Committee will continue to hold hearings
on lessons from the Gulf War in May.  

The House Banking Committee, International Finance Subcommittee
will hold another hearing on possible ExIm Bank policy revisions on 2
May.

The Senate Appropriations Foreign Operations Subcommittee is
scheduled to hold a hearing on security assistance in the post-Cold
War era on 21 May.

Recent Congressional publications                   

Proliferation and Regional Security in the 1990's (hearing before the
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, October 9, 1990)
USGPO: 1991

Finding Common Ground: US Export Controls in a Changed Global
Environment (National Academy of Sciences) National Academy
Press: 1991

Non-Proliferation Regimes: A comparative Analysis of Policies to
Control the Spread of Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Weapons and
Missiles (Zachary S. Davis, Congressional Research Service, US
Library of Congress) CRS: 1 April 91



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