Arms Sales Monitor #7-8, September-October 1991

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(Issue No. 7-8 , Sept-Oct 1991)




Sales in progress                                     

16 September  The DSAA notifies Congress of a proposed sale of
110 "surplus" M-60A3 tanks with Tank Thermal Sights to Taiwan for
$119 million. The deal includes overhauling the tanks, as well as 
machine guns, smoke grenade launchers, spare parts and logistics
support for the tanks.  

16 September  Congress is notified of the Air Force's intention to sell
Egypt ground-based communications equipment, spare parts and
associated support and facilities services for its air defense system at
a price of $70 million.  

17 September  The Pentagon proposes a $547 million sale to Thailand
of 18 F-16 A&B model fighter aircraft, along with four spare engines
and six LANTIRN night navigation/targeting pods.   

17 September  The DSAA notifies Congress of its intention to sell
South Korea 179 AIM-7M Sparrow missiles for Korea's F-4 fighter
aircraft at a price of $31 million. Another deal, worth $86 million, in
spare parts for Korea's F-4, F-5, T-37, C-130 and F-16 aircraft is also
conveyed to Congress.  

17 September  Congress is told by the Pentagon of its intention to
transfer $350 million worth of design, engineering and managerial
services to Kuwait for the restoration and repair of the Ali Al Salem
and Ahmed Al Jabar air bases. 

19 September  Congress is notified by the DSAA of the Navy's inten-
tion to transfer 36 A-7 and TA-7 aircraft to Greece, which will pay
$120 million to have the aircraft overhauled. The deal also includes
14 spare engines, other spare parts, training and logistics support. 


19 September The DSAA tells Congress of the Air Force's intention
to sell Turkey $70 million worth of spare parts for its C-130, F-4E, F-
5, F-100, F-104, T-33, T-37 and T-38 aircraft.

23 September  President Bush notifies Congress that he is reinstating
the military aid to Jordan which Congress had cut off in the Desert
Shield/Storm Supplemental Budget Bill last Spring. Congress deleted
the assistance in retribution for Jordan's support of Saddam Hussein
during the war, but included a waiver to be invoked if the President
determined the aid was in the national interest. In justifying his
determination that it was, President Bush says the military aid "would
be beneficial to the peace process." Jordan may now receive the full
$57.2 million in military assistance appropriated for FY91.  

27 September  The State Department determines that the Armaments
Corporation of South Africa (ARMSCOR) has engaged in "missile
technology proliferation activities" that require--under a law passed in
the FY91 defense authorization act--the prohibition of certain imports, 
exports and contracts involving ARMSCOR. Specifically, licenses for 
all items controlled by the AECA and EAA to ARMSCOR will be denied for 2
years starting from today; no US government contracts with ARMSCOR may be
entered into for that period; and no products of ARMSCOR may be imported 
into the US for two years. These are category one sanctions--the most 
serious level--which mean that ARMSCOR's proliferant activities related 
to complete missile systems or subsystems as listed in category one of 
the "Equipment and Technology Annex" to the MTCR guidelines. 

Israel reportedly exported to South Africa the equipment which led to the 
imposition of these sanctions; however, Israel was not sanctioned.  

8 October Rep. Dave Obey, chairman of the House Foreign Operations
Subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee, sends a second
letter [see ASM No. 6] to Secretary of State Baker concerning the
proposed coproduction/sale of 40 out of an eventual 80 F-16 aircraft
to Turkey, notified to Congress on 23 July. Although the congressio-
nal review period passed on 6 August, clearing the way for the formal
offer, the LOA has yet to be signed.

Obey is concerned that Congress will be committed, perhaps against
its will, to fund the second part of the deal. He also questions the
wisdom of the sale in light of Turkey's worsening human rights
record. 

Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs Janet Mullins
responds to Obey's letter, saying the deal does not lock the US gov-
8ernment into a future commitment to fund the purchase of the
remaining 40 aircraft. She says, "If the US and other friends of
Turkey are unable to provide assistance for military modernization,
then the government of Turkey must provide the additional funding
needed to complete the program, or the program will be terminated."
On Turkey's human rights record, she notes that "the human rights
situation in Turkey must improve. While there have been some ad-
vances ... during this past year, problems remain. We will continue to
convey our concerns on this subject to the highest levels of the Turk-
ish government." 

24 October The formal LOA between the US government and the
government of South Korea for the FMS portion of the Korean F-16 
deal [see ASM No. 4-5] is signed in Washington today. The next day,
in Seoul, General Dynamics and Samsung Aerospace sign an agree-
ment for the commercial portion of the sale--the licensed production
component. Taken together, the deal is worth more than $5 billion. 


Speeches, letters, etc.                                 

11 September  Sen. Dennis DeConcini, who--along with Helsinki
Commission Chairman Steny Hoyer--recently led a Congressional
delegation to Vienna for a meeting of the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), says the CSCE could play an important
role in monitoring and limiting arms transfers. "Nine of the world's top
ten arms-selling states are CSCE members," he notes. "The United
States, which sold more weapons last year than any other nation, has
a special responsibility in this regard, and should be at the head of
efforts to stem the destabilizing flow of arms. Yet we do little, while
our allies and friends propose concrete measures." Poland recently
submitted a proposal for CSCE action in this area.  

17 October  Congress receives a Report on US Export Controls from
President Bush, which outlines the actions taken by the Executive
branch in light of the lapse of the Export Administration Act on 30
September last year. (Congress passed reauthorizing legislation in
November 1990, but President Bush vetoed it due to provisions he
found unacceptable pertaining to sanctions for chemical weapons 
proliferation activities.) The Export Administration Act has been 
administered under presidential fiat--by use of the International 
Emergency Economic Powers Act-- and will continue to be administered 
by such until new reauthorizing legislation is passed [see page 6].

The report outlines administration initiatives in the area of export 
controls on dual-use items, including the Enhanced Proliferation Control
Initiative that President Bush announced in December 1990, and the 
subsequent Department of Commerce regulations to implement
and enforce it.

He also discusses the new, pared-down COCOM core list of items still 
subject to national security export controls by the 17 COCOM 
member-states.  The new list became effective on the 1st of September. 
In devising the new core list, he says, Commerce totally
revised its Commodity Control List (now called
Commerce Control List), and during this process export controls on
exports of some computers, aircraft and petroleum products to South
Africa were removed.  

25 October  Speaking of the recommendations of the UN study group
that has been looking at ways of promoting transparency and
openness in the international arms trade, Sen. William Roth notes that
"An arms registry is not the final step, but it is a first step, and it is
a significant step. It will provide arms trading nations information
around which to begin to build cooperative trading behavior, and it
will increase the amount of information which is publicly available
regarding global arms transfers. ... As one of the world's leading arms
exporters, the United States cannot shirk its responsibility to export
in an accountable and controlled manner, nor can it neglect its equally
important responsibility to exercise leadership to ensure that other
nations follow this lead." Roth introduces a resolution (S.Res.207) en-
dorsing the UN's work.  

31 October  In a statement on the House floor, Rep. Bill McCollum
says that the House Republican Task Force on Terrorism and Uncon-
ventional Warfare, which he chairs, published two reports in July on
Iran's nuclear-weapons-making efforts. "I find it of great concern that
the information released in these reports ... was so easily dismissed
by senior officials within the administration," he opines. The reports,
entitled "Iran's Nuclear Effort" and "Iran's Nuclear Effort--An Update,"
are printed in their entirety in the Congressional Record.    

Notes from some hearings                            

12 September  The Human Rights and Western Hemisphere Subcom-
mittees and the Task Force on International Narcotics Control of the
HFAC hold a hearing on military aid to Peru in light of ongoing con-
cerns about human rights violations there. On 30 July the State
Department notified Congress that the Fujimori government met the
human rights conditions necessary under the International Narcotics
Control Act of 1990 to receive weapons grants from the United
States in order to combat its coca production. At issue is $35 million
in military aid authorized for FY91, and--because the administration
linked it to Peru's acceptance of the military aid--$60 million in econ-
omic assistance. 

Stephen H. Greene of the Drug Enforcement Agency and several
Assistant Secretaries of State testify in support of military aid to Peru
for counter-narcotics purposes; Holly Burkhalter of America's Watch
testifies against it.

State Department Justifies Weapons to Peru

The State Department maintains that military aid is necessary both in
order to imbue in the Peruvian security forces the American military's
respect for human rights and to have some success in slaying the
coca crop. Indeed, the administration pegs the overall success of the
Andean initiative--the drug wars in Bolivia, Colombia and Peru--on
Peru's receipt of US military assistance, as Peru is the largest
producer of the coca plant, responsible for 60% of the world's total.
The State Department also contends that development aid to Peru is
useless without attendant military assistance, as brutal Sendero
Luminoso insurgents will destroy the development projects and kill the
those taking part in them. 

       The State of the Drug-War

Aronson describes current US military engagement in Peru: "Through
a March 1990 agreement, we are already providing over $19 million
in equipment and training to the Peruvian National Police to support
counter-narcotics operations primarily in the Upper Hullagua Valley of
Peru. The center of this effort is the Santa Lucia counter-narcotics
base. In the one year period ending in March 1991, the police have
mounted air operations which have destroyed 150 labs, seized over
5 metric tons of coca paste, and disrupted trafficking networks. ...
New resources from our 1991 aid package will extend the reach of
existing counternarcotics programs." Assistant Secretary for Interna-
tional Narcotics Matters, Melvyn Levitsky, adds that the Peruvian Air
Force has forced down and inspected over 50 aircraft in the Upper
Hullagua Valley. "These efforts, however, have been limited, due in
large part to serious shortfalls in equipment, spare parts, fuel, and
sufficient manpower." 

Levitsky says that the US military assistance is explicitly for counter-
narcotics purposes, and not for counter-insurgency use against the
Sendero Luminoso or other groups. "End use monitoring in the field
and review procedures will be set up so that we can assure compli-
ance with the agreement," he says. Further, Levitsky notes that "The
only role for DOD personnel in Peru is in a training and technical
capacity. This is necessary because of the quality and quantity of
equipment which we will be supplying. It also allows the US to
upgrade the effectiveness of the Peruvian military--while at the same
time imprinting US values in areas such as human rights. There will
be no DOD presence on field operations."

            State Department Plays Semantics Game

On Peru's human rights record, Richard Schifter, the Assistant
Secretary for Human Rights, says: "Except for restrictions imposed in
the country's emergency zones, fundamental freedoms are generally
respected in Peru." [Holly Burkhalter, in her testimony, notes that
55% of the population lives in security zones!] He continues: 

     Peru's security forces, it should be clear, do not as a rule
     engage in random repression. The human rights problem
     which they pose stems from the nature of the response of
     some units and some individuals to the terrorist threat. ... In
     some security zones captured terrorists or persons suspected
     of belonging to or collaborating with terrorist organizations
     have been killed by the security forces, mostly by the Army,
     rather than being turned over to the civilian authorities for
     prosecution. There is reason to believe that in many instanc-
     es the detainees have been tortured before being killed,
     probably to extract information from them. The annual rate
     of such killings has recently run in the low hundreds.

The International Narcotics Control Act specifies that the administra-
tion must find that Peru's military and police forces are not engaged
in a "consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recog-
nized human rights." The administration, Schifter says, has inter-
preted the term "consistent pattern" to "apply to institutions which
have committed themselves, as a matter of policy, to gross violations
of human rights or which engage in gross violations so consistently
and uniformly that a policy can be inferred." The human rights
violations carried out by branches of the Peruvian government--the
military and the police forces--are not handed down from the high
command as a matter of policy, he says, but rather are ad hoc
decisions taken by soldiers/policemen in the field. Nor do the abuses
rise to the level of "a consistent pattern," he asserts, because some
1,000 Sendero have not been summarily killed by the security forces,
but rather are receiving trials through the judicial system!

          Human Rights Watch on Peru

Contrary to the State Department testimony, Holly Burkhalter says
that the human rights situation has not improved substantially during
President Alberto Fujimori's first year in office. Attached to Burkhal-
ter's testimony is a 4 page letter outlining in detail Human Rights
Watch's objections to the administration's determination that Peru's
human rights record lives up to the law. In sum, though, she says:

     Our great concern with the determination is that the Ad-
     ministration equated promises of human rights improvement
     by the Fujimori government with the actual fulfillment of the
     mandatory human rights standards contained in US law. In
     our view, it should have been impossible to certify that an
     army and police responsible for literally hundreds of docu-
     mented disappearances of Peruvians and a number of cruel
     massacres of unarmed civilians in the past six months are
     not involved in gross abuses of internationally recognized
     human rights. In our view, it should not have been possible
     to certify that an army which has never once submitted to
     prosecution and punishment of a single member for abuses
     of human rights is firmly under civilian control.

She notes that the government has taken some recent action to per-
mit civilian officials onto military premises to investigate human rights
violations, and it has announced that the army will create a register
of all the people it is detaining. "Mr. Chairman," she says, "the steps
announced within recent weeks by the Peruvian government only
came about because of pressure by the US Congress. But we have no
evidence that these steps have resulted in a diminution in killings,
torture and disappearances. We urge you to uphold the law and
continue to deny Peru security assistance until there are demonstrable
signs that human rights violations have ended." 
19 September  The Senate Armed Services Committee holds a
hearing on possible US assistance in the conversion of the Soviet
arms industry. Former Pentagon official William Perry, Arthur
Alexander of the RAND Corporation, and Allen Paulson of the Gulf-
stream Corporation testify.  

17 October  The SFRC holds a hearing on Iraq's nuclear program,
with Senator John Glenn, David Kay (IAEA) and Robert Galucci
(Deputy Director of the UN Special Commission overseeing Iraq's
disarmament) testifying. Glenn outlines two legislative proposals he
is introducing today to put "brains, backbone and teeth into our
nuclear non-proliferation policy." One of these, the Omnibus Trade
Sanctions Bill of 1991 (S.1128), is designed to "take the profits out
of proliferation" he says, by attacking the incentives of suppliers to
meet the demands of would-be proliferators. It would ban imports by
the US government of products from firms that aid nuclear prolifera-
tion efforts. He also introduces, along with Rep. Pete Stark, a
resolution (J.Res.207) on 21 reforms to strengthen the IAEA.

        Iraq's Nuclear Program

David Kay, the leader of the IAEA team involved in the "parking lot
incident" in Iraq, describes the information the team recovered:

   This sixth inspection took place from 22-28 September and
   was successful in collecting a vast--over 45,000 pages--
   amount of documentation directly relevant to the Iraqi
   nuclear weapons design and development program. ... The
   inspection team obtained conclusive evidence that the
   Government of Iraq had a program for developing an implo-
   sion-type nuclear weapon. ... Contrary to Iraq's claims of
   having only a peaceful nuclear program, the team found
   documents showing that Iraq had been working on the
   revision of a nuclear weapons design and one linking the
   IAEC [Iraqi Atomic Energy Agency] to work on a surface-to-
   surface missile project--presumably one intended delivery
   system for their nuclear weapon.

Kay says that the IAEA has identified three uranium enrichment pro-
grams in Iraq, and that Iraq is still withholding information related to
centrifuge enrichment, weapons design and procurement networks.
The nuclear weapons effort has resulted in "the indiginization of the
scientific and technical infrastructure necessary to support a nuclear
weapons program," he says. However, Kay also notes in his testimo-
ny that the Security Council has established procedures "for the
development of a regime that would ensure over the longer term that
this capacity would not be redeveloped."

18 October  The SFRC Subcommittee on Trade, Terrorism and
Narcotics continues its hearings into the BCCI scandal and its foreign
policy implications. James Dougherty II, an insurance investigator for
Lloyd's of London, testifies that BCCI "provided financial backing to
a Jordanian businessman named Munther Ismael Bilbeisi who illegally
sold helicopters and munitions to Central American governments."
Dougherty says that he notified Customs Service and Justice Depart-
ment officials about this repeatedly beginning in late 1989 but
received no response.  

21 October  The HFAC Subcommittees on International Organizations
and Europe and the Middle East hold a hearing on Iraqi compliance
with United Nations ceasefire resolutions; US Ambassador to the UN
Thomas Pickering and Assistant Secretary of State John Bolton
testify. 

Long-term, Intrusive UN Presence in Iraq

Pickering provides very comprehensive and detailed testimony on
implementation of UN Security Council Res. 687, the Gulf War
ceasefire. He describes the resolution as "the foundation of the most
comprehensive ceasefire program in modern history." Consistent with
its unprecedented nature, he says, is the plan for the long term
monitoring of Iraq's nuclear, CBW and ballistic missile programs,
adopted unanimously on 11 October by the Security Council. "This
compliance monitoring plan [Res. 715] mandates the strongest, most
extensive verification procedures and the most effective enforcement
provisions in the history of arms control arrangements," he asserts,
seeming to imply that this is a voluntary arms control measure, rather
than mandated disarmament. Res. 715, which entered into force
when it was passed by the Security Council, provides for "permanent,
extensive oversight of any Iraqi activities with possible bearing on
nuclear and non-nuclear weapons of mass destruction." And it inc-
ludes, according to Pickering, "immediate, unconditional and unre-
stricted access to all facilities, equipment, personnel, records, or any
item the inspectors may wish to inspect."


          Non-existent BW Weapons and Phantom Missiles

The Special Commission found no biological weapons, nor any
evidence of biological-weapons production in Iraq, Pickering notes.
Concerning ballistic missiles, he says that: "Since destroying Iraq's
declared ballistic missiles, launchers, related equipment and produc-
tion capacity as well as its so called "Super Gun," the Special
Commission is concentrating its efforts on locating what is believed
to be several hundred or more undeclared Scud and related missiles.
With the recent addition of several helicopters the Special Commissi-
on's capacity to search for the missing Scuds will, we hope, be
greatly enhanced."

          Arms Embargo Against Iraq Will Remain in Force

On conventional arms imports, Pickering notes that: "The ceasefire
resolution also mandated a tough, permanent arms embargo against
Iraqi imports of technology for weapons of mass destruction, as well
as a ban on import of conventional weapons until such time as the
Security Council finds Iraq in compliance with 687 and subsequent
relevant resolutions. Needless to say, the tight noose which continues
to encircle Iraq as a consequence of the overall sanctions and
embargo regime is also a highly effective antidote to arms acquisition.
You may recall that the Secretary General developed detailed guide-
lines intended to help ensure effective and universal observation of
the arms embargo. On June 17 the Security Council adopted those
guidelines in resolution 700 and directed member states to bring their
national legislation and practices in conformity with them. To date, 
approximately 50 countries have reported to the Secretary General
on domestic measure taken to give effect to the arms embargo."

Finally, he provides estimates of the cost of implementing the
ceasefire resolutions: from the Special Commission's inception in April
through the end of this year its work will cost $46 million. He notes
that these figures do not reflect large increases anticipated in the
Special Commission's budget due to the costs of confiscating large
amounts of Iraqi materiel and of the long-term monitoring.

23 October  The SFRC holds another hearing on Iraq's nuclear
weapons program. Hans Blix, Director General of the IAEA, testifies
on the implications of Iraq's covert nuclear program for the future of
the IAEA and nuclear non-proliferation efforts in general. Against the
negative picture of Iraq, he outlines numerous recent successes in
global non-proliferation, noting: Brazil and Argentina's recent bilateral
agreement to forswear nuclear weapons and the opening up of their
installations to IAEA safeguards; recent statements by China and
France that both "are ready in principle" to join the NPT; and South
Africa's recent signing of the NPT, with Mozambique, Tanzania and
Zambia quickly following suit. Further, he notes that "North Korea,
which adhered to the treaty in 1985, recently accepted the IAEA's
standard agreement for safeguards verification under the NPT." 

     Hans Blix: What He Needs to Do His Job

While many western countries readily criticize IAEA's inspection
regime as insufficient, Blix notes that "the present system of verifica-
tion and inspections under the NPT ... reflects the reluctance of the
industrialized states which created it to confer far-reaching rights on
international inspectors." The IAEA must have access to intelligence
sources, such as satellite information and information from supplier
states on exports of relevant material, he says. Further, "the Agency
must have the right of free access to locations pinpointed by the intel-
ligence reports. Although the Agency is given the right to perform
special inspections in safeguard agreements, it has never been used
for the purpose of inspecting undeclared locations. This is primarily
because up until recent events in Iraq, there was never any informa-
tion indicating a need for such inspections." Other necessary reforms
are the right to short notice, unannounced inspections and the right
of entry for inspectors to the inspected country without obtaining a
visa. 

He laments that with seven years of zero real growth budgeting, the
Agency's annual budget of $60 million is not sufficient to do its job
properly. The IAEA has 200 inspectors to cover almost 1000 installa-
tions worldwide, not counting those of the recent adherents. He notes
that the twice yearly inspections are due to need to treat all adherents
uniformly. "[W]ith more frequent inspections, we might have deferred
Iraqi authorities from the nuclear weapons effort." But, the number of
visits is also restricted by budgetary considerations. Further con-
tributing to IAEA's financial problems is "the manner in which several
countries delay their payments against their regular budget assess-
ments until late in the calendar or program year so that we are
perennially in economic disaster. Regrettably, the example of the
United States is rubbing off on other countries."

         IAEA Will Name Names

Concerning the documents confiscated from Iraq, he says "barring
any directive to the contrary from the Security Council, we will make
public names of firms which appear to have been involved in trade n
sensitive items. We have no wish to protect any firms violating
national regulations. But we must handle this responsibly."

30 October  The HFAC Western Hemisphere Subcommittee holds a
hearing on US military aid to El Salvador. 

 Aronson on US Success in El Salvador

Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Bernard
Aronson outlines the considerable recent movement toward a
cessation to the long-running Salvadoran civil war. Of the US role he
says:

   US policy has also helped move El Salvador over the past
   decade toward both peace and democratic reform. There is
   an important lesson here for future policy. Go back and
   read the debate about US aid to El Salvador over the past
   decade. You will find opponents of aid claiming that US
   assistance fueled the war and prevented a settlement. In
   truth, US assistance ensured that those seeking to rule El
   Salvador through violence and intimidation, on both the left
   and the right, did not prevail while Salvadoran society
   slowly, painfully, but deliberately created authentic demo-
   cratic institutions, opened political space, and created new
   mechanisms to defend human rights and the rule of law.

Aronson paints military aid as the US government's only means of
"engagement" with the government of El Salvador; the only alterna-
tive to it is to abandon any US role there. The administration and
those in Congress who have demonstrated the "political courage to
refuse to abandon El Salvador ... deserve some credit for helping to
create the conditions that allowed Salvadorans to achieve these
goals," he asserts. He continues:

   I find it incomprehensible that some members of this body
   want to reopen this debate today by proposing new legisla-
   tion that would risk sending new and dangerous signals to
   the parties involved in the process just as peace is becom-
   ing visible. Rather than descend into another fruitless,
   irresponsible, and dangerous political quarrel over issues of
   assistance that have already been settled, Congress and the
   Administration should begin preparing for the challenges of
   peace. [By continuing to send weapons?]

         Rep. Levine Disagrees

Representatives Mel Levine, Matthew McHugh and Jim McDermott
testify in opposition to continued military aid to El Salvador. Levine
explains his opposition: "One of the terms applicable to FY91 funding
provided for a suspension in assistance if the Salvadoran Government
fails to conduct a thorough and professional investigation into the
murders of the Jesuit priests. No set of circumstances could justify
a good faith certification that this condition has been met. Yet, the
aid was allowed to flow unhindered. ... Six of the eight soldiers
implicated in the murder ... were acquitted even though they admitted
their involvement. Testimony was perjured, withheld, and destroyed;
the military employed intimidation tactics on the judge and jury; and
strong evidence suggests that officers higher ranking than those
convicted were involved. Everything wrong with the Salvadoran
judicial system was manifest at this trial."

"The administration argued that any changes in the Salvador aid
program would send the wrong message to the Government and
could upset the peace process. This argument is nothing more than
a red herring to stymie Congressional action. We've seen the
administration use this tactic before. For example, to squelch debate
on human rights abuses in China, Syria and now, once again, in El
Salvador. ... The administration has it backwards. By not adding new
conditions we are sending the wrong message."

Levine and Subcommittee Chairman Torricelli today introduce
H.R.3498, the "El Salvador Peace, Security and Justice Act," to
foster further progress in the ongoing peace talks, while expressing
outrage over continued human rights abuses by the Salvadoran
government. The legislation mandates an immediate transfer of $10
million from Salvador's military assistance account into the "Demobili-
zation and Transition Fund," and requires that half of what is left of
the FY91 assistance be transferred to the fund if the army officers
convicted in the Jesuit murder are pardoned or given amnesty.

            Continuing Resolution Keeps Weapons-Aid Flowing

Rep. McHugh laments: "The United States has provided more than $4
billion of military and economic assistance to the government, while
the FMLN has received some assistance from others. Neither side is
close to a military victory. ... While we cannot mandate peace and
justice from Washington ... we must do all we can to encourage the
parties to those ends. The primary tool available to Congress for this
purpose is the foreign aid program. It is an imperfect instrument, but
how we handle assistance now will send the clearest message to El
Salvador of just how serious we are about wanting an end to this
war. Unfortunately, the House recently passed a Continuing Resolu-
tion which does not send a strong enough message. Beyond the
military aid already in the pipeline (which approximates $80 million),
it appropriates an additional $42 million in military aid for the first six
months of fiscal year 1992."

            Rep. McHugh for Reprogramming Military Aid

McHugh urges that any additional military aid for El Salvador be
subject to reprogramming, which would preclude further military
assistance unless the appropriate committees of Congress were first
notified and the Committees agreed that the aid was justified. "[R]e-
programming is not a radical proposal," he says. "Currently, we
require the President to reprogram all US assistance for nine coun-
tries. Given the unpredictable nature of events in El Salvador, and the
uncertainty surrounding negotiations, reprogramming would be the
best way for Congress to reserve judgment on future aid in this case
as well."  

Rep. McDermott outlines House action/inaction on El Salvador military
aid: before the continuing resolution passed last week, he notes, it
had been a year and a half since the House had voted on the issue.
"Congress has ducked this issue over and over again this year," he
asserts. He says:

    For too long we have heard the same rationale from the
    Administration about our policy in El Salvador. We are told
    that our involvement in El Salvador will help teach the
    Salvadoran military respect human rights and that our aid is
    essential to maintain the fragile democracy that exists and
    to end the civil war. But when you cut through these stale
    arguments, one fact remains: twelve year of military aid
    have yet to bring peace or justice to El Salvador. 

30 October  The Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East
Asian and Pacific Affairs holds a hearing on the security environment
in the Asia-Pacific region. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian
and Pacific Affairs Richard Solomon gives an overview of the issues.

          Richard Solomon: Chaos in Pacific Rim?  

There are a number of differing rivalries within the Asian/Pacific area,
Solomon says. Now that the previously somewhat-unifying Soviet
threat is gone, "What had been a secondary aspect of our Cold War
security presence is now evolving into the primary rationale for our
defense engagement in the region: to provide geopolitical balance; to
be an honest broker; and to reassure against uncertainty." This role
will remain "for the foreseeable future," Solomon assures the subcom-
mittee. 


He notes the desire of the Philippines "to discuss a three year
withdrawal agreement" of US forces. The loss of Subic Naval base is
more tolerable now than it would have been previously, he says:
"While we have no intention of building new military bases abroad,
we have the option of working out new access arrangements with
other nations in the region," such as joint facilities in Australia and a
recently concluded access agreement with Singapore. 

          Removal of Tactical Nukes from Ships and Subs

Of President Bush's announcement on 27 September that tactical
nuclear weapons would be removed from all surface ships and attack
subs, he says: "As a matter of national policy, US Navy ships will not
carry nuclear weapons in normal circumstances, although we would
retain the option to redeploy them in a future crisis." He mentions the
possibility of reviving the ANZUS treaty in light of this initiative. But,
"The President's announcement has not altered our reluctance to
accede to the SPNFZ [South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone] protocols.
Various aspects of the protocol of the Treaty of Raratonga remain
problematic. In some respects, the Treaty's provisions are more
restrictive than those of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and do not meet our
criteria for acceptable nuclear free zones." [!]
Solomon also says that the initiative further limits North Korea's
excuses for not opening up all of its nuclear facilities to full-scope
IAEA safeguards. He says that the US administration views "full com-
pliance by the North Koreans with the IAEA safeguard regime as an
indispensable step towards the larger objective of agreement by both
Seoul and Pyongyang to keep the Korean Peninsula free from the
production or acquisition of any weapons-grade nuclear material--the
essential requirement for ensuring that there is no nuclear arms race
on the Peninsula."

Legislation passed and pending                            

Previous issues of the ASM have focussed on the major relevant
legislation--the foreign aid authorization and appropriation bills and the
State Department authorization bill. During the past two months, two
of these bills went through conference committee and floor votes,
one being enacted into law and the other dying in the House; the third
bill--the appropriations bill--has been stalled in the Senate through an
agreement with the administration; a continuing resolution was
passed to appropriate funds in the interim. Summary updates of these
follow.

Foreign Aid Authorization Dies on House Floor

H.R.2508, the International Security and Economic Cooperation Act,
which authorizes the foreign aid expenditures for FY92 and 93, was
conferenced on 16-17 September, but not yet reported out as the
conferees engaged in further discussion with administration in an
attempt to overcome its objections to the bill. Several issues
unrelated to military aid and arms transfer policy were at issue (e.g.,
family planning aid). The conference bill was finally reported out on
27 September, and is printed in the Congressional Record of that
date. See pp. H6943-7016 for the text of the bill and pp. H7016-
7066 for the accompanying report language.

The Senate passed the conferenced H.R.2508 on 8 October by a vote
of 61-38; however, the House failed by a wide margin to pass the bill
in its vote on 30 October, making it highly unlikely that an authorizing
bill will be enacted this year. (None has been enacted since 1985,
with the failure due in the past to the Senate.) 

Passage of the legislation had been in doubt in the House, and it had
twice been withdrawn from consideration to further shore up support.
The lopsided House vote--159 for, and 262 against--was due to
domestic politics more than to any particular problem with the bill,
although the administration did oppose some provisions. In the midst
of a serious recession, and with the Democrats in Congress accusing
President Bush of lacking a domestic policy, a vote in support of a
$25 billion foreign aid bill was not deemed politic.

FY92-93 Foreign Aid Appropriation Bill on Hold 

A foreign aid appropriation bill was passed in the House on 19 June,
with much of the same policy language contained in the House
authorizing bill [see ASM nos. 4-5]. In the Senate, appropriating
legislation was never reported out of the Foreign Operations subcom-
mittee of the Appropriations Committee. In early September Sen.
Patrick Leahy, Chairman of the Subcommittee, agreed to block further
action on the bill until early next year in order to deny a vehicle for
the passage of $10 billion in housing loan guarantees which Israel is
seeking from the United States. The administration requested this
action to encourage the Middle East peace process underway. 
Continuing Resolution Tides Things Over

Since no appropriation would be worked out, both chambers passed
on 24 October, as part of an omnibus continuing resolution (H.J.Res.
360), a stop-gap appropriation through the end of March. The funding
contained in the measure is set at the levels approved by the House
in its appropriating bill passed in June, or at the FY91 funding level,
whichever is lower. Many of the same people who voted against the
foreign aid authorization in the House voted for this money bill. 

Leahy says he will act on the two year appropriations bill well before
the March deadline of the continuing resolution expires.
 
State Department Authorization Bill Becomes Law!

H.R.1415, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act which authorizes
the State Department and related agencies appropriations, was
reported out of the House-Senate conference on 3 October. The
Senate approved the measure by a voice vote on 4 October, and the
House passed it on the 8th; the bill was signed into law by President
Bush on 28 October as PL 102-138. 

Unfortunately provisions on arms transfer policy that were contained
in the Senate version of this bill were cut, because they were
redundant to language contained in the now-moribund foreign aid
authorization bill. Many pertinent provisions remain, however:

Under Title III ("Miscellaneous Foreign Policy Provisions"), the con-
ference bill allows Congress to block an attempt by the Executive
Branch to rescind a prior determination that a country is a "terrorist
nation" (which affects its eligibility to receive arms from the United
States). Under this law, Congress has 45 days after notification of
such intent during which it can block the rescission by passing a joint
resolution against it. 

          Policy on Arms Sales to the Mideast Further Weakened

Section 322 contains what remains of the policy guidance on Mideast
arms sales which had originally been introduced by Sen. John Kerry
[see ASM No. 3]. He introduced four requirements that sales to the
region must meet; of these only three remain. Deleted was the very
sensible provision that, in the words of the conference report, "with
the agreement of other suppliers no transfers take place which would
introduce newly developed advanced defense articles that would
create new and significantly higher combat capabilities in the region." 

The criteria that remain, each already embodied in existing law, are:
reliable assurances must be given by recipients that defense articles
and services will be used only for specified purposes; the transfer
must not contribute to an arms race; and the administration must
"take steps to ensure that each recipient affirm the right of all nations
in the region to exist within safe and secure borders and support
direct regional peace negotiations."

          Loan Guarantee Program Stripped Out 

A provision, sponsored by Sen. Chris Dodd, for the State Department to 
administer $1 billion in loan guarantess to promote commercially-brokered
arms sales to NATO and major non-NATO allies was defeated in the
conference. House conferees of both parties opposed the measure, while
Senate conferees were split on the issue. Sen. Sarbanes led the Senate
opposition to it; Senators Kerry and Dodd supported it. It was finally 
defeated by a one vote margin on the Senate side, with three key Republicans
voting against it: Hank Brown voting for himself and by proxy for
Jesse Helms and Nancy Kassebaum voted against the program. 

         Link Between Arms and Democracy in Mideast Denied

A measure introduced by Sen. Joe Biden that would require the
President to report on the extent to which Mideast recipients of
American weapons had taken steps to build democratic institutions
and to foster economic development in the region was deleted.

The much-vaunted "Arms Transfer Restraint Policy for the Middle East
and Persian Gulf Region" is contained under Title IV of the bill. It
requires the President to continue negotiations he initiated among the
five permanent members of the UN Security Council, and to "commit
the United States to a multilateral arms transfer and control regime
toward the Middle East and Persian Gulf." The conference bill also
encourages the President to propose to the five the adoption of a
temporary moratorium on transfer of major military equipment to the
Mideast and Persian Gulf "until such time that an agreement on a
multinational arms transfer and control regime is concluded."

         The Moratorium?

Included in the bill is a section under the heading "Limitation on
United States Arms Sales to the Middle East and persian Gulf," which
states that "Beginning 60 days after enactment, sales could be made
and licenses issued to nations in the Middle East and Persian Gulf only
after the President certifies that he has undertaken good faith efforts
to convene a conference for the establishment of an arms supplier
regime. ... The conferees believe that the President has met the
requirements to undertake good faith efforts ... and that the President
can easily meet the certification requirements of this section." The
conferees note that if good faith efforts in this area cease, "it would
be the intention of a majority of the conferees to use all available
means to achieve the purposes of this section."[!] 
 
A provision that had been in the Senate version of the bill, mandating 
that the administration submit a report "setting forth a US plan for 
leading the world community in establishing a multilateral regime to 
restrict the transfer of conventional and unconventional arms to the 
Middle East" was dropped.

          Reports to Congress

Beginning 15 January 1993 the administration is to submit quarterly
to the relevant committees a report on its progress in implementing
multinational arms transfer and control regime and efforts made by 
US to induce others to curtail volume of arms sales to the Mideast.
Also, within 60 days of enactment it is to submit an initial report on
arms transfers to, and the military balance in, the Mideast and Persian
Gulf, with a similar report due annually beginning 15 January 1992.

Under Title III, Section 324 mandates a report within 90 days of
enactment be submitted to the SFRC and HFAC on "Chinese nuclear,
chemical, biological and missile proliferation practices that improve
the military capabilities of the nations in the Middle East and South
Asia." 

   `Spoils of War' Language Dropped 

A provision subjecting war booty to existing laws governing US arms
transfers was dropped in conference, as identical language was con-
tained in the now-moribund foreign aid bill. The measure would have
called for the President to report within 90 days of enactment on
transfers previously concluded of equipment captured since 2 August
1990. 

      Some CBW Sanctions Included

Title V of the bill contains the "Chemical and Biological Weapons
Control Act," substantially the same as that passed in the 1990
Omnibus Export Amendments Act and vetoed by President Bush. In
this version, though, the conferees agreed to grant the President a
national security waiver. He would be required to notify the chairmen
and ranking minority members of the HFAC/SFRC 15 days prior to
invoking the waiver. 

A jurisdictional difficulty arose with House Ways and Means Commit-
tee over sanctions banning the import by the US government of the
product of companies which are found to be aiding in chemical
proliferation. These are considered to be perhaps the most meaningful
sanctions included. 

H.R.3409 Introduced to Strengthen CBW Sanctions

The House managers of the bill then tried to accommodate Ways and
Means' concerns by introducing on 25 September a stand-alone
measure, H.R.3409, that would amend the Export Administration Act
and the AECA, incorporating a two-tiered system of sanctions against
companies that aid in proliferation. 

H.R.3409 was referred to HFAC and the Ways and Means Commit-
tee. HFAC reported it out on 26 September, and it still awaited mark-
up by Ways and Means at the end of October.

 Omnibus Export Amendments Act of 1991

This bill, H.R.3489, would reauthorize the Export Administration Act
of 1979, the federal law governing high-technology and dual-use
exports which lapsed on 30 September 1990. H.R.3489 would re-
extend the EAA through 1 March 1993. This is considered a short-
term fix, with a major overhaul of the export administration laws
expected next year. Title I of the bill amends the EAA to bring US
export controls into synch with the great changes that have taken
place in the world during past two years: namely it proposes that the
administration seek to remove Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia
from the COCOM list of countries to which dual-use technology is
controlled. Much of H.R.2755, the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention
Act introduced by Reps. Markey, Solomon, Wolpe and Stark and by
Sen. Wirth, is contained under Title III. 

The House passed H.R.3489 by a voice vote on 30 October; the
Senate passed its version, S.320, on 20 February 1991. The bill went
to a conference committee in early November, where the main issue
for conference is the inclusion of nuclear proliferation sanctions in the
House version of the bill.

Recent congressional publications                    

Andean Drug Strategy (hearing of the Western Hemisphere Affairs
Subcommittee, House Foreign Affairs Committee on 26 Feb 91)
USGPO: 1991, 67 pp.

Andean Strategy (hearing of the Narcotics Abuse & Control Commit-
tee on 11 June 91) USGPO: 1991, 108 pp.

Arms Control: US and International Efforts to Ban Chemical Weapons
(GAO/NSIAD-91-317), 30 September 91, 28 pp. 

Banca Nationale Del Lavoro (BNL) (hearing of the Banking, Finance &
Urban Affairs Committee on 9 April 91) USGPO: 1991

Defense Research: Protecting Sensitive Data and Materials at 10
Chemical and Biological Laboratories (GAO/NSIAD-91-57), 8 July 91.

Drug Enforcement Administration and the 1991 Andean Interdiction
Operations (hearing of the Government Information, Justice and
Agriculture Subcommittee of the Government Operations Committee
on 22 May 91) USGPO: 1991.

Drug War Observations on Counternarcotics Aid to Colombia (GAO/-
NSIAD-92-296), 30 September 91.

Drug War: US Programs in Peru Face Serious Obstacles (GAO/NSIAD-
92-36), 21 October 91.

Export-Import Bank: Financing Commercial Military Sales (CRS Issue
Brief no. 91074) updated 23 September 91, 12 pp.

Foreign Assistance Legislation for Fiscal Years 1992-93 (parts 1-9)
(hearings of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and its subcommit-
tees on foreign aid legislation during 1991) USGPO: 1991.

Internal Controls: Theft at Three Defense Facilities in Utah
(GAO/NSIAD-91-215), 22 August 91, 17 pp.

Inventory Management: Strengthened Controls Needed to Detect and
Deter Small Arms Parts Thefts (GAO/NSIAD-91-186), 17 July 91.

Iraqi and Banca Nationale Del Lavoro Participation in Export-Import
Programs (hearing of the Banking, Finance & Urban Affairs Commit-
tee, 17 April 1991), USGPO: 1991.

Redesigning Defense: Planning the Transition to the Future US
Defense Industrial Base, Office of Technology Assessment, USGPO:
1991.

Southwest Asia: Cost of Protecting US Interests (GAO/NSIAD-91-
250), 14 August 91, 22 pp.

The US Export-Import Bank: No Evidence of Financing Restricted
Chemical Exports to Iraq (GAO/NSIAD-91-284), 30 September 91.

United States Exports of Sensitive Technology to Iraq (hearing of the
International Economic Policy and Trade Subcommittee of HFAC on
8 April and 22 May 91) USGPO: 1991, 128 pp.

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