(Issue No. 7-8 , Sept-Oct 1991)
Sales in progress 16 September The DSAA notifies Congress of a proposed sale of 110 "surplus" M-60A3 tanks with Tank Thermal Sights to Taiwan for $119 million. The deal includes overhauling the tanks, as well as machine guns, smoke grenade launchers, spare parts and logistics support for the tanks.16 September Congress is notified of the Air Force's intention to sell Egypt ground-based communications equipment, spare parts and associated support and facilities services for its air defense system at a price of $70 million. 17 September The Pentagon proposes a $547 million sale to Thailand of 18 F-16 A&B model fighter aircraft, along with four spare engines and six LANTIRN night navigation/targeting pods. 17 September The DSAA notifies Congress of its intention to sell South Korea 179 AIM-7M Sparrow missiles for Korea's F-4 fighter aircraft at a price of $31 million. Another deal, worth $86 million, in spare parts for Korea's F-4, F-5, T-37, C-130 and F-16 aircraft is also conveyed to Congress. 17 September Congress is told by the Pentagon of its intention to transfer $350 million worth of design, engineering and managerial services to Kuwait for the restoration and repair of the Ali Al Salem and Ahmed Al Jabar air bases. 19 September Congress is notified by the DSAA of the Navy's inten- tion to transfer 36 A-7 and TA-7 aircraft to Greece, which will pay $120 million to have the aircraft overhauled. The deal also includes 14 spare engines, other spare parts, training and logistics support. 19 September The DSAA tells Congress of the Air Force's intention to sell Turkey $70 million worth of spare parts for its C-130, F-4E, F- 5, F-100, F-104, T-33, T-37 and T-38 aircraft. 23 September President Bush notifies Congress that he is reinstating the military aid to Jordan which Congress had cut off in the Desert Shield/Storm Supplemental Budget Bill last Spring. Congress deleted the assistance in retribution for Jordan's support of Saddam Hussein during the war, but included a waiver to be invoked if the President determined the aid was in the national interest. In justifying his determination that it was, President Bush says the military aid "would be beneficial to the peace process." Jordan may now receive the full $57.2 million in military assistance appropriated for FY91. 27 September The State Department determines that the Armaments Corporation of South Africa (ARMSCOR) has engaged in "missile technology proliferation activities" that require--under a law passed in the FY91 defense authorization act--the prohibition of certain imports, exports and contracts involving ARMSCOR. Specifically, licenses for all items controlled by the AECA and EAA to ARMSCOR will be denied for 2 years starting from today; no US government contracts with ARMSCOR may be entered into for that period; and no products of ARMSCOR may be imported into the US for two years. These are category one sanctions--the most serious level--which mean that ARMSCOR's proliferant activities related to complete missile systems or subsystems as listed in category one of the "Equipment and Technology Annex" to the MTCR guidelines. Israel reportedly exported to South Africa the equipment which led to the imposition of these sanctions; however, Israel was not sanctioned. 8 October Rep. Dave Obey, chairman of the House Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee, sends a second letter [see ASM No. 6] to Secretary of State Baker concerning the proposed coproduction/sale of 40 out of an eventual 80 F-16 aircraft to Turkey, notified to Congress on 23 July. Although the congressio- nal review period passed on 6 August, clearing the way for the formal offer, the LOA has yet to be signed. Obey is concerned that Congress will be committed, perhaps against its will, to fund the second part of the deal. He also questions the wisdom of the sale in light of Turkey's worsening human rights record. Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs Janet Mullins responds to Obey's letter, saying the deal does not lock the US gov- 8ernment into a future commitment to fund the purchase of the remaining 40 aircraft. She says, "If the US and other friends of Turkey are unable to provide assistance for military modernization, then the government of Turkey must provide the additional funding needed to complete the program, or the program will be terminated." On Turkey's human rights record, she notes that "the human rights situation in Turkey must improve. While there have been some ad- vances ... during this past year, problems remain. We will continue to convey our concerns on this subject to the highest levels of the Turk- ish government." 24 October The formal LOA between the US government and the government of South Korea for the FMS portion of the Korean F-16 deal [see ASM No. 4-5] is signed in Washington today. The next day, in Seoul, General Dynamics and Samsung Aerospace sign an agree- ment for the commercial portion of the sale--the licensed production component. Taken together, the deal is worth more than $5 billion. Speeches, letters, etc. 11 September Sen. Dennis DeConcini, who--along with Helsinki Commission Chairman Steny Hoyer--recently led a Congressional delegation to Vienna for a meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), says the CSCE could play an important role in monitoring and limiting arms transfers. "Nine of the world's top ten arms-selling states are CSCE members," he notes. "The United States, which sold more weapons last year than any other nation, has a special responsibility in this regard, and should be at the head of efforts to stem the destabilizing flow of arms. Yet we do little, while our allies and friends propose concrete measures." Poland recently submitted a proposal for CSCE action in this area. 17 October Congress receives a Report on US Export Controls from President Bush, which outlines the actions taken by the Executive branch in light of the lapse of the Export Administration Act on 30 September last year. (Congress passed reauthorizing legislation in November 1990, but President Bush vetoed it due to provisions he found unacceptable pertaining to sanctions for chemical weapons proliferation activities.) The Export Administration Act has been administered under presidential fiat--by use of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act-- and will continue to be administered by such until new reauthorizing legislation is passed [see page 6]. The report outlines administration initiatives in the area of export controls on dual-use items, including the Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative that President Bush announced in December 1990, and the subsequent Department of Commerce regulations to implement and enforce it. He also discusses the new, pared-down COCOM core list of items still subject to national security export controls by the 17 COCOM member-states. The new list became effective on the 1st of September. In devising the new core list, he says, Commerce totally revised its Commodity Control List (now called Commerce Control List), and during this process export controls on exports of some computers, aircraft and petroleum products to South Africa were removed. 25 October Speaking of the recommendations of the UN study group that has been looking at ways of promoting transparency and openness in the international arms trade, Sen. William Roth notes that "An arms registry is not the final step, but it is a first step, and it is a significant step. It will provide arms trading nations information around which to begin to build cooperative trading behavior, and it will increase the amount of information which is publicly available regarding global arms transfers. ... As one of the world's leading arms exporters, the United States cannot shirk its responsibility to export in an accountable and controlled manner, nor can it neglect its equally important responsibility to exercise leadership to ensure that other nations follow this lead." Roth introduces a resolution (S.Res.207) en- dorsing the UN's work. 31 October In a statement on the House floor, Rep. Bill McCollum says that the House Republican Task Force on Terrorism and Uncon- ventional Warfare, which he chairs, published two reports in July on Iran's nuclear-weapons-making efforts. "I find it of great concern that the information released in these reports ... was so easily dismissed by senior officials within the administration," he opines. The reports, entitled "Iran's Nuclear Effort" and "Iran's Nuclear Effort--An Update," are printed in their entirety in the Congressional Record. Notes from some hearings 12 September The Human Rights and Western Hemisphere Subcom- mittees and the Task Force on International Narcotics Control of the HFAC hold a hearing on military aid to Peru in light of ongoing con- cerns about human rights violations there. On 30 July the State Department notified Congress that the Fujimori government met the human rights conditions necessary under the International Narcotics Control Act of 1990 to receive weapons grants from the United States in order to combat its coca production. At issue is $35 million in military aid authorized for FY91, and--because the administration linked it to Peru's acceptance of the military aid--$60 million in econ- omic assistance. Stephen H. Greene of the Drug Enforcement Agency and several Assistant Secretaries of State testify in support of military aid to Peru for counter-narcotics purposes; Holly Burkhalter of America's Watch testifies against it. State Department Justifies Weapons to Peru The State Department maintains that military aid is necessary both in order to imbue in the Peruvian security forces the American military's respect for human rights and to have some success in slaying the coca crop. Indeed, the administration pegs the overall success of the Andean initiative--the drug wars in Bolivia, Colombia and Peru--on Peru's receipt of US military assistance, as Peru is the largest producer of the coca plant, responsible for 60% of the world's total. The State Department also contends that development aid to Peru is useless without attendant military assistance, as brutal Sendero Luminoso insurgents will destroy the development projects and kill the those taking part in them. The State of the Drug-War Aronson describes current US military engagement in Peru: "Through a March 1990 agreement, we are already providing over $19 million in equipment and training to the Peruvian National Police to support counter-narcotics operations primarily in the Upper Hullagua Valley of Peru. The center of this effort is the Santa Lucia counter-narcotics base. In the one year period ending in March 1991, the police have mounted air operations which have destroyed 150 labs, seized over 5 metric tons of coca paste, and disrupted trafficking networks. ... New resources from our 1991 aid package will extend the reach of existing counternarcotics programs." Assistant Secretary for Interna- tional Narcotics Matters, Melvyn Levitsky, adds that the Peruvian Air Force has forced down and inspected over 50 aircraft in the Upper Hullagua Valley. "These efforts, however, have been limited, due in large part to serious shortfalls in equipment, spare parts, fuel, and sufficient manpower." Levitsky says that the US military assistance is explicitly for counter- narcotics purposes, and not for counter-insurgency use against the Sendero Luminoso or other groups. "End use monitoring in the field and review procedures will be set up so that we can assure compli- ance with the agreement," he says. Further, Levitsky notes that "The only role for DOD personnel in Peru is in a training and technical capacity. This is necessary because of the quality and quantity of equipment which we will be supplying. It also allows the US to upgrade the effectiveness of the Peruvian military--while at the same time imprinting US values in areas such as human rights. There will be no DOD presence on field operations." State Department Plays Semantics Game On Peru's human rights record, Richard Schifter, the Assistant Secretary for Human Rights, says: "Except for restrictions imposed in the country's emergency zones, fundamental freedoms are generally respected in Peru." [Holly Burkhalter, in her testimony, notes that 55% of the population lives in security zones!] He continues: Peru's security forces, it should be clear, do not as a rule engage in random repression. The human rights problem which they pose stems from the nature of the response of some units and some individuals to the terrorist threat. ... In some security zones captured terrorists or persons suspected of belonging to or collaborating with terrorist organizations have been killed by the security forces, mostly by the Army, rather than being turned over to the civilian authorities for prosecution. There is reason to believe that in many instanc- es the detainees have been tortured before being killed, probably to extract information from them. The annual rate of such killings has recently run in the low hundreds. The International Narcotics Control Act specifies that the administra- tion must find that Peru's military and police forces are not engaged in a "consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recog- nized human rights." The administration, Schifter says, has inter- preted the term "consistent pattern" to "apply to institutions which have committed themselves, as a matter of policy, to gross violations of human rights or which engage in gross violations so consistently and uniformly that a policy can be inferred." The human rights violations carried out by branches of the Peruvian government--the military and the police forces--are not handed down from the high command as a matter of policy, he says, but rather are ad hoc decisions taken by soldiers/policemen in the field. Nor do the abuses rise to the level of "a consistent pattern," he asserts, because some 1,000 Sendero have not been summarily killed by the security forces, but rather are receiving trials through the judicial system! Human Rights Watch on Peru Contrary to the State Department testimony, Holly Burkhalter says that the human rights situation has not improved substantially during President Alberto Fujimori's first year in office. Attached to Burkhal- ter's testimony is a 4 page letter outlining in detail Human Rights Watch's objections to the administration's determination that Peru's human rights record lives up to the law. In sum, though, she says: Our great concern with the determination is that the Ad- ministration equated promises of human rights improvement by the Fujimori government with the actual fulfillment of the mandatory human rights standards contained in US law. In our view, it should have been impossible to certify that an army and police responsible for literally hundreds of docu- mented disappearances of Peruvians and a number of cruel massacres of unarmed civilians in the past six months are not involved in gross abuses of internationally recognized human rights. In our view, it should not have been possible to certify that an army which has never once submitted to prosecution and punishment of a single member for abuses of human rights is firmly under civilian control. She notes that the government has taken some recent action to per- mit civilian officials onto military premises to investigate human rights violations, and it has announced that the army will create a register of all the people it is detaining. "Mr. Chairman," she says, "the steps announced within recent weeks by the Peruvian government only came about because of pressure by the US Congress. But we have no evidence that these steps have resulted in a diminution in killings, torture and disappearances. We urge you to uphold the law and continue to deny Peru security assistance until there are demonstrable signs that human rights violations have ended." 19 September The Senate Armed Services Committee holds a hearing on possible US assistance in the conversion of the Soviet arms industry. Former Pentagon official William Perry, Arthur Alexander of the RAND Corporation, and Allen Paulson of the Gulf- stream Corporation testify. 17 October The SFRC holds a hearing on Iraq's nuclear program, with Senator John Glenn, David Kay (IAEA) and Robert Galucci (Deputy Director of the UN Special Commission overseeing Iraq's disarmament) testifying. Glenn outlines two legislative proposals he is introducing today to put "brains, backbone and teeth into our nuclear non-proliferation policy." One of these, the Omnibus Trade Sanctions Bill of 1991 (S.1128), is designed to "take the profits out of proliferation" he says, by attacking the incentives of suppliers to meet the demands of would-be proliferators. It would ban imports by the US government of products from firms that aid nuclear prolifera- tion efforts. He also introduces, along with Rep. Pete Stark, a resolution (J.Res.207) on 21 reforms to strengthen the IAEA. Iraq's Nuclear Program David Kay, the leader of the IAEA team involved in the "parking lot incident" in Iraq, describes the information the team recovered: This sixth inspection took place from 22-28 September and was successful in collecting a vast--over 45,000 pages-- amount of documentation directly relevant to the Iraqi nuclear weapons design and development program. ... The inspection team obtained conclusive evidence that the Government of Iraq had a program for developing an implo- sion-type nuclear weapon. ... Contrary to Iraq's claims of having only a peaceful nuclear program, the team found documents showing that Iraq had been working on the revision of a nuclear weapons design and one linking the IAEC [Iraqi Atomic Energy Agency] to work on a surface-to- surface missile project--presumably one intended delivery system for their nuclear weapon. Kay says that the IAEA has identified three uranium enrichment pro- grams in Iraq, and that Iraq is still withholding information related to centrifuge enrichment, weapons design and procurement networks. The nuclear weapons effort has resulted in "the indiginization of the scientific and technical infrastructure necessary to support a nuclear weapons program," he says. However, Kay also notes in his testimo- ny that the Security Council has established procedures "for the development of a regime that would ensure over the longer term that this capacity would not be redeveloped." 18 October The SFRC Subcommittee on Trade, Terrorism and Narcotics continues its hearings into the BCCI scandal and its foreign policy implications. James Dougherty II, an insurance investigator for Lloyd's of London, testifies that BCCI "provided financial backing to a Jordanian businessman named Munther Ismael Bilbeisi who illegally sold helicopters and munitions to Central American governments." Dougherty says that he notified Customs Service and Justice Depart- ment officials about this repeatedly beginning in late 1989 but received no response. 21 October The HFAC Subcommittees on International Organizations and Europe and the Middle East hold a hearing on Iraqi compliance with United Nations ceasefire resolutions; US Ambassador to the UN Thomas Pickering and Assistant Secretary of State John Bolton testify. Long-term, Intrusive UN Presence in Iraq Pickering provides very comprehensive and detailed testimony on implementation of UN Security Council Res. 687, the Gulf War ceasefire. He describes the resolution as "the foundation of the most comprehensive ceasefire program in modern history." Consistent with its unprecedented nature, he says, is the plan for the long term monitoring of Iraq's nuclear, CBW and ballistic missile programs, adopted unanimously on 11 October by the Security Council. "This compliance monitoring plan [Res. 715] mandates the strongest, most extensive verification procedures and the most effective enforcement provisions in the history of arms control arrangements," he asserts, seeming to imply that this is a voluntary arms control measure, rather than mandated disarmament. Res. 715, which entered into force when it was passed by the Security Council, provides for "permanent, extensive oversight of any Iraqi activities with possible bearing on nuclear and non-nuclear weapons of mass destruction." And it inc- ludes, according to Pickering, "immediate, unconditional and unre- stricted access to all facilities, equipment, personnel, records, or any item the inspectors may wish to inspect." Non-existent BW Weapons and Phantom Missiles The Special Commission found no biological weapons, nor any evidence of biological-weapons production in Iraq, Pickering notes. Concerning ballistic missiles, he says that: "Since destroying Iraq's declared ballistic missiles, launchers, related equipment and produc- tion capacity as well as its so called "Super Gun," the Special Commission is concentrating its efforts on locating what is believed to be several hundred or more undeclared Scud and related missiles. With the recent addition of several helicopters the Special Commissi- on's capacity to search for the missing Scuds will, we hope, be greatly enhanced." Arms Embargo Against Iraq Will Remain in Force On conventional arms imports, Pickering notes that: "The ceasefire resolution also mandated a tough, permanent arms embargo against Iraqi imports of technology for weapons of mass destruction, as well as a ban on import of conventional weapons until such time as the Security Council finds Iraq in compliance with 687 and subsequent relevant resolutions. Needless to say, the tight noose which continues to encircle Iraq as a consequence of the overall sanctions and embargo regime is also a highly effective antidote to arms acquisition. You may recall that the Secretary General developed detailed guide- lines intended to help ensure effective and universal observation of the arms embargo. On June 17 the Security Council adopted those guidelines in resolution 700 and directed member states to bring their national legislation and practices in conformity with them. To date, approximately 50 countries have reported to the Secretary General on domestic measure taken to give effect to the arms embargo." Finally, he provides estimates of the cost of implementing the ceasefire resolutions: from the Special Commission's inception in April through the end of this year its work will cost $46 million. He notes that these figures do not reflect large increases anticipated in the Special Commission's budget due to the costs of confiscating large amounts of Iraqi materiel and of the long-term monitoring. 23 October The SFRC holds another hearing on Iraq's nuclear weapons program. Hans Blix, Director General of the IAEA, testifies on the implications of Iraq's covert nuclear program for the future of the IAEA and nuclear non-proliferation efforts in general. Against the negative picture of Iraq, he outlines numerous recent successes in global non-proliferation, noting: Brazil and Argentina's recent bilateral agreement to forswear nuclear weapons and the opening up of their installations to IAEA safeguards; recent statements by China and France that both "are ready in principle" to join the NPT; and South Africa's recent signing of the NPT, with Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia quickly following suit. Further, he notes that "North Korea, which adhered to the treaty in 1985, recently accepted the IAEA's standard agreement for safeguards verification under the NPT." Hans Blix: What He Needs to Do His Job While many western countries readily criticize IAEA's inspection regime as insufficient, Blix notes that "the present system of verifica- tion and inspections under the NPT ... reflects the reluctance of the industrialized states which created it to confer far-reaching rights on international inspectors." The IAEA must have access to intelligence sources, such as satellite information and information from supplier states on exports of relevant material, he says. Further, "the Agency must have the right of free access to locations pinpointed by the intel- ligence reports. Although the Agency is given the right to perform special inspections in safeguard agreements, it has never been used for the purpose of inspecting undeclared locations. This is primarily because up until recent events in Iraq, there was never any informa- tion indicating a need for such inspections." Other necessary reforms are the right to short notice, unannounced inspections and the right of entry for inspectors to the inspected country without obtaining a visa. He laments that with seven years of zero real growth budgeting, the Agency's annual budget of $60 million is not sufficient to do its job properly. The IAEA has 200 inspectors to cover almost 1000 installa- tions worldwide, not counting those of the recent adherents. He notes that the twice yearly inspections are due to need to treat all adherents uniformly. "[W]ith more frequent inspections, we might have deferred Iraqi authorities from the nuclear weapons effort." But, the number of visits is also restricted by budgetary considerations. Further con- tributing to IAEA's financial problems is "the manner in which several countries delay their payments against their regular budget assess- ments until late in the calendar or program year so that we are perennially in economic disaster. Regrettably, the example of the United States is rubbing off on other countries." IAEA Will Name Names Concerning the documents confiscated from Iraq, he says "barring any directive to the contrary from the Security Council, we will make public names of firms which appear to have been involved in trade n sensitive items. We have no wish to protect any firms violating national regulations. But we must handle this responsibly." 30 October The HFAC Western Hemisphere Subcommittee holds a hearing on US military aid to El Salvador. Aronson on US Success in El Salvador Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Bernard Aronson outlines the considerable recent movement toward a cessation to the long-running Salvadoran civil war. Of the US role he says: US policy has also helped move El Salvador over the past decade toward both peace and democratic reform. There is an important lesson here for future policy. Go back and read the debate about US aid to El Salvador over the past decade. You will find opponents of aid claiming that US assistance fueled the war and prevented a settlement. In truth, US assistance ensured that those seeking to rule El Salvador through violence and intimidation, on both the left and the right, did not prevail while Salvadoran society slowly, painfully, but deliberately created authentic demo- cratic institutions, opened political space, and created new mechanisms to defend human rights and the rule of law. Aronson paints military aid as the US government's only means of "engagement" with the government of El Salvador; the only alterna- tive to it is to abandon any US role there. The administration and those in Congress who have demonstrated the "political courage to refuse to abandon El Salvador ... deserve some credit for helping to create the conditions that allowed Salvadorans to achieve these goals," he asserts. He continues: I find it incomprehensible that some members of this body want to reopen this debate today by proposing new legisla- tion that would risk sending new and dangerous signals to the parties involved in the process just as peace is becom- ing visible. Rather than descend into another fruitless, irresponsible, and dangerous political quarrel over issues of assistance that have already been settled, Congress and the Administration should begin preparing for the challenges of peace. [By continuing to send weapons?] Rep. Levine Disagrees Representatives Mel Levine, Matthew McHugh and Jim McDermott testify in opposition to continued military aid to El Salvador. Levine explains his opposition: "One of the terms applicable to FY91 funding provided for a suspension in assistance if the Salvadoran Government fails to conduct a thorough and professional investigation into the murders of the Jesuit priests. No set of circumstances could justify a good faith certification that this condition has been met. Yet, the aid was allowed to flow unhindered. ... Six of the eight soldiers implicated in the murder ... were acquitted even though they admitted their involvement. Testimony was perjured, withheld, and destroyed; the military employed intimidation tactics on the judge and jury; and strong evidence suggests that officers higher ranking than those convicted were involved. Everything wrong with the Salvadoran judicial system was manifest at this trial." "The administration argued that any changes in the Salvador aid program would send the wrong message to the Government and could upset the peace process. This argument is nothing more than a red herring to stymie Congressional action. We've seen the administration use this tactic before. For example, to squelch debate on human rights abuses in China, Syria and now, once again, in El Salvador. ... The administration has it backwards. By not adding new conditions we are sending the wrong message." Levine and Subcommittee Chairman Torricelli today introduce H.R.3498, the "El Salvador Peace, Security and Justice Act," to foster further progress in the ongoing peace talks, while expressing outrage over continued human rights abuses by the Salvadoran government. The legislation mandates an immediate transfer of $10 million from Salvador's military assistance account into the "Demobili- zation and Transition Fund," and requires that half of what is left of the FY91 assistance be transferred to the fund if the army officers convicted in the Jesuit murder are pardoned or given amnesty. Continuing Resolution Keeps Weapons-Aid Flowing Rep. McHugh laments: "The United States has provided more than $4 billion of military and economic assistance to the government, while the FMLN has received some assistance from others. Neither side is close to a military victory. ... While we cannot mandate peace and justice from Washington ... we must do all we can to encourage the parties to those ends. The primary tool available to Congress for this purpose is the foreign aid program. It is an imperfect instrument, but how we handle assistance now will send the clearest message to El Salvador of just how serious we are about wanting an end to this war. Unfortunately, the House recently passed a Continuing Resolu- tion which does not send a strong enough message. Beyond the military aid already in the pipeline (which approximates $80 million), it appropriates an additional $42 million in military aid for the first six months of fiscal year 1992." Rep. McHugh for Reprogramming Military Aid McHugh urges that any additional military aid for El Salvador be subject to reprogramming, which would preclude further military assistance unless the appropriate committees of Congress were first notified and the Committees agreed that the aid was justified. "[R]e- programming is not a radical proposal," he says. "Currently, we require the President to reprogram all US assistance for nine coun- tries. Given the unpredictable nature of events in El Salvador, and the uncertainty surrounding negotiations, reprogramming would be the best way for Congress to reserve judgment on future aid in this case as well." Rep. McDermott outlines House action/inaction on El Salvador military aid: before the continuing resolution passed last week, he notes, it had been a year and a half since the House had voted on the issue. "Congress has ducked this issue over and over again this year," he asserts. He says: For too long we have heard the same rationale from the Administration about our policy in El Salvador. We are told that our involvement in El Salvador will help teach the Salvadoran military respect human rights and that our aid is essential to maintain the fragile democracy that exists and to end the civil war. But when you cut through these stale arguments, one fact remains: twelve year of military aid have yet to bring peace or justice to El Salvador. 30 October The Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs holds a hearing on the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Richard Solomon gives an overview of the issues. Richard Solomon: Chaos in Pacific Rim? There are a number of differing rivalries within the Asian/Pacific area, Solomon says. Now that the previously somewhat-unifying Soviet threat is gone, "What had been a secondary aspect of our Cold War security presence is now evolving into the primary rationale for our defense engagement in the region: to provide geopolitical balance; to be an honest broker; and to reassure against uncertainty." This role will remain "for the foreseeable future," Solomon assures the subcom- mittee. He notes the desire of the Philippines "to discuss a three year withdrawal agreement" of US forces. The loss of Subic Naval base is more tolerable now than it would have been previously, he says: "While we have no intention of building new military bases abroad, we have the option of working out new access arrangements with other nations in the region," such as joint facilities in Australia and a recently concluded access agreement with Singapore. Removal of Tactical Nukes from Ships and Subs Of President Bush's announcement on 27 September that tactical nuclear weapons would be removed from all surface ships and attack subs, he says: "As a matter of national policy, US Navy ships will not carry nuclear weapons in normal circumstances, although we would retain the option to redeploy them in a future crisis." He mentions the possibility of reviving the ANZUS treaty in light of this initiative. But, "The President's announcement has not altered our reluctance to accede to the SPNFZ [South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone] protocols. Various aspects of the protocol of the Treaty of Raratonga remain problematic. In some respects, the Treaty's provisions are more restrictive than those of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and do not meet our criteria for acceptable nuclear free zones." [!] Solomon also says that the initiative further limits North Korea's excuses for not opening up all of its nuclear facilities to full-scope IAEA safeguards. He says that the US administration views "full com- pliance by the North Koreans with the IAEA safeguard regime as an indispensable step towards the larger objective of agreement by both Seoul and Pyongyang to keep the Korean Peninsula free from the production or acquisition of any weapons-grade nuclear material--the essential requirement for ensuring that there is no nuclear arms race on the Peninsula." Legislation passed and pending Previous issues of the ASM have focussed on the major relevant legislation--the foreign aid authorization and appropriation bills and the State Department authorization bill. During the past two months, two of these bills went through conference committee and floor votes, one being enacted into law and the other dying in the House; the third bill--the appropriations bill--has been stalled in the Senate through an agreement with the administration; a continuing resolution was passed to appropriate funds in the interim. Summary updates of these follow. Foreign Aid Authorization Dies on House Floor H.R.2508, the International Security and Economic Cooperation Act, which authorizes the foreign aid expenditures for FY92 and 93, was conferenced on 16-17 September, but not yet reported out as the conferees engaged in further discussion with administration in an attempt to overcome its objections to the bill. Several issues unrelated to military aid and arms transfer policy were at issue (e.g., family planning aid). The conference bill was finally reported out on 27 September, and is printed in the Congressional Record of that date. See pp. H6943-7016 for the text of the bill and pp. H7016- 7066 for the accompanying report language. The Senate passed the conferenced H.R.2508 on 8 October by a vote of 61-38; however, the House failed by a wide margin to pass the bill in its vote on 30 October, making it highly unlikely that an authorizing bill will be enacted this year. (None has been enacted since 1985, with the failure due in the past to the Senate.) Passage of the legislation had been in doubt in the House, and it had twice been withdrawn from consideration to further shore up support. The lopsided House vote--159 for, and 262 against--was due to domestic politics more than to any particular problem with the bill, although the administration did oppose some provisions. In the midst of a serious recession, and with the Democrats in Congress accusing President Bush of lacking a domestic policy, a vote in support of a $25 billion foreign aid bill was not deemed politic. FY92-93 Foreign Aid Appropriation Bill on Hold A foreign aid appropriation bill was passed in the House on 19 June, with much of the same policy language contained in the House authorizing bill [see ASM nos. 4-5]. In the Senate, appropriating legislation was never reported out of the Foreign Operations subcom- mittee of the Appropriations Committee. In early September Sen. Patrick Leahy, Chairman of the Subcommittee, agreed to block further action on the bill until early next year in order to deny a vehicle for the passage of $10 billion in housing loan guarantees which Israel is seeking from the United States. The administration requested this action to encourage the Middle East peace process underway. Continuing Resolution Tides Things Over Since no appropriation would be worked out, both chambers passed on 24 October, as part of an omnibus continuing resolution (H.J.Res. 360), a stop-gap appropriation through the end of March. The funding contained in the measure is set at the levels approved by the House in its appropriating bill passed in June, or at the FY91 funding level, whichever is lower. Many of the same people who voted against the foreign aid authorization in the House voted for this money bill. Leahy says he will act on the two year appropriations bill well before the March deadline of the continuing resolution expires. State Department Authorization Bill Becomes Law! H.R.1415, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act which authorizes the State Department and related agencies appropriations, was reported out of the House-Senate conference on 3 October. The Senate approved the measure by a voice vote on 4 October, and the House passed it on the 8th; the bill was signed into law by President Bush on 28 October as PL 102-138. Unfortunately provisions on arms transfer policy that were contained in the Senate version of this bill were cut, because they were redundant to language contained in the now-moribund foreign aid authorization bill. Many pertinent provisions remain, however: Under Title III ("Miscellaneous Foreign Policy Provisions"), the con- ference bill allows Congress to block an attempt by the Executive Branch to rescind a prior determination that a country is a "terrorist nation" (which affects its eligibility to receive arms from the United States). Under this law, Congress has 45 days after notification of such intent during which it can block the rescission by passing a joint resolution against it. Policy on Arms Sales to the Mideast Further Weakened Section 322 contains what remains of the policy guidance on Mideast arms sales which had originally been introduced by Sen. John Kerry [see ASM No. 3]. He introduced four requirements that sales to the region must meet; of these only three remain. Deleted was the very sensible provision that, in the words of the conference report, "with the agreement of other suppliers no transfers take place which would introduce newly developed advanced defense articles that would create new and significantly higher combat capabilities in the region." The criteria that remain, each already embodied in existing law, are: reliable assurances must be given by recipients that defense articles and services will be used only for specified purposes; the transfer must not contribute to an arms race; and the administration must "take steps to ensure that each recipient affirm the right of all nations in the region to exist within safe and secure borders and support direct regional peace negotiations." Loan Guarantee Program Stripped Out A provision, sponsored by Sen. Chris Dodd, for the State Department to administer $1 billion in loan guarantess to promote commercially-brokered arms sales to NATO and major non-NATO allies was defeated in the conference. House conferees of both parties opposed the measure, while Senate conferees were split on the issue. Sen. Sarbanes led the Senate opposition to it; Senators Kerry and Dodd supported it. It was finally defeated by a one vote margin on the Senate side, with three key Republicans voting against it: Hank Brown voting for himself and by proxy for Jesse Helms and Nancy Kassebaum voted against the program. Link Between Arms and Democracy in Mideast Denied A measure introduced by Sen. Joe Biden that would require the President to report on the extent to which Mideast recipients of American weapons had taken steps to build democratic institutions and to foster economic development in the region was deleted. The much-vaunted "Arms Transfer Restraint Policy for the Middle East and Persian Gulf Region" is contained under Title IV of the bill. It requires the President to continue negotiations he initiated among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, and to "commit the United States to a multilateral arms transfer and control regime toward the Middle East and Persian Gulf." The conference bill also encourages the President to propose to the five the adoption of a temporary moratorium on transfer of major military equipment to the Mideast and Persian Gulf "until such time that an agreement on a multinational arms transfer and control regime is concluded." The Moratorium? Included in the bill is a section under the heading "Limitation on United States Arms Sales to the Middle East and persian Gulf," which states that "Beginning 60 days after enactment, sales could be made and licenses issued to nations in the Middle East and Persian Gulf only after the President certifies that he has undertaken good faith efforts to convene a conference for the establishment of an arms supplier regime. ... The conferees believe that the President has met the requirements to undertake good faith efforts ... and that the President can easily meet the certification requirements of this section." The conferees note that if good faith efforts in this area cease, "it would be the intention of a majority of the conferees to use all available means to achieve the purposes of this section."[!] A provision that had been in the Senate version of the bill, mandating that the administration submit a report "setting forth a US plan for leading the world community in establishing a multilateral regime to restrict the transfer of conventional and unconventional arms to the Middle East" was dropped. Reports to Congress Beginning 15 January 1993 the administration is to submit quarterly to the relevant committees a report on its progress in implementing multinational arms transfer and control regime and efforts made by US to induce others to curtail volume of arms sales to the Mideast. Also, within 60 days of enactment it is to submit an initial report on arms transfers to, and the military balance in, the Mideast and Persian Gulf, with a similar report due annually beginning 15 January 1992. Under Title III, Section 324 mandates a report within 90 days of enactment be submitted to the SFRC and HFAC on "Chinese nuclear, chemical, biological and missile proliferation practices that improve the military capabilities of the nations in the Middle East and South Asia." `Spoils of War' Language Dropped A provision subjecting war booty to existing laws governing US arms transfers was dropped in conference, as identical language was con- tained in the now-moribund foreign aid bill. The measure would have called for the President to report within 90 days of enactment on transfers previously concluded of equipment captured since 2 August 1990. Some CBW Sanctions Included Title V of the bill contains the "Chemical and Biological Weapons Control Act," substantially the same as that passed in the 1990 Omnibus Export Amendments Act and vetoed by President Bush. In this version, though, the conferees agreed to grant the President a national security waiver. He would be required to notify the chairmen and ranking minority members of the HFAC/SFRC 15 days prior to invoking the waiver. A jurisdictional difficulty arose with House Ways and Means Commit- tee over sanctions banning the import by the US government of the product of companies which are found to be aiding in chemical proliferation. These are considered to be perhaps the most meaningful sanctions included. H.R.3409 Introduced to Strengthen CBW Sanctions The House managers of the bill then tried to accommodate Ways and Means' concerns by introducing on 25 September a stand-alone measure, H.R.3409, that would amend the Export Administration Act and the AECA, incorporating a two-tiered system of sanctions against companies that aid in proliferation. H.R.3409 was referred to HFAC and the Ways and Means Commit- tee. HFAC reported it out on 26 September, and it still awaited mark- up by Ways and Means at the end of October. Omnibus Export Amendments Act of 1991 This bill, H.R.3489, would reauthorize the Export Administration Act of 1979, the federal law governing high-technology and dual-use exports which lapsed on 30 September 1990. H.R.3489 would re- extend the EAA through 1 March 1993. This is considered a short- term fix, with a major overhaul of the export administration laws expected next year. Title I of the bill amends the EAA to bring US export controls into synch with the great changes that have taken place in the world during past two years: namely it proposes that the administration seek to remove Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia from the COCOM list of countries to which dual-use technology is controlled. Much of H.R.2755, the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act introduced by Reps. Markey, Solomon, Wolpe and Stark and by Sen. Wirth, is contained under Title III. The House passed H.R.3489 by a voice vote on 30 October; the Senate passed its version, S.320, on 20 February 1991. The bill went to a conference committee in early November, where the main issue for conference is the inclusion of nuclear proliferation sanctions in the House version of the bill. Recent congressional publications Andean Drug Strategy (hearing of the Western Hemisphere Affairs Subcommittee, House Foreign Affairs Committee on 26 Feb 91) USGPO: 1991, 67 pp. Andean Strategy (hearing of the Narcotics Abuse & Control Commit- tee on 11 June 91) USGPO: 1991, 108 pp. Arms Control: US and International Efforts to Ban Chemical Weapons (GAO/NSIAD-91-317), 30 September 91, 28 pp. Banca Nationale Del Lavoro (BNL) (hearing of the Banking, Finance & Urban Affairs Committee on 9 April 91) USGPO: 1991 Defense Research: Protecting Sensitive Data and Materials at 10 Chemical and Biological Laboratories (GAO/NSIAD-91-57), 8 July 91. Drug Enforcement Administration and the 1991 Andean Interdiction Operations (hearing of the Government Information, Justice and Agriculture Subcommittee of the Government Operations Committee on 22 May 91) USGPO: 1991. Drug War Observations on Counternarcotics Aid to Colombia (GAO/- NSIAD-92-296), 30 September 91. Drug War: US Programs in Peru Face Serious Obstacles (GAO/NSIAD- 92-36), 21 October 91. Export-Import Bank: Financing Commercial Military Sales (CRS Issue Brief no. 91074) updated 23 September 91, 12 pp. Foreign Assistance Legislation for Fiscal Years 1992-93 (parts 1-9) (hearings of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and its subcommit- tees on foreign aid legislation during 1991) USGPO: 1991. Internal Controls: Theft at Three Defense Facilities in Utah (GAO/NSIAD-91-215), 22 August 91, 17 pp. Inventory Management: Strengthened Controls Needed to Detect and Deter Small Arms Parts Thefts (GAO/NSIAD-91-186), 17 July 91. Iraqi and Banca Nationale Del Lavoro Participation in Export-Import Programs (hearing of the Banking, Finance & Urban Affairs Commit- tee, 17 April 1991), USGPO: 1991. Redesigning Defense: Planning the Transition to the Future US Defense Industrial Base, Office of Technology Assessment, USGPO: 1991. Southwest Asia: Cost of Protecting US Interests (GAO/NSIAD-91- 250), 14 August 91, 22 pp. The US Export-Import Bank: No Evidence of Financing Restricted Chemical Exports to Iraq (GAO/NSIAD-91-284), 30 September 91. United States Exports of Sensitive Technology to Iraq (hearing of the International Economic Policy and Trade Subcommittee of HFAC on 8 April and 22 May 91) USGPO: 1991, 128 pp.