Arms Sales Monitor #13-14, March-April 1992

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(Issue No. 13-14 , March-April 1992)


Sales in progress

Missile proliferation sanctions invoked 6 March---The Lyongaksan
Machineries and Equipment Export Corporation, the Changgwang Credit
Corporation (both of North Korea), and the Ministry of Defense and
Armed Forces Logistics (Iran) are found to have engaged in "missile
proliferation activities" resulting in the imposition of sanctions
under the AECA. Beginning today and effective for two years,
licenses for exports to those firms of any items controlled by the
EAA will be denied, no US government contracts will be entered with
them, and no products made by them can be imported into the US.
Because North Korea is a non-market economy, these sanctions will
apply to the entire North Korean government.  

In the past 12 months missile proliferation sanctions have also
been invoked against Pakistan and South Africa, and they were
waived in the cases of Israel and China, in exchange for their
promises to abide by the MTCR export control guidelines in the
future. (See ASM No. 7-8, page 1 and No. 11-12, page 1.)

Radars for Turkey proposed  11 March---The DSAA notifies Con-
gress of the Army's proposed sale to Turkey of AN/TPQ-36 fire-
finding, counter-mortar radars, manufactured by Hughes aircraft.
The sale is valued at $28 million.  

F-16 sale to Turkey finalized  
26 March--- Pentagon and Turkish officials sign a formal LOA for 40
F-16C/D fighter aircraft and related equipment, valued at $1.5
billion. Turkish Aerospace Industries, Inc. will make 90 percent of
the aircraft airframes in Turkey. 

In 1983 Turkey contracted for the sale/licensed production of 160
F-16s, and has to date taken delivery of 94 of them. A sale of 40
more aircraft are anticipated.  

Patriot/Hawk sale to Kuwait  
31 March---The DSAA notifies Congress of its intention to sell
Kuwait Patriot and Hawk air-defense systems. The $2.5 billion sale
includes 6 Patriot fire units, one training unit, one "maintenance
float fire unit," radar, fire control and launching stations, 450
Patriot missiles, 6 mobile Hawk missile batteries (Phase II), 342
Hawk missiles, related equipment and software.  

Kuwait is also being offered trucks, trailers, utility vehicles and
25 High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles.    

On 28 April, Rep. Howard Berman introduces H.J.Res.473, which would
prohibit the Patriot/Hawk sale. Two days later the 30-day
Congressional notification period elapses, freeing the
administration to make the formal offer to Kuwait.

TOW missiles to Egypt  7 April---Congress is notified of the
Pentagon's intention to sell 695 TOW 2A guided anti-tank missiles
to Egypt for $28 million.  

Commercial transfers announced in late April 
28 April---The State Department notifies Congress of its desire to
license the commercial export of "major defense equipment" to both
Thailand and Taiwan.  

Speeches, letters, etc.                        

HFAC Chair warns State Dept. to shape up on arms licensing  
2 April---House Foreign Affairs Chairman Dante Fascell writes Sec.
of State Jim Baker concerning the recently released State
Department Inspector General's audit ("Department of State
Defense Trade Controls"), the findings of which he says "are very
disturbing." "The audit demonstrates that our conventional arms
transfer policy is over-extended, counterproductive and mis-
managed." Fascell warns the Secretary against issuing export
licenses for any major military equipment "until you can advise
the Congress that adequate policy and management controls are
in place." Otherwise, Congress will take unilateral action.

Bi-partisan opposition to Saudi F-15 sale  
9 April---Over one-half of the House of Representatives send
President Bush a letter expressing concern over arms sales to the
Middle East. In particular, they note that, "Since the Gulf War,
the Administration has sold $14.8 billion worth of major military
equipment to Saudi Arabia." Citing reports that the Administration
is now considering the sale of 72 advanced combat aircraft to that
country, they say "an F-15 sale would represent a significant
escalation of the regional arms race." The high volume of US sales
"puts the US in a position where we are unable to ask a country
like Russia to refrain from selling top-of-the-line SU-24 aircraft
and T-72 tanks to Iran because we are unwilling to stop our own
sales."

Signers of the letter, which was circulated by Rep. Mel Levine, in-
clude the Chairman and ranking minority member of the Foreign
Affairs Committee, and the majority and minority whips.  

Berman opposes `defensive' missiles  
27 April---Rep. Howard Berman sends out a "dear colleague" letter
announcing his opposition to the administration's planned $2.5
billion sale of anti-aircraft and anti-missile missiles to Kuwait.
"Some people will ask, why stop a sale of defensive weapons? The
US-Soviet arms race dramatically demonstrated the escalating
relationship between defensive and offensive weapons. The fact is
that all arms sales contribute to the arms race. The only
justification for the sale of Hawks and Patriots to Kuwait is
short-term, short-sighted economic gain. As the Gulf war
dramatically proved, the weapons cannot defend Kuwait. Only foreign
forces can do that. This sale is nothing more than prepositioning
for Iraq."

Notes from some hearings                   

HFAC Favors Non-Proliferation Fund

3 March---The HFAC Subcommittee on Arms Control holds a
hearing on arms control and proliferation in the 1990s. Testifying
are Elisa Harris and Janne Nolan of the Brookings Institution, and
Louis Nosenzo of the Meridian Corporation.

Chairman Dante Fascell has a plan for addressing the problem: "It
is my hope that a nonproliferation and disarmament fund could be
established as part of the foreign aid bill in the amount of
several hundred million dollars.... These funds would be used to
support bilateral and multilateral efforts to halt the
proliferation of all types of weaponry." As examples of uses, he
cites US support of: the IAEA and special supplements to its budget
for the disarmament of Iraq; an international technical and
scientific center to employ Russian and other scientists to work on
non-proliferation controls and conversion of defense industry;
computer and communications links between the UN and the
Permanent Five conventional arms transfer restraint regimes; and
a computer network among MTCR member states.

Chemical weapons deproliferation  "The information available in
the open literature does not suggest that the [chemical weapons]
proliferation problem has gotten appreciably worse," Harris says.
In fact, several countries are relinquishing chemical and
biological weapons programs: Iraq is being forcibly disarmed; the
US and Russia have agreed (in 1990) to deep bilateral reductions in
their chemical weapons arsenals. Further, she notes related con-
fidence-building steps are being undertaken by several countries,
including India and Pakistan and North and South Korea. In South
America, "nearly every country ... has agreed not to develop, pro-
duce, acquire, store, retain or use chemical or biological weapons.
They have also agreed to be original signatories of the Chemical
Weapons Convention." Harris suggests there are many reasons
for this "deproliferation." In particular, countries "must weigh
the political costs of possessing chemical weapons ... against the
rather limited military benefits of using chemical weapons,
especially against a well protected adversary."

Anti-ballistic missile proliferation  Citing South Korea's ability
to reverse engineer Nike Hercules air defense missiles in the 1970s
into ballistic missiles, Nolan warns against indiscriminate or
freeflowing transfers of "defensive missiles" such as the Patriot.
Such missiles contribute to an arms race dynamic, spread tech-
nology relevant to ballistic missiles, and nurture the illusion
that there is a technological fix for the problem of missile
proliferation, she argues. 

State Responds to Human Rights Criticism

4 March---Richard Schifter, Assistant Secretary of State for
Humanitarian Affairs, testifies before the Foreign Affairs Subcom-
mittee on Human Rights. In response to criticism raised at a
previous Subcommittee hearing (see ASM No. 11-12), Schifter
says the foremost task of the US government is to protect the
"national interest," rather than to protect human rights. "We must
recognize that our foreign policy cannot be based solely on our
commitment to the cause of human rights." Furthermore, there
are times, he suggests, "when the result which we seek to
achieve, namely to end an abuse, can be reached best by quiet
diplomacy rather than by denunciations and aid cut-offs."

Cheney Cites Dangers of Conventional Weapons Spread

4 March---Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney and Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell appear before the HFAC to
explain the administration's $278.3 billion Pentagon budget
request for FY93. (This dollar figure would represent 18 percent
of the total federal budget outlays in FY93, and 4.5 percent of
the country's GNP.) In cautioning against reductions in the DOD
budget, Cheney says: "It is important for us to remember that
future peace and stability in the world will continue to depend in
large measure upon our willingness to deploy forces overseas, in
Europe, Southwest Asia and the Pacific."

Cheney's prepared statement also says:

     Regional conflicts will increasingly be complicated by
     increases in both the conventional and unconventional
     capabilities in the Third World. ...

     The threat is not limited just to weapons of mass destruction.
     The global diffusion of military and dual-use technologies   
     will enable a growing number of countries to field highly 
     capable weapons systems, such as ballistic missiles, stealthy 
     cruise missiles, integrated air defenses, submarines, modern 
     command and control systems, and even space-based assets. As
     a result, our regional adversaries may be armed with capabili-
     ties that in the past were limited only to the superpowers. 

     We are concerned that political turmoil and economic distress
     in the states of the former Soviet Union may increase the risk
     of potentially dangerous technologies getting into the hands
     of irresponsible governments and individuals. Third World
     countries attempting to acquire nuclear, biological and
     chemical weapons will undoubtedly attempt to take advantage
     of economic distress in the former Soviet Union. The diffusion
     of advanced conventional technologies developed by the
     Soviets could tilt regional balances against our interests. 

4-5 March---Commanders of the various integrated and regional
commands testify before the SASC on the `threats' they face. 

                            US Forces in Korea

Gen. Robert Riscassi, Commander of US Forces in Korea, says
total troop strength of the North Korean armed forces is over 6
million, with nearly 1 million active and the rest in reserve; he
paints an ominous picture of the North's numerical advantage in
military equipment (excluding US forces). Riscassi admits, though,
that "a number of North Korea's military systems are based on
old technologies, updated with product improvement programs,
but still limited in capability due to vintage." By contrast, the
South is equipped with top-of-the-line US and European weapon-
ry. In the past two years, the ROK has purchased 120 F-16
fighters, 8 P-3 Orion naval aircraft and 81 Blackhawk helicopters,
and taken delivery of 90 Cobra helicopters. These purchases
alone add up to over $8 billion, says Riscassi. Although the
country is suffering economically (he notes shortages of food,
fuel, hard currency and technology), Riscassi says sustaining and
improving the military has cost North Korea 20-25 percent of its
GNP per year. South Korea, by comparison, spends around 4
percent of its GNP on its military, but as he later notes, South
Korea's GNP of nearly $300 billion is 10 times the size of the
North's. 25 percent of North Korea's $30 billion GNP equals a
$7.5 billion annual defense expenditure; South Korea's defense
budget was nearly $11 billion last year.

                              Pacific Command

Admiral Charles Larson, Commander-in-Chief of US Pacific
Command, notes that "A by-product of the Cold War era and the
spread of technology is the increasing availability of
sophisticated weapons. Longer-range delivery systems, precision
guidance mechanisms, and more lethal munitions are readily
available on the world market. ... North Korea and China have been
major suppliers of arms to third world counties for years...." [In
1990, according to CRS data, China accounted for 6 percent of all
arms sales made to the Third World; North Korea accounted for less
than .5 percent. The US, by comparison, accounted for 45
percent of all such sales.]


Larson says military relations with China remain under a presi-
dential sanction [due to the Tianaman Square massacre]. "[T]heir
formal agreement to abide by the Missile Technology Control
Regime is a step in the right direction. We are hopeful there will
be continued progress that will allow renewed [US] military
interaction with China." Miliary ties with India are on the
increase and, Larson says, "We look forward to increased contact in
the years ahead to support the Mongolian military's
development..."!

     Central Command

The testimony of Gen. Joseph Hoar, Commander-in-Chief of US
Central Command, makes a 70 page plug for arms sales and
military aid. This assistance, together with a forward presence
(air bases and port visiting rights) and joint military exercises,
are the linchpins of CENTCOM's "peacetime" strategy---and provide
for an easy transition into CENTCOM's "wartime" strategy, should
this presence fail to deter actions disfavored by the US. 


Of the Kuwait war, Hoar says "The US demonstrated its commit-
ment to regional peace and stability and its resolve to maintain
the free flow of oil. Success in these operations opened the door
to increased politico-military cooperation throughout the region.
To date, the US has signed new security agreements with the
Governments of Kuwait and Bahrain, and renewed its long-
standing arrangements with Oman. Discussions continue with
Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates."

His testimony provides an overview, country-by-country, of those
states in his command (all of the Middle East/Persian Gulf except
Israel, plus Pakistan, Afghanistan, and African countries from
Egypt to Kenya), outlining their strategic import to the US (and
the necessity for arms transfers from the US) or the threat that
they pose to US interests (and the reason why other countries
should be prevented from transferring arms to them). 

Urges arms to Pakistan  "US security assistance to Pakistan was
designed to enhance Pakistan's conventional forces and provide
an alternative to nuclear weapons as a means of security."
[However, it failed to do so, and in 1990 the US suspended
security assistance to Pakistan because the President was unable
to certify that Pakistan was not in possession of a nuclear
weapon.] Nevertheless, Hoar continues: "Pakistan will acquire
arms--if not from the US, then from others. Such an outcome will
dilute US influence with this long-term friend in the South Asian
area and erode our ability to work for stability in the region."

No arms for Iran!  Hoar says Iran is using "windfall oil profits"
to step up its force modernization, begun after its 8-year-long war
with Iraq. "Iran may become the greatest threat to peace and
stability in the region," he postulates. "Iran is concentrating on
improving its missile and chemical weapons capabilities", and
"may have embarked on a nuclear weapons program."

Arms control in Iraq?  Without the continuation of UN sanctions,
Hoar says "it is possible for Iraq's military to return to
pre-August 1990 levels within eight to nine years." Coalition
forces arrayed against Iraq eliminated 3,847 tanks, 1,450 fighting
vehicles, and 2,917 artillery pieces from the Iraqi arsenal, he
states. 

Urges more arms to Saudi Arabia  Hoar notes that the US-Saudi
military supply relationship represents "the largest Foreign
Military Sales program in the world." Even so, he says Saudi Arabia
wants to expand "its existing military assistance program with the
United States." Hoar cites an immediate Saudi requirement for F-15
aircraft. A decision on the sale "will have to be made now,
because I think there is a degree of urgency" over Iran and Iraq,
he says. The F-15 is being sought for its air-to-ground anti-armor
capabilities. 

Control freaks  Hoar says: "The sale of US equipment to friendly
countries in our theater is in keeping with the Administration's
efforts to control the spread of arms throughout this volatile
region. Imbalances in military capability, perceived or real, be-
tween potential adversaries only perpetuate the unconstrained
build-up of forces and more destructive weapons. Controlled arms
transfers on our part will assist in the balancing efforts by
satisfying only legitimate defense requirements. This will increase
our credibility as a reliable defense partner and decrease the
perceived need for weapons of mass destruction by regional
countries [see Pakistan above]. ... If nations within the region
are unable to procure US equipment and training, they will not
hesitate to buy equipment from other countries. ... The alternative
of allowing others to sell their most lethal weapons systems
throughout the region, may preclude US influence into the area." 

Amongst pages of apologia for arms sales, Hoar says: "Weapons
proliferation, including weapons of mass destruction and uncon-
trolled growth of conventional weapons, undermines regional
military balances. ... As more countries feel the need to arm
themselves against a perceived threat from their neighbors, the
opportunity for regional conflict grows."

                  Army Chief of Staff on Future `Threats'

5 March---Gen. Gordon Sullivan, Army Chief of Staff, testifies
before the Defense Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations
Committee on the Army's mission in the coming years. "[A] range
of different threats to US interests could quickly emerge from
existing conditions and circumstances: ideology inimical to ours;
amassing arms and technology proliferation; regional instability;
economic collapse, competition or restrictions [!]; renegade states
(Cuba, North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Libya); ethnic, religious and
cultural differences; environmental degradation" [!!?]. Crises that
"challenge our interests could occur in any region of the world"---
he assures the Subcommittee---but says, "the Persian Gulf and
Middle East have become the most contentious and over-milita-
rized regions of the globe." 

He also says: 

     One of the most hazardous and widespread trends in the
     developing world is the proliferation of modern military
     capabilities. The US experience in the Persian Gulf revealed
     the impact of high-technology warfare on the battlefield....
     Many nations are working to upgrade their military 
     capabilities, contributing to the potential for instability 
     and conflict.
     
     The acceleration of technology transfer worldwide, along with
     growing intra-regional competition, will result in an 
     increasing number of developing states acquiring advanced 
     weapons systems. The proliferation of precision-guided 
     munitions and high-technology weapons systems among developing 
     nations will make future Third World battlefields high-risk 
     environments. 

                 JEC Hearing on Non-Proliferation, Part II

13 March---In follow-up to hearings last year, the Subcommittee
on Technology and National Security of the Joint Economic
Committee hears testimony on arms trade and non-proliferation
in the Middle East. Subcommittee Chairman Sen. Jeff Bingaman
presides. The first panel consists of non-governmental experts:
Michael Klare of Hampshire College on conventional arms transfer
restraint; Kathleen Bailey of National Security Research Inc. on
the efficacy of dual-use export controls; Janne Nolan of the
Brookings Institution on the proliferation of advanced technology--
principally ballistic missile technology; and William Potter of the
Monterrey Institute on nuclear proliferation. The second panel
comprises administration witnesses: Richard Clarke, Assistant
Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs; James LeMunyon,
Acting Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Administra-
tion; and Henry Sokolski, Deputy for Non-Proliferation Policy,
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense.

Restraint by US is needed  Klare says: "Because other major
military suppliers view increased US weapons sales as a sign of
American tolerance toward conventional arms transfers, it is likely
that these suppliers will follow our lead and increase their own
sales to areas of conflict. We are faced, therefore, with a choice
between two clear policy options: either we move toward the
adoption of tighter international constraints on the arms trade or
we allow the restoration of an essentially unregulated arms
market. The choice we make in this regard will be crucial for the
future evolution of the international security environment. With
the Cold War over, the greatest threat to world peace and
security that we face today is the increasing frequency and
intensity of regional conflicts. In this situation, the relative
tempo and scale of international arms trafficking will prove
critical: if the arms flow expands, we are almost certain to see an
increase in the intensity and duration of regional conflicts; if we
can somehow bring this trade under control, we will have a better
chance at curbing the virulence of regional conflicts."

Klare outlines the many reasons why controlling the arms trade
is essential: "Iraq did not use its missiles to seize and occupy
Kuwait--such acts of aggression can only be conducted by
conventional forces." Further, he notes the interconnection of
conventional arms proliferation and proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction and missiles. "It is precisely because so many
Third World countries have acquired large quantities of modern
conventional weapons that some among them have acquired
unconventional weapons as a hedge and a deterrent." In addition,
"there is the growing risk that US forces committed to peace-
keeping or contingency operations abroad will be confronted by
capable Third World armies equipped with large numbers of highly
lethal and sophisticated weapons." Finally, Iraq's conventional
arms build-up of the 1980s provoked and sustained the Persian
Gulf crisis, Klare asserts, by providing Saddam the self-confidence
to attack, and encouraing his refusal to abandon Kuwait.

Perm Five effort not enough  Of the Bush administration's arms
transfer control initiative he says: "The adoption of these guide-
lines suggests a strong commitment by the United States to the
principle of conventional arms transfer restraint. If followed up
with appropriate regulatory and enforcement measures, the
London guidelines could provide the foundation for an interna-
tional arms transfer control regime akin to the existing regimes
for the control of nuclear, chemical and missile technology. It is
not clear, however, that Bush Administration officials view the
guidelines in quite this manner. Rather, senior officials appear to
view the guidelines as little more than a hedge against some
future repetition of Iraq's mammoth arms buildup of the 1980s."
In conclusion, Klare says, "in today's uncertain and chaotic world,
it is safer to view most arms transfers as a potential
proliferation risk rather than as an assured asset for US national
security." 

State Dept. on export controls and arms control successes 
Clarke says the past year's record on proliferation and arms trade
control "has been one of substantial achievement." The various
multilateral export control regimes have all expanded their mem-
bership, and both the Australia Group (controlling chemical and
biological weapons-relevant materials) and the Missile Technology
Control Regime have expanded their lists of controlled items.
Specifically, he says, "Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania
and Bulgaria are in the process of applying controls comparable
to those of the Australia Group. Israel has adopted controls on all
50 CW precursors. China has also adopted some precursor
controls, as to a lesser extent, has India. ... [T]he MTCR is
currently working to enlist as members Portugal, Greece, Ireland,
Switzerland, Iceland and Turkey, so as to include all of the EC,
NATO and West European neutral states. The MTCR is also beginning
a dialogue with East Europe, the former Soviet republics, Argentina
and Brazil. The US is discussing with South Africa its adherence to
the guidelines."

In addition, arms control and disarmament regimes have also been
strengthened over the past year: Ten countries joined the Biologi-
cal Weapons Convention. Further, "China has acceded to the NPT
[on 9 March] and France is expected to do so soon. South Africa,
Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have
also adhered to the NPT since the beginning of 1991. Russia has
assumed the obligations of the former Soviet Union under the
NPT, and prospects are favorable for the other newly-independent
states of the former Soviet Union to join the NPT as non-nuclear
weapons states." 

East Europe/Soviet export controls  The former Soviet Union and
East European countries pose special proliferation concerns.
Clarke outlines activity and progress in this area: "In July 1990,
the US conducted a special visit to Eastern Europe focused on the
need to establish responsible and effective non-proliferation and
defense trade controls. A follow-up visit to the region was made
in October 1991. In December 1990 and again in December
1991, the Australia Group held seminars on CBW for Eastern
Europe and the Soviet Union. A multilateral group of MTCR
partners visited Moscow in October 1991 to discuss missile
proliferation. Just last month, an inter-agency team visited
Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia to discuss the need for effective
export controls and to stress the importance of participating in
the non-proliferation regimes. The MTCR will host a seminar for
Eastern European, Baltic and former Soviet Union states on March
30, and a third Australia Group seminar will be conducted in
Budapest in December. The results in Eastern Europe have been
highly encouraging." 

New North Korean ballistic missile?  "North Korea is now the only
country selling complete missile systems that exceed MTCR
parameters to the Third World. ... North Korea has learned to pro-
duce indigenously Scud missiles, and to extend the range of its
Scuds. It sells these missiles to countries in volatile
regions--such as Syria and Iran." He says Pyongyang is also selling
Scud production technology, and that they are working on "on a
still longer range system in the 1000-km class." Clarke says this
missile, dubbed the `Nodong-1', "is very far along in its research
and development. We expect it to be flight-tested early this year,
and we expect that it could be sold in the Middle East early next
year."

Commerce Department  LeMunyon gives testimony largely
redundant to Clarke's, outlining progress in five separate export
control regimes: COCOM (East-West trade); chemical-biological
weapons proliferation; missile proliferation; nuclear proliferation
and supercomputer exports. For both national security and
proliferation reasons, he says the US and Japan have agreed to
apply similar safeguards on suprcomputer exports to various
country groups. In addition, European suppliers are being brought
into the process: "Those negotiations should be successfully
completed later this spring." 

Pentagon's `non-apocalyptic' threats  Sokolski predicts that cruise
missiles, unmanned air vehicles (UAV) and shallow-water
submarines will pose increasing threats to the US and US allies.
"In the Mediterranean, Egypt, Israel, Syria, Algeria and Libya all
have submarines and are in the process of modernizing their
fleets. In the Gulf, Iran and others have either ordered or are
considering orders of submarines. Iraq, before the war, was also
in the market. How these boats will be equipped and employed
and how best to operate in waters where these boats and mines
may be present will clearly be matters of increased interest to our
Navy and to the security forces of our friends, both in and outside
of the region." Submarine sales could complicate the task of
identifying the state responsible for attacks. If a US ship was
sunk by a submarine-placed mine, torpedo, or sub-launched anti-
ship missile, "we and our friends would have the greatest
difficulty knowing who perpetrated the act," Sokolski muses.

During the Gulf War, the US "telegraphed world-wide, literally"
the importance of Global Positioning System (GPS) satellites and
cruise missiles employing such guidance systems. Sokolski says
given access to GPS cruise missiles and UAVs will be easier to
produce. GPS, he says, is "almost certain to create proliferation
headaches."

Soviet `Brain Drain' Not Happening 

17 March---Robert Galucci, coordinator of the State Department
task force to prevent scientists in the former Soviet Union from
selling their skills to weapons programs abroad, and Allan Brom-
ley, Presidential science adviser, testify on their efforts to
prevent a `brain drain' of Soviet scientists. According to the New
York Times, the two tell the Committee there is "no confirmed
evidence that any Soviet scientist or engineer ha[s] gone to work
for Iraq, Libya or other third world countries or that any Soviet
missile or nuclear technology ha[s] been diverted to such na-
tions." The Russians, Bromley says, "are concerned as much as
we are and they are making an historic effort" to ensure that
weapons scientists do not defect.  

Bartholomew on Bush Arms Transfer Policy

24 March---The HFAC Subcommittees on Arms Control and on
Europe and the Middle East hear testimony from Under Secretary
of State for International Security Affairs Reginald Bartholomew
on US conventional arms transfer policy and the prospects for
global restraint in arms sales.

HFAC still favors moratorium  Chairman Dante Fascell sums up
the conditions that led the Committee to seek a moratorium on
arms sales last year, and the events that have transpired since
then. Several lessons, he says, should be noted. First and fore-
most, "Offensive weapons sales spark defensive weapons sales,
and defensive purchases provoke more offensive weapons
purchases. It's called an arms race." Second, we cannot expect
nations engaged in an arms race to exercise restraint. "Such
behavior must be encouraged from outside the region. ... [W]hat
is wrong with new schemes, such as an arms moratorium, and
what is wrong with the US seizing the leadership role to ac-
complish such a moratorium? ... We do not lose anything by
challenging others to join us and stop all sales of all major
defense
equipment to the Middle East/Persian Gulf for the next 6 months
or a year to see if a broader Middle East peace process can take
hold." 

Bartholomew states that the purpose of the Perm Five exercise is
to achieve "responsibility, transparency and consultation," rather
than to limit the trade. "[W]e are not trying to create an interna-
tional arms cartel. Rather, the guidelines give us wide berth to
question and be questioned on such matters. This is exactly what
we intended when we proposed the guidelines." 


Missiles contentious issue  Bartholomew describes the major
outstanding issues in the talks. First, there is not total
agreement on the US proposal to ban transfers of all
surface-to-surface missiles to the Middle East, he says. "[A]ll
five countries have now agreed to limit transfers of missiles and
missile technology defined by the Missile Technology Control
Regime, which includes missiles capable of delivering a 500
kilogram payload to a minimum distance of 300 kilometers. However,
given the danger posed by surface-to-surface missiles and the
history of their use in the Middle East, we believe that it is
necessary to exercise even greater restraint than that called for
by the MTCR. The plain fact is that missiles below MTCR
range/payload capabilities can have a very destabilizing effect in
a region with strategic distances as small as those in the Middle
East."

Info-sharing procedures  The second point of difference lies in the
timing of information-sharing on arms transfers. "We would like
this exchange to occur as early [in the sales decision making
process] as possible. ... Our top concern is that information
should be exchanged in time to permit serious consultation about
whether a transfer should go forward. This process must have the
ability to affect decisions about arms transfers." When asked
whether he thinks it will be possible to achieve prior
notification, Bartholomew answers, "Yes, but I'm worried that it
might take a long time."  

In response to a question about how the notification would
actually take place, Bartholomew says one would simply notify
the other four of a planned transfer of any of the agreed-upon
categories of weapons. The others can call for consultation if the
sale is of concern to them. However, there are no penalties if an
objectionable sale occurs. Legislating penalites would "harm, not
help" the process, warns Bartholomew. 

When asked if there has been any consultation within the group
on the proposed F-15 sale to Saudi Arabia, Bartholomew says no,
and there won't be until all details of the P-5 info sharing
process are nailed down. 

Bartholomew says "There are also a number of important
technical issues to be resolved. Questions like: What types and
tonnages of naval vessels should we tell each other about before
transferring? Should we exchange information on defensive anti-
aircraft systems? Should we exchange information on transfers
of all combat aircraft or only those with long ranges?"

Sales volume belies success of arms transfer control initiative 
Chairman Dante Fascell cites the recent "explosion of US arms
sales," specifically noting $12-16 billion in sales to the Mideast
since the war. "We are not starting from the proposition that
arms sales in and of themselves are bad," says Bartholomew; there-
fore, high dollar volume is not good or bad. Obviously expecting
the question, he disaggregates the past year's sales, saying that
from March 1991 to March 1992 the administration has notified
Congress of $11 billion in sales to the Middle East. 56 percent of
these sales, he says, were for "defensive" missile systems (Hawk
and Patriot); 17 percent ($1.85 billion) were related to equipment
previously transferred (spares; resupply of bombs and missiles);
7 percent were for reconnaissance and border patrol aircraft; 20
percent ($2.28 billion) of the sales were "major military equip-
ment," comprising 46 F-16 to Egypt and 20 Apache gunships to
the UAE.

Chairman Lee Hamilton notes that Bartholomew's breakdown
omits $3-5 billion in direct commercial sales licensed by the State
Department last year. The posture and example of the US matters
more than the rational sales breakdown, he says. What motiva-
tion does another country have to hold down transfers when the
US is pumping billions of dollars of weapons into the region? 
Bartholomew responds, "The question comes down to looking at
individual sales" and determining if they are sensible.

What about a Russian fire sale?  Rep. Goss asks what the US is
doing to alleviate Russian economic pressures to sell arms? The
US is encouraging continued positive Russian participation in the
P-5 talks and assisting the government in strengthening its export
controls. The US is "not just going after weapons of mass
destruction" but also conventional arms transfers, Bartholomew
stresses. The US is also helping Russia down-size and convert its
weapons industry; however, there is nothing within the P-5
process that addresses conversion.

Iraqi Compliance Record 

27 March---A hearing on the UN role in the Persian Gulf and Iraqi
compliance with UN resolutions is held before a joint hearing of
the HFAC subcommittees on Europe and the Middle East and
Human Rights and International Organizations. Thomas Pickering,
US Ambassador to the UN, and John Wolf, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State, Bureau for International Organizations,
testify.

One year after the passage of UN Security Council Resolution
687 ending the war, Pickering says the UN inspection teams
implementing that resolution and subsequent related resolutions
are making "significant progress" in the location and destruction
of Iraqi weapon stockpiles. "Nearly all of this progress has
occurred despite Iraq," not because of it. Nevertheless, to date
31 inspections have taken place in Iraq, and the UN Special
Commission has destroyed or verified the Iraqi destruction of 463
chemical munitions and 140 ballistic missiles. 

Long-term monitoring---as set out in UN Security Council Resolu-
tion 715---remains unresolved, with the Iraqis still refusing to
accept all of its provisions. The US and the UN are determined to
enforce these provisions, Wolf says.

CIA Chief Gates Renders Another Threat Assessment

27 March---Robert Gates, Director of Central Intelligence testifies
before the HASC Defense Policy Panel on "emerging threats,"
focussing on the Middle East/Persian Gulf and the Korean
Peninsula. He cites, among other "disquieting news" the fact that
"arms races are heating up in the Middle East and Southeast Asia,
among other regions."

Residual Iraqi threat  "Operation Desert Storm greatly reduced
Iraq's ability to conduct large-scale offensive military
operations. The UN sanctions have impeded Saddam's efforts to
reequip his forces. Preoccupied with defending the regime and
putting down local insurgencies, the Iraqi military is currently
capable of conducting only small-scale offensive operations with
limited objectives."   

On Iraq's special weapons programs, Gates says the CIA believes
Baghdad has managed to hide some nuclear and chemical-related
equipment and ballistic missiles from the UN inspectorate: "we
believe the regime still has more of everything-- more precursor
chemicals, more bulk agent, more munitions, more production
equipment." Further, he says, the CIA knows the Iraqis had a
biological weapons program, and "we are convinced they have
been able to preserve some biological weapons and the means to make
even more."

"Limited production of artillery and ammunition has resumed at
some weapons production facilities damaged during the Gulf War.
Despite these efforts, total arms production will remain signifi-
cantly below prewar levels as long as sanctions remain in force
and inspections continue. If sanctions were removed, we estimate
it would take Iraq at least three to five years to restore its
prewar conventional military inventories." The CIA judges "that the
Iraqis could soon restore their capability to produce Scud-type
missiles, though they might need some help from abroad."
Iran  The goals of Iran's military build-up are, according to
Gates, to "guarantee the survival of the regime; project power
throughout the region; and offset US influence in the Middle East."
As if it were a relatively massive amount, Gates proclaims that
from "1990-1994 Iran plans to spend $2 billion in hard currency
annually on foreign weapons." [Saudi Arabia by comparison spent
over $5 billion on imported weapons from the US alone last year,
and over $10 billion in 1990.] "Already, Tehran has purchased
significant numbers of advanced warplanes and anti-aircraft
missiles from Russia and China. It has bought some extended
range Scud missiles from North Korea and is building a factory to
manufacture its own. As part of its upgrade of naval forces, Iran
has also contracted to buy at least two Kilo-class attack sub-
marines from Russia. Even after Operation Desert Storm, Iraq still
has three times as many armored vehicles as Iran. To reduce that
gap, Tehran is attempting to purchase hundreds of tanks from
Russian and East European suppliers. ... Iran has still not recov-
ered from the destruction suffered during its long war with Iraq,
and its military reconstruction is being hampered by the poor
state of its economy." 

North Korea  "The North maintains enormous ground forces just
north of the Demilitarized Zone. ... [U]ntil these forces go away,
the threat they present is real and serious. ... I don't want to
exaggerate this threat. North Korea's armed forces suffer from
many deficiencies. Their training and, consequently, combat
readiness are questionable. They have weaknesses in air defense
and logistics. They could not count on much if any support from
erstwhile allies. ... North Korea's large inventory of weapons is
becoming obsolete. The North's defense industry is based on
1960s technology and beset by quality problems. Pyongyang
lacks the hard currency to purchase more advanced technology.
We have seen no deliveries of major weapons from the Soviet
Union or its successors since 1989. China cannot provide the
types of weapons, such as modern aircraft or surface-to-air
missile systems, that the Soviets supplied." But this very
weakness "could reinforce the North's determination to develop
nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles," Gates warns. "We believe
Pyongyang is close, perhaps very close, to achieving a nuclear
weapon capability." 

                   Foreign Ops. Hearing on Proliferation

8 April---The Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the House
Appropriations Committee holds a hearing on proliferation and
arms transfers. Very comprehensive testimony is provided by CRS
analysts Zachary Davis, Steven Bowman, Robert Shuey and
Richard Grimmett on nuclear, chemical/biological, missile and
conventional anti-proliferation regimes and US policy options.
Under Secretary of State Reginald Bartholomew also testifies.

Grimmett says there are countervailing pressures to the post-Cold
war financial incentives to sell conventional weapons. "Most
Third World states, apart form oil rich states such as Saudi
Arabia, lack large cash reserves and are thus dependent on
securing credit from sellers to conclude major arms purchases. ...
These circumstances may significantly affect sales by suppliers,
such as Russia, which are not in a position to provide deep
discounts or grants to prospective clients as was the case in the
past." 

Bartholomew testifies on the administration's efforts to curb the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and `destabilizing'
conventional arms. Echoing, in large part verbatim, Richard
Clarke's testimony in March, he outlines achievements in non-
proliferation policy over the past year. 

Nuclear weapons  In addition to nine states announcing their
intention to, or having acceded to, the NPT since 1990, Argentina
and Brazil have renounced nuclear weapons and accepted full-
scope IAEA safeguards; "Algeria has placed its Chinese-origin
research reactor under safeguards, and Syria has recently
completed an NPT full-scope safeguard agreement with the
IAEA." North Korea has signed a safeguard agreement but has yet
to ratify and fully implement it, Bartholomew says, and he notes
that Iraq's nuclear program is subject to destruction under
international supervision. 

27 countries in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) have agreed to
the US demand for "full scope safeguards" (safeguards on all
nuclear facilities) as a condition for the sale of new nuclear
supplies. In addition, in early April, the NSG agreed to control "a
substantial list of dual-use nuclear-related equipment and technol-
ogy." 

Ballistic missiles  The MTCR has grown from its original 7 to 18
members, with two more slated to join by the end of the year,
Bartholomew says. The US has persuaded Russia and China "to
apply strict MTCR missile export control standards." [Note: as
this newsletter is going to `press', the US invoked MTCR
sanctions against the Russian and Indian space agencies, because
of the sale of a rocket motor by Russia to India. More in the next
issue.]  Argentina and Israel "now observe MTCR-equivalent
controls," with several East European countries in the process of
doing likewise, Bartholomew says. The list of MTCR controlled
goods has been revised and the scope of the MTCR expanded "to
include missiles capable of delivering all weapons of mass
destruction. ... Technical experts from the Partner nations are
meeting this week to work out how to implement this extension
of the Guidelines."

The US has imposed trade sanctions for missile-related exports on
foreign entities in China, Pakistan, South Africa, North Korea and
Iran. "We have gotten a number of countries out of the missile
business," Bartholomew asserts. "Argentina last year announced
the termination of its Condor ballistic missile program. ... Only
North Korea is still exporting complete MTCR-class missile
systems." 

Third World Nuclear/Missile Threat

30 April---The Research and Development Subcommittee of the
House Armed Services Committee holds a hearing on appropriate
responses to nuclear and ballistic missile proliferation. A panel
of non-governmental proliferation experts testify, followed by a
closed briefing from Gordon Oehler, Director of the Intelligence
Community Non-Proliferation Center.

Low tech delivery more likely than ICBM  Gary Milhollin, Director
of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, says that of
the current and possible near future nuclear weapons states, only
Israel (other than the Perm Five countries) "seems likely to be
able to build an ICBM capable of reaching the United States." The
threat of "low tech" means of delivery--such as by van or
recreational boat--is on the rise, though, Milhollin argues. These
low tech options have several advantages over high tech forms:
they are much cheaper; provide for a great deal of anonymity; can
be developed quietly, greatly reducing the likelihood of preemp-
tion. He notes that "For India to develop an ICBM, there would
have to be a series of long-range tests. The first test would
undoubtedly set off a storm of opposition, and could easily end
India's access to the World Bank and International Monetary
Fund." A low tech means would be more reliable, he says, than
an untested or inadequately-tested ICBM.

Milhollin argues that the US is spending too much money on the
vanishing Soviet ICBM threat and not directing enough resources
toward the "growing nuclear threat from the developing world."
The US should spend more on "better intelligence", fully fund the
IAEA to support aggressive inspections, reduce the amount of
fissile material circulating in world trade, and tighten dual-use
nuclear-relevant export controls.

MTCR: useful but incomplete  Janne Nolan, Senior Fellow at the
Brookings Institution, discusses ballistic missile proliferation.
Export control measures, such as the MTCR, are important in that
they raise the economic and political costs of missile acquisition,
Nolan asserts. "Supplier controls may not terminate missile pro-
grams, but they can delay their progress while efforts are
launched to redress the underlying reasons for the demand of
such systems. ... The types of missiles that could strike the US
require inputs and expertise which are still under the tight
control of a relatively few industrial countries, including
advanced guidance and re-entry vehicles," she says. 

Nolan notes that hyping ballistic missile proliferation unduly
plays into the hands of forces in developing countries that want
them, by reinforcing the perception that missiles provide power and
prestige. Further, "Efforts to control missile proliferation in a
context of a permissive approach to the export of high perfor-
mance aircraft, naval systems (including submarines) or advanced
dual-use technologies for other weapon development is not
intellectually defensible. Even if advanced conventional weapons
have already proliferated fairly widely and may seem too daunting
to control in any comprehensive manner, it is not too late to start
to contain the spread of new, potentially even more dangerous
technologies...."

Legislation passed and pending            

Foreign Operations Continuing Resolution Passed

1 April---Congress passes a $14.2 billion continuing resolution
(H.J.Res.456) providing military and economic aid for the
remainder of FY92. President Bush signs it into law the same day
as PL 102-266. Foreign aid funding had lapsed the previous day,
when a 6-month continuing resolution passed in October expired.
This bill includes $270 million for UN Peacekeeping Operations,
with the money drawn from a 1.48 percent reduction in all
accounts, except those specifically earmarked by Congress.
Ceilings and earmarks on aid to Morocco, Jordan and several
organizations were eliminated in this bill, but most funding is
continued at about the FY91 levels.

Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction 
and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1992

8 April---Rep. Henry Gonzalez introduces this bill, H.R.4803,
which is referred to the Banking Committee he chairs. Title I of
the bill mandates that one year after entry into force, the US
government cannot provide funds to any international develop-
ment institution "if the most recent determination of the Secre-
tary of the Treasury ... is that a member country of the institu-
tion---(A) is capable of producing, or is seeking to produce, a
type of weapon that is a subject of a regime for controlling
weapons of mass destruction; and (B) is not adhering to the
regime." "Regimes" include the NPT, Treaty of Tlatelolco, Nuclear
Suppliers Group, Geneva Protocol, BWC and Australia Group. 

Within 6 months of enactment, and annually thereafter, the Sec.
of Treasury, in conjunction with the Sec. of State and Defense
and Director of the CIA, will determine which countries are
capable of or seeking to produce weapons of mass destruction;
identify which international development institutions the country
is a member of; and report this to the Banking Committee. "Inter-
national development institutions" are defined to include the IMF,
World Bank and associated agencies, African Development Bank,
African Development Fund, Asian Development Bank, Inter-
American Development Bank and Inter-American Ivestment
Corporation. The EXIM bank would also be prohibited from
guaranteeing, insuring and extending credits to countries so
identified.

       China-MFN  

18 March---The Senate fails to override President Bush's veto of
H.R.2212, which would have required presidential certification
that, among other things, China had made "significant progress"
in curbing its weapons proliferation activities, in order to renew
China's most-favored-nation trade status beginning this summer.
Specifically, the President would have had to certify that China
had not sold missiles or missile launchers to Syria and Iran. (See
ASM Nos. 9-10 and 11-12 for more.)
 
On March 11 the House overwhelmingly overrode the veto with a
357-61 vote. The Senate vote (60-38), was 6 votes short of the
two-thirds necessary. Sen. Joseph Biden says these provisions "do
no more than lock in the pledge that Beijing has formally made now
in return for us lifting sanctions against companies in China.
... These provisions will force the Chinese leaders to choose
between an international arms market measured in hundreds of
millions of dollars and an American consumer market where China
enjoys in the area of $13 billion annual surplus."

"I ... have serious concerns about public testimony given by the
Director of Central Intelligence 3 weeks ago. On the same day
that we in the Senate were convened in closed session to discuss
the disturbing implications of intelligence reports about Chinese
arms sales, Director Gates was over in the House giving China a
clean bill of health. His testimony that day raises questions of
both propriety and accuracy---questions I have posed directly in
writing to Director Gates and also shared with members of the
Intelligence Committee."  
                                    ***

Several bills have recently been introduced to suspend military aid
or ban arms sales to specific countries. 

                      Military Aid to Peru Suspended

7 April---Senator Kennedy and 7 others introduced S.2537, the
Democracy in Peru Act, which mandates that all aid to Peru, other
than humanitarian aid, be suspended until the President can certify
that: the Peruvian Constitution, congress, judiciary and individual
rights are restored; the Peruvian armed forces have submitted to
civilian control; and the Peruvian armed forces and President
Fujimori have renounced violence as a means of achieving political
goals.

On April 8, the HFAC approved by a voice vote a non-binding
resolution, H.Con.Res.306, condemning the antidemocratic
actions of President Fujimori and urging President Bush to delay
the approval of loans for Peru in multilateral lending institutions
until democracy is restored.

                            Arms Ban for Burma

7 April---S.Con.Res.107 is introduced by Senators Helms, Moyni-
han, Simon and Wofford. The resoultion would note that it is the
sense of Congress that the President should seek an international
arms embargo against the military government of Myanmar
(Burma) until power has been transferred to a "legitimate,
democratically elected government." Specifically, the Secretary
of State is instructed to call both privately and publicly for an
end to Chinese arms sales to the Burmese regime until all political
prisoners are released, martial law is lifted and democracy
installed.  

                                  Turkey

S.2019, "a bill to prohibit all US military and economic assis-
tance to Turkey until the Turkish government takes certain ac-
tions to resolve the Cyprus problem" [meaning Turkey's
invasion of Cyprus in 1974], was introduced last November
by Sen. Pressler. If enacted no credits could be extended and no
guarantees issued under the AECA until the President certifies
that "all Turkish military forces in excess of those permitted by
the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee and all Turkish colonists are
withdrawn from Cyprus." In addition, Turkey must become
compliant with UN resolutions on Cyprus (UNGA Resolution
3212, UNSC Resolutions 365, 353, 354, 357, 358 and 360), the
NATO Preamble and Article I and the Foreign Assistance Act.

               Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992

This bill, S.2543, would amend the Foreign Relations Authoriza-
tion Act of FY92-93 by adding a new Title VI to make the UN
sanctions now in force against Iraq applicable under US law to
Iran as well; it reinforces US law regarding sales of dual-use
technologies and advanced conventional arms to the two and would
also discourage foreign governments and companies from
transferring weapons and related technologies to these countries.


"Advanced conventional weapons" is defined to include "long-
range precision-guided munitions, fuel air explosives, cruise
missiles, low observability aircraft or other radar evading
aircraft, military satellites, electro-magnetic weapons, and laser
weapons."

Within 30 days of learning that a foreign government or company
has transferred covered items to Iran or Iraq, the President must
send Congress a report on the transfer and on the US response.
The President would be obliged to bar the US government from
procuring or contracting to procure goods from a foreign company
that is found to have sold prohibited goods to Iraq or Iran for 2
years. All licenses for the export of goods to those firms must be
prohibited for 2 years. In addition, the President could prevent
the importation into the US of any product produced by a company
dealing in arms with Iran or Iraq. Mandatory sanctions against
governments found to be transferring prohibited items to the two
countries are: suspension of US military and economic assistance;
opposition by the US in multilateral lending institutions to loans
or financial or technical assistance to that country; termination
of all technical exchange agreements and of all coproduction or
codevelopment agreements of weapons. In addition, the President
may revoke most-favored-nation trade status, freeze that
country's financial assets and/or restrict air landing or shipping
privileges.

The bill is sponsored by Senators McCain, Gore, Thurmond and
Helms. See Congressional Record 8 April 92 pp. S5052-8.

Recent Congressional publications          

Arms Trade and Nonproliferation (Hearings before the Subcommittee
on Technology and National Security of the Joint Economic Committee
on 21 September 90 and 23 April 91) USGPO: 1992.

Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress, April
1992.

Defense for a New Era: Lessons of the Persian Gulf War (Report by
the House Armed Services Committee) USGPO: 1992.

Defense Inventory: Control and Security Weaknesses Create
Opportunity for Theft (Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on
Readiness, Committee on Armed Services), GAO/NSIAD-92-60, March
1992, 36 pp.

Economic Sanctions: Effectiveness as Tools of Foreign Policy
(Report to the Chairman, SFRC) GAO/NSIAD 92-106, February 1992, 32
pp.

"Economic Sanctions: Issues Raised by the Sanctions Against Iraq,"
Douglas McDaniel, CRS Report for Congress (No. 92-370F), 17 April
92. 

"Iraq's Post-War Compliance Record: A Chronology," Kenneth Katzman,
CRS Report for Congress (No. 92-320F), 31 March 92, 47 pp.

"Middle East Arms Supply: Recent Control Initiatives," Alfred
Prados, CRS Issue Brief, 2 March 92, 14 pp.

National Security: Perspectives on Worldwide Threats and
Implications for U.S. Forces and National Security: Papers Prepared
for GAO Conference on Worldwide Threats, GAO/NSIAD-92-104, April
1992.

Proposal for Export-Import Fianancing of Defense Articles and
Services (Hearing of the Subcommittee on International Development,
Finance, Trade and Monetary Policy of the House Committee on
Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs on 2 May 91) USGPO: 1992.

Security Assistance: Shooting Incident in East Timor, Indonesia,
GAO/N-SIAD-92-132FS, February 1992, 17 pp. 

U.N. Security Council Resolutions on Iraq: Compliance and
Implementation (Report prepared by the CRS for the Subcommittee on
Europe and the Middle East, House Committee on Foreign Affairs)
USGPO: 1992.

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