(Issue No. 13-14 , March-April 1992)
Sales in progress Missile proliferation sanctions invoked 6 March---The Lyongaksan Machineries and Equipment Export Corporation, the Changgwang Credit Corporation (both of North Korea), and the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (Iran) are found to have engaged in "missile proliferation activities" resulting in the imposition of sanctions under the AECA. Beginning today and effective for two years, licenses for exports to those firms of any items controlled by the EAA will be denied, no US government contracts will be entered with them, and no products made by them can be imported into the US. Because North Korea is a non-market economy, these sanctions will apply to the entire North Korean government.In the past 12 months missile proliferation sanctions have also been invoked against Pakistan and South Africa, and they were waived in the cases of Israel and China, in exchange for their promises to abide by the MTCR export control guidelines in the future. (See ASM No. 7-8, page 1 and No. 11-12, page 1.) Radars for Turkey proposed 11 March---The DSAA notifies Con- gress of the Army's proposed sale to Turkey of AN/TPQ-36 fire- finding, counter-mortar radars, manufactured by Hughes aircraft. The sale is valued at $28 million. F-16 sale to Turkey finalized 26 March--- Pentagon and Turkish officials sign a formal LOA for 40 F-16C/D fighter aircraft and related equipment, valued at $1.5 billion. Turkish Aerospace Industries, Inc. will make 90 percent of the aircraft airframes in Turkey. In 1983 Turkey contracted for the sale/licensed production of 160 F-16s, and has to date taken delivery of 94 of them. A sale of 40 more aircraft are anticipated. Patriot/Hawk sale to Kuwait 31 March---The DSAA notifies Congress of its intention to sell Kuwait Patriot and Hawk air-defense systems. The $2.5 billion sale includes 6 Patriot fire units, one training unit, one "maintenance float fire unit," radar, fire control and launching stations, 450 Patriot missiles, 6 mobile Hawk missile batteries (Phase II), 342 Hawk missiles, related equipment and software. Kuwait is also being offered trucks, trailers, utility vehicles and 25 High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles. On 28 April, Rep. Howard Berman introduces H.J.Res.473, which would prohibit the Patriot/Hawk sale. Two days later the 30-day Congressional notification period elapses, freeing the administration to make the formal offer to Kuwait. TOW missiles to Egypt 7 April---Congress is notified of the Pentagon's intention to sell 695 TOW 2A guided anti-tank missiles to Egypt for $28 million. Commercial transfers announced in late April 28 April---The State Department notifies Congress of its desire to license the commercial export of "major defense equipment" to both Thailand and Taiwan. Speeches, letters, etc. HFAC Chair warns State Dept. to shape up on arms licensing 2 April---House Foreign Affairs Chairman Dante Fascell writes Sec. of State Jim Baker concerning the recently released State Department Inspector General's audit ("Department of State Defense Trade Controls"), the findings of which he says "are very disturbing." "The audit demonstrates that our conventional arms transfer policy is over-extended, counterproductive and mis- managed." Fascell warns the Secretary against issuing export licenses for any major military equipment "until you can advise the Congress that adequate policy and management controls are in place." Otherwise, Congress will take unilateral action. Bi-partisan opposition to Saudi F-15 sale 9 April---Over one-half of the House of Representatives send President Bush a letter expressing concern over arms sales to the Middle East. In particular, they note that, "Since the Gulf War, the Administration has sold $14.8 billion worth of major military equipment to Saudi Arabia." Citing reports that the Administration is now considering the sale of 72 advanced combat aircraft to that country, they say "an F-15 sale would represent a significant escalation of the regional arms race." The high volume of US sales "puts the US in a position where we are unable to ask a country like Russia to refrain from selling top-of-the-line SU-24 aircraft and T-72 tanks to Iran because we are unwilling to stop our own sales." Signers of the letter, which was circulated by Rep. Mel Levine, in- clude the Chairman and ranking minority member of the Foreign Affairs Committee, and the majority and minority whips. Berman opposes `defensive' missiles 27 April---Rep. Howard Berman sends out a "dear colleague" letter announcing his opposition to the administration's planned $2.5 billion sale of anti-aircraft and anti-missile missiles to Kuwait. "Some people will ask, why stop a sale of defensive weapons? The US-Soviet arms race dramatically demonstrated the escalating relationship between defensive and offensive weapons. The fact is that all arms sales contribute to the arms race. The only justification for the sale of Hawks and Patriots to Kuwait is short-term, short-sighted economic gain. As the Gulf war dramatically proved, the weapons cannot defend Kuwait. Only foreign forces can do that. This sale is nothing more than prepositioning for Iraq." Notes from some hearings HFAC Favors Non-Proliferation Fund 3 March---The HFAC Subcommittee on Arms Control holds a hearing on arms control and proliferation in the 1990s. Testifying are Elisa Harris and Janne Nolan of the Brookings Institution, and Louis Nosenzo of the Meridian Corporation. Chairman Dante Fascell has a plan for addressing the problem: "It is my hope that a nonproliferation and disarmament fund could be established as part of the foreign aid bill in the amount of several hundred million dollars.... These funds would be used to support bilateral and multilateral efforts to halt the proliferation of all types of weaponry." As examples of uses, he cites US support of: the IAEA and special supplements to its budget for the disarmament of Iraq; an international technical and scientific center to employ Russian and other scientists to work on non-proliferation controls and conversion of defense industry; computer and communications links between the UN and the Permanent Five conventional arms transfer restraint regimes; and a computer network among MTCR member states. Chemical weapons deproliferation "The information available in the open literature does not suggest that the [chemical weapons] proliferation problem has gotten appreciably worse," Harris says. In fact, several countries are relinquishing chemical and biological weapons programs: Iraq is being forcibly disarmed; the US and Russia have agreed (in 1990) to deep bilateral reductions in their chemical weapons arsenals. Further, she notes related con- fidence-building steps are being undertaken by several countries, including India and Pakistan and North and South Korea. In South America, "nearly every country ... has agreed not to develop, pro- duce, acquire, store, retain or use chemical or biological weapons. They have also agreed to be original signatories of the Chemical Weapons Convention." Harris suggests there are many reasons for this "deproliferation." In particular, countries "must weigh the political costs of possessing chemical weapons ... against the rather limited military benefits of using chemical weapons, especially against a well protected adversary." Anti-ballistic missile proliferation Citing South Korea's ability to reverse engineer Nike Hercules air defense missiles in the 1970s into ballistic missiles, Nolan warns against indiscriminate or freeflowing transfers of "defensive missiles" such as the Patriot. Such missiles contribute to an arms race dynamic, spread tech- nology relevant to ballistic missiles, and nurture the illusion that there is a technological fix for the problem of missile proliferation, she argues. State Responds to Human Rights Criticism 4 March---Richard Schifter, Assistant Secretary of State for Humanitarian Affairs, testifies before the Foreign Affairs Subcom- mittee on Human Rights. In response to criticism raised at a previous Subcommittee hearing (see ASM No. 11-12), Schifter says the foremost task of the US government is to protect the "national interest," rather than to protect human rights. "We must recognize that our foreign policy cannot be based solely on our commitment to the cause of human rights." Furthermore, there are times, he suggests, "when the result which we seek to achieve, namely to end an abuse, can be reached best by quiet diplomacy rather than by denunciations and aid cut-offs." Cheney Cites Dangers of Conventional Weapons Spread 4 March---Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell appear before the HFAC to explain the administration's $278.3 billion Pentagon budget request for FY93. (This dollar figure would represent 18 percent of the total federal budget outlays in FY93, and 4.5 percent of the country's GNP.) In cautioning against reductions in the DOD budget, Cheney says: "It is important for us to remember that future peace and stability in the world will continue to depend in large measure upon our willingness to deploy forces overseas, in Europe, Southwest Asia and the Pacific." Cheney's prepared statement also says: Regional conflicts will increasingly be complicated by increases in both the conventional and unconventional capabilities in the Third World. ... The threat is not limited just to weapons of mass destruction. The global diffusion of military and dual-use technologies will enable a growing number of countries to field highly capable weapons systems, such as ballistic missiles, stealthy cruise missiles, integrated air defenses, submarines, modern command and control systems, and even space-based assets. As a result, our regional adversaries may be armed with capabili- ties that in the past were limited only to the superpowers. We are concerned that political turmoil and economic distress in the states of the former Soviet Union may increase the risk of potentially dangerous technologies getting into the hands of irresponsible governments and individuals. Third World countries attempting to acquire nuclear, biological and chemical weapons will undoubtedly attempt to take advantage of economic distress in the former Soviet Union. The diffusion of advanced conventional technologies developed by the Soviets could tilt regional balances against our interests. 4-5 March---Commanders of the various integrated and regional commands testify before the SASC on the `threats' they face. US Forces in Korea Gen. Robert Riscassi, Commander of US Forces in Korea, says total troop strength of the North Korean armed forces is over 6 million, with nearly 1 million active and the rest in reserve; he paints an ominous picture of the North's numerical advantage in military equipment (excluding US forces). Riscassi admits, though, that "a number of North Korea's military systems are based on old technologies, updated with product improvement programs, but still limited in capability due to vintage." By contrast, the South is equipped with top-of-the-line US and European weapon- ry. In the past two years, the ROK has purchased 120 F-16 fighters, 8 P-3 Orion naval aircraft and 81 Blackhawk helicopters, and taken delivery of 90 Cobra helicopters. These purchases alone add up to over $8 billion, says Riscassi. Although the country is suffering economically (he notes shortages of food, fuel, hard currency and technology), Riscassi says sustaining and improving the military has cost North Korea 20-25 percent of its GNP per year. South Korea, by comparison, spends around 4 percent of its GNP on its military, but as he later notes, South Korea's GNP of nearly $300 billion is 10 times the size of the North's. 25 percent of North Korea's $30 billion GNP equals a $7.5 billion annual defense expenditure; South Korea's defense budget was nearly $11 billion last year. Pacific Command Admiral Charles Larson, Commander-in-Chief of US Pacific Command, notes that "A by-product of the Cold War era and the spread of technology is the increasing availability of sophisticated weapons. Longer-range delivery systems, precision guidance mechanisms, and more lethal munitions are readily available on the world market. ... North Korea and China have been major suppliers of arms to third world counties for years...." [In 1990, according to CRS data, China accounted for 6 percent of all arms sales made to the Third World; North Korea accounted for less than .5 percent. The US, by comparison, accounted for 45 percent of all such sales.] Larson says military relations with China remain under a presi- dential sanction [due to the Tianaman Square massacre]. "[T]heir formal agreement to abide by the Missile Technology Control Regime is a step in the right direction. We are hopeful there will be continued progress that will allow renewed [US] military interaction with China." Miliary ties with India are on the increase and, Larson says, "We look forward to increased contact in the years ahead to support the Mongolian military's development..."! Central Command The testimony of Gen. Joseph Hoar, Commander-in-Chief of US Central Command, makes a 70 page plug for arms sales and military aid. This assistance, together with a forward presence (air bases and port visiting rights) and joint military exercises, are the linchpins of CENTCOM's "peacetime" strategy---and provide for an easy transition into CENTCOM's "wartime" strategy, should this presence fail to deter actions disfavored by the US. Of the Kuwait war, Hoar says "The US demonstrated its commit- ment to regional peace and stability and its resolve to maintain the free flow of oil. Success in these operations opened the door to increased politico-military cooperation throughout the region. To date, the US has signed new security agreements with the Governments of Kuwait and Bahrain, and renewed its long- standing arrangements with Oman. Discussions continue with Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates." His testimony provides an overview, country-by-country, of those states in his command (all of the Middle East/Persian Gulf except Israel, plus Pakistan, Afghanistan, and African countries from Egypt to Kenya), outlining their strategic import to the US (and the necessity for arms transfers from the US) or the threat that they pose to US interests (and the reason why other countries should be prevented from transferring arms to them). Urges arms to Pakistan "US security assistance to Pakistan was designed to enhance Pakistan's conventional forces and provide an alternative to nuclear weapons as a means of security." [However, it failed to do so, and in 1990 the US suspended security assistance to Pakistan because the President was unable to certify that Pakistan was not in possession of a nuclear weapon.] Nevertheless, Hoar continues: "Pakistan will acquire arms--if not from the US, then from others. Such an outcome will dilute US influence with this long-term friend in the South Asian area and erode our ability to work for stability in the region." No arms for Iran! Hoar says Iran is using "windfall oil profits" to step up its force modernization, begun after its 8-year-long war with Iraq. "Iran may become the greatest threat to peace and stability in the region," he postulates. "Iran is concentrating on improving its missile and chemical weapons capabilities", and "may have embarked on a nuclear weapons program." Arms control in Iraq? Without the continuation of UN sanctions, Hoar says "it is possible for Iraq's military to return to pre-August 1990 levels within eight to nine years." Coalition forces arrayed against Iraq eliminated 3,847 tanks, 1,450 fighting vehicles, and 2,917 artillery pieces from the Iraqi arsenal, he states. Urges more arms to Saudi Arabia Hoar notes that the US-Saudi military supply relationship represents "the largest Foreign Military Sales program in the world." Even so, he says Saudi Arabia wants to expand "its existing military assistance program with the United States." Hoar cites an immediate Saudi requirement for F-15 aircraft. A decision on the sale "will have to be made now, because I think there is a degree of urgency" over Iran and Iraq, he says. The F-15 is being sought for its air-to-ground anti-armor capabilities. Control freaks Hoar says: "The sale of US equipment to friendly countries in our theater is in keeping with the Administration's efforts to control the spread of arms throughout this volatile region. Imbalances in military capability, perceived or real, be- tween potential adversaries only perpetuate the unconstrained build-up of forces and more destructive weapons. Controlled arms transfers on our part will assist in the balancing efforts by satisfying only legitimate defense requirements. This will increase our credibility as a reliable defense partner and decrease the perceived need for weapons of mass destruction by regional countries [see Pakistan above]. ... If nations within the region are unable to procure US equipment and training, they will not hesitate to buy equipment from other countries. ... The alternative of allowing others to sell their most lethal weapons systems throughout the region, may preclude US influence into the area." Amongst pages of apologia for arms sales, Hoar says: "Weapons proliferation, including weapons of mass destruction and uncon- trolled growth of conventional weapons, undermines regional military balances. ... As more countries feel the need to arm themselves against a perceived threat from their neighbors, the opportunity for regional conflict grows." Army Chief of Staff on Future `Threats' 5 March---Gen. Gordon Sullivan, Army Chief of Staff, testifies before the Defense Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee on the Army's mission in the coming years. "[A] range of different threats to US interests could quickly emerge from existing conditions and circumstances: ideology inimical to ours; amassing arms and technology proliferation; regional instability; economic collapse, competition or restrictions [!]; renegade states (Cuba, North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Libya); ethnic, religious and cultural differences; environmental degradation" [!!?]. Crises that "challenge our interests could occur in any region of the world"--- he assures the Subcommittee---but says, "the Persian Gulf and Middle East have become the most contentious and over-milita- rized regions of the globe." He also says: One of the most hazardous and widespread trends in the developing world is the proliferation of modern military capabilities. The US experience in the Persian Gulf revealed the impact of high-technology warfare on the battlefield.... Many nations are working to upgrade their military capabilities, contributing to the potential for instability and conflict. The acceleration of technology transfer worldwide, along with growing intra-regional competition, will result in an increasing number of developing states acquiring advanced weapons systems. The proliferation of precision-guided munitions and high-technology weapons systems among developing nations will make future Third World battlefields high-risk environments. JEC Hearing on Non-Proliferation, Part II 13 March---In follow-up to hearings last year, the Subcommittee on Technology and National Security of the Joint Economic Committee hears testimony on arms trade and non-proliferation in the Middle East. Subcommittee Chairman Sen. Jeff Bingaman presides. The first panel consists of non-governmental experts: Michael Klare of Hampshire College on conventional arms transfer restraint; Kathleen Bailey of National Security Research Inc. on the efficacy of dual-use export controls; Janne Nolan of the Brookings Institution on the proliferation of advanced technology-- principally ballistic missile technology; and William Potter of the Monterrey Institute on nuclear proliferation. The second panel comprises administration witnesses: Richard Clarke, Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs; James LeMunyon, Acting Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Administra- tion; and Henry Sokolski, Deputy for Non-Proliferation Policy, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense. Restraint by US is needed Klare says: "Because other major military suppliers view increased US weapons sales as a sign of American tolerance toward conventional arms transfers, it is likely that these suppliers will follow our lead and increase their own sales to areas of conflict. We are faced, therefore, with a choice between two clear policy options: either we move toward the adoption of tighter international constraints on the arms trade or we allow the restoration of an essentially unregulated arms market. The choice we make in this regard will be crucial for the future evolution of the international security environment. With the Cold War over, the greatest threat to world peace and security that we face today is the increasing frequency and intensity of regional conflicts. In this situation, the relative tempo and scale of international arms trafficking will prove critical: if the arms flow expands, we are almost certain to see an increase in the intensity and duration of regional conflicts; if we can somehow bring this trade under control, we will have a better chance at curbing the virulence of regional conflicts." Klare outlines the many reasons why controlling the arms trade is essential: "Iraq did not use its missiles to seize and occupy Kuwait--such acts of aggression can only be conducted by conventional forces." Further, he notes the interconnection of conventional arms proliferation and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles. "It is precisely because so many Third World countries have acquired large quantities of modern conventional weapons that some among them have acquired unconventional weapons as a hedge and a deterrent." In addition, "there is the growing risk that US forces committed to peace- keeping or contingency operations abroad will be confronted by capable Third World armies equipped with large numbers of highly lethal and sophisticated weapons." Finally, Iraq's conventional arms build-up of the 1980s provoked and sustained the Persian Gulf crisis, Klare asserts, by providing Saddam the self-confidence to attack, and encouraing his refusal to abandon Kuwait. Perm Five effort not enough Of the Bush administration's arms transfer control initiative he says: "The adoption of these guide- lines suggests a strong commitment by the United States to the principle of conventional arms transfer restraint. If followed up with appropriate regulatory and enforcement measures, the London guidelines could provide the foundation for an interna- tional arms transfer control regime akin to the existing regimes for the control of nuclear, chemical and missile technology. It is not clear, however, that Bush Administration officials view the guidelines in quite this manner. Rather, senior officials appear to view the guidelines as little more than a hedge against some future repetition of Iraq's mammoth arms buildup of the 1980s." In conclusion, Klare says, "in today's uncertain and chaotic world, it is safer to view most arms transfers as a potential proliferation risk rather than as an assured asset for US national security." State Dept. on export controls and arms control successes Clarke says the past year's record on proliferation and arms trade control "has been one of substantial achievement." The various multilateral export control regimes have all expanded their mem- bership, and both the Australia Group (controlling chemical and biological weapons-relevant materials) and the Missile Technology Control Regime have expanded their lists of controlled items. Specifically, he says, "Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania and Bulgaria are in the process of applying controls comparable to those of the Australia Group. Israel has adopted controls on all 50 CW precursors. China has also adopted some precursor controls, as to a lesser extent, has India. ... [T]he MTCR is currently working to enlist as members Portugal, Greece, Ireland, Switzerland, Iceland and Turkey, so as to include all of the EC, NATO and West European neutral states. The MTCR is also beginning a dialogue with East Europe, the former Soviet republics, Argentina and Brazil. The US is discussing with South Africa its adherence to the guidelines." In addition, arms control and disarmament regimes have also been strengthened over the past year: Ten countries joined the Biologi- cal Weapons Convention. Further, "China has acceded to the NPT [on 9 March] and France is expected to do so soon. South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have also adhered to the NPT since the beginning of 1991. Russia has assumed the obligations of the former Soviet Union under the NPT, and prospects are favorable for the other newly-independent states of the former Soviet Union to join the NPT as non-nuclear weapons states." East Europe/Soviet export controls The former Soviet Union and East European countries pose special proliferation concerns. Clarke outlines activity and progress in this area: "In July 1990, the US conducted a special visit to Eastern Europe focused on the need to establish responsible and effective non-proliferation and defense trade controls. A follow-up visit to the region was made in October 1991. In December 1990 and again in December 1991, the Australia Group held seminars on CBW for Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. A multilateral group of MTCR partners visited Moscow in October 1991 to discuss missile proliferation. Just last month, an inter-agency team visited Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia to discuss the need for effective export controls and to stress the importance of participating in the non-proliferation regimes. The MTCR will host a seminar for Eastern European, Baltic and former Soviet Union states on March 30, and a third Australia Group seminar will be conducted in Budapest in December. The results in Eastern Europe have been highly encouraging." New North Korean ballistic missile? "North Korea is now the only country selling complete missile systems that exceed MTCR parameters to the Third World. ... North Korea has learned to pro- duce indigenously Scud missiles, and to extend the range of its Scuds. It sells these missiles to countries in volatile regions--such as Syria and Iran." He says Pyongyang is also selling Scud production technology, and that they are working on "on a still longer range system in the 1000-km class." Clarke says this missile, dubbed the `Nodong-1', "is very far along in its research and development. We expect it to be flight-tested early this year, and we expect that it could be sold in the Middle East early next year." Commerce Department LeMunyon gives testimony largely redundant to Clarke's, outlining progress in five separate export control regimes: COCOM (East-West trade); chemical-biological weapons proliferation; missile proliferation; nuclear proliferation and supercomputer exports. For both national security and proliferation reasons, he says the US and Japan have agreed to apply similar safeguards on suprcomputer exports to various country groups. In addition, European suppliers are being brought into the process: "Those negotiations should be successfully completed later this spring." Pentagon's `non-apocalyptic' threats Sokolski predicts that cruise missiles, unmanned air vehicles (UAV) and shallow-water submarines will pose increasing threats to the US and US allies. "In the Mediterranean, Egypt, Israel, Syria, Algeria and Libya all have submarines and are in the process of modernizing their fleets. In the Gulf, Iran and others have either ordered or are considering orders of submarines. Iraq, before the war, was also in the market. How these boats will be equipped and employed and how best to operate in waters where these boats and mines may be present will clearly be matters of increased interest to our Navy and to the security forces of our friends, both in and outside of the region." Submarine sales could complicate the task of identifying the state responsible for attacks. If a US ship was sunk by a submarine-placed mine, torpedo, or sub-launched anti- ship missile, "we and our friends would have the greatest difficulty knowing who perpetrated the act," Sokolski muses. During the Gulf War, the US "telegraphed world-wide, literally" the importance of Global Positioning System (GPS) satellites and cruise missiles employing such guidance systems. Sokolski says given access to GPS cruise missiles and UAVs will be easier to produce. GPS, he says, is "almost certain to create proliferation headaches." Soviet `Brain Drain' Not Happening 17 March---Robert Galucci, coordinator of the State Department task force to prevent scientists in the former Soviet Union from selling their skills to weapons programs abroad, and Allan Brom- ley, Presidential science adviser, testify on their efforts to prevent a `brain drain' of Soviet scientists. According to the New York Times, the two tell the Committee there is "no confirmed evidence that any Soviet scientist or engineer ha[s] gone to work for Iraq, Libya or other third world countries or that any Soviet missile or nuclear technology ha[s] been diverted to such na- tions." The Russians, Bromley says, "are concerned as much as we are and they are making an historic effort" to ensure that weapons scientists do not defect. Bartholomew on Bush Arms Transfer Policy 24 March---The HFAC Subcommittees on Arms Control and on Europe and the Middle East hear testimony from Under Secretary of State for International Security Affairs Reginald Bartholomew on US conventional arms transfer policy and the prospects for global restraint in arms sales. HFAC still favors moratorium Chairman Dante Fascell sums up the conditions that led the Committee to seek a moratorium on arms sales last year, and the events that have transpired since then. Several lessons, he says, should be noted. First and fore- most, "Offensive weapons sales spark defensive weapons sales, and defensive purchases provoke more offensive weapons purchases. It's called an arms race." Second, we cannot expect nations engaged in an arms race to exercise restraint. "Such behavior must be encouraged from outside the region. ... [W]hat is wrong with new schemes, such as an arms moratorium, and what is wrong with the US seizing the leadership role to ac- complish such a moratorium? ... We do not lose anything by challenging others to join us and stop all sales of all major defense equipment to the Middle East/Persian Gulf for the next 6 months or a year to see if a broader Middle East peace process can take hold." Bartholomew states that the purpose of the Perm Five exercise is to achieve "responsibility, transparency and consultation," rather than to limit the trade. "[W]e are not trying to create an interna- tional arms cartel. Rather, the guidelines give us wide berth to question and be questioned on such matters. This is exactly what we intended when we proposed the guidelines." Missiles contentious issue Bartholomew describes the major outstanding issues in the talks. First, there is not total agreement on the US proposal to ban transfers of all surface-to-surface missiles to the Middle East, he says. "[A]ll five countries have now agreed to limit transfers of missiles and missile technology defined by the Missile Technology Control Regime, which includes missiles capable of delivering a 500 kilogram payload to a minimum distance of 300 kilometers. However, given the danger posed by surface-to-surface missiles and the history of their use in the Middle East, we believe that it is necessary to exercise even greater restraint than that called for by the MTCR. The plain fact is that missiles below MTCR range/payload capabilities can have a very destabilizing effect in a region with strategic distances as small as those in the Middle East." Info-sharing procedures The second point of difference lies in the timing of information-sharing on arms transfers. "We would like this exchange to occur as early [in the sales decision making process] as possible. ... Our top concern is that information should be exchanged in time to permit serious consultation about whether a transfer should go forward. This process must have the ability to affect decisions about arms transfers." When asked whether he thinks it will be possible to achieve prior notification, Bartholomew answers, "Yes, but I'm worried that it might take a long time." In response to a question about how the notification would actually take place, Bartholomew says one would simply notify the other four of a planned transfer of any of the agreed-upon categories of weapons. The others can call for consultation if the sale is of concern to them. However, there are no penalties if an objectionable sale occurs. Legislating penalites would "harm, not help" the process, warns Bartholomew. When asked if there has been any consultation within the group on the proposed F-15 sale to Saudi Arabia, Bartholomew says no, and there won't be until all details of the P-5 info sharing process are nailed down. Bartholomew says "There are also a number of important technical issues to be resolved. Questions like: What types and tonnages of naval vessels should we tell each other about before transferring? Should we exchange information on defensive anti- aircraft systems? Should we exchange information on transfers of all combat aircraft or only those with long ranges?" Sales volume belies success of arms transfer control initiative Chairman Dante Fascell cites the recent "explosion of US arms sales," specifically noting $12-16 billion in sales to the Mideast since the war. "We are not starting from the proposition that arms sales in and of themselves are bad," says Bartholomew; there- fore, high dollar volume is not good or bad. Obviously expecting the question, he disaggregates the past year's sales, saying that from March 1991 to March 1992 the administration has notified Congress of $11 billion in sales to the Middle East. 56 percent of these sales, he says, were for "defensive" missile systems (Hawk and Patriot); 17 percent ($1.85 billion) were related to equipment previously transferred (spares; resupply of bombs and missiles); 7 percent were for reconnaissance and border patrol aircraft; 20 percent ($2.28 billion) of the sales were "major military equip- ment," comprising 46 F-16 to Egypt and 20 Apache gunships to the UAE. Chairman Lee Hamilton notes that Bartholomew's breakdown omits $3-5 billion in direct commercial sales licensed by the State Department last year. The posture and example of the US matters more than the rational sales breakdown, he says. What motiva- tion does another country have to hold down transfers when the US is pumping billions of dollars of weapons into the region? Bartholomew responds, "The question comes down to looking at individual sales" and determining if they are sensible. What about a Russian fire sale? Rep. Goss asks what the US is doing to alleviate Russian economic pressures to sell arms? The US is encouraging continued positive Russian participation in the P-5 talks and assisting the government in strengthening its export controls. The US is "not just going after weapons of mass destruction" but also conventional arms transfers, Bartholomew stresses. The US is also helping Russia down-size and convert its weapons industry; however, there is nothing within the P-5 process that addresses conversion. Iraqi Compliance Record 27 March---A hearing on the UN role in the Persian Gulf and Iraqi compliance with UN resolutions is held before a joint hearing of the HFAC subcommittees on Europe and the Middle East and Human Rights and International Organizations. Thomas Pickering, US Ambassador to the UN, and John Wolf, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau for International Organizations, testify. One year after the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 687 ending the war, Pickering says the UN inspection teams implementing that resolution and subsequent related resolutions are making "significant progress" in the location and destruction of Iraqi weapon stockpiles. "Nearly all of this progress has occurred despite Iraq," not because of it. Nevertheless, to date 31 inspections have taken place in Iraq, and the UN Special Commission has destroyed or verified the Iraqi destruction of 463 chemical munitions and 140 ballistic missiles. Long-term monitoring---as set out in UN Security Council Resolu- tion 715---remains unresolved, with the Iraqis still refusing to accept all of its provisions. The US and the UN are determined to enforce these provisions, Wolf says. CIA Chief Gates Renders Another Threat Assessment 27 March---Robert Gates, Director of Central Intelligence testifies before the HASC Defense Policy Panel on "emerging threats," focussing on the Middle East/Persian Gulf and the Korean Peninsula. He cites, among other "disquieting news" the fact that "arms races are heating up in the Middle East and Southeast Asia, among other regions." Residual Iraqi threat "Operation Desert Storm greatly reduced Iraq's ability to conduct large-scale offensive military operations. The UN sanctions have impeded Saddam's efforts to reequip his forces. Preoccupied with defending the regime and putting down local insurgencies, the Iraqi military is currently capable of conducting only small-scale offensive operations with limited objectives." On Iraq's special weapons programs, Gates says the CIA believes Baghdad has managed to hide some nuclear and chemical-related equipment and ballistic missiles from the UN inspectorate: "we believe the regime still has more of everything-- more precursor chemicals, more bulk agent, more munitions, more production equipment." Further, he says, the CIA knows the Iraqis had a biological weapons program, and "we are convinced they have been able to preserve some biological weapons and the means to make even more." "Limited production of artillery and ammunition has resumed at some weapons production facilities damaged during the Gulf War. Despite these efforts, total arms production will remain signifi- cantly below prewar levels as long as sanctions remain in force and inspections continue. If sanctions were removed, we estimate it would take Iraq at least three to five years to restore its prewar conventional military inventories." The CIA judges "that the Iraqis could soon restore their capability to produce Scud-type missiles, though they might need some help from abroad." Iran The goals of Iran's military build-up are, according to Gates, to "guarantee the survival of the regime; project power throughout the region; and offset US influence in the Middle East." As if it were a relatively massive amount, Gates proclaims that from "1990-1994 Iran plans to spend $2 billion in hard currency annually on foreign weapons." [Saudi Arabia by comparison spent over $5 billion on imported weapons from the US alone last year, and over $10 billion in 1990.] "Already, Tehran has purchased significant numbers of advanced warplanes and anti-aircraft missiles from Russia and China. It has bought some extended range Scud missiles from North Korea and is building a factory to manufacture its own. As part of its upgrade of naval forces, Iran has also contracted to buy at least two Kilo-class attack sub- marines from Russia. Even after Operation Desert Storm, Iraq still has three times as many armored vehicles as Iran. To reduce that gap, Tehran is attempting to purchase hundreds of tanks from Russian and East European suppliers. ... Iran has still not recov- ered from the destruction suffered during its long war with Iraq, and its military reconstruction is being hampered by the poor state of its economy." North Korea "The North maintains enormous ground forces just north of the Demilitarized Zone. ... [U]ntil these forces go away, the threat they present is real and serious. ... I don't want to exaggerate this threat. North Korea's armed forces suffer from many deficiencies. Their training and, consequently, combat readiness are questionable. They have weaknesses in air defense and logistics. They could not count on much if any support from erstwhile allies. ... North Korea's large inventory of weapons is becoming obsolete. The North's defense industry is based on 1960s technology and beset by quality problems. Pyongyang lacks the hard currency to purchase more advanced technology. We have seen no deliveries of major weapons from the Soviet Union or its successors since 1989. China cannot provide the types of weapons, such as modern aircraft or surface-to-air missile systems, that the Soviets supplied." But this very weakness "could reinforce the North's determination to develop nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles," Gates warns. "We believe Pyongyang is close, perhaps very close, to achieving a nuclear weapon capability." Foreign Ops. Hearing on Proliferation 8 April---The Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee holds a hearing on proliferation and arms transfers. Very comprehensive testimony is provided by CRS analysts Zachary Davis, Steven Bowman, Robert Shuey and Richard Grimmett on nuclear, chemical/biological, missile and conventional anti-proliferation regimes and US policy options. Under Secretary of State Reginald Bartholomew also testifies. Grimmett says there are countervailing pressures to the post-Cold war financial incentives to sell conventional weapons. "Most Third World states, apart form oil rich states such as Saudi Arabia, lack large cash reserves and are thus dependent on securing credit from sellers to conclude major arms purchases. ... These circumstances may significantly affect sales by suppliers, such as Russia, which are not in a position to provide deep discounts or grants to prospective clients as was the case in the past." Bartholomew testifies on the administration's efforts to curb the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and `destabilizing' conventional arms. Echoing, in large part verbatim, Richard Clarke's testimony in March, he outlines achievements in non- proliferation policy over the past year. Nuclear weapons In addition to nine states announcing their intention to, or having acceded to, the NPT since 1990, Argentina and Brazil have renounced nuclear weapons and accepted full- scope IAEA safeguards; "Algeria has placed its Chinese-origin research reactor under safeguards, and Syria has recently completed an NPT full-scope safeguard agreement with the IAEA." North Korea has signed a safeguard agreement but has yet to ratify and fully implement it, Bartholomew says, and he notes that Iraq's nuclear program is subject to destruction under international supervision. 27 countries in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) have agreed to the US demand for "full scope safeguards" (safeguards on all nuclear facilities) as a condition for the sale of new nuclear supplies. In addition, in early April, the NSG agreed to control "a substantial list of dual-use nuclear-related equipment and technol- ogy." Ballistic missiles The MTCR has grown from its original 7 to 18 members, with two more slated to join by the end of the year, Bartholomew says. The US has persuaded Russia and China "to apply strict MTCR missile export control standards." [Note: as this newsletter is going to `press', the US invoked MTCR sanctions against the Russian and Indian space agencies, because of the sale of a rocket motor by Russia to India. More in the next issue.] Argentina and Israel "now observe MTCR-equivalent controls," with several East European countries in the process of doing likewise, Bartholomew says. The list of MTCR controlled goods has been revised and the scope of the MTCR expanded "to include missiles capable of delivering all weapons of mass destruction. ... Technical experts from the Partner nations are meeting this week to work out how to implement this extension of the Guidelines." The US has imposed trade sanctions for missile-related exports on foreign entities in China, Pakistan, South Africa, North Korea and Iran. "We have gotten a number of countries out of the missile business," Bartholomew asserts. "Argentina last year announced the termination of its Condor ballistic missile program. ... Only North Korea is still exporting complete MTCR-class missile systems." Third World Nuclear/Missile Threat 30 April---The Research and Development Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee holds a hearing on appropriate responses to nuclear and ballistic missile proliferation. A panel of non-governmental proliferation experts testify, followed by a closed briefing from Gordon Oehler, Director of the Intelligence Community Non-Proliferation Center. Low tech delivery more likely than ICBM Gary Milhollin, Director of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, says that of the current and possible near future nuclear weapons states, only Israel (other than the Perm Five countries) "seems likely to be able to build an ICBM capable of reaching the United States." The threat of "low tech" means of delivery--such as by van or recreational boat--is on the rise, though, Milhollin argues. These low tech options have several advantages over high tech forms: they are much cheaper; provide for a great deal of anonymity; can be developed quietly, greatly reducing the likelihood of preemp- tion. He notes that "For India to develop an ICBM, there would have to be a series of long-range tests. The first test would undoubtedly set off a storm of opposition, and could easily end India's access to the World Bank and International Monetary Fund." A low tech means would be more reliable, he says, than an untested or inadequately-tested ICBM. Milhollin argues that the US is spending too much money on the vanishing Soviet ICBM threat and not directing enough resources toward the "growing nuclear threat from the developing world." The US should spend more on "better intelligence", fully fund the IAEA to support aggressive inspections, reduce the amount of fissile material circulating in world trade, and tighten dual-use nuclear-relevant export controls. MTCR: useful but incomplete Janne Nolan, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, discusses ballistic missile proliferation. Export control measures, such as the MTCR, are important in that they raise the economic and political costs of missile acquisition, Nolan asserts. "Supplier controls may not terminate missile pro- grams, but they can delay their progress while efforts are launched to redress the underlying reasons for the demand of such systems. ... The types of missiles that could strike the US require inputs and expertise which are still under the tight control of a relatively few industrial countries, including advanced guidance and re-entry vehicles," she says. Nolan notes that hyping ballistic missile proliferation unduly plays into the hands of forces in developing countries that want them, by reinforcing the perception that missiles provide power and prestige. Further, "Efforts to control missile proliferation in a context of a permissive approach to the export of high perfor- mance aircraft, naval systems (including submarines) or advanced dual-use technologies for other weapon development is not intellectually defensible. Even if advanced conventional weapons have already proliferated fairly widely and may seem too daunting to control in any comprehensive manner, it is not too late to start to contain the spread of new, potentially even more dangerous technologies...." Legislation passed and pending Foreign Operations Continuing Resolution Passed 1 April---Congress passes a $14.2 billion continuing resolution (H.J.Res.456) providing military and economic aid for the remainder of FY92. President Bush signs it into law the same day as PL 102-266. Foreign aid funding had lapsed the previous day, when a 6-month continuing resolution passed in October expired. This bill includes $270 million for UN Peacekeeping Operations, with the money drawn from a 1.48 percent reduction in all accounts, except those specifically earmarked by Congress. Ceilings and earmarks on aid to Morocco, Jordan and several organizations were eliminated in this bill, but most funding is continued at about the FY91 levels. Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1992 8 April---Rep. Henry Gonzalez introduces this bill, H.R.4803, which is referred to the Banking Committee he chairs. Title I of the bill mandates that one year after entry into force, the US government cannot provide funds to any international develop- ment institution "if the most recent determination of the Secre- tary of the Treasury ... is that a member country of the institu- tion---(A) is capable of producing, or is seeking to produce, a type of weapon that is a subject of a regime for controlling weapons of mass destruction; and (B) is not adhering to the regime." "Regimes" include the NPT, Treaty of Tlatelolco, Nuclear Suppliers Group, Geneva Protocol, BWC and Australia Group. Within 6 months of enactment, and annually thereafter, the Sec. of Treasury, in conjunction with the Sec. of State and Defense and Director of the CIA, will determine which countries are capable of or seeking to produce weapons of mass destruction; identify which international development institutions the country is a member of; and report this to the Banking Committee. "Inter- national development institutions" are defined to include the IMF, World Bank and associated agencies, African Development Bank, African Development Fund, Asian Development Bank, Inter- American Development Bank and Inter-American Ivestment Corporation. The EXIM bank would also be prohibited from guaranteeing, insuring and extending credits to countries so identified. China-MFN 18 March---The Senate fails to override President Bush's veto of H.R.2212, which would have required presidential certification that, among other things, China had made "significant progress" in curbing its weapons proliferation activities, in order to renew China's most-favored-nation trade status beginning this summer. Specifically, the President would have had to certify that China had not sold missiles or missile launchers to Syria and Iran. (See ASM Nos. 9-10 and 11-12 for more.) On March 11 the House overwhelmingly overrode the veto with a 357-61 vote. The Senate vote (60-38), was 6 votes short of the two-thirds necessary. Sen. Joseph Biden says these provisions "do no more than lock in the pledge that Beijing has formally made now in return for us lifting sanctions against companies in China. ... These provisions will force the Chinese leaders to choose between an international arms market measured in hundreds of millions of dollars and an American consumer market where China enjoys in the area of $13 billion annual surplus." "I ... have serious concerns about public testimony given by the Director of Central Intelligence 3 weeks ago. On the same day that we in the Senate were convened in closed session to discuss the disturbing implications of intelligence reports about Chinese arms sales, Director Gates was over in the House giving China a clean bill of health. His testimony that day raises questions of both propriety and accuracy---questions I have posed directly in writing to Director Gates and also shared with members of the Intelligence Committee." *** Several bills have recently been introduced to suspend military aid or ban arms sales to specific countries. Military Aid to Peru Suspended 7 April---Senator Kennedy and 7 others introduced S.2537, the Democracy in Peru Act, which mandates that all aid to Peru, other than humanitarian aid, be suspended until the President can certify that: the Peruvian Constitution, congress, judiciary and individual rights are restored; the Peruvian armed forces have submitted to civilian control; and the Peruvian armed forces and President Fujimori have renounced violence as a means of achieving political goals. On April 8, the HFAC approved by a voice vote a non-binding resolution, H.Con.Res.306, condemning the antidemocratic actions of President Fujimori and urging President Bush to delay the approval of loans for Peru in multilateral lending institutions until democracy is restored. Arms Ban for Burma 7 April---S.Con.Res.107 is introduced by Senators Helms, Moyni- han, Simon and Wofford. The resoultion would note that it is the sense of Congress that the President should seek an international arms embargo against the military government of Myanmar (Burma) until power has been transferred to a "legitimate, democratically elected government." Specifically, the Secretary of State is instructed to call both privately and publicly for an end to Chinese arms sales to the Burmese regime until all political prisoners are released, martial law is lifted and democracy installed. Turkey S.2019, "a bill to prohibit all US military and economic assis- tance to Turkey until the Turkish government takes certain ac- tions to resolve the Cyprus problem" [meaning Turkey's invasion of Cyprus in 1974], was introduced last November by Sen. Pressler. If enacted no credits could be extended and no guarantees issued under the AECA until the President certifies that "all Turkish military forces in excess of those permitted by the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee and all Turkish colonists are withdrawn from Cyprus." In addition, Turkey must become compliant with UN resolutions on Cyprus (UNGA Resolution 3212, UNSC Resolutions 365, 353, 354, 357, 358 and 360), the NATO Preamble and Article I and the Foreign Assistance Act. Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992 This bill, S.2543, would amend the Foreign Relations Authoriza- tion Act of FY92-93 by adding a new Title VI to make the UN sanctions now in force against Iraq applicable under US law to Iran as well; it reinforces US law regarding sales of dual-use technologies and advanced conventional arms to the two and would also discourage foreign governments and companies from transferring weapons and related technologies to these countries. "Advanced conventional weapons" is defined to include "long- range precision-guided munitions, fuel air explosives, cruise missiles, low observability aircraft or other radar evading aircraft, military satellites, electro-magnetic weapons, and laser weapons." Within 30 days of learning that a foreign government or company has transferred covered items to Iran or Iraq, the President must send Congress a report on the transfer and on the US response. The President would be obliged to bar the US government from procuring or contracting to procure goods from a foreign company that is found to have sold prohibited goods to Iraq or Iran for 2 years. All licenses for the export of goods to those firms must be prohibited for 2 years. In addition, the President could prevent the importation into the US of any product produced by a company dealing in arms with Iran or Iraq. Mandatory sanctions against governments found to be transferring prohibited items to the two countries are: suspension of US military and economic assistance; opposition by the US in multilateral lending institutions to loans or financial or technical assistance to that country; termination of all technical exchange agreements and of all coproduction or codevelopment agreements of weapons. In addition, the President may revoke most-favored-nation trade status, freeze that country's financial assets and/or restrict air landing or shipping privileges. The bill is sponsored by Senators McCain, Gore, Thurmond and Helms. See Congressional Record 8 April 92 pp. S5052-8. Recent Congressional publications Arms Trade and Nonproliferation (Hearings before the Subcommittee on Technology and National Security of the Joint Economic Committee on 21 September 90 and 23 April 91) USGPO: 1992. Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress, April 1992. Defense for a New Era: Lessons of the Persian Gulf War (Report by the House Armed Services Committee) USGPO: 1992. Defense Inventory: Control and Security Weaknesses Create Opportunity for Theft (Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Readiness, Committee on Armed Services), GAO/NSIAD-92-60, March 1992, 36 pp. Economic Sanctions: Effectiveness as Tools of Foreign Policy (Report to the Chairman, SFRC) GAO/NSIAD 92-106, February 1992, 32 pp. "Economic Sanctions: Issues Raised by the Sanctions Against Iraq," Douglas McDaniel, CRS Report for Congress (No. 92-370F), 17 April 92. "Iraq's Post-War Compliance Record: A Chronology," Kenneth Katzman, CRS Report for Congress (No. 92-320F), 31 March 92, 47 pp. "Middle East Arms Supply: Recent Control Initiatives," Alfred Prados, CRS Issue Brief, 2 March 92, 14 pp. National Security: Perspectives on Worldwide Threats and Implications for U.S. Forces and National Security: Papers Prepared for GAO Conference on Worldwide Threats, GAO/NSIAD-92-104, April 1992. Proposal for Export-Import Fianancing of Defense Articles and Services (Hearing of the Subcommittee on International Development, Finance, Trade and Monetary Policy of the House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs on 2 May 91) USGPO: 1992. Security Assistance: Shooting Incident in East Timor, Indonesia, GAO/N-SIAD-92-132FS, February 1992, 17 pp. U.N. Security Council Resolutions on Iraq: Compliance and Implementation (Report prepared by the CRS for the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, House Committee on Foreign Affairs) USGPO: 1992.