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Editorial: FREEDOM OF INFORMATION

While the United States' arms sales procedure is touted as being "open," and much data is published annually in several government reports (see the attached ASM Extra for a listing and description of these reports), "real time" information about sales the executive branch is proposing, and Congress is reviewing, is quite difficult for the public to obtain.

Unless it is a major sale and is reported in the mass media, the public can now find out (under the "Executive Communications" section in the Congressional Record) only that the Pentagon has notified Congress of a proposed sale of some unnamed defense articles and services to a particular country. These notices are unclassified, but will not be given to the public unless requested under the Freedom of Information Act. Requesting and receiving the unclassified notification by mail takes well over a month, coming too late to influence Congress' 30-day review period.

Except for those relatively few Members on the Foreign Affairs and Foreign Relations Committees, the majority of Congress is also kept in the dark about most weapons being sold and licensed. The key Committee Chairmen, to whom these sales notifications are sent, could easily make more information available to their colleagues in Congress, as well as to the American public, by printing the unclassified sales and commercial license notifications in the Congressional Record in their entirety. (This step was taken by the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee until 1986.) Doing so would immediately and easily notify all Members of Congress and the public of pending arms exports.

Unclassified quarterly and annual reports to Congress, listing outstanding offers to sell military equipment and offers accepted, could also be printed in the Record upon receipt. This unclassified information is now protected from the public by being labeled "confi- dential business information." But how listing the dollar volume of sales agreements and licenses to various countries could possibly divulge any proprietary information is difficult to discern.

Timely information on actions taken by our elected representatives---actions which may very well result in U.S. involvement in a future conflict we will be called upon to support---is a public right and is vital to a functioning democracy. -Lora Lumpe

CLINTON ADMIN. WATCH

Les Aspin on U.S. F-15/F-16 Sales

Sen. William Cohen: "Russia has sold something like $2 billion since 1990 in military equipment to Iran.... Correspondingly, we have been engaged in sales of weapons as well. ... We had the sale of F-15s to Saudi Arabia, the sale of F-16s to Taiwan. We had the French who were selling Mirages to Taiwan. And that, of course, has upset the Chinese who have been engaged in sales of their own.

One suggestion that has been made is that if we really want to get the P-5 talks, [talks among] the permanent members of the UN [Security Council], back on track, is to review these particular sales. Is that something that you would advocate as Secretary of Defense, that we go back and review the sale of F-15s to either Saudi Arabia or [F-16s] to Taiwan in an effort to lure China back to the table, as such, and perhaps get the other nations involved in trying to stop the proliferation of conventional weapons to inherently unstable areas?"

Rep. Les Apsin: "Let me talk about the issue in general, because I think that---you're absolutely right. A corollary of us not having an industrial base policy is that in order for industries to survive, the pressure comes on selling the equipment abroad. And that's---I do not think that we're ever going to deal adequately with the issue of arms sales until you take care of the political pressure to make those arms sales, and I'm talking about domestic political pressure from the people who otherwise are going to be put out of work. As long as that pressure exists, I think any reviews by any other group and what else are not going to be very successful. The thing that drives arms sales is the economic situation. And if that's true in this country, it's true in spades in the Soviet Union. I mean, literally, their only thing that they can sell and get hard currency---virtually---is arms. ... The economic pressures on them to [make] arms sales is tremendous. So I ... understand the concern. I think it's a very tough problem to deal with. And it's clearly something that we're going to have to have a comprehensive strategy on dealing with, because you're going to have to deal with the economic pressures in the United States and in the Soviet Union and presumably in other, Western countries which are selling. The British and the French and other arms manufacturers are feeling the same strain."

Sen. Cohen: "I take it you're not going to call for a review of the sales that have been made to date."

Rep. Aspin: "That might stir up an awful lot of trouble. [Laughter.]"

Secretary of State Warren Christopher

In his prepared testimony, Christopher describes the "three pillars" of Clinton Administration foreign policy: the elevation of economic security as a primary facet of for- eign policy; the preservation of military strength to meet new security challenges; and the promotion of democracy and free markets abroad. "Democratic movements and govern- ments are not only more likely to protect human and minority rights, they are also more likely to resolve ethnic, religious, and territorial disputers in a peaceful manner and to be reliable partners in diplomacy, trade, arms accords, and global environmental protection."

Christopher says regional conflicts, terrorism and the proliferation of advanced conventional and unconventional weaponry are the fundamental security threats. Helping Russia to "demilitarize, privatize, invigorate its economy, and develop representative political institu- tions" is also identified as a principal security challenge of the 1990s.

He cites the particular difficulty afforded by China, saying: "Our policy will seek to facilitate a peaceful evolution of China from communism to democracy by encouraging the forces of economic and political liberalization in that great country." But, Christopher says, "we cannot ignore continuing reports of Chinese exports of sensitive military technology to troubled areas...." In southern Asia, he cites combatting nuclear proliferation, restoring peace to Afghanistan and promoting respect for human rights in Burma and Pakistan as primary interests.

In the Middle East, Christopher reiterates the administration's support for Israel: "Our democracy-centered policy underscores our special relationship with Israel, the region's only democracy, with whom we are committed to maintaining a strong and vibrant strategic relationship." He also says the administration "will work toward new arms control agree- ments, particularly concerning weapons of mass destruction."

Christopher pledges candor "Practitioners of statecraft sometimes forget their ultimate purpose is to improve the daily lives of the American people. They assume foreign policy is too complex for the public to be involved in its formation. That is a costly conceit. From Vietnam to Iran-Contra, we have too often witnessed the disastrous effects of foreign poli- cies, hatched by the experts, without proper candor or consultation with the public and their representatives in Congress.

More than ever before, the State Department cannot afford to have `clientitis,' a malady characterized by undue deference to the potential reactions of other countries. I have long thought the State Department needs an `America Desk.' This Administration will have one--- and I'll be sitting behind it."

Woolsey on Proliferation

Access to information Chairman John Glenn is particularly pleased that today's hearing is open, since "the threat posed by the spread of weapons of mass destruction is becoming more real to all Americans---from the soldiers from Middletown U.S. who recently fought in the Gulf, to average taxpayers...." Glenn, who also sits on the Intelligence Committee, has been working with Republican members of that committee to urge the Defense Intelligence Agency to prepare an annual unclassified review of international weapons prolif- eration developments akin to its former Soviet Military Power threat assessments. Noting that the DIA has resisted doing so, and even responded to his request for greater freedom of information with a classified letter, Glenn releases translations of the recent, long report on weapons proliferation prepared by the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service [formerly the KGB]. "I hope that in the future the American people will not have to rely on the Rus- sian Foreign Intelligence Service" for a description of the threat, Glenn complains.

Making more information public about the scope and nature of the proliferation threat facing the U.S. is a key subject of the Q&A, with Senators from both parties pushing Woolsey to make public more specific information. While Woolsey agrees that it's important for the American people to understand these issues, sensitive sources and methods of collection must be protected to maintain the flow of information in the future. But, he assures the panel, by emphasizing certain publicly available information, and downplaying bad information, he is able to steer the public toward the truth without jeopardizing sources.

So, where did he steer us in his prepared testimony?

China Woolsey soft-pedals Chinese proliferation in his prepared testimony, but assumes a harder line when answering questions by the Senators. "China is also a major prolifer- ation concern. ... We are closely monitoring its behavior for signs that China is not living up to its [MTCR and NPT] commitments." He acknowledges that Chinese nuclear-related deals with Algeria, Syria and Iran appear consistent with its NPT obligations. "On the other hand," he continues, "China's relationship with Pakistan seems less benign. We are also concerned about Beijing's missile and chemical transfers to the Middle East."

In early December the L.A. Times reported (and it was widely repeated) that China had transferred 24 M-11 ballistic missiles to Pakistan, in apparent violation of its November 1991 pledge to abide by the MTCR missile export restrictions. The Bush State Department re- mained ambiguous, saying only that "no determination has been made" as to the validity of the allegations. Woolsey also refused to validate or refute the claim publicly, saying only that he was "closely watching" the situation.

Iran Woolsey, rather subjectively, declares that "despite the blow to Iraq---its only real adversary [emphasis added]---during Desert Storm" Iran is carrying on a "massive and costly military buildup." He continues: "Iran's efforts ... encompass advanced fighter aircraft, long-range fighter bombers, submarines, and missiles. Iran's military buildup, de- spite severe economic crisis, underscores its desire to dominate its own neighborhood, and reach far beyond." He adds that Iran is "pursuing the acquisition of nuclear weapons"; "has an active chemical warfare program," producing "primarily choking and blister agents" ... and "may also have a stockpile of nerve agents." "Biological weapons," he says, "if not already in production, probably are not far behind."

Iraq "The Iraqis retain missiles, support equipment, and propellant, and they are still capable of firing Scud missiles. Iraq's biological weapons capability is perhaps of greatest immediate concern. Baghdad had an advanced program before Desert Storm, and neither war nor inspections have seriously degraded this capability."

Libya "Libya is constructing a second chemical weapons production facility. ... Libya continues also to try to import technologies for its missile programs."

North Korea Woolsey identified Pyongyang as the Agency's "most grave current [proliferation] concern." North Korea "is developing and actively marketing a new, 1,000 kilometer-range missile. North Korea apparently has no threshold governing its sales---it is willing to sell to any country with the cash to pay."

Pakistan/India The two countries pose "perhaps the most probable prospect for future use of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons." The CIA estimates that "at the present time both India and Pakistan have the capability to assemble the components of a small number of nuclear weapons within a very short period of time."

Aircraft and missiles worrisome "Advanced aircraft are often the delivery system of choice for weapons of mass destruction, and they are now commonplace among proliferating countries. Although missiles are less vulnerable than aircraft to defensive measures, and are more difficult to detect, the aircraft available to these countries are fully capable of delivering nuclear weapons and munitions filled with chemical or biological agents," Woolsey testifies.

Indeed, when asked in the Q&A about the likely delivery mode for Pakistani nuclear weapons, Woolsey replies: "Our best judgment right now would be the [U.S.-supplied] F- 16s. They have other platforms that could be used---for example, C-130 [U.S. supplied cargo planes], some of the old French Mirages, and so forth."

He gives an overview of global missile proliferation: "North Korea has sold Syria and Iran extended range Scud Cs, and has apparently agreed to sell missiles to Libya. Russia and Ukraine are showing a growing willingness to sell missile technology prohibited by the MTCR. Egypt and Israel are developing and producing missiles, and several Persian Gulf states have purchased whole systems as well as production technology from China and North Korea. Some have equipped these missiles with weapons of mass destruction, and others are striving to do so."

Conventional arms proliferation menacing Woolsey singles out the spread of conventional weaponry as an area of specific concern:

"We are also concerned with the worldwide proliferation of advanced conventional weapons---weapons that significantly increase conventional war-fighting capability, but fall short of the devastating capabilities of mass destruction weapons. The proliferation of these weapons, although perhaps less potent and psychologically alarming than weapons of mass destruction, may have an even more pronounced impact in the military outcome of future regional conflicts. ... These weapons will present formidable challenges to U.S. military operations in the future."

"Anti-ship cruise missiles employing countermeasures and precision guidance threaten U.S. and allied naval forces. The expanding ranks of Third World nations who are now fielding the weapons include Iran, Syria, and Libya. Increasingly advanced surface-to-air missiles, with enhanced anti-stealth capability pose a growing threat to low-flying aircraft and cruise missiles such as those in the U.S. inventory. We have witnessed a sharp increase in the demand for such weapons since Desert Storm, which vividly demonstrated the effectiveness of the systems we used there. Similarly, many countries are marketing precision guided munitions---some even more capable than many U.S. systems."

Russian export control efforts mixed "Russia's ability to maintain control of its special [mass destruction] weapons and associated technologies has somewhat weakened under the stresses and strains of the Soviet breakup. ... We have no credible reporting that nuclear weapons have left CIS territory, and we do not believe that nuclear weapon design information has been sold or transferred to foreign states." But, he continues later, "Despite important high-level Russian political support for establishing effective export controls, Moscow's fledgling efforts have not yet produced solid results. Legal, personnel, and fund- ing problems are slowing progress. Moreover, many agencies involved in controlling exports are also responsible for promoting military exports, creating obvious concerns." [The U.S. State Department's Center for Defense Trade also undertakes both arms export licensing and arms export promotional activities.]

"Economic and nationalist pressures are causing some Russian and Ukrainian leaders to question the wisdom of adhering to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Some Russians contend that national laws, not the MTCR, will govern their export of missile tech- nology. Our initial understanding of the Russian regulations indicate they may not be consistent with the MTCR. ... In a recent arms show in Moscow, the Russians advertised a derivative of the old SS-23 for sale as a civilian rocket [space launch vehicle], raising additional MTCR concerns."

Deputy Secretary of Defense William Perry

Perry is a strong proponent of increased reliance on dual use technologies to maintain and downsize the defense industrial base. He advocates eliminating burdensome overhead and management practices, allowing arms manufacturers to more easily adapt their product for commercial markets and to sell to the government with less cost and hassle. In the Q&A, Chairman Sam Nunn asks him how the U.S. achieves greater commercialization of its de- fense industry, while at the same time controlling exports useful for weapons of mass destruction. Perry responds: "We have to draw a clear distinction between defense-unique systems and between dual use technology. And the former we can and should control the sale whenever we think that's going to damage our proliferation goals. But, in the latter, the dual use technologies, I think that's a hopeless task, and it only interferes with a company's ability to succeed internationally if we try to impose all sorts of controls in that area. ... By having too wide, too extensive, a list of technologies we try to control, we effec- tively trivialize the process and make it almost impossible to execute."

Further, he says, the Pentagon should shape its R&D and procurement programs to ensure that the residual defense industry maintains a minimal essential production capability. Low rate production could maintain the submarine, aircraft and tank industrial bases, he says, adding: "I would not support production lines simply to keep production lines going. ... I would only support production lines where it is clear the Department of Defense had a future need for that capability." Good plan.

To further help maintain the defense industrial base he says that "rework" (weapons upgrades) should be moved out of service-owned and operated depots to contractor facili- ties, a move that the defense industries have been lobbying heavily for. Perry also advocates increased cooperative acquisition programs, which he says will im- prove interoperability and help sustain the U.S. industrial base.

Frank Wisner: Dej Vu

Wisner says he thinks military aid programs have generally been highly constructive. "In recent years, however, the effectiveness of some programs has been jeopardized by funding reductions. Clearly, it has been appropriate to reduce overall security assistance funding as the world-wide Soviet challenge first receded and then disappeared ....I am concerned however, that reductions have gone much too far, too fast, at least given constant levels for the two major recipients [Israel and Egypt]." Wisner is anxious about the public perception that security assistance is no longer needed. "It is clear that the post-Cold War world is filled with threats and violence, that there is a continued, if not increased, reliance on coalition arrangements to respond to these dangers."

The administration will "fully implement requirements of law which insure that our interests in promoting democracy and human rights are fully taken into account," he assures. In answer to how the U.S. should work with other countries to curb the spread of weapons, Wisner outlines U.S. activities in several bilateral and multilateral fora. Among the 52 CSCE countries, the U.S. is promoting nonproliferation and restraint in arms exports, he relates, and the U.S. has tentatively agreed to send experts to brief the countries on U.S. arms export policies and controls. He reasserts U.S. support for the UN register of conventional arms imports and exports, to which the first data declaration is due at the end of April. On the meetings of the big five arms exporters (U.S., Britain, France, Russia and China), initiated in May 1991 by President Bush, Wisner says: "After some encouraging initial meetings, China withdrew from the talks after the announcement of U.S. F-16 sales to Taiwan. The other parties continue to meet."

The objective of all these efforts, he says, "is to discourage transfers of conventional weapons which could prove qualitatively or quantitatively destabilizing. All countries should be made aware of the dangers of such proliferation, and be encouraged to develop responsible national export policies and legal systems to enforce these policies. This administration welcomes the opportunity to assist any country in creating export control policies and regimes needed to eliminate destabilizing transfers." It all sounds familiar.

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