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ARMS SALES MONITOR

No. 30 (20 July 1995)


Table of Contents:

COMMERCE DEPT. LICENSES EXPORT OF TORTURE DEVICES

It would probably surprise most Americans to learn that their government licenses instruments of torture for export to countries around the world.

From September 1991-December 1993, the Commerce Department approved over 350 export licenses, worth more than $27 million, for torture and police equipment under commodity category 0A82C. According to the U.S. Export Administration Regulations, this broad-ranging category includes: "saps, thumbcuffs, thumbscrews, leg irons, shackles, and handcuffs; specially designed implements of torture; strait jackets, plastic handcuffs, police helmets and shields; and parts and accessories." (See p.2)

Another export category, 0A84C, combines electric shock batons and cattle prods with shotguns and shells. Over 2,000 licenses were granted for these items. We obtained the information under a Freedom of Information Act request for data on gun exports. These licenses represent the government's permission for the export to go forward; they do not indicate actual delivery.

By lumping controversial items (like thumbscrews) together with non-controversial ones (like helmets) into broad general categories, Commerce effectively frustrates public oversight. This makes many suspect the worst, especially when these commodities are licensed for export to governments with well-documented records of human rights abuse. For example, Commerce approved $10.5 million to Saudi Arabia, where government officials "continued to torture and otherwise abuse detainees, including citizens and foreigners," according to the State Department's latest human rights report.

STATE, COMMERCE HIDE SALES FROM PUBLIC

Compared to the State and Commerce Departments, the Pentagon is a paragon of openness. The Defense Department regularly and readily discloses information about government-negotiated Foreign Military Sales---e.g., what and how much weaponry it is exporting and to whom. State and Commerce withhold similar data about sales which they license. Because these sales are negotiated directly by the arms industry, this information is considered proprietary, although not classified (see ASM No. 27).

Commerce and State cite section 12(c) of the Export Administration Act to block information. This law states that "information obtained for the purpose of consideration of, or concerning, license applications...shall be withheld from public disclosure unless the release of such information is determined by the Secretary to be in the national interest." This provision presumably is intended to safeguard deals in the works. Why the information would remain proprietary after the sale has been won and the commodities have been shipped is far from clear.

For over a year, the ASM Project has sought information from all three departments on exports of light arms (e.g., guns and ammunition, light artillery and mortars). These weapons are a staple of recent and on-going regional and civil wars, yet because they are cheap, they fall well below the $14 million threshold for Congressional oversight.

In response to our request under the Freedom of Information Act, the Pentagon promptly released detailed and disaggregated information on deliveries of such weapons during the time we requested (1980-1993).

Commerce initially provided us with only highly aggregated data—the total number and dollar volume of relevant licenses which they approved to all countries during 1991-1993. Upon appeal, Commerce released country-specific information on licenses for this same time period. However, the data are still so aggregated that it is impossible to know what specifically was approved for export.

The State Department has interpreted section 12(c) to mean that it does not have to divulge any information about exports it has licensed.

Consumer reports

TURKEY WAGES WAR ON KURDS WITH U.S. ARMS, AID

Turkey sent 35,000 troops across the border into northern Iraq from 20 March to 2 May in pursuit of the Kurdish militants (PKK) it has been fighting since 1984. Several thousand Turkish troops returned to Iraq for a week in early July to continue the job.

Turkish and foreign press have long reported the use of American-made weapons in the war, which has claimed an estimated 15,000 lives. In June the State Department acknowledged that Turkey is using U.S.-supplied arms in attacks on civilians (see box).

In response to the cross-border attack, Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway and South Africa suspended military assistance and/or arms exports to Turkey. Austria and Switzerland had done so previously.

The U.S. State Department and White House, while not happy about the latest chapter in the war, have stood by Turkey, maintaining that the $450 million of military loans and $100 million grant economic aid requested for the coming year are still merited. According to the administration's budget documents, these programs are necessary for Turkey to "support U.S. goals" and to allow Turkey to "defend its own borders."

Congress has taken a harder line. Sen. Alfonse D'Amato (R-NY) and Rep. Robert Andrews (D-NJ) introduced legislation to block U.S. aid to Turkey unless Turkey cooperates with human rights monitors, pulls its forces from Cyprus, ends the blockade of Armenia, and ends the harassment of Christian communities. Andrews also opposed the sale of Harpoon missiles to Turkey in March.

Rep. John Porter (R-IL), a dogged critic of Turkey's human rights record, also sought to eliminate military aid to Turkey. In a 4 April hearing, Porter blasted U.S. policy. Members of the Foreign Operations Subcommittee---Democrats and Republicans---lined up to associate themselves with his eloquent and impassioned comments (see Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations for 1996, part 3, US GPO: 1995).

In the end, the House appropriated $21 million in economic aid and $320 million of military loans. The Senate will vote on aid to Turkey in August or September.

Why we need to sell them more arms at a time when they are using our arms in ways that are against our law in repressing their own people and killing innocent people is beyond me, and I can't understand how this administration can possibly support it.

---Rep. John Porter, 4 April 1995

[T]here is no question that Turkey's human rights record is very bad....That said, for us to base our policies solely on Turkey's human rights record would be very shortsighted.

---Walter Slocombe,
Under Sec. of Defense, 4 April 1995

STATE DEPT. REPORT ON TURKEY

Last year's foreign aid appropriations act required the State Department to report on allegations of human rights abuses by the Turkish military in its war with the PKK (see ASM No. 27 p. 1). The report was delivered to Congress on 1 June. Excerpts follow.

"U.S.-origin equipment, which accounts for most major items of the Turkish military inventory, has been used in operations against the PKK during which human rights abuses have occurred. It is highly likely that such equipment was used in support of the evacuation and/or destruction of villages. However, we have no evidence that verifies reports of torture and extrajudicial killings involving U.S. equipment....

According to Turkish government figures, as of October 1, 1994, 1,046 villages and hamlets had been evacuated.... Most NGOs now estimate the total number of evacuated villages and hamlets at around 2,000. Various sources estimate that over two million have left their homes. Village evacuations have been a significant contributing factor to this....In some instances evacuations of villages have been accompanied by burning, bombing, shelling or other de- struction....In a number of instances reported by U.S. human rights NGOs and others, eye witnesses have identified the equipment involved as U.S. models.

  • Evacuated villagers from Nurettin identified M-113 armor- ed personnel carriers as being involved in the evacuation of that village in November 1993.
  • Both Blackhawk and Super Cobra helicopters were identified in press reports as having been used in operations in Tunceli province in September-October 1994.
  • As indicated earlier, reportedly at least 4 F-16s bombed four villages on March 26, 1994.

    The USG finds the evidence for the use of this equipment these three instances highly credible....

    Extrajudicial killings and so-called `mystery killings' occurred at a high rate until the end of 1994....The total over the past three years now exceeds 2000."

    U.S. GUNS FOR GUATEMALA

    Guatemala's long-abysmal human rights record has recently received attention by the mainstream media due to sensational revelations by Rep. Robert Torricelli (D-NJ) that a Guatemalan colonel, on the payroll of the CIA, was involved in the 1990 murder of a U.S. citizen and in the 1992 torture/murder of a guerrilla married to a U.S. citizen. During the past three decades, the Guatemalan army has razed hundreds of villages, killed over 100,000 civilians---mostly Mayans---and tortured countless numbers in an effort to eradicate the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG).

    Since 1977, when Guatemala refused to accept human rights conditions on military aid, the Defense Department has maintained minimal ties with the country's armed forces, principally through the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program. IMET was canceled in March (see ASM No. 29 p. 6). Unclassified data we received from the Defense Department shows no sales of small arms to Guatemala during fiscal years 1980-1993.

    As recent press coverage made clear, however, even after the Bush administration supposedly cut off all military aid to Guatemala in 1990, the CIA continued to channel about $5-7 million to the Guatemalan military annually .

    In addition, the Commerce Department approved over $2.5 million of export licenses for shotguns, buckshot and shock batons and $170,771 of police and torture equipment to Guatemala during 1991-1993 (see p. 2). According to information presented at a Senate Government Affairs subcommittee hearing in June 1994, the State Department granted 141 licenses for exports of pistols, revolvers, and rifles totaling $6.7 million during 1989-1993.

    Despite all of the bad press of late, the Guatemalan military has a friend in Rep. Dan Burton (R-IN). In a recent speech on the House floor, Burton asserted that "a prolonged terrorist campaign, conducted by elements of the communist URNG...has provoked violent military responses to its attacks and assassinations." Burton claimed that if the U.S. didn't resume aid to the Guatemalan armed forces, we "would thereby be aligning ourselves with the terrorist URNG in the peace process" .

    SAUDIS GO FOR BROKE ON U.S. ARMS

    In May the State Department acknowledged that the economic downturn in Saudi Arabia—in part due to large-scale arms purchases—is undermining political stability in the sheikdom. Low oil prices, a $60 billion tab for the 1991 Gulf War, and over $30 billion of new weapons have led to large budget deficits for the past several years. As a result, the Saudi government is now engaged in painful budget cutting, including substantial reductions in popular public subsidies for gas, electricity and water.

    In a letter to Rep. Lee Hamilton (D-IN), the State Department reported that "Tighter government budgets have reduced employment opportunities for young Saudis, frozen wages and slowed the private sector.... The short term economic downturn has colored popular perceptions of the government's financial management and sharpened the distinctions among the social groups. These economic strains have added to the resentment over the advantages enjoyed by the very large Saudi royal family."

    Since 1990, the United States has signed over $29 billion in Foreign Military Sales (FMS) contracts with Saudi Arabia. Hamilton asked the State Department whether U.S. efforts to boost sales of advanced weaponry and aircraft have contributed to the Saudis' financial woes and whether the burden of these payments contributes to anti-American sentiment. "We are aware that the high profile of some U.S. commercial successes has generated critics of the U.S. in sectors of Saudi society which believe incorrectly that the U.S. has pressed the Saudi government to make unwanted or unneeded purchases," said the State Department. "It is the Saudis alone who have defined their import priorities. Thus, it is misleading to suggest that U.S. companies are responsible for Saudi economic problems."

    Actually, the United States has been helping Saudi Arabia define its military needs for over fifty years. In 1991, Lt. Gen. Dennis Malcor completed the most recent DOD assessment of Saudi Arabia's security needs, which presumably laid the groundwork for recent U.S. sales of Patriot anti-aircraft missiles, F-15E bombers and M-1A2 tanks. According to recent reports, the Pentagon is now recommending that the Saudis buy several Aegis-class destroyers and cruisers at $1 billion each.

    Tax dollars at work

    GAO: `UNLEVEL PLAYING FIELD' IS A MYTH

    American firms captured more than 70 percent of the global arms market in 1993, while our four largest West European competitors—Britain, France, Germany and Italy—together garnered less than 14 percent . Even so, export proponents routinely cite unfair competition from Europe, especially when they are seeking new government aid to promote weapons sales.

    The General Accounting Office (GAO) recently investigated the matter and found that, although forms of support vary somewhat, the U.S. arms industry enjoys support similar to that provided by France, Britain and Germany. The report, "Military Exports: A Comparison of Government Support in the United States and Three Major Competitors," considered financing, high level government advocacy, and bureaucratic support for arms exports.

    Financing: According to GAO, Britain, France and Germany finance weapons sales through official export credit guarantees, which insure that the selling government will repay commercial loans if the purchaser defaults. Britain's Export Credits Guarantee Department backed $2.9 billion of loans for arms in 1993-1994. The report provided no information on the amount of French or German-backed loans.

    The U.S. government, on the other hand, primarily finances arms exports with grant aid and direct loans. In fiscal year 1994, the government financed sales of nearly $4 billion of weapons: $3.1 billion through grants and $800 million through loans. In addition, the GAO points out, legislation passed last year allows the Export-Import Bank to guarantee loans for non-lethal military exports, if the primary use is to be non-military. The Ex-Im Bank may also finance lethal military exports for counter-narcotics purposes. Finally, the report notes that several state governments—most notably California—guarantee loans for exports from local weapons manufacturers. Advocacy: The GAO reports that Britain and France have historically sent high-level government officials to persuade foreign buyers to buy their weapons. Germany has not done so. Citing several recent successes, the report says "High-ranking U.S. officials have been increasingly willing to intervene to influence competitions in favor of U.S. defense companies." Recent cases in point: William Perry attended his first arms bazaar as Secretary of Defense in March, when he dropped by the IDEX show in Abu Dhabi; Commerce Secretary Ron Brown, accompanied by several arms industry CEOs, toured the Persian Gulf in March. Bureaucratic support: The GAO reports that "France and the UK have a single organization within their defense ministries with responsibility for identifying defense export opportunities abroad, promoting and facilitating defense exports, providing assistance with defense equipment demonstrations and trade shows, and providing advice to industry regarding offsets." A $7 million annual budget employed roughly 200 people in France's Delegation for International Relations, while Britain's Defence Export Services Organisation had a 1992-93 budget of $25.9 million, with a staff of 350.

    GAO notes that U.S. industry enjoys a panoply of bureaucratic support for arms sales in the Commerce, Defense and State Departments; however, the report provides no comparable budgetary and manpower data. According to this year's budget documents, the Defense Security Assistance Agency spent $332 million in fiscal year 1994, employing over 9,000 people.

    PARIS AIR SHOW

    Government officials, industrialists and the media from dozens of countries flocked to the 41st biannual Paris Air Show during 10-18 June to see, be seen and sell! More than 200 aircraft from 37 nations were displayed.

    Former White House chief of staff (and Friend of Bill) Thomas "Mack" McLarty led the U.S. delegation. McLarty said President Clinton "recognized early that international trade is the key to economic growth and the key to the creation of high-skill and high-wage jobs in the American work force" .

    As such, the government spent an estimated $500,000 of public money to transport 20 advanced aircraft and associated personnel to the marketing show. Under Secretary of Defense Walter Slocombe justified the expenditure to Congress in a letter on 7 March:

    "Display of U.S. weapons and technology will demonstrate superiority of U.S. weapons systems and serve to promote rationalization, standardization, and interoperability with our NATO allies and potential coalition defense partners [East Europe]....With the drawdown of U.S. forces worldwide, particularly the closing of facilities in Europe, the U.S. needs to show that the security of Europe remains a top national security priority....We recognize that economic competitiveness is an integral part of our national security and that U.S. industry faces formidable competition from other nations [i.e., European] which are actively marketing their equipment globally."

    CONGRESS CONSIDERS NEW SALES FINANCING

    Despite the fact that the U.S. has written off $9 billion in military loans in the past five years, the House of Representatives voted in June to place the full backing of the government behind unlimited amounts of commercial loans for weapons exports.

    On 14 June Rep. Howard Berman (D-CA) attempted to strike a provision of the DOD authorization bill establishing new loan guarantees. He was defeated 152-277.

    If the Senate passes the provision, NATO members (which includes credit risky Turkey), major non-NATO allies (Israel, Egypt) and 17 members of the Asian Pacific Economic Council would be eligible for U.S.-backed loans on terms similar to those offered by the Export-Import Bank for commercial exports. There is no cap on the amount of loans which could be guaranteed annually.

    Supporters advertise it as a "no cost measure," since no government appropriation would be required. Instead, either the purchasing country or the selling corporation would pay into a Pentagon fund to cover the risk assessment for market-rate loans. But taxpayers will be liable for repayment of the principal and interest in case of default.

    Since 1990 industry has sought additional financing for arms sales (see ASM No. 26 p. 4), claiming that European firms with access to loan guarantees have an unfair advantage. Government guarantees will allow countries with poor credit ratings to obtain affordable commercial loans for weapons purchases.

    Citizens for a Sound Economy, a fiscally-conservative group representing 250,000 taxpayers, endorsed Berman's effort to block the program, as did more than 30 Republican deficit hawks. The administration also opposed new loan guarantees, saying they are "unnecessary, given the availability of existing authority for transactions of this type and the substantial American presence in international markets for military equipment.

    The Senate will vote on the matter in the DOD authorization bill in late July/early August.

    WEAPONS LOANS GONE BAD

  • In November 1990, during the build up to `Operation Desert Storm', the Bush administration forgave $7.1 billion in military debt owed by Egypt.

  • A report to Congress in January 1995 showed more than $16 billion of DOD direct and guaranteed loans for arms exports outstanding as of 30 September 1994. Several countries were $190 million in arrears at that time; others had rescheduled their loans many times. The government will likely have to write off much of this debt.

  • The Clinton administration is currently asking Congress to appropriate money to write off nearly $300 million of outstanding loans which Jordan owes the Pentagon.

  • In February 1995, the Clinton administration agreed to pay off the last of Iraq's debt which the U.S. government had guaranteed during the late 1980s. These were not intended to be military loans, although some of the money was used to purchase weapons and components. This installment is costing American taxpayers $400 million; all told, commercial banks have sued the U.S. government for $2 billion to cover U.S.-backed Iraqi loans in default.

    HOUSE BEATS BACK REPEAL OF "RECOUPMENT" FEES

    The arms industry and its allies in the administration made repealing "recoupment fees" on government-negotiated Foreign Military Sales (FMS) their number one legislative priority this year (see ASM No. 29 p. 1). In May-June, an unusual coalition of liberal arms controllers and conservative deficit hawks thwarted the initiative in the House of Reps. The measure is still pending in the Senate.

    Recoupment fees are currently required by law on FMS to recover from the purchasing country part of the cost to U.S. taxpayers of researching and developing the weapon. The fees were also applied to industry-negotiated sales until 1992, when President Bush ended this requirement. The money collected goes to offset the federal deficit.

    Lt. Gen. Thomas Rhame, the Director of the Pentagon's arms sales agency, testified before the House International Relations Committee on 30 March: "There is no logical basis for applying a different recoupment policy to Foreign Military Sales and Direct Commercial Sales. Therefore, we ask you to support the restoration of a common policy by repealing the Foreign Military Sales requirement."

    Of course, there are two ways to restore a common policy. Citizens Against Government Waste, which represents 600,000 taxpayers, wrote the House in May: "repealing all recoupment fees would reduce Treasury receipts by $200 million a year. The playing field should be leveled for the American taxpayer by reinstating "recoupment fees" for direct sales of arms."

    On 11 May, in the Committee's markup of the foreign aid/State Department authorization bill, Rep. Howard Berman (D-CA) and Mark Sanford (R-SC) offered an amendment to do just that. They lost by a very narrow margin (20 nos/18 yeas) in a nearly party-line vote.

    Sanford, a freshman who ran on a pledge to eliminate the deficit, argued that "a subsidy is a subsidy" and that the U.S. can't and needn't afford this one. Opponents argued that the fee would price U.S. firms out of the market, resulting in layoffs that would offset the revenue brought in from the fee. Such arguments overlook the fact that the United States' massive market dominance counts only FMS, which currently include recoupment fees.

    Berman, Sanford and Rep. Peter deFazio (D-OR) were set to offer their amendment when the bill came to the floor of the House, but the debate expired before they could do so.

    Meanwhile, the House DOD authorization bill contained a provision to eliminate the fees on FMS. Behind the scenes, Rep. John Kasich (R-OH), chairman of the Budget Committee, stripped the provision out of the bill.

    "GUCCI SHOES" CALLING THE SHOTS

    Whenever and wherever arms export policy is being made, financially self-interested representatives of the arms export lobby are at the table. The government even facilitates this special interest access through advisory committees at the State, Commerce and Defense Departments.

  • On 28 June the Defense Policy Advisory Committee for Trade (DPACT) convened a closed meeting at the Pentagon. According to its charter, DPACT is "a federal advisory committee established to provide independent advice to the Secretary of Defense and the U.S. Trade Representative." The body comprises 18 CEOs of America's largest weapons producers and one official of the UAW.

  • On 26 April the Commerce Department held a closed meeting of the President's Export Council Subcommittee on Export Administration, which is made up of officials from 18 high technology and arms exporters and two consulting firms. This body advises the Department on laws and policies governing exports of militarily-significant items regulated by the Export Administration Act.

  • On 13 March the Defense Trade Advisory Group (DTAG) met at the State Department for a partially public meeting. Established in 1992, DTAG exists to "provide a formal channel for regular consultation and coordination with U.S. defense exporters on issues involving the U.S. laws and regulations for munitions exports," according to its charter. DTAG currently has 52 members; all but five are officials from the arms industry.

    Senator David Pryor (D-AR), the ranking Democrat on the Government Affairs subcommittee with jurisdiction over government consultants, is concerned about the stacked advice the State Department is receiving. Last year he queried the State Department on the number of export licenses DTAG members have received (see box). (The State Department hastened to say there is no connection between export licenses and membership in DTAG.)

    In a June 28 letter to Under Secretary of State Lynn Davis, Pryor wrote: in order to obtain "fairly balanced" advice on U.S. arms export policies, that would seem to call for either a broadening of the DTAG to include persons critical of U.S. arms export policies or the formation of another advisory committee that will not have such a restrictive charter. I do not believe that the American public would agree that it is sufficient for State to be advised on arms export matters by representatives from companies receiving hundreds of export licenses."

    In March, in response to pressure from Pryor, the State Department asked for names of people knowledgeable about U.S. conventional arms export policy. We sent names of 37 people with a variety of perspectives—moral/religious, arms control/security, human rights, development and conversion. We are unaware of any follow-up.

    
    DTAG Member		Licenses 	 	Licenses
    Company		Received 		Received  			
    			in FY92		in FY93
    
    Boeing			141			200
    Bulova			24			49
    Corning   		2			5
    E-Systems		167			148
    General Dynamics	351	 	 	167
    General Electric	591			456
    General Motors		89			78
    Grumman			63			72
    Hughes Aircraft		345			703
    Litton			1,101			1,068
    Lockheed		177			693
    LTV Aerospace		69			3
    Martin Marietta		121			336
    McDonnell Douglas	356			339
    Motorola		958			987
    Northrop		107			138
    Pratt & Whitney		33		   	9
    Raytheon		365			358
    Rockwell		50 			856
    SAIC			43		 	37
    Smith & Wesson		609			597
    Smiths Industries	139			94
    Teledyne		325			411
    Varian			134			171
    Westinghouse		204			149
    
    Source: A Review of Arms Export Licensing, Sen.Hrg. 103-670. 
    

    Proliferation Panel Nearing Completion

    On 12-13 June, the "President's Advisory Board on Arms Proliferation Policy" (see ASM No. 28 p. 3) held its first and only open session and invited input from several non-governmental policy organizations. The Board met previously on 16 May and 18 April in closed sessions with government attendees. A final meeting is planned for July, when the board wraps up its proceedings. It will submit a report to the President in early fall.

    The threat

    CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS... [DELETED]

    The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) must have given some briefing to the Senate Armed Services Committee in January. Their presentation on conventional arms proliferation was almost totally excised from the record published in June (Senate Hearing 104-35). Only seven of 62 view graphs which DIA representative Dee Bumbera presented made it by the censor.

    She estimated the arms market to be "something on the order of $334 billion" for 1991-2000. Bumbera said due to the factors listed in the accompanying view graph, "we are seeing more technology moving around the world, being used at levels that are sufficient to build these weapons systems. We are also seeing less and less controls on dual use but military-relevant technology, making it tough for us to get a handle on where it is all going, who is getting it, and what they are doing with it."

    DIA's main intelligence function is to assess the threat posed to U.S. forces by conventional arms.

    THE WEAPONS PROLIFERATION THREAT

    "The acquisition of advanced conventional weapons and technologies by hostile countries could result in significant casualties being inflicted on U.S. forces or regional allies in future conflicts. Purchases of advanced conventional weapons also have the potential to rapidly change military capabilities in a region and may have threat implications that extend outside of the

    region....Moreover, as countries' reliance on exports to maintain their defense industrial base grows, pressures will increase to export advanced conventional weapons and technologies to remain competitive with the United States in the world's arms market."
    —CIA Non-Proliferation Center, March 1995

    Solutions

    STRONG SHOW OF SUPPORT FOR CODE IN THE HOUSE

    On 24 May Rep. Cynthia McKinney (D-GA) offered the Code of Conduct on Arms Transfers Act (see ASM No. 28 p.6 ) as an amendment to the fiscal year 1996 foreign aid authorization bill. The House rejected the measure 157-262. The Clinton administration opposed the amendment, and 56 Democrats, including Lee Hamilton (IN), former chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, voted against it. House Minority Leader Dick Gephardt (MO) and party Whip, David Bonior (MI ), supported the Code, as did 16 Republicans—including Reps. Chris Smith (NJ), Dana Rohrabacher (CA) and dark horse Presidential candidate Robert Dornan (CA).

    In the Senate, Mark Hatfield (R-OR), chairman of the Appropriations Committee, held a hearing on the Code of Conduct on 23 May with government and non-government witnesses. He will offer the Code as an amendment to the foreign aid appropriations bill in September.

    LOOK WHO'S TALKING

    "I think we need to be more serious about who we are willing to sell arms to. Arms sales ought to be conditioned and human rights ought to matter."—Rep. Christopher Smith (R-NJ), 24 May

    "[N]ow that the Cold War is over, we can afford to take this decision making process about what kind of countries we will be dealing with—especially arming to the teeth—what kind of countries we will be selling our sophisticated weaponry to."—Rep. Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA), 24 May

    "This will allow us to seize the moral high-ground necessary to take the lead in establishing a world-wide regime that reduces these transfers."—Lawrence Korb, Assistant Sec. of Defense in the Reagan administration, 23 May

    "Proposals, such as the Code of Conduct on Arms Transfers, that would bring greater openness and accountability to arms transfer decisions deserve support."—U. S. Catholic Bishops, 16 June

    POST-COCOM REGIME MOVES FORWARD

    At their summit in Moscow on 10 May, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin signed a joint statement reaffirming that Russia will make no new arms sales to Iran and that it will participate in founding the post-COCOM multilateral export control regime (see ASM No. 27 p. 6).

    According to a White House fact sheet, "Russia will retain the right to complete its existing contracts with Iran....[The contracts will be ended within a few years and will not provide Iran with new capabilities, do not alter the military balance in the region, and do not compromise the ability of the U.S. and our allies to protect our mutual interests."

    Vice President Gore and Russian Prime Minister Chernonomyrdin finalized this understanding in late June in a confidential agreement.

    The agreement removes the major hurdle to finalization of the new (post-COCOM) regime, which will focus on conventional arms and advanced technology transfers. Originally intended to be up and running on 1 April 1994, December 1995 is the new target date.

    MISSILE CONTROLS

    Efforts to limit the spread of ballistic and cruise missiles have been a mixed bag of late.

    In June, charges that China is exporting missile technology to Iran and Pakistan re-emerged. (See Sen.Hrg. 104-35 p. 24.) Arms Control & Disarmament Agency Director John Holum was scheduled to fly to Beijing in July for consultations on China's adherence to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in follow-up to last September's agreement (see ASM No. 27 p. 6). China canceled the talks on 28 May, however, in protest of the United States' issuance of a visa to Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui. At their meeting in late June, Vice President Gore and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin cleared the way for formal Russian participation in the MTCR.

    In late May, Hungarian Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti announced that—with American help—his country had destroyed all Soviet-made ‘Scud-B' missiles on its territory. According to Keleti, `Scuds' are still deployed in other East European countries.

    President Clinton informed Congress that members of the MTCR agreed last October to a "no undercut" policy on license denials. According to the President, "Under this multilateral arrangement, denials notifications received from MTCR members are honored by other members for similar export license applications."

    In an 18-page classified report in January, the State Department Inspector General found that the Office of Defense Trade Controls (DTC) does not refer all export license applications for missile-related items to the Department of Defense as required by law. DTC also does not separately code license applications for MTCR items in its computer system and is, therefore, generally unable to track the applications and monitor their disposition.

    In an April report ("Export Controls: Some Controls Over Missile-Related Exports To China Are Weak"), the GAO also criticized U.S. controls on missile-related technology to China, citing both inadequate license referral to the Pentagon and inadequate end-use checks.

    CONVENTION ON CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS

    On 24 March the Senate unanimously ratified the Inhumane Weapons Convention, allowing U.S. participation in the treaty's review conference in late September.

    Concerning the treaty's landmine protocol, the Senate's resolution of ratification encourages the administration to: expand the scope to include internal armed conflicts; require all remotely delivered mines be equipped with self-destruct devices; require that manually placed mines without self-destruct features be placed only within controlled, marked, and monitored fields; require that all mines be detectible by commonly available technology; require that parties laying mines assume responsibility for them; and establish an effective mechanism to verify compliance.

    A draft protocol banning blinding laser weapons—put forward by Sweden and the International Committee of the Red Cross—will also be discussed at the conference. The United States has not yet resolved its position on the proposal. The DOD opposes it.

    LANDMINE MORATORIUM VOTE SOON

    In mid June, Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-VT) and Rep. Lane Evans (D-IL) introduced "The Landmine Use Moratorium Act of 1995" (S.940/H.R.1876). The bill calls on President Clinton to support international negotiations to achieve his stated goal of the eventual elimination of antipersonnel landmines.

    It also imposes a one year moratorium on the use by U.S. troops of antipersonnel landmines, except along international borders in monitored minefields. The moratorium would not go into effect until three years after the bill is enacted, in order to give the Army time to prepare and devise new strategies. In addition, the bill would block arms exports to any country that continued to export antipersonnel landmines.

    Sen. Leahy is expected to offer S.940 as an amendment to the DOD authorization bill in late July/early August. As of 12 July, the bill had 46 cosponsors in the Senate and 35 in the House.

    Deals in the Works

    From mid-March to June, the administration notified Congress of the following proposed government-negotiated Foreign Military Sales (FMS), export licenses for industry-negotiated Direct Commercial Sales (DCS), leases of equipment, and reduced cost or grant excess defense article (EDA) transfers to the developing world. This list does not include all arms sales; the Arms Export Control Act requires the administration to notify Congress only of FMS and DCS valued at $14 million or more. Congress has 30 days within which to block these proposed sales (15 days for NATO members and major non-NATO allies). To do so, both houses of Congress must pass a resolution by a two-thirds majority. None of the following sales were contested, meaning that an FMS contract may be signed or a DCS license issued. In the case of EDA transfers, the Pentagon notifies Congress 15 days before it is authorized to deliver the items.

    [Table deleted]

    Sources: House International Relations Committee. DOD Excess Defense Article Bulletin Board

    Recent Government Documents

    "Ballistic and Cruise Missile Forces of Foreign Countries, CRS Report for Congress, Robert Shuey with Craig Cerniello, 5 June 1995, 27 pp.

    "Chinese Missile and Nuclear Proliferation: Issues for Congress," CRS Issue Brief, Robert Shuey and Shirley Kan, 6 July 1995, 15 pp.

    Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations for Fiscal Year 1996, Department of State, April 1995, 537 pp. [Annual budget justification document for foreign development and security assistance.]

    The DISAM Journal of International Security Assistance Management, vol. 17 no. 3 (Spring 1995), Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management.

    European Diversification and Defense Market Assessment: A Comprehensive Guide for Entry into Overseas Markets, Department of Commerce, Bureau of Export Administration, Office of Strategic Industries and Economic Security, June 1995.

    Export Administration Annual Report 1994 and 1995; Report on Foreign Policy Export Controls, Department of Commerce, March 1995, 147 pp.

    Export Controls: Concern Over Stealth-Related Exports, General Accounting Office [NSIAD-95-140], May 1995, 26 pp.

    Export Controls: Some Controls Over Missile-Related Exports To China Are Weak, General Accounting Office [NSIAD-95-82], April 1995, 28 pp.

    Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales and Military Assistance Facts (as of 30 September 1994), Defense Security Assistance Agency, June 1995, 120 pp.

    Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations for 1996, Parts 1-4 (hearings before the House Appropriations Subcmte. on Foreign Operations during 1995), US GPO: 1995. [This series contains the administration's request for foreign military and police aid, justifying documents and congressional testimony for FY 1996.]

    Human Rights Situation in Africa (hearing before the House International Relations Subcmte. on Africa, 22 February 1995), US GPO: 1995.

    Intelligence Briefing on Smuggling of Nuclear Material and the Role of International Crime Organizations, and on the Proliferation of Cruise and Ballistic Missiles (closed hearing before the Senate Armed Services Cmte., 31 January 1995), US GPO: 1995, 33 pp.

    Military Exports: A Comparison of Government Support in the United States and Three Major Competitors, General Accounting Office [NSIAD-95-86], May 1995, 32 pp.

    Military Exports: Recovery of Nonrecurring Research and Development Costs, General Accounting Office [NSIAD-95-147], May 1995, 18 pp.

    National Military Strategy: A Strategy of Flexible and Selective Engagement, Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. GPO: 1995.

    National Security: Impact of China's Military Modernization in the Pacific Region, General Accounting Office [NSIAD-95-84], June 1995, 50 pp.

    Pacific Rim Diversification and Defense Market Assessment, Department of Commerce, Bureau of Export Administration, Office of Strategic Industries and Economic Security, May 1995, 131 pp.

    Report to Congress on Allegations of Human Rights Abuses by the Turkish Military and on the Situation in Cyprus, Department of State, May 1995. United States Central Command 1995 Posture Statement, U.S. Central Command, 1995, 63 pp. [An overview of the Persian Gulf.]

    United States Security Strategy [on Europe, Asia and the Middle East], Department of Defense, Office of International Security Affairs, 1995.

    The Weapons Proliferation Threat, Central Intelligence Agency, Nonproliferation Center, March 1995, 16 pp.

    World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1993-1994, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, February 1995, 172 pp.

    Worldwide Intelligence Review (hearing before the Senate Intelligence Cmte., 10 January 1995), US GPO: 1995, 192 pp.


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