

ARMS SALES MONITOR

Highlighting U.S. government policies on arms exports and conventional weapons proliferation.



UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms

The United Nations recently concluded the first global conference to address the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, the preferred tools of insurgents, criminals and human rights abusers around the world. The "Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects," held in New York from 9-20 July, produced an action plan for states to implement at the national, regional, and international levels.

The final Program of Action was approved by consensus after long and contentious negotiations. Although not legally binding, national delegations pushed hard to include - or in the U.S. case, exclude - their pet issues. On the positive side, the Canadian government insisted on adding references to the humanitarian impact of small arms-related violence, especially the effects on women and children. The European Union states advocated for language on weapons export criteria drawn from the EU Code of Conduct.

On the other hand, China spoke out against language on transparency, as well as calls to negotiate new treaties on arms brokers and the marking and tracing of small arms. Delegates also slowed negotiations by bringing extraneous issues into the Conference in order to cater to domestic constituencies. For example, a paragraph recognizing the right to self-determination brought on a lengthy debate between Israel and Arab League states that had little to do with the small arms trade.

The U.S. Fails to Lead

But the country that caused the biggest problems for the Conference was the United States. Egged on by gun rights lobbyists inside and out of the official delegation (three "public" members of the official delegation had ties to the NRA), the U.S. delegation began and ended the Conference with a hard-nosed, anti-UN, pro-gun stance. During his opening statement, Under Secretary of State John Bolton introduced several "red line" issues that the U.S. would not accept in the Program of Action, including problems never mentioned during the three previous preparatory meetings. On two of these points - restrictions on civilian ownership of guns and a prohibition of arms transfers to non-state actors - the U.S. was prepared to walk away from the Conference rather than accept innocuous compromise language. Eventually, the vast majority of nations were forced to cede to U.S. demands in order to save the Conference.

The U.S. government's position was somewhat surpris-

ing given the leadership it has shown on this issue in other fora. It had pushed hard for a strong Firearms Protocol to the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, and has some of the best export control laws in the world, including regulations on the operations of arms brokers. Secretary of State Powell had also pledged to members of Congress that the U.S. delegation would advocate for "strong language" on export controls at the UN.

In his opening speech, Bolton did make note of strong U.S. export controls and called on other states to "adopt similar practices." But while the U.S. delegation apparently proposed stronger language on some export control provisions, it did not insist on these changes. Rather, it used most of its political capital to insert qualifying language on many measures and to remove calls for international financing of new initiatives.

A Small Step Forward

Despite an unhelpful U.S. position, the final Conference Program of Action did move the debate on small arms proliferation forward in several significant areas (see p. 2). First, it contains repeated references to the humanitarian impact of small arms violence, moving the issue out of a purely disarmament arena. It also includes several suggestions for ways to remove weapons from post-conflict regions, to control the activities of arms brokers, and to keep better control over legal exports, imports, shipments, and storage of small arms. Finally, conferees agreed to hold a review conference in 2006, plus biennial meetings along the way. These meetings will keep the issue on the international agenda and provide opportunities to revisit the Program of Action formally in a short time frame.

To learn more about the conference, go to: <http://fas.org/asmp/campaigns/smallarm.html>.

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FAS Statement to the UN Conference on Small Arms

Tamar Gabelnick, July 16, 2001

... The Program of Action should include a call for norms and standards on the export of small arms and light weapons... Some delegates have challenged the pertinence of export criteria to a document focused on the illicit trade in small arms. But the connection is often short between government-authorized sales and the illicit trade. Small arms exported to states with weak border controls, poor stockpile security, or even corrupt government agents can quickly end up in the black market. Breaking the legal to illicit link therefore depends on prudent exporting decisions that take into consideration the recipient states' records on diversions, among other factors.

But ... some government-authorized sales must be considered illicit *in the first instance*. Just because a government grants permission for an export does not mean that it is legal under international law. The most obvious example is when a state approves weapon transfers to a state or armed group in violation of a UN arms embargo. While government-authorized, it is still illegal. Likewise, small arms exports that violate states' obligations under other international treaties - such as the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons or the Landmines Treaty - are also obviously illegal.

... There are also indirect limits on exports based on the use of the weapons. According to the International Law Commission's Draft Articles on State Responsibility, a state that aids another state to commit an international crime is internationally responsible for that action. If I were to hand a gun to someone about to commit murder, I could be considered an accomplice to that crime. And so it is with international weapons transfers.

Under current principles of international law, states have a responsibility not to authorize arms exports when there is a clear risk that the weapons would be used to commit serious violations of international humanitarian or human rights law, to engage in acts of genocide or other crimes against humanity, or to violate norms of the UN Charter. Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions on the laws of war - which requires states to "respect and ensure respect" for its provisions - reinforces the notion that states must not sell arms that would be used to violate the Conventions.

The norm of state responsibility for the use of its exported weapons has also been enshrined in many states' national laws and has been included in regional agreements such as the EU Code of Conduct and the OSCE Document on Small Arms. The international community must now build on the norms accepted by many of the major arms exporters and agree to them at the international level....

"Just because a government grants permission for an export does not mean that it is legal under international law."

UN Program of Action Excerpts

On the humanitarian impact of small arms:

"Recognizing that the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects sustains conflicts, exacerbates violence, contributes to the displacement of civilians, undermines respect for international humanitarian law, impedes the provision of humanitarian assistance to victims of armed conflict and fuels crime and terrorism,"

On export criteria and controls:

States undertake "to assess applications for export authorizations according to strict national regulations and procedures that cover all small arms and light weapons and are consistent with States' existing responsibilities under international law taking into account in particular the risk of diversion of these weapons into the illegal trade. Likewise, to establish or maintain an effective national system of export and import licensing or authorization, as well as measures on international transit, for the transfer of all small arms and light weapons...."

On arms brokers:

States undertake "to develop adequate national legislation or administrative procedures regulating the activities of those who engage in small arms and light weapons brokering ... such as registration of brokers, licensing or authorization of brokering transactions as well as the appropriate penalties for all illicit brokering activities performed within the State's jurisdiction and control."

On marking and tracing:

States undertake "to ensure that henceforth licensed manufacturers apply an appropriate and reliable marking on each small arm and light weapon as an integral part of the production process. This marking should be unique and should identify the country of manufacture and also provide information that enables the national authorities of that country to identify the manufacturer and serial number, so that the authorities concerned can identify and trace each weapon."

On post-conflict demobilization:

States undertake "to develop and implement ... effective disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes, including the effective collection, control, storage and destruction of small arms and light weapons, particularly in post-conflict situations..."

Follow-up:

Parties recommend to the General Assembly to: "convene a Conference no later than 2006 to review progress made in the implementation of the Programme of Action, the date and venue to be decided at the 58th session of the General Assembly; (and to) convene a meeting of States on a biennial basis to consider the national, regional and global implementation of the Programme of Action."

Top Ten Arms Sales Lists

The United States on Top in Arms Exports

The Congressional Research Service recently released its annual report on conventional arms sales to the developing world. In calendar year 2000, the report shows that the United States maintained its firm leadership in the global arms market. The United States was first in arms sales to developing countries, capturing a full 50% of that market. The United States was also first in arms exports to the entire world, in a year when total global arms sales were higher than they have been in real terms since 1993.

Russia, France, and Germany were the runners up in new worldwide arms sales, with China – often accused of arms proliferation by U.S. officials – in fifth place with a meager \$400 million worth of new sales (see below). The United States, in comparison, made deals worth \$18.56 billion in 2000. This number includes a \$6.4 billion sale of 80 F-16s to the United Arab Emirates.

Almost 70% of U.S. contracts in the past few years have been with developing countries. Within that group, most arms sales were to the Middle East and Asia, receiving approximately 75% and 20% of new contracts for 1997-2000, respectively. Sales to Latin America made up only 4% of U.S. sales in that period, but are likely to pick up with prospective sales of fighter jets to Chile and possibly Brazil in the next year or two (see p. 5).

Top 10 Arms Suppliers Worldwide 2000

	Supplier	Agreements
1	United States	\$18,562
2	Russia	7,700
3	France	4,100
4	Spain	1,500
5	Germany	1,100
6	Israel	600
7	United Kingdom	600
8	China	400
9	Turkey	300
10	Sweden	200

Agreements in millions of U.S. dollars

Source: *Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1993-2000*, Congressional Research Service, 16 August 2001.

Top 10 Recipients in Developing World 2000

	Recipient	Agreements
1	United Arab Emirates	\$7,400
2	India	4,800
3	South Korea	2,300
4	China	2,100
5	Egypt	1,800
6	Israel	1,600
7	Singapore	1,600
8	Saudi Arabia	500
9	North Korea	400
10	Malaysia	400

Agreements in millions of U.S. dollars

Source: *Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1993-2000*, Congressional Research Service, 16 August 2001.

U.S. Arms Makers Lead in Defense Revenues

Seven out of ten of the top weapons producers in the world are American companies, according to a list put out by *Defense News*. This year, Raytheon bumped the UK's BAE SYSTEMS for third place, and Northrop Grumman nudged EADS out of its number six spot. So much for "Fortress Europe" hampering the competitiveness of American arms producers.

Top 10 Defense Companies 2000

	Company	Country	Defense Revenue
1	Lockheed Martin Corp.	U.S.	\$18,000.0
2	Boeing Company	U.S.	17,000.0
3	Raytheon Company	U.S.	14,033.0
4	BAE SYSTEMS	UK	13,247.5
5	General Dynamics Corp.	U.S.	6,542.0
6	Northrop Grumman Corp.	U.S.	5,600.0
7	EADS	France	4,559.8
8	Thales	France	4,261.5
9	United Technologies Corp.	U.S.	4,130.0
10	TRW, Inc.	U.S.	4,000.0

Revenue in millions of U.S. dollars

Source: *Defense News*, July 30-August 5, 2001

Lifting Barriers to Arms Sales Under the Bush Administration

Attack Helicopters to Turkey

Turkey's long-delayed attack helicopter purchase may be in the home stretch if the Pentagon manages to seal a deal with Ankara on the technical terms of the sale. Last summer Turkey picked Bell Textron's King Cobra AH-1Z attack helicopters in a competition delayed for several years because of repeated political and economic crises. Severe financial shortfalls have forced the Turkish military to reduce procurement numbers from 150 helicopters for \$4.5 billion down to 50 for a mere \$1.6 billion (the same amount as the latest IMF bailout loan to Ankara).

The last remaining hurdle is not a judgement about whether Turkey's military has improved its human rights record enough to be entrusted with U.S. arms, but about how much of the technology behind those weapons can also be shipped. Turkey wants to produce much of the helicopters itself, including the critical mission computer. Its goal is to develop its indigenous capacity to produce arms, thereby reducing its dependence on foreign suppliers and increasing its weapons exports.

The Pentagon has so far held out against a total transfer of technology for the helicopters, though it will allow 95% of the software codes to be sent. It will also require that the helicopters incorporate the mission computer built by Litton in the U.S., not a newly developed Turkish model. The computer can be tailored to meet some special Turkish requirements, but the changes must be made in the U.S.

Faced with these "unreasonable" restrictions, Undersecretary for the Turkish Defence Industries (SSM), Dursun Ali Ercan threatened to take Turkish arms business elsewhere. Second in line in this competition is a Russian-Israeli model that the Turks admit is much less desirable.

Given Turkey's strong preference for U.S. military wares, it is likely that

the two governments will soon reach a compromise deal. This will allow Bell Textron to resume contract negotiations, which should finish this fall. At that point, the State Department and Congress will have a chance to examine the sale on foreign policy grounds.

The Clinton Administration had promised to give proper weight to Turkey's human rights record when making its decision on an export license. But with the Bush Administration much less interested in the link between arms sales and human rights, it may fall to Congress to make a stink about the sale. There are reports that Senator Biden (D-DE), now chair of the Foreign Relations Committee, wants to link the sale to Turkey's cooperation on resolving the Cyprus dispute. It is unclear, however, if Turkey's poor human rights record will become an issue.

Renewed Ties with Indonesia?

On July 30, the Bush Administration announced that it would press for the "step-by-step" restoration of military ties with Indonesia, cut off by the Clinton Administration following the military-supported wave of terror that engulfed East Timor in 1999. The Bush Administration is considering providing limited military training and non-lethal military equipment despite Jakarta's failure to reform the military and bring past perpetrators of human rights abuses to justice.

The administration justified the proposal by asserting that limited military aid, training and interaction with the U.S. military would help Jakarta maintain control over the vast archipelago, the break-up of which would have dire geopolitical ramifications. Glossing over the military's abusive history, the administration pointed to the restraint exercised by the military during the recent ouster of former President Wahid as evidence that Jakarta has made progress in the struggle to extract the

military from the political sphere.

The Bush administration's announcement followed hard on the heels of reports that Indonesia is considering purchasing an unspecified number of advanced Russian SU-30 fighter jets. Some analysts believe the cash-strapped nation is less interested in the acquisition of the fighter jets than in the deal's power to weaken the resolve of the U.S. to maintain its arms embargo.

While the administration is not likely to sell the Indonesian military any major weapons systems in the near future, the proposed resumption of military ties with Indonesia is problematic nonetheless. Despite the partially successful efforts of former President Wahid to improve the human rights situation, the Indonesian military continues to be accused of gross violations in Papua and Aceh. In Aceh, the military recently carried out a brutal counterinsurgency offensive despite former President Wahid's orders to the contrary. This act of defiance against the civilian leadership, combined with the executions and disappearances committed by the military in the course of the offensive, suggest that neither respect for human rights nor civilian control of the armed forces have become institutionalized values of the Indonesian military.

India Next in Line?

The Bush administration is apparently also paying close attention to Russian military exports to India. The concern is not about limiting arms sales to this tinder box region, but about guaranteeing a cut for U.S. arms makers in India's planned \$95 billion buying bonanza. The market is now off limits to U.S. firms because of U.S. sanctions imposed after India's 1998 nuclear tests. Expect pressure on Congress to lift the sanctions soon. Sen. Joseph Biden (D-DE), Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, has already written to President Bush in support of this move.

AMRAAMs Around the World

The transfer of Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAMs), which allow pilots to target objects beyond visual range, used to cause quite a stir in Washington. Now additional sales hardly raise an eyebrow, as long as they are first kept for safe storage in the U.S. Below is a list of countries that have either received, or have been approved to receive, AMRAAMs:

Bahrain	Greece	Norway	Sweden
Belgium	Israel	Poland	Switzerland
Denmark	Italy	Saudi Arabia	Taiwan
Egypt	Japan	Singapore	Thailand
Finland	Kuwait	South Korea	Turkey
Germany	Netherlands	Spain	United Arab Emirates
			United Kingdom

Thailand Next on AMRAAMs List

Thailand recently became the latest country slated to receive U.S. AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAMs) to arm its F-16 fleet. The sale will add to a series of international arms transfers to Thailand and Burma - including the transfer of 10 Russian MiG-29s - that are occurring despite the fact that border skirmishes brought the countries to the brink of war just seven months ago.

The Thai and Burmese armies were drawn into clashes between pro- and anti-government Burmese militia groups operating along the border. According to an account in the 1 March issue of *Jane's Defense Weekly*, Burmese troops occupied a Thai ranger base after an unsuccessful assault on a hostile militia group based in Thai territory. In retaliation, Thai forces shelled the Burmese troops, who in turn attacked a Thai border town. At one point during the crisis, both governments positioned heavy weaponry, including armor, artillery and fighter planes, along the border.

Recent high level talks between the governments may ease tensions between the two historic enemies. But several areas of dispute - border demarcation, drug smuggling and cross-border raids by Burmese insurgent groups - must first be resolved. The threat of border skirmishes continuing

or escalating into a full-blow conflict therefore remains.

Though the U.S. allows American corporations to hawk their wares to Thailand, some U.S. officials decried the transfer of Russian MiGs to Burma. In a July 12 floor statement about the Russian sale, Sen. Mitch McConnell (R-KY) warned that "[t]ensions between the Thais and the [Burmese military leadership] have already spilled over into exchanges of gunfire and mortars," and that "[a]n escalation in the air war would be destabilizing to the entire region."

The American message is clear: potentially destabilizing weapons transfers are unacceptable - unless they line the pockets of U.S. arms manufacturers.

To mitigate the impact of the sale on regional stability, the U.S. will require that the AMRAAMs be stored in the United States. This stipulation will do little to allay Burmese concerns about the sophisticated missiles, however, since the Thais can request and receive them within 48 hours.

The Pentagon announced on August 27 the Foreign Military Sales contract with Raytheon for eight AMRAAMs to Thailand. The value of the sale - around \$7 million - fell below the monetary threshold that triggers congressional notification. But past congressional opposition to the sale seems to have evaporated after reports of the sale of MiGs to Burma.

High-Tech Sales to Chile

The U.S. Congress recently approved a possible \$714 million sale of 10 F-16C/D Block 50+ fighter jets and 2 KC-135 aircraft to the Chilean Air Force. The Chilean sale, which will be the first transfer of new U.S. fighter jets to a South American country since 1975, has many critics, both within the Chilean government and abroad. Former Chilean ambassador to the United States John Biehl called the jet a "symbol of destruction" and fears that the deal will hurt the country's image. Conservative and socialist members of Parliament concerned about the steep price tag have also spoken out against the sale, as have church leaders.

Regional leaders fearing an arms race also condemned the sale. During his inaugural address, Peruvian President Alejandro Toledo urged the numerous heads of state in the audience, including Chilean President Lagos, to refrain from purchasing offensive weapons and to work instead on a regional arms control instrument. Toledo emphasized that public funds would serve the Latin American people better if invested in education and other social programs. Former Presidents Jimmy Carter and Oscar Arias of Costa Rica have also spoken out against such lavish Chilean defense spending with no regional threat to justify the expense.

The Chilean Air Force had originally requested advanced air-to-air missiles (AMRAAMs) for the F-16s. But in exchange for congressional support for the deal, the Bush Administration agreed to uphold U.S. policy to refrain from introducing new technology into a region. According to State Department officials, the U.S. will permit AMRAAM sales only if another country first sells AMRAAM equivalents to a Latin American state. There are already unconfirmed reports that Peru has acquired similar beyond visual range missiles from Russia.

Chile was also denied long-range fuel tanks, also seen as disruptive to the regional military balance.

Brazil has also recently announced plans to buy up to 24 fighter jets as part of a \$3.4 billion air force modernization package. Brazil may attempt to bypass U.S. restrictions on advanced technology by choosing the French company Dassault to supply its next generation of fighters. According to media reports, the French are receptive to Brazil's demands that the Mirage 2000-5 Mk 2 fighters be equipped with beyond visual range missiles (AMRAAM equivalents) and other advanced features that U.S. companies are pro-

hibited from including. If the Brazilians choose Dassault, the U.S. government will come under heavy pressure to drop its own restrictions on the Chilean deal, especially if Santiago threatens to take its business elsewhere. The result? An erosion of U.S. leverage over importers that, combined with internal pressure from American arms manufacturers worried about losing market share, is likely to hasten the demise of the 25-year-old U.S. effort to limit the spread of destabilizing weaponry in South America.

Legislative Update

Export Administration Act

On August 1, the House International Relations Committee (HIRC) marked up its version of a new Export Administration Act. The bill would renew and modify the 1979 Export Administration Act (EAA), which controls the transfer of technology with both military and civilian uses, such as high-speed computers, police equipment, and satellites. The EAA lapsed in 1994 but has been extended each year by executive order.

The EAA has been the target of an assault waged by pro-industry members of Congress and industry lobbyists who claim that many of its regulations are outdated, ineffective, and a hindrance to cooperation between U.S. and foreign companies. These forces managed to produce a bill in the Senate (S. 149) that severely weakens the original law (see ASM 45, May 2001). S.149 was approved by the Senate Banking Committee, but a floor vote has been held up by security hawks like Senators Fred Thompson (R-TN) and Jesse Helms (R-NC). The Senate is scheduled to take up the bill again in early September.

Not to be rushed into approving bad law, the HIRC introduced its own version of the EAA (H.R. 2581) in July. (Since the EAA extension was set to expire on August 20, President Bush was forced to issue another executive order extending EAA controls until a new law is passed.) Led by HIRC Chairman Rep. Henry Hyde (R-IL) and ranking member Rep. Tom Lantos (D-CA), a group opposed to gutting the EAA managed to insert 35 amendments to the bill during the five-hour markup.

According to a HIRC staff member, the following improvements were made to the bill:

- an authorization for the president to place any item he views as a threat to national security on the National Security Control List;
- a prohibition of the transfer of police equipment to countries where torture is systematically practiced, and on all exports of equipment used primarily for torture;
- restrictions on the export of experimental drugs likely

to be used in clinical trials overseas and pesticides not approved for use in the U.S.;

- a codification of the Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI), a 1990 regulation that places special controls on items known by the exporter to be intended for use in the manufacture of weapons of mass destruction;
- inclusion of a "presumption of denial" of applications for items deemed to pose a threat to regional security or the security of a U.S. ally; and
- empowerment of the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State to veto decisions about which items to put on the Commerce Control List (versus the more tightly controlled U.S. Munitions List).

On the other hand, the House bill keeps some of the most troubling aspects of the Senate bill, including a license exemption for items deemed to be widely available on the international "mass market." Both bills would also do away with the 180-day waiting period for increasing the minimum processing power of computers included on the Commerce Control List, as well as time limits on license approval decisions.

The House bill, as amended, would also shift the responsibility for approving the transfer of satellite technology from the State Department back to the Commerce Department (except for transfers to China). While the merits of this change can be debated, it would certainly help to relieve the current pressure to overhaul the State Department arms export approval process, much of which was coming from the satellite industry and their supporters in Congress.

Whether the House's EAA provisions survive a floor vote and conference committee with the Senate remains to be seen. Many computer companies are apparently very disturbed by the stricter rules included in H.R. 2581. But supporters of that bill say that if the satellite industry is to receive its long-sought after goal of moving exports back to Commerce's control, it will have to be in exchange for an overall stronger set of rules on those exports.

Foreign Operations and the Andean Counterdrug Initiative: Throwing Good Money after Bad

The FY 2002 Foreign Operations Appropriations bills passed by the House and approved by the Senate Appropriations Committee would give more money to the failing effort to reduce drug flows into the United States by attacking the supply at its source. Funds for the Bush Administration's "Andean Regional Initiative," (ARI) - a follow-on to last year's \$1.3 billion support for Plan Colombia and other regional counter-narcotics efforts - are included in both bills, though the Senate bill gives less money and attaches more conditions to the aid.

On July 24, the House passed its version of the Foreign Operations Appropriations bill (H.R. 2506), which includes \$676 million for the counterdrug portion of ARI (out of \$731 requested by the administration; see table). Funds for additional military, economic, and social aid are included in other parts of the State and Defense Department budgets. Several amendments to shift millions of dollars from ARI to disease prevention, child health, and disaster relief programs were all defeated or withdrawn.

Representatives concerned about increased U.S. involvement in the Colombian conflict scored a partial victory, however, blocking the administration's attempt to lift the limit on civilian contractors involved in counterdrug activities. In a compromise deal, the total number of military and civilian personnel permitted in Colombia was limited to 800. The House also approved an amendment conditioning distribution of \$65 million of the aid on certification by the administration that the systemic flaws resulting in the downing of a missionary's plane in Peru last April have been corrected.

The Senate version, marked up by the Appropriations Committee on July 26, provides only \$567 million for the counterdrug portion of ARI. It also includes strong human rights conditions with no waiver authority, halts funding for fumigation until a review of the health effects is conducted, and preserves the current caps for U.S. personnel operating in Colombia (500 military and 300 civilian contractors).

Supporters of the ARI claim that it balances military training and equipment with social and economic aid. While the percentage of funds designated for military and police assistance as a whole is less than under Plan Colombia, the ARI dramatically increases the amount of military aid designated for individual South American countries. Brazil, for example, will see an estimated 345% increase in its military aid if figures included in an April draft plan drawn up by the Bush Administration are carried over to the final version of the bill. Moreover, the quantity of military aid in absolute terms remains significant - \$252 million is earmarked for narcotics and security aid for Colombia alone.

The decision to continue providing Colombia with large amounts of military aid was made despite solid evidence compiled by human rights organizations of persistent and

FY '02 Proposed Budget for Andean Counterdrug Aid
In millions of dollars

Country	Interdiction	Alternative Devt./ Institution Building	Total
Colombia	252	147	399
Peru	77	79	156
Bolivia	54	47	101
Ecuador	19	20	39
Brazil	15	-	15
Venezuela	10	-	10
Panama	11	-	11
Total	438	293	731

widespread collusion between the Colombian military and the brutal paramilitaries. According to Human Rights Watch, Colombian National Police records show the number of massacres by paramilitaries rose 22 percent from 1999 to 2000, and are so far up another 15 percent in 2001.

In addition, Colombian President Pastrana recently signed a law that weakens civilian oversight and control over military activities even further. One of the most worrisome of the law's provisions is the creation of martial law zones where civilian officials would become subordinate to military and police commanders. The law will also allow the armed forces to detain civilians for longer periods, reduce the amount of time the attorney general has to bring a case against a member of the security forces accused of abuses, and provide the military branch of the prosecutor's office with exclusive jurisdiction over such cases.

Conflict Diamonds

Diamonds mined in the conflict zones of Africa are not associated with love and marriage, but rather blood and misery. Rebel groups in Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Angola have fought hard to gain control of diamond mines. Now these groups - often more brutal in their attacks on civilians than the governments they are fighting - are trading the diamonds for weapons in their vicious attempts to keep the territory in their control.

Two bills in Congress would try to prevent diamonds coming from these areas from reaching U.S. stores. The Senate version (S. 1084), supported by both the diamond industry and human rights groups, would allow imports of diamonds only from countries that follow an internationally approved mechanism for certifying the origin of their diamonds. Diamond-producing states are currently negotiating such a regime.

The House version of the bill (H.R. 2722) includes the same requirement to bar the import of non-certified diamonds into the U.S. It also encourages the president to try to negotiate an international agreement to eliminate the trade in diamonds coming from regions of conflict.

New Documents of Note on the Arms Trade

Documents preceded by an asterisk (*) can be found on our web site at: <http://www.fas.org/asmp/resources/govtdocs.htm>

Government Documents

GAO: General Accounting Office

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NGO Documents

Consequences of the Proliferation and Misuse of Small Arms and Light Weapons: Fact Sheets, Small Arms Working Group, July 2001. <http://fas.org/asmp/campaigns/smallarms/sawg.htm#Facts>

SIPRI Yearbook 2001, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, June 2001. <http://www.sipri.se/index.html>

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ASMP Farewells

The Arms Sales Monitoring Project bids a fond farewell to Pamina Firchow, who has been a Research Assistant with the project since early 2000 and summer intern Matt Schroeder. We will miss them both!

FAS Fund Arms Sales Monitoring Project

Founded in 1945, the Federation of American Scientists Fund is a public interest organization of natural and social scientists and engineers dedicated to the responsible use of science and technology. Since 1991, the Arms Sales Monitoring Project at the FAS Fund has worked for a reduction in global weapons production and trade.

Tamar Gabelnick, Director of the Project, edited this newsletter with contributions by intern Matt Schroeder. You may reproduce and cite this publication freely.

All newsletters can be found on our web site at: www.fas.org/asmp/library/armsmonitor.html.

**FAS has moved! Please update your rolodex, database, PDA, etc. We are now located at:
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