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ARMS AND VIOLENCE IN LATIN AMERICA

WHEN MEASURED in dollars, Latin America's share of the total world arms traffic is relatively small—accounting for only about 4 percent of the military imports of all nations in 1989-1993.¹ This low percentage is a reflection of the fact that Latin American countries have limited resources and spend relatively little on major weapons systems (tanks, planes, warships, and so on) which tend to be far more costly than other types of weapons. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Latin American nations together spent about \$4.9 billion on imports of major weapons in 1989-1993, compared to \$29.5 billion for the Middle East and \$47.3 billion for Asia (all figures in U.S. dollars).² Because analysis of the arms trade has in the past principally focused on transfers of major weapons, Latin America's arms purchases have received comparatively less attention than those by other regions with higher levels of arms spending. But the rate of spending on major weapons does not tell the full story: in recent decades, Latin America has been inundated with massive quantities of small arms and light weapons, fueling a deadly epidemic of political and criminal violence. In a region that has suffered repeated internal conflicts, the unchecked flow of small arms and light weapons must be viewed as a major threat to stability.

It has long been assumed that light weapons play a relatively minor role in warfare, with the decisive role reserved for major weapon systems. This was, of course, the case in World Wars I and II, in the Korean War, and in the Persian Gulf conflict of 1991. But in many of the civil wars and insurgent conflicts of the recent period, small arms and light weapons *have* played a significant role, often accounting for a very large share of the casualties. In at least some of these conflicts, lightly-armed paramilitary forces have been able to triumph over more heavily-armed professional armies, or have been able to inflict enough damage to secure a seat at the bargaining table. Light weapons have also been used by the police and internal security forces of authoritarian regimes to crush opposition movements, eliminate dissidents, and terrorize the general population.³

Light weapons have played an especially significant role in Latin America, where interstate conflicts are rare and internal warfare the norm. Of all major conflicts that have occurred in the region since 1945, only a handful involved the systematic use of major weapons; most were fought with light and medium weapons alone. This is true of even some of the most protracted and bloody conflicts, such as the guerrilla wars in Colombia, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Peru. Moreover, light weapons figure prominently in the criminal violence that has beset many Latin American nations, including Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico. Light weapons are also used by state security forces, government-backed militias (like the FRAPH in Haiti), and covert "death squads" to suppress opposition forces in many countries.

Unfortunately, no agency or organization provides disaggregated data on the trade in small arms and light weapons, so it is impossible to obtain accurate figures on the flow of such munitions to Latin America. However, the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) has estimated that about 13 percent of the international arms traffic is composed of small arms and ammunition.⁴ If applied to the \$8.15 billion worth of arms transferred to Latin American countries in 1989-1993,⁵ this percentage would yield a figure of approximately \$1 billion in small arms deliveries over this period. In addition, it is likely that approximately the same amount was devoted to the acquisition of imported machine guns, mortars, grenade launchers, and other infantry support weapons. In fact, these figures probably underestimate the value of small arms and light weapons brought into Latin America. The percentage of the arms flow comprised of such munitions is likely higher in this region than in most others, given the emphasis placed on internal security by Latin American military forces. In addition, many of the light weapons coming into the region do so through black-market channels, and are not being counted in the official arms trade statistics.

For those analysts and policymakers who are accustomed to arguing over the merits of multi-billion dollars sales of advanced tanks and jet fighters to major powers in volatile areas, the transfer of \$1 billion or so in small arms and light weapons over a five-year period to all of Latin America may appear as a minor concern. But when we examine the internal conditions in these countries—in particular, the high degree of societal violence present in many of them—it becomes clear that arms sales of this type and magnitude can have profound social and political implications.

Many of the nations of Latin America have a long history of military rule, and the armed forces of these countries continue to exert a high degree of influence over internal political affairs. In some cases, as in Bolivia, Guatemala, and Peru, the military serves as the dominant instrument of governance in large areas of the country. In addition, many of these nations have been the site of revolutionary guerrilla warfare over the past few decades, and armed clashes between disgruntled peasants and

overzealous military forces are a recurring phenomenon. Added to this is the growing presence throughout the region of narcotraffickers and other criminal elements, producing incessant conflict with state security forces, certain guerrilla groups, and each other. In this environment, the uncontrolled flow of firearms can produce chronic and deadly violence.

The Diffusion of Arms

When studying the impact on Latin America of light weapons trafficking, it is also important to recognize that such arms circulate within *all levels of society*, not just those associated with the state and the established military forces. Whereas heavy weapons are usually confined to the arsenals of the regular armed forces, light weapons are acquired by the military, the police, and other security forces, along with guerrilla groups, gangs, narcotics traffickers, private militias, and other non-state actors. In Haiti, for instance, the old regime relied on the paramilitary Front for the Advancement and Progress of Haiti (FRAPH) and similar groups to stay in power; in Brazil, gold miners and ranchers have formed small armies to drive the indigenous peoples of the Amazon out of their ancestral lands,⁶ and, in Colombia, wealthy landlords (sometimes aided by prominent narcotics traffickers) have employed private militias to suppress peasant groups and guerrilla bands. These, and other such forces, are among the principal recipients of small arms in Latin America.

There are also many type of suppliers of small arms and light weapons, both legal and illegal. As in the past, the United States government continues to provide the militaries of some Latin American countries with arms and ammunition through formal military assistance and sales programs. Similarly, the major weapons firms in North America, Europe, and Asia continue to sell such equipment to authorized buyers in the region. Many of the larger countries in Latin America also produce light weapons on their own, for domestic government use and for sale to private citizens.

Accompanying these overt, legal mechanisms for the trade in weapons are a number of covert, illegal channels. Black-market dealers operate throughout the region, providing insurgents and criminal groups with arms not available to them through legal means. Until recently, moreover, both the United States and the Soviet Union covertly provided arms and ammunition to friendly insurgent groups in the region, such as the contras in Nicaragua (aided by Washington) and the FMLN in El Salvador (aided by Moscow and Havana). Such covert operations have largely disappeared since the end of the Cold War, but many of the arms supplied in this fashion during the 1980s continue to circulate throughout Latin America via black-market channels. Hence, groups seeking arms in the region—be they public or private, licit or illicit—have many

sources to choose from when seeking small arms and light weapons.

Indeed, it is not sufficient to speak of the arms *trade* (in the traditional sense of arms transfers from one nation to another) when referring to the flow of weapons in Latin America, as the phenomenon is much more complex. It is more useful to speak of the *diffusion* of arms, suggesting the dispersion and recirculation of arms through multiple channels to all levels of society.⁷ This diffusion of the means of violence is one of the most distinctive features of contemporary Latin American society, and—along with the spread of narcotics and the widespread increase in lawlessness and corruption—one of the most destructive. The spread of arms is, in fact, closely connected to the spread of drugs and lawlessness, in that each of these phenomena tends to reinforce the others.

The diffusion model of arms trafficking is especially useful because it highlights the importance of sub-state actors in the regional epidemic of internal conflict. While government forces continue to play a key role in these conflicts, often inflicting the highest levels of casualties (as in El Salvador and Guatemala), non-state actors figure prominently in many of them, and in some cases (as with the *Sendero Luminoso* in Peru and the narco-traffickers in Colombia) have been responsible for considerable carnage and disorder. This model also encapsulates the growing traffic in *recycled* weapons—that is, arms that have been stolen from their original, legitimate owners or sold by them on the black market. Many of the arms captured from the guerrillas in Colombia, for instance, have been traced back to corrupt army officers in neighboring countries or to the *contras* and similar groups in Central America.⁸

The Pervasiveness of Violence

The diffusion of small arms and light weapons has to be set against the backdrop of pervasive violence that has plagued Latin America since the 1970s and 1980s. Civil wars raging throughout Central America and brutal military dictatorships in South America helped to cultivate a *culture of violence*, in which indiscriminate killings and massive human rights abuses were daily occurrences. Although many of the civil wars and internal conflicts of that period have been settled through peace accords and increased popular participation in government, systematic abuses of human rights, widespread gang violence, and lingering guerrilla warfare persist throughout the region.⁹

The widespread violence is all too familiar to those who live or work in the region. Says James Cavallaro of Human Rights Watch in Brazil: "What has changed [in Latin America] is not the nature of human rights violations—torture without marks, murder without corpses—but the victims. Instead of students, leftists or intellectuals, the targets are the poor, 'disposable' people like street kids, crime suspects, or Indians. And it will go on as long as Latin America fails to come to grips with its past."¹⁰

The persistence of social unrest and lawlessness is particularly evident in Colombia. Violence is that country's leading cause of death. With a record 25,100 violent deaths in 1992, Colombia's murder rate is approximately nine times that of the United States.¹¹ Of those deaths, at least 4,100 were politically motivated.¹² According to the U.S. State Department's 1996 report on human rights, members of the military and police continue to commit political and extrajudicial killings, kidnappings, torture, and other forms of physical abuse, despite the professed efforts of the Colombian government to reduce such violence. Internecine warfare among the drug cartels, along with attacks by the narco-traffickers and guerrillas on government forces and suspected informers has also contributed to the incidence of death and torture. And paramilitary and vigilante groups have engaged in what they term "social cleansing" by killing street children, prostitutes, homosexuals, and other "social undesirables."¹³

This high level of violence correlates closely with the widespread diffusion of guns circulating in Colombia. According to Colombian analyst Daniel García-Peña Jaramillo, there are approximately one million firearms in the hands of private citizens who have legally obtained permits for them. But because many more guns are thought to be in the hands of Colombian citizens without permits, the total number of privately-owned guns is estimated at two to five million.¹⁴ Hundreds of thousands of additional guns are in the possession of army and police personnel, guerrilla forces, and various paramilitary organizations. With a total population of 36 million, this equates to about one gun for every two to four adult males—the principal gun-owning population.

El Salvador has also suffered from high levels of political and criminal violence.

Some 70,000-80,000 people are thought to have been killed during the civil war of the 1980s, and many more wounded or driven from their homes and villages. The internal violence did not end, however, with the signing of peace accords in 1992: since the end of the conflict, a number of criminal gangs—some led by young gang members returning to El Salvador from North American cities—have established themselves throughout the country, engaging in a variety of violent enterprises. According to some estimates, over 20,000 Salvadorans have been killed in violent acts since the onset of the peace process in 1992. This increase in violent crime is partly due to problems arising from the demobilization of the old army-dominated police force and delays in establishing a new, civilian force; of equal significance is the abundance of firearms in private hands.¹⁵

Following the civil war, about 10,000 members of the Farabundo Martí Front for National Liberation (FMLN) and 30,000 soldiers of the Salvadoran military were demobilized and left to integrate themselves as best they could into the civilian economy. But, with El Salvador's unemployment rate running at around 50 percent, and few positions available in the new 11,000-man national police force, many of these demobilized soldiers drifted into criminal gangs. Equipped with automatic rifles and grenade launchers left over from the civil war—of which an estimated 360,000 remain in private hands¹⁶—these gangs engage in armed robbery, kidnapping, extortion, and the settling of old scores left over from the civil war. This, in turn, has led ordinary citizens to acquire firearms for their own protection. At one gas station in San Salvador, where gun holsters are the fastest selling commodity, an attendant told a reporter from the *Washington Post*, "Some people use them to hide their guns and assault others. Some use them to hide their guns to defend themselves. All I know is that every night, a group of armed men come, take over the [nearby] bridge, and rob everything that moves, and the police don't do anything about it."¹⁷

Reacting to El Salvador's weak and corrupt judicial system, new death squads have emerged (as in Colombia) to carry out "social cleansing" by killing people considered to be criminals or "anti-social elements." These groups, with names like the Black Shadow, the White Hand, and the Temporary Executive Anti-Delinquent Command, use the same grisly methods employed by right-wing deaths squads in the 1980s. The vigilantes have received some support from the general public as crime has soared and the police have proved unable to stem the tide of violence. At the same time, however, teen-age gangs have built up their own arsenals, saying that they will resist any incursions by these groups into their slum neighborhoods.¹⁸

Other countries in Central America have also suffered varying degrees of violence since the end of the Cold War. Increased levels of violent crime have been reported throughout the region, and many governments continue to be cited for human rights

violations. Most Central American nations lack a strong judicial system that can cope with an increase in crime, widespread police corruption, and persistent governmental repression. In Nicaragua, for instance, the rule of law does not extend to rural areas, permitting waves of criminal violence to occur in a still politicized and highly-armed society. In Honduras, impunity for the military and political elite, plus a weak, underfunded, and sometimes corrupt judiciary have allowed almost all human rights abuses to go unpunished.¹⁹

The persistence of violence is particularly evident in Guatemala, the site of a prolonged civil war stretching back to the 1960s. Although fighting between leftist guerrillas and government security forces has largely subsided—leaving an estimated 140,000 Guatemalans dead and over one million displaced—extrajudicial killings of dissidents by the military and right-wing death squads continue. In 1995, a report by a special U.N. human rights observer group found that “a pervasive climate of violence” exists in Guatemala, with “those responsible for the administration of justice and public security...widely perceived as ineffective [in protecting citizens] from torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.”²⁰ Similarly, the U.S. State Department’s 1996 report on human rights practices in Guatemala noted that “politically motivated killings continue with disturbing frequency.”²¹ Human rights groups have also charged members of the army and police with directing an extrajudicial campaign of “social cleaning,” entailing the murder of children and adults believed to have committed common crimes.²²

A number of other factors contribute to the climate of violence in Guatemala. Criminal gangs, known as *maras*, have become more active in Guatemala City and other communities, contributing to an increase in gun-related deaths and injuries. In some cases, members of the army and police have been implicated in these criminal activities. At the same time, and largely in response, there has been a significant rise in the number of armed neighborhood committees and private security firms in Guatemala, producing a further increase in the demand for light weapons. The spread of arms in private hands is given additional impetus by Guatemala’s lax gun ownership regulations (notably the 1992 Law of Arms and Munitions), which allow virtually any citizen to procure small arms.²³

Further south, in Brazil, there exists a similar pattern of rising crime and extrajudicial violence. In Rio de Janeiro and other large cities, well-armed gangs engage in extortion, kidnapping, and drug trafficking—often operating out of slum neighborhoods where extreme poverty is the norm. Here, too, there are reports of extrajudicial executions by paramilitary forces and government-linked death squads. In 1993, for instance, police vigilantes killed seven homeless boys who were sleeping in front of a Rio de Janeiro church.²⁴ (One of the accused killers, Marcus Vinícius

Borges Emanuel, was later sentenced to 309 years in prison for his role in the slaughter.²⁵) More recently, in August 1995, paramilitary police went to the town of Corumbiara in Rondonia and opened fire on a group of 500 families that had been squatting on the Santa Elina farm; nine squatters (including a nine-year-old girl) were killed and 130 wounded. Most of the dead squatters were later found to have been shot in the back at short range, and the downward trajectory of the bullet suggested that many of the victims were shot from behind while kneeling.²⁶ Similar attacks on squatters, petty criminals, and homeless children are reported on a regular basis.²⁷

In all of these cases, a weak judiciary and undisciplined police forces have played a key role in the escalation of social violence. Economic conditions—in particular, the scarcity of jobs for urban youth and demobilized soldiers—have also contributed to the level of strife. Everywhere, however, the rise in violence has been fueled by a deluge of guns—in many cases, guns left over from the civil wars and military aid programs of the 1970s and 1980s. This abundance of lethal firepower has enabled a wide variety of actors, including street gangs, private militias, narcoterrorists, and paramilitary death squads, to undermine social stability and inflict tremendous pain and suffering on the civilian population in many countries.

The pervasiveness of violence also threatens to undermine the progress toward democracy that has been made over the past fifteen years. With street crime and gun violence on the rise, government officials and ruling elites are more likely to dispense with legal practice and to employ government forces and quasi-autonomous death squads in efforts to liquidate suspected miscreants and others deemed a threat to society. Where insurgency and protest activity are on the rise, moreover, such measures are also used—as they have so often been in the past—to eliminate trade union and peasant leaders. This, in turn, strengthens the inclination of opposition forces (of whatever sort) to resort to armed violence themselves. The result is *acycle of violence* that systematically subverts the rule of law and the democratic process.

Although the citizens of Latin America are the principal victims of this cycle of violence, the people of North America have not been immune to its corrosive effects. Citizens traveling in Latin America have been subjected to violent attacks, and U.S. firms operating there have suffered from kidnappings and extortion. Far more significant, however, is the indirect damage to U.S. society produced by the growing firepower of the Latin American drug cartels: as the size and potency of their arsenals increase, so does their capacity to resist government crackdowns—and this, in turn, enhances their overall ability to funnel illegal narcotics into the United States. By the same token, growing lawlessness and corruption in Latin America undermines U.S. efforts on behalf of democracy, reform, and respect for human rights throughout the region.

New Priorities for Research

Clearly, there is a very close relationship between the diffusion of arms and the pervasiveness of violence in Latin America. The fact that both state and non-state actors have access to such an abundance of firepower has contributed in many ways to the rise of lawlessness, brutality, and bloodshed. While other factors also play an important role in fostering these phenomena, the widespread abundance of guns frustrates every effort to restore peace, lawfulness, and stability in divided or otherwise vulnerable societies.

It follows from all this that stronger measures are needed to control and constrain the trade in small arms and light weapons. Just as arms control agreements can play a significant role in ameliorating conflict *between* countries, so restraints on light weapons trafficking can play a role in ameliorating conflict *within* countries. The imposition of such restraints is described by U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali as "micro-disarmament"—meaning, he said, "practical disarmament in the context of the conflicts the United Nations is actually dealing with, and of the weapons, most of them light weapons, that are actually killing people in the hundreds of thousands." To reduce this carnage, he argued, "progress since 1992 in the area of [controlling] weapons of mass destruction and major weapons systems must be followed by parallel progress in conventional arms, particularly with respect to light weapons."²⁸

Historically, the adoption of arms control regimes has been preceded by extensive research on the numbers, characteristics, and effects of the munitions involved. In the light weapons area, however, there has been very little research of this sort. Most of the major sources of information on the conventional arms trade—the *SIPRI Yearbook*, the ACDA's annual tabulation of arms transfers, and so on—focus on major weapons only or lump small arms together with other types of weapons, thereby making it impossible to study the light weapons traffic in detail. Further complicating efforts to study this trade is the widespread prominence of black-market trafficking, which, by its very nature, is difficult to monitor and tabulate. If the development of new controls on arms trafficking is to rest on a thorough knowledge of the problem, it is essential that we learn more about the global trade in light weapons.

To generate a substantial body of knowledge on this traffic will require the contributions of many researchers working in different parts of the world. Such an undertaking will also require the development of new research methodologies, inasmuch as existing methods have proven inadequate for analysis of this problem.²⁹ Although some efforts have already been undertaken to correct this deficiency,³⁰ it is evident that much more work will be needed to produce a comprehensive analysis. Preliminary research suggests, moreover, that such efforts are best approached on a regional basis,

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which allows for the problem to be addressed on a manageable scale. A regional approach also simplifies the exchange of information between existing networks of researchers and facilitates the development of regional transparency and arms control measures.

Endnotes for Chapter 1

Note: FBIS refers to the Federal Broadcast Information Service, which collects, translates, and disseminates foreign open-source information (print and broadcast media) on behalf of the U.S. government.

1. U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1993-1994* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995), pp. 91-93 (hereinafter cited as ACDA, *WME&AT 93-94*).

2. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), *SIPRI Yearbook 1995: Armaments, Disarmament, and International Security* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 510 (hereinafter cited as SIPRI, *SIPRI Yearbook 95*). Figures in constant 1990 dollars.

3. For elaboration of this point, see Aaron Karp, "Small Arms—The New Major Weapons," in Jeffrey Boutwell, Michael T. Klare, and Laura W. Reed, eds., *Lethal Commerce: The Global Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons* (Cambridge, MA.: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1995), pp. 17-30.

4. See U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee on Federal Services, *A Review of Arms Export Licensing*, Hearing, 103rd Cong., 2d Ses., June 15, 1994, p. 37.

5. ACDA, *WME&AT 93-94*, p. 93. Figures are in constant 1993 dollars.

6. In August 1993, for instance, gold miners in the north of Brazil killed some 73 Yanomami Indians in a remote area near the Venezuelan border. Among the dead were 34 children and two pregnant women, according to officials of Brazil's Indian protection agency. See James Brooke, "Brazil's Outrage Intensifies as Toll in Massacre Hits 73," *New York Times*, August 23, 1993.

7. Michael Klare first analyzed the difference between traditional types of arms transfers and the diffusion of arms in "Light Weapons and Global Violence in the Post-Cold War Era," in Jasjit Singh, ed., *Light Weapons and International Security* (New Delhi: Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 1996), pp. 1-40.

8. On the sale of arms by Venezuelan personnel, see "Army Continues to Seize Venezuelan Weapons From Guerrillas," transcript of transmission from the "NTC" newscast on Santa Fe de Bogota Inravisión Television Cadena 1, January 15, 1994, in FBIS-LAT-94-011, January 18, 1994, pp. 67-68; on the recirculation of arms provided to the contras, see Douglas Farah, "Traffickers Said to Buy Contras Arms," *Washington Post*, November 18, 1990.

9. For more on this point, see Stephen Baranyi, "Central America: A Firm and Lasting Peace?" *SIPRI Yearbook 1995*, pp. 147-70; Richard L. Millett, "Central America's Enduring Conflicts," *Current History*, March 1994, pp. 124-28.

10. Quoted in Todd Lewan, "Legacy of Wars on Leftists Haunts Latin America," *Washington Times*, March 17, 1996.

11. Human Rights Watch/Americas Watch, *State of War: Political Violence and Counter-insurgency in Colombia* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1993), fn. 4.

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12. *Ibid.*, p. 3.

13. U.S. Department of State, "Colombia," *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1995*, Report Submitted to Congress in Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996). See also Human Rights Watch, *State of War*; Marc W. Chernick, "Colombia's Fault Lines," *Current History*, February 1996, pp. 76-81.

14. Daniel Garcia-Peña Jaramillo, "Light Weapons and Internal Conflict in Colombia," in Boutwell, *et al.*, *Lethal Commerce*, p. 103.

15. See Program for Arms Control, Disarmament, and Conversion, Monterey Institute of International Studies (MIIS), *Armed Violence in El Salvador: Background and the Buy-Back Option* (Monterey, CA: MIIS, April 1993), p. 7. See also Baranyi, "Central America," pp. 157-63; Larry Rohter, "El Salvador, 3 Years Later: A Country Remade by Peace," *New York Times*, April 25, 1995.

16. Program for Arms Control, *Armed Violence in El Salvador*, p. 7.

17. Quoted in Douglas Farah, "Salvadorans Complain Postwar Crime Defeating Rebuilt Police Force," *Washington Post*, March 15, 1995.

18. Douglas Farah, "New Salvadoran Death Squads Target Criminals," *Washington Post*, May 27, 1995.

19. U.S. Department of State, "Honduras," *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1995*.

20. Quoted in Stanley Meisler, "U.N. Report Details State of Terror in Guatemala," *Los Angeles Times*, March 24, 1995.

21. U.S. Department of State, "Guatemala," *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1995*.

22. *Ibid.*

23. See the reports of the United Nations Mission for the Verification of Human Rights in Guatemala (MINUGUA). See also Christopher Louise, "Preliminary Report on the Militarization of Civil Society in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Chiapas," prepared for a meeting of the British-American Security Information Council, London, June 14, 1996.

24. See James Brooke, "Brazil Arrests Military Policemen in the Killing of 7 Homeless Boys," *New York Times*, July 27, 1993.

25. Diana Jean Schemo, "Rio Ex-Officer Is Convicted in Massacre of Children," *New York Times*, May 1, 1996.

26. U.S. Department of State, "Brazil," *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1995*.

27. *Ibid.* See also James Brooke, "21 Shot Dead in Rio Slum; Policemen Are Suspected," *New York Times*, August 31, 1993.

28. *Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations*, Document A/50/60, January 3, 1995, pp. 14-15.

29. For discussion of this point, see Karp, "Small Arms—The New Major Weapons."

30. For example, in February 1994 the American Academy of the Arts and Sciences (AAAS) held a conference on the light arms trade. Conference papers were published in Boutwell, *et al.*, *Lethal Commerce*. The following year, the Washington- and London-based British American Security Information Council (BASIC) initiated a major project aimed at developing the field of light weapons research. Together, AAAS, BASIC, and Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs hosted a meeting on light arms in Delhi, India in October 1995. The papers from this conference were published in Singh, *Light Weapons and International Security*.