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U.S. AND SOVIET MILITARY AID

THROUGHOUT THE Cold War era, the governments of the United States and the Soviet Union (and some of their close allies) provided large quantities of arms and ammunition to Latin American military and police forces in the form of grants and sales. Such activities, usually described as "military aid" or "security assistance," were viewed by the supplying countries as an aspect of their foreign policy rather than as a commercial undertaking—even if they received compensation for the arms.¹ This aid constituted a major source of small arms and light weapons to Latin American governments during the Cold War period, and many of these weapons remain in active service. While grant military assistance has largely disappeared (except for aid associated with anti-drug efforts), Washington and Moscow continue to supply arms to Latin America through governmental sales channels.

During the Cold War, the two superpowers viewed these arms-supply programs as a means of strengthening the self-defense capabilities of friendly states in the region (for both external and internal defense) and of acquiring political influence, especially among military elites. In some cases, such transfers were also used as a payoff for political favors (as, for example, when Washington supplied arms to El Salvador and Honduras in return for their support of the Nicaraguan contras) or as a means of funneling arms to insurgent and revolutionary forces in the region (as when Moscow supplied weapons to Cuba for transshipment to guerrilla forces in other countries). Together, these motives generated tens of billions of dollars' worth of U.S. and Soviet arms transfers to Latin America between 1950 and 1990.²

U.S. Military Grants and Sales

For obvious historic and geographical reasons, the United States enjoyed the closest military ties with Latin American governments during this period, providing all but a few of them with arms and ammunition. Latin American nations first became eligible for military assistance in the early 1950s, following passage of the Mutual Security Act of 1951. Under this, and subsequent legislation, the U.S. government was authorized to provide arms, ammunition, and military training to friendly governments in Latin America in return for a promise to make their nations' strategic raw materials available for exploitation by the United States and to cooperate in hemispheric defense against the Soviet Union. Over time, a number of channels and mechanisms were established by the U.S. government to provide such assistance. These included outright grants of arms and equipment through the Military Assistance Program (MAP), the delivery of surplus U.S. weaponry under the Excess Defense Articles (EDA) program, and the provision of government-backed credits toward the purchase of U.S. arms through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program. Still other channels were utilized by the Reagan Administration, including the use of MAP funds to pay for arms supplied to Latin America through the FMS program (so-called "MAP Merger" funds) and the waiver of some payments owed to the U.S. government for FMS purchases.³

In the early days of the Cold War, when it was assumed that any future threat to the region from the Soviet Union would take the form of air and naval attack, the bulk of U.S. aid to Latin America consisted of major weapons systems—ships, tanks, aircraft, etc.—intended for defense against external assault. Following the Cuban Revolution, however, the emphasis of U.S. aid programs shifted toward internal defense against revolutionary guerrilla warfare.⁴ Thus, in 1965, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara testified that the principal objective of the military assistance program in Latin America was to aid "in the continued development of indigenous military and paramilitary forces capable of providing, in conjunction with the police and other security forces, the needed domestic security."⁵ In accordance with this outlook, the United States provided Latin American military forces with large quantities of light weapons and counterinsurgency gear; similar aid was also provided to Latin American police forces through the Public Safety program of the Agency for International Development.⁶

According to the Defense Security Assistance Agency, the United States provided Latin American governments with \$660 million worth of arms and equipment under the Military Assistance Program between 1950 and 1979. In addition, the United States supplied these countries with \$230 million worth of

"surplus" U.S. weapons under the Excess Defense Articles program, along with \$960 million in credits toward the purchase of U.S. arms through the Foreign Military Sales program—bringing total U.S. arms aid (excluding training and purely commercial arms sales) for 1950-1979 to \$1.86 billion (see Table 3.1).⁷ While a large share of these expenditures were devoted to transfers of major military systems like tanks and aircraft, a significant portion was allocated to transfers of small arms and light weapons.

Unfortunately, the Department of Defense has not made available precise figures on U.S. deliveries of light weapons to Latin America via the MAP and FMS programs during this period. It has acknowledged, however, that the U.S. government supplied a wide range of small arms and light infantry weapons to military forces in the region (see Table 3.2). Some additional data on U.S. aid deliveries during this period is available from other sources. According to *Rifles of the World*, U.S. deliveries of the M1 carbine and the M1 Garand rifle included 30,000 units to Argentina, 30,750 to Paraguay, 33,000 to Uruguay, and 55,670 to Venezuela.⁸ Further evidence of U.S. largesse is found in data on the arms inventories of the Latin American militaries, which are replete with U.S. handguns, rifles, machine guns, mortars, and similar systems.⁹

Table 3.1

U.S. Military Aid and Arms Sales to Latin America, 1950-1993								
(current U.S. dollars in millions; by fiscal year)								
	1950-1979				1980-1993			
	MAP Grants	EDA Grants	FMS Sales	Total	MAP Grants	EDA Grants#	FMS Sales	Total
Argentina	34.0	4.4	200.3	238.7	15.0	-	53.3	68.3
Belize	-	-	-	-	0.5	-	3.6	4.1
Bolivia	33.4	10.1	2.1	45.6	13.3	-	90.5	103.8
Brazil	207.2	83.1	289.7	580.0	-	-	393.4	393.4
Chile	80.5	24.0	190.3	294.8	3.4	-	26.7	30.1
Colombia	83.2	17.9	39.6	140.7	92.0	-	385.0	477.0
Costa Rica	0.9	0.1	1.5	2.5	-	-	29.4	29.4
Cuba	8.6	5.5	4.5	18.6	-	-	-	-

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Dom. Rep.	21.7	3.9	2.3	27.9	-	-	31.1	31.1
Ecuador	32.0	10.4	91.6	134.0	8.6	-	79.5	85.1
El Salvador	5.0	2.5	3.5	11.0	69.0	*	897.3	966.3
Guatemala	16.3	6.7	32.4	55.4	-	-	32.6	32.6
Haiti	2.4	0.2	1.3	3.9	-	-	3.3	3.3
Honduras	5.6	2.0	9.9	17.5	19.8	1.8	418.5	440.1
Jamaica	1.1	*	0.2	1.3	14.9	-	32.6	47.5
Mexico	*	*	21.6	21.6	43.0	-	172.7	215.7
Nicaragua	7.7	5.2	5.3	18.2	0.4	-	-	0.4
Panama	4.6	1.7	5.3	11.6	-	-	31.6	31.6
Paraguay	9.5	11.2	0.7	21.4	-	-	0.3	0.3
Peru	75.0	20.3	186.3	281.6	-	-	47.3	47.3
Uruguay	41.0	20.4	19.4	80.8	5.0	-	14.8	19.8
Venezuela	*	0.3	244.7	245.0	-	-	713.7	713.7
Other			0.1	0.1	29.9		38.4	68.3
Totals	669.6	229.9	1,352-.6	2,252-.2	1,574.1	1.8	3,495-.6	5,071.5
(Note: totals may not add due to rounding) * = less than \$50,000 MAP = Military Assistance Program # = no grants in 1986-1993 EDA = Excess Defense Articles deliveries (acquisition value) FMS = Foreign Military Sales program agreements Source: DSAA, <i>Foreign Military Sales Facts 1993</i> and earlier editions.								

The United States also provided large quantities of small arms and anti-riot systems to Latin American police forces through the State Department's Office of Public Safety (OPS). In Brazil, for instance, OPS provided the police with 36 patrol cars, 52 jeeps, 800,000 rounds of .38 cal. pistol ammunition, 540 riot batons, and 20,336 tear-gas grenades between 1959 and 1970. Similar equipment was provided to the police in Bolivia, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.¹⁰ All told, the OPS spent \$56.6 million in support of Latin American police forces in 1961-1973.¹¹

Table 3.2

Select U.S. Light Weapons Transfers to Latin America, Fiscal Years 1960-1979

(x = at least some copies of this weapon provided)

	.45 cal. pis- tol	M1, M14 rifle*	M1, M2 car- bine	M1,M3 s.m.g.	.30 cal. m.g.	.50 cal. m.g.	M7, M79 gren. Incher	.60m m mor- tar	.81m m morta r
Argentina	x	x				x	x		
Bolivia	x	x	x	x	x	x		x	x
Brazil		x		x	x	x	x	x	x
Chile	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Colombia	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Costa Rica	x		x					x	x
Cuba		x			x			x	x
Dom. Rep.		x					x		x
Ecuador	x	x	x	x	x	x			x
El Salvador	x	x	x		x	x	x	x	x
Guatemala	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Haiti	x	x			x			x	x
Honduras	x	x	x		x	x	x	x	x
Jamaica					x	x			
Mexico	x	x	x	x					
Nicaragua		x			x		x	x	x
Panama	x	x	x					x	
Paraguay	x	x			x	x	x		x
Peru	x	x	x		x			x	x
Trin.&Tob.					x				x
Uruguay	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Venezuela		x				x		x	x

m.g.= machine gun
*may include other models

s.m.g.= submachine gun
Source: U.S. Department of Defense

Given the fact that the police in a number of these countries were tied to quasi-governmental "death squads," it is almost certain that at least some of this equipment was passed on to personnel engaged in "disappearances" and executions.¹²

In the mid-1970s, the U.S. Congress began to pay closer attention to human rights problems in Latin America, as one civilian government after another was replaced by a military dictatorship, and as reports of torture, disappearances, and other abuses became more widespread. In response to these reports, Congress imposed a number of statutory restraints on U.S. aid to the armed forces of certain nations with a particularly egregious human rights record. Arms transfers to Chile were banned under Section 406 of the International Security Assistance Act of 1976; transfers to Argentina were banned under Section 620B of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (as amended in 1977); and military aid to Uruguay was terminated under Section 503A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1978. Several other nations, including Brazil and Guatemala, were barred from receiving arms sales credits under the Foreign Military Sales program. In addition, Congress voted in 1974 (under Section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act) to terminate the Public Safety program and to bar direct U.S. assistance to foreign police forces (except with respect to anti-narcotics matters¹³).

As a result of these restrictions and a general desire on the part of Congress to reduce U.S. military aid outlays, the MAP and EDA program began to decline in the late 1970s. MAP aid to Latin America dropped from \$5.7 million in fiscal year 1976 and \$3.1 million in 1977 to a mere \$201,000 in 1978 and \$369,000 in 1979.¹⁴ This trend was reversed, however, when the Reagan Administration came to power in the early 1980s. For a variety of reasons, President Reagan and his advisers sought to increase the level of U.S. military aid to friendly states in Latin America.

The first of these was a by-product of U.S. efforts to support the Nicaraguan contras. In order to obtain the assistance of El Salvador, Honduras, Costa Rica, and Guatemala in contra support operations, the Reagan Administration agreed to provide these countries with increased military aid through the MAP, MAP Merger, and FMS credit programs.¹⁵ As a result, total U.S. military aid to these four countries rose from only \$9.2 million in fiscal year 1980 to \$119 million in 1983, \$280.8 million in 1984, \$212.1 million in 1985, \$207.9 million in 1986, and \$176.5 million in 1987; all told, the United States provided them with \$1.1 billion in arms and equipment during 1982-1987 (see Table 3.3).¹⁶ Much of this aid, moreover, was devoted to small arms and light weapons. El Salvador, for instance, was given 11,918 M16 rifles and 644 M79 grenade launchers during this period, while Honduras received 4,500 M-16s.¹⁷ (For more on this effort, see chapter 6.)

The second factor leading to an increase in U.S. military aid in the 1980s was the

growing concern in Washington over illegal drug trafficking from Latin America to the United States. In order to enhance the capacity of the affected Latin American governments to combat drug trafficking in their territories, the U.S. government established a number of channels for the supply of military equipment—including small arms and light weapons—to the police and armed forces of these countries.¹⁸ Under Section 506 of the Foreign Assistance Act, the President was given special authority to transfer arms and other equipment in U.S. military stockpiles (including small arms and ammunition) to friendly governments in Latin America for anti-narcotics purposes. Using this authority, the United States has supplied (through fiscal year 1993) arms and equipment worth \$20 million to Colombia, \$17 million to Mexico, \$5 million to Jamaica, \$7.8 million to Bolivia, \$3 million to Ecuador, and \$500,000 to Belize.¹⁹ In addition, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru were awarded several million dollars in supplemental FMS credits for anti-narcotics purposes in fiscal years 1990-1992.²⁰ Typically, equipment provided under these programs includes helicopters, spotter planes, communications gear, and light weapons. Colombia, for instance, was given several helicopters, 10,000 M-14 rifles, 440 M79 grenade launchers, 331 M60 machine guns, 1,240 pistols

Table 3.3

U.S. Military Aid to Central America, 1982-1987 (current U.S. dollars in millions; by fiscal year)							
	<i>1982</i>	<i>1983</i>	<i>1984</i>	<i>1985</i>	<i>1986</i>	<i>1987</i>	<i>Total</i>
Costa Rica	2.0	2.5	9.0	11.0	2.4	1.5	28.4
El Salvador	70.1	80.0	195.3	134.8	120.4	110.0	710.6
Guatemala	0	0	0	0	5.0	5.0	10.0
Honduras	30.3	36.5	76.5	66.3	80.1	60.0	349.7
Total	102.4	119.0	280.8	212.1	207.9	176.5	1,098.7
Includes Military Assistance Program (MAP) grants, MAP Merger Funds, and Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Program credits. Source: DSAA, <i>Foreign Military Sales Facts 1990</i> .							

and revolvers, and a large quantity of small arms ammunition.²¹

Another channel for providing U.S. military equipment to Latin America was

established in 1989, when, under Section 517 of the Foreign Assistance Act, the Department of Defense was authorized to transfer surplus arms and equipment to friendly states in the region for anti-narcotics purposes through a revived Excess Defense Articles (EDA) program. Recipients of small arms under this program have included Belize, Brazil, Colombia, and Guyana. Another new feature of the EDA program, established by Congress in 1990, allows for the transfer of surplus U.S. equipment to friendly countries for general military "modernization" purposes; recipients of small arms under this authority (Section 519 of the Foreign Assistance Act) have included Chile, Costa Rica, Honduras, and Uruguay.²²

These programs aside, Washington has eliminated most forms of grant military assistance to Latin American countries. However, the U.S. government continues to *sell* a wide range of military products to these nations through the Foreign Military Sales program. (For a breakdown of these figures by country, see Table 3.1.) All told, FMS sales to Latin America totalled \$3.5 billion in fiscal years 1980-1993. To facilitate these sales, Washington provided Latin American governments with \$885 million in military credits during this period.²³ Much of this expenditure was, of course, devoted to transfers of major weapons systems; as in the past, however, a significant portion was allocated to small arms and light weapons. El Salvador acquired 32,474 M16 rifles and 266,410 grenades through FMS channels in 1980-1993, while Honduras received 8,607 M16s and 22,668 grenades (see Table 3.4).²⁴

Soviet Arms Transfers

Like the United States, the Soviet Union provided arms and military services to its allies in Latin America in accordance with its foreign policy objectives. In the Soviet case, however, such aid was highly concentrated in a handful of countries—principally Cuba, Nicaragua, and Peru.²⁵ According to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), the Soviet Union provided these three countries with an estimated \$15 billion of arms, military equipment, and military services between 1964 and 1988 (in current dollars), with Cuba receiving \$11.5 billion, Peru \$1.3 billion, and Nicaragua \$2.2 billion.²⁶ As in the case of U.S. security assistance programs, much of this largess was devoted to major military systems; here

Table 3.4

<p>Deliveries of Selected Arms to Latin America Under the U.S. Foreign Military Sales Program, Fiscal Years 1980-1993</p>

<p>(Quantities of items delivered)</p>

	M1911 pistol	9 mm pistol	M16A1,2 rifle	grenade launcher		hand grenade	
				M203	M79	M67	M14
Barbados						632	
Belize		24	500	18		2,160	95
Bolivia		745	1,847	144	18		1,007
Colombia		2,732	400	11	195	43,990	
Costa Rica	1,000	130	4,750	140			
Dom.Rep.	1,500	1,001	1,662	720	81	120	
Ecuador		148	1,595	200		1,230	
El Salvador	225	1,675	32,474	1,413	1,704	266,410	96
Grenada	32		90		10	420	
Honduras	1,116		8,607	651	18	22,668	1,139
Mexico	5,000						
Panama	100			57		6,000	
Peru		30	734	95			
Others	68	14	39			1,326	
Totals	9,041	6,499	52,698	3,449	2,026	344,956	2,337
Source: Defense Security Assistance Agency, data supplied to the Federation of American Scientists under the Freedom of Information Act.							

too, however, a considerable amount of small arms and light weapons were included. Moscow also provided Cuba with light weapons intended for transshipment to revolutionary movements in other Latin American countries, including Nicaragua, Grenada, and El Salvador.²⁷ Unfortunately, the data on Soviet military assistance to Latin America is less detailed and precise than that available on U.S. aid. The Soviets did not enact a Freedom of Information Act or publish statistics of the sort available from U.S. government agencies. In addition, there is some doubt as to the accuracy of the ACDA figures above, given the tendency of U.S. government analysts to overstate the value of Soviet arms transfers when calculated in dollars.²⁸ Furthermore, an unknown percentage of the arms supplied by Moscow to Cuba were intended for use by Cuban forces engaged in Soviet-backed military operations in Angola and Ethiopia.²⁹ It is also impossible to determine what portion of Soviet arms transfers

to Latin America consisted of direct grants, what portion consisted of pure sales (for hard currencies), and what portion was devoted to subsidized sales (that is, sales made in local currencies, at deflated prices, or at concessional interest rates). We do know that Moscow was less inclined than Washington to provide arms at no cost to its allies and clients in Latin America, but more likely to sell arms at very low interest rates or to accept local currencies or bartered goods in compensation.³⁰

That the Soviet Union (and its allies in Eastern Europe) provided large quantities of medium and heavy weapons to Cuba, Nicaragua, and Peru is beyond dispute, as these items are relatively easy to track and identify.³¹ What is more difficult to determine is the nature and extent of Soviet supplies of small arms and light weapons. Certainly it is safe to assume that the military and paramilitary forces of Cuba and Nicaragua (during the Sandinista period) were equipped with a full range of Soviet (or Eastern European) rifles, machine guns, mortars, and so on—a process that would have entailed the transfer of large numbers of such systems. (In 1989, the Cuban military was comprised of 180,000 active-duty troops plus 130,000 reservists and 20,000 internal security personnel; the Nicaraguan military was comprised of 80,000 regular troops plus 32,000 actively serving reservists.³²) In addition, the Soviet Union provided some light weapons to Guyana and Peru, but these countries also obtained munitions from other sources, and so it is not possible to estimate the total Soviet contribution to their inventories.³³

Although, in most cases, we cannot calculate the full extent of Soviet light weapons transfers to Latin American countries, we do have considerable data on such transfers to one country: Grenada. Between 1979 and 1983, while that country was governed by Maurice Bishop's New Jewel Movement, the Soviet Union gave Cuba large quantities of small arms for transshipment to Grenada. According to documents acquired by the U.S. military following its October 1983 invasion of the island, Moscow agreed in 1979 to provide Bishop (via Cuba) with 3,400 rifles, 200 machine guns, 100 shoulder-fired rocket launchers, and a variety of light cannon and mortars. Follow-up agreements in 1981 and 1982 led to further deliveries of such weapons, and, by the time U.S. forces arrived in 1983, they collected some 9,000 rifles and machine guns plus 5 million rounds of ammunition—this for a country with a population of 95,000 and a military of 1,000.³⁴

Soviet military aid to Cuba and Nicaragua continued during the early years of the Gorbachev period but came to a halt as the USSR was overtaken by political and economic turmoil. Today, Russian arms firms sell their wares in Latin America as in other Third World locations, but such transactions are on strictly commercial basis and fall far short of Soviet deliveries in the 1970s and 1980s. Thus, according to the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress, Soviet/Russian arms

sales to Latin America plunged from \$7.5 billion in 1987-1990 (approximately \$1.9 billion per year) to \$900 million in 1991-1994 (\$225 million per year).³⁵

Other Suppliers

Except for those transfers conducted by United States and the Soviet Union, most of the arms deliveries to Latin America originating outside of the region have been of a purely commercial nature, and so are discussed under that heading (see chapter 4). However, a number of European countries have conducted modest military assistance programs in the region. This aid, for the most part, has consisted of small arms and light weapons provided to the police and paramilitary forces of former colonies, especially in the immediate post-independence era. Although data on such transfers is scarce, the legacy of these programs can be detected in the entries for light weapons in the arms inventories of particular countries— British weapons, for instance, are prevalent in former colonies like Jamaica, Barbados, and Belize. In addition, several countries—notably France, Britain, and the Netherlands—still possess colonial territories in the region, and naturally tend to provide their forces there with weapons of the type carried by police and security forces in their homeland.³⁶

Endnotes for Chapter 3

1. For the U.S. government, "Security assistance is an instrument of foreign policy, covering a broad range of programs which employ funding and legal authorities to provide defense assistance, economic support, peacekeeping, nonproliferation, and counter-narcotics assistance to key friends and allies." U.S. Department of State and the Defense Security Assistance Agency, *Congressional Presentation for Security Assistance Programs*, Fiscal Year 1994 (Washington: U.S. Department of State, 1993), p. 3.
2. See Michael T. Klare, *War Without End: American Planning for the Next Vietnams* (New York: Knopf, 1972), chapters 5, 10; Andrew J. Pierre, *The Global Politics of Arms Sales* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), pp. 232-54.
3. For background on these programs, see U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), *U.S. Security and Military Assistance: Programs and Related Activities*, Report GAO/ID-82-40 (Washington: GAO, June 1, 1982). Year-by-year data on U.S. military assistance allocations and arms transfers is available in U.S. Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA), *Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales, and Military Assistance Facts as of September 30, 1994* (Washington: DSAA, n.d.), and earlier editions (hereinafter cited as DSAA, *FMS Facts 19XX*).
4. Willard F. Barber and C. Neale Ronning, *Internal Security and Military Power* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1966).
5. U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Foreign Assistance Act of 1967*, Hearings, 90th Cong., 1st Ses., 1967, p. 117.
6. For background on this effort, see Klare, *War Without End*, chapter 10. See also U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, *United States Military Policies and Programs in Latin America*, Hearings, 91st Cong., 1st Ses., 1969.
7. DSAA, *FMS Facts 1979*.
8. Walter, *Rifles of the World*, pp. 73, 296.
9. See *Jane's Infantry Weapons 95-96*, pp. 677-87.
10. See U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), *Program and Project Data Presentation to the Congress for Fiscal Year 1971* (Washington: USAID, 1970). For background on the Public Safety program, see Klare, *War Without End*, chapter 9.
11. U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), *USAID Operations Data*, as of June 30, 1973 (Washington: USAID, 1973), and earlier editions. Most of these funds were allocated to Bolivia (\$2.3 million), Brazil (\$8.6 million), Chile (\$2.4 million), Colombia (\$6.9 million), Costa Rica (\$1.9 million), Dominican Republic (\$4.2 million), Ecuador (\$3.9 million), El Salvador (\$2.1 million), Guatemala (\$4.9 million), Honduras (\$1.7 million), Panama (\$2.1 million), Peru (\$4.1 million), Uruguay (\$2.2 million), and Venezuela (\$3.6 million). These funds were expended on advisory services and police training in addition to equipment transfers.
12. For discussion of these ties, see A. J. Langguth, *Hidden Terrors* (New York: Pantheon, 1978).

13. Following passage of Section 660, the United States was barred from supplying arms and technical assistance to the police in Latin America. However, this measure and related legislation allow for U.S. support of the anti-narcotics activities of Latin American police and security forces—thereby opening another channel for the flow of arms and military equipment to the region. Using this channel, the International Narcotics Control (INC) program of the Department of State furnished Latin American countries with \$162.7 million in arms and technical assistance in 1973-1981, with the bulk of this aid going to Bolivia (\$15.8 million), Colombia (\$34.2 million), Mexico (\$95.1 million), and Peru (\$8.4 million). At least some of these funds were used to provide small arms and ammunition to recipient countries; beginning in 1978, however, INC funds could not be used to supply weapons (except for the arming of aircraft used in anti-narcotics operations). For background and additional data, see Michael T. Klare and Cynthia Arnson, *Supplying Repression: U.S. Support for Authoritarian Regimes Abroad* (Washington: Institute for Policy Studies, 1981), pp. 28-40.

14. DSAA, *FMS Facts 1979*, p. 18.

15. For background on the Reagan Administration's use of military aid as an inducement for support of the contras by these countries, see U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, *United States v. Oliver L. North*, Docket no. CR-88-80, Stipulation of Facts Acknowledged by the U.S. Government to be True, pp. 16-42 (hereinafter cited as *U.S. v. North*, Stipulation).

16. DSAA, *FMS Facts 1990*, pp. 44-45, 64-65, 70-71. All figures in current U.S. dollars. Includes MAP aid, FMS credits, and "MAP Merger Funds" (or funds diverted to the FMS credit program for the purchase of U.S. arms but with no repayment required).

17. U.S. Defense Security Assistance Agency, information provided to the Federation of American Scientists under the Freedom of Information Act, September 1994.

18. One such channel, the International Narcotics Control (INC) program of the Department of State, provides aircraft and communications gear to the military and police of Latin American countries, but is barred by Section 482(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act from supplying lethal combat systems (except self-defense weaponry for any aircraft supplied under this heading).

19. DSAA, *FMS Facts 1993*, pp. 73-77.

20. *Ibid.*, pp. 45-50. The largest of these grants, \$5.9 million, was awarded to Peru in 1992.

21. Human Rights Watch, *State of War*, pp. 130-34 and Appendix II.

22. U.S. Defense Security Assistance Agency, "Excess Defense Articles Tracking Report For FY95," computer printout supplied to the Federation of American Scientists under the Freedom of Information Act. For background, see Paul F. Pineo and Lora Lumpe, *Recycled Weapons: American Exports of Surplus Arms 1990-1995* (Washington: Arms Sales Monitoring Project, Federation of American Scientists, May 1996).

23. DSAA, *FMS Facts 1993*, pp. 7, 13, 43; and earlier editions. All figures in current U.S. dollars.

24. U.S. Defense Security Assistance Agency, information provided to the Federation of American Scientists under the Freedom of Information Act, September 1994.

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25. For background on Soviet arms transfers to Latin America, see Pierre, *The Global Politics of Arms Sales*, pp. 74-77, 239-41, 244-45.

26. ACDA, *WMEAT 1989*, and earlier editions.

27. For background on such transfers, see Edward Gonzalez, "Cuba, the Third World, and the Soviet Union," in Andrzej Korbonski and Francis Fukuyama, eds., *The Soviet Union and the Third World: The Last Three Decades* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), pp. 123-47; Richard H. Shultz, Jr., "The Soviet Union and Central America," in Richard H. Shultz, Jr., et al., eds., *Guerrilla Warfare and Counterinsurgency* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1989), pp. 375-99.

28. For discussion of this point, see Edward J. Laurance, *The International Arms Trade* (New York: Lexington Books, 1992), pp. 22, 25, 34-35.

29. On these operations, see Rajan Menon, *Soviet Power in the Third World* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1986), pp. 129-44. See also Gonzalez, "Cuba, the Third World, and the Soviet Union."

30. For discussion see Menon, *Soviet Power*, pp. 208-09; Pierre, *The Global Politics of Arms Sales*, pp. 78-79.

31. For a list of the major Soviet weapons in the inventories of these countries in 1989, see International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), *The Military Balance 1989-1990* (London: IISS, 1989), pp. 190-91, 197-98, 200-01 (hereinafter cited as IISS, *Military Balance 89-90*).

32. *Ibid.*, pp. 190, 197.

33. Soviet light weapons in the inventory of these and other Latin American countries are identified (but not quantified) in *Jane's Infantry Weapons 95-96*, pp. 677-87.

34. See U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), *Soviet Military Power 1984* (Washington: DoD, 1984), pp. 128-31.

35. Richard F. Grimmett, *Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1987-1994* (Washington: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, August 4, 1995), p. 52 (hereinafter cited as Grimmett, *Conventional Arms Transfers 87-94*). Figures in current dollars.

36. See *Jane's Infantry Weapons 95-96*, pp. 677-87.