THE WHITE HOUSE

                     Office of the Press Secretary

                     (South Brunswick, New Jersey)

________________________________________________________________________

For Immediate Release                                    August 23, 2000

                      MEMORANDUM OF JUSTIFICATION

                     IN CONNECTION WITH THE WAIVERS

                      UNDER SECTION 3201(a)(4) OF

                    THE EMERGENCY SUPPLEMENTAL ACT,

                             AS ENACTED IN

           THE MILITARY CONSTRUCTION APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2001

     The challenges faced by Colombia are a matter of national security

interest to the United States.  Our assistance package is crucial to

maintaining our counterdrug efforts and helping the Colombian Government

and people to preserve Colombia's democracy.  Moreover, the United

States has important interests in promoting economic reform, protection

of U.S. citizens, and hemispheric stability, all of which are addressed

by our support for Colombia.  Pursuant to Section 3201(a)(4) of the

Emergency Supplemental Act, and for the following reasons, the President

has determined that a waiver of the certification requirements in

Section 3201(a)(1)(A)(ii) and (iii) and 3201(a)(1)(B)-(E) is in the

national security interest.

 

     Colombia confronts a drug emergency that directly affects the

United States.  In spite of aggressive counterdrug efforts, coca

cultivation in Colombia has increased 140 percent over the last five

years.  This massive rate of increase threatens to reverse the

counterdrug successes in Peru and Bolivia.  Ninety percent of the

world's cocaine is grown, processed, or transported through Colombia.

The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration estimates that up to 75 percent

of the heroin consumed on the East Coast of the United States comes from

Colombia.  Illegal drugs cost our society 52,000 lives and nearly $110

billion each year in health costs, accidents, and lost productivity.

The drug trade is also fueling the illegal armed groups involved in

Colombia's internal conflict, further exacerbating human rights

problems.

 

     The Administration supports the Congress' effort to ensure that

human rights are respected and protected in Colombia.  As we begin the

certification process, the Administration is committed to working with

the Colombian Government to protect human rights by making progress in

all areas stipulated by the law.  While the Government of Colombia is

actively taking steps to meet the seven conditions on assistance, we are

currently able to certify only one (Section 3201(a)(1)(A)(i)).  The

Government of Colombia will need some time before we will be able to

certify several of the criteria.  We continue to press the Government of

Colombia to achieve tangible results in these areas.  By the terms of

the law, another certification or waiver will be required prior to the

obligation of further funds in FY 2001.  The Administration will

continue to engage in an extensive consultative process with the

Colombian Government over the coming months as we strive to be able to

certify additional provisions.

 

     Consistent with Section 3201(a)(2), the State Department has

consulted with internationally recognized human rights organizations.

Senior State Department principals met with representatives of these

organizations on August 2 to initiate an ongoing consultative dialogue

on the implementation of the U.S. assistance package.  Meetings were

also held on August 10, 17, and 18.  Our Embassy officials in Bogota

also met with 15 Colombian NGOs on August 2, and agreed to establish a

similar consultative process.  Additionally, the Colombian Government

has instituted its own formal consultative mechanism with Colombian

NGOs.

 

     For each of the six certification requirements that the President

has waived, this memorandum describes the steps the Colombian government

has already taken toward meeting the requirements, the reason they

cannot be certified at this time, and the further steps we expect them

to take to allow them to meet the conditions for certification in the

future.

 

(1) Secretary of State must certify "that the Commander General of the

Colombian Armed Forces is promptly suspending from duty any Colombian

Armed Forces personnel who are credibly alleged to have committed gross

violations of human rights or to have aided or abetted paramilitary

groups.  . . ."  (Section 3201(a)(1)(A)(ii)).

 

     At the present time, the Military Commander of the Colombian Armed

Forces has only limited authority to promptly suspend from duty all

Armed Forces personnel credibly alleged to have committed gross

violations of human rights or to have aided or abetted paramilitary

groups.  Currently, the Military Forces have the authority to remove

officers with a minimum of 15 years of service.  The proposed reform of

the military career personnel statutes, which is expected to become law

by September 14, 2000, will also give the Military Commander, General

Fernando Tapias, the authority to dismiss officers with fewer than 15

years of active duty service.  Non-commissioned officers (NCOs) will

continue to be subject to removal from the Armed Forces by a senior

military commander.  The Administration will strongly urge that the

Commanding General use the requisite authorities to suspend promptly

from service Armed Forces personnel facing credible allegations of

involvement in human rights violations or of aiding or abetting

paramilitary groups.

 

     In several important cases, usually by order of civilian

authorities, senior-level officers have been suspended after charges

have been brought against them.  Examples include General Jorge Plazas

Acevedo, arrested and suspended in April 1999 in connection with the

murder of Benjamin Khoudari; Brigadier General Jaime Humberto Uscategui,

suspended in April 1999 in connection with the 1997 paramilitary

massacre at Mapiripan (Meta); and Lieutenant Colonel Jesus Maria

Clavijo, suspended in March 2000 after being arrested on charges of

collaboration with paramilitaries and involvement in "social cleansing"

killings while a member of the Army's 4th Brigade.

 

     However, there are still a number of documented cases of senior

security force personnel remaining on "active duty" even while charges

against them were being pursued.

 

     On August 15, six children were killed and five were injured after

being shot by Colombian army troops.  According to a senior Colombian

army officer, the National Liberation Army (ELN), Colombia's second

largest guerrilla force, were using the children as "human shields"

following a shoot-out between the Colombian army and the ELN.  However,

witnesses of the incident report that the ELN was not involved.

President Pastrana has said he will personally oversee the

investigation.

 

     According to the Human Rights Report of the Colombian Ministry of

Defense, 32 members of the Armed Forces were separated from service

between 1998 and 1999 for presumed human rights violations.  During that

same period, the military justice system also discharged 65 police

officers.  We will continue to work with the Government of Colombia in

order to monitor further progress in holding military and police

personnel accountable for violations of human rights.

 

     Additionally, the Ministry of Defense reported that approximately

63,000 security force members received human rights training in 1999,

provided by the International Committee of the Red Cross, the Colombian

Red Cross, the Roman Catholic Church, elements of the government and

security forces, and foreign governments.

 

     Nevertheless, there remain disturbing, credible allegations that

individual Colombian military officers continue to collaborate with

paramilitaries.  The Government of Colombia needs to take further, and

more effective, measures that aggressively prevent collusion between

security force personnel and paramilitary groups, and to take decisive

disciplinary measures against its personnel where appropriate before we

can certify compliance.  The Administration has raised these issues with

the Government of Colombia repeatedly at all levels of our bilateral

dialogue and will continue to work with the Colombian Government to

satisfactorily address these concerns.

 

(2) Secretary of State must certify that "the Colombian Armed Forces and

its Commander General are fully complying with Section 3201 (a)(1)(A)(i)

and (ii) of the Act. . . ." (Section 3201(a)(1)(A)(iii)).

 

     With respect to Section 3201(a)(1)(A)(i), President Pastrana's

directive to the Colombian Armed Forces was issued only recently, so we

will need to monitor the extent of their compliance over the next

several months.  With respect to Section 3201(a)(2)(A)(ii), some Armed

Forces personnel have been promptly suspended when credibly alleged to

have committed gross violations of human rights; however, there are

still many cases where this does not occur.

 

     It is our expectation that the Presidential directive, which was

issued on August 17, will provide the requisite authorities with the

power to suspend from duty Armed Forces personnel credibly alleged to

have committed gross violations of human rights or to have aided or

abetted paramilitary groups.  We expect the Armed Forces and the

Commanding General to take prompt and immediate steps to use the new

authority in the Presidential directive.  Accordingly, the Armed Forces

and its Commander General cannot be said to be "fully" complying at this

time.

 

(3) Secretary of State must certify that "the Colombian Armed Forces are

cooperating fully with civilian authorities in investigating,

prosecuting, and punishing in the civilian courts Colombian Armed Forces

personnel who are credibly alleged to have committed gross violations of

human rights. .  . ."  (Section 3201(a)(1)(B)).

 

     During the Pastrana Administration, there has been a gradual, but

steady, improvement in the cooperation between civilian authorities and

the Colombian Armed Forces in the investigation, prosecution, and

punishment in the civilian courts of military personnel who are credibly

alleged to have committed gross violations of human rights, but steps

remain to be taken before this condition can be certified.  President

Pastrana has demonstrated his Government's commitment to human rights by

the dismissal of four generals and numerous mid-level officers and NCOs

for collaboration with right wing paramilitaries or for failure to

confront them aggressively.  The military high command, under the

leadership of Defense Minister Ramirez and General Tapias, has also

stated repeatedly that it will not tolerate collaboration between

military personnel and paramilitary groups.  However, security force

actions in the field are not always consistent with this policy.

 

     The human rights unit of the Prosecutor General's Office (Fiscalia)

investigated, indicted, or prosecuted 303 security force members during

1999, including at least 12 officers, on a variety of charges including

homicide, torture, and sponsorship of paramilitary groups.  The Attorney

General's Office (Procuradoria) and the security forces demonstrated a

greater willingness to follow up with instructions that those ordered

arrested be removed from their duties, denied the right to wear a

uniform, or turned over to civilian judicial authorities.

 

     Most recently, five Colombian generals and other ranking officers

are being investigated by the Procuraduria for failing to protect

residents from paramilitary massacres.  In July 2000, the Procuraduria

reopened the case against four army Generals and one Lieutenant Colonel

for failing to take appropriate measures to protect the residents of

Puerto Alvira from a May 1998 paramilitary attack.  One of these

officers is Brigadier General Jaime Humberto Uscategui, who was

rearrested on July 31, 2000 in connection with the 1997 Mapiripan

massacre.  Additionally, an investigation was opened concerning the

former commander of the 5th Brigade, General Alberto Bravo Silva, and

four other officers for failure to act to prevent the August 21-22, 1999

paramilitary massacre in the areas of Tibu and La Gabarra.

 

     The military judiciary demonstrated an increased willingness to

turn cases involving security force officers accused of serious human

rights violations over to the civilian judiciary.  The military cites

over 500 such cases since the 1997 Constitutional Court decision;

however, some of these cases involve the police, and many of them

involve criminal activity not directly related to human rights.

 

     Civilian authorities, including the Prosecutor General, have

expressed concern over the number of security force personnel who have

escaped from military confinement while awaiting trial in civilian

courts.  As stated in the Department of State's 1999 Country Report on

Human Rights for Colombia, there are a number of cases of Armed Forces

personnel accused of human rights violations that have been adjudicated

in the civilian courts but progress is still insufficient to permit

certification of this provision at this time.

 

     The Government of Colombia is making concrete progress in ensuring

that military personnel credibly alleged to have committed gross

violations of human rights are brought to justice, but continued work is

needed.  This should include active cooperation with civilian

authorities in executing outstanding arrest warrants related to human

rights abuses or paramilitary activity; complete sharing of information

with civilian authorities; effective detention of alleged perpetrators

of human rights violations against whom there are arrest warrants; and,

establishment and implementation of effective measures to protect

civilian investigators and prosecutors from threats that impede their

work.

 

(4) Secretary of State must certify that "the Government of Colombia is

vigorously prosecuting in the civilian courts the leaders and members of

paramilitary groups and Colombian Armed Forces personnel who are aiding

or abetting these groups. . . ."  (Section 3201(a)(1)(C)).

 

     The Colombian military's record in dealing with paramilitary groups

remains inadequate.  In some locations, elements of the army have

attacked and captured members of such groups; in others, individual

members tolerated or even collaborated with paramilitary groups.  At the

end of 1999, Colombian military and security forces began to target more

aggressively paramilitary forces.

 

     In taking forceful action against paramilitary forces, many of

these armed encounters resulted in paramilitary members' deaths and the

capture over 300 paramilitaries according to 1999-2000 data from the

Statistics Center of the Colombian Ministry of Defense.

 

     The Department of State's 1999 Country Report on Human Rights on

Colombia reports that "the military judiciary demonstrated an increased

willingness to turn cases involving security force officers accused of

serious human rights violations over to the civilian judiciary, as

required by a 1997 Constitutional Court ruling; however, concerns about

impunity within the military judiciary remain."  The Fiscalia is also

vigorously going after a number of military personnel for aiding or

abetting paramilitaries.  Although the Fiscalia is committed to

prosecuting military personnel colluding with paramilitaries, it remains

burdened by competing demands and scarce resources.  Our supplemental

aid package will help the Fiscalia deal with these challenges by

augmenting and expanding the recently created Human Rights Special Unit,

and by providing training for judges and public defenders.  The

Fiscalia's Human Rights Special Unit is a task force comprised of more

than 100 prosecutors, investigators, and technicians responsible for the

investigation and prosecution of human rights crimes.  Formed in October

1999, this unit has received initial specialized training in the United

States on conducting criminal investigations of cases involving multiple

homicides, bombings, and kidnappings.

 

     As stated in the Department of State's 1999 Country Report on Human

Rights for Colombia, the Government of Colombia "demonstrated an

increased willingness to remove from duty security force officers who

failed to respect human rights, or ignored or were complicit in the

abuses committed by paramilitary groups."  Since the August 1997

Constitutional Court ruling, which more narrowly defined the

constitutional provision that crimes by state agents unrelated to "acts

of service" must be tried in civilian courts, the military judiciary has

turned 526 cases of possible human rights violations over to the

civilian judiciary for investigation and possible prosecution.  Among

the cases transferred during 1999 were those of three full colonels --

the first time that the military judiciary turned over cases concerning

several high-ranking officers.  However, some of the cases included in

this figure do not involve gross violations of human rights.

 

     The Government of Colombia is making progress in bringing to

justice paramilitary personnel and armed forces personnel credibly

alleged to have aided paramilitary personnel, but must continue to

implement effective measures to achieve this objective.  The Superior

Military Tribunal provided a list of cases transferred from September

1997 to the present consistent with the Constitutional Court decision of

1997.  That list indicates that, in 1999, 27 cases (involving murder,

deprivation of liberty, personal injury, etc.) were transferred to

civilian courts.  In January - May 2000, 4 such cases were transferred.

In February, the Government created (via executive decree) a

Coordinating Center for the Struggle against "Self Defense" and other

Illegal Armed Groups.  To date, however, this Center has not achieved

tangible results, such as the establishment of a "Search Block" to

pursue paramilitaries, or the creation of an early warning system to

provide better protection to the civilian population, or the development

of an effective rapid response team to follow up on investigations of

human rights violations by paramilitaries.

 

     The Administration is strongly urging the Government of Colombia to

undertake all necessary measures to eliminate impunity within the

military justice system and to dedicate to the Fiscalia all necessary

resources to permit it to investigate and, as appropriate, prosecute

members of the paramilitary groups or members of the government security

forces who assist them.

 

(5) Secretary of State must certify that "the Government of Colombia has

agreed to and is implementing a strategy to eliminate Colombia's total

coca and opium poppy production by 2005 through a mix of alternative

development programs; manual eradication; aerial spraying of chemical

herbicides; tested, environmentally safe mycoherbicides; and the

destruction of illicit narcotics laboratories on Colombian territory. .

. ."  (Section 3201(a)(1)(D)).

 

     The Administration does not believe that this criterion can be met.

The Colombian Government in Plan Colombia has set a goal of eliminating

50 percent of drug crop cultivation within five years (October 2005).

This target is in keeping with the much-heralded reductions achieved in

Peru and Bolivia.  A 50 percent reduction is significant, realistic, and

obtainable.

 

     Any plan for total coca and poppy elimination in this time period

would require more resources than are contemplated in Plan Colombia.  As

the implementation of Plan Colombia proceeds, it may be possible for the

Government of Colombia to revise its timetable for drug elimination;

this is particularly true for opium poppy elimination.  The

Administration has asked the Government of Colombia to determine a

timetable, and an estimate of resources, that would allow it to work

towards a strategy of eliminating coca and poppy production.

 

     With respect to mycoherbicides, we have made clear that the United

States will not support the use of mycoherbicides against the Colombian

coca crop unless three conditions have been met: first, a rigorous,

carefully supervised research and test program in Colombia determines

that mycoherbicides are safe, effective, and superior to existing

chemical eradication methods; second, a broader national security

assessment, including consideration of the potential impact on

biological weapons proliferation and terrorism, provides a solid

foundation for concluding that the use of this particular drug control

tool is in our national interest; and, third, the Colombian Government

agrees with proceeding with the mycoherbicide program.

 

(6) Secretary of State must certify that "the Colombian Armed Forces are

developing and deploying in their field units a Judge Advocate General

Corps to investigate Colombian Armed Forces personnel for misconduct. .

.  ."  (Section 3201(a)(1)(E)).

 

     The military penal reform bill (which became effective August 12,

2000) requires, for the first time, that the military legal system

operate outside and independent of the chain of command.  Under this new

penal code, the commanding officer in the field would no longer conduct

criminal trials.  Instead, the code provides for the installation of

professional military judges.  Criminal investigations will continue to

be conducted by "judges of instruction," who in essence are civilians

with legal training.  According to the Colombian Ministry of Defense,

the Colombian military is in the process of establishing a JAG Corps.

Given the differences between the U.S. and Colombian legal systems, the

Colombian JAG Corps may differ in important respects from the U.S.

version.  The Administration believes with international support, the

JAG Corps will be fully developed and deployed in the near future.

 

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