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Colombia Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2002 Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor March 31, 2003
Despite decades of drug and politically related violence, the market-based economy is diverse and relatively advanced. The country's population is estimated at 44 million. Crude oil, coal, coffee, and cut flowers are the principal legal exports, although illegal drug trafficking has created a large illicit economy. Economic growth for the year was estimated at 1.6 percent, while inflation measured over 7 percent. Income distribution was highly skewed, with 67 percent of the population living in poverty.
The Government's human rights record remained poor; there were continued efforts to improve the legal framework and institutional mechanisms, but implementation lagged, and serious problems remained in many areas. A small percentage of total human rights abuses reported were attributed to state security forces; however, some members of the government security forces continued to commit serious abuses, including unlawful and extrajudicial killings. Some members of the security forces collaborated with paramilitary groups that committed serious abuses. Impunity remained at the core of the country's human rights problems. The civilian judiciary was inefficient, severely overburdened by a large case backlog, and undermined by corruption and intimidation. Despite some prosecutions and convictions, the authorities rarely brought high-ranking officers of the security forces charged with human rights offenses to trial.
Police, prison guards, and military forces mistreated detainees. Conditions in the overcrowded and underfunded prisons were harsh; however, renovation and new construction ameliorated some problems. There were allegations of arbitrary arrests and detentions, particularly in "Rehabilitation and Consolidation Zones," and prolonged pretrial detention remained a fundamental problem. The authorities sometimes infringed on citizens' privacy rights, and the security forces sometimes interfered with public demonstrations and marches. A number of journalists were killed, and journalists continued to work in an atmosphere of threats and intimidation, in some instances from local officials, but primarily from paramilitary groups and guerrillas. Journalists practiced self-censorship to avoid reprisals. There were some restrictions on freedom of movement, generally because of security concerns and confined to narrowly defined geographic areas, particularly "Rehabilitation and Consolidation Zones." Violence and instability in rural areas displaced over 400,000 civilians from their homes. The total number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) may have exceeded 2.5 million. There were reports that security force members harassed members of human rights groups. Violence and extensive societal discrimination against women, child abuse, and child prostitution were serious problems. Extensive societal discrimination against indigenous people and minorities continued. Labor leaders and activists continued to be victims of high levels of violence. Child labor was a widespread problem. Trafficking in women and girls for the purpose of sexual exploitation was a problem. Colombia was invited by the Community of Democracies' (CD) Convening Group to attend the November 2002 second CD Ministerial Meeting in Seoul, Republic of Korea, as a participant.
Paramilitaries continued to commit numerous unlawful and political killings, particularly of labor leaders, often kidnaping and torturing suspected guerrilla sympathizers prior to executing them. Paramilitaries also conducted kidnapings for ransom. Paramilitaries committed "social cleansing" killings of homosexuals and other "undesirable" elements. However, paramilitaries appeared to commit far fewer large-scale massacres than in 2001. Paramilitaries often interfered with personal privacy in areas where they exercised de facto control, and regularly engaged in military operations in which they endangered civilian lives by fighting in urban areas and using civilian dwellings as combat shelter. Paramilitaries displaced thousands through both terror-induced forced displacements of suspect populations and military operations that drove peasants from their homes. Paramilitaries regularly threatened and attacked human rights workers and journalists who criticized their illegal activities. Paramilitaries also recruited child soldiers.
Guerrillas, particularly the FARC, were responsible for a large percentage of civilian deaths attributable to the internal armed conflict. The rate of guerrilla abuses increased during the year, particularly as the FARC attempted to undermine the national elections and complicate the peaceful transfer of power between administrations. They engaged in a concerted campaign to destabilize municipal governments by killing 9 mayors and threatening to execute others, forcing nearly 400 mayors to submit their resignations. In addition to politicians, guerrillas killed journalists, labor union members, and numerous religious leaders. The FARC also continued to kidnap, torture, and kill off-duty members of the public security forces. Guerrillas, particularly the FARC and the ELN, kidnaped thousands of civilians to help finance subversion and put political pressure on the Government. Victims were held in deplorable conditions and often tortured both physically and psychologically. Guerrillas, particularly the FARC, caused mass displacements both intentionally and as byproducts of military offensives, and caused thousands of civilian deaths and injuries through indiscriminate attacks on small towns and random terrorist bombings throughout the country. Guerrillas, particularly the FARC, engaged in widespread recruitment of minors and used female conscripts as sex slaves.
In April the Executive Director of the Americas Division of Human Rights Watch (HRW) testified that both the FARC and the AUC committed similar abuses and crimes, although their motives and goals were different.
The Government operated a protection program for threatened human rights workers, union leaders, journalists, mayors, and several other groups. The program provided a range of protection options, ranging from vehicles and armoring of offices to relocation and economic assistance.
a. Arbitrary and Unlawful Deprivation of Life
Political, unlawful, and some extrajudicial killings remained an extremely serious problem. The Permanent Committee for the Defense of Human Rights (CPDDH), a prominent local human rights NGO (see Section 4), estimated that of the 28,230 homicides reported by the National Police, 4,416 were politically motivated. The DAS estimated that there were approximately 4,025 politically motivated homicides, the vast majority committed by nonstate actors. However, some members of the security forces continued to commit unlawful killings. The CPDDH reported that the security forces committed 59 political killings during the year, or 1.34 percent of the total. The Jesuit founded Center for Investigation and Popular Research (CINEP) reported that security forces were responsible for 92 intentional homicides of protected persons in the first 6 months of 2001. Most of the incidents cited by the CPDDH and CINEP were under investigation by military and/or civilian authorities at year's end. Civilian courts tried an increasing number of cases of military personnel accused of human rights violations (see Section 1.e.). Members of the security forces sometimes collaborated illegally with paramilitary forces, and the authorities continued to investigate past cases of alleged collaboration with or failure to prevent massacres by paramilitaries. Investigations of past killings and massacres proceeded slowly. There were no published reports that police or members of the armed forces committed social cleansing killings.
On September 25, near the village of Brisas de Yanacue, in the municipality of Cantagallo, Bolivar department, army troops broke into a private residence before sunrise and killed Florentino Castellanos and his 9-year-old son. Castellanos's wife, Mongui Jerez, was seriously wounded, losing an arm and a leg. Army troops mistakenly suspected that FARC guerrillas were sheltered in the family's dwelling. At year's end, the Procuraduria General (the Procuraduria) and the military were investigating the incident to establish basic facts and determine if the military should transfer its investigation to the Prosecutor General's Office (Fiscalia).
On December 8, the Fiscalia indicted 8 members of the army's Ninth Brigade, including a colonel and a captain, for the August 24 killing of FARC deserter Robinson Castro. The suspects allegedly killed Castro to steal $250,000 (728.1 million pesos) in cash he had intended to turn over to Government authorities.
Authorities continued to investigate the April 2001 killing of policeman Carlos Ceballos, who had testified in the investigation of illegal wiretapping by the Medellin GAULA anti-kidnaping force (see Section 1.f.).
The CPDDH reported that 2,452 persons were killed in massacres during the year. The CPDDH defines a "massacre" as the killing of 3 or more persons outside of combat in the same general location within a 24 period. The MOD reported a much smaller figure, with 361 persons killed in massacres during the year. The National Police registered 680 victims of massacres. Both the MOD and the National Police define a "massacre" as the killing outside of combat of 4 or more persons in a single incident. The CPDDH reported that state security forces killed 86 persons in massacres during the year, although it released no information on specific incidents. There continued to be reports of acts of negligence or deliberate omission by state security forces that facilitated massacres. In 2001 a military trial court exonerated the soldiers involved in the August 2000 killing of six children by an army unit in the town of Pueblo Rico, Antioquia department; however, the Superior Military Tribunal returned the case for reconsideration. No decision had been reached at year's end (see Section 1.g.).
There was no significant progress in investigations by the Fiscalia and the Procuraduria of a March 2001 paramilitary massacre in San Carlos, Antioquia department, which resulted in the deaths of 13 persons. CINEP and the Colombian Commission of Jurists (CCJ) charged that police and military troops withdrew from the area of the attack 3 days prior to the massacre, and permitted a truck carrying 15 paramilitary hostages to pass unchallenged through a military roadblock. On June 6, the Procuraduria ordered the dismissal of army Lieutenant Emilio Suarez and 28 enlisted personnel for participating in the 1997 kidnaping and killing of two suspected guerrillas near Santa Ana, Antioquia department, and for subsequently staging a mock combat intended to cover up the crimes.
On November 5, retired army Lieutenant Colonel Jorge Plazas, former director of intelligence for the army's 13th Brigade, was sentenced to 40 years in prison for his role in the 1998 kidnaping and killing of Jewish businessman Benjamin Khoudari. The Bogota Supreme Court had still not ruled on appeals by two other persons of their convictions for aggravated kidnaping and murder in the case.
Prosecutors continued to investigate the possible involvement of public security forces in the May 1998 Barrancabermeja massacre, as well as the July 2000 killing of Elizabeth Canas, a key eyewitness. The Procuraduria also was conducting an inquiry into Canas's death. No progress seemed likely in either investigation.
There was no ruling in the trial of retired army Colonel Bernardo Ruiz, former commander of a military intelligence brigade, for allegedly ordering the 1995 killing of Conservative Party leader Alvaro Gomez. Two civilians were convicted of the killing and sentenced to lengthy prison terms, while four other persons were acquitted.
The Supreme Court had not yet ruled on an appeal by five army officers and four suspected paramilitaries of their 1998 convictions for the 1988 Nuevo Segovia paramilitary massacre in which 43 persons were killed.
On May 23, the Council of State overturned on a technicality the Inspector General's 1994 order dismissing Brigadier General Alvaro Velandia from the armed forces for involvement in the 1987 kidnaping, torture, and killing of Nydia Erika Bautista, an M-19 guerrilla. The Procuraduria was appealing the decision at year's end. The Association of Families of Detained and Disappeared Persons (ASFADDES) and the Bogota office of the U.N. High Commission for Human Rights (UNHCHR) condemned the decision. ASFADDES and Bautista's relatives had already presented the case to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR). No progress seemed likely in an investigation of the case by the Fiscalia.
Credible allegations of cooperation with paramilitary groups, including instances of both passive support and direct collaboration by members of the public security forces, particularly the army, continued. Evidence suggested that there were tacit arrangements between local military commanders and paramilitary groups in some regions, since paramilitary forces operated freely in some areas despite a significant military presence. Some members of the security forces actively collaborated with members of paramilitary groups--passing them through roadblocks, sharing intelligence, providing them with ammunition, and allegedly even joining their ranks while off duty.
The military high command stated repeatedly that it would not tolerate collaboration between military personnel and paramilitaries, and that the armed forces would combat paramilitary groups. Although state security forces doubled operations against paramilitaries during the year and quadrupled the number of paramilitaries captured since 2000 (see Section 1.g.), security force actions in the field were not always consistent with the leadership's positions. In addition to active collaboration, the military often was accused of failing to respond in a timely manner to warnings of impending paramilitary massacres or selective killings. The military generally cited lack of credible information, available manpower, and adequate mobility to explain these failures. Impunity for military personnel who collaborated with members of paramilitary groups remained common.
An investigation continued into the January 2001 paramilitary massacre of 27 civilians at the village of Chengue, near the town of Chalan in Sucre department. On November 12, a specialized criminal court in Sincelejo found army Sergeant Ruben Dario Rojas "not guilty" of facilitating the massacre. The Fiscalia appealed the decision. The same specialized court had yet to rule of the culpability of army Sergeant Euclides Rafael Bossa, although the evidence against the two suspects was similar. The Fiscalia formally linked paramilitary leader Nidia Esther Veilla to the crime. The Procuraduria filed formal disciplinary charges against nine members of the public security forces, including former Navy Admiral Rodrigo Quinones, for possible culpable omission in failing to prevent the massacre. Quinones resigned from the armed forces effective December 31.
In December the authorities released two gunmen arrested for the August 2001 killing of Yolanda Paternina, local lead prosecutor in the Chengue case, for lack of evidence. Two CTI investigators working undercover on the case already had disappeared in April 2001 near the town of Berrugas and were presumed dead.
On May 3, the Human Rights Unit of the Fiscalia formally charged 72 paramilitaries for killing 20 persons in the April 2001 massacre in the Alto Naya region, bordering the departments of Cauca and Valle del Cauca. Fifteen paramilitaries pled guilty to conspiracy to commit the crimes. Three others were convicted of killing and sentenced to 26 years in prison. The Procuraduria was conducting a disciplinary investigation into allegations that the army may have been negligent in preventing the massacre. According to prosecutors, no active duty service members were implicated in the commission of this crime.
The Procuraduria was investigating army Brigadier General Eduardo Herrera and Police Colonel Guillermo Aranda for possible misconduct related to the July 2001 kidnaping by paramilitaries of 43 men near Peque, Antioquia department. Seven of these men, who the AUC forced to herd cattle, were later found dead. At year's end, it was still unclear whether their paramilitary kidnapers killed them or the FARC did on the assumption that they were paramilitary collaborators.
The Procuraduria found no evidence of misconduct by any member of the public security forces related to the October 2001 paramilitary massacre of 24 persons near the city of Buga, Valle del Cauca department. The Fiscalia continued its criminal investigation; however, the investigation's closure seemed likely. The Fiscalia also was investigating allegations of army complicity in a series of paramilitary crimes in and around the "peace community" of San Jose de Apartado, in the Uraba region of Antioquia department in 2000 and 2001. In two separate incidents in 2000, paramilitaries massacred five residents of San Jose and six residents of the nearby community of La Union. In March 2001 paramilitaries again entered San Jose and threatened members of the community. In July 2001, paramilitaries entered La Union, killed one resident, and drove out hundreds of others. On March 30, presumed paramilitaries killed a member of the San Jose peace community on the road between San Jose and the regional capital of Apartado. On October 20, paramilitaries entered La Union, "disappeared" one resident, and drove out hundreds of others, who were displaced to San Jose. To prevent further terrorist attacks on the community, the military established a permanent presence in the mountains surrounding La Union. La Union's residents had not returned by year's end. Although peace community leaders accused the army's 17th Brigade of involvement or acquiescence in many of these incidents, prosecutors uncovered no evidence of military complicity.
An investigation continued of army Colonel Victor Matamorros and army Captain Juan Carlos Fernandez regarding allegations that the two actively collaborated with paramilitaries between 1997 and 1999 in the department of Norte de Santander. Matamorros and Fernandez were the commander and intelligence chief, respectively, of an army battalion based in the departmental capital of Cucuta. Over a period of 5 months in 1999, 15 major paramilitary massacres occurred near the Norte de Santander towns of La Gabarra and Tibu. On April 8, a court in Cucuta convicted Giovanni Velasquez, a paramilitary, of aggravated murder for his role in the massacre.
In March 2001, the Fiscalia charged former Tibu military base commander Major Mauricio Llorente, former Tibu police commander Major Harbey Fernando Ortega, and 13 policemen with murder and complicity with paramilitaries in one of the 1999 Tibu massacres. An investigation continued into a related massacre of six persons near the town of Los Cuervos. The Procuraduria continued its disciplinary investigation of a police official for possible involvement in the Los Cuervos massacre; however, it closed its investigation of the Tibu massacre after finding no evidence of negligence or complicity by any member of the public security forces. The Fiscalia continued to investigate the 1998 paramilitary massacre of 19 persons in Puerto Alvira, near the town of Mapiripan, Meta department. In March 2001, the Superior Military Tribunal confirmed a lower military court’s decision to close the military's investigation of the case. The Procuraduria formally exonerated Major General Agustin Ardila, Major General Jaime Humberto Cortes, Brigadier General Freddy Padilla, Brigadier General Jaime Uscategui, and Lieutenant Colonel Gustavo Sanchez of any wrongdoing related to the massacre at Puerto Alvira. The Fiscalia continued its investigation of 21 members of the public security forces for alleged collusion with paramilitaries responsible for approximately 160 social cleansing killings in northeastern Antioquia between 1995 and 1998. The Procuraduria was investigating 26 officials on disciplinary charges related to the same events. The Fiscalia continued its investigation of General Jaime Humberto Uscategui for alleged collusion with paramilitaries related to the 1997 Mapiripan massacre. In November 2001, the Constitutional Court overturned on jurisdictional grounds Uscategui's April 2001 military court conviction for dereliction of duty in failing to prevent the massacre (see Section 1.e.). The Fiscalia also was prosecuting 11 other defendants, including 3 members of the armed forces, for offenses related to events at Mapiripan. The Fiscalia continued its investigation into allegations that former General Rito Alejo del Rio collaborated with paramilitaries in the Uraba region of Antioquia department while he was commander of the army's 17th Brigade from 1995-97. Del Rio was arrested on these charges in July 2001, but subsequently was released based on a controversial ruling that there were jurisdictional flaws in the arrest warrant. On December 5, the Procuraduria closed its disciplinary investigation into similar allegations after finding insufficient evidence of the alleged crimes.
The trial continued of retired army Colonel Jose Ancizar Hincapie for alleged collaboration with paramilitaries who killed 11 persons between 1993 and 1994.
Former navy intelligence informant Jimmy Alberto Arenas was convicted of murdering 63 persons in Barrancabermeja between 1991 and 1993 and was sentenced to a lengthy prison term. On July 29, the Government concluded an amicable settlement of claims related to the 1992 police killings of eight children and one adult in the Villatina neighborhood of Medellin. As part of the settlement, the Government agreed to construct and equip the community with a modern health center, fund the establishment of an employment-generating local small business, and indemnify the victims' families. Shortly after his inauguration, President Uribe instructed foreign ministry officials to reach friendly settlements in all pending cases in which state responsibility seemed clear. On October 17, the Government began serious negotiations on five cases.
Paramilitaries committed numerous political and unlawful killings, primarily in areas they disputed with guerrillas and generally in the absence of a strong government presence. The MOD reported that paramilitary forces were responsible for the deaths of 397 civilians as of November 30. The Human Rights Ombudsman's Office reported that it had received reports of 329 unlawful killings by paramilitaries as of October 31. According to the Colombian Commission of Jurists (CCJ), a well-known local NGO (see Section 4), paramilitaries were responsible for the deaths of at least 930 civilians in the first 6 months of the year. Paramilitaries targeted journalists (see Section 2.a.), human rights activists (see Section 4), labor leaders (see Section 6.a.), community activists, indigenous leaders (see Section 5), local politicians, and others they suspected of sympathizing with guerrillas.
The Fiscalia continued investigations into numerous killings committed by paramilitaries in the Magdalena River port city of Barrancabermeja, Santander department. During the year, army personnel concentrated on combating paramilitary influence in the region. Of the 54 confirmed members of illegal armed groups captured by the army battalion in Barrancabermeja, 48 were paramilitaries. The battalion also captured 66 persons involved in gasoline theft, a multi-million dollar criminal enterprise dominated by paramilitaries. The Fiscalia was investigating the September 2001 killing by presumed paramilitaries of Congressman and House of Representatives Acting Peace Committee Chairman Jairo Hernando Rojas.
Paramilitaries also killed members of the armed forces and national police who attempted to hamper their illegal activities. For example, on June 14, paramilitary gunmen interrupted an English class at a night school in the town of Pamplona, Norte de Santander department, and killed local police chief Major Sergio Gutierrez. Gutierrez had received death threats warning him to cease efforts to dismantle a local paramilitary organization. On November 19, 12 armed men killed 2 police investigators working on an operation to combat paramilitary extortionists in the town of La Ceja, Antioquia department. On December 3, 15 paramilitaries from the Central Bolivar Block stopped a bus 12 miles outside the town of Concepcion, Santander department, removed 3 unarmed police officers dressed in civilian clothes, and killed them. The three officers were traveling to the town of Malaga to testify in a criminal case against paramilitaries.
In November 2001, AUC leader Carlos Castano issued a public statement promising the cessation of large-scale paramilitary massacres. Based on the observations of diplomatic observers and the national press, many AUC-affiliated paramilitary groups appeared to change their operations accordingly, significantly reducing the number of massacres perpetrated by paramilitaries. For example, according to the MOD, paramilitaries had killed 54 persons in 11 massacres as of November 30, compared with 281 victims in 42 massacres in 2001. The National Police released a similar figure, reporting that 59 persons were killed by paramilitaries in massacres during the year. However, the CPDDH released a much larger figure, reporting that paramilitaries killed 1,549 persons in massacres.
For example, on August 22, members of the AUC's Calima Front, which is deeply involved in drug trafficking, kidnaped and killed eight men near the village of Barragan, in Valle del Cauca department. Two days later, army troops killed two paramilitaries believed to have been involved in the killings.
Prosecutors continued to investigate massacres
committed by paramilitaries in 2001 in the municipalities of Penol,
Antioquia department, Frias, Magdalena department, Sabaletas, Valle del
Cauca department, and a remote region of Boyaca department. There was no
significant progress in any of these investigations. The
Fiscalia continued to investigate a series of attacks in November 2000 in
which paramilitaries killed 27 fishermen in the La Cienaga de Santa Marta
area, Magdalena department.
The
Fiscalia continued to investigate two different massacres near Trujillo,
Valle del Cauca department, in 1989-90 and 1994. The authorities held one
accused paramilitary in custody and had outstanding arrest warrants for
three others. One paramilitary suspect was killed while in custody.
The
Fiscalia reopened an investigation into the 1990 killing of presidential
candidate and former M-19 guerrilla Carlos Pizarro after AUC leader Carlos
Castano confessed to the killing in memoirs published in 2001. In June
prosecutors requested that Castano be tried in absentia and sentenced to
60 years in prison.
Paramilitary "social cleansing" killings of
homosexuals, prostitutes, drug users, vagrants, and persons with mental
disabilities were reported in Barrancabermeja, Cucuta, and other cities.
The CCJ reported that paramilitaries committed at least 212 "social
cleansing" killings in the first 6 months of the year. For example, on
June 14, paramilitaries executed two men on the outskirts of the town of
Giron, Santander department; a note attached to one of the bodies
attempted to justify the killings on the grounds that the men were common
criminals. On September 14, paramilitaries in the town of Soledad,
Atlantico department, killed 19-year-old Mario Paut as a presumed vagrant
because he had broken a 9 p.m. curfew. Paut had left his home at 10 p.m.
to buy diapers for his 1-month-old infant.
During
the year, guerrillas, particularly the FARC, appeared to have committed a
higher percentage of the nation's unlawful killings than they did the
previous year, often targeting noncombatants. The MOD attributed 70
percent of civilian deaths, or 916 killings, to guerrillas between January
and November. The MOD had attributed 51 percent of civilian deaths in 2001
to guerrillas. The Human Rights Ombudsman's Office reported that as of
October 31, it had received complaints of 324 intentional killings by
guerrillas, 193 by the FARC, 20 by the ELN, and 111 by unidentified
guerrillas. However, the CPDDH reported that guerrillas were responsible
for only 452 civilian deaths during the year, or 10 percent of the total.
The CPDDH attributed 382 killings to the FARC and 53 to the ELN. The CPDDH
attributed the deaths of 3,882 civilians to unidentified illegal armed
groups.
Guerrilla targets included local elected officials and
candidates for public office (see Section 3), civic leaders, business
owners, peasants opposed to guerrilla activities, religious leaders (see
Section 2.c.), indigenous people (see Section 5), labor leaders (see
Section 6.a.), and teachers (see Section 2.a.). Some communities
controlled by guerrillas also experienced social cleansing killings.
Guerrilla offensives often caused significant civilian casualties (see
Section 1.g.) and prompted significant displacements (see Section 2.d.).
Many
unlawful killings committed by guerrillas were politically-motivated. The
security chief for ex-president Andres Pastrana claimed to have thwarted
92 attempts on Pastrana's life, the vast majority by guerrillas, during
Pastrana's 4-year-term that ended on August 7. The FARC also attempted to
assassinate candidate and current President Alvaro Uribe at least 12 times
(see Section 3).
Smaller
guerrilla groups also committed politically motivated unlawful killings.
For example, on April 27, seven members of the Popular Liberation Army
(EPL) killed a 16-year-old girl in the town of San Calixto, Norte de
Santander department, for consorting with local military personnel.
The
FARC committed more large-scale massacres than it did in 2001. The
Ministry of Defense attributed 85 percent of civilian deaths in massacres
during the year, or 307 total killings, to guerrillas. In 2001 the MOD
attributed 36 percent of such deaths to guerrillas. The CPDDH reported
that guerrillas killed 280 persons in massacres during the year, only 11
percent of its much larger estimate of massacre victims. According to the
CPDDH, the FARC killed 241 persons in massacres and the ELN killed 31. The
CPDDH blamed the deaths of an additional 691 persons on unidentified
illegal armed groups.
On
September 15, the FARC abducted 22 coca-leaf pickers near the town of
Vista Hermosa, Meta department. After 4 days of torture, the guerrillas
killed 11 coca-leaf pickers and buried them in a mass grave, apparently
because the FARC suspected they were paramilitary collaborators. On August
10, near the town of La Gabarra, Norte de Santander department, the FARC
shot and killed seven peasants who refused to be forcibly recruited. On
August 31, near the town of Corralito in the Montes de Maria region of
Bolivar department, the FARC killed eight farm workers whom it accused of
being paramilitary collaborators.
Prosecutors continued to investigate the February 2001
killings by the FARC of seven ecotourists in Purace national park,
bordering the departments of Huila and Cauca. Eight senior FARC leaders
were identified as suspects in the case.
An
investigation continued into the FARC's May 2001 killing of seven peasants
near the village of Alto Sinu, Tierra Alta municipality, Cordoba
department. Prosecutors ordered the arrest of Jhoverman Sanchez, leader of
the FARC's 58th Front.
There
was no progress in the investigation of the ELN's killing of nine peasants
in the village of La Cristalina, located near the town of Puerto Wilches,
Santander department, in retaliation for their vocal opposition to a
Government proposal to create an ELN safe haven in the region in
anticipation of potential peace negotiations. Little
progress was made or seemed likely on investigations into killings
committed by the FARC in its former safe haven ("despeje"). For example,
no arrests were anticipated for the FARC's killing of seven residents of
the former despeje town of La Macarena, Meta department, in the week
following the abolishment of the FARC safe haven. Five of the victims were
killed reportedly for failing to fully cooperate with the FARC, and two
others were killed for attempting to steal FARC commander Mono Jojoy's
custom bed and prize pig following his departure.
The
Fiscalia continued to investigate the killings of 20 persons, including 8
police officers and the mayor of Vigia del Fuerte, Antioquia department,
during a March 2000 FARC attack on Vigia del Fuerte and Bellavista, Choco
department, located on opposite sides of the Atrato River. On April 8, the
authorities charged three members of the FARC with killing and terrorism.
They were in custody and awaiting trial at year's end.
The
Fiscalia continued to investigate the FARC's December 2000 killing of
Congressional peace commission chairman Diego Turbay, his mother, and five
other persons in Caqueta department. No progress was expected in arresting
the senior FARC leaders accused of ordering the crime. However, on June 5,
a court sentenced--in absentia--Manuel Marulanda, alias "Tirofijo;" Jorge
Briceno, alias "Mono Jojoy;" and 3 other members of the FARC Secretariat
to 396 years in prison for the 1997 kidnaping and killing of Turbay's
older brother, then-Senator Rodrigo Turbay.
On
November 5, the Fiscalia ordered the arrest of eight members of the FARC's
57th Front for the January 2001 killing of Henry Perea, mayor of the town
of Jurardo, Choco department. Perea had been pulled from his office and
shot in broad daylight. No arrests appeared imminent.
On July
30, prosecutors indicted nine senior FARC leaders for the September 2001
kidnaping and killing of former Minister of Culture Consuelo Araujo near
Valledupar, Cesar department. The FARC apparently killed Araujo when it
became clear she could not maintain the pace required for the FARC to
outrun military efforts to rescue her. On November 18, the Fiscalia
ordered the arrest of two other FARC leaders for their involvement in the
crime. The
FARC executed guerrilla soldiers who attempted to desert. For example, on
June 3, near the town of Yondo, eastern Antioquia department, the FARC
killed two female soldiers who planned to desert.
Guerrillas killed citizens using bombs, artillery, and
antipersonnel landmines, and continued their practice of using gas
canisters to attack small towns, killing civilians indiscriminately (see
Section 1.g.).
b.
Disappearance
The law
specifically defines forced disappearance as a crime. More than 3,800
cases of forced disappearance have been formally reported since 1977. Very
few have been resolved. The great majority of victims of forced
disappearance have never been seen or heard from again.
The
CPDDH reported that state security forces were responsible for 10 forced
disappearances during the year. The CCJ reported four such cases in the
first 6 months of the year. The Procuraduria investigated 105 members of
the state security forces on disciplinary charges related to forced
disappearances (see Section 1.a.). In 35 cases, the allegations were
credible enough for the Procuraduria to open a formal investigation. One
army captain was formally charged, two police agents were found guilty and
sanctioned, and one police agent was exonerated.
The law
prohibits kidnaping; however, it remained an extremely serious problem.
According to the Free Country Foundation, an anti-kidnaping NGO (see
Section 4), during the year there were a total of 2,986 kidnapings; 936
were attributed to the FARC, 776 to the ELN, 180 to paramilitaries,
including the AUC, and the remaining to smaller groups such as the EPL
(People's Liberation Army) and common criminals. Elite government
anti-kidnaping units known as GAULAs and other elements of the security
forces freed 693 hostages and forced the release of 190 others. However,
despite government efforts, the Free Country Foundation reported that at
least 62 persons died in captivity during the year, including 3 children.
Thirty-eight of these persons were killed by their captors. On January 29,
then-President Andres Pastrana signed a new anti-kidnaping law that
provides for 40-year jail sentences. At the same time, Pastrana announced
disbursements of approximately $2 million (5 billion pesos) to strengthen
the GAULAs.
Some
members of the state security forces were involved in kidnaping for
ransom. For example, on May 14, police arrested two members of the
National Police and an official from the Fiscalia for participating in the
kidnaping of shoe magnate Esteban Rangel. On September 20, the BBC
reported that some kidnap victims alleged they were abducted by members of
the police either at roadblocks or after having been flagged down by
police cars. The report noted that victims were uncertain whether they had
been kidnaped by corrupt police officers or guerrillas using stolen police
uniforms.
Paramilitaries were responsible for the majority of
forced disappearances. The CPDDH attributed 439 forced disappearances
during the year to paramilitaries, or 60 percent of such violations. The
CPDDH also reported that 277 persons were forcibly "disappeared" by
unidentified armed groups. According to the Free Country Foundation,
paramilitaries were responsible for 180 kidnapings, or 7 percent of all
kidnapings during the year in which a perpetrator was identified.
Paramilitaries generally abducted persons suspected of collaboration with
guerrillas, whom they almost always killed (see Section 1.a.). In April
and October, presumed paramilitaries abducted persons near the town of San
Jose de Apartado, in the Uraba region of Antioquia department (see Section
1.a.). Authorities continued to investigate the October 2001
paramilitary kidnaping of 13 fishermen near the Cienaga de Santa Marta,
Magdalena department. Three of the victims escaped, and at least six were
confirmed dead. The four victims still missing were presumed dead.
Paramilitaries sometimes abducted government employees
investigating paramilitary crimes (see Section 1.a.). No further progress
seemed likely in the April 2001 disappearances of two CTI investigators
near Berrugas, Sucre department, who were working undercover on the
January 2001 Chengue paramilitary massacre (see Section 1.a.). An
investigation continued into the 2000 abduction of seven members of the
CTI near Minguillo, Cesar department. The whereabouts of the CTI employees
were unknown, and they were presumed dead. Kidnaping continued to be an unambiguous, standing
policy and major source of revenue for both the FARC and ELN. The FARC
continued to kidnap persons in accordance with its so-called "Law 002,"
announced in March 2000, which requires persons with more than $1 million
(2.95 billion pesos) in assets to volunteer payments to the FARC or risk
detention. The Free Country Foundation reported that guerrillas committed
75 percent of the 2,986 kidnapings reported during the year in which a
perpetrator was identified. The Foundation reported that the FARC kidnaped
936 persons and the ELN 776. In addition, the FARC often purchased victims
kidnaped by common criminals and then negotiated ransom payments with the
families. There were many reports that guerrillas tortured kidnap victims
(see Sections 1.c. and 1.g.). Several released kidnap victims claimed that
the FARC had been holding more than 200 persons in the former despeje
before the zone's abolishment in February.
According to the Free Country Foundation, merchants,
government employees, and cattle ranchers were among the guerrillas'
preferred victims. However, the largest category of kidnaping victims was
children, over 384 of whom were kidnaped during the year. In 2001, for
example, the FARC kidnaped 11-year-old Laura Ulloa from her school bus in
Cali, and did not release her until April 5. It was suspected that a
ransom was paid for her return. In October 2001, the FARC kidnaped
18-month-old Mariana Ossa in a middle class neighborhood of Medellin.
Although Ossa's parents paid a ransom for her release in July, she was not
released until December 22. The FARC kidnaped several mayors' children to
pressure the mayors into resigning (see Section 3).
According to the Free Country Foundation, 1,714
kidnapings during the year, or over 57 percent of the total, were
economically motivated. During an April 2 newspaper interview, ELN Supreme
Commander Nicolas Rodriguez, alias "Gabino," stated that the ELN expected
to receive payment for the release of kidnap victims. Gabino added that
kidnap victims "have a specific economic value" and that "the Government
must understand that, if there are funds for a peace agreement, these
funds must be applied to resolving the situation of these kidnap victims."
The Government immediately rejected Gabino's demand.
On
August 19, the ELN kidnaped 27 tourists from a resort near the town of
Bahia Solano, Choco department. At year's end, all but three had been
released, most in return for ransom payments or IOUs accompanied by death
threats for noncompliance. Victims reported that the group, which included
retired persons and children, was forced to hike 12 hours a day through
jungle swamps on meager rations of bananas and rice. Many of the victims
contracted malaria or other serious illnesses and one elderly victim died
of a heart attack and was buried in an unmarked grave.
Guerrillas sometimes demanded ransom payments before
returning the bodies of kidnap victims who died in captivity. For example,
in April relatives of a merchant kidnaped near the town of Pensilvania,
Caldas department, paid the FARC nearly $2,000 (5.9 million pesos) to
recover his body.
Guerrillas also kidnaped foreigners for ransom.
According to the Free Country Foundation, 31 foreigners were kidnaped
during the year. For example, on April 19, the FARC abducted two Canadian
citizens and one French citizen whose helicopter made an emergency landing
in a remote region of Narino department. They were released on July 30.
Government authorities believe a ransom was paid. In October 2001, the
FARC kidnaped Dutch student Roelant Jonker near the village of Santa
Cecilia, Choco department. Jonker was released on June 12 in return for a
ransom of approximately $8,000 (23.6 million pesos). On May 22, a combined
team of army, police, and DAS personnel rescued 64-year-old Maria Luisa
Trevissan de Bachetti, an Italian citizen and owner of a Venezuelan steel
plant, from a joint FARC/ELN team holding her hostage in the town of
Maico, La Guajira department. Trevissan de Bachetti had been kidnaped on
April 19 in Venezuela. The guerrillas were demanding $10 million (29.5
billion pesos) for her release.
The
FARC committed numerous politically motivated kidnapings in an attempt to
destabilize the Government and pressure it into a prisoner exchange.
According to the Free Country Foundation, there were 208 politically
motivated kidnapings during the year. On April 15, HRW published a letter
to FARC leader Manuel Marulanda that called for an immediate end to
targeting political leaders.
On
February 20, FARC operatives hijacked an airliner on route from Neiva,
capital of Huila department, to Bogota, forced it to land on the
Bogota-Neiva highway, and kidnaped Senator Jorge Eduardo Gechem, Chairman
of the Senate Peace Commission. The hijacking was apparently planned for
the express purpose of kidnaping Senator Gechem. Gechem's cousin, Diego
Turbay, former chairman of the House of Representatives Peace Commission,
was killed by the FARC in 2000. Gechem's kidnaping led then-President
Pastrana to declare a definitive end to stalled peace negotiations with
the FARC and abolish the FARC's despeje in the south.
On
February 23, 3 days after the despeje was abolished, the FARC kidnaped
presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt and her campaign manager, Clara
Rojas, on the highway between Florencia and San Vicente del Caguan,
Caqueta department. On July 23, the FARC released a videotape of a thin,
tired Betancourt, apparently recorded on May 15. In early October, a
Bogota television news station received a message from the FARC stating
that Betancourt was in good condition.
On
April 11, the FARC committed a daring daylight kidnaping of 16 members of
the Valle del Cauca departmental assembly from the assembly's headquarters
in downtown Cali. FARC operatives dressed in army uniforms announced that
the building was being evacuated because of a bomb threat and hurried
victims into a waiting bus painted in army colors. Although four victims
were rescued by the military in the following week, 12 victims remained in
captivity at year's end. On August 28 and December 27, the FARC released
videos of the 12 remaining captives, who appeared to be in good health.
On
April 21, the FARC kidnaped Guillermo Gaviria, governor of Antioquia, and
Gilberto Echeverri, departmental peace commissioner and former national
Minister of Defense, while the governor was leading a peace march through
the eastern Antioquia town of El Vaho.
The
FARC continued to hold captive former members of Congress Orlando Bernal,
Luis Eladio Perez, and Consuelo Gonzalez, kidnaped in 2001, and
Congressman Oscar Lizcano, kidnaped in 2000. All four former members'
terms expired while they were in captivity. The FARC also held former Meta
governor Alan Jara, who was kidnaped in July 2001 while riding in a U.N.
vehicle with the U.N. Development Program (UNDP) director and other
government officials.
The
FARC continued to hold nine victims of a mass kidnaping carried out in
July 2001 from a luxury apartment building in Neiva, Huila department. The
captives included the wife and two children of a congressman. On
April 5, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) recovered the
bodies of two police officers, both killed by the FARC. One of the bodies
was that of Corporal Jose Norberto Perez, the father of Andres Felipe
Perez, a 13-year-old boy who died of cancer in December 2001 after having
pleaded with the FARC to release his father so that the family could be
reunited before the boy's death.
Guerrillas kidnaped journalists (see Section 2.a.).
The
whereabouts of three American missionaries kidnaped from eastern Panama in
1993 remained unknown, and they were presumed dead.
c.
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
The
Constitution and criminal law explicitly prohibit torture, and cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; however, there were reports
that the police, military, and prison guards mistreated and tortured
detainees. The Military Penal Code directs that trials of members of the
military and police accused of torture be held in civilian, rather than
military, courts (see Section 1.e.). The Procuraduria received 103
complaints of torture by state agents during the year. CINEP reported that
state security forces tortured 16 persons during the first 6 months of the
year; 14 of these cases were attributed to the army and 2 to the police.
The
Fiscalia was investigating accusations publicized during the year by the
Committee in Solidarity with Political Prisoners (CSPP) that members of
the Cali GAULA collaborated with paramilitaries in abducting and torturing
individuals suspected of involvement in kidnapings.
Colonel
Jose Ancizar Molano, Captains Alvaro Hernando Moreno and Rafael Garcia,
Lieutenant Carlos Eduardo Jaramillo, and four noncommissioned officers
remained on trial at year's end for torturing 12 marines with asphyxiation
and electric shock in 1995.
CINEP
reported 42 cases of torture by paramilitaries during the first 6 months
of the year. Victims of paramilitary killings often showed signs of
torture.
Guerrilla groups also tortured and abused persons.
CINEP reported only three cases of torture by guerrillas during the first
6 months of the year; however, the bodies of many persons kidnaped and
subsequently killed by guerrillas showed signs of torture and
disfigurement. Numerous former kidnap victims and hostages taken by the
guerrillas during combat reported severe deprivation, denial of medical
attention, and physical and psychological torture during captivity (see
Section 1.b.). The MOD reported that guerrillas tortured or mutilated and
killed soldiers and policemen after they surrendered (see Section 1.g.).
Prison
conditions were harsh, particularly for prisoners without significant
outside support. Severe overcrowding and dangerous sanitary and health
conditions remained serious problems. The National Prison and Penitentiary
Institute (INPEC) reported that the nation's daily food allowance per
prisoner was only $1.25 (3,500 pesos). Private sources continued to
provide the majority of most prisoners' food. In June 2001, based on a
lawsuit filed by prisoners incarcerated in Valledupar, Cesar department,
the Valledupar Supreme Court ordered INPEC to improve prison conditions in
the department. Many of INPEC's 10,000 prison guards were poorly trained
or corrupt. On March 6, prison guards at the Valledupar penitentiary beat
an unruly prisoner in his cell so severely that he died 36 hours later.
The Fiscalia placed the six guards under arrest on suspicion of murder.
The Office reportedly was investigating allegations of prison guard
brutality in other installations as well.
Only
four prisons--Valledupar, Acacias, Popayan, and Combita--met international
standards for acceptable conditions for prison facilities. Two more
prisons designed to meet these standards were under construction in La
Porada, Caldas department, and Palo Gordo, near Bucaramanga, Santander
department. In other prisons, inmates paid to eat, drink, sleep on a
mattress, wash clothes, or make telephone calls. Many inmates in such
facilities also were forced to pay protection money to fellow inmates or
corrupt prison guards.
According to INPEC, overcrowding remained a serious
problem. In October the country's prisons and jails held approximately
52,900 inmates, 16 percent over their intended capacity of 45,500. The
country's largest prisons had some of the highest occupancy levels. For
example, Medellin's Bellavista prison, the country's largest, held over
three times as many prisoners as it was designed to hold.
An
estimated 17.8 percent of the country's prisons were between 40 and 80
years old, 3.5 percent between 80 and 201 years old, and 2.4 percent more
than 201 years old. The Ministry of Justice made some progress in
implementing a plan announced in 2000 to expand prison capacity by 18,000
beds by 2003. Since the announcement, the Government renovated 17 of the
country's 151 penitentiaries, including some of its largest, expanding
prison capacity by 6,400 beds.
The
Government sometimes failed to prevent deadly violence among inmates. For
example, on July 12, a routine cell search in Bucaramanga's La Modelo jail
revealed plans for a mass escape led by ELN inmates and sparked a large
riot that resulted in the death of one inmate and serious injuries to four
others. INPEC reported 8 major prison riots, compared with 19 in 2001.
However, unlike the previous year when 61 inmates died in such uprisings,
only 3 lives were lost in these disturbances.
There
were no large-scale prison escapes; however, a total of 223 prisoners did
escape from the country's prisons during the year. These escapes were
divided roughly evenly between classic escapes and abuses of
administrative privileges such as 72-hour passes. Nevertheless, these
numbers represented an improvement over 781 escapes registered in 2000.
Enhanced external security, which prevented paramilitaries and guerrillas
from breaking out imprisoned comrades, and the revocation during the year
of the policy permitting the issuance of 72-hour passes to favored
prisoners, accounted for the improvement. Several failed escapes were
elaborately planned, such as an effort by paramilitaries, discovered in
October, to tunnel out of Bogota's La Picota prison.
During
the year, the authorities moved high-level narcotics traffickers to the
new high security prison at Combita, where they endured the same spartan
conditions as other prisoners. The renovation of the high security wing of
Bogota's La Picota prison also was completed, ending many inmates'
relatively comfortable prison lifestyles.
There
were separate prison facilities for women, and in some parts of the
country there were separate women's prisons. Conditions at women's prisons
were similar to those at men's prisons, but were far less violent.
According to the Criminal Procedure Code, no one under the age of 18 may
be held in a prison. Juveniles were held in separate facilities operated
by the Colombian Family Welfare Institute (ICBF).
There
were no separate facilities for pretrial detainees, who made up an
estimated 43 percent of all prison inmates. According to INPEC, 981
pretrial detainees were held in overcrowded police jails, despite court
orders that they be transferred to long-term detention facilities. Failure
on the part of many local military commanders and jail supervisors to keep
mandatory detention records or follow notification procedures made
accounting precisely for all detainees impossible.
The
ICRC continued to have routine access to most prisons and police and
military detention centers. The ICRC continued to have ad hoc access to
civilians held by paramilitaries and guerrillas. However, the FARC and ELN
continued to deny the ICRC access to police and military hostages (see
Sections 1.b. and 1.g.).
d.
Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The
Constitution includes several provisions designed to prevent illegal
detention; however, there continued to be allegations that authorities
arrested or detained citizens arbitrarily. Many such allegations
originated in "Rehabilitation and Consolidation Zones" established by
presidential decree, where security forces were granted expanded powers to
establish public order.
President Uribe issued Decree 2002 on September 10 by
authority of his August declaration of a "State of Internal Disturbance"
(see Section 1.f.). In addition to authorizing the creation of
"Rehabilitation and Consolidation Zones", the decree granted the police
and armed forces the power to make arrests, intercept communications, and
search private residences without written warrants, and to do so without
judicial authorization in exigent circumstances. However, on November 26,
the Constitutional Court struck down provisions of the decree that granted
police powers to the military, emphasizing that prosecutorial officials
must determine when personal liberty interests can be infringed upon in
the interests of public safety.
The
Constitutional Court's decision was consistent with its April 11 ruling
striking down the National Defense and Security Act of 2001, which had
threatened to infringe on the due process rights of persons detained or
investigated by the military (see Section 1.e.). Among other things, the
Act had not specified the maximum period detainees might be held by the
military before being turned over to civilian authorities.
The law
prohibits incommunicado detention. Even in Rehabilitation Zones, anyone
detained by law enforcement authorities must be brought before a senior
prosecutor within 36 hours of his or her detention. A senior prosecutor
must then rule on the legality of the detention within an additional 36
hours. Despite these legal protections, there continued to be allegations
of arbitrary detention.
Conditional pretrial release is available for minor
offenses or after unduly long periods of investigative detention. In the
case of most felonies, detention prior to the filing of formal charges
cannot exceed 180 days, after which a suspect must be conditionally
released. In the cases of crimes deemed particularly serious, such as
murder or terrorism, authorities are allowed up to 360 days to file formal
charges before a suspect must be conditionally released.
Paramilitaries in the city of Barrancabermeja,
Santander department, exercised illegal "social controls," such as curfews
for children, ad hoc punishments for domestic violence and petty crimes,
and the issuance of paramilitary-produced identification cards to bona
fide local residents.
The
FARC pressed the Government to adopt a permanent prisoner exchange law;
however, both the Pastrana and Uribe administrations rejected the idea.
Families of kidnap victims, particularly relatives of 12 Valle del Cauca
Assembly members kidnaped in April and still held by the FARC (see Section
1.b.), pressed the Government to participate in a one-time humanitarian
prisoner exchange. During the year, guerrillas continued to hold at least
47, and as many as 102, soldiers and police who either were captured in
combat or kidnaped while off-duty. The ICRC was not permitted access to
them (see Section 1.b.).
The
Constitution prohibits forced exile, and the Government did not practice
it. However, there were numerous instances of individuals pressured into
self-exile for their personal safety. Such cases included persons from all
walks of life, including politicians, journalists, human rights workers,
slum-dwellers, business executives, farmers, and others (see Sections 2.a.
and 4). The threats came from various quarters: some individual members of
the security forces, paramilitary groups, guerrilla groups, narcotics
traffickers, and other criminal elements.
e.
Denial of Fair Public Trial
The
Constitution provides for an independent judiciary, and the civilian
justice system was independent of the executive and legislative branches
in both theory and practice; however, the suborning or intimidation of
judges, witnesses, and prosecutors was common. Impunity remained the
single greatest problem threatening the credibility of the Government's
commitment to human rights. The university-affiliated Corporation for
Judicial Excellence, which was preparing a study on impunity, reported
that the overall level of impunity cited by a variety of governmental and
nongovernmental sources was between 80 and 95 percent.
Judges
have long been subject to threats and intimidation, particularly when
handling cases involving members of the public security forces or of
paramilitary, guerrilla, and narcotics trafficking organizations. Violent
attacks and threats against prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges
continued. Prosecutors reported that potential witnesses in major cases
often lacked faith in the Government's ability to protect them and thus
were unwilling to testify, hindering chances for successful prosecutions.
For example, in December two prosecution witnesses failed to appear at the
trial of three members of the Irish Republican Army who were accused of
training members of the FARC. One of the witnesses could not be found, and
the other said that he feared for his life.
According to a statement issued by the Supreme Court,
as of July 16, terrorist organizations such as the FARC and the AUC had
threatened judicial officials working in at least 368 courts in 231
municipalities. As of August 30, 408 judges and 396 prosecutors from 248
municipalities felt obligated to work out of offices in departmental
capitals for reasons of security.
In
March 2001, Bogota judge Lesther Gonzalez received threats that appeared
related to important cases on her docket, including the 1995 assassination
of Alvaro Gomez, the 1997 Mapiripan massacre, and the 1997 killings of
three CINEP volunteers. Also in March 2001, Medellin judge Adalgisa Lopera
fled the city with her family following a death threat. Judge Lopera heard
paramilitarism, terrorism, and narcotics cases.
In
April 2001, two undercover CTI employees investigating the January 2001
Chengue massacre disappeared in Sucre department. In December two gunmen
arrested for the August 2001 killing of Yolanda Paternina, local lead
prosecutor in the case, were released for lack of evidence (see Section
1.a.).
An
investigation continued into the April 2000 killing of prosecutor
Margarita Maria Pulgarin in Medellin. Paramilitaries were suspected of
killing her. One suspect had been charged in absentia; however, no one had
been detained by year's end.
The
civilian justice system is a separate and independent branch of government
that uses a Napoleonic legal system incorporating some accusatorial
elements. The military justice system, which is part of the executive
branch, also relies on a mixed system, although accusatorial aspects
predominate.
On
December 16, Congress approved constitutional changes designed to convert
the current mixed judicial system into a purely accusatorial system. The
reforms will go into effect in January 2005, prior to which major changes
will have to be made to the penal, criminal procedure, and evidence codes.
After that date, judges, rather than prosecutors, will issue arrest
warrants and decide pretrial motions. Cases will be tried in open court
and decided on the basis of oral trial proceedings, rather than an
exhaustive written dossier. Prosecutor General Luis Camilo Osorio has
predicted that the reforms will reduce the average investigatory phase of
a case from 3 years to 6 months.
The
judicial system was extremely overburdened. Based on information collected
from 77 percent of the nation's courts, as of September the administrative
chamber of the Supreme Council of the Judiciary (CSJ) reported that the
civilian judiciary suffered from a backlog of at least 1,14 million cases,
approximately 140,000 of them criminal. These backlogs had created large
numbers of pretrial detainees (see Section 1.c.) In October, the President
of the Council of State complained that the Council was facing a 6 to 8
year backlog. The Fiscalia reported that approximately 220,000 arrest
warrants were still outstanding.
The
civilian justice system is composed of four functional jurisdictions:
civil, administrative, constitutional, and special. The civil jurisdiction
is the largest jurisdiction within the civilian justice system, and
handles all criminal, civil, labor, agrarian, and domestic cases involving
non-military personnel. The civil jurisdiction is divided into 31 judicial
districts, each containing at least one judicial circuit encompassing one
or more municipalities. A superior tribunal serves as each district's
court of appeals. The civil jurisdiction's 436 magistrates are distributed
according to the population of each district. The lower circuit and
municipal courts, each staffed by a judge, a court clerk, and perhaps a
few administrative personnel, are the basic cells of the civil
jurisdiction. In the smallest towns, a single "all-purpose" judge rules on
all cases.
Specialized circuit courts within the civil
jurisdiction try cases involving crimes designated as grave threats to the
administration of justice, such as narcotics trafficking, terrorism,
paramilitarism, torture, and money laundering.
The
Supreme Court is the highest court within the civil jurisdiction and
serves as its final court of appeals. In addition to hearing appeals from
lower courts, the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction in trials of the
President, cabinet ministers, heads of independent government agencies,
admirals and generals, and magistrates of the Supreme Court, Council of
State, Constitutional Court, and CSJ.
The
administrative jurisdiction of the civilian justice system is divided into
27 judicial districts with an equal number of tribunals. Each tribunal has
from 1 to 23 magistrates, depending on the population of the district.
Administrative actions such as decrees and resolutions may be challenged
in the administrative jurisdiction on constitutional or other grounds. The
Council of State is the highest court in the administrative jurisdiction
and serves as the final court of appeals for complaints arising from
administrative acts.
The
Constitutional Court, which is charged with "safeguarding the integrity
and supremacy" of the Constitution, is the sole judicial body comprising
the constitutional jurisdiction of the civilian justice system. It rules
on the constitutionality of laws, presidential decrees, and constitutional
reforms. The Constitutional Court may also issue advisory opinions on the
constitutionality of bills not yet signed into law, and randomly reviews
the decisions of lower courts on "tutelas," or writs of protection of
fundamental rights, which can be filed before any judge of any court at
any stage of a judicial procedure as a legal defense of last resort.
Courts must rule on the validity of a tutela within 10 days. Approximately
15,500 tutelas were before the Constitutional Court for possible review.
The
final functional jurisdiction of the civilian justice system is the
special jurisdiction. The special jurisdiction consists of the justice of
the peace program, designed to encourage alternative dispute resolution at
the municipal level, which has been implemented in less than 1 percent of
the country's municipalities, and the indigenous jurisdiction, which
grants indigenous leaders the right to exercise judicial functions on
indigenous reservations in accordance with traditional laws (see Section
5.).
The CSJ
is responsible for the administration and discipline of the civilian
justice system. The CSJ is divided into two chambers: administrative and
disciplinary. The administrative chamber supervises the civilian justice
system's budget and determines its organization. The disciplinary chamber
disciplines judicial officials and resolves jurisdictional clashes, such
as those between the civilian and military justice systems. The
Fiscalia is tasked with investigating criminal offenses and presenting
evidence against the accused. The Supreme Court elects the Prosecutor
General from a list of three candidates selected by the President. The
Prosecutor General serves a 4-year term that overlaps two presidential
administrations. The Office is independent of both the executive and
judicial branches and is divided into national, regional, and local
offices. The Office has its own corps of armed investigators known as the
Corps of Technical Investigators (CTI). The Office has significant
judicial functions; however, consistent with constitutional reforms passed
in December, it will be converted by 2005 into a purely investigatory and
prosecutorial agency.
The
Prosecutor General created the Human Rights Unit in 1995. As of October,
the Unit's 41 prosecutors had 1,369 open cases involving 1,618 suspects,
including 173 members of the state security forces. The Human Rights Unit
arrested 57 members of the state security forces during the year and filed
charges against 25 for a variety of crimes including murder, torture,
kidnaping, and collaboration with paramilitary groups. However, impunity
continued to be very widespread.
In
November HRW published "A Wrong Turn; the Record of the Colombian Attorney
General's Office," a report that alleged that under the leadership of
Prosecutor General Luis Camilo Osorio, the ability of the Fiscalia to
investigate and prosecute human rights abuses had deteriorated. The report
accused the Prosecutor General of failing to support prosecutors who
worked on human rights cases by not providing adequate protection for
justice officials whose lives were threatened and by the dismissal and
forced resignation of veteran prosecutors and judicial investigators.
In its
December response, the Human Rights Unit of the Fiscalia reported that for
the first time in its history, Osorio had obtained a specific allotment in
the national budget for the Unit. While it was true that 4 of the Unit's
41 prosecutors had been dismissed during the year, their replacements had
equal or greater experience. Finally, the Unit was working hard to
increase the protection available to prosecutors.
The
Procuraduria investigates allegations of misconduct by public employees,
including members of the state security forces. The Inspector General,
whose term overlaps those of two presidents, is elected by the Senate to a
4-year term from a list of three candidates nominated by the President,
Supreme Court, and Council of State. During the year, the Procuraduria
received 395 complaints of alleged serious violations of human rights by
state agents, compared with 502 complaints in 2001. A total of 235 of
these complaints were lodged against the army, 3 against the navy, 8
against the air force, and 149 against the National Police. Of these
complaints, 380 were still under preliminary investigation, 14 had reached
the stage of a formal disciplinary investigation, and 1 had resulted in
the filing of formal charges. The Procuraduria imposes administrative
sanctions that range from letters of reprimand to dismissal and permanent
bans from public office. It has no authority to impose criminal sanctions,
but can refer cases to the Prosecutor General. The Procuraduria referred
all cases of human rights violations received during the year to the
Prosecutor General for investigation and reported that that the majority
of these cases were investigated by the Fiscalia.
The
Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman, or Public Defender, employs 923
public defenders nationwide to provide the indigent with legal
representation in criminal cases. However, as of December, these public
defenders were required to manage over 70,000 cases. In addition, the
Ombudsman's 34 departmental and regional offices throughout the country
provide a legal channel for thousands of complaints and allegations of
human rights violations (see Section 4). The Ombudsman, who reports to the
Inspector General, is elected by the House of Representatives from a list
of three candidates submitted by the President to serve a 4-year term that
overlaps those of two presidents.
A
criminal case begins with a preliminary investigation that can last up to
180 working days. If evidence is found linking a particular individual to
a crime, the case moves into a formal investigative stage in which
prosecutors have a maximum of 360 working days to file formal charges.
Once formal charges are filed, the Government has 35 working days to bring
a case to trial. Trials are open to the public. Judges question witnesses
directly and determine the outcome of all trials. There are no juries.
The
Constitution specifically provides for the right to due process.
Nevertheless, as of November 30, the Human Rights Ombudsman's office had
received 1,270 complaints of denial of due process. An accused is presumed
innocent until proven guilty and has the right to timely consultation with
counsel. Attorneys from the Ombudsman's Office are required to represent
indigent defendants; however, representation for the indigent has
historically been inadequate. During the year, an estimated 90 percent of
indigent defendants received no assistance from a public defender.
Defendants have the right to be present at proceedings against them,
present witnesses and evidence on their own behalf, and confront and
question prosecution witnesses. Defendants also have the right to review
government evidence relevant to the case. Defendants have the right to
appeal a conviction to a higher court. The Constitution extends these
rights to all citizens.
The
military justice system, as part of the Ministry of Defense, falls under
the executive branch. To improve the accountability and independence of
the military justice system, the military judicial code was amended in
2000 so that military prosecutors report directly to the director of the
military justice system, rather than to their local unit commanders. The
director of the military justice system reports directly to the civilian
Minister of Defense. Nevertheless, impunity for members of the public
security forces--particularly high-ranking officers--accused of human
rights abuses or collaboration with paramilitaries remained a problem.
Some military justice personnel investigating sensitive cases reported
they were pressured to make particular rulings and threatened or harassed
for not doing so.
The
military justice system is composed of the Superior Military Tribunal,
which serves as the court of appeals for all cases tried in the military
justice system, and 40 military trial courts. The civilian Supreme Court
serves as a second court of appeals for cases in which sentences of 6
years or more in prison are imposed. The military judiciary may
investigate, prosecute, and try active duty military and police personnel
for alleged crimes "related to acts of military service." Civil courts
must try retired personnel, even for service-related acts committed before
their retirement. The military penal code specifically defines forced
disappearance, torture, and genocide as crimes not related to military
service. Moreover, a presidential directive issued in 2000 raised "to the
category of law" a 1997 Constitutional Court ruling that defined all
serious violations of human rights as being unrelated to military service.
The military penal code also provides protections to members of the public
security services who may feel pressure from commanders to violate human
rights. For example, the code denies unit commanders the power to judge
subordinates and extends legal protection to service members who refuse to
obey illegal orders to commit human rights abuses.
Criminal investigations by the military justice system
are designed to be completed rapidly. By law an investigation may last a
maximum of 180 working days, after which a suspect must be brought to
trial within 2 months. However, this rigorous timetable is suspended if a
defendant appeals the court's jurisdiction or procedural rulings. This
exception causes many cases in the military justice system to drag on for
years. For example, jurisdictional appeals accounted for some of the delay
in the military's investigation of the apparent air force bombing of the
village of Santo Domingo, Arauca department in December 1998 (see Section
1.g.). The military justice system's formal investigation began in 2000,
and was still in its investigatory phase when it was transferred to the
civilian justice system in December.
Criminal procedure within the military justice system
is similar to that within the civilian justice system, with the exception
that the military justice system has already incorporated many
accusatorial elements. Defendants are considered innocent until proven
guilty and have the right to timely consultation with counsel. However,
there is no military equivalent to the civilian public defender system;
defendants generally must retain counsel at their own expense.
Representatives of the civilian justice system--generally from the
Procuraduria--have a right to be present at military trials.
The
military judiciary demonstrated a willingness during the year to turn
cases of military personnel accused of human rights violations or other
criminal activities over to the civilian justice system. The Superior
Military Tribunal reported that between August 1997 and December it
voluntarily transferred 1,377 cases, 627 military and 750 police, to the
civilian justice system. An independent review of the 627 cases involving
military personnel revealed that 168 cases involved allegations of gross
violations of human rights or collaboration with paramilitaries.
In
September 2000, the President signed 12 decrees to reform and strengthen
the military. The decrees sharpened the definitions, classifications, and
punishments for crimes, required military officials to cooperate with
civilian investigators who investigate such crimes, and mandated, with
limited exceptions, the dismissal of service members convicted and
imprisoned by either the civilian or military justice systems.
Presidential Decree 1790 of 2000 allows senior
military commanders, at their discretion, to separate from service any
uniformed members of the security services regardless of time of service.
From October 2000 through the end of 2001, the military dismissed
approximately 600 members; no figures were available on how many were
discharged during the year under the authority of Decree 1790. No
information was available from the MOD regarding the specific reasons for
any of the dismissals, nor were the names of those dismissed made public.
The MOD confirmed the claims of many human rights NGOs that a large number
of those dismissed subsequently entered the ranks of illegal paramilitary
groups.
When
military officers were tried, convicted, and sentenced for human rights
violations, they generally were not incarcerated in civilian prisons but
were confined instead to their bases or military police detention centers,
as permitted by law. Some performed administrative functions while
incarcerated. The MOD reported, and the Fiscalia confirmed, that military
and police prisoners charged by civilian prosecutors routinely were
suspended from their duties and placed on half-pay. Officers and
noncommissioned officers were removed from any command duties. Forty-one
members of the military and 25 police officers reportedly were suspended
at year's end.
To
address concerns about escapes from improvised military detention
facilities, in June a new high security military prison was inaugurated
near Melgar, Tolima department. The civilian INPEC provided oversight of
the military's management of the prison. Although the facility was
designed to house up to 200 inmates, it was still not large enough to
house all military prisoners, leaving some in facilities of questionable
security.
The
case of former General Jaime Humberto Uscategui, accused of failing to
prevent a 1997 massacre in Mapiripan, Meta department, remained under
investigation by the Fiscalia (see Section 1.a.). Although the
Constitution dictates that generals accused of crimes related to acts of
service must be tried by the Supreme Court, Uscategui would be tried by an
ordinary criminal court because the crimes of which he was accused were
unrelated to acts of service.
According to statistics provided by the CSJ, in cases
of jurisdictional conflict between the military and civilian justice
systems, the total number of cases assigned to military courts dropped
from 50 percent in 1992 to 15 percent in 2000. Over the same period, cases
assigned to civilian jurisdiction rose from 40 percent in 1992 to 60
percent. Between January and September, the CSJ ruled on 39 jurisdictional
disputes between the civilian and military justice systems, assigning 16
cases to the civilian justice system, 5 cases to the military justice
systems, and abstaining from ruling on 18 cases.
The
Government stated that it did not hold political prisoners.
The
ICRC had access to the approximately 3,000 prisoners accused of terrorism,
rebellion, or aiding and abetting insurgency.
f.
Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence
The law
provides for the protection of these rights, and the Government generally
respected them in practice; however, at times the authorities infringed
upon them.
On
August 8, President Uribe declared a "State of Internal
Disturbance"--upheld by the Constitutional Court on October 2--that
granted him expanded emergency powers with the potential to abridge
individual rights. On September 10, President Uribe issued Decree 2002,
which allowed members of the public security forces to perform arrests,
searches, and wiretaps without a written warrant. Oral authorization from
a judicial authority was still required, except in exigent circumstances.
Arrests, searches, and wiretaps made without prior judicial authorization
had to be fully justified within 24 hours. On November 26, the
Constitutional Court struck down's Decree 2002's grant of police powers to
the armed forces, ruling that only prosecutorial authorities may determine
when privacy rights can be infringed in the interests of public safety.
Decree 2002 also authorized the creation of special "Rehabilitation and
Consolidation Zones" in which military authorities can exercise
exceptional powers, including limiting civilian movements and temporarily
commandeering private property and individual services. Two such zones
were created during the year, one in the department of Arauca and another
encompassing portions of Bolivar and Sucre departments. In its November 26
decision, the Constitutional Court overturned a provision granting the
military authority to conduct censuses in these zones. An
investigation by the Fiscalia continued into extensive illegal wiretapping
of human rights NGOs by the Medellin GAULA (see Section 1.b.). Prosecutors
also continued investigating the April 2001 killing of police officer
Carlos Ceballos, who testified in the case (see Section 1.a.). The
Procuraduria was conducting its own disciplinary investigation into
Ceballos's killing.
The
Government generally did not punish family members for alleged violations
committed by their relatives. However, there were complaints that some
family members of guerrilla leaders were falsely accused of crimes. For
example, on July 16, DAS officials in Bogota arrested Javier Carvajalino,
brother of FARC leader Jesus Emilio Carvajalino, alias Andres Paris.
Javier Carvajalino, a respected attorney with the Bogota district office
of the Human Rights Ombudsman's Office, was accused of conspiracy to
commit terrorist attacks in the nation's capital. The arrest was
criticized not only by human rights NGOs, but by government officials as
well, and on November 20, Carvajalino was released from custody following
a decision by a senior prosecutor to close the case for lack of evidence.
Paramilitaries illegally monitored private
communications in attempts to identify guerrilla collaborators. They also
forcibly entered private homes when searching for suspected guerrillas.
Paramilitaries caused forced displacement. Paramilitaries harassed,
threatened, and killed individuals because of their membership in leftist
political organizations, and also threatened and killed family members of
known guerrillas. Children were also among the preferred kidnaping
targets of guerrillas (see Section 1.b.). Former
female guerrillas reported forced abortions and forced implantation of
intrauterine devices (see Section 1.g.).
g. Use
of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in Internal
Conflicts
The
country's 40-year-old internal conflict--among government forces, several
leftist insurgent groups, and a right-wing paramilitary movement nominally
supportive of the State--intensified during the year. The internal armed
conflict, and the narcotics trafficking that both fueled it and prospered
from it, were the central causes of violations of human rights and
international humanitarian law. In her 2001 report, U.N. High Commissioner
for Human Rights Mary Robinson noted that all sides in the conflict failed
to respect the principles of humanitarian law. She said that "the conflict
has deteriorated to such an extent that combatants are disregarding the
most basic humanitarian precept…the defenseless civilian population and
children continue to be the principal victims of these actions." For
example, in November 2001, the World Food Program reported that armed
groups had been hijacking trucks carrying deliveries intended for
displaced children.
The
Human Rights Ombudsman's Office stated in its 2001 report that women, who
by and large remain socially and economically disadvantaged, continued to
be affected disproportionately by violence, particularly in war zones (see
Section 5). The Ombudsman’s Office also noted a lack of government
programs to address their problems. Female leaders of political and
peasant organizations in various regions were the targets of abuse,
threats, torture, and executions. Intrafamilial violence, sexual assault,
and killing of women remained serious problems throughout the country (see
Section 5). More than 30 percent of FARC combatants were female. Several
observers criticized the use of female combatants in guerrilla
organizations as sex slaves (see Sections 1.f. and 5).
Government security forces generally abided by
international humanitarian law and respected human rights; however, some
members of the security forces violated these standards and committed
serious violations of human rights. Data gathered by CINEP indicated that
during the first 6 months of the year, state security forces were
responsible for the deaths of 30 civilians during combat operations.
Paramilitary groups and guerrillas committed the great majority of abuses.
In
December Amnesty International (AI) published "Colombia: Security at What
Cost?", a report that alleged that the Government contributed to impunity
by weakening the role of civilian human rights institutions, restricting
the rights of civilians through security measures authorized by the
declaration of a "State of Internal Disturbance" and Presidential Decree
2002, and drawing the civilian population into the internal conflict
through policies such as its civilian informant program. The Government
insisted it was not undermining civilian institutions and that enhanced
security measures were necessary to establish a secure environment in
which illegal armed groups could not infringe on human rights.
There
were no reports during the year that the Government militarized public
hospitals in conflict areas, which had increased the risk that the
hospitals would become targets of guerrilla attack. There were no reports
that the Government refused medical treatment to guerrillas. In 2000 the
Constitutional Court ruled that state security forces could not maintain
installations such as police stations next to schools, to avoid
endangering the lives of students in case of guerrilla attacks; however,
this practice continued in some communities.
Forced
displacement is a crime; however, military counterinsurgency operations
sometimes forced peasants to flee their homes and farms, and there was a
very large population of IDPs (see Section 2.d.). NGOs and international
governmental organizations sometimes blamed government negligence for
large-scale displacements, as occurred in May in the department of Choco,
where combat between the FARC and AUC along the Atrato River displaced at
least 3,000 persons from the town of Bojaya and surrounding communities.
The UNHCHR held the Government partly responsible for events at Bojaya,
where 119 civilians died, since the Government appeared to have ignored
warnings from the Catholic Church about large groups of paramilitaries
traveling past military installations along the Atrato. On June 18, the
Procuraduria opened a formal investigation into the conduct of the
security forces before, during, and immediately after the Bojaya tragedy.
The
ICRC reported that the Government, including military authorities,
followed an open-door policy toward the ICRC. For example, in the weeks
following the abolition of the former FARC "despeje," the ICRC was the
only international organization granted access to the region. The military
readily incorporated Red Cross curriculums on international humanitarian
law in standard military training. However, impunity remained a problem.
According to military sources, local commanders often transferred or
discharged soldiers accused of serious human rights violations, rather
than initiate legal proceedings. It remained unclear how many suspected
human rights violators were investigated or prosecuted after being
dismissed (see Section 1.e.).
There
was still no decision by an army judge regarding the responsibility of
members of an army unit for the 2000 shooting deaths of six children in
the town of Pueblo Rico, Antioquia department. The Superior Military
Tribunal returned the case for reconsideration in April 2001 following an
initial ruling of innocence based on findings that the children were
caught in a crossfire between the army and ELN guerrillas. A decision by
the Procuraduria was pending regarding a parallel disciplinary
investigation of the case.
In
October the Procuraduria ordered the dismissal of two air force pilots
involved in the 1998 bombing of the town of Santo Domingo, Arauca
department. The pilots, who at the time of the bombing were supporting
army units engaged in combat with the FARC, were ruled to have acted
negligently. On October 31, the Constitutional Court ruled that a parallel
criminal case being handled by the military justice system should be
transferred to civilian court. The air force refused to accept
responsibility for the incident. On January 25, presumed paramilitaries
shot and killed Angel Riveros, a witness in the Santo Domingo
investigation and community leader in Arauca department.
Some
members of the public security forces--principally enlisted personnel and
noncommissioned officers--collaborated with or tolerated the activities of
illegal paramilitaries. Reasons for collaboration or tolerance varied from
ideological sympathy and perceived operational exigencies to corruption
and participation in illegal paramilitary activities such as drug
trafficking. On May 27, civilian law enforcement authorities arrested army
Major Orlando Alberto Martinez for his alleged role in trafficking
thousands of AK-47 assault rifles from Bulgaria to the AUC. On May 30,
Martinez was dismissed from the armed forces based on the discretionary
powers of Presidential Decree 1790 of 2000 (see Section 1.e.).
Civilian defense authorities and the military high
command repeatedly emphasized official opposition to paramilitarism and
the Government's commitment to combat paramilitaries and guerrillas with
equal vigor. In the first 11 months of the year, public security forces
killed 183 paramilitaries in combat and captured 1,214.
Paramilitaries were responsible for numerous
violations of international humanitarian law and human rights. There were
approximately 12,000 paramilitaries in the country, organized into several
associations, the largest and most influential of which was the terrorist
organization AUC. The AUC experienced a series of leadership crises during
the year that led to its temporary breakup and a reduction in its
membership. The largest of the paramilitary organizations that formally
remained a part of the AUC was the United Self-Defense Forces of Cordoba
and Uraba (ACCU), which operated in the northern part of the country and
was led by the principal organizers of the AUC, Carlos Castano and
Salvatore Mancuso.
Following a November 2001 statement by Castano
promising an end to paramilitary massacres, the number of massacres
committed by paramilitaries appeared to drop dramatically. However,
paramilitaries still committed massacres and were responsible for many
selective political killings (see Section 1.a.), which frequently involved
kidnaping and torture (see Sections 1.b. and 1.c.). Paramilitary groups
used terror as a tactic to take support away from guerrillas.
Paramilitaries forcibly displaced civilians residing
along key drug and weapons transit corridors or suspected of harboring
sympathies for guerrillas. For example, on August 18, approximately 400
armed paramilitaries arrived in the villages of San Francisco and Puerto
Matilde, located in a FARC-dominated region along the Cimitarra river in
the municipality of Yondo, Antioquia department. Approximately 600 persons
were displaced. The Human Rights Ombudsman's Office reported receiving
1,528 complaints of forced displacement by paramilitaries as of October
31. Paramilitaries also prevented or limited the delivery of foodstuffs
and medicines to towns and regions considered sympathetic to guerrillas,
straining local economies and increasing forced displacement, particularly
in the departments of Choco, Antioquia, Santander, Bolivar, Cesar, and La
Guajira (see Section 2.d.). For example, in March, paramilitary violence
and intimidation against persons transporting food and supplies to the
town of San Jose de Apartado, in the Uraba region of Antioquia department,
created a de facto blockade of the town.
Hundreds of civilians died during the year as a
result of combat between paramilitaries and guerrillas. For example, the
UNHCHR held the AUC partly responsible for the deaths of 119 civilians
killed by a FARC cylinder bomb in Bojaya, Choco department, based on the
fact that AUC fighters exposed the civilian population to danger by taking
shelter in the town. Throughout the year, civilians in poor urban areas
and rural districts were killed and wounded during exchanges of gunfire
between illegal armed groups. For example, on May 30, four civilians in
the "Veinte de Julio" neighborhood of Medellin, Antioquia department, were
killed by stray bullets during a firefight between paramilitaries and
leftist urban militias. In
anticipation of potential peace negotiations with the Government, the AUC
declared a unilateral cease-fire beginning December 1. Several
unaffiliated paramilitary groups agreed to abide by similar cease-fires.
On December 16, Congress amended Public Order Law 418 of 1997, which
authorizes the President to negotiate with "illegal armed groups", to
allow negotiations with groups, such as paramilitaries, that had not been
granted "political status" by the Government. On December 26, the
Government named six individuals to a special "exploratory commission"
that, in cooperation with Peace Commissioner Luis Carlos Restrepo, was to
make contact with paramilitary groups that had expressed an interest in
seeking peace with the Government. However, not all paramilitaries abided
by the cease-fire, and some continued to commit serious violations of
human rights.
Although paramilitaries continued to recruit minors
throughout the year (see Section 5), in December the Central Bolivar Block
released a total of 19 child soldiers into the custody of a humanitarian
commission headed by the Colombian Family Welfare Institute (ICBF) (see
Section 5). Guerrillas failed to respect the injured and medical
personnel. Both the FARC and ELN frequently executed wounded prisoners and
threatened and killed doctors and nurses. On August 30, for example, a
joint FARC/ELN unit attacked an ambulance outside the town of Morales,
Bolivar department, seriously injuring three health care workers. On July
28, the ELN stopped an ambulance outside the town of Cravo Norte, Arauca
department, killed the driver, and stole the medicine he was transporting.
On December 31, the ELN issued a written communique in which it pledged
not to attack ambulances, medical infrastructure, medical workers, and
members of medical missions. According to the Free Country Foundation,
guerrillas were responsible for the kidnapings of 29 doctors during the
year, most for economic reasons (see Section 1.b.).
Guerrillas forcibly displaced peasants to clear key
drug and weapons transit routes and remove potential government or
paramilitary collaborators from strategic zones. For example, in early
August the FARC forced the departure of at least 1,600 peasants from the
village of Puerto Alvira, Meta department, which is located along the
Guaviare river, a key transit route. The Human Rights Ombudsman's Office
reported receiving 2,202 complaints of forced displacement by guerrillas,
including at least 1,500 instances of forced displacement by the FARC.
Guerrillas also blockaded communities in areas in which they exerted
control. For example, following a major landslide in the San Lucas
mountain range of Bolivar department that destroyed several small
communities, the ELN prevented government officials and rescue teams from
reaching the area for nearly a week. On December 30, near the town of San
Lucas, eastern Antioquia department, the ELN declared that no vehicle
would be allowed to enter or leave the town. The following day, less than
a mile outside of town and despite the presence in San Lucas of
significant numbers of police and army personnel, the ELN enforced its
order by executing five truck drivers who ignored its edict. Later on
December 31, the ELN destroyed a major bridge linking San Lucas with the
Medellin-Bogota highway. Combat between guerrillas and state security forces
or paramilitaries resulted in thousands of civilian casualties. For
example, on May 2, FARC forces launched an inaccurate gas cylinder bomb at
AUC forces taking cover in the small town of Bojaya, located along the
Atrato river in central Choco department. The bomb struck the town church,
where approximately 300 civilians had sought refuge from the fighting,
leaving 119 civilians dead, including 45 children, and at least 105
wounded. On May 20, the UNHCHR's country office held the FARC responsible
for having fired the gas cylinder. On June 8, FARC commander Alfonso Cano
was reported to have described the Bojaya attack as a mistake caused by
the nature of warfare. On November 8, AI published a letter to FARC
Commander Manuel Marulanda rejecting Cano's excuse and calling on the FARC
to issue a statement promising to respect the right of the civilian
population not to be drawn into the armed conflict.
According to the Ministry of Defense, as of November
30, guerrillas, particularly the FARC, and, to a lesser extent, the ELN,
committed nearly 1,000 terrorist bombings. In the early morning hours of
April 7, for example, a large car bomb exploded in a congested nightclub
area of Villavicencio, Meta Department. The car bomb, which killed 11 and
wounded at least 70, was detonated as a secondary device that targeted
onlookers who arrived to see the results of a smaller explosion 5 minutes
earlier. On October 22, a FARC car bomb exploded outside Bogota's
metropolitan police headquarters, killing 3 persons and injuring at least
39. A similar bomb exploded outside another Bogota police station on
December 9, injuring 35. On December 10, Bogota police seized four
additional FARC car bombs capable of even greater destruction. On December
13, a powerful FARC bomb disguised as a briefcase exploded in a crowded
restaurant on the 30th floor of an upscale residential and commercial
complex in Bogota, wounding at least 30 persons. On December 21, the ELN
detonated a large car bomb next to police headquarters in Cucuta, Norte de
Santander department, killing four civilians.
The
FARC also targeted particular individuals for bombings. On December 13,
for example, a FARC book bomb exploded in the hands of Senator German
Vargas, a strong supporter of President Uribe. Vargas lost a finger in the
explosion. On August 20, a similar book bomb addressed to Prosecutor
General Luis Camilo Osorio was intercepted by CTI agents before it reached
him. The FARC also used other, more creative methods of bomb delivery,
such as attaching explosives to mules and dogs, rigging lost wallets, and
booby-trapping dead bodies. For example, on April 22, members of the
FARC's 61st Front forced two children to lead a horse loaded with
explosives toward a military checkpoint near the town of Acevedo, Huila
department. The charge exploded prematurely, killing one of the children.
On May 3, FARC guerrillas killed a 14-year-old boy, attached explosives to
his body, and forced a civilian to drive it to an army barracks in Vista
Hermosa, Meta department, where it was deactivated by military
anti-explosives experts. On December 30, near Cerro Azul, southern Bolivar
department, an army soldier lost a leg when he accidentally activated a
FARC-rigged bomb attached to the body of a dead paramilitary fighter
killed in FARC-AUC combat 5 days earlier.
Following the abolition of the despeje in February,
the FARC intensified its systematic campaign to attack and cripple the
nation's infrastructure. According to government figures, the FARC
destroyed 483 electrical towers, costing the nation approximately $335
million (760.45 billion pesos) in repair costs and overall damage to the
national economy. Large regions of the country were plunged into darkness
for weeks at a time. The town of San Vicente del Caguan, former capital of
the despeje, which depended on electrical pumps to draw water from
underground wells, suffered particularly serious deprivation as threats of
FARC violence discouraged private trucking companies from shipping in
water, food, and other basic supplies. As of September 30, the National
Transportation Association reported that at least 75 buses had been
hijacked and destroyed by guerrillas, resulting in a loss of at least $4
million (9.08 billion pesos).
The
FARC, in conjunction with the ELN, also blew 74 holes in the nation's oil
pipelines, resulting in a loss of approximately $225 million (510.75
billion pesos) in government revenue. Attacks on the oil infrastructure
also caused significant environmental damage. On August 12, prosecutors
formally charged 9 members of the ELN, including senior leader Nicholas
Rodriguez, alias "Gabino", with murder for a 1998 oil pipeline bombing in
Antioquia department that killed 84 persons. The FARC also destroyed 62
telecommunications towers and 100 bridges. In addition, the FARC committed
12 attacks against dams and aqueducts, the most notorious of which was its
attempt to blow a hole in Chingaza Dam, Bogota's principal source of
drinking water. Had the attack on Chingaza succeeded, it would not only
have risked the water supply of the country's largest city, but also
flooded and destroyed Villavicencio, a city with an estimated population
of 300,000 and capital of the department of Meta.
In
its November 8 letter to FARC commander Manuel Marulanda, AI expressed
concern over the FARC's July 23 killing of Embera indigenous leader
Bertuflo Domico in Dabeiba, Antioquia department (see Section 5). The
letter also described the killing of several evangelical pastors,
including Abel Ruiz on July 31, by presumed FARC members in San Vicente
del Caguan, Caqueta department (see Section 2.c.). Amnesty, as it has in
the past, criticized the recruitment of minors and the violence committed
against women in the FARC (see Section 5). The letter called on the FARC
and all armed groups in the country to respect the rights of
noncombatants.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties,
Including:
a.
Freedom of Speech and Press
The
Constitution provides for freedom of speech and the press and the
Government generally respected these rights in practice; however,
journalists regularly practiced self-censorship to avoid retaliation and
harassment by various groups. Individuals criticized the Government both
publicly and in private without fear of reprisal. The privately owned
print media published a wide spectrum of political viewpoints and often
sharply criticized the Government without fear of reprisals. Media
ownership remained highly concentrated. Wealthy families or groups
associated with one of the two dominant political parties consolidated
their holdings of news media, and regional firms continued to purchase
local news media outlets. As a result of the general economic downturn,
large press conglomerates closed radio stations and newspaper offices in
certain provinces and reduced staff. In September financial problems
forced El Espectador, the nation's oldest newspaper, to change from a
daily to a weekly publication. Economic problems and concentration of
media ownership limited the media's resources, causing it to rely heavily
on a smaller pool of advertisers, including the Government. The National
Television Commission continued to oversee television programming
throughout the year.
The
Government did not use libel laws to suppress criticism or engage in
direct or indirect censorship of the media. However, the media's reliance
on government advertising revenues may have reduced its criticism of
Government actions and policies.
The
Government did not assert "national security" to suppress views that were
merely politically embarrassing or objectionable on other grounds.
However, Reporters Without Borders criticized the presidential decree that
created Special Rehabilitation and Consolidation Zones in highly
conflictive areas that foreigners, including journalists, could enter only
with special permission from government authorities. The organization
stated that "the possibility of journalists being refused entry into the
special zones is a flagrant violation of the Inter-American Human Rights
Convention, whose article 13 guarantees freedom of movement for
journalists." In accordance with a November 26 decision by the
Constitutional Court, the Government announced that it would grant foreign
press correspondents registered with the Government's international press
office expedited authorization to visit Rehabilitation Zones. A ban on the
publication of evidence pertaining to criminal investigations, based on
secrecy provisions of the penal code and an anticorruption statute, also
remained in effect.
Police or other public security forces generally did
not subject journalists to harassment, intimidation, or violence. However,
there were exceptions, as well as reports of threats against journalists
from local officials accused of corruption. On January 30, unknown persons
shot Orlando Sierra, deputy editor and columnist for La Patria newspaper
in Manizales, Caldas department. He died on February 1. On May 9, Luis
Fernando Soto was sentenced to 19 years in prison for the crime, but
accepted a plea bargain that reduced his sentence by 10 years. Two other
persons were under arrest and awaiting trial. A joint investigation by
seven prominent newspapers and magazines revealed that local politicians,
whom Sierra had frequently accused of corruption, may have ordered his
killing.
During the year, both paramilitaries and guerrillas
intimidated, threatened, kidnaped, and killed journalists. According to
information gathered by the International Federation of Journalists (IFJ)
and the Colombian Foundation for Press Freedom (FLIP), at least 10 media
representatives were killed, 75 threatened, and 12 kidnaped. At least four
of the media representatives killed during the year were killed as a
direct consequence of their work. The number of reported threats was
believed to be low, since many targeted individuals did not report threats
to government authorities or NGOs. Domestic and international NGOs and
other international organizations reported self-censorship by the media
due to threats from illegal armed groups. In May the Committee to Protect
Journalists included the country on a list of the 10 worst places to be a
journalist, noting that 29 journalists had been killed in the country in
the last 10 years.
Paramilitaries regularly threatened journalists. For
example, in an interview published in the July 8 edition of Santander
department's Vanguardia Liberal daily, a paramilitary commander from the
Middle Magdalena region threatened to execute journalists who published
sensationalistic stories about paramilitary atrocities. In a July 29
communique, paramilitaries in the department of Arauca stated that
"journalists, anchormen, correspondents, and media owners and managers"
would be declared "military targets" if they failed to "live up to the
responsibilities of their profession."
On
March 21, El Espectador columnist Fernando Garavito went into exile abroad
because of death threats, allegedly from paramilitaries. In his columns,
Garavito had harshly criticized paramilitary groups, as well as
then-presidential candidate Alvaro Uribe.
Paramilitaries were suspected of killing journalists.
For example, on June 28, outside the city of Arauca in the department of
the same name, presumed paramilitaries intercepted a vehicle driven by
Efrain Alberto Varela, director of local radio station Meridiano 70.
Despite the pleas of Varela's sister and brother-in-law, he was removed
from the vehicle and killed. Six days before his death, he had denounced
on the air the arrival of over 100 paramilitaries in the city of Arauca.
No
progress appeared likely in an investigation by the Fiscalia into the
September 2000 paramilitary killing of Carlos Jose Restrepo, publisher of
a small newspaper in the department of Tolima and a former member of the
now demobilized M-19 guerrillas. On
July 26, a specialized criminal court in Bucaramanga, Santander
department, sentenced two paramilitaries to 19 years in prison for the
1999 murders of cameraman Luis Alberto Rincon and photographer Alberto
Sanchez in the town of Playon.
The
offices of the Prosecutor General and Inspector General were awaiting a
ruling on their appeals of "not guilty" verdicts issued in favor of two
paramilitaries accused of murdering newspaper editor Guzman Quintero in
Valledupar, Cesar department, in 1999.
There
were no developments in the investigation of the 2000 kidnaping and rape
of journalist Jinet Bedoya by men identifying themselves as
paramilitaries. No progress in the case appeared likely.
Guerrillas frequently threatened journalists. For
example, in July the FARC's urban front operating in Cali, capital of
Valle del Cauca department, sent a statement to the local office of the
RCN media group accusing eight journalists of being "enemies of the people
and defending the interests of the ruling oligarchy." The eight were
warned to leave the city within 3 days or be killed.
Guerrillas also kidnaped journalists or held them
against their will. For example, on February 19 and 20 near the village of
El Currillo on the border between the departments of Putumayo and Caqueta,
members of the FARC's 49th Front held foreign correspondent T. Christian
Miller captive while they verified his press credentials. They released
Miller after 24 hours in captivity. On August 6, near the town of Mistrato
in the department of Risaralda, members of the FARC's Aurelio Rodriquez
Front kidnaped three media representatives from the local El Tiempo Cafe
newspaper and released them the next day. Most guerrilla kidnapings of
journalists were brief.
Guerrillas also killed media representatives. For
example, on July 11, members of the FARC abducted and shot Elizabeth
Obando at a roadblock near the town of Playa Rica, Tolima department.
Obando died from her wounds on July 13. Obando, who was responsible for
the distribution of regional newspaper El Nuevo Dia in the municipality of
Roncevalles, had been involved in a public confrontation with a regional
FARC leader who objected to a story in the paper criticizing FARC
extortion, child soldier recruitment, and forced "agrarian reform" in the
area.
Threats of violence drove at least 13 journalists
into exile, joining five who had left the country in 2001. Former RCN
journalist Claudia Gurisatti remained in exile because of FARC threats.
Three suspects arrested for conspiring to kill her were released because
of lack of evidence. Vice President Francisco Santos, former editor of the
country's largest circulation newspaper, Bogota's El Tiempo, and founder
of the Free Country Foundation, a prominent anti-kidnaping NGO, returned
from exile to assume the responsibilities of the vice-presidency.
The
authors of most threats and acts of violence against journalists remained
undetermined. For example, no progress was made and little further
progress seemed likely in investigations by the Fiscalia into the 2000
deaths of radio journalists Guillermo Leon and Alfredo Abad in Florencia,
capital of Caqueta department.
In
October the International Federation of Journalists opened an office in
Bogota to monitor violence against the media and help provide assistance
to local journalists. In 2000 the Inter-American Press Society had opened
its own rapid action unit in Bogota to help the Fiscalia investigate
crimes against journalists. The Ministry of Interior operated a program
for the protection of journalists, established by an August 2000
presidential decree. During the year, the program provided protection to
41 journalists. The Ministry of the Interior also supported an alerts
network organized for journalists by providing a small number of radios
and an emergency telephone hot line. In October the Attorney General's
office, in response to rising crimes against journalists, added 12 new
prosecutors to its unit dedicated to investigating attacks against the
press.
Domestic organizations that promoted freedom of the
press included the Colombian Foundation for Press Freedom (FLIP) and Media
for Peace.
The
Government did not limit or block access to the Internet or censor
websites.
The
Government did not restrict academic freedom. However, paramilitary groups
and guerrillas maintained a presence on many university campuses, aimed at
generating political support for their respective campaigns and
undermining support for their adversaries through both violent and
nonviolent means. Paramilitaries threatened and killed university
professors and students they suspected of leftist sympathies. For example,
in 1999 the AUC took credit for killing a University of Antioquia student.
Following the killing, the AUC released a list of other "subversive"
students it demanded cease their "delinquent activities" or leave the
university on pain of death. Several of these students withdrew.
Paramilitaries have had their greatest influence in the north of the
country, where in the last 7 years they are suspected of killing as many
as 12 students and professors at the University of Atlantico, in
Barranquilla, Atlantico department, and as many as 10 at the University of
Cordoba, in Monteria, Cordoba department.
Leftist guerrillas used university campuses to plan,
prepare for, and carry out terrorist attacks. On October 26, the Medellin
metropolitan police discovered 332 explosive devices hidden on the campus
of the University of Antioquia. The explosives were linked to an illegal
student organization with ties to FARC urban militias. On November 20, a
protest at the Industrial University of Santander (UIS), in Bucaramanga,
turned violent, apparently after six members of the ELN infiltrated the
demonstration against the university's new private security firm, which
leftist students accused of participating in the Government's civilian
informants program. One student was killed, and 10 students and 12
policemen were injured. On November 22, four mortar rounds launched from
the campus of the National University landed on a grass field in front of
the headquarters of the Fiscalia, wounding one passerby. At year's end, a
government investigation had uncovered no evidence of student involvement
in the attack.
Both
paramilitary groups and guerrillas regularly threatened and killed public
school teachers, particularly at the high school level. In November
Minister of Education Cecilia Maria Velez reported that approximately 800
teachers, mostly in rural areas, were working under the shadow of death
threats from illegal armed groups, particularly the FARC. According to the
National Teacher's Union (FECODE), 83 teachers were killed during the
year, most by paramilitaries. For example, on October 28, in the village
of Media Luna, Pivijay municipality, Magdalena department, four alleged
members of the AUC shot and killed Oscar David Polo at the entrance of the
school where he taught. Four teachers were killed in this small
municipality during the year, and 9 total in the department of Magdalena.
A total of 14 teachers were killed in the department of Antioquia, more
than in any other department.
Investigations continued into 1999 attacks against
three prominent academics: Jesus Antonio Bejarano, a former government
peace commissioner; Dario Betancur, head of the social sciences faculty of
Bogota's Universidad Pedagogica; and Hernando Henao, an anthropologist who
published on the subject of displaced persons. Prosecutors suspected the
FARC of responsibility for Bejarano's death and the AUC of responsibility
for killing Henao.
As a
result of these and other incidents, many professors and students assumed
a lower profile. Some universities banned extracurricular social
activities that addressed controversial topics related to the internal
armed conflict. Some academics went into voluntary exile.
b.
Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The
Constitution provides for freedom of peaceful assembly, and the Government
generally respected this right in practice. The authorities normally did
not interfere with public meetings and demonstrations and granted the
required permission except when they determined that there was imminent
danger to public order.
There
were large demonstrations on many occasions by citizens throughout the
country, some to repudiate terrorist activities, and others to protest
government budget cuts and social policies. The authorities generally did
not interfere. For example, on September 16, approximately 800,000 public
employees throughout the country went on strike and held large marches in
major cities to protest government-sponsored pension, labor, and tax
reform bills. The protest was generally peaceful. However, the following
day, government officials announced that employees whose positions were
considered essential, such a firefighters and judges, would be sanctioned
for having participated in the strike. Also, throughout the week of
September 16 there were clashes between members of the public security
forces and peasants conducting parallel mobilizations in rural areas to
protest government agricultural programs and related policies. The
security forces temporarily detained hundreds of peasants to enforce a
government decree that prohibited impeding transportation on public
highways. The Government claimed, and some peasants confirmed, that the
FARC pressured some peasants into participating in the protests. On
September 17, the Government expelled three Spanish citizens it claimed
were inciting peasant protests (see Section 4).
The
Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the Government
generally respected this right in practice. Legal organizations are free
to associate with international groups in their field. However, membership
in proscribed organizations such as the FARC, ELN, EPL, and AUC is a
crime. Freedom of association was limited in practice by threats and acts
of violence committed by illegal armed groups against labor unions and
NGOs (see Sections 4 and 6.a.).
c.
Freedom of Religion
The
Constitution provides for freedom of religion, and the Government
generally respected this right in practice.
Although there is no official state religion, most
citizens were Roman Catholic and the Roman Catholic Church retained a de
facto privileged status. Accession to a 1997 public law agreement with the
State is required for non-Roman Catholic religions to minister to their
adherents in public institutions, such as schools and hospitals. Although
12 Christian churches acceded to the agreement, the Government has not
given a similar opportunity to hundreds of other mostly small, evangelical
churches that received legal recognition after 1997. Protestant churches
also complained that new zoning laws showed de facto favoritism toward
Roman Catholicism, since most Roman Catholic cathedrals were constructed
before zoning laws were instituted and were therefore exempt from the
laws' requirements.
The
Human Rights Unit of the Fiscalia reported that it was investigating 42
crimes believed to have been religiously motivated.
Paramilitaries sometimes harassed religious leaders
and members, usually for political reasons.
On
March 6, a court sentenced the convicted murderer of Roman Catholic priest
Jorge Luis Maza and Spanish aid worker Inigo Egiluz to 31 years in prison.
Nine alleged members of a paramilitary group arrested in connection with
this crime were released for lack of evidence. The case was closed at
year's end.
The
FARC and ELN threatened and committed acts of violence against religious
leaders and members, usually for political reasons, and inhibited the
right to free religious expression in areas they controlled. On
March 16, Isaias Duarte, Roman Catholic Archbishop of Cali, was killed as
he left a church in a poor Cali neighborhood. On November 29, the Fiscalia
indicted FARC 30th Front commander John Fredy Jimenez and a hired gunman
for carrying out the crime. A second gunman had been killed in prison in
May. Prosecutors also opened a formal investigation of seven members of
the FARC Secretariat, including Pedro Antonio Marin, alias "Tirofijo," and
Jorge Briceno, alias "Mono Jojoy," who they suspected ordered Duarte's
killing to silence his blunt criticism of their criminal activities and
insincerity in peace negotiations.
On
July 13, two unknown assailants killed Sister Marta Ines Velez, director
of the Marcelino Mothers Shelter in the town of Mogotes, Santander
department. Sister Velez was the religious community delegate to the
Mogotes community assembly, an organization whose efforts to promote peace
won the town the country's 1998 National Peace Prize.
On
October 20, the army foiled a plot by the FARC to kidnap Francisco Javier
Munera, the Roman Catholic Bishop of Florencia, Caqueta department. After
the army learned of the plot, Bishop Munera was moved to a different
location.
On
November 11, FARC guerrillas kidnaped Jorge Enrique Jimenez, president of
the Latin American Bishops Conference and Bishop of Zipaquira,
Cundinamarca department, along with parish priest Desiderio Orjuela. On
November 15, members of the armed forces rescued the two churchmen.
According to the Christian Union Movement (MUC), an
association of evangelical Christian churches, 32 Protestant pastors had
been killed as of November 30. According to the MUC, 93 pastors had been
killed since 1994. The FARC was believed responsible for 90 percent of the
killings of Protestant pastors. FARC threats and violence forced the
closure of hundreds of evangelical churches, particularly in the
southwestern part of the country. According to the MUC, the FARC targeted
Protestant pastors and church members for political, rather than
religious, reasons.
In
August FARC guerrillas shot and killed Pentecostal clergyman Abel Ruiz in
San Vicente del Caguan, Caqueta department, capital of the FARC's former
despeje. On July 14, FARC guerrillas shot and killed Jose Vicente Flores,
another United Pentecostal Church minister, in the same church.
On
October 17, near the town of Anserma, Caldas department, ELN guerrillas
executed Bishop Gabriel Arias, Vicar of Armenia, Quindio department, while
Arias was on a humanitarian mission to plead for the release of former
Quindio governor Ancizar Lopez, the victim of an ELN kidnaping.
Authorities failed to capture the FARC's Arley Leal
and Milton de Jesus Tonal, who were suspected of the 1998 killing of Roman
Catholic priest Alcides Jimenez in Putumayo. The Procuraduria continued to
investigate possible government negligence in failing to prevent the
killing.
Investigations continued into the March 2000 killing
of Roman Catholic priest Hugo Duque in Supia, Caldas department, and the
March 2001 killing of Protestant pastor Onofre Hernandez in Arauca City,
Arauca department. There appeared to be little likelihood of progress in
either case.
For a
more detailed discussion see the 2002 International Religious
Freedom Report.
d.
Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration, and
Repatriation
The
Constitution provides citizens with the right to travel domestically and
abroad, and the Government generally respected this right in practice;
however, there were exceptions. For example, in areas where
counterinsurgency operations were underway, police and military officials
often required civilians to obtain safe-conduct passes. In special
Rehabilitation and Consolidation Zones established by presidential decree,
travel was restricted and persons were sometimes detained for up to 24
hours so that officials could conduct identification checks as provided by
law. Paramilitaries and guerrillas used similar means to restrict travel
in areas they controlled. The Government implemented curfews in conflict
zones. Outsiders who wished to enter indigenous reservations had to be
invited.
Throughout the year, roadblocks erected by
paramilitaries guerrillas, and peasant farmers inhibited transportation,
communication, and commerce (see Sections 1.g. and 2.a.). Social
organizations also resorted to blocking roads to protest government
actions or policies (see Section 2.b.). Almost every major artery was
closed at some point during the year. There were numerous reports of
members of indigenous communities, particularly in Putumayo, being
forbidden to leave their communities without either paramilitary or FARC
permission, and in which paramilitaries and guerrillas blockaded
communities.
The
U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported that 5,086 Colombians
registered as refugees in Ecuador, Panama, and Venezuela. An additional
3,995 Colombians requested asylum in Ecuador, the neighboring country with
the most liberal asylum policy. Hundreds of Colombians also fled to Costa
Rica. There were few reports of the forced return of refugees from Panama,
Ecuador, or Costa Rica, although most refugees received little assistance.
There continued to be reports that refugees were forcibly repatriated from
Venezuela.
In
April the Constitutional Court upheld a May 2000 law that criminalized
forced displacement; however, there was a large population of IDPs caused
by forced conscription and incursions by paramilitaries and guerrillas,
battles between illegal armed groups, and military counterinsurgency
operations that displaced peasants from their homes and farms.
Both
paramilitaries and guerrillas used forced displacement to gain control
over disputed territories and to weaken their opponents' base of support.
Authorities sometimes encouraged civilian populations to move back to
their homes before security situations had normalized, or civilians
returned before it was advisable.
In
August 2001, the U.N. Special Coordinator on Internal Displacement
characterized the country's internal displacement problem as "acute."
According to the UNHCR, the country ranks second among countries with the
largest IDP populations. The Government estimated that there were 350,000
new displaced persons during the year, a significant increase from 2001.
According to the Consultancy for Human Rights and Displacement (CODHES), a
human rights NGO specializing in displacement issues (see Section 4),
353,000 civilians were displaced during the first 9 months of the year. If
CODHES's statistics were accurate, and displacements continued at the same
rate during the last 3 months of the year, over 400,000 persons were
displaced during the year, an increase of at least 50,000 over 2001.
Precise numbers of IDPs were difficult to obtain, since some were
displaced more than once and many did not register with the Government or
NGOs. The FARC and the ELN discouraged IDPs from registering with the
Government through force, intimidation, and disinformation. Guerrilla
agents masqueraded as IDPs to sow doubt and discontent among the displaced
population. The Government's IDP service agency, the Social Solidarity
Network (RSS), reported a significant increase in the number of
municipalities affected by displaced populations. According to government
figures, since 1996 over 927,000 citizens had registered as IDPs. CODHES
estimated that over 2 million persons were displaced over the same period.
The RSS worked with the UNHCR, CODHES, and the Bishop’s Conference of the
Roman Catholic Church to develop a system for providing more accurate
estimates of IDPs; however, they had yet to reach agreement on such a
mechanism.
CODHES stated that some persons have been displaced
for as long as 10 years, but it could not define a typical timeframe.
CODHES estimated that 65 percent of displacements became permanent, while
the ICRC placed the figure at 50 percent. The U.N. Thematic Group, an
intersectoral working group composed of U.N. agencies, government
agencies, and NGOs, reported that state agents were responsible for less
than five percent of displacements during the year. Paramilitaries, on the
other hand, were responsible for 55 percent, and guerrillas for 40
percent.
The
vast majority of IDPs were rural peasants displaced to cities, where many
had difficulty integrating into society. Many displaced persons settled on
the outskirts of large cities such as Bogota, Bucaramanga, Medellin, and
Cartagena, where conditions were overcrowded and unsanitary. Poor
neighborhoods were overwhelmed by a need for basic public services.
According to CODHES, 57 percent of IDPs were women, 22 percent were female
heads of household, and 70 percent were under the age of 19. In July UNHCR
reported that 72 percent of all IDPs were women and children. Some
families fled or remained displaced to avoid the forced recruitment of
their children by guerrillas (see Sections 1.f. and 5). Thousands of IDPs
were unable to return to their homes because of the presence of
antipersonnel mines (see Section 1.g.). Displaced women and girls were
particularly vulnerable to domestic violence and sexual abuse and
exploitation (see Section 5). PAHO reported that only 65 percent of
displaced households had access to health services through the general
social security system, and that many could not afford the required
co-payment, despite the fact that it was as low as 15 percent of a
person's total medical expenses. UNICEF estimated that only 68 percent of
displaced children attended school. Malnutrition among displaced children
was common. According to the UNHCR, more than one-third of IDPs were
indigenous or Afro-Colombian. On
December 21, the police removed an organized group of 106 IDPs from the
former headquarters of the ICRC in Bogota. It appeared that the squatters
departed voluntarily after having been warned that if they did otherwise,
they would be forcibly evicted. Many of the IDPs already owned homes
through a government-sponsored subsidy program. Those who did not own
homes were lodged in a local hotel at government expense until other
accommodations were found. Prior to the IDPs' expulsion, at least 200
others had either moved to their subsidized homes or found other long-term
solutions that allowed them to leave the ICRC's former headquarters.
The
Constitution provides for the right to asylum under terms established by
law in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The country has a tradition of providing
asylum dating from 1920s. The Government reserves the right to determine
eligibility for asylum, based upon its own assessment of the nature of an
applicant's claim. The issue of the provision of first asylum did not
arise during the year. There were no reports of the forced return of
persons to a country where they feared persecution. According to the U.S.
Committee for Refugees, 207 recognized refugees resided in the country.
During the year, 9 persons applied for asylum. Three applications were
rejected, and six were pending at year's end.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of
Citizens to Change Their Government
The
Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their government
peacefully, and citizens exercised this right in practice through
periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of universal
suffrage. Presidential elections are held every 4 years, with the
incumbent barred from reelection. Members of Congress are also elected to
4-year terms. Governors, mayors, and other local officials are elected to
3-year terms. Congressional and presidential elections were held in March
and May, respectively. The last elections for local officials took place
in October 2000.
On
March 10, voters elected a bicameral legislature with a mix of Liberal,
Conservative, and independent members. On May 26, voters elected
independent Alvaro Uribe President. Both elections were generally free and
fair, in spite of a concerted campaign by terrorist organizations such as
the FARC to disrupt them. The Liberal and Conservative parties often
negotiated with members of smaller, independent parties to form working
coalitions. In the House, the Liberal Party held on to 58 seats, while the
Conservative Party held 21. The remaining 87 seats were filled by
candidates from some 40 different "independent" political movements, some
loosely affiliated with the Liberal and Conservative parties. In the
Senate, Liberals took 31 seats, Conservatives took 13, indigenous
candidates took 2 constitutionally mandated seats, and independents filled
the remaining 56 seats.
Political parties generally operated freely without
government interference. Parties that fail to garner 50,000 votes in a
general election lose the right to present candidates and receive
government funds. However, they may reincorporate at any time by
presenting 50,000 signatures to the National Electoral Board. Suffrage is
universal and voluntary for citizens age 18 and over, except for active
duty members of the police and armed forces, who are prohibited from
voting. Civilian public employees, although eligible to vote, are not
allowed to participate in partisan politics.
The
congressional and presidential elections, conducted under unprecedented
levels of state security, were generally free and fair, despite attempts
by paramilitaries and guerrillas to interfere in the political process.
However, the National Electoral Commission invalidated 17,000 votes based
on evidence of fraud, annulling the victories of five Senators-elect. In
areas dominated by paramilitaries, such as the department of Cordoba and
urban areas of the Middle Magdalena region, paramilitaries gathered
community leaders--sometimes by force--to instruct them on acceptable
candidates. However, despite paramilitary boasting that they elected 35
percent of the legislature, election results revealed that candidates
reportedly endorsed by paramilitaries consistently lost in regions
dominated by these groups. For example, in the city of Barracabermeja,
where paramilitary influence was widely acknowledged, all candidates
reportedly endorsed by paramilitaries lost the elections by wide margins.
Guerrillas conducted a systematic campaign of
violence designed to disrupt and discredit the national elections. The
FARC attempted to assassinate Alvaro Uribe when he was a candidate more
than 12 times, including a major bomb attack on April 14 in the coastal
city of Barranquilla that left 3 dead and 13 injured, including 10
civilians. The FARC threatened to kill civic leaders and residents of
towns in which most voters cast their ballots for Uribe, and successfully
prevented thousands of peasants in rural areas from going to the polls.
Nevertheless, in FARC influenced regions, such as the department of
Caqueta, Uribe won by a large margin. In retaliation for Uribe's first
round election victory, on June 5 the FARC killed Luis Carlos Caro, the
mayor of Solita, a town in Caqueta department that voted overwhelmingly
for Uribe. In an attempt to destabilize the country prior to Uribe's
inauguration, the FARC extended its threats to all local elected officials
throughout the country, resulting in the submission of resignations by 399
mayors nationwide. Another 300 mayors were obligated to carry out their
responsibilities by telephone and messenger from relatively secure
department capitals. Many city council members and municipal workers also
resigned, halting the provision of public services in many municipalities.
In total, the FARC killed 9 mayors and 70 city councilmen during the year.
On inauguration day, the FARC launched a rocket attack on the presidential
palace; however, most of the 15 rockets missed their target and fell in a
slum near the palace, killing 23 persons, including 3 children.
The
FARC also committed aggressions against threatened mayors' families. In
July the FARC killed Omar Castano, the son of Jose Leonel Castano, mayor
of the town of Vista Hermosa, Meta department, formerly part of the FARC
despeje. Omar Castano had been kidnaped June 28. His body was not
returned. The FARC kidnaped several mayors' children to pressure the
mayors into resigning. For example, on July 17, members of the FARC
kidnaped the 3-year-old daughter of Libardo Herazo, mayor of Colon,
Putumayo department. The girl and her nanny were released on July 31,
after Herazo publicly announced his resignation.
The
AUC initially threatened to retaliate against mayors who resigned in the
face of FARC intimidation, but stepped back from this policy in June as
announced in a letter to the Colombian Federation of Municipalities.
The
FARC kidnaped politicians in an attempt to force the Government into a
prisoner exchange. For example, on February 23, the FARC kidnaped
independent presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt (see Section 1.b.).
Three days earlier, the FARC had kidnaped Senator Jorge Eduardo Gechem
(see Section 1.b.), Chairman of the Senate Peace Commission, during an
airplane hijacking. The FARC continued to hold captive an additional four
members of Congress (see Section 1.b.).
Both
the AUC and the FARC claimed to operate clandestine political movements:
the AUC's National and Democratic Movement, launched in September 2001,
and the FARC's Bolivarian Movement for a New Colombia, announced in April
2000. The status of these movements was uncertain, although their
influence appeared minimal.
In
municipalities that lacked a state security presence and in poor urban
neighborhoods both guerrillas and paramilitaries sought to impose control
and garner political support using measures along a spectrum from social
cleansing killings (see Sections 1.a., 1.d., and 5) to donations of labor
and materiel for community projects. Indigenous persons made up less than two percent of
the population. There were three indigenous Senators, two of whom occupied
seats reserved for indigenous persons, and one indigenous member of the
House of Representatives. In 2000 citizens of the department of Cauca
elected the nation's first indigenous governor. There were no indigenous
ministers or vice-ministers and no indigenous person served on any of the
nation's high courts.
Approximately 21 percent of the population was of
Afro-Colombian descent. There were two Afro-Colombian Senators and five
Afro-Colombian members of the House of Representatives. However, there was
no Afro-Colombian minister or vice minister and no Afro-Colombian on any
of the nation's high courts. There were 70 Afro-Colombian mayors. A
disproportionate percentage of the country's displaced persons were
Afro-Colombians who had difficulty participating in the political process.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding
International and Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of
Human Rights
A
wide variety of domestic and international human rights groups generally
operated without government restriction, investigating and publishing
their findings on human rights cases; however, many prominent human rights
monitors worked under constant fear for their physical safety. Government
officials were generally cooperative and responsive to their views;
however, lingering suspicions on both sides sometimes made cooperation
difficult. Over 60,000 human rights and civil society NGOs were registered
in the country. Most existed only on paper. Approximately 1,000 small to
medium-sized NGOs were members of the Colombian Federation of NGOs. The
Truth for Colombia ("Verdad Colombia") group was a relatively new
association of small, right wing human rights NGOs. The most significant
domestic human rights NGOs included: the Colombian Commission of Jurists
(CCJ) and Lawyers' Collective Jose Alvear Restrepo, both of which focused
on defending human rights through legal analysis and case work; the
Jesuit-founded Center for Popular Research and Education (CINEP), which
managed the country's largest and most influential database of human
rights violations; the Permanent Committee for the Defense of Human Rights
(CPDDH), which provided support and assistance to victims of human rights
violations and worked to organize civil society to defend human rights and
promote a peaceful resolution to the country's armed conflict; the
Committee in Solidarity with Political Prisoners (CSPP), which focused on
the rights and treatment of persons detained for politically motivated
crimes, particularly left-wing subversion; the Association of Families of
Detained and Disappeared Persons (ASFADDES), the country's leading voice
in demanding justice for the disappeared, many of whom were active in the
legitimate left-wing Patriotic Union (UP) political party; the Consultancy
for Human Rights and Displacement (CODHES) which advocated policies
designed to prevent displacement and defended the rights of the displaced;
the Association for Alternative Social Promotion (MINGA), which sought to
promote respect for human rights through education, research, lobbying,
and legal assistance (MINGA received the French Republic's Liberty,
Equality, Fraternity Prize for Human Rights during the year); the Peace
Network (Redepaz), a civil society organization dedicated to the promotion
of peace at the national, regional, and local level; and the Free Country
Foundation, which provided psychological, legal, and public relations
assistance to kidnap victims and their families and lobbied the Government
for better anti-kidnaping efforts.
On
October 23, President Uribe sent various foreign ambassadors a letter in
which he promised to guarantee the rights of NGOs to work in the country
and argued that his policy to retake the national territory would ensure
freedom of speech and human rights in the long term. He stressed that the
active participation of civilians was necessary to reestablish public
order. Uribe said the judicial powers decreed in the State of Internal
Disturbance were needed to tackle impunity and were legitimate, having
been upheld by the Constitutional Court. He said he had stressed to the
armed forces that they must respect human rights and operate within the
norms of international treaties.
Although the Government generally did not interfere
with the work of domestic human rights NGOs, there were unconfirmed
reports that government security forces harassed or threatened human
rights workers, particularly in highly conflictive areas. Vice President
Francisco Santos, whose office directs the Presidential Program for the
Protection of Human Rights, told the press that NGOs would not be
harassed. Prominent local NGOs made an effort to be fair and objective in
their analysis of a serious and complex human rights situation. However,
their coverage of human rights abuses tended to focus on the Government
and right-wing paramilitaries, rather than leftist guerrillas. For
example, the Colombian embassy in Canada, noted that only 3 of 5,000
letters generated in 2001 by alerts disseminated by Colombian human rights
groups specifically condemned the FARC.
Local
human rights NGOs had an influence that far exceeded their membership or
resources. By sharing information among themselves and disseminating it to
international human rights organizations and the media they raised the
country's human rights profile and contributed to significant levels of
international attention. They were also effective at changing laws and
policies through lawsuits, such as the CCJ's participation in a successful
challenge to the National Defense and Security Act of 2001, or the Free
Country Foundation's effective lobbying for stronger, more cohesive
government anti-kidnaping efforts. Representatives of a wide variety of
government agencies found it useful or politically necessary to meet with
local human rights groups and study their proposals.
The
Government has occasionally filed criminal charges against human rights
advocates, generally for subversive activities. For example, on December
6, CTI agents in Bucaramanga, Santander department, arrested Julio Avella
and Alvaro Tapias, President and Treasurer, respectively, of the National
Association of Solidarity Assistance (ANDAS), an NGO arm of the Colombian
Communist Party, for allegedly providing financial assistance to the FARC.
Arrest warrants were still outstanding for Carlos Mejia and Gladys Rojas,
former directors of a small NGO in Barrancabermeja that in August 2001
organized a major international human rights event. Mejia and Rojas, who
remained in hiding, were charged with rebellion for acts prior to their
NGO organizing activities. Government officials sometimes have accused
human rights NGOs of being guerrilla front organizations without providing
evidence to back up their charges.
Under
the authority granted by the President's declaration of a State of
Internal Disturbance, law enforcement authorities searched the offices of
a number of NGOs. Most searches focused on the headquarters of small,
local NGOs; however, on October 25, police raided and searched the Bogota
office of the Permanent Assembly for Peace, a large, well-regarded NGO
umbrella organization. Justifying the search by reference to emergency
powers granted under the State of Internal Disturbance, police officials
failed to secure a prosecutor's written approval before entering the
building. The raid, which was widely condemned in the country and abroad,
uncovered no evidence of illegal activity. The
Fiscalia continued to investigate the illegal wiretapping of NGO and labor
unions offices by the Medellin GAULA (see Section 1.f.).
Paramilitaries subjected human rights groups to
intense pressure in the form of obvious surveillance, harassing telephone
calls, graffiti campaigns, and death threats.
For
example, in August the "Cacique Calarca" bloc of the AUC, which operated
in the country's coffee belt, circulated a statement in the departments of
Quindio and Risaralda that accused 13 human rights and labor leaders by
name of being guerrilla agents. In addition, the statement declared the 13
persons military targets and gave them 15 days to leave the region. On
September 15, Augustin Jimenez of the CSPP received an anonymous call that
told him that a coworker had been killed and that he would be next. The
AUC repeatedly and explicitly threatened the CSPP. There
was no information on the whereabouts of Angel Quintero and Claudia
Patricia Monsalve, members of ASFADDES who were kidnaped in 2000 by
presumed paramilitaries. Authorities continued to investigate the
kidnaping, although the victims were presumed dead.
Prosecutors issued arrest warrants for AUC leader
Carlos Castano and suspected paramilitary Yesid Fernando Lemus for the
1999 kidnapings and murders of southern Bolivar department peasant leaders
Edgar Quiroga and Gildardo Fuentes.
Arrest warrants remained outstanding for Carlos
Castano and four other paramilitaries for the 1997 murders of two CINEP
workers (see Section 1.a.). Imminent arrests appeared unlikely.
The
Government, through the Ministry of the Interior and the DAS, allocated
approximately $11.4 million (28.5 billion pesos) to its program for the
protection of human rights and labor activists associated with 88
different human rights NGOs and unions. As of August 30, the Ministry,
bolstered by a budget increase of 690 percent over 2000, had provided
protection measures to 890 human rights activists and bulletproofed 54 NGO
offices and residences. Nevertheless, legitimate requests for protection
far outpaced the increase in the protection program's budget. Human rights
groups continued to state that the protection programs were inadequate to
address the crisis, and called for increased efforts to combat impunity.
The
Government generally did not interfere with the work of international
human rights and humanitarian NGOs. Representatives of international human
rights groups visited the country and held meetings with local human
rights groups and individuals in various regions of the country without
government interference. The larger international NGOs, such as AI, HRW,
and the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), devoted equal attention
to government forces, guerrillas, and paramilitaries; however, they held
the Government to a higher standard and criticized it not only for direct
violations of human rights, but also for its failure to completely sever
links between the military and paramilitaries and prevent high levels of
political violence.
The
Government deported several representatives of smaller international human
rights groups for violations of immigration law. For example, in August
and October, the DAS ordered five members of Christian Peacemaker Teams, a
small group that provided humanitarian accompaniment in the highly
conflicted Middle Magdalena region, to depart the country for carrying out
activities inconsistent with their tourist visa status. On September 17,
the DAS ordered one Spanish citizen to depart the country and formally
deported two others for allegedly inciting peasants to participate in a
national labor strike (see Section 2.b.).
The
Government cooperated with international governmental organizations. The
UNHCR, the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the
International Labor Organization (ILO), the United Nations High Commission
for Human Rights (UNHCHR), and the ICRC had an active presence in the
country and were allowed to carry out their work without government
interference.
UNHCHR's Bogota office opened at Government
invitation in 1997; it has since added field offices in Cali and Medellin.
The office monitored and analyzed the national human rights situation and
provided advice and assistance on human rights protection. President Uribe
extended UNHCHR's mandate in the country through the end of his
administration in 2006.
The
Government has an extensive human rights apparatus coordinated by the
Office of the President's Advisor for Human Rights. The Office conducted
regular dialog with local human rights groups and established a Special
"Momentum" Committee to advance judicial resolutions of 100 key human
rights cases. Executive branch offices specializing in promoting and
protecting human rights include the human rights office of the Ministry of
Interior and the human rights offices of the Ministry of Defense and its
constituent services, including the National Police.
The
MOD reported that over 290,000 members of the security forces had received
human rights training since 1996, conducted by the ICRC, the Colombian Red
Cross, the Roman Catholic Church, foreign governments, and other
government offices and agencies. In September 2001, the MOD signed an
agreement with two national universities and the Inter-American Institute
of Human Rights to conduct research and training on human rights issues
and to organize seminars designed to foster dialog with NGOs and
academics.
Offices of independent government agencies that
protect and promote human rights include the Procuraduria's Disciplinary
Delegate for the Defense of Human Rights, the Human Rights Unit of the
Fiscalia, and the Office of the National Human Rights Ombudsman. The House
of Representatives elects the National Human Rights Ombudsman for a 4-year
term, which does not coincide with that of the President. The office has
the constitutional duty to ensure the promotion and exercise of human
rights. The Ombudsman's 34 regional offices provided public defenders to
the indigent and a channel for complaints of human rights violations (see
Section 1.e.). The Ombudsman's Bogota office served as the headquarters of
a national Early Warning System designed to alert public security forces
to impending human rights violations, particularly large-scale massacres.
The Ombudsman's office was an important party to the lawsuit that
successfully challenged the National Defense and Security Act of 2001 that
was ruled unconstitutional in April. In August 2000, the House of
Representatives confirmed former Constitutional Court Justice Eduardo
Cifuentes as Human Rights Ombudsman. Cifuentes was active in his role,
publicly criticizing a wide variety of human rights violations, visiting
massacre sites, and pressing for increased security and humanitarian
assistance for affected communities. His office, with international
assistance, provided training for its regional ombudsmen and conducted
public education on human rights. Despite the Ombudsman's successes,
resource constraints meant the office was generally underfunded and
understaffed, limiting its ability to effectively monitor human rights
violations or prevent their occurrence.
As of
October 31, the Human Rights Ombudsman's office had processed 6,781
complaints of violations of human rights and international humanitarian
law, of which 3,747 involved forced displacements, 1,743 involved threats,
411 involved unlawful killings, and 191 involved kidnapings.
Illegal armed groups sometimes targeted regional
human rights ombudsmen. Four paramilitaries were on trial for the January
2001 murder of regional human rights ombudsman Ivan Villamizar in Cucuta,
Norte de Santander department (see Section 1.a). The Fiscalia was
investigating the FARC's July 2000 kidnaping and killing of Jose Manuel
Bello, municipal human rights ombudsman in Vigia del Fuerte, in the Atrato
region of western Antioquia department. The office also was investigating
the July 2000 killing of Yemil Fernando Hurtado, human rights ombudsman in
Narino municipality in southeastern Antioquia.
The
Constitution specifically prohibits discrimination based on race, sex,
disability, language, or social status; however, in practice, many of
these provisions were not enforced. The killing of homosexuals as part of
so-called social cleansing campaigns, particularly by paramilitaries, was
a problem (see Section 1.a.).
Women
Rape
and other acts of violence against women were pervasive in society, and
like other crimes, seldom were prosecuted successfully. According to the
Ombudsman's 2001 report, intrafamilial violence, sexual assault, and the
killing of women were increasing problems. The ICBF and the Presidential
Adviser's Office for Youth, Women, and Family Affairs continued to report
high levels of spousal and partner abuse throughout the country. The
Institute for Forensic Medicine reported 28,738 cases of spousal abuse for
the year. There were 6,519 cases of domestic violence against women by
other family members. The Institute reported 10,062 cases of suspected sex
crimes, including rape. The Institute commented that the crimes of
domestic violence and rape were greatly underreported, citing its 1995
survey that indicated that as few as 5 percent of these crimes were
reported, and that only 2 percent of victims received a medical
evaluation. The ICBF conducted programs and provided refuge and counseling
for victims of spousal abuse; however, the level and amount of these
services were dwarfed by the magnitude of the problem. For example, each
of the ICBF's 527 family ombudsmen handled approximately 1,230 cases per
year.
The
1996 Law on Family Violence criminalized violent acts committed within
families, including spousal rape. The law also provides legal recourse for
victims of family violence, immediate protection from physical or
psychological abuse, and judicial authority to remove the abuser from the
household. It allows a judge to oblige an abuser to seek therapy or
reeducation. For acts of spousal sexual violence, the law mandates
sentences of 6 months to 2 years and denies probation or bail to offenders
who disobey restraining orders issued by the courts.
A
1997 law also made additional, substantial modifications to the Penal Code
and introduced sentences of between 4 and 40 years for crimes against
sexual freedom or human dignity, including rape, sex with a minor, sexual
abuse, induction into prostitution, and child pornography. The June 2000
reforms to the Penal Code reduced the maximum sentence for violent sexual
assault from 20 to 15 years; the minimum sentence is 8 years. The ICBF's
"Make Peace" program provided support to women and children who were
victims of domestic violence. Under the auspices of the same program, the
Human Rights Ombudsman's office conducted regional training workshops in
various cities to promote application of domestic violence statutes.
Women
faced an increased threat of sexual assault in the context of the internal
conflict (see Section 1.g.). The UNHCHR, CODHES, and the Human Rights
Ombudsman all noted that internally displaced women and girls were
particularly vulnerable to domestic violence, sexual abuse, and sexual
exploitation (see Section 2.d.). In August 2001, the Colombian Pro-Family
Institute published a study of sexual health and reproduction in displaced
women and adolescents that found that 20 percent of displaced women had
been raped and that 30 percent of displaced teenage girls had children or
were pregnant. International organizations and NGOs noted that sexual
violence was largely unreported and that no long-term assistance was
available to female IDPs. In addition, they criticized the use of female
combatants in guerrilla organizations as sex slaves. Former female
guerrillas also reported forced abortions and forced implantation of
intrauterine devices (see Section 1.g.).
Prostitution, which is legal in designated "tolerance
zones," was widespread and remained a serious problem exacerbated by a
poor economy and internal displacement. Sex tourism existed to a limited
extent, particularly in coastal cities such as Cartagena and Barranquilla.
It was likely that some marriage and dating services were covers for
sexual tourism.
Trafficking in women for sexual exploitation
continued to be a problem (see Section 6.f.).
The
law prohibits sexual harassment; however, it was a pervasive problem.
The
Constitution prohibits discrimination against women, and specifically
requires that authorities ensure "adequate and effective participation by
women at decision making levels of public administration." However,
discrimination against women persisted. A 2000 study by the University of
Rosario concluded that women faced hiring discrimination, were
disproportionately affected by unemployment, and had salaries that were
generally incompatible with their education and experience. Government
unemployment statistics indicated that the unemployment rate for women was
20.5 percent, 6 points higher than the rate for men. According to the
U.N., women earned an average of 28 percent less than men during 2001.
Female workers in rural areas were most affected by wage discrimination
and unemployment.
Despite an explicit constitutional provision
promising additional resources for single mothers and government efforts
to provide them with training in parenting skills, women's groups reported
that the social and economic problems of single mothers remained great.
According to a 1997 Constitutional Court decision, pregnant women and
mothers of newborn children less than 3 months of age may not be fired
from their jobs without "just cause." The court ruled that bearing
children was not just cause. There were no published reports of such
firings during the year.
Children
Constitutional and legislative commitments to the
protection of children's rights were implemented only to a minimal degree.
The Constitution imposes an obligation on the family, society, and the
state to protect children, foster their development, and ensure the full
exercise of their rights. The Children's Code describes these rights and
establishes services and programs designed to enforce the protection of
minors. Children's advocates reported the need to educate citizens
regarding the code as well as the 1996 and 1997 laws on family violence,
which increased legal protection for women and children. The ICBF oversees
all government child protection and welfare programs and also funds
nongovernmental programs that benefit children. Despite these legal
protections and programs, government commitments to the protection of
children's rights were not fully implemented.
The
Constitution provides for free public education, which is compulsory
between the ages of 6 and 15; however, a study by the National Department
of Statistics (DANE) estimated 14 percent of children ages 5 to 17 did not
attend school because of lax enforcement of truancy laws, inadequate
classroom space, and economic pressures for children to provide additional
family income. Although the Government covered the basic costs of primary
education, many families faced additional expenses such as matriculation
fees, books, school supplies, and transportation costs, which were
significant in rural areas where many children lived far from school.
These costs were often prohibitive, particularly for the rural poor.
The
law requires the Government to provide medical care for children. However,
medical facilities were not universally available, particularly in rural
areas.
Child
abuse was a serious problem. The National Institute for Forensic Medicine
reported 8,125 cases of child abuse during the year. According to the
Association Against Child Abuse, only 5 percent of child sex abuse cases
were reported. Based on figures from the Government's Institute for Legal
Medicine, which reported 11,000 cases of child sexual abuse during the
year, the Association estimated that at least 220,000 children were
sexually abused during the year.
According to UNICEF, an estimated 35,000 adolescents
worked as prostitutes, in spite of legislation prohibiting sex with minors
or the employment of minors for prostitution.
Children were trafficked for sexual exploitation (see
Section 6.f.).
In
conflict zones, children often were caught in the crossfire between public
security forces, paramilitaries, and guerrillas. For example, on June 16,
a crossfire between paramilitaries and a mixed contingent of FARC and ELN
fighters killed a 9-year-old boy outside his home near the rural village
of Aguas Lindas, southern Bolivar department. Landmines and abandoned
munitions killed and maimed scores of children. According to the
Presidential Program for Human Rights, landmines injured at least 20
children during the year. For example, on June 9, a 15-year-old boy was
killed after stepping on a landmine outside the town of Cajibio, Cauca
department. On September 19, three children in a lower class section of
Bogota were killed when the fragmentation grenade with which they were
playing exploded. The grenade apparently had been discarded by members of
a FARC urban militia that operated in the neighborhood.
Children suffered disproportionately from the
internal conflict, often forfeiting opportunities to study as they were
displaced by conflict and suffered psychological traumas. According to
UNICEF, over 1 million children have been displaced from their homes over
the past decade (see Section 2.d.). The Human Rights Ombudsman's office
estimated that only 15 percent of displaced children attended school.
Displaced children were particularly vulnerable to mistreatment, sexual
exploitation, and recruitment by criminals.
Since
1999, persons under the age of 18 are not allowed to serve in the public
security forces. However, both paramilitaries and guerrillas employed
child soldiers. The ICBF estimated that 12,000 to 15,000 children were
members of illegal armed groups. Sixty percent of these children were
members of the FARC. The Roman Catholic Church stated that the FARC used
its freedom of action in its former despeje, or safe haven, to lure or
force hundreds of children into its ranks. Thousands of families from
FARC-prevalent zones throughout the country chose to be displaced rather
than risk the forcible recruitment of their children. For example, many
former-displaced residents of Bojaya, Choco department chose to leave
their teenage children in Quibdo, the departmental capital, to avoid their
forced recruitment by the FARC. The FARC was believed responsible for the
January 11 killing in Caldas department of a Roman Catholic priest who had
complained to authorities in the departmental capital of Manizales about
FARC recruitment at a local high school. On August 2, the Fiscalia filed
charges against senior FARC leaders for the recruitment of minors. As a
good will gesture in anticipation of possible peace negotiations with the
Government (see section 1.g.), in December paramilitaries from the Central
Bolivar Bloc, formerly members of the AUC, handed over 19 child soldiers
to representatives of the ICBF and the Colombian Red Cross.
Although many minors were forcibly recruited, a
UNICEF study found that 83 percent of child soldiers volunteered. Limited
educational and economic opportunities and a desire for acceptance and
camaraderie increased the appeal of service in armed groups. Nevertheless,
many children found membership in guerrilla and paramilitary organizations
difficult, and the MOD reported an increase in the number of minors
deserting illegal armed groups. As of July, at least 230 children had
surrendered to state security forces during the year. FARC child deserters
reported that local guerrilla commanders threatened to kill their families
should they desert or attempt to do so. A reinsertion program for former
child soldiers administered by the ICBF provided assistance to 332
children during the year.
Children were among the preferred kidnaping targets
of guerrillas (see Section 1.b.). The Free Country Foundation reported 384
kidnapings of children during the year (see Section 1.b.). The
Constitution enumerates the fundamental social, economic, and cultural
rights of persons with physical disabilities. However, serious practical
impediments prevented the full participation of these persons in society.
No legislation mandates that buildings provide special access for persons
with disabilities. Consequently, the disabled could not access most public
buildings and transportation systems; however, the Constitutional Court
ruled that persons with physical disabilities must have access to voting
stations and receive assistance if they so request. The Court also ruled
that the social security fund for public employees cannot refuse to
provide services for children with disabilities, regardless of the cost
involved.
Indigenous People
There
are 82 distinct ethnic groups among the country's 716,400 indigenous
inhabitants, who constitute approximately 2 percent of the population.
Indigenous communities are concentrated in the Colombian Massif of the
Andes Mountains, in southern Cauca department, along the lowlands of the
Pacific Coast, on the Guajira peninsula, and in the Amazon region.
According to the National Organization of Colombia's Indigenous (ONIC), 93
percent of indigenous persons live in rural areas, and approximately
115,000 indigenous persons are without land. By
law, indigenous groups have perpetual rights to their ancestral lands.
According to the National Agrarian Reform Institute (INCORA), 28 percent
of the national territory has been legally recognized as indigenous land,
and approximately 80 percent of these lands have been demarcated. The
Institute was involved in a program to buy back lands declared to belong
to indigenous communities. Approximately 200 indigenous communities had no
legal title to lands that they claimed. Armed groups often violently
contested indigenous land ownership. Traditional Indian authority boards
operated approximately 545 reservations as municipal entities, with
officials selected according to indigenous traditions. The boards
controlled reservation finances and were subject to fiscal oversight by
the national Comptroller General. Sixty percent of the indigenous
population lived on these designated reservations.
In
July Occidental Petroleum turned over oil exploration rights to areas near
the U'wa reservation in Arauca department to national parastatal
corporation Ecopetrol. Although the U'wa tribe had strenuously opposed
exploration near its reservation, the courts consistently overruled U'wa
legal efforts to prevent it. Occidental's decision was economic, but
Ecopetrol stated that it planned to continue exploration in the area. In
December the U'wa stated that they would not oppose exploration by
Ecopetrol.
The
Constitution provides for special criminal and civil jurisdictions within
indigenous territories based on traditional community laws (see Section
1.e.). However, these jurisdictions were subject to manipulation and often
rendered punishments that were much more lenient than those imposed by
regular civilian courts.
The
law permits indigenous communities to educate their children in
traditional dialects and in the observance of cultural and religious
customs. Indigenous men are not subject to the national military draft.
Members of indigenous communities continued to be
victims of all sides in the internal conflict. According to the MOD, 73
indigenous persons were killed during the year as a result of the internal
armed conflict, 29 in massacres. The UNHCHR strongly criticized both
paramilitary and FARC threats against indigenous communities and
characterized government investigations of human rights violations against
indigenous groups as insufficient. ONIC reported widespread cases in which
members of indigenous communities, particularly in Putumayo, were
forbidden to leave their communities without either paramilitary or
guerrilla permission, in which paramilitaries or guerrillas blockaded
communities, or in which indigenous persons returning from urban areas
were accused by guerrillas of being paramilitary collaborators.
Paramilitaries and guerrillas forced indigenous
persons, including children, into their ranks (see Section 1.f.).
Paramilitaries killed indigenous persons (see Section
1.a.). For example, in June, the Cauca Regional Indigenous Council
condemned the paramilitary killings of 10 indigenous persons near the
towns of Corinto and Pradera, northern Cauca department, and Florida,
southern Valle del Cauca department. In August paramilitaries ordered the
killing of three indigenous leaders near La Hormiga, Putumayo department.
Guerrillas also killed indigenous persons. For
example, on July 27, the FARC killed Embera leader Bertulfo Domico in the
town of Dabeiba, western Antioquia department. Domico was apparently
killed for leaving the city without the local FARC commander's permission.
On October 4, FARC guerrillas killed Embera Katio tribe member Adolfo
Cundama in front of his family on a designated indigenous reservation near
Tierralta municipality, Cordoba department. The FARC accused Cundama of
collaborating with paramilitaries. According to the National Planning Department, the
country had approximately 10.6 million citizens of African heritage. The
departments with the largest number of Afro-Colombians were Valle,
Antioquia, Bolivar, Atlantico, Magdalena, and Cordoba. However, the
department of Choco had the highest percentage of Afro-Colombian
residents, at 85 percent. Although estimates vary, government figures
indicated that Afro-Colombians represented approximately 21 percent of
total population.
Afro-Colombians are entitled to all constitutional
rights and protections; however, they faced significant societal
discrimination. Afro-Colombian organizations reported that Afro-Colombians
had almost no representation in the executive branch, judicial branch,
civil service positions, or in military hierarchies (see Section 3). The
March 2001 report of the UNHCHR noted that an estimated 80 percent of
Afro-Colombians lived in conditions of extreme poverty, that 74 percent
received wages below the legal minimum, and that their municipalities had
the highest rates of poverty. Choco had the lowest per capita level of
social investment and ranked last in terms of education, health, and
infrastructure. Although a special law designed to benefit Afro-Colombians
was passed in 1993, little concrete progress had been made on the law's
commitments to expand public services and private investment in Choco and
other predominantly Afro-Colombian regions along the country's coastline.
Choco
was also the scene of some of the country's worst political violence, as
paramilitaries and guerrillas struggled for control of the department's
key drug and weapons smuggling corridors. All 119 civilians killed in a
FARC cylinder bomb attack on the town of Bojaya, in Choco, were
Afro-Colombians (see Section 1.g.).
A
1993 law authorizes Afro-Colombian communities to receive collective
titles to some Pacific coastal regions. Afro-Colombian leaders complained
that the Government was slow to issue land titles, and that access to such
lands was often inhibited by the presence of paramilitaries or guerrillas.
Afro-Colombians were disproportionately represented among the nation's
IDPs.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a.
The Right of Association
The
Constitution provides for the right to organize unions, except for members
of the armed forces, police, and persons executing "essential public
services" as defined by law. In practice, violence against union members
and antiunion discrimination were obstacles to joining unions and engaging
in trade union activities. Labor leaders around the country continued to
be targets of attacks by paramilitary groups, guerrillas, and narcotics
traffickers. Union leaders contended that perpetrators of violence against
workers operated with virtual impunity.
The
heavily amended 1948 Labor Code provides for automatic recognition of
unions that obtain 25 signatures from potential members and comply with a
simple registration process. However, the ILO has received reports that
this process is slow and sometimes takes years. The law penalizes
interference with freedom of association and allows unions to determine
freely their internal rules, elect officials, and manage activities. The
law also forbids the dissolution of trade unions by administrative fiat.
Law 584 limits government interference in a union’s right to free
association. However, the law includes a provision authorizing Ministry of
Labor officials to compel trade unions to provide interested third parties
with relevant information on their work, including books, registers,
plans, and other documents. The ILO Committee of Experts considers this
amendment to be inconsistent with freedom of association, since it
believes an administrative authority only should conduct investigations
when there are reasonable grounds to believe that an offense has been
committed.
Labor
leaders nationwide continued to be attacked by paramilitaries, guerrillas,
and narcotics traffickers. According to the National Labor College (ENS),
a Medellin-based NGO that collects, studies, and consolidates information
on organized labor, 178 labor activists were killed during the year and
1,875 since 1991. The ENS attributed a majority of these crimes to
paramilitaries. Paramilitaries were particularly aggressive in targeting
members of the United Workers Central (CUT), the country's largest and
most left-leaning labor federation. For example, authorities suspected
paramilitaries of killing Hernan de Jesus Ortiz and Jose Pineda in the
municipality of Aranzazu, Caldas department on April 12. Ortiz, a local
teacher's union (FECODE) leader, was also a member of the CUT's national
board and an active participant in its human rights office, which
regularly condemned paramilitary abuses. Pineda was a member of the
CUT-affiliated Colombian Electricity Workers Union (SINTRAELECOL).
Paramilitaries also continued their attacks on members of the Oil Workers
Trade Union (USO), which they accused of ties to the ELN. For example,
paramilitaries were suspected of the June 17 killing of USO national board
member Cesar Blanco in Bucaramanga. In June AI testified to the ILO that
paramilitaries also targeted public sector unions, particularly health
workers.
The
Fiscalia continued investigating crimes perpetrated against union leaders
in previous years for which paramilitaries were believed responsible. For
example, investigations continued into the killings of labor activists
Valmore Locarno, Victor Hugo Orcasita, Gustavo Soler, Ricardo Orozco, and
Oscar Dario Soto. On the whole, government identification of perpetrators
of crimes against trade union members was slow, a situation which the ILO
Special Representative's June report noted was aggravated by the
difficulties faced by the Procuraduria and the Fiscalia in carrying out
their inquiries and offering adequate assurances of protection so that
witnesses would be willing to come forward. Of the 116 killings of labor
union members documented as of September, there were no arrests,
prosecutions, or convictions at year's end. The Human Rights Unit of the
Fiscalia reported that from August 1986 to April, there were 376 criminal
investigations into violations of the right to life of unionists. Of
these, 321 were in the preliminary stage, 24 were at the investigative
stage, 3 were at the trial state, 7 had been sent to military criminal
courts, and 13 were awaiting assignment. Guilty verdicts were issued in
only five cases.
Progress was made in several high profile
investigations. For example, on December 17, a specialized criminal court
in Bogota sentenced former army Captain Jorge Rojas and former army
Sergeant Evangelista Basto to 18 years in prison for the attempted killing
of public employee union (FENALTRASE) president Wilson Borja in December
2000. Rojas and Basto had been in active service when the crime occurred,
but were dismissed from the military during the course of the criminal
investigation. The court also convicted army Corporal Jhon Fredy Pena of
conspiracy and sentenced him to 42 months in prison. On November 19, the
Fiscalia reconfirmed its August 16 decision to permanently close its
investigation into the alleged involvement in the crime of Police
Lieutenant Carlos Fredy Gomez. A separate trial continued of army Major
Cesar Alonso Maldonado and civilian Regulo Rueda for their alleged
involvement in the plot to murder Borja. On July 31, the DAS arrested AUC
leader Sergio Manuel Cordoba, a suspect in the 2001 killing of USO leader
Aury Sara. On September 21, the army arrested AUC leader Didimo Rodriguez,
wanted for the October 2001 killing of labor leader Luis Manuel Anaya. On
October 19, prosecutors indicted Edgar Armando Daza for alleged
involvement in the 1998 murder of CUT Vice President Jorge Luis Ortega. On
May 4, a Bogota judge sentenced Rafael Cespedes to 27 years in prison for
Ortega's murder. Prosecutors also indicted a paramilitary suspect for the
2001 murder of labor leader Jose Luis Guete.
In
its evaluation of antiunion violence, the ENS also noted a significant
increase in crimes against union activists committed by guerrillas. For
example, on April 26, the FARC massacred nine members of the Agricultural
Workers Union (SINTRIANAGRO) near Apartado, in the Uraba region of
Antioquia department. Uraba was hotly contested between guerrillas and
paramilitaries. The ENS attributed the deaths of at least 19 union
activists to the FARC.
In
addition to the many union activists who were killed, the ENS also
reported that 17 union members survived attempts on their lives, 189 were
threatened with death, 26 were kidnaped, and 8 disappeared.
The
most prominent release of a kidnaped union leader occurred on April 7,
when the AUC freed USO leader Gilberto Torres after 40 days in captivity.
In an
attempt to ameliorate the security risks confronting union leaders, the
Government significantly increased the resources it devoted to the Program
for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders and Trade Union Leaders.
Between 2000 and the year the Program's budget increased nearly 700
percent, to nearly $11.5 million (28.5 billion pesos). However, the UNHCHR
has expressed concern over delays in transferring and making available
funds allocated to the program, affecting the timely and effective
implementation of security measures. As of August, the program had
assisted 1,195 union leaders and activists, who, depending on a threat
evaluation, received bulletproof vests, bodyguards, and, in some cases,
vehicles. Trade unionists and human rights groups criticized the
protection program because these increased measures were insufficient to
protect adequately the large number of trade unionists who were
threatened. For example, in March 2001 Valmore Locarno and Victor
Orcasita, employees of Drummond Coal Company and local president and
vice-president of mine workers union SINTRAMIENERGETICA, were killed by
presumed paramilitaries after having been assessed as "medium to low"
risk. Six months later the new president of the same union, Gustavo Soler,
also was killed.
At
the November ILO Governing Body meeting, the ILO’s Committee on Freedom of
Association reported that measures adopted by the Government had been
insufficient to reduce the violence directed against trade union
officials. The Government had not reported any convictions of individuals
for the killing of trade unionists. The ILO Governing Body decided by
consensus to postpone to its March 2003 meeting any consideration of
appointing a "Fact-Finding and Conciliation Commission." The workers
proposed a Commission of Inquiry in 1998, and that proposal was pending.
The
law forbids antiunion discrimination and the obstruction of free
association. However, according to union leaders, both discrimination and
obstruction of free association occurred frequently. There were only 271
government labor inspectors to cover 1,098 municipalities and more than
300,000 companies. The inspection apparatus was therefore weak.
Furthermore, labor inspectors often lacked basic equipment, including
vehicles. Guerrillas sometimes deterred labor inspectors from performing
their duties by declaring them military targets. In some cases,
paramilitaries threatened and killed union members who failed to renounce
collective bargaining agreements.
The
Labor Code calls for fines to be levied for restricting freedom of
association.
Unions are free to join international confederations
without government restrictions and did so in practice.
b.
The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The
Constitution protects the rights of workers to organize and engage in
collective bargaining. Workers in large firms and public services have
been most successful in organizing, but these employees represented only a
small percentage of the workforce. High unemployment, a large informal
economic sector, traditional antiunion attitudes, and weak union
organization and leadership limited workers' bargaining power in all
sectors. A requirement that trade unions must represent a majority of
workers in each company as a condition for representing them in sectoral
agreements also weakened workers' bargaining power.
According to the ENS, there were 2,482 registered
unions, with a total of 860,281 members. The number of unions and union
members continued to decline during the year, as it had in previous years.
Approximately 5 percent of the labor force was unionized. The CUT
encouraged unions to merge along industry lines to increase their
efficiency and bargaining power.
The
number of workers covered by collective bargaining agreements has been
gradually declining. According to the ENS, 223,670 workers were employed
under collective bargaining agreements during the period 2000-2001,
compared with 409,918 during the period 1994-95.
Collective pacts between individual workers and their
employers are not subject to collective bargaining and typically were used
by employers to obstruct labor organization. Although employers must
register collective pacts with the Ministry of Labor, the Ministry does
not exercise any oversight or control over them.
The
Labor Code eliminated mandatory mediation in private labor-management
disputes and extended the grace period before the Government can intervene
in a conflict. Federations may assist affiliate unions in collective
bargaining.
The
Constitution provides for the right to strike, except for members of the
Armed Forces, Police, and persons executing essential public services as
defined by law.
Before staging a legal strike, unions must first
negotiate directly with management and, if no agreement results, accept
mediation. The Labor Code prohibits the use of strikebreakers. Legislation
that prohibits public employees from striking is still in effect, although
it often is overlooked. By law public employees must accept binding
arbitration if mediation fails; however, in practice public service unions
decide by membership vote whether or not to seek arbitration.
The
ILO had a number of long-standing criticisms of the Labor Code: the
requirement that government officials be present at assemblies convened to
vote on a strike call; the legality of firing union organizers from jobs
in their trades once 6 months have passed following a strike or dispute;
the requirement that candidates for trade union offices must belong to the
occupation that their union represents; the prohibition of strikes in a
wide range of public services that are not necessarily essential; various
restrictions on the right to strike; the power of the Ministry of Labor
and the President to intervene in disputes through compulsory arbitration
when a strike is declared illegal; and the power to dismiss trade union
officers involved in an unlawful strike.
On
September 16, the three main labor federations called a national work
stoppage to protest the Government's proposed labor and pension reforms.
In March USO conducted a strike to protest the killing of one USO member
and the kidnaping of Gilberto Torres. In May and June, 7,000 employees at
Telecom, the leading telecommunications company, went on strike over wage
levels and work rules.
Labor
law applies in the country's 15 free trade zones (FTZs), and its standards
are enforced.
The
Constitution forbids slavery and any form of forced or bonded labor, and
there were no reports of such practices in the formal sector.
Paramilitaries and guerrillas practiced forced
conscription (see Section 5). There were some reports that guerrillas used
forced labor.
The
law prohibits forced or bonded labor by children; however, the Government
does not have the resources to enforce this prohibition effectively (see
Section 6.d.). Although there were no known instances of forced child
labor in the formal economy, several thousand children were forced to
serve as paramilitary or guerrilla combatants (see Sections 1.f. and 5),
to work as prostitutes (see Section 5), or as coca pickers.
d.
Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for Employment
The
Constitution prohibits the employment of children under the age of 14 in
most jobs, and the Labor Code prohibits the granting of work permits to
children under 18; however, child labor remained a significant problem,
particularly in the informal sector. According to the National Department
of Statistics (DANE), nearly 15 percent of children were employed, over
half of whom received no remuneration. DANE reported that only 1 percent
of child workers received the minimum wage.
A
1989 decree established the Minors Code and prohibited the employment of
children under age 12. It also required exceptional conditions and the
express authorization of the Labor Ministry to employ children between the
ages of 12 and 17. Children under age 14 are prohibited from working, with
the exception that those ages 12 and 13 may perform light work with the
permission of their parents and appropriate labor authorities. Children
ages 12 and 13 may work a maximum of 4 hours a day, children ages 14 and
15 may work a maximum of 6 hours a day, and children ages 16 and 17 may
work a maximum of 8 hours a day. All child workers are prohibited from
working at night, or performing work where there is a risk of bodily harm
or exposure to excessive heat, cold, or noise. Children are prohibited
from working in a number of specific occupations, including mining and
construction; however, these requirements largely were ignored in
practice, and only 5 percent of working children possessed the required
work permits. By allowing children ages 12 and 13 to work, even under
restricted conditions, the law contravenes international standards on
child labor, which set the minimum legal age for employment in developing
countries at 14 years. In addition, the legal minimum employment age of 14
was inconsistent with completing a basic education.
In
the formal sector, the Ministry of Labor enforced child labor laws through
periodic inspections. However, in the informal labor sector and rural
areas, child labor continued to be a problem, particularly in agriculture
and mining. Children as young as 11 worked full time in almost every
aspect of the cut flower industry. Even children enrolled in school or, in
some cases, those too young for school, accompanied their parents to work
at flower plantations at night and on weekends. In 2001 the ILO reported
that children were employed in gold and emerald mining. However, in the
mining sector, coal mining presented the most difficult child labor
problem. Many marginal, usually family-run, mining operations employed
young children as a way to boost production and income. It is estimated
that between 1,200 and 2,000 children were involved. The work was
dangerous and the hours were long. Younger children carried water and
packaged coal, while those ages 14 and up engaged in more physically
demanding labor such as carrying bags of coal. These informal mining
operations were illegal. The Ministry of Labor reported that by the end of
1999 an interagency governmental committee had removed approximately 80
percent of child laborers from the informal mines and returned them to
school.
A
Catholic Church study conducted in 1999 reported that approximately 2.7
million children worked, including approximately 700,000 children who
worked as coca pickers. Observers noted that the economic downturn might
increase the number of children working, particularly in rural areas.
Child participation in agricultural work soared at harvest time. All child
workers must receive the national minimum wage for the hours that they
work. However, according to the Ministry of Labor, working children
between the ages of 7 and 15 earned between 13 and 47 percent of the
minimum wage. An estimated 26 percent of working children had regular
access to health care; the health services of the social security system
cover only 10 percent of child laborers. Approximately 25 percent were
employed in potentially dangerous activities. School attendance by working
children was significantly lower than for nonworking children,
particularly in rural areas.
The
Labor Ministry had an inspector in each of the country's 32 departments
and the national capital district, responsible for certifying and
conducting repeat inspections of workplaces that employed children;
however, the system lacked resources and covered only 20 percent of the
child labor force employed in the formal sector of the economy. The Labor
Ministry was designing an oversight and inspection model to be implemented
in early 2003. Under its Action Plan to Eradicate Child Labor, the
Government allocated $2 million (5.9 billion pesos) to the National
Committee for the Eradication of Child Labor, which includes
representatives from the Ministries of Labor, Health, Education, and
Communications, as well as officials from various other government
offices, unions, employer associations, and NGOs.
The
Minors Code provides for fines ranging from 1 to 40 minimum monthly
salaries for violations. If a violation is deemed to have endangered a
child’s life or threatened a child’s moral values, sanctions can also
include the temporary or permanent closure of the establishment in
question.
The
National Committee for the Eradication of Child Labor has conducted
training on legislation and enforcement for approximately 600 public
officials in the departments of Antioquia, Bolivar, Cauca, Cordoba,
Cundinamarca, Santander, and Valle del Cauca. The Committee also created
an information system on child labor to measure and understand the problem
better. The Government, the main labor federations, and media
representatives published articles, broadcasted documentaries, and
launched various programs to delegitimize child labor.
The
Ministry of Education expanded the school day in 134 municipalities to
prevent children from dropping out and entering the labor force. In 2001
UNICEF launched a program to withdraw children from the labor force and
return them to school. Over 200 children in Santander de Quilichao, Cauca
department, 140 children in Medellin, capital of Antioquia department, and
350 children in Armenia, capital of Quindio department, benefited from
this program.
The
legal definitions of "worst forms of child labor" and "hazardous work" are
consistent with ILO convention 182 and do not exempt specific sectors.
The
law prohibits forced and bonded labor by children; however, the Government
was unable to enforce this prohibition effectively. Paramilitaries and
guerrillas abducted children for use as combatants (see Section 5).
e.
Acceptable Conditions of Work
The
Government sets a uniform minimum wage for workers every January to serve
as a benchmark for wage bargaining. The monthly minimum wage, set by
tripartite negotiations among representatives of business, organized
labor, and the Government, was about $114 (309,000 pesos). The national
minimum wage did not provide a decent standard of living for a worker and
family.
Because the minimum wage is based on the Government's
target inflation rate, the minimum wage has not kept up with real
inflation in the past several years. An estimated 70 percent of all
workers earned wages that were insufficient to cover the costs of the
Government's estimated low-income family shopping basket. An estimated 76
percent of all workers earned no more than twice the minimum wage.
On
December 20, Congress approved President Uribe's proposed labor reform
bill. The bill lengthened the regular working day by 4 hours and reduced
the amount of overtime pay. It also gave employers more flexibility in
devising work schedules. The "indemnity" paid to workers who are unjustly
fired will be reduced. However, for the first time unemployed workers can
receive an unemployment benefit for 6 months. Under the new system,
apprentices no longer will be considered employees, but they will be able
to contribute to the social security fund. The bill also establishes
several subsidies for employers who create new jobs.
Legislation provides comprehensive protection for
workers' occupational safety and health; however, these standards were
poorly enforced, in part because of the small number of Labor Ministry
inspectors. In general a lack of public safety awareness, inadequate
attention by unions, and lax enforcement by the Labor Ministry resulted in
a high level of industrial accidents and unhealthy working conditions.
Over 80 percent of industrial companies lacked safety plans. The Social
Security Institute reported over 56,000 work-related accidents during the
year, resulting in 356 deaths. The industries most prone to worker
accidents were mining, construction, and transportation. According to
insurance company association FASECOLDA, approximately 12 million
persons--many of them children--had no insurance against work-related
injuries.
According to the Labor Code, workers have the right
to withdraw from a hazardous work situation without jeopardizing continued
employment. However, unorganized workers, particularly those in the
agricultural sector, feared losing their jobs if they exercised their
right to criticize abuses.
f.
Trafficking in Persons
The
Criminal Code defines trafficking in persons as a crime; however,
trafficking in persons, primarily women and girls, remained a problem.
Law
747, passed in a special session of Congress in June, broadened the
definition of trafficking in persons and provided for prison sentences of
between 10 and 15 years and fines of up to 1,000 times the monthly minimum
wage. These penalties, which are even more severe than those for rape (see
Section 5), can be increased by up to one-third if there are aggravating
circumstances, such as trafficking of children under the age of 14.
Additional charges of illegal detention, violation of the right to work in
dignified conditions, and violation of personal freedom also may be
brought against traffickers. Police actively investigated trafficking
offenses and some traffickers were prosecuted. However, inadequate
resources for witness protection hindered prosecutions.
A
government advisory committee composed of representatives of the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, Interpol, the DAS, the Ministry of Justice, the
Procuraduria, the Fiscalia, and the Presidency met every 2 months to
discuss trafficking in persons. The committee prepared information
campaigns, promoted information exchange between government entities,
created trafficking hot lines for victims, and encouraged closer
cooperation between the Government and Interpol.
The
Government cooperated with foreign counterparts on investigations and
successfully freed victims in solo and joint operations. To protect
citizens who were trafficked to other countries, government foreign
missions provided legal aid and social welfare assistance.
Colombia was a source country for trafficking in
women and girls to Europe, the United States, Asia, and other Latin
American countries. The DAS reported in 2000 that the country was one of
the three most common countries of origin of trafficking victims in the
Western Hemisphere; in 2000 an estimated 35,000 to 50,000 Colombian
trafficking victims were overseas. The majority of women trafficked for
prostitution reportedly went to the Netherlands, Spain, Japan, and Hong
Kong. A study carried out in Spain in 1999 by the Roman Catholic religious
order the "Adoratrices" found that Colombian women constituted nearly half
of all trafficking victims in that country. According to press reports,
more than 50 percent of women from Colombia who entered Japan were
trafficking victims forced to work as prostitutes. Law enforcement
authorities reported that most trafficking victims were from the
departments of Valle de Cauca, Antioquia, Santander, Cundinamarca, and the
coffee-growing regions of Risaralda, Caldas, Quindio, and Tolima.
Police reported that most traffickers were linked to
narcotics or other criminal organizations. Traffickers disguised their
intent by running media ads offering jobs, portraying themselves as
modeling agents, offering marriage brokerage services, or operating
lottery or bingo scams with free trips as prizes. Recruiters reportedly
loitered outside high schools, shopping malls, and parks to lure
adolescents into accepting phantom jobs abroad.
The
country's overall situation of economic downturn, high unemployment,
internal conflict between three major illegal armed groups, and social
exclusion contributed to the availability of victims. While young women
were the primary targets of traffickers, children and men also were
affected. According to officials at the Colombian Family Welfare Institute
(ICBF), a high rate of unwanted pregnancy in unwed teenage girls
contributed to trafficking in children.
Additional efforts addressed the problem of
trafficking within the country's own borders. The Association Against
Child Abuse estimated that 220,000 children were victims of sexual
exploitation. The ICBF estimated that in Bogota alone there were over
10,000 girls and nearly 1,000 boys exploited as child prostitutes. During
the year, the ICBF provided assistance, either directly or through other
specialized agencies, to over 14,000 sexually exploited children.
The
Hope Foundation, which assisted 26 trafficking victims through October,
provided educational information, social support, and counseling to
victims of trafficking who returned to the country. Services provided by
the Hope Foundation in coordination with government social service
agencies included psychological counseling, social assistance, placement,
and follow-up care.
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