capacity building

Revolution in Egypt (c) Al Jazeera

• In the wake of revolution the U.S. must immediately engage with Egypt and Tunisia through S&T initiatives.
• The U.S. should: expedite student visas, fund additional scholarships, support dialogues between U.S and regional universities, and recommit existing S&T and education aid packages.
• S&T activities should be a key component of building better, more resilient relationships with MENA countries.

The Middle East and North Africa are currently in a period of intense instability and transition and we do not know what the other side looks like.  Within the last month revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt have ousted Presidents Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak, respectively, while Yemenis continue to protest against the rule of President Ali Abdullah Salah, who has agreed to step down in the next election.  All three of these leaders are secular strongmen who have ruled their respective countries for at least twenty years and are widely viewed in the region as pro-American.

While vastly different, each of these three countries has the potential to be an important economic, political, and security partner for the United States.  Currently America’s relationship with all three heavily emphasizes military and anti-terrorism cooperation, often at the expense of our economic and political relationship.

In fact the U.S. government is the leading military supplier for all three countries, with military assistance counting for over 70% of their total country aid package.  Egypt alone received over USD 1.5 billion in military and economic aid in 2010, second only to Israel in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, while Tunisia received USD 20 million and Yemen received USD 160 million.  Of this almost USD 1.7 billion in aid, less than 800 million went to all non-security aid programs, which include economic development, civil society and governance building, and education.

To provide perspective on the size of U.S. military support, the President’s FY 2012 requested budget for the entire Office of International Science and Engineering (OISE) at the National Science Foundation requests just over USD 58 million, up over 21% from FY 2010.  Under this budget funding for OISE, which serves as the interagency focal point for all international science and engineering activities, equals just over 22% of the military aid for Egypt alone in FY2010.   And given the current Congress, even this relatively small budget is likely to face stiff opposition.  But should the United States be focusing so intently on military and security aid to the MENA region or could other forms of aid and engagement play an equally important role?

Despite decades of high military funding for Egypt and other MENA countries, Egypt and Tunisia’s revolutions reveal that the countries are neither stable nor economically and politically successful.  A different approach to U.S. economic assistance and engagement is needed.  The U.S. S&T sector will play a critical role in this new approach because of the sector’s ability to develop new economic opportunities, the popularity of U.S. science, and the focus on positive engagement.

Over the past two years the U.S. government has begun a new initiative in the region that aims to further and deepen science and technology (S&T) ties between America and the Muslim world.  Popularly termed the “Cairo Initiative,” through the Mulsim-Majority Countries Initiative the government has appointed three science envoys, scaled up existing S&T projects, increased dialogue on S&T and education, and developed (on paper) five centers of excellence, though none have received appropriations and remain unrealized.

In the face of the recent political upheaval and revolution, S&T partnership, assistance, and support play an even more critical role, both because of the disruptions to S&T that have occurred and because of the unique opportunities provided by these circumstances.

The S&T challenges created or exacerbated by political upheaval and revolution can broadly be grouped into: education, economic, foreign relations, and damages to or destruction of resources and physical infrastructure.

In each category some challenges and opportunities will be immediate, while others will be long term and may not be most effectively addressed until a new government and power structure is in place.

In the immediate future the greatest needs and challenges for the S&T communities will be:  the disruption of academic institutions, the temporary halting or holdup of student visas, international aid holds, and lost economic opportunities.  The U.S. government and S&T community can play a critical role in responding to and overcoming these challenges.

Immediately, embassies in each country should work to get their visa processing—especially of student visas—back up to speed.  The U.S. embassies should expedite the processing of visas for all students who have a place at a U.S. academic institution.  Simultaneously, academic institutions in the U.S. should work with students to make up any time they have missed as a result of their visa holdup and inability to leave the country.  For the upcoming Fall 2011 semester, the U.S. should look for opportunities to increase study opportunities and scholarships in the U.S. for students from Egypt, Tunisia, and other countries where academic institutions may not be on stable footing.

In many Middle Eastern countries, top university positions are politically appointed.  Where the revolution or political transition has created voids in S&T leadership and where there are opportunities to restructure how leadership positions are decided, U.S. universities can immediately begin dialogues with partner institutions in the Middle East on how to restructure leadership based on criteria such as merit and fit with institutional needs.  The government can support U.S. universities in these efforts by creating a pool of funding for delegations of university administrators and leaders to visit and engage with existing partner institutions in Egypt, Tunisia, and other countries undergoing similar upheaval.

A third critical role the U.S. government can play in the immediate future will be the recommitment of all promised S&T aid and funding, especially for funding that benefits S&T stakeholders at many levels.

In Egypt, for example, USAID has promised USD 50 million for S&T higher education in Egypt, to be channeled to the Ministry of Higher Education.  Over the past few months, USAID has worked with Ministry officials, scientists, and other stakeholders to develop a model to leverage this funding to engage and benefit stakeholders and provide economic opportunities for the S&T community.  Efforts such as these must not be lost.  Rather, the U.S. government must recommit to this and similar assistance packages, get staff back on the ground to determine how the funding model has changed, and actively engage with S&T stakeholders to provide aid that is appropriate, need driven, and stakeholder supported.

At this critical juncture in the Middle East, the U.S. must seize our opportunities to engage with, to support, and to build our positive relationship with the S&T community.

• US aid for Yemen goes predominantly to military and hard security projects.
• To confront the key sources of instability the U.S. must look beyond military assistance.
• Tier two engagement will be a critical component of this strategy, especially in looking at challenges to natural resource and human security.

government protesters in Sana'a, 2009

As Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen makes headlines yet again for attempted terrorist activities against the United States, the US government is preparing a $150 million package aimed at training and aiding Yemeni security and military forces.  This unsurprising move represents business as usual for US-Yemeni relations; a continuation of security and terrorism-centric dialogue, policy, and funding that pervades all levels of the two countries’ engagement.    In fact, of the $63 million in aid money to Yemen in FY10, well over half goes toward military and security assistance.

In his October 29th speech on the attempted cargo plane bombings, President Obama announced that the US government intends to “strengthen a more stable, secure and prosperous Yemen so that terrorist groups to not have the time and space they need to plan attacks from within its borders.”   This statement is coupled with an announcement to increase the military aid to Yemen to $150 million.  Considering that the President’s FY11 budget called for just over $100 million in total aid for Yemen, 48% of which was for military and security assistance, this new announcement triples military aid and makes it approximately 75% of Yemen’s aid money.

While security is the primary focus of the FY 11 budget, under its new Yemen strategy USAID is also working to address some of the soft security issues that fuel instability.  Included in this FY11 budget are projects on:

• Military and security assistance;
• Responsive governance, a multi-sector project expected to be funded at $43 million for 5 years and aimed to strengthen public policies and institutions;
• The Community Livelihoods Project, a multi-sector program expected to be funded at $125 million for 5 years with the goal of economic stabilization through government services, job creation, civic participation, and responsive local governance.
• Urban refugee aid for those living in Sana’a;
• Public health; and
• Supporting an independent media.

AQAP, 2009, courtesy of The Long War Journal

This $200 million in aid compares to packages of over $1.5 billion for Egypt, $730 million for Iraq, $680 million for Jordan, $550 million for the West Bank and Gaza, and $250 million for Lebanon.

A recent article by Christopher Boucek of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace points out that Yemen suffers from more than just the hard security challenges associated with AQAP, the Houthi Rebellion in Sa’da, and the Southern Mobility separatist movement in the South and in Hadramawt[1]. Boucek notes that, “Beyond its security concerns, Yemen is on the brink of economic disaster, suffering from poor governance and quickly dwindling water supplies.”

The article rightly calls for the U.S. government to expand its aid focus to help Yemen: improve its legal system and laws, fight corruption, increase policing capacity, improve the economy, alter the land distribution and ownership system, and enhance the education system. These policy prescriptions are standard practice in the Middle East—multilateral aid packages with the goals of addressing economic instability, furthering governance and rule of law, promoting civil society, and improving education and with debatable effectiveness. Boucek further calls on the U.S. government to partner with Saudi Arabia, Yemen’s largest donor nation at $2 billion a year.

While these prescriptions will be important components in a comprehensive Yemen strategy, they fall short of addressing Yemen’s immediate and long term stability challenges, especially those

related to:  natural resources, population growth, and human health and capacity.

Robust track one and track two Yemeni-U.S. engagement will be necessary over the coming years.  Track two approaches will be especially important for addressing these core resource, population, and human challenges as their solutions are highly technical in nature, the target populations often live in areas with limited central government involvement or legitimacy, and effective solutions will require individual buy-in and stakeholder engagement from diverse actors.

Note that an effective strategy must include cooperation and engagement with the tribal and religious networks and stakeholders that are central components of Yemen’s social structure and civil society.  Tribes especially will be important partners in Yemen’s ongoing stability.  As an example of this, the leader of Yemen’s largest Bakil tribe, Sheikh Naji Abdul Aziz Al-Shayef, recently called for the creation of a coalition aligned with the government against Al Qaeda.

In the immediate future, the U.S. must support both track one and especially track two engagement in:

• Resource ownership. An immediate problem, Yemen’s oil and natural gas are running out and its water is running out even faster.  The U.S. must support scientists, technologists, and other experts in working with Yemeni government officials, scientists, and stakeholders to determine resource distribution, replenishment rate, and must begin dialogues with stakeholders on how resources are distributed, allocated, and managed.
• Land ownership. Before radically overhauling the land ownership system, the U.S. must work with the Yemeni government to institute legal safeguards that ensure that traditional land tenure systems are recognized. Current land reform efforts seek to secure land titling through registration and ownership legislation.  However, much land is owned at the tribal level, is communally owned, or is owned by the local mosque for the benefit of the mosque and the area’s poor (generally as a result of land donated through zakat or alms) and land reformation has the potential to further increase poverty as those without registration are displaced.
• Science and technology (S&T) cooperation. The U.S. government should take advantage of the Arab world’s favorable opinion of U.S. S&T to develop exchange programs and build internal Yemeni S&T capacity, focusing on issues such as water, energy, and biosecurity, which are of mutual need and interest.
• Refugees. Located not just below Saudi Arabia, but just across the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden from Africa, Yemen is a country of 23 million people, with almost 200,000 refugees.  The majority of these refugees are from Somalia, with small groups from Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Iraq.  The U.S. must work with civil society in the U.S., Yemen, and internationally, as well as with the UNHRC, to develop a strategy for permanent resettlement and to aid refugees as well as the populations in the South of Yemen where the refugee camps are located.
• Internally displaced persons. Yemen has an estimated 150,000-250,000 internally displaced persons, mostly in Sa’da and the North.  The U.S. must work with local tribes, international human rights and refugee organizations, and the government of Yemen and to develop a strategy for infrastructure and housing development, for public health initiatives, and for economic development.

Long term formal and informal engagement on the following issues is critical:

• Resource management. With dwindling resources, especially of water and fossil fuels, management is an increasingly critical challenge.  Sustainable resource use and allocation mechanisms are critical.   Their development can be best facilitated by the U.S. supporting tier two collaborations between experts, resource managers, and stakeholders, backed by tier one cooperation with politicians to develop supportive legislation, markets, and profit sharing mechanisms.
• Infrastructure development.
• Public health. Foci of these efforts should be infectious diseases, material and reproductive health, access to basic medical services, and population control issues.

No one policy or engagement strategy will be a panacea for Yemen’s root destabilizing factors.  Instead, the U.S. and other donor nations must focus on a variety of strategies at multiple levels of engagement that enhance human capacity and education, stabilize resource use and availability, improve governance, engage Yemen in the global S&T community, and approach Yemen as both a unique state and as a critical actor in a volatile region.

Over the past three weeks in Sana’a, rain has fallen nearly every day.  So much so that the primary drainage canal for the Old City (the Salia)—normally a roadway—has run with feet of water on multiple occasions.

See  the Salia running with water in this FAS Youtube video.

It is an arid city, but not one without water, receiving some eight inches of rain per year.  And yet despite this annual rainfall, some estimates predict that Sana’a will essentially run out of water within the next decade.  Where does the water go once it has fallen?  How much is expected to fall over the coming years?  How much of the shallow groundwater aquifer is refilled when it rains?  And how quickly is that aquifer being drained?

Most of these questions cannot be answered as Yemen’s water and environmental monitoring capacity is highly limited.  In fact, for the Sana’a basin, there are only two sets of water monitoring tools (one for precipitation and one for groundwater wells) available to university and non-government researchers.  Considering that some models show Sana’a running out of groundwater within a decade, this monitoring limitation is a critical barrier to the development and implementation of effective solutions and management strategies.

Enhanced monitoring is one of the key needs identified by researchers and stakeholders within Yemen.

In meetings over the past two weeks dozens of academics, ministers, and NGO environmentalists have identified key areas for research and debated the primary needs of both the Yemeni research community and Yemen’s environment.

As expressed by the scientists, future research should focus on environmental challenges related to water, energy, and agriculture (for more on Yemen’s environmental issues, see our blog on systems research).  In order to develop meaningful solutions to these environmental challenges, specific needs must be met.  These needs broadly fall into the following categories:  improved resource monitoring and management, increased access to resources, and improved knowledge sharing and collaboration.

To undertake meaningful environmental research and address these critical challenges, capacity must be developed in the following areas:

• environmental monitoring, especially of water, ecological systems, and energy resources;
• accurate and comprehensive data of key environmental systems;
• models of environmental systems that include physical, social, economic, and cultural factors;
• water and energy management, including the development of markets and long-term monitoring capacity;
• access to additional water and energy supplies and infrastructure; and
• domestic and international funding and support for applied research.

In addition, the capacity of the research community itself must be strengthened. For example, this group of researchers has no formal mechanism for knowledge or resource sharing and has had little internal communication in the past.  One researcher, in fact, thanked us for coming because before this conference he had never known there were people at universities working in renewable energy—our coming to his university was the first time he had the opportunity to know about and possibly collaborate with these colleagues.

This example demonstrates one of the many capacity limitations that confront the Yemeni environmental research community.  In order to overcome these limitations, researchers have identified the following areas as priorities for community capacity building:

• improved access to physical, financial, and personnel resources (including but not limited to equipment and facilities, technology, research funding, international training and expertise, data, and international journals and publications);
• a strengthened voice in Yemen both within government and amongst the general population;
• better internal knowledge and information sharing;
• enhanced communication with the international research and technical communities; and
• a long term strategy for cooperation with international researchers, funders, and stakeholders.

As conversations over our two weeks of meetings constantly reiterated, as the International Science Partnership moves forward all research projects undertaken must not only address the critical environmental issues in Yemen, but must also develop the country’s capacity to engage in meaningful environmental research and address the concerns and needs of the Yemeni research community itself.