Comments on: Congressional Resources on Arms Control http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/2008/12/arms_control.html Secrecy News from the FAS Project on Government Secrecy Sat, 28 Nov 2009 00:31:30 -0500 http://wordpress.org/?v=abc hourly 1 By: George Smith http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/2008/12/arms_control.html/comment-page-1#comment-2322 George Smith Wed, 03 Dec 2008 21:34:40 +0000 http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/?p=2115#comment-2322 Here's a bit of a cryptic statement from the head of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency: <I>"The first thing is you are probably aware of the fact that very important research is being done on the part of the Nunn- Lugar program. It is creating a series of central research laboratories in Central Asia, where they are collecting rare pathogens, centralizing them, and categorizing them. Those pathogens are challenging us to develop therapeutics that respond to those pathogens should an entity be able to isolate them and create a biological weapon from a rare species."</i> It comes from the testimony you posted <a HREF="http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2008_hr/combat-wmd.html" rel="nofollow">here</A>. Central Asia? That's a big space. Where are the labs, how big are they, and what precisely are they doing? Well, it's not clear here nor has it been clear in the public record. However, these does appear to be disbursement of contracts to American security companies for non-specific purposes related to them. For example, see <a HREF="http://www.theregister.co.uk/2008/11/03/twot_pork/print.html" rel="nofollow">here</A> for mention of a $158 million contract from the DTRA to US contractor Black & Veatch for counter-bioterrorism at a facility or facilities in the Ukraine. Although not mentioned in the story, Black & Veatch subsequently portioned out a piece of the contract to another contractor named SRI. I'm a pro and I have difficulty following the threads of what taxpayer money is funding in the name of bioterror threat reduction in Central Asia. In 2007, the GAO reported their was a lack of federal oversight of domestic biodefense laboratories, something again addressed in the Graham/Talent commission's report on WMD today. (See <a HREF="http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/content/bt/bioprep/news/oct0407hearing.html" rel="nofollow">here</A> for a news piece on GAO concerns. I know the report is here but I couldn't immediately return a link.) In any case, under discussion here are an unspecificed number of labs in Central Asia. The question arises: If oversight of domestic biodefense labs isn't what it ought to be, how does one oversee biodefense labs started up through the US government overseas? And why is the work being done in Central Asia? Presumably, the Centers for Disease Control and other public health agencies worldwide must have immediate access to emerging disease organisms for the public good. What is the scope and justification of another layer of biodefense laboratories in foreign countries where even Congressmen would probably have a hard time just up and visiting them? Here’s a bit of a cryptic statement from the head of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency:

“The first thing is you are probably aware of the fact that
very important research is being done on the part of the Nunn-
Lugar program. It is creating a series of central research
laboratories in Central Asia, where they are collecting rare
pathogens, centralizing them, and categorizing them. Those
pathogens are challenging us to develop therapeutics that
respond to those pathogens should an entity be able to isolate
them and create a biological weapon from a rare species.”

It comes from the testimony you posted here.

Central Asia? That’s a big space. Where are the labs, how big are they, and what precisely are they doing?

Well, it’s not clear here nor has it been clear in the public record. However, these does appear to be disbursement of contracts to American security companies for non-specific purposes related to them.

For example, see here for mention of a $158 million contract from the DTRA to US contractor Black & Veatch for counter-bioterrorism at a facility or facilities in the Ukraine. Although not mentioned in the story, Black & Veatch subsequently portioned out a piece of the contract to another contractor named SRI.

I’m a pro and I have difficulty following the threads of what taxpayer money is funding in the name of bioterror threat reduction in Central Asia.

In 2007, the GAO reported their was a lack of federal oversight of domestic biodefense laboratories, something again addressed in the Graham/Talent commission’s report on WMD today. (See here for a news piece on GAO concerns. I know the report is here but I couldn’t immediately return a link.)

In any case, under discussion here are an unspecificed number of labs in Central Asia.

The question arises: If oversight of domestic biodefense labs isn’t what it ought to be, how does one oversee biodefense labs started up through the US government overseas? And why is the work being done in Central Asia? Presumably, the Centers for Disease Control and other public health agencies worldwide must have immediate access to emerging disease organisms for the public good. What is the scope and justification of another layer of biodefense laboratories in foreign countries where even Congressmen would probably have a hard time just up and visiting them?

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