Comments on: Obama Orders Review of Classification Policy http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/2009/06/classification_review-2.html Secrecy News from the FAS Project on Government Secrecy Sat, 28 Nov 2009 00:31:30 -0500 http://wordpress.org/?v=abc hourly 1 By: Frank http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/2009/06/classification_review-2.html/comment-page-1#comment-3720 Frank Wed, 03 Jun 2009 19:22:52 +0000 http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/?p=2581#comment-3720 Having had a security clearance, I always found it amusing that there is this assumption that things are just classified willy nilly. Now, my experience was in DoD, not in a lot of other areas that also have classified information, such as Treasury, State, Customs, the FBI and so on. For DoD, classification is done by program or project. Say the SR-71 to point to a program that is no longer being flown. Initially if its secret, as it was, it would have a codeword to denote it. For the Lockheed program, it was Oxcart. Hence, the classifier would be Oxcart. You would have to be cleared for that information to have access. Even if you had a clearance, you would have to have a need to know about the program. Either a test pilot, intelligence analyst who looks at the photographs, maintenance, and so on. There would be a Security Classification Guide (SCG) associated with this project. Documents would be denoted classified say, Secret, by Oxcart SCG, with a declassify by date on them. Now, declassification would be by Originating Agency Declassification Review (OADR) in most cases. Sometimes the SCG would say, declassify 6 months for example after flight. But that would be the document for classifying information on the project. Usually pretty comprehensive. But, NOT EVERYTHING is classified. One project, for example, basic science was unclassified. For the most part, limits, areas of vulnerability, operations, were classified. For obvious reasons. Maximum altitude or speed would be another area for aircraft, at least initially. Like any bureaucracy, there should be some backup for why its classified. Now, if you disagree with it, you can challenge it. And for the most part, DoD had requirements that improperly classified information should be tagged and sent up for declassification. No sense in having more stuff classified than you need to. And don't forget, you have to put a number on it, keep it in a safe or secure location, maintain the log, audit the materials usually every 30 days, all that. Are there people who go overboard? Probably. But realistically, at the end of a program, say SR-71 quits flying, pretty much everything except the intelligence or sensitive items should be declassified. 25 years is more than enough for most material. Except if its still in use or say is sensitive for intelligence reasons. Lets say names of Vietnamese agents in Hanoi as a wild guess, but anything to do with South Vietnam or the Vietnam war should pretty much be open except if it would show sources and methods, say how we tap telephones. Having had a security clearance, I always found it amusing that there is this assumption that things are just classified willy nilly. Now, my experience was in DoD, not in a lot of other areas that also have classified information, such as Treasury, State, Customs, the FBI and so on.

For DoD, classification is done by program or project. Say the SR-71 to point to a program that is no longer being flown. Initially if its secret, as it was, it would have a codeword to denote it. For the Lockheed program, it was Oxcart. Hence, the classifier would be Oxcart.

You would have to be cleared for that information to have access. Even if you had a clearance, you would have to have a need to know about the program. Either a test pilot, intelligence analyst who looks at the photographs, maintenance, and so on.

There would be a Security Classification Guide (SCG) associated with this project. Documents would be denoted classified say, Secret, by Oxcart SCG, with a declassify by date on them. Now, declassification would be by Originating Agency Declassification Review (OADR) in most cases. Sometimes the SCG would say, declassify 6 months for example after flight.

But that would be the document for classifying information on the project. Usually pretty comprehensive.

But, NOT EVERYTHING is classified. One project, for example, basic science was unclassified. For the most part, limits, areas of vulnerability, operations, were classified. For obvious reasons. Maximum altitude or speed would be another area for aircraft, at least initially.

Like any bureaucracy, there should be some backup for why its classified. Now, if you disagree with it, you can challenge it. And for the most part, DoD had requirements that improperly classified information should be tagged and sent up for declassification. No sense in having more stuff classified than you need to.

And don’t forget, you have to put a number on it, keep it in a safe or secure location, maintain the log, audit the materials usually every 30 days, all that.

Are there people who go overboard? Probably.

But realistically, at the end of a program, say SR-71 quits flying, pretty much everything except the intelligence or sensitive items should be declassified.

25 years is more than enough for most material. Except if its still in use or say is sensitive for intelligence reasons. Lets say names of Vietnamese agents in Hanoi as a wild guess, but anything to do with South Vietnam or the Vietnam war should pretty much be open except if it would show sources and methods, say how we tap telephones.

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