Reply: Don’t know. Do you know of any? HK

Herein lies the problem. The US is planning to make 100% sure that if it attacks China, the PLA would be helpless like in the Korean war. That it is unable to strike the US.

The Pentagon is living in a fool’s paradise if it thinks it can eliminate the PLA arsenal with impunity. Those days are long gone. Yes in a showdown the Chinese will still have more to loose but the US ain’t going to escape punishment for starting a war.

Reply: It would be interesting to hear more about the basis for your conclusion that China could be destroyed 100% but the US only 50%. Even so, most agree that China’s nuclear posture is not poised for a first strike against the United States.

Yet China’s posture is changing and its next generation of long-range solid-fuel missiles will not have the same operational constraints as the old DF-5 liquid-fueled missiles. How more capable weapons will influence Chinese nuclear policy in the future remains to be seen, but if the history of the other nuclear powers are an indication, then there is no reason to believe Chinese nuclear policy will remain static. You somewhat acknowledge this trend by saying the days are long gone when the US could eliminate China’s nuclear arsenal with impunity.

That China would have “more to loose” in a nuclear war certainly depends on who’s counting and what’s being counted. In terms of the size of nuclear arsenals, certainly, but it’s hard to find winners in nuclear wars. And the devastation and international repercussions of a nuclear exchange or disarming strike (if one believes in such an option) would be on a scale that would make both countries big losers. HK

Reply: As far as is known in the United States, DF-31A is not yet operational. There’re are many rumors on the Internet, but if you could point us to a credible source on DF-31A in Delingha, we are many who would like to see it.

As far as I can see, it looks like DF-21 (or perhaps DF-25, if that is indeed the mysterious new missile that has emerge recently). The trucks are certainly not long enough to be DF-31s, unless there’s a shorter version than the ones that have been displayed. I expect the DF-31A launcher will be longer that the DF-31 given its longer range. I have been holding back on the DF-25, however, because there has been no hint about it in the intelligence reports in recent years.

As for the safety of Delingha from B-2 attacks, I doubt Chinese planners are as confident as you. HK

My personal suspicion is that Delinghua is no longer an operational launch base per se, but rather a 2nd Artillery unit training area. My reasons for this suspicion are as follows.

1) Lack of uniformity of launch facilities (of which IO counted 22 on the site). Militaries prize uniformity, from clothes to training to launch pads. Uniformity allows maximization of operating procedure efficiency and efficacy. This facility is marked precisely by a lack of uniformity.

2) The former launch pads appear to be nothing more than large parking lots now, and the actual launch sites differ widely into the following types:

Crop Circles (3): Main launch strips are all 45m in length. The first one of these is at 37°27’14.41″N 97° 1’54.73″E, and is a large launching strip with access for support vehicles and ancillary buildings for some unique purpose for this particular strip (none of the other sites have these) another is at is at 37°24’50.34″N: 96°49’45.58″E, with the concrete appearing slightly distressed, and the third at 37°27’46.54″N: 96°50’9.63″E and the concrete and surrounding terrain appears very distressed. Why would an operational site have distressed concrete?

Long Strips (4): all are 40m, no paved access road, two are clean, one looks distressed, one is of bedrock, but exactly 40m and with vehicle tracks.

Short Strips (5): 15m long, unpaved access.

Mystery square: 10x10m at 37°25’40.04″N: 96°50’22.40″E. No shadow, seems like a pad, but for what?

Road shoulders (9): Ranging from 40m to 550m in length. Though not necessarily for launches, these varied lengths would make for very useful practice both for individual TELs and convoys.

Unfinished (1): 37°24’36.75″N: 96°50’44.94″E. Recognizable only by semicircular rivetment. Also have seen very suspicious picture of DF15 launch with consistent alluvial geology.

In summary, as nuclear warfare base for mobile missiles Delinghua makes little sense, as a training center it makes more sense IMHO. [edited, ed.]

Reply: Great comments and analysis. This is the problem of limited intelligence: many possibilities but little evidence. HK

Also, letting my imagination run… I can’t tell if the paved surface is concrete or gravel despite the tire smudging. However, concrete might be a good defense against ground penetrating radar in the event underground operations were increased. Also, the trucks could carry in excavation implements and carry out dirt. If I was to dig beneath one of these “pad” structures, I’d put the access hole right in the center. Look at Launch Site 1. Hmm, it’s somewhat plausible!

The counterpart strategy against the US would be to hit Guam and/or Okinawa, maybe a carrier, with medium range missiles, while holding the DF-5s and JL-2s in reserve. [shortened, ed.]

Reply: Thanks for the appraisal. I’ve forwarded your recommendation to our computer department. HK

If this is true, there could be an effort to shore up these areas to in fact attempt to provide the ability to rapidly neutralize Russian silos in the event of conflict before the Russians even attempt a launch. If this is true, however, it begs the question if the Chinese have worked on improving their fusing in order to provide a hard-kill capability needed to target those SS-18 and -25 silos.

Also, if these [missiles] are placed [deployed] as they look to be, these weapons could also be within range of marshaling, logistics, and rail-head positions that would be feeding a long logistical train towards Russian forces in the West.

Reply: My sense is that the missiles are for generic targeting along the Russian border, not necessarily targeting of the silos, which are both too many and too hard. HK

Reply: I am very careful in my analysis not to conclude that China is targeting the Russian ICBM fields, but to describe the changed deployment sites. It is probably more interesting how Russia may be targeting the Delingha sites. HK

Reply: I agree, I don’t think they are doing counterforce as we know it from US doctrine. But China does have a doctrine of “nuclear counterattack” (or “counterstrike”), and the 2006 defense white paper described efforts to “increase its capabilities of landbased strategic nuclear counterstrikes.” Does increasing the capabilities of the “counterstrikes” mean the same as increasing the capabilities of the delivery platforms, or something else?

At least to me it’s not entirely clear whether the “nuclear counterattack” doctrine implies the same kinds of targets as in countervalue or could include something else. Even under China’s non-alert posture, planners will have to put x’s on the map in advance somewhere. And increased delivery capabilities in other nuclear powers have had a nasty tendency of creating mission-creep. HK