Comments on: Targeting Missile Defense Systems

By: antti

antti — Mon, 05 Nov 2007 03:57:15 +0000

Antti: What do you make of the claims that a U.S. missile defense system in Czech and Poland would be a crucial step towards the militarization of space? People at the Heritage Foundation and elsewhere seem to think it only natural that the unreliable Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system be replaced by a more efficient space-based interceptor system. It’s hard to imagine there’d be no nuclearization of space once interceptors would be in place. Further, the sought-for GMD alternatives, including space-based interceptors, would be designed to strike their targets in the boost phase, essentially making space-based interceptors a first-strike weapon.

Reply: I personally doubt we’ll see nuclearization (meaning deployment of nuclear weapons in orbit) of space. But as missile defenses gradually improve, we’ll probably see more of a direct effect on nuclear planning (on the ground) as well, especially as the size of the nuclear arsenals decline. Offensive-defensive integration will be the next problem. HK

By: Happy

Happy — Sat, 27 Oct 2007 15:16:37 +0000

Happy: This is like the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962. At that time, the USSR was the aggressor, but today it’s the US. History repeats itself. I wonder if our politicians truly learn from the past. What would the US do if Russia, feeling threatened, re-targeted its missiles against Western-Europe? If you had some advices for both sides to solve this matter peacefully, what would it be? [edited]

Reply: The dispute is very different from the Cuban missile crisis. Neither side is a clear aggressor, but both increasingly fall victim to their failure to end Cold War posturing with nuclear weapons on high alert. Russian planners see a need to plan against a European missile defense system because it could disturb the effectiveness of their nuclear strike options. US planning against Iran is so worst-case-scenario that it is allowed to disrupt relations with Russia. Resolving this matter will require concessions on both sides, but my biggest concern is that this – combined with many other disputes with Russia – leads to a empowerment of Cold War warriors in both countries. Preventing that requires bold political leadership, not military worst-case planning. HK

By: L

Fri, 20 Jul 2007 08:40:21 +0000

L: Hey, thanks for your reply. I totally agree. I just wanted to say soething to the last point about pursuading other countries to follow: It is of course also important to persuade non nuclear countries (like Iran) to not join nuclear armament – I’m sure you implicated this.

Due to your article, Russia could be seen as an example as they plan to disarm their arsenal down to 150 ICBMs in 2015. The US seems here like an anti-example, saying nations shouldn’t develop nuclear weapons but renovate (or at least not disarm – you’re the expert here) their own nuclear arsenal in the same breath. Some nations might regard this a bit unfair.

Reply: For sure it’s important to persuade others from developing nuclear weapons, but at least on this issue there are very strong international efforts underway to pressure those countries. The existing nuclear powers, in contrast, are not under nearly as much pressure to reduce and disarm their nukes. All – without exeption – are modernizing their nuclear forces.

Ten years ago I would have held Russia forward as an example, but not today. Going to lower numbers is not enough if those weapons continue to be modernized and the importance of nuclear weapons reiterated in official statements. The meter of progress today is not the number of weapons, but lack of modernization, disavowing the salience of nuclear weapons in national and international policy, and an unambiguous plan to move toward disarmament. HK

By: Pavel

Pavel — Fri, 20 Jul 2007 04:51:41 +0000

Pavel: And a good link to add to your collection. It's a first in a series of several articles on Soviet/Russian missile defense. [shortened, ed.]

By: L

Thu, 19 Jul 2007 20:52:49 +0000

L: It’s really interesting to read that the situation is not new (just with switched positions). Thank you very much for this blog post! Am I the only one who thinks that nuclear weapons are quite insane? I see much more long term damage than strategic win – well maybe others see this different.

Reply: Your point about lack of “strategic win” is astute. I think it is difficult for most people to see a real value or purpose of nuclear weapons other than having a few as an ultimate insurance.

The big challenge – the one we’re facing right now – is how to turn down the requirement for a “credible deterrence,” which locks planners into an endless refinement of weapons and strike plans, to a sufficient deterrence of a small inventory of almost dormant weapons in storage.

That will require some unilateral steps combined with an aggressive foreign policy effort to try to engage and ultimately persuade the other nuclear powers to follow. HK