Obviously one risk in such deployment, from Cold War experience, is loss of a boat through accident – with the wreck then being salvaged by another nation. A Chinese deep submergence capability (cf. the US Deep Submergence Systems Project, prompted by the loss of the USS Thresher) would seem to be a prerequisite for such a deployment, to mitigate that risk.

Reply: Military subs can’t dive deeper than approximately 300-700 meters, so a submersible with a 7,000-meter capability doesn’t in and of itself suggest a link to SSBN operations. One possibility, as you suggest, although that is not clear from the article, is that the submersible could have a secondary mission to check on military subs that might sink in deep water. Another mission could be to rescue sailors from sunken subs, but that requires the submersible to be designed to attach to the hull. So I think it is too early to say whether the submersible is linked to military sub operations. HK

Type 093: site 1 and site 2

Comparison between type 094 and 092: site 3

What is your comment about these internet pictures? Bloggers always mentioning PLA has not only one Type 092 SSBN, but that there are a number of 092s in the inventory. This is because PLA is using the same Hull number (406) but different subnumber. For example, such as 406A for one submarine, 406B for another. However, they display the same hull number when shown publicly. The purpose is very obvious: To confuse intelligence analysis. So, is that real? [edited]

Reply: You’re certainly right that there are many claims on the internet about Chinese submarines. Part of the problem is that China doesn’t make factual information about its submarine fleet available to the public.

The sub images on the first two sites you listed show the Type-093 class, called the Shang-class by the U.S. intelligence community. Sea trials began in 2005 and several boats reportedly have been launched, although I haven’t seen a “solid” number yet. Type-093 is expected to replace the five noisy Han-class (Type 091) submarines during the next years. Retirement of the first Type-091 has already begun. Whether China will replace the Type-091s with Type-093s on a one-for-one basis or build more is unknown.

As far as I know, there is only one Type-092; the Xia. There were reports in the 1980s and early 1990s that a second Type-092 had been launched, but that rumor died. The U.S. intelligence community only lists one Type-092. But the Xia was modified a couple of years ago and the “new look” may have given rise to rumors when bloggers compare old and new pictures.

As for the numbers painted on the hull, I agree with you that they can be confusing and not necessarily be used as “proof” of more subs. Generally speaking, when making assessments about these matters, it is good not to rely on a single image but consult many sources over a longer period. HK

Reply: Although we have seen recently that U.S. intelligence can make serious mistakes, I prefer their assessment over the many rumors that circulate on the internet about Julang-2…that is, unless the rumors are backed up by something. They tend not to be. Good analysis is one thing, but simply stating something as a matter of fact is quite another. Ask any one of the bloggers how they know it is multiple warheads.

There is no way other than U.S. intelligence assessments that I know of to “confirm” that the Julang-2 has only one warhead. U.S. intelligence monitors the test flights and can “see” what the Chinese fly on their missiles during development. It is presumably based on that type of intelligence – as well as spying inside China – that they make their assessment.

But why would China deploy multiple warheads on their SLBMs? China has so far not demonstrated a serious interest in doing so, even though they’ve had the capability to load multiple warheads on the DF-5 for years. It also wouldn’t fit well with the relaxed posture that China has deployed up till now. Moreover, doing so would put a lot of eggs in a very vulnerable basket, so to speak, and increasing the vulnerability of the force – not decreasing it – is China’s current priority.

I can only see missile defense as a potential justification for China to consider deploying multiple warheads on their missiles, but even then it might only be multiple reentry vehicles, not necessarily warheads. The difference being that if a missile defense system forces Chinese planners to chose between loading 2-3 warheads on a missile and loading 1 warhead plus a handful of penetration aids and decoys to ensure the warhead can get through the defenses, then I guess they would probably chose the latter option. If I were to speculate beyond that, I think multiple warhead capability is more likely to occur on China’s non-nuclear ballistic missiles in the future.

As for the picture of the Type 093, I’ve seen several pictures that claim to be the new attack submarine. Which picture are you talking about? HK

Do we have any idea of the CEP of the new submarine-launched missiles? Are they able to provide anything close to a “hard-kill” capability, or are they more tailored towards targeting cities?

Reply: I haven’t seen anything credible on the accuracy of the Julang-2, although it is reasonable to assume that the missile is probably more accurate than its predecessor the Julang-1.

As for hard target kill capability, there are reports that China is improving the accuracy of its short-range conventional missiles, but I don’t see that as a goal for the current Chinese nuclear modernization.

The question of deployment outside China’s territory is, as I mention in the blog, one of the implications of a sea-based deterrent. Whether China plans to deploy nuclear weapons on SSBNs on deterrent patrol like the other old nuclear powers do or simply have it as a surge deployment option is not known. Given the extraordinary vulnerability of relatively noisy Chinese SSBNs, it is hard to see what China would gain in its posture by deploying nuclear weapons at sea. Right now, China may simply be trying to see if they can develop a fully operational SSBN – something they failed to demonstrate with the Xia. HK

Reply: I have seen references to the Russians using that, but never the Chinese. HK

The basis for separate deployment of warhead and missiles may be attributed to better authorization control and maybe also due to factional differences between the different branches of PLA.

What’s interesting is that the bottom sub has an unknown box shaped object on the tail….

Reply: Good points. So you think the separation of warheads and missiles might be beaucratic rather than policy related?

I studied the shaft also, but concluded that it might be that neither the propellor nor the rudder has been installed yet and that the “box” is part of the separation of the two. The image of the Xianpingdao sub also shows an extension after the hull, although it appears less box-like, but that may be because the submarine is lower in the water. HK

How much more difficult is it to make a SLBM with 13000 km (incidentally 8000 miles) range, instead of 8000km? There are various reports on the internet that say JL2 has a range of 8000 miles. If so, there is no need for patrol and the war heads can be mated when there is a need. The sea water is simply used as a cover for the subs. That may be why the Chinese is willing to show their subs so openly.

Reply Only the Chinese know the actual range. The 8,000 km number comes from the US intelligence community; the estimate presented in the 2007 DOD report on Chinese military forces is “8,000+ km” (p. 42). But other elements of the intelligence community has given other ranges. The uncertainty probably reflects the fact that the missile has not been flight tested at full range.

There’re a lot of unsubstantiated rumors on the web about Chinese nuclear forces. The 13,000 km range is for the DF-5A. Not even the US can squeeze 13,000 km into a SLBM. An 8,000 km range Julang-2 would be significant enough and a considerable improvement over the 1,770+ km of the Julang-1.

If the US maritime strategy of the 1980s is any indication, any Chinese SSBN – regardless of missile range – trying to slip out of port in crisis would face a rough time being hunted by US attack submarines. HK

The Xiaopingdao sub is fully fitted, nearly or is already operational. That is one reason from both images, why the sub sinks lower in the water than the two new subs in Huludao. Being stationed in Xiaopingdao is also indication of an operational status, because if the sub is in trials, it won’t go far from the Huludao base.

The two new Huludao subs are high in the water line indicating they are not fully fitted yet.

Reply: The cloud patterns and boat wakes indicate that the date of the Xiaopingdao image is October 17, 2006. Yes something has changed about the image, and the submarine is significantly more grainy than the first one I downloaded.

Well, the Xiaopingdao sub appears to be further along in the outfitting than the two new subs, but how far toward full operational status is anyones guess. I think three subs too, but had to at least raise the hypothetical uncertainty. HK

Reply: No, it the old Xia (Type 092) in drydock. I first described this image in the report Chinese Nuclear Forces and US Nuclear War Planning from November 2006. The image itself was taken sometime in 2005. HK