Reply: I would have rejected this comment, but it is a good example of a conspiratory theory that mixes selective bits from history with unsubstantiated claims about the government’s intensions toward Iran and North Korea. Everyone can have an opinion, of course, and there are certainly plenty of disagreement out there about what kind of policy to pursue toward Iran and North Korea. But the comments don’t present a shred of evidence that backs up the claims and opinions. Besides, who are the “saner heads” running U.S. policy, if you exclude the “Pentagon/President/politicians”? I don’t know who else makes decisions about U.S. strategy and use of force. HK

Dear HK, has the use of WMD in Nagasaki and Hiroshima and mass murder of dozens of thousands of innocent Japanese civilians ever been justified?! One has to apprehend the fact the acceptance of the idea to use nuclear weapon has not been an abstract category for more than a half of century – it is a “real politik” part of mentality of the US conservative political elite….

Reply: Actually, the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki have repeatedly been justified as a way of avoiding landing tens of thousands of troops in Japan and the bloody battles that would have followed such a strategy. But since we fire-bombed Japanese cities extensively it was obviously not civilian casualties that concerned the decision makers back then but probably more how to spare our troops…and then, of course, the opportunity to test and demonstrate a powerful new weapon.

I fail to see why “the acceptance of the idea to use nuclear weapons…is a ‘real politik’ part of mentality of the US conservative political elite.” Both Republican and Democratic political elites (to use your phrase) have accepted the potential use of nuclear weapons, funded nuclear arms build-ups, and modernized capabilities to better be able to do so if necessary. Although the Bush administration embraced preemption in a new dangerous way in its first term, it was under the Clinton administration that the expansion of nuclear targeting policy occurred to cover all forms of WMD. Interpreting history in political terms, I think, misses many of the nuances that are necessary to understand these developments. HK

Reply: I don’t know how many precision weapons the US used in the 2003 strikes on Iraq, but it probably used many more precision weapons than bunker-busters (a nuclear weapons is actually more expensive than a conventional precision weapon). But I doubt nuclear weapons even in the most overblown scenario would ever be used in such numbers that they would ease the conventional weapons demand. Given US conventional capabilities, what single specific target in Iran is so important that it would justify use of a nuclear weapon? HK

By this, I mean a detailed analysis of a strike aimed at destroying every strategic target in Iran, from military bases, WMD production sites, industrial sites, etc; via bomber delivered devices in the vein of Strategic Air Command’s ‘Sunday punch’ of the 1950s and 1960s.

It would be interesting to see the reaction if it was publicly admitted that we could, if we wanted to, destroy Iran as a nation, completely and totally while not using 2/3rds of our Triad, and the reaction within the region.

Reply: Yet it is not my sense that the new options in Revision 03 against regional states are designed to “destroy Iran as a nation, completely and totally.” They are not Soviet-era strike plans but probably relatively limited options to take out strategic targets associated with WMD. But the question is: since we have the conventional capabilities to cripple Iran (and they probably know it), why are the nuclear strike plans necessary? HK

Reply: I agree entirely, but in translating the political guidance into military plans the military also has a responsibility to carefully weigh the options and analyze the rationales. And without political oversight those plans can quickly become excessive and dominated by worst-case scenarios. HK

Reply: Well, fair enough that you believe so, but at least enlighten us with the analysis based on which you reach the conclusion that “the Pentagon should indeed have plans for nuclear contingencies for regional actors that seek or have WMD.” HK

The political consequences for the United States for using a nuclear weapon are VERY HIGH. If this is the case, then what good are they? In short, they are the ultimate insurance policy. They have a historical record of preventing wars between major powers. They also provide the final guarantee of national sovereignty to nation states.

However, I am not so sure that this applies to nation states who have only a few weapons. I am VERY dubious of an existential deterrent. Based on the historical examples, it seems to me that the more weapons you have, the less likely it is that another nation-state will attempt to conquer you. Yes, there may be limited wars on the borders, strikes, etc. but does anyone really think that India would make a serious effort to conquer Pakistan? No, because Pakistan would resort to using the dozens of nuclear weapons it has.

So, are there limits on nuclear weapons? I think that depends on your perception of your national security. I don’t think that few to no nuclear weapons guarantees peace. I do think that double to triple digits of weapons promotes stability. In the case of the US and Russia, thousands seem appropriate considering their global ambitions. I believe that if these nations became regional powers, their need for thousands of weapons would decrease.

Reply: A challenge in discussing the role of nuclear weapons is to keep their mission separate from that of conventional weapons, and to think clearly about the unique role the nuclear weapons are intended to play.

In this blog I describe a nuclear policy development that appears to go beyond what you call “ultimate insurance policy” and the “final guarantee of national sovereignty to nation states” and “preventing wars between major powers,” to one of broadening the role of nuclear weapons against regional states that cannot threaten the “national sovereignty” or the survival of the United States. And where we (and some of them) appear to be preparing for major war anyway. Against regional states, many of our assumptions about the role and effect of nuclear weapons appear to fall short. Yet there is a great temptation to mirror Cold War nuclear deterrence theory onto the regions.

Instead I see an tendency to create effects-based planning, where it is less about influencing the behavior of regional states and more about ensuring target destruction if necessary. The new Global Strike mission is a strong example of this, precisely because it is based on the conclusion that deterrence will fail sooner or later and we therefore need better capabilities to hit the regional states quicker.

The “historical example” you mention where “the more weapons you have, the less likely it is that another nation-state will attempt to conquer you” has a serious flaw: Last time we tried that recipe, it spiralled into the Cold War nuclear arms race with the United States and the Soviet Union both convinced that the other side was trying to do just that.

As for your suggestion that nuclear weapons prevent India from trying to conquer Pakistan, did India ever try doing that before Pakistan acquired nuclear weapons? I don’t think so, and the Kargil War of 1999 suggests that nuclear weapons are not necessarily a guarantee against war between two nuclear powers.

Whether double or triple digit numbers of nuclear weapons are necessary I don’t know, but for the most powerful conventional military power on the planet to argue that it needs nuclear weapons to deter regional powers from using weapons of mass destruction should, I think, at least make us pause and ask why. I know Congress is planning to do so. HK

The headline could read: “Pentagon has nuclear weapons and plans how to use them.”

The fact that the Pentagon plans for nuclear contingencies outside of the near-peers seems logical to me. In fact, shouldn’t they be doing that?

The debate should center on whether or not the United States should have nuclear weapons at all, not whether they plan to use them or not.

For me, reductions in numbers of weapons (a la NPT) is a separate argument from military plans. If the US still has weapons, it should plan on how to use them if they are needed.

Reply: That’s an interesting logic. Do you see any limit to the potential use of nuclear weapons? HK

I also notice this statement in your post: “but envisioned actual nuclear warfighting intended to annihilate a wide range of facilities in order to deprive the states the ability to launch and fight with WMD.” It seems to me, on some limited evidence, that Bush has revived intra-war deterrence thinking in relation to regional WMD contingencies. PDD-60 reportedly deleted the “prevailing in a protracted nuclear war” provisions of NSDD13 so could, perhaps to speculate, one of the things that NSPD-14 has done is to revive intra-war deterrence (the conceptual core of NSDD13) hence the need to go beyond PDD-60 in presidential guidance?

Reply: I don’t agree with your theory that US nuclear weapons are “not meant to deter attacks on the CONUS.” That is certainly still the core, but we’re seeing a broadening of the mission and a lowering of the conflict intensity level where nuclear weapons could potentially be used.

Your observation about what you call intra-war deterrence is astute. There is certainly a new element of warfighting about this type of planning, especially given the absence of an existential threat to the United States from the regional adversaries. HK