By Hans M. Kristensen
The Chinese navy has deployed a Jin-class (Type 094) ballistic missile submarine to a new base near Yulin on Hainan Island on the South China Sea, according to a satellite image obtained by FAS. The image shows the submarine moored at a pier close to a large sea-entrance to an underground facility.
Also visible is a unique newly constructed pier that appears to be a demagnetization facility for submarines.
A dozen tunnels to underground facilities are visible throughout the base compound.
The satellite image, which has also been described in Jane’s Defense Weekly, was taken by the QuickBird satellite on February 27, 2008, and purchased by FAS from DigitalGlobe.
The Arrival of the Jin-Class Submarine
The dimensions of the submarine in the satellite image are similar to the Jin-class SSBN I spotted at Xiaopingdao Submarine Base in July 2007 and the two Jin-class SSBNs I detected at the Bohai shipyard in October 2007.
China is believed to have launched two Jin-class SSBNs with a third possibly under construction. The U.S. Intelligence community estimates that China might possibly build five SSBNs if it wants to have a near-continuous deterrent at sea. Of course, it is not known whether China plans to operate its SSBNs that way. See Figure 1 for the location of the submarine.
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Figure 1: |
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| A new satellite photo purchased by FAS from DigitalGlobe shows a Chinese Jin-class SSBN at Yulin (Sanya) Naval Base on Hainan Island. Additional piers are outside the left frame of the photo. Click on image for larger photo. North is left. |
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Missile loadout of the SSBN will probably take place at pierside at the main pier to the left of the narrow triple-pier where the submarine is seen, unless the underground facility is large enough to permit such operations out of satellite view. Not yet visible at the base is a dry dock large enough to accommodate an SSBN; the Northern Fleet submarine base at Jianggezhuang has a dry dock.
New Demagnetization Facility
One of the most interesting new additions to the base is what appears to be a submarine demagnetization facility (see Figure 2). Located in the southern part of the base and connected by pier to a facility on a small island, the demagnetization facility closely resembles such facilities at U.S. SSBN bases. Demagnetization is conducted before deployment to remove residual magnetic fields in the metal of the submarine to make it harder to detect by other submarines and surface ships. There is no demagnetization facility at the Jianggezhuang base, so this appears to be a new capability for China.
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Figure 2: |
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| Since 2005, what appears to be a submarine demagnetization facility has been added to the base. Click on image for larger photo. |
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Underground Facilities
The base has extensive underground facilities. The most obvious is a large portal over a sea-entrance to what is probably an underground facility. The entrance appears to be approximately 3 meters (15 feet) wider than a similar entrance at the Northern Fleet Jianggezhuang Naval Base (see Figure 3 for comparison).
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Figure 3: |
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| The submarine cave entrance at Yulin Naval Base (top) is approximately 3 meters wider than the one at Jianggezhuang Naval Base. Click on image for larger photo of the Yulin entrance. Description of the Jianggezhuang facility is available here. |
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Although the interior of the facility is not known, it probably includes a canal at least the length of one submarine as well as halls for handling or possibly storing equipment as well as rooms for personnel. Directly on the other side of the mountain are several land-entrances that might connect to the central facility as well, although none of this is known for sure. Two of those entrances appear from their shadows to be very tall structures (see Figure 4).
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Figure 4: |
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| At least a dozen tunnels to underground facilities are visible, including some very tall ones on the east side of the mountain housing the submarine cave. Click on image for larger photo. |
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Some Implications
The SSBN base on Hainan Island will probably be seen as a reaffirmation of China’s ambitions to develop a sea-based deterrent. To what extent the Chinese navy will be capable of operating the SSBNs in a way that matters strategically is another question. China’s first SSBN, the Xia, was no success and never sailed on a deterrent mission. As a consequence, the Chinese navy has virtually no tactical experience in operating SSBNs at sea. Yet the Jin-class and the demagnetization facility on Hainan Island show they’re trying.
The location of the base is important because the Indian government already has pointed to a future threat from Chinese missile submarines operating in the South China Sea or Indian Ocean. The arrival of the Jin-class in Hainan will probably help sustain India’s own SSBN program. For China to sail an SSBN into the India Ocean and operate it there in a meaningful way, however, will be very difficult and dangerous in a crisis. Chinese SSBNs are more likely to stay close to home.
The base on Hainan Island is near deep water and some analysts suggest this will support submarine patrols better that operations from the Northern Fleet base at Jianggezhuang. Of course, if the water is so shallow the submarine can’t submerge fully it will limit operations, but deep water is - contrary to popular perception - not necessarily an advantage. Military submarines generally are not designed to dive deeper than 400-600 meters, so great ocean depth may be of little value. The U.S. navy has several decades of experience in trailing Soviet SSBNs in the open oceans; shallow waters are much more challenging. And the South China Sea is a busy area for U.S. attack submarines, which have unconstrained access to the waters off Hainan Island. And I’d be surprised if there were not a U.S. “shadow” following the Jin-class SSBN when it arrived at Hainan Island.
Additional information: Chinese Nuclear Forces and U.S. Nuclear War Planning | Chinese Submarine Patrols Rebound in 2007, but Remain Limited | A Closer Look at China’s New SSBNs
April 24th, 2008 at 11:27 am
Very cool stuff!
Nobody, including most Indians, will think that these expensive Paper Tigers are meant to scare the Indians. China has so many other ways and very little need to scare their Indian brothers. If we can be almost certain that these SSBNs based in Hainan are designed to hold CONUS targets at risk, there are only two mutually exclusive conclusions:
(1) The Chinese decision makers are not smart enough to know the drawbacks of basing SSBN in Hainan, such as easy access of US shadow attack subs, easier detection in deep sea, etc.
or
(2) JL-2 has a much longer range and it does not matter where to base the SSBN. Hainan would then be a redundant insurance policy, in addition to other potential bases. The lack of experience in “Strategic Patrol” would thus not matter, and the Chinese leadship can sleep better with their Paper Tigers not roaming too far away.
My question for the experts is whether it is physically impossible for JL-2 to have that kind of range, given the size of 094 type of SSBN. Most Chinese think very similarly. The idea of a Strategic Patrol sounds too risky and too jingoistic to most Chinese, especially when one thinks about China’s no-first-use doctrine.
Reply: Thanks much! As for your comment about “paper tigers,” I agree, there certainly appears to be quite a lot of national status symbol behind the Chinese SSBN program. Even so, the annual report from the Indian Ministry of Defence noted under the “regional picture” in 2003: “As far as India is concerned, it cannot be ignored that every major Indian city is within reach of Chinese missiles and this capability is being further augmented to include Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles(SLBMs).”
Concerning the range, I don’t know what the “experts” will say, but the DOD has lowered the JL-2 range by 10 percent in its 2008 report on Chinese military power; back to the estimate from a few years ago: 7,200+ km. How much extra the “+” translates into is probably insufficient to give the weapon a CONUS mission; I think this is a regional deterrence weapon. HK
April 24th, 2008 at 3:08 pm
Not being too harsh on our experts in DOD or CIA, they do not seem to have a good record of estimating things going on in China. Would any academic JL-2 aficionados satisfy my curiosity about its range upper limit? There are simply not that many targets within 7200 or 8000 km that worth China to develop a second strike capability. We are talking about the ultimate doomsday weapon from China, when all or most of the road mobile DF31A plus the old DF5 are either neutralized or not enough for retaliation. Anyway, if DOD thinks that JL2/094 combo is not meant for CONUS targets, we have no other means of knowing, as China will never tell.
April 25th, 2008 at 10:23 am
Great photos.
I wonder if the US Navy will be using this to go to Congress to ask for more attack subs.
Reply: It’s already there….
April 25th, 2008 at 1:51 pm
My guess is that they realize that they need a credible second strike deterrent, and that they need to start operating the boomers in order to develop the skills to be credible with regard to the US.
April 25th, 2008 at 10:07 pm
The main benefit that deploying in Hainan can offer is that Hainan and South China Sea located mostly beyond the US and its allies’ Ballistic Missile early warning network system currently under setting up mainly around Japan-Taiwan-Hawaii. But I could hardly image if the SLBM carried by the 094 SSBN in Hainan could have been in any deterrent effect should the SLBM’s max range be as short as reported by DoD and the likes.
Although the USN’s Nuclear Submarines could have better access to the deeper waters around Hainan than the shallow one in north, I think that’s not the whole picture. When it can come closer, it still has to face superior number of SSKs and 093 SSNs just nearby as well as modern surface ships with improved ASW. The sheer fact is the number of USN’s SSNs currently operated in west pacific is far too small to form an effective counter force around the whole vast South China Sea.
April 29th, 2008 at 2:59 pm
Some reports say the JL-2 is meant to carry up to Ten MIRV’s. Do you think that’s true?
Reply: No. There are many claims and rumors about Chinese nuclear forces, but none of them provide a source for their claim. My source for writing that JL-2 is intended to carry a single warhead is the U.S. intelligence community, which, as we have seen, is not always right. But until someone provides a better authoritative source that says otherwise, I think its a good play the start.
More important than sources, however, is the question of why China would deploy multiple warheads on missiles. I never see those who claim they have multiple warhead systems explaining China’s strategic thinking behind such a posture. As far as we know, China has a minimum deterrent which is not thought to be on alert - at least the way other nuclear weapon states powers define alert. Those states developed MRV and later MIRV if they needed to build up their nuclear weapons fast to compete with another adversary or overwhelm a missile defense system, or developed a counterforce strategy where they had to hit many different targets quickly in a single strike.
There are no indications, at least as far as I have seen, that China has decided to rapidly build up its nuclear forces or is developing a counterforce strategy. But the U.S. missile defense system - and that of Russia and India (if they develop one in the future) - could potentially provide China with a motivation to deploy MRV or MIRV. If so, however, the assessment of the U.S. intelligence community is that it would probably happen on the silo-based DF-5A ICBMs, not on the mobile systems.
What might confuse some people is that China’s long-range systems are thought to deploy with a package of penetration aids, such as decoys and other technologies intended to confuse missile defense systems. Testing of those packages might have been misunderstood to be MRV or MIRV. HK
May 1st, 2008 at 7:18 pm
I definitely study the next generation warheads that China is developing. The more smaller compact warheads for the DF-5A ICBM. For the DF-5A and the DF-31A the max MIRV payload is said to be 3 90 Kiloton MIRV’s. I keep a very close eye on China’s nuclear Forces, because their nuclear strategy is somewhat unknown.
Replay: Could you possibly reveal the source for your claim that the “payload is said to be 3 90 Kiloton MIRVs.” Thanks. HK
May 3rd, 2008 at 10:11 am
Google Earth indicates that the maximum elevation of the peninsula where the tunnels are is 70 meters. That seems enough for protection against conventional attack or even a nuclear airburst targeted against the surface structures. But it seems kind of thin protection for nuclear surface bursts targeted against the tunnels themselves, no?
Reply: Think access. It probably takes one conventional precision weapon to close each of the entrances. What good at a lot of military equipment inside a well-protected underground facility if you can’t access it and use it? HK
May 4th, 2008 at 11:10 am
PLAN are in need of more ASW planes and warships. Having subs alone doesn’t protect their maritime interest, especially at the new age when large scale military confrontation between nuk owning countries are unlikely.
May 5th, 2008 at 4:32 pm
Not knowing a lot about these things, I would simply say these large “Boomers” are China’s tickets to entry on the world stage as a superpower, someone not to be bullied, and a credible deterrent to anything the US can muster. If they are Mirv-ed, and say, four of them are fully functional - then at least one or two could possibly get launches off before our attack subs could find them in time. Lets see, two, times, say five mirved missiles, say 25 warheads hitting targets in US soil. Think: 25 9-11 catastrophes, at least. Now that, folks, is a credible deterrent.