Comments on: Another Nuclear Trade Deal, This Time with Russia http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2008/05/another-nuclear-trade-deal-this-time-with-russia.php Comments and analyses of important national and international security issues Fri, 25 May 2012 17:31:54 +0000 hourly 1 http://wordpress.org/?v= By: Pavel http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2008/05/another-nuclear-trade-deal-this-time-with-russia.php/comment-page-1#comment-2990 Pavel Tue, 20 May 2008 22:41:11 +0000 http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/?p=242#comment-2990 Ivan, reprocessing is specifically excluded from the agreement (NPAS, p. 25): "Article 9 [of the agreement] [...] does not include reprocessing in the list of activities for which U.S. consent is given" Ivan, reprocessing is specifically excluded from the agreement (NPAS, p. 25):

“Article 9 [of the agreement] [...] does not include reprocessing in the list of activities for which U.S. consent is given”

]]> By: Jon Wolfsthal http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2008/05/another-nuclear-trade-deal-this-time-with-russia.php/comment-page-1#comment-2989 Jon Wolfsthal Tue, 20 May 2008 22:08:30 +0000 http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/?p=242#comment-2989 Just a quick reaction from Japan and I will write more later. While I appreciate Ivan 's concerns about GNEP, my questions is - why not mount opposition to GNEP and why use the US-Russia 123 as a target? Also, if you are concerned about reprocessing - as I am - then you must take into account that Russia could - under this agreement - accept spent fuel from Taiwan and the ROK lessening the interest in those two states to mount domestic reprocessing campaigns. If reprocessing is your focus, then you have to take a broader look into it. Also, I cannot agree with your interpretation about the agreement. Yes, it does permit alteration in form with consent, but I do not think this was included to permit reprocessing. I fact, Russia did not ask for and was not given progammatic consent for such activities. The agreement did envision the US sending sample fuel elements to Russia for testing and "post irradiation examination" but such steps would be useful for plutonium disposition as well. The nonpro impacts of the agreement should be considered in total, not in isolation. Just a quick reaction from Japan and I will write more later. While I appreciate Ivan ‘s concerns about GNEP, my questions is – why not mount opposition to GNEP and why use the US-Russia 123 as a target? Also, if you are concerned about reprocessing – as I am – then you must take into account that Russia could – under this agreement – accept spent fuel from Taiwan and the ROK lessening the interest in those two states to mount domestic reprocessing campaigns. If reprocessing is your focus, then you have to take a broader look into it.

Also, I cannot agree with your interpretation about the agreement. Yes, it does permit alteration in form with consent, but I do not think this was included to permit reprocessing. I fact, Russia did not ask for and was not given progammatic consent for such activities. The agreement did envision the US sending sample fuel elements to Russia for testing and “post irradiation examination” but such steps would be useful for plutonium disposition as well.

The nonpro impacts of the agreement should be considered in total, not in isolation.

]]> By: Bob Alvarez http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2008/05/another-nuclear-trade-deal-this-time-with-russia.php/comment-page-1#comment-2974 Bob Alvarez Tue, 20 May 2008 16:19:43 +0000 http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/?p=242#comment-2974 Ivan has presented a cogent analysis of the 123 Agreement between the U.S. and the Russian Federation. However, its not clear that the U.S. government will be able to disentangle itself from the imperative to reprocess spent reactor fuel and establish a plutonium fuel economy, once this agreement enters into force. At issue is the fate of some 33,000 metric tons of spent reactor fuel containing U.S. origin nuclear material subject to U.S. consent rights. While Russian nuclear officials have recently expressed no further interest in U.S. origin spent fuel, the facts remain that the Russian Duma has approved importation of this material.Moreover, the 123 Agreement provides the framework to allow it to happen, without further approval by the U.S. Congress. Without the billions of dollars in revenues that could flow from managing U.S. orgin spent fuel, its not clear how Russia will generate the necessary private funds to achieve its goal of a closed fuel cycle. Whether or not GNEP survives beyond the Bush administration, the agreement's endorsement of a closed fuel cycle may prove to be more trouble than its worth. Ivan has presented a cogent analysis of the 123 Agreement between the U.S. and the Russian Federation. However, its not clear that the U.S. government will be able to disentangle itself from the imperative to reprocess spent reactor fuel and establish a plutonium fuel economy, once this agreement enters into force.

At issue is the fate of some 33,000 metric tons of spent reactor fuel containing U.S. origin nuclear material subject to U.S. consent rights. While Russian nuclear officials have recently expressed no further interest in U.S. origin spent fuel, the facts remain that the Russian Duma has approved importation of this material.Moreover, the 123 Agreement provides the framework to allow it to happen, without further approval by the U.S. Congress. Without the billions of dollars in revenues that could flow from managing U.S. orgin spent fuel, its not clear how Russia will generate the necessary private funds to achieve its goal of a closed fuel cycle.

Whether or not GNEP survives beyond the Bush administration, the agreement’s endorsement of a closed fuel cycle may prove to be more trouble than its worth.

]]> By: kestasjk http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2008/05/another-nuclear-trade-deal-this-time-with-russia.php/comment-page-1#comment-2972 kestasjk Tue, 20 May 2008 15:10:28 +0000 http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/?p=242#comment-2972 If reprocessing is so crazy why are they pursuing it: - Economic reasons - Diplomatic reasons (it's a lot of money just for that, right?) - Military reasons (US and Russia collaborating to build more bombs, surely not) - Security reasons, less reliance on new fuel? Keeping an eye out for the future? If they're going for it so strong they must have good reasons, and I feel like there must be an omission in the articles recently regarding this. It sounds like you want a fast breeder reactor on US soil one minute, but want to cut funding and scrap reprocessing the next. As a layman I don't get it; isn't recycling nuclear waste good? (And isn't international collaboration on recycling nuclear waste better still?) If reprocessing is so crazy why are they pursuing it:
- Economic reasons
- Diplomatic reasons (it’s a lot of money just for that, right?)
- Military reasons (US and Russia collaborating to build more bombs, surely not)
- Security reasons, less reliance on new fuel? Keeping an eye out for the future?

If they’re going for it so strong they must have good reasons, and I feel like there must be an omission in the articles recently regarding this.

It sounds like you want a fast breeder reactor on US soil one minute, but want to cut funding and scrap reprocessing the next. As a layman I don’t get it; isn’t recycling nuclear waste good? (And isn’t international collaboration on recycling nuclear waste better still?)

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