Reply: Delingha is an old deployment area, and any base area will have a mix of testing and training activities. The “pack up and go” tents etc. are characteristics of the old DF-3 and DF-4 missile regiments, but also (although to a smaller extend) of the DF-21 and DF-31. Of course it’s not possible to seal off caves whose locations are not know, nor have I suggested that all of the pads would necessarily be used; they’re launch options.

The vulnerability of mobile missiles certainly depends on the scenario. While a Minuteman in a silo is invulnerable to anything but a very accurate and high-yield warhead, any mobile missile that leaves its cave is highly vulnerable to blast and electromagnetic effects. Its only advantage really is that it can move, which is an advantage only until it’s discovered. And contrary to public belief, Chinese long-range mobile ballistic missiles cannot launch from literally anywhere, due to the size of their launcher and to avoid being damaged by ground debris during blastoff. HK

Reply: Delingha and Da Qaidam have been deployment sites for Chinese nuclear missiles for many decades. This has been reported by declassified and leaked intelligence documents, “private” scholars and experts, as well as occasional news media reports. The location of these facilities far from potential adversaries — combined with what is known about Chinese medium-and long-range ballistic missiles, as well as specific vehicles and structures seen on recent satellite images — all point to nuclear missiles. Of course, it will take a great deal more information to determine that no conventional missiles are present in the area, but China has only recently introduced medium-range ballistic missiles with conventional warheads. They, and short-range ballistic missiles, are thought to be deployed further toward the Taiwan region.

Reporting on Chinese nuclear missile deployments is not “fear mongering” but scrutiny and analysis, something FAS does on all the nuclear weapon states. This is essential for the public to understand and debate the status and role of nuclear weapons. Actually, compared with some of the non-governmental reports that have been published about Chinese nuclear forces, I think you’ll find that FAS with its analysis actually is trying to counter “fear mongering.” This is difficult, not least because the Chinese government’s excessive secrecy makes it very easy for the “fear mongers” to do their work. HK

Reply: How do you know that they are conventional ammunition storage areas and that the antennae are lightning conductors? HK

Response from Brit AT: Because “Brit AT” stands for ‘British Ammunition Technician’, and I’ve seen a few.

Reply: So you’re saying that those two sites in China look like British conventional ammunition storage areas. They might, but the raised earth mounds are not, I think, berms surrounding explosive storage facilities, but piled up soil to prevent water erosion of the site. This is evident all over the area for roads and buildings.

Response from Brit AT: Explosive Storage Sites have fairly common identifying features. If anything, NATO sites have moved away from this type of design, due to differing logistic concepts of ops, resource availability and site requirements (although they are still encountered). They are common in former Warsaw Pact countries (often known as ‘platforms’) and they could be expected in most areas where asset protection and explosive safety is considered important. Based on my experience, I consider them to be lightning-protected open stack explosive storage sites. Your comment on erosion prevention holds water (sorry) but there are also indicators of traversing, especially in the photo on the left.

Reply: Fair enough. We have two different interpretations of the two structures, but little to help settle the issue. Time will tell. HK

Since 1964 when China developed its first nuclear weapon, its stated policy has been to “not be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time or under any circumstances.” Thus, logic dictates that all Chinese nuclear weapons would be Paper Tigers unless China is first attacked by nuclear weapons. Like India, which also vows no-first use, China needs to plan for all contingencies. It would be too presumptive to say that China has an India-specific missile. The base in Qinghai would not allow its Paper Tigers to have full coverage of India. If China really wants to hold Indian targets at risk, it would base the missiles much closer. Wars fought in the past give people more reasons for peace for the future. The current trends in the Sino-Indian and Sino-Vietnam relationships are good proof of that. It is illogical to think that China, with its aspirations for a peaceful and prosperous future, would use nuclear weapons to ruin its chance, even if one does not believe China’s NFU doctrine.

Jian

On top of that – alluvial fans (I don’t know about these particular ones) mostly are made up of brecciated conglomerate … or would become such rather were the fan to become a sedimentary rock. Fans in the Nevada deserts (similar to this area) have many rock types from smooth and round in stream beds to sharp and angular, but all fans I’ve driven across even with heavy drilling tires the fans are very dangerous to tires and can easily cause blow-outs. So it is necessary to pave the roads, but the roads need to support heavy several tonned vehicles and their several tonned payloads. And a fan simply cannot easily support such a road bed.

So what’s going on here? Well I think it’s more of a testing facility than a practical strategic missile battery – I don’t think the location suits a strategic importance. The situation is more suited for the similarly temporary testing facilities in Nevada Playas and fans.

http://youtube.com/watch?v=FN3FWjQe8A0

Reply: Once the placemarks have been loaded by GoogleEarth, then you must check the box for the coordinates to show up on your screen and click the “+” to open up the folders. There are two folder in the downloaded file: one for Delingha and one for Da Qaidam. HK