Reply: How can you be sure? “First strike” is not necessarily first use – an out of the blue surprise attack, but can also be a preemptive strike within a military campaign that has already begun. The Commission report is not very clear about this but seems to leave all options open for the planners. HK

If you look into the Russian statement during the ratification in the Duma it explicitly says that hydrodynamic tests are allowed: “At present the sufficiency of regular non-prohibited by the CTBT subcritical and hydrodynamic nuclear tests in order to guarantee safety of storage, transportation and combat readiness of the nuclear warheads with a required degree of credibility is confirmed.”

Reply: The reason a solid-fuel missile doesn’t need as long as a liquid-fuel missile to launch is that the solid-fuel missile already has the fuel in the missile ready for ignition, whereas the liquid-fuel missile must have the fuel transferred from storage tanks first before it can be launched. Fueling the missile on the ramp is a lengthy and dangerous procedure. HK

A change in strategy needs to be used if reduction is to be made. I think FAS & others should campaign for elimnation of land based ICBM launch sites on the mainland just like France. With the vast amount of Sea and Air power There is absolutely no need for this leg. This arrangement will find more acceptance in public and Govt rather than an overall reduction

Reply: No one (that I know of) is suggesting the United States “virtually unilaterally eliminating nuclear weapons.” The path to elimination is a long and bumpy road. What I and I believe many others are looking for is a policy that unequivocally puts us on that road and not one that, which is what I think the Commission report does, pulls over at the first stop and waits for all the others to pass and pave the road first. It’s relatively easy to trim the nuclear arsenal back from the Cold War level. The hard part will be how to articulate a way forward. But it has to be done and there’s a window now that may not stay open for very long. HK

Herman Kahn pointed out that countries like Russia and China have historically been able to absorb massive deaths and casualties during previous conflicts. While the loss of one million people or 10 million in the U.S. would be a catastrophe unlike any other, to China or Russia it is not without precedent.

In the end the U.S. needs a survivable, credible nuclear deterrent that if needed can retaliate in kind against nuclear aggression or prevent the nuclear coercion of key strategic allies.