Reply: I don’t know if “baby step” is the right word, but the impression I get is that in two tests North Korea hasn’t been able to demonstrate convincingly that they have an effective nuclear weapon design. Granted, we don’t know what they’ve been aiming for, and even a small yield is a yield. But at least in my mind it raises some serious questions about the widespread claim that North Korea has actually built nuclear weapons. One problem is a tendency to translate plutonium into weapons. But it takes a great deal more to deploy an operational nuclear weapon than producing some plutonium and setting off an explosion inside a mountain. Are they working on the same test device (2006 and 2009)? Was the second test an actual weapon or only a test device? If it’s only a test device, then they still have to miniaturize it so it can fit under the wing of an aircraft or inside a reentry body on top of a ballistic missile. I don’t know what the intelligence community knows, but what I see in public does not convince me that North Korea has operational nuclear weapons yet. It took them three years to move from test one to test two, from less than one kiloton to less than four (so it seems) kilotons. Whether they think that is sufficient for a weapon remains to be seen. HK

Reply: There are many “ifs” in this matter, but as for the assertion you include from the so-called Cox report, that “Chinese espionage at Los Alamos and other sensitive sites netted them designs for the W-88 (our most advanced warhead) among others,” readers should read the assessment published by Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) before drawing conclusions. HK

The problem with that scenario is (IIRC) the radioactive byproducts that are used to trace such tests are only produced by nuclear explosions and not during normal operation of a reactor.

In those 56 years that have elapsed after the Korean War Armistice, the NKA has likely stockpiled hundreds of thousands of tons of ammunition in its arsenals. The dear Leader may have been persuaded by some ambitious and yet practical-minded ordnance officer that rather than horde it all, the oldest stuff is so marginal that they might as well dispose of it in one big underground detonation that would get rid of about 6000 tons / 6 kt of useless outdated ordinance, artillery shells, mortar rounds, Katyusha rockets, anti-tank gun ammunition, land mines, etc; then sprinkle it with some radioactive byproducts from their reactors so as to get enough radiation to leak out from underground, and thus dear Leader could create the impression that North Korea is a nuclear power when in fact they are not even close to it ?

During the Cold War there was only one return address, the Soviet Union. If we were attacked, massive retaliation-MAD-would be delivered to that return address. Since the end of the Cold War, the Russians and Chinese have been creating other potential return addresses-Iran, North Korea and terror groups. We will never know who attacked us with a HEMP weapon and we do not even have a retaliation policy for a HEMP attack.

Hardening the power grid is not that expensive and the cost of hardening all the critical infrastructures is not expensive compared to the current stimulus and recovery act expenditures. Experts say perhaps 3% to 7% is the range of additional cost of hardening a device if incorporated during the design phase. One expert believes the critical transformers could be protected for only a few hundred million dollars. Compared to a potential massive loss of life, these costs are minuscule. Not protecting against HEMP is the height of irresponsibility toward protecting American life.

Reply: There are different assessments on the need for hardening, how much needs to be hardened, and how significant the threat is. It would be good to see some references to the statements you make.

As for the “many submarines” you say North Korea have that “can deliver [nuclear] missile” to the middle of the United States, I’m not aware they have any submarines that can do that, much less have nuclear missiles that we know currently can deliver nuclear weapons. Can you identify the submarines and missiles you’re taking about? HK

Response from JohnA: You will find extensive materials on the EMP Commission website. Perhaps 80+% of the EMP Commission documentation/work is classified. Because of the general lack of response to this threat, and in answer to questions, the head of the EMP Commission made some comments (likely classified before this hearing) during the 7-10-08 hearing to put this horrendous asymmetric threat into proper perspective. The video of the hearing is on the HASC website (scroll down to July 10th, 2008 and to video and available transcripts).

Reply: If you mean nuclear “war” then I’d estimate the possibility is 2. If you mean nuclear “use” then I’d estimate 5. I think the risk of nuclear “war” – meaning two nuclear powers fighting each other with nuclear weapons – is low because India and Pakistan are probably the greatest possibility right now, but both of them have more important issues to deal with. The risk of nuclear “use” is greater, I think, because of accidental/inadvertent launch of nuclear forces on alert or a terrorist organization getting hold of a weapon. HK

HEMP E1 & E2 effects were details in a full nuclear exchange. However, we did not know about HEMP E3 effect until 1994 when a Russian scientist told us about it and its destructive effects in a conference. We did not know because we tested over water in 1962 and the Soviets tested over land and suffered consequences to their electrical grids and devices. This is likely why they signed the above-ground Test Ban Treaty-because we did not know about E3 and they did.

In the Soviet Union, both the strategic weapons and critical infrastructures were protected against HEMP. Also, nuclear shelters existed in all major cities for the elites as is also the case in China-including the brand new one in Shanghai.

We did not know the Soviets/Russians had a super HEMP weapon until 2004 when Russian generals hired by the EMP Commission told us of its existance. It delivers 200,000 volts/meter at the center of the detonation line-of-sight. We protected our strategic weapons and facilities to 50,000 volts/meter during the Cold War and up to today. Therefore, we are totally unprotected. A HEMP weapon is the perfect asymmetric weapon for a rogue state/terror group to destroy the U.S. Also, we would never know who did it. The Russian’s said this in 1999 when the head of the Russian Duma threatened us with such a HEMP attack over the Kosovo negotiations. Both Iran and North Korea have tested HEMP trajectories-Iran from submarines and NK over Japan. Next question?

Reply: Only this: it would be interesting to see the references for all of that. HK