Comments on: New Air Force Intelligence Report Available http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2009/06/nasic09.php Comments and analyses of important national and international security issues Fri, 25 May 2012 17:31:54 +0000 hourly 1 http://wordpress.org/?v= By: armor http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2009/06/nasic09.php/comment-page-1#comment-12722 armor Fri, 27 Aug 2010 15:46:10 +0000 http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/?p=1342#comment-12722 It could be that India is included in this study due to the prickly relationship it has with Pakistan. Knowledge of the Indian nuclear arsenal would make useful reading for both planning for and reacting to an Indo-Pak confrontation or actual engagement of forces. The threat posed to U.S. interests, even when a friendly or neutral country uses or threatens to use nuclear weapons, is decidedly real and planning for such a possibility is only prudent. It could be that India is included in this study due to the prickly relationship it has with Pakistan. Knowledge of the Indian nuclear arsenal would make useful reading for both planning for and reacting to an Indo-Pak confrontation or actual engagement of forces. The threat posed to U.S. interests, even when a friendly or neutral country uses or threatens to use nuclear weapons, is decidedly real and planning for such a possibility is only prudent.

]]> By: JK http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2009/06/nasic09.php/comment-page-1#comment-8211 JK Fri, 02 Oct 2009 23:23:51 +0000 http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/?p=1342#comment-8211 The National Day Parade confirmed that the "new" DF-21s are the conventional variant, not the ASBM one. The conventional, and very likely the ASBM, DF-21 variants, are using a different TEL compared with the nuclear ones. With two distinct type of TEL, can we say that China is trying to reduce the chance of misinterpretation, avoiding the crisis stability problem mentioned in the FAS 2006 report? <b>Reply: </b>The ASBM is also based on the DF-21 airframe, so there're are two conventional versions: one now (DF-21C) and the future ASBM (DF-21D). It's not my impression that there's a particular effort in Chinese posture planning to avoid misinterpretations by making launcher clearly different. Whether the old nuclear DF-21A/Bs will get the new launcher as well remains to be seen, but even if they don't it's probably harder than people imagine to distinguish between the two TELs in a battle environment. HK The National Day Parade confirmed that the “new” DF-21s are the conventional variant, not the ASBM one.

The conventional, and very likely the ASBM, DF-21 variants, are using a different TEL compared with the nuclear ones.

With two distinct type of TEL, can we say that China is trying to reduce the chance of misinterpretation, avoiding the crisis stability problem mentioned in the FAS 2006 report?

Reply: The ASBM is also based on the DF-21 airframe, so there’re are two conventional versions: one now (DF-21C) and the future ASBM (DF-21D). It’s not my impression that there’s a particular effort in Chinese posture planning to avoid misinterpretations by making launcher clearly different. Whether the old nuclear DF-21A/Bs will get the new launcher as well remains to be seen, but even if they don’t it’s probably harder than people imagine to distinguish between the two TELs in a battle environment. HK

]]> By: JK http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2009/06/nasic09.php/comment-page-1#comment-7801 JK Sun, 14 Jun 2009 16:23:28 +0000 http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/?p=1342#comment-7801 That will certainly be a revealing analysis. Then please have a look at the photos: http://shuzhongxing.photo.hexun.com/39747224_d.html#39747224 and http://www.guofang.info/tsjs/200932/0932747.html There are some support vehicles, linked with the DF-31 TEL by some cables. It seems that these are support vehicles used as power sources (electricity?). Information concerning SS-25 and SS-27 shows nothing about the same kind of support vehicles. Are there similar support vehicles used by the Russian mobile ICBM units, or we are looking at a Chinese feature? That will certainly be a revealing analysis.

Then please have a look at the photos:
http://shuzhongxing.photo.hexun.com/39747224_d.html#39747224
and
http://www.guofang.info/tsjs/200932/0932747.html

There are some support vehicles, linked with the DF-31 TEL by some cables.
It seems that these are support vehicles used as power sources (electricity?).
Information concerning SS-25 and SS-27 shows nothing about the same kind of support vehicles.

Are there similar support vehicles used by the Russian mobile ICBM units, or we are looking at a Chinese feature?

]]> By: JK http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2009/06/nasic09.php/comment-page-1#comment-7797 JK Sat, 13 Jun 2009 14:35:06 +0000 http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/?p=1342#comment-7797 Please have a look at the photo <a target="_blank" href="http://dvs.china.com/unti-linking/china-logo-200-150.gif" rel="nofollow">here</a>. Is it possible that we can know more about whether the Second Artillery Corps will put warheads on top of solid-fuel missiles (DF-31s) on the battlefield? It seems that DF-31 has a nose cone configuration that creates difficulties for a battlefield warhead mating process. <b>Reply: </b>I'm working on a blog about precisely that. Check back later.... Please have a look at the photo here.

Is it possible that we can know more about whether the Second Artillery Corps will put warheads on top of solid-fuel missiles (DF-31s) on the battlefield?

It seems that DF-31 has a nose cone configuration that creates difficulties for a battlefield warhead mating process.

Reply: I’m working on a blog about precisely that. Check back later….

]]> By: Alex http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2009/06/nasic09.php/comment-page-1#comment-7791 Alex Fri, 12 Jun 2009 06:43:56 +0000 http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/?p=1342#comment-7791 I find it interesting that North Korea's two stage booster worked successfully yet the third stage failed. A failure at this stage seems a little coincidental when It is common knowledge that North Korea sold missile technology to Iran, who has manged to complete their third stage booster and put a satellite into orbit. By presenting a third booster stage failure North Korea is portraying a perceived inadequacy in their technology. Deceiving the international community from intervening due to their lack of progress, gives them the time to perfect their Taepo Dong 2 ICBM. It seems incredible to me that the international community's entire strategy could be based on some deficient part in some rocket, have they never heard of disinformation. This seems scarily similar to the Russian deceiving the US that their accelerometer's in their SS-7 were redundant. Causing the US to radically underestimate the Russian's ability to accurately destroy their missile command centers in a surprise attack. I'm not alluding that this is what north Korea has planned, but to underestimate their missile ability due to the failure of their third stage booster seems extremely shortsighted. I find it interesting that North Korea’s two stage booster worked successfully yet the third stage failed. A failure at this stage seems a little coincidental when It is common knowledge that North Korea sold missile technology to Iran, who has manged to complete their third stage booster and put a satellite into orbit. By presenting a third booster stage failure North Korea is portraying a perceived inadequacy in their technology.
Deceiving the international community from intervening due to their lack of progress, gives them the time to perfect their Taepo Dong 2 ICBM. It seems incredible to me that the international community’s entire strategy could be based on some deficient part in some rocket, have they never heard of disinformation.
This seems scarily similar to the Russian deceiving the US that their accelerometer’s in their SS-7 were redundant. Causing the US to radically underestimate the Russian’s ability to accurately destroy their missile command centers in a surprise attack.
I’m not alluding that this is what north Korea has planned, but to underestimate their missile ability due to the failure of their third stage booster seems extremely shortsighted.

]]> By: Amit http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2009/06/nasic09.php/comment-page-1#comment-7776 Amit Wed, 10 Jun 2009 10:45:49 +0000 http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/?p=1342#comment-7776 [Edited] Oh so whats the definition of 'friendly' nuclear armed nations as per US dictionary? It's very strange that the US is feeling insecure about Indian nukes and missiles which are clearly not directed towards it, whereas North Korea and Iran doesn't even appear in this report. They have also dangerous missiles which are threatening. This report is questionable. <b>Reply: </b>It's a good question why India is in a "threat" report that doesn't include France, Britain or Israel (except cruise missiles). But both North Korea and Iran are certainly in the report. Look again. HK [Edited] Oh so whats the definition of ‘friendly’ nuclear armed nations as per US dictionary? It’s very strange that the US is feeling insecure about Indian nukes and missiles which are clearly not directed towards it, whereas North Korea and Iran doesn’t even appear in this report. They have also dangerous missiles which are threatening. This report is questionable.

Reply: It’s a good question why India is in a “threat” report that doesn’t include France, Britain or Israel (except cruise missiles). But both North Korea and Iran are certainly in the report. Look again. HK

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