Comments on: START Follow-On: What SORT of Agreement? http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2009/07/start.php Comments and analyses of important national and international security issues Fri, 25 May 2012 17:31:54 +0000 hourly 1 http://wordpress.org/?v= By: Scott Monje http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2009/07/start.php/comment-page-1#comment-7889 Scott Monje Sat, 11 Jul 2009 13:54:18 +0000 http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/?p=1497#comment-7889 My understanding was that this treaty was mainly intended to keep the START verification provisions alive (or replace them with something comparable but cheaper). With only a few months available to negotiate (and Lugar is saying it should be in the Senate by September if people want it ratified before START expires in December), there is little time to negotiate substantial reductions. Moreover, with the Nuclear Posture Review, Quadrennial Defense Review, and Ballistic Missile Defense Review all still pending, it would be politically difficult to propose substantial changes at this time. In that case, the START follow-on treaty (STARTFOT?) becomes a place holder, with the "real" negotiations to follow. The Joint Understanding specifically allows for the follow-on to be superseded by a subsequent treaty before it expires. Of course, nothing guarantees that more negotiations will follow, much less what they will produce if they do come, but nothing is precluded either. <b>Response: </b>That is my understanding too. HK My understanding was that this treaty was mainly intended to keep the START verification provisions alive (or replace them with something comparable but cheaper). With only a few months available to negotiate (and Lugar is saying it should be in the Senate by September if people want it ratified before START expires in December), there is little time to negotiate substantial reductions. Moreover, with the Nuclear Posture Review, Quadrennial Defense Review, and Ballistic Missile Defense Review all still pending, it would be politically difficult to propose substantial changes at this time. In that case, the START follow-on treaty (STARTFOT?) becomes a place holder, with the “real” negotiations to follow. The Joint Understanding specifically allows for the follow-on to be superseded by a subsequent treaty before it expires. Of course, nothing guarantees that more negotiations will follow, much less what they will produce if they do come, but nothing is precluded either.

Response: That is my understanding too. HK

]]> By: anon http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2009/07/start.php/comment-page-1#comment-7876 anon Thu, 09 Jul 2009 14:12:23 +0000 http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/?p=1497#comment-7876 Hans, a couple of caveats. First, the ranges given in the Joint Statement for warheads and DVs are not likely to appear in the Treaty. They are the opening positions for the two sides, and, as is often the case in arms control negotiations, are essentially "bracketed" ranges that will eventually be replaced by either a single number or a smaller range. As a result, there is very little possibility that the top number of DVs, 1,100, will appear in the Treaty. Second, everyone knows that the U.S. currently has fewer "real" DVs, but it is still counting that many because of the START counting rules and elimination rules. If the elimiantion rules change -- particularly so that the U.S. does not have to count launch tubes on Trident SSGNs, empty ICBM silos, and mothballed bombers, then the number of required DVs can come down to a number closer to reality. Also, if the elimination rules and monitoring process change, then the U.S. may be able to send Tridents to sea with fewer than 24 missiles, and have the Russians count the boats as if they carried fewer than 24 missiles. Under START, we can only do that if we cut out the tubes, but the new Treaty may have some changes in these rules. I strongly suspect that the combination of counting rules, elimination rules, and DV limits will allow the United State to maintain the precise configuration of deployed strategic systems that it has now. The trick will be in finding a package of rule changes that both sides can live with. <b>Reply: </b>Thanks for the caveats, of which I'm certainly aware. The difference between 1,500 and 1,675 warheads - 175 warheads - is not significant; it's what a single Ohio-class SSBN carries with fully loaded Trident missiles. The loadout is only half that now but the upload capability is retained with reserve warheads. And 175 its not going to make much of a difference for two nuclear superpowers each with thousands of nuclear warheads, nor will it make that much difference on MIRVing. As for delivery vehicles, I agree that 1,100 probably won't be the result. If the U.S. no longer has to count B-1s and launch tubes on SSBNs that have been converted to SSGNs, then it will officially drop to 798 (which is what I count it has now), and if it then converts two more SSBNs it will be down to 750. A decision by the NPR to retire one of the three Minuteman wings would bring it down to 650. Close enough. My main point is that even with 1,500 as the level, this is not a "dramatic" reduction. It would leave the two countries with 3,000 strategic warheads deployed. Why so many? HK Hans, a couple of caveats. First, the ranges given in the Joint Statement for warheads and DVs are not likely to appear in the Treaty. They are the opening positions for the two sides, and, as is often the case in arms control negotiations, are essentially “bracketed” ranges that will eventually be replaced by either a single number or a smaller range. As a result, there is very little possibility that the top number of DVs, 1,100, will appear in the Treaty. Second, everyone knows that the U.S. currently has fewer “real” DVs, but it is still counting that many because of the START counting rules and elimination rules. If the elimiantion rules change — particularly so that the U.S. does not have to count launch tubes on Trident SSGNs, empty ICBM silos, and mothballed bombers, then the number of required DVs can come down to a number closer to reality. Also, if the elimination rules and monitoring process change, then the U.S. may be able to send Tridents to sea with fewer than 24 missiles, and have the Russians count the boats as if they carried fewer than 24 missiles. Under START, we can only do that if we cut out the tubes, but the new Treaty may have some changes in these rules.

I strongly suspect that the combination of counting rules, elimination rules, and DV limits will allow the United State to maintain the precise configuration of deployed strategic systems that it has now. The trick will be in finding a package of rule changes that both sides can live with.

Reply: Thanks for the caveats, of which I’m certainly aware. The difference between 1,500 and 1,675 warheads – 175 warheads – is not significant; it’s what a single Ohio-class SSBN carries with fully loaded Trident missiles. The loadout is only half that now but the upload capability is retained with reserve warheads. And 175 its not going to make much of a difference for two nuclear superpowers each with thousands of nuclear warheads, nor will it make that much difference on MIRVing.

As for delivery vehicles, I agree that 1,100 probably won’t be the result. If the U.S. no longer has to count B-1s and launch tubes on SSBNs that have been converted to SSGNs, then it will officially drop to 798 (which is what I count it has now), and if it then converts two more SSBNs it will be down to 750. A decision by the NPR to retire one of the three Minuteman wings would bring it down to 650. Close enough.

My main point is that even with 1,500 as the level, this is not a “dramatic” reduction. It would leave the two countries with 3,000 strategic warheads deployed. Why so many? HK

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