So, really (using the IR-1/P-1) the 4 years should be for a test device. An actual bomb with a tested design sitting inside a warhead should take longer.

With military involvement in both Iraq and Afghanistan, the US is very much reluctant on a military engagement with Iran, which doesn’t meant that the option is completely off the table. Concerns like yours are often brought up regarding intelligence on Iran’s nuclear program submitted by the US, UK and France (for example, Iran’s nuclear weapons work referred to by the IAEA as the “alleged studies”). It is for this reason that Iran’s concent to IAEA inspections of the Qom facility is highly welcomed. Now the Agency can independently verify information that it has recieved.

However, the US uses the same kind of reasoning against Iran that you have just employed. Considering Iran’s track record on acquiring centrifuge technology on the black market and developing enrichment capabilities covertly, how can Iran be trusted that it’s facilities will not be used in nuclear weapons production?

Although the US is a nuclear weapons state, it is still subject to IAEA safeguards. For example, the US was very active in the creation of the Additional Protocol and its acceptance by other members hinged on US ratification of the document to address the claim that safeguards will not be an economic hindrance. Of course, the US version has a national security exception clause that restricts inspectors from any facility that is deemed of national security importance. So the IAEA inspects US facilities occasionally – not as frequently as the IAEA inspects Iran, but inspections still happen.

Much appreciated,
Jim

Iran has to submit design plans of the Qom facility to the IAEA. These should clearly define the facility’s purpose. The IAEA then goes on site and verifies that what it has received corresponds to what is in the enrichment plant. Then it identifies strategic points in the material flow where it should install cameras and put seals. This is approved by Iran. Design information includes total number of machines, possibly some aspects of cascade arrangement and the maximum enrichment allowed.

Currently, if there are no machines installed, Qom is probably being electrified and piping is being installed. If there are no operational machines and there is no uranium in the facility, of course inspectors will not have much to verify in terms of material diversion or enrichment degree. But they will check that the floor plans are correct,see where material will be stored etc. When material is actually fed into the cascades, safeguards will proceed like at Natanz, ensuring that no material leaves the facility secretly and that it is not being enriched to HEU levels.

A lot of people have brought up the economic argument that it would be cheaper for Iran to buy LEU elsewhere than to produce it. Iran’s rationale is that it has tried that in the past, but Western countries have not kept their part of the bargain. Apparently, Iran owns about 10% of Eurodif, a French enrichment company, but has never received any uranium and it has had a really hard time finishing the construction of the nuclear reactor at Bushehr, which Siemens abandoned in the 1970s. That is why Iran decided to acquire centrifuge blue-prints on the black market. Why does an oil country want a nuclear industry? Apparently, Iranian oil reserves will substantially decrease in the next 20 or so years and Iran wants an independent nuclear fuel cycle. And independent nuclear fuel cycle equals energy independence. Note that only 3 countries have the complete fuel cycle, or about 10 percent of the countries possessing nuclear reactors. (It also happens that the same 3 also have nuclear weapons, but that’s not a rule.)

Will inspectors on the ground necessarily be able to divine the facility’s purpose? Or, if no machines have been installed, will it just be a big hole in the ground?