Additionally, a dependent question arises: In what way do these machines convey protection? Again, this is an honest question. Offering the near instantaneous obliteration of masses of people, lengthy poisoning of large areas, and destruction of valuable equity may indeed have some effect and may seem or even be desirable to some select few, but I am not aware of any cogent argument that supports the idea that these machines offer protection. What remains is, I suspect, another rhetorical canard that supports a dangerous narrative myth – that “nuclear protection” exists.

Reply: The Germans certainly want to see some movement on the issue, and they will get support from several other countries. By stating in public that they want to see a withdrawal they have already accomplished raising the issue. How far they can move this inside NATO during the Strategic Concept review, much less before the NPR is published, is hard to gauge. If the past is any indication, then a decision will not come from Europe but from Washington. Some people will try to link that decision to the next round of arms control with Russia, which both Russia and the United States have said should address non-strategic weapons. But Germany and other supporters of a withdrawal have not made that link a condition, which I think is a good thing.

On the JSF, I think the NPR will made a recommendation. But although we hear some argue that that decision is intrinsically linked to extended deterrence in Europe, I don’t think that view is necessarily shared by the authors of the NPR, who see other ways of continuing extended deterrence even without a nuclear JSF. HK

Reply: The “30 plus” are listed in this blog. HK

I don’t really see the importance of withdrawal, though the storage issue might be worse than I think;
but since the fall of the soviet block, the tactical nukes are obsolete, also: there’s still two nuclear powers within arm’s reach, France and the UK, who are also NATO members.

Reply: Good questions. The importance of withdrawal, as I see it, is twofold: first, to free NATO from a Cold War posture to focus on today’s challenges, and; second, to end the deterrence relationship with Russia. HK

But I feel that these tac nukes in Europa are at least aimed as much inwards, as outwards. Sure a lot of folks in the security establishment have a hard time to leave the Cold War behind, but there are also still those who have an even harder time to leave WW2 behind …

We can all figure out how a future contradiction between actual wartime needs on one hand, and limitations of the NPT on the other, would be resolved. Practicing with dummies presents no current contradiction.

Reply: “Contradiction,” oh but it most certainly is. The main issue is not legal but political. Equipping non-nuclear NPT countries with the means, skills, and plans to delivery nuclear weapons is not consistent with the nonproliferation regime and the nonproliferation standards Europe and the United States are promoting. The parallel would be Russia deploying nuclear weapons in Iran, equipping Iranian aircraft to carry the weapons, training Iranian pilots to deliver the weapons, and making the procedures for handing over control of the weapons to Iran in times of war. In such a hypothetical scenario, Russia could argue that it was merely doing so to assure Iran about its security and thereby preventing it from developing its own nuclear weapons. Obviously, it would require enormous changes in Russian and Iranian policies to create such a posture, but I think most would argue that it would be a clear contradiction of the NPT. HK