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2008-03-11T17:29:33Z

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Chinese Submarine Patrols Rebound in 2007, but Remain Limited

2008-01-07T20:50:00Z

The entire Chinese submarine fleet conducted six patrols in 2007, up four from 2006.

By Hans M. Kristensen

China's entire fleet of approximately 55 general-purpose submarines conducted a total of six patrols during 2007, slightly better than the two patrols conducted in 2006 and zero in 2005.

The 2007 performance matches China's all-time high of six patrols conducted in 2000, the only two years since 1981 that Chinese submarines conducted more than five patrols in a single year.

The new information, obtained by Federation of American Scientists from the U.S. Navy under the Freedom of Information Act, also shows that none of China's ballistic missile submarines have ever conducted a deterrent patrol.

]]> In Perspective

Just what constitutes a Chinese "patrol" is secret, according to the U.S. Navy, but it probably refers to an extended voyage away from the homeport area (see here for further definitions). The seven Chinese patrols conducted in 2007 is but a fraction of the number of patrols conducted by the U.S. submarine force, which musters well over 100 patrols per year. But a comparison of U.S. and Chinese submarine patrol levels is not possible because the two navies have very different missions. China has no overseas military commitments and uses its submarine fleet almost exclusively as a coastal defense force, whereas the U.S. submarine force is constantly engaged in forward operations alone or with allies.

The Chinese patrol rate compares better with that of the Russian Navy, which has largely ceased forward submarine operations compared with those of the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Russian general purpose submarines conducted seven patrols in 2007.

Chinese Submarine Patrols 1981-2007

The entire Chinese submarine fleet conducted six patrols during 2007, matching the previous all-time high from 2000. The performance indicates that China operates its submarine fleet almost entirely as a coastal defense force.

In historic perspective, the six Chinese submarine patrols conducted in 2007 continues a trend that China in this decade has sent slightly more submarines on patrol than during the 1990s. Whereas Chinese submarines in the 1990s conducted an average of 1.2 patrols each year, the average has been 3.4 patrols since 2000.

About Those Boomers

Twenty-five years after it launched its first ballistic missiles submarine, Xia (Type 092), China has yet to conduct its first deterrent patrol. The new information confirms that neither the Xia, nor the two new Jin-class (Type 094) ballistic missile submarines - the first of which was launched in 2004 - have ever conducted a deterrent patrol.

The single-warhead Julang-1 sea-launched ballistic missile developed for the Xia has been test launched twice, but is not thought to be fully operational and has been referred to by the U.S. intelligence community for years as the CSS-NX-3 (X for experimental). Each Jin-class submarine has 12 launch tubes for the new Julang-2 sea-launched ballistic missile, which the U.S. intelligence community estimates will carry a single warhead.

China's New Nuclear Submarines

China's new Chang-class (Type-093) nuclear-powered attack submarine (top) and Jin-class (Type-094) nuclear-powered sea-launched ballistic missile submarine (bottom) were photographed at the Xiaopingdao submarine base near Dalian by the Quickbird satellite on May 3, 2007, and October 17, 2006, respectively. A comparison of the two images shows the different size of the two submarines: roughly 100 meters versus 135 meters.

The future mission of the missile submarines appears to be regional because the range of the missiles and operational constraints facing the submarines limit the targets that can be held at risk. The range of the Julang-2 is estimated by the US intelligence community at more than 8,000 km (4,970+ miles), which brings Hawaii and Alaska (but not the continental United States) within reach from Chinese territorial waters. Assuming they made it out of port past lurking U.S. attack submarines, the Chinese missile submarines would have to sail through the narrow straight between South Korea and Japan into the Sea of Japan for its Julang-2 missiles to be able to strike the Seattle area.

The Bo Hai Bay has been suggested as a possible deployment area for China's missile submarines because it would offer more protection against hostile attack submarines. From the shallow bay, the Julang-2 missiles could be used to target Guam and Alaska, India, Russia, and - at the limit of its range - Hawaii.

There are also rumors - one apparently even with a photo - that China may plan to homeport some of its ballistic missile submarines at the new submarine base under construction at Hainan Island in the South China Sea. The infrastructure includes what appears to be a waterway entrance to an underground facility similar to the underground facility at Jianggezhuang submarine base near Qingdao where the Xia is based. Hainan Island has access to deeper waters than Jianggezhuang, but is also less protected. From Hainan Island the Julang-2 would be within range of Guam, India and most of Russia, but not Hawaii.

The U.S. Navy has assessed that China might build as many as five Jin-class submarines "in order to provide more redundancy and capacity for a near-continuous at-sea SSBN presence," but is yet unclear whether China plans to develop a near-continuous sea-based deterrent or just a surge capability for deployment in a crisis. If all current ballistic missile boats became fully operational, China could deploy a maximum of 36 warheads at sea, although at least one of the boats would probably be in overhaul at any given time. Whatever the future mission, absent any deterrent patrols so far, the Chinese military will first have to learn how to operate the missile submarines in a way that would matter.

Implications

Despite the rebound in general purpose submarine patrols, dramatic reports from recent years about Chinese submarines operating inside Japanese territorial waters or surfacing close to U.S. aircraft carriers have been largely absent in 2007. The meaning of the patrol rebound is yet unclear. After all, it follows a complete absence of submarine patrols in 2005, the fourth year since 1981 that China's submarine fleet did not conduct any patrols despite introduction of several new classes of more advanced submarines for greater reach. That modernization has (not yet) manifested itself in the form of a clear increase in submarine patrols.

The patrol number does not say anything about what the submarines did during the six patrols. They might have been basic attempts to sail far from shore to test navigational equipment or communication with the homebase, or they might have included more advanced tactical operations. They might have been conducted by six different submarines, or only a couple.

Yet for the Chinese submarine force overall, six patrols do not provide very much operational experience for more than 50 submarines and their crews. If China did plan a more extended reach for its submarine force, one might expect the patrol rate to continue to increase in the next couple of years. Only the future will tell. But the operational experience from the 55 patrols conducted by the entire submarine force between 1981 and the end of 2007 suggests that China's submarine force - at least for now - remains a coastal defense force.

More information: browse previous blogs about China | Chinese Nuclear Forces and U.S. Nuclear War Planning

Event: Also check out New American Foundation's event on China's Boomers, Wednesday, January 9, 2008

National Biodefense Science Board Meeting: Day 2

2007-12-19T19:59:47Z

To begin the day the NBSB listened to presentations from each of the members of the Public Health Emergency Medical Countermeasures Enterprise (PHEMCE). The Enterprise is coordinated within HHS by the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response and includes the NIH, CDC, FDA and BARDA. PHEMCE’s role in HHS is to coordinate the research, development, acquisition and deployment of medical countermeasures to chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) threats. Many of the topics the NBSB will consider and provide recommendations on will fall within the PHEMC Enterprise, so the board heard a representative from each of the agencies describe their efforts and role in PHEMCE. The morning session ended with presentations from Bruce Gellin giving an overview of the HHS pandemic flu program and Robin Robinson detailing BARDA’s pandemic preparedness and response activities.

During the afternoon session the board got down to business. After being presented with information on the possible topics that they were considering, the NBSB voted for 4 specific topics and formed subcommittees for each.

First the NBSB wanted to address the issue of pandemic influenza preparedness. The subcommittee will evaluate current research, identify the gaps, and then report to the whole board to begin making recommendations.

The second subcommittee will review the US government research portfolio to determine whether efforts are as integrated as they could be. They too will return their findings to the whole board with the goal of making recommendations to increase collaboration and avoid duplication of efforts.

The third subcommittee was commissioned to look at disaster medicine. They will take HSPD-21 as a framework for evaluation and further development of a national disaster medicine plan. It will include the possibility of promoting ‘disaster medicine’ as a new discipline and setting up dedicated training courses and programs.

Finally, it was agreed that a subcommittee be set up to look at the gaps in the medical countermeasures marketplace. This subcommittee will focus on the private sector and look at ways to engage their involvement in countermeasures development.

It was also agreed that the issue of special and at-risk populations and the issue of communications and data interoperability not be stand alone topics. They will be integrated into each of the four subcommittees and a decision to exclude them would need to be explicitly justified.

Finally the members of the NBSB volunteered their placement on subcommittees within their areas of expertise and subcommittee chairs were appointed. Andrew Pavia will chair the pandemic influenza subcommittee, Patrick Scannon; the government research evaluation subcommittee, Jim James; the disaster medicine subcommittee and John Parker; the gaps in countermeasure marketplace subcommittee. The NBSB will meet again in 6 months to hear reports from the subcommittees and make recommendations.

Written with Cheryl Vos

White House Announces (Secret) Nuclear Weapons Cuts

2007-12-18T21:56:24Z

The W62 is the only nuclear warhead that has been publicly identified for elimination under the Bush administration's secret nuclear stockpile reduction plan.

By Hans M. Kristensen

The While House announced earlier today that the President had "approved a significant reduction in the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile to take effect by the end of 2007." The decision reaffirmed an earlier decision from June 2004 to cut the stockpile "nearly 50 percent," but moved the timeline up five years from 2012 to 2007.

Not included in the White House statement, but added by other government officials, is an additional decision to cut the remaining stockpile by another 15% percent, although not until 2012.

The announcement of these important initiatives unfortunately was hampered by Cold War secrecy which meant that government officials were not allowed to reveal how many nuclear weapons will be cut or what the size of the stockpile is. As a result, news media accounts were full of errors, and one can only imagine the misperceptions this misplaced secrecy creates in other nuclear weapon states.

]]> Estimates of the Secret Cuts

Before the latest announcements, I and my colleague Robert Norris estimated that the stockpile consisted of approximately 9,900 warheads of which roughly 4,600 were operational. With the new announcements, we predict the following development:

The White House announcement reaffirms the 2004 decision to reduce the size of the Defense Department's nuclear weapons stockpile "by nearly 50 percent from the 2001 level." This objective was reaffirmed by the National Nuclear Security Administration in a press release earlier today. The DOD stockpile included roughly 10,500 warheads in 2001, which means that the 2004 stockpile plan probably envisioned a stockpile of some 5,400 warheads by 2012. It is this cut that the White House reaffirmed today, but implemented by the end of 2007 instead of 2012.

The additional 15 percent reduction announced today and confirmed by the White House would cut approximately 800 warheads more from the 5,400, resulting in an estimated stockpile of roughly 4,600 warheads by 2012.

At that time the SORT agreement signed with Russian in 2002 is scheduled to enter into effect, setting an upper limit of no more than 2,200 operationally deployed strategic warheads. The remaining 2,400 warheads will likely include 2,000 reserve warheads to "hedge" against unforseen political developments and 400 non-strategic bombs.

Estimated U.S. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile 1945-2012

The Bush administration's planned reduction of the nuclear stockpile is significant but modest compared to the cuts in the 1990s, and will leave a stockpile that is four times larger than the combined arsenals of all other nuclear weapon states (excluding Russia).

What Doesn't Change

The White House's announcement to implement the 2004 stockpile plan in 2007 does not mean that the "cut" warheads will have been dismantled by then - far from it. In fact, the decision to reduce the stockpile does not in itself result in the destruction of a single warhead. "Reducing" the stockpile by nearly half is a form of nuclear book keeping that means that ownership of the "cut" warheads will shift from DOD to DOE.

But DOE doesn't have storage capacity for all of these weapons at its facility at Pantex. That factory is busy rebuilding the warheads slated to remain in the "enduring stockpile" beyond 2012. As a result, dismantlement of the backlog of warheads from the current reductions is not scheduled to be completed until 2023, more than a decade-and-a-half after today's White House announcement to speed things up. Indeed, the current administration has demonstrated the lowest warhead dismantlement rate of any U.S. government since the Eisenhower administration.

So for now, most of the "cut" warheads will likely remain at the bases where they are and only gradually be moved to the central warhead storage locations such as Kirtland Air Force Base in New Mexico. The only known timeline for this move is 2012, by which time no more than 2,200 strategic warheads can remain at bases for operational delivery platforms according to the SORT agreement.

Observations

The While House statement highlights that "the U.S. nuclear stockpile will be less than one-quarter its size at the end of the Cold War" [1991, ed.]. But the stockpile the administration plans for 2012 is large by post-Cold War standards:

* Four times the combined number of nuclear weapons of all the world’s nuclear weapons states, excluding Russia.
* Almost half of the stockpile – a maximum of 2,200 warheads – will be operational, and a third of those (more than 850) will be on alert.
* More than 10 times bigger than in 1950, when the United States decided to contain the Soviet Union.

Although the White House says the planned reductions seek to "reduce U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons," the statement not only reaffirms that "a credible deterrent remains an essential part of U.S. national security," but also declares that "nuclear forces remain key to meeting emerging security challenges."

In the weeks ahead, we will fine-tune this estimate further.

More background: Estimates of the U.S. Nuclear Stockpile Today and Tomorrow | Estimates of the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile, 2007 and 2012

National Biodefense Science Board Meeting: Day 1

2007-12-18T16:48:42Z

The National Biodefense Science Board (NBSB) began their inaugural meeting yesterday in Washington DC. The board, made up of 13 voting members and 21 non-voting ex officio representatives, was created as part of the 2006 Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act. The NBSB was chartered with the task of providing expert advice to the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Secretary on science, technology, and other matters of special interest on chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear issues, including both naturally occurring and deliberate events.

The members include Patricia Quinlisk (Iowa Dept. of Public Health, chair), James J. James (American Medical Association), Steve Cantrell (Denver Health Medical Center), Eric Rose (SIGA Technologies), Albert Di Rienzo (Welch Allyn), Ken Dretchen (Georgetown University Biosecurity Institute), John Grabenstein (Merck Vaccine Division), Ruth Berkelman (Emory University , Thomas MacVittie (University of Maryland School of Medicine), John Parker (SAIC), Andrew Pavia (University of Utah Medical Center) Roberta Carlin (American Association on Health and Disability), and Patrick Scannon (XOMA).

After the morning introductory session, the group listened to several talks presented by executive branch officials that discussed current US Government policies on preparedness and response. After this, the group heard another series of talks that outlined possible topics and issues that the NBSB could focus on initially. The broadly defined proposed topics, developed by officials at HHS, are as follows- an evaluation of research and development components of the HHS influenza preparedness strategy, innovation and medical countermeasure development, how to address gaps in the medical countermeasures marketplace, modeling and metrics to inform medical consequence assessment, and considerations for special and at-risk populations.

Today the group will make decisions about how to go forward as a board. The group will try to prioritize topics and determine how to fulfill their charge. Since the mandate to the NBSB is so broad, many members agreed that it is important to determine the group’s focus in a way that considers issues based on their timeliness and achievability.

The agenda for the meeting is here
NBSB main page
Members list

Written by Nate Hafer

Congress Zeroes Out Money for the Reliable Replacement Warhead. Part Funding for Global Nuclear Energy Partnership.

2007-12-17T20:30:05Z

The spending bill just agreed by Congress over the weekend explicitly specifies zero funding for the Reliable Replacement Warhead, or RRW, and support for the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership, but below the administration's request.

The RRW is a new nuclear weapon that the administration claims is essential to maintaining the integrity of the nuclear arsenal. Most outside experts believe that existing nuclear weapons are more than adequately reliable. Moreover, as I have commented previously in this blog, the Reliable Replacement warhead will almost certainly not be more reliable than current warheads and absolutely certainly will not be meaningfully more reliable. Moreover, it will not replace existing warheads but be deployed alongside them for decades, and it is not even the reliable replacement warhead, because a minimum of four new types were planned.

]]> This does not mean that the RRW is dead forever. The Congress has not said “No!” to any future warhead program. Instead, the Congress has stated quite clearly that the administration was moving forward with plans for a new warhead without thinking through what a new nuclear warhead is for. The Congress blocked funding this year and required the administration to develop a plan for what the scientific capabilities of the National Labs ought to be. The relevant Committees of both the House and Senate have written quite emphatic language that the administration needs to go back to the drawing board of nuclear weapons and explain why we need nuclear weapons before asking for money for new ones. I want to thank David Culp of the Friends Committee on National Legislation for sending out the Congressional language on the RRW.

Another major program of interest to the Federation is the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership, or GNEP, which received $179M all together. Other non-GNEP expenses are folded in there so this represents a small cut from last year’s spending. (Thanks to Shervin Boloorian of the Union of Concerned Scientists for alerting us to the GNEP budget numbers.) (Keep in mind that last year, the government operated under a continuing resolution, which allows the administration some leeway in spending, so the administration spent more on GNEP than would have been approved by Congress in an appropriation.)

The GNEP is a plan to restart commercial plutonium reprocessing in the United States after a three decade hiatus. The Federation opposes the GNEP because the world wide proliferation of plutonium reprocessing technology presents a grave risk of nuclear weapon proliferation. And there is no balancing benefit. Reprocessing is more expensive than direct disposal, the energy benefit is quite limited until a new generation of advanced fast neutron reactors is developed and, finally, if the long term goal is to develop breeder reactors by the end of the century, then the last thing we should be doing is burning up the plutonium now. Plutonium reprocessing is a good idea in theory that does not work in practice, at least for now. It might make great sense eventually but “eventually” is probably no sooner than 2070 and possibly 2100. Even if plutonium reprocessing turns out to be technically feasible and economically justifiable, the country would be making a huge mistake by prematurely forcing itself to choose among heo technical choices available today. You don’t have to be opposed to reprocessing to be opposed to the administration’s program. We should revisit this question in another 50 years.

This bill was agreed by the joint Senate-House conference committee and must be voted on the floor and is subject to amendment. Once a bill gets this far, however, amendments are hard, although certainly not impossible. And, finally, keep in mind that President Bush might veto the whole thing. If that happens, the Congress might just give up and fall back on a continuing resolution, which means the country just goes back to last year’s budget. But since last year we also had a continuing resolution, a second continuing resolution would put the country back to its Fiscal Year 2006 budget, which included money for RRW and GNEP.

Curious Omission in a Congressional Budget Office Report on Plutonium Reprocessing

2007-12-13T19:57:48Z

On 14 November, Peter Orszag, Director of the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), testified before the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee about the relative costs of plutonium reprocessing and direct disposal of used nuclear fuel. The oral testimony was quite brief and, unless otherwise noted, my comments are based primarily on the longer and presumably more carefully prepared written testimony. The testimony contained many errors, not all of them trivial, but one gigantic omission discussed at the end of this essay is inexcusable and calls into question the credibility of the entire CBO report.

]]> When Mr. Orszag writes that “Uranium-235 is relatively scarce and typically makes up less than 1 percent of mined uranium ore” it could just be poor wording—235 does not typically make up less than a percent, it is 0.71% everywhere in the world (with one fascinating exception)—but I don’t know how that ambiguity is going to affect the Committee’s decision about whether to support a national plutonium reprocessing program to separate the plutonium and other components of used fuel from commercial nuclear reactors.

When he writes that, “Under reprocessing—which is done in a few countries but not the United States—a reprocessing facility recovers the useful components of the spent fuel (uranium and certain forms of plutonium) and returns them to the fuel cycle, where they are combined with newly mined uranium to produce more reactor fuel …” I start to worry because reprocessing recovers all forms of plutonium, not certain forms, and this is an error that is starting to affect the question of whether we should reprocess the plutonium from commercial nuclear reactors.

When he writes that, “Spot prices for uranium have recently reached historical highs (adjusted for inflation), but high prices would have to persist for decades to increase the economic viability of reprocessing” and later in his testimony, “Although uranium prices are currently high by historical standards, it is not certain whether high prices will continue in the future or whether current prices will encourage additional uranium development that could lower prices,” he addresses an issue that directly affects the attractiveness of reprocessing. He should have added that, at the time he spoke, uranium spot prices had already tumbled by almost half from their summer peaks and that the surge in prices was far more likely to be a replay of the bump in the late 70s than a long term increase.

But, really, all these problems, and there are others, are small potatoes compared to the great glaring omission: The CBO study, in developing its cost estimates, used two other studies, one by a respected group of academics at Harvard and the University of Maryland—including John Holdren, the current president of the American Association for the Advancement of Science and Steve Fetter, the Dean of the School of Public Policy at Maryland—and the other by the Boston Consulting Group (BCG). Starting from the cost estimates in these two studies, CBO essentially splits the differences between their cost estimates to arrive at a “best estimate” for the economic viability of plutonium reprocessing. The authors of these two reports were not mentioned at all in the oral testimony before the committee. But the BCG report was prepared on contract for Areva, the French company, partially owned by the French government, that hopes to sell the United States a multi-billion dollar reprocessing facility. Search as I may, I could not find in the prepared text of CBO testimony any mention of the origin of this cost study. Finally, I did find a reference, in a parenthetical comment in a footnote, and then in a caption in a chart. But the CBO report did not reprint this key paragraph from the BCG report:

“This report was prepared by The Boston Consulting Group at the request of AREVA. BCG reviewed publicly available information and proprietary data provided by AREVA, but did not undertake any independent verification of the facts contained in those source materials. Changes in these facts or underlying assumptions could change the results reported in this study. Any other party using this report for any purpose, or relying on this report in any way, does so at their own risk. No representation or warranty, express or implied, is made in relation to the accuracy or completeness of the information presented herein or its suitability for any particular purpose.”

In other words, this is not some independent, disinterested report from some unheard-of “Boston Consulting Group,” this is an Areva study; Areva just hired a contractor to crunch a couple of numbers, write some narrative, and put a cover on it. Can anyone imagine that the origin and motivation for this report would not be of immense interest to the members of the Committee who are trying to judge the credibility of competing cost claims? Not that Areva’s numbers are necessarily wrong but if the Congress were deciding on purchase of, say, a new fighter plane, they would not unquestioningly use cost calculations from, say, Boeing if Boeing is hoping to win a huge government contract to manufacture it. Moreover, the difference between the two reports is not trivial. BCG estimates that reprocessing reactor waste will cost $30 more per kilogram than direct geological disposal while the Harvard study estimates that reprocessing will cost $700 more per kilogram, that is, a twenty three times greater addition.

CBO owes it to Congress to be more than clear, to be emphatic, when it is basing its reports on “analysis” carried out by clearly vested groups with the potential to make huge profits from government contracts decided by the vote of Congress.

The Future of US Missile Defense in Poland

2007-12-10T16:09:17Z

[NOTE: The Federation of American Scientists is delighted to have a Scoville Fellow this year, Ms. Katarzyna (Kasia) Bzdak. Kasia comes to FAS from Columbia University has been following the Polish language press since before the recent national elections there and submitted this report on the political status of the US missile defense deployment.]

Although the recent election in Poland promised to bring change in the style of Polish foreign policy, it was not a definitive referendum on the future of US missile defense components on Polish territory. The outgoing ruling party, Law and Justice (PiS), lead by former Prime Minister Jaroslaw Kaczynski, supported the deployment of US interceptors in Poland wholeheartedly during its tenure and during the campaign. The victorious Civic Platform (PO), conversely, failed to clearly articulate a position on the missile defense shield, and seemed to hedge its position on what the US would concede to Poland for its participation in the program. Reports in the Polish press directly following the election suggested that certain concessions from the United States—the transfer of short and medium-missile defense systems, relaxed visa restriction, or economic investments—could induce the Civic Platform’s consent. More recent reports in the Polish press, however, suggest that the PO has tempered its enthusiasm for the project, and negotiations with the United States have been postponed pending discussions with Poland’s neighbors, including Russia. Nonetheless, given the dual-executive system codified in Poland’s constitution, President Lech Kaczynski (former PM Jaroslaw Kaczynski’s twin, biologically and ideologically, and a leader of PiS) will continue to wield substantial power in Polish foreign policy, so the effect of the PO’s potential change of heart remains dubious.

]]> In the course of the election, the PO and its leader, Donald Tusk (now Prime Minister), never ruled out the deployment of missile interceptors in Poland, but instead indicated their intent to drive a harder bargain with US negotiators, repeatedly stressing the importance of close cooperation with the US. While the missile defense system remains unpopular amongst the Polish population, the PO initially suggested that some specific concessions by the United States could help broker a deal. One of the PO’s leaders, Bronislaw Komorowski, was candid about one of these demands, making it clear that Poland would not consider a deal that neglected to provide short and medium-range missiles for Polish territorial defense. Many media outlets and pundits, in Poland and elsewhere, speculated that the transfer of a US Patriot missile defense system might be a precondition to the deployment of long-range interceptors the US wants to deploy in Poland. Two other issues commanded a great deal of attention within Poland: increased economic investments by the US in Poland and a relaxation of visa requirements for Poles seeking to travel to the America. In the debate prior to the election, Mr. Tusk personally harangued the former Prime Minister for acceding to the deployment of Polish troops to Iraq and to the missile defense shield without gaining anything in these two categories. The Civic Platform’s position on missile defense seemed relatively fluid at that point, and US concessions on one or all of those fronts could have apparently resulted in continued support for the deployment.

In the weeks following the election, however, press reports in the Polish media indicated that Prime Minister Tusk and his party began to lose enthusiasm for the deployment. The Civic Platform’s public overtures to Russia are indicative of this shift. The new administration is apparently more concerned with the state of Polish-Russian relations than its predecessor, and has voiced particular apprehension regarding the Russian decision to suspend its participation in the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty. Poland additionally continues to suffer economically from a Russian ban on Polish meat products, which is widely thought to be politically motivated.

The PO has made two significant concessions to Russia in the past few weeks in line with this attempt to mollify Russia: it has declared that Poland will cease blocking Russian negotiations with the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (which Poland had veto power over), and more significantly in the realm of the missile defense deployment, it has declared that Poland would consult Russia and other neighbors prior to resuming negotiations with the United States. This is a significant departure from the Kaczynski administration’s policy that held that the missile defense talks were a strictly bilateral issue. The Polish daily Rzeczpospolita reports that the PO’s decision to confer with Russia on missile defense has been influenced by a recent study by physicists at Cornell and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, which argues that US missile interceptors in Poland could potentially destroy Russian intercontinental ballistics missiles, not just Iranian intermediate range ballistics missiles. The recent publication of the US intelligence community’s National Intelligence Estimate on Iran, which downplays the risk of Iran attaining nuclear weaponry is the near term, may further decrease the administration’s inclination to permit deployment of the missile defense shield components on Polish soil.

Nonetheless, opponents of the missile defense shield must remain vigilant, as Polish politics complicate the seemingly simple picture. If Prime Minister Tusk and his party reject the deployment of US interceptors after further negotiations (now a distinct possibility), they will still have to contend with the significant influence President Lech Kaczynski will continue to have in Polish foreign and security policy. In Poland’s dual-executive governing system, the President has ultimate authority in Polish foreign relations and national security: President Kaczynski is Supreme Commander of the Polish Armed Forces, and has the authority to agree to or revoke international agreements. If President Kaczynski’s public statements are an accurate indication, he intends to exert this influence to the fullest extent possible in pushing his own vision of Polish foreign and defense policy—which, of course, includes an acceptance of US interceptor missiles in Poland. Therefore, even if Mr. Tusk decides that the deployment of missile defense components is not in Poland’s interest, he will not be able to single-handedly commandeer Polish foreign policy. Given these complexities, the future of US missile defense components on Polish territory remains unclear, although on balance, the election of the Civic Platform has reduced the probability of the deployment taking place, at least in the short term.

National Research Council Report slams NIH findings on Boston U containment lab

2007-11-30T19:21:57Z

The National Research Council (NRC) just released a report that finds that “a National Institutes of Health draft assessment of the risks associated with a proposed biocontainment laboratory at Boston University is "not sound and credible.”"

The NRC report came in response to a request by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts for technical input into the scientific adequacy of the NIH study. The NIH study, known as the Draft Supplemental Environmental Report (DSER), was to perform additional risk assessments and site analyses in response to environmental safety concerns raised in an earlier Federal court ruling.

From the NRC report cover letter:

The NRC committee was asked to address three specific questions:
1. Are the scientific analyses in the DSER sound and credible?
Overall, the Committee believes that the DSER as drafted is not sound and credible.

2. Has the NIH identified representative worst case scenarios?
The DSER as drafted has not adequately identified and thoroughly developed worst case scenarios.

3. Based on the comparison of risk associated with alternative locations, is there a greater risk to public health and safety from the location of the facility in one or another proposed location?
The DSER does not contain the appropriate level of information to compare the risks associated with alternative locations.

This latest report is unfortunate, but not unexpected in this case. The handling of the new BU lab has been mishandled on just about every conceivable level and has led to community distrust and has unfairly marked other biocontainment facilities with a scarlet letter. That the report was simply a draft is a poor excuse in this case because everyone involved was aware of the controversy surrounding the BU facility. This case is certainly cause for a serious re-evaluation of practices associated with the expansion of US biodefense capabilities and, at the very least, a system of checks and balances that prevent this brand of folly from ever happening again.

For the full NRC report click here.

To see the draft NIH study in question click here.

For a copy of the news release from the NRC, visit here.

Written with Nate Hafer.

Oh, No! Not another “Uranium Dirty Bomb” Story!

2007-11-30T15:27:06Z

According to a recent report from AP, Slovak police arrested people trying to sell highly enriched uranium to undercover agents. According to the police, the material, said to be about a kilogram of uranium, could be used for a dirty bomb. This is a replay of the Padilla case, the so-called “Dirty Bomber,” who was allegedly going to use uranium to make a radiological, or “dirty,” bomb. (The government later dropped reference to the dirty bomb but convicted Padilla on other charges.) I don’t think what the Slovaks have is actually uranium (see below) but, even if it is, dirty bombs are not the problem.

]]> So, people, pay attention: Uranium is not a good dirty bomb material because uranium is not particularly radioactive. I guess because uranium is used to power nuclear reactors and nuclear bombs, people assume it must be highly radioactive. It is not. That is like saying that because coal is used to power furnaces, it must be hot. No, it is just coal, sitting there waiting to get hot when you burn it. But just being coal does not make it hot. The dominant isotope of uranium, U-238, makes up over 99% of natural uranium and has a half-life of about five billion years. That means that if I have a pound of uranium and let is sit and “decay,” or break down into lighter elements, for five billion years, I will have half a pound left. (For comparison, the Earth is about five billion years old.) The lesser isotope, U-235 is 0.7% and has a half life of almost a billion years. This is to say uranium decays very slowly, which is to say it is not very radioactive. One way to think of this is to imagine that, on the day you were born, you swallowed an ounce of uranium and then lived with it inside you until you died and you lived to be 100 years old. Well, in those hundred years, you have lived just two hundred millionths of the half life, so if half of the uranium will decay in a half life, you would expect about one hundred millionth to decay during your lifetime. (The actual math is a bit more complicated because the decay is exponential, not linear, but not far enough different to change the point.) Not a very efficient way to irradiate someone. This is not to say that uranium is harmless. It is very slightly radioactive. In places where the natural rock has uranium in it, houses have higher concentrations of radon and that does have a risk. It is a heavy metal so it is poisonous, just as lead, mercury, cadmium and many other heavy metals are poisonous, but there are far more dangerous radioactive materials in common use in industry that could be used as dirty bomb material.

When the Podilla case came out, FAS did some calculations on the quantities needed to make a dirty bomb using various radioactive materials. Note that to make a large “dirty” bomb using uranium, tons of uranium are required. The greatest danger from uranium from such a device would be having large chunks of uranium metal fall on your head.

As of now (Friday morning) I think the most likely explanation for the Slovak case is that some crooks were trying to scam someone. I don’t think the sample is actually uranium. The Slovak police released a photo of the radiation detector, which I got from the AP. The story from Slovakia makes no sense. You can see photos of the detector and get some specs here. As far as I can tell, it is only a little 2x2” hand held sodium iodide detector. One output on the detector reading is “Bq,” which stands for Becquerels, which is one nuclear disintegration or decay per second. Since the detector is just a hand held device and I don’t know how far the detector is from the source of radioactivity, there is no way it can measure the number of decays so I am guessing that what number really means the number of detected gamma rays. Anyway, I have a table here that tells me that the specific activity of U-238 is 12,445 Bq/g. So if I divide that into the number on the detector, 4.89 x 10^9, I get close to 400kg of uranium. I have to multiply that amount by some large number because the detector is seeing only a small fraction of the total radiation. In addition, the ratios of the U-235 and U-238 do not make sense for any conceivable sample of uranium. Obviously I can’t be sure unless I had the sample and a lab but my suspicion is that someone spiked some material with tiny amounts of some much more radioactive material specifically to fool this detector and hoped to sell it to some gullible person.

A Rebuttal to Brown and Deutch Op-Ed in the Wall Street Journal

2007-11-26T18:21:50Z

Arguments justifying the continuing existence of the world’s nuclear arsenals are like the tired joke about the joke convention. Many of these arguments have been with us for decades. Some made sense decades ago but do no longer, now that the Cold War is history. Others never made sense even during the Cold War but have, through sheer longevity, taken on a wholly undeserved intellectual authority. And some statements are not really logical arguments at all but merely catch-phrases that have been with us so long we no longer question their truth; indeed, we don’t even reflect on what, if anything, they actually mean. So one can, like at the joke convention, just shout out “Number 37!” and, instead of laughing, the wise ones of the nuclear establishment nod in sage agreement.

]]> There would be some sense in holding defenders of the status quo to less stringent logical standards if those arguing for change, in this case those arguing for global nuclear prohibition, were arguing for something that had some hypothetical benefit but also clear risks, while those arguing for the status quo were arguing for staying with the safe bet we know. Anyone advocating any new, potentially risky course should be held to higher standards of proof. But the bet we know is not safe. There is one, and only one, danger that threatens our very existence as a nation and a society and that is Russia’s vast nuclear arsenal. The Russians can say the same about us. Having thousands of immensely powerful nuclear warheads on hair trigger alert twenty-four hours a day is a real and continuing danger. The fact that the world has been lucky so far does not make the danger any less real. Those arguing for continuing today’s nuclear force posture should not win their arguments by default; they should be held to as rigorous logical standards as those, like me, who argue that we should make every effort to move toward a global prohibition on nuclear weapons.

It is, therefore, immensely frustrating to read the recent op-ed, "The Nuclear Disarmament Fallacy," by Harold Brown and John Deutch in the 19 November 2007 Wall Street Journal (p. A19), written as a counter to the earlier Wall Street Journal op-ed by Henry Kissinger et al. that argued for a campaign for nuclear prohibition. Even accepting the enforced shorthand of the op-ed format, Brown and Deutch do not make a logical case for staying the course.

The first, and the most pervasive, logical sleight of hand is the appeal to “deterrence.” What is deterrence? Apparently it is something that nuclear weapons just ooze. Or that they simply are. I have heard our submarine nuclear missiles referred to as our “sea-based deterrent.” The definition of deterrence seems to be that it is what you get when you have nuclear weapons; so if you want some of this deterrence stuff, you better get yourself some nuclear weapons. And deterrence, of course, is a good thing to have. Brown and Deutch write, “…it [nuclear prohibition] risks compromising the value that nuclear weapons continue to contribute, through deterrence, to U.S. security and international stability.” Therefore, we need nuclear weapons. Please, whenever anyone discusses “deterrence,” tell me what is being deterred and how.

Most discussions of nuclear “deterrence” are not about deterrence at all, they are about nuclear war fighting, or nuclear machismo, or nuclear revenge but let’s assume that when the authors say “deterrence” they mean deterrence. Deterrence by punishment is simple: if you try to grab something, I have to be able to inflict enough pain, or at least plausibly threaten to, to make the seizing of that thing a bad deal; then you will be deterred. I have written elsewhere that, if we want a nuclear arsenal, not for nuclear war fighting, but to deter attacks, particularly nuclear attacks, then the size of our nuclear arsenal should be tied the stakes involved. During the Cold War the stakes were the ideological future of the entire world and the nuclear arsenals were correspondingly huge. The plausible stakes in play among nations today are much smaller and the number of nuclear weapons should be correspondingly smaller.

If the Russians want to launch a thousand nuclear bombs at us, we want to respond with a thousand to make that seem like a bad idea, that is, to deter them. Right? But why are they launching weapons at us? What are their war goals? What prize are they trying to sieze? How do we make seizing that prize seem like a bad idea? Perhaps, based on their war goal, we do not need to launch a thousand but only one. If we need to launch one and we actually launch a thousand, that is not deterrence, that is revenge. Perhaps what we want is revenge but then we should say that and not muddy the argument by calling it something else. Unless nuclear defenders can tell me what this hypothetical conflict is all about—and I am not asking for specifics, just some, any, example—then there is no way I can even know whether I need nuclear weapons, much less how many.

Another common logical lacuna is to make some theoretically appealing case for nuclear weapons and then jump to the conclusion that we need more or less the nuclear force structure we have today. The authors say, “…the U.S. can safely reduce the total inventory of nuclear weapons to the lowest number needed for the purpose of deterrence. This number is likely to be considerably below the present stockpile of over 8,000 weapons.” That hedging “likely” hints strongly to me that the number they have in mind is not 99% less than the 8,000 we have today. If I match my nuclear forces to the stakes in play today, then I imagine we might be able to make do with ten nuclear weapons; to be on the safe side we could double it to twenty. Nuclear advocates will respond that my number implies that I am going to use my nuclear forces to flatten cities, to use these horrendous weapons to inflict pain on the enemy by massacring innocents. No, they respond, nuclear deterrence is far subtler than that. Attacks on cities are immoral so we have to be more discriminating. Alright, I accept that argument. But now what are the targets? Power stations? Oil refineries? These targets can be attacked with conventional weapons. Why do I need to threaten with nuclear weapons to deter if I am not going to fully exploit what nuclear weapons are best at: turning cities into balls of flame and killing civilians by the millions? Some might respond that there are important targets that are not vulnerable to conventional weapons, for example, hardened enemy missile silos, but if the missiles are still inside then that sounds more like nuclear preemption, not deterrence. True, I might threaten nuclear preemption to deter conventional attack but that is not what most Americans have in mind when they hear “nuclear deterrence.” Moreover, if the enemy hides some valued assets in deep caves, I cannot destroy them but that does not matter. The enemy does not get to choose how I inflict my deterring pain, I do. Just so long as there is something vulnerable that I can hurt, which in every society includes its industry and society, then I can have something to threaten for the sake of deterrence. Whenever and wherever we scratch the surface, get beyond vague appeals for “deterrence,” the arguments for having nuclear weapons come apart.

The authors go on to write: “A nation that wishes to acquire nuclear weapons believes these weapons will improve its security. The declaration by the U.S. that it will move to eliminate nuclear weapons in a distant future will have no direct effect on changing this calculus. Indeed, nothing that the U.S. does to its nuclear posture will directly influence such a nation's (let alone a terrorist group's) calculus.”

Everything about this statement is wrong.

The first sentence is true only because it is tautological.

The second sentence is puzzling on several counts. First, it counters one of the main arguments for U.S. nuclear forces, that our nuclear weapons are a strong force for limiting nuclear proliferation. It is only a robust U.S. nuclear umbrella, so the argument goes, that keeps the Japanese, Taiwanese, and Koreans from going nuclear; that is, our nuclear forces have a very powerful, and positive, effect on other countries’ nuclear decision. But the authors are really arguing that we must keep nuclear weapons because of the inevitability of other countries’ having them; in other words, other nations’ possession of nuclear weapons drives our decisions but our possession is irrelevant to their decisions. Curious. This may be true but such a peculiar asymmetric result bears explaining.

One explanation of the asymmetry might be that, for example, in the case of Pakistan and India, they are looking at each other not at the United States. In the cases of Iran and North Korea, however, the nuclear programs are probably quite strongly motivated as a counter to the United States. But here too it may be true that the structure of our nuclear forces is irrelevant because Iran and North Korea are developing their weapons as a counter to our conventional military capability. To say that our decisions about our nuclear forces will not affect their nuclear calculus is to admit that our nuclear forces are neither a response to nor a counter to their nuclear forces. Iran and North Korea might develop biological and chemical weapons but that does not mean we must develop biological and chemical weapons as a counter or balance just as our nuclear weapons are not an appropriate response to their nuclear weapons.

The last sentence may be true depending on how one defines “directly.” But consider this situation: Imagine the big nuclear powers, in particular, the United States, Russia, and China, have decided to eliminate nuclear weapons. Now imagine that a little fifth rate country like North Korea starts a nuclear program. When its only ally, China, gently takes North Korea aside and explains that nuclear weapons simply will not do, isn’t it at least plausible that such a bit of advice would carry particularly strong weight coming from a country that has just rid itself of its nuclear arsenal? I believe that changes in our nuclear forces and particularly our nuclear doctrine can have “direct” influence on other countries’ decisions.

Finally, I have to note the parenthetical reference to terrorist groups. Stating that terrorist groups are going to try to get nuclear weapons—even if we plan to get rid of ours—sneakily implies that somehow our nuclear weapons are a response to nuclear terror. If by “terrorist groups” we mean non-state actors, will someone please explain to me what are the nuclear targets involved? What is the role for nuclear weapons in deterrence of terrorist attack? And finally, the authors are flatly wrong: national nuclear arsenals are important to terrorist bombs because, by far, the most likely way for terrorists to get a nuclear bomb is to steal the materials or a complete bomb from some nation’s nuclear weapons program.

Another curious unexplained asymmetry is that the authors say we cannot give nuclear weapons up ourselves but we should make every effort to limit their further proliferation. I do not agree with Ken Waltz that a world of many, even mostly, nuclear powers would be so circumspect that it would actually be safer but at least it has a certain “what’s good for the goose is good for the gander” consistency. Presumably the best possible world from the perspective of Brown and Deutch is that only the United States have nuclear weapons. But if that is not going to happen, they fail to explain why it is that we must have nuclear weapons and how we are still going to convince the rest of the world to give them up, presumably for our, not their, benefit.

Upon close reading, this essay by Brown and Deutch, like so many other calls to rally the nuclear troops, depends on an appeal to cliché, to tired arguments left over from the Cold War, to seemingly profound but ultimately ungrounded theoretical arguments that cannot find any handhold in the real world. Here is a compromise: Let’s not get rid of nuclear weapons; let’s take the nuclear advocates at their word and agree that nuclear weapons are needed for deterrence (and actual deterrence of nuclear attack, not war fighting, not preemption, not revenge, not prestige); let’s make realistic evaluations about how many nuclear weapons that deterrence will require, and, when the answer turns out to be a dozen or so, let’s get down to a dozen or so and then I will wait a year before haranguing again for zero.

US Arms Sales to Pakistan: New CRS Report

2007-11-15T21:51:53Z

A new Congressional Research Service report on "U.S. Arms Sales to Pakistan" recently obtained by the FAS provides a succinct overview of recent U.S. arms sales to General Pervez Musharraf's regime, the tumultous fifty-year history of US security assistance to Pakistan, and presidential authority to stop such sales. The release of the report coincides with a worsening political crisis in Pakistan and growing Congressional and public discontent over the United States' multi-billion dollar military aid program for General Musharraf's beseiged and increasingly authoritarian regime. ]]> The 4-page report, which was written by veteran analyst Richard Grimmett, contains several noteworthy observations. According to the report, arms transfer agreements with Pakistan totaled more than $3.5 billion in 2006 - nearly equal to the combined total of arms sales to the troubled South Asian nation from FY1950 to FY2001. These statistics reflect a sudden and dramatic shift in US arms trade policy toward Pakistan after September 11th that transformed the country from pariah state to major aid recipient practically overnight. Within weeks of the attack, the Bush administration waived prohibitions on arms transfers to Pakistan that were imposed following tit-for-tat nuclear tests with India in 1998 and the coup that brought President Musharraf to power in 1999. Since 2001, Pakistan has become one of the largest recipients of U.S. security assistance, including arms transfers; from FY2002 to FY2006, Musharraf's regime has received nearly $1 billion in Foreign Military Financing (grant aid provided to foreign countries specifically for the purchase of US weapons), and has signed government-to-government agreements for nearly $4.34 billion in U.S. weaponry, according to the Defense Department.*

The CRS report also notes that U.S. law gives the president the power to terminate arms sales at any point, a particularly timely observation in light of growing Congressional discontent with arms sales and military aid for Pakistan. On November 8th, Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman Joseph Biden warned that "if President Musharraf does not restore his nation to the democratic path, U.S. military aid will be in great jeopardy." On the chopping block would be "big ticket weapon systems intended primarily to maintain the balance of power with India," including the 36 F-16 fighter aircraft promised to the Pakistani military last summer. The F-16 has become a symbol of America's on-again, off-again relationship with Pakistan, and the multi-billion dollar deal signed last year was seen as the completion of the latest repproachment between the two countries. The current tumult in Pakistan suggests that the sale may have been premature, however, and that a more gradual resumption of major arms sales - preferably pegged to significant, lasting progress in regards to regional peace and stability, democratic governance and effective counter-terrorism operations - might have been more prudent.

Should President Musharraf survive the current challenge to his rule but fail to take significant steps to restore democracy and rule of law, US policymakers will face a difficult choice: cut off some or all arms sales to Pakistan for the third time in four decades and possibly jeopardize ongoing counter-terrorism operations in Pakistan (and America's reputation as a reliable arms supplier and ally), or deliver F-16s and other weapons to an increasingly authoritarian and unpopular regime and sully America's image as a champion of human rights and democracy. With any luck, the current crisis will be resolved in a way that precludes this tough choice. Regardless, the F-16 sale - and arms sales to Pakistan more broadly - underscore the need to error on the side of caution and restraint when arming potentially volatile and unstable countries.

*This number does not include commercial arms exports. For data on licenses issued for commercial exports to Pakistan, see the State Department's section of the annual "Section 655 report." For data on deliveries, see page 67 of "Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales And Other Security Cooperation."

For more information on U.S. arms sales and military aid to Pakistan, see

"U.S. Arms Sales to Pakistan," Congressional Research Service, 8 November 2007.

"Biden calls for New Approach to Pakistan," 8 November 2007.

"Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1999-2006," Congressional Research Service, 26 September 2007.
Annual
"Section 655" report on US Military Assistance. Includes country-by-country summaries of US arms sales by commodity.

"Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales And Other Security Cooperation," Defense Security Cooperation Agency, September 2007. Includes annual dollar value totals for US arms sales and military aid to each country from FY1997 - FY2006, and cumulative data from FY1950 - FY1996.

"Combat Aircraft Sales to South Asia," Congressional Research Service, 6 July 2006.

"Lawmakers Scold Administration Over F-16 Sale to Pakistan," FAS Strategic Security Blog, 23 July 2006.

"PROPOSED SALE OF F–16 AIRCRAFT AND WEAPONS SYSTEMS OF PAKISTAN," Hearing Transcript, 20 July 2006.

Transcript of Panel Discussion on Arms Transfers to India and Pakistan, 28 january 2003.

White House Guidance Led to New Nuclear Strike Plans Against Proliferators, Document Shows

2007-11-05T13:00:00Z

The U.S. nuclear war plan that entered into effect in March 2003 included new executable strike options against regional states seeking weapons of mass destruction.
(click on image to download PDF-version)

By Hans M. Kristensen

The 2001 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and White House guidance issued in response to the terrorist attacks against the United States in September 2001 led to the creation of new nuclear strike options against regional states seeking to acquire weapons of mass destruction, according to a military planning document obtained by the Federation of American Scientists.

Rumors about such options have existed for years, but the document is the first authoritative evidence that fear of weapons of mass destruction attacks from outside Russia and China caused the Bush administration to broaden U.S. nuclear targeting policy by ordering the military to prepare a series of new options for nuclear strikes against regional proliferators.

Responding to nuclear weapons planning guidance issued by the White House shortly after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, U.S. Strategic Command created a series of scenario driven nuclear strike options against regional states. Illustrations in the document identify the states as North Korea and Libya as well as SCUD-equipped countries that appear to include Iran, Iraq (at the time), and Syria - the very countries mentioned in the NPR. The new strike options were incorporated into the strategic nuclear war plan that entered into effect on March 1, 2003.

The creation of the new strike options contradict statements by government officials who have insisted that the NPR did not change U.S. nuclear policy but decreased the role of nuclear weapons.

]]> Non-Denial Denials and a Few Hints

When portions of the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) were leaked in the Los Angeles Times in March 2002, government officials responded by playing down the importance of the document and its effect on nuclear planning. And officials have since continue to credit the NPR with reducing the reliance on nuclear weapons.

The NPR is "not a plan, it's not an operational plan," then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard B. Myers insisted on CNN the day after the NPR was leaked. "It's a policy document. And it simply states our deterrence posture, of which nuclear weapons are a part....And it's been the policy of this country for a long time, as long as I've been a senior officer, that the president would always reserve the right up to and including the use of nuclear weapons if that was appropriate. So that continues to be the policy."

A formal statement published by the Department of Defense added that the NPR "does not provide operational guidance on nuclear targeting or planning," but that the military simply "continues to plan for a broad range of contingencies and unforeseen threats to the United States and its allies."

Most recently, on October 9, 2007, Christina Rocca, the U.S. permanent representative to the Conference on Disarmament, told the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly that the United States has been "reducing the...degree of reliance on [nuclear] weapons in national security strategies....It was precisely the new thinking embodied in the NPR that allowed for the historic reductions we are continuing today."

Yet a few officials hinted in 2002 that the same guidance expanded nuclear planning. "There are nations out there developing weapons of mass destruction," then Secretary of State Colin Powell said on CBS' Face the Nation. "Prudent planners have to give some consideration as to the range of options the president should have available to him to deal with these kinds of threat," he said.

The declassified U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) document shows that one of the first results of "the new thinking" of the NPR was the creation of a series of new nuclear strike options against regional states.

A Series of Regional Options

The 26-page declassified document, an excerpt from a 123-page STRATCOM briefing on the production of the 2003 strategic nuclear war plan known as OPLAN 8044 Revision 03, includes two slides that describe the planning against "regional states." The first of these slides lists a "series of [deleted] options" directed against regional countries with weapons of mass destruction programs. The planning is "scenario driven," according to the document. The majority of the document deals with targeting of Russia and China, but virtually all of those sections were withheld by the declassification officer.

The names of the "regional states" were also withheld, but three images used to illustrate the planning were released, and they leave little doubt who the regional states are: One of the images is the North Korean Taepo Dong 1 missile; another image shows the Libyan underground facility at Tarhuna; and the third image shows a SCUD B short-range ballistic missile. The SCUD B image is not country-specific, but the Air Force National Air and Space Intelligence Center report Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat from 2003 listed 12 countries with SCUD B missiles: Belarus, Bulgaria, Egypt, Iran, Kazakhstan, Libya, North Korea, Syria, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Vietnam and Yemen. Five of these were listed in the NPR as examples of countries that were "immediate, potential, or unexpected contingencies...setting requirements for nuclear strike capabilities": Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea and Syria.

Images included in the declassified STRATCOM document identify several regional states as targets for new nuclear strike plans.

The inclusion of regional nuclear counterproliferaiton strike options into the national (strategic) war plan is a new development because such scenarios have normally been thought to reside at a lower level than the national strategic plan, which has traditionally been focused on targeting of Russia and China. During the 1990s, STRATCOM developed adaptive planning capabilities that enabled quick production of strikes against "rogue" states if necessary, but "there were no immediate plans on the shelf for target packages to give to bombers or missile crews," a former senior Pentagon official told Washington Post in 2002. OPLAN 8044 Revision 03 changed that by producing executable strike options to the nuclear forces.

The "target base" for the regional states is outlined in the STRATCOM document, but everything except the title has been withheld. But the target base probably included weapons of mass destruction, deep, hardened bunkers containing chemical or biological weapons, or the command and control infrastructure required for the states to execute a WMD attack against the United States or its friends and allies. The U.S. Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy (NUWEP) that entered into effect one year after OPLAN 8044 Revision 03 stated in part: "U.S. nuclear forces must be capable of, and be seen to be capable of, destroying those critical war-making and war-supporting assets and capabilities that a potential enemy leadership values most and that it would rely on to achieve its own objectives in a post-war world."

The creation of a "target base" indicates that the planning went further than simple retaliatory punishment with one or a few weapons, but envisioned actual nuclear warfighting intended to annihilate a wide range of facilities in order to deprive the states the ability to launch and fight with WMD. The new plan formally broadened strategic nuclear targeting from two adversaries (Russia and China) to a total of seven.

Iraq presumably disappeared from the war plan again after U.S. forces invaded the country in March 2003 - only three weeks after OPLAN 8044 Revision 03 went into effect - and discovered that Iraq did not have weapons of mass destruction. Libya presumably disappeared after December 2003, when President Muammar Gaddafi declared that he was giving up efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction.

The nuclear strike plans against Iran, North Korea and Syria, however, presumably were carried forward into the next OPLAN 8044 Revision 05 from October 2004, a plan that was still in effect as recently as July 2007.

Nuclear Guidance

"The 2001 Nuclear Posture Review (top) and White House guidance led to an expansion of U.S. nuclear targeting plans.

New Guidance for the Regions

The STRATCOM document indicates that National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-14 signed by President Bush on June 28, 2002, was the key While House guidance that resulted in the incorporation into the strategic nuclear war plan of strike options against regional proliferators.

Very little has been disclosed about NSPD-14, except that it laid out Presidential nuclear weapons planning guidance and provided broad overarching directions to the agencies and commands for nuclear weapon planning. As such, NSPD-14 might have been replacing Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)-60 signed by President Clinton in November 1997 as the primary White House guidance for nuclear weapons planning. PDD-60 reportedly also required planning against proliferators, but the new strike options incorporated into Revision 03 were "notable changes" compared with the previous plan, according to the STRATCOM document.

Flowing from NSPD-14 were several other important guidance documents that deepened the commitment to targeting regional proliferators. The first was the JSCP Transitional Guidance in June 2002, which directed changes to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). JSCP includes a nuclear annex or supplement, known as JSCP-N, that give detailed nuclear planning guidance to the unified and regional commanders. The new JSCP-N was published on October 1, 2002. Another document was the NUWEP (Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy) Transitional Guidance signed on August 29, 2002, which led to the publication of NUWEP-04 in April 2004.

Three months after NSPD-14, on September 14, 2002, President Bush also signed NSPD-17 (National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction), a directive that articulated a comprehensive strategy to counter nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. NSPD-17 reaffirmed that, if necessary, the United States will use nuclear weapons against anyone using weapons of mass destruction against the United States, its forces abroad, and friends and allies, according to Washington Times. But a top-secret appendix to NSPD 17 specifically named Iran, Syria, North Korea and Libya as being among the countries that are the central focus of the new strategy, and that options included nuclear weapons. Those options were in place with OPLAN 8044 Revision 03. The motivation for the new strategy, one participant in the interagency process that drafted it told Washington Post, was the conclusion that "traditional nonproliferation has failed, and now we’re going into active interdiction." NSPD-17 is sometimes also called the preemption doctrine.

The regional strike plans also found their way into the draft Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations (Joint Publication 3-12), which was under preparation within the military at the time Revision 03 was created. Yet the doctrine showed that planning went beyond retaliation and included preemptive strikes. The second draft from March 2005 listed five scenarios where use of nuclear weapons might be requested:

• To counter an adversary intending to use weapons of mass destruction against U.S., multinational, or allies forces or civilian populations;
• To counter an imminent attack from an adversary’s biological weapons that only effects from nuclear weapons can safely destroy;
• To attack on adversary installations including weapons of mass destruction, deep, hardened bunkers containing chemical or biological weapons, or the command and control infrastructure required for the adversary to execute a WMD attack against the United States or its friends and allies; [this was probably the "target base" in OPLAN 8044 Revision 03]
• To counter potentially overwhelming adversary conventional forces;
• To demonstrate U.S. intent and capability to use nuclear weapons to deter adversary WMD use.

After I disclosed this development in an article in Arms Control Today in September 2005 and the Washington Post followed up with a front-page story, sixteen members of Congress - including the current chair of the House Armed Services Committee - reacted by writing to the president to object to what they considered to be a "drastic shift in U.S. nuclear policy."

Embarrassed by the exposure, the Pentagon canceled not only the draft doctrine (and four other related doctrine documents) but also the existing Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations document that had been publicly available on the Joint Chiefs of Staff web site for a decade. A Joint Staff official explained that the documents would not be published, revised or classified, explaining that that they had been found not to be real doctrine documents but "pseudo doctrine" documents discussing nuclear policy issues. The public "visibility led a lot of people to question why we have them," he said.

General Richard Myers and Admiral James Ellis

During the tenure of Admiral Ellis (right), STRATCOM prepared, and CJCS Richard Myers (left) approved, an expansion of the SIOP to "a family of plans applicable in a wider range of scenarios."

From SIOP to OPLAN 8044: A "Family of Plans"

There is no indication that cancelation of the Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations documents changed nuclear policy. The declassified STRATCOM document describes OPLAN 8044 Revision 03 as "a transitional step toward the new TRIAD and future war plans." That transition began long before the "New Triad" phrase was coined by the 2001 NPR, and has gradually transformed the top-heavy self-standing Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) to a broader set of strike options applicable in a wider range of scenarios against more adversaries. When preparation of Revision 03 began in March 2002, the combat employment portion of the strategic nuclear war plan was still known as the SIOP, but the name had to be changed to reflect the emerging multitude of strike options.

As the Joint Staff started to review the new war plan, STRATCOM commander Admiral James Ellis wrote to General Myers that the name SIOP did not properly describe the new plan. "STRATCOM is changing the nation’s nuclear war plan from a single, large, integrated plan to a family of plans applicable in a wider range of scenarios," Ellis explained with a reference to Revision 03. The first STRATCOM commander, General George Lee Butler, had tried to change the name in 1992, but with no luck. Butler wanted to change the name to National Strategic Response Plans. Eleven years later, Admiral Ellis tried again. The SIOP name, he said, was a Cold War legacy.

This time, the JCS chairman was more receptive. On February 8, 2003, only one month before Revision 03 went into effect, General Myers authorized STRATCOM to formally change the name to reflect the creation the "new family of plans." Yet Myers was concerned that confusion might arise "between the basic USSTRATCOM OPLAN 8044 and the combat employment portion of that OPLAN, currently known as the SIOP." The solution, he decided, was to continue to call the basic plan OPLAN 8044, but incorporate the term OPLAN 8044 Revision (FY) to describe that portion of the plan currently known as the SIOP. The Revision number (FY) would correspond to the fiscal year the combat employment plan was put into effect. OPLAN 8044 Revision 03 of March 1, 2003, was the first plan to carry the new name.

The new strike options apparently were carried forward into OPLAN 8044 Revision 05, the next strategic war plan that entered into effect on October 1, 2004. This plan was described as a "major revamping" of the U.S. strategic war plan, which, according to General Myers, "provides more flexible options to assure allies, and dissuade, deter, and if necessary, defeat adversaries in a wider range of contingencies." OPLAN 8044 Revision 05 was still in effect as of July 2007 (for a chronology of U.S. nuclear guidance and war plans under the Bush administration, go here).

Claims About Reducing Reliance On Nuclear Weapons

Officials frequently credit the NPR with having significantly reduced the reliance on nuclear weapons in U.S. nuclear policy. The basis for this claim is that non-nuclear capabilities also should play a role in deterring potential adversaries, an goal exemplified by the incorporation of conventional strike options into OPLAN 8044 Revision 05, the war plan than followed OPLAN 8044 Revision 03, and the removal of Russia as an "immediate contingency."

"The United States has set in motion an entirely new way of looking at the role of nuclear weapons in our defense strategy," Jackie W. Sanders, U.S. Ambassador and Special Representative of the President for the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, told the 2005 Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference. "I speak, Mr. Chairman, of the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review, or NPR, of 2001. The United States has undertaken reviews of this sort in the past, but the 2001 NPR is unique, and fully consistent with Article VI. The 2001 NPR established a New Triad of strategic capabilities, one that places far less reliance on nuclear weapons to meet U.S. defense policy goals…. Let me emphasize, Mr. Chairman, that the New Triad concept resulting from the NPR, in principle and in practice, will reduce reliance on nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy. It reflects a totally new vision of the future, and is fully consistent with our indisputable resolve to implement Article VI."

But while some conventional weapons are being incorporated into the national war plan and planning against Russia is not done in the same way it was during the Cold War, the NPR (building on the 1997 PDD-60) and White House guidance also resulted in an increased nuclear targeting of China and, as the declassified STRATCOM document illustrates, an geographic expansion of national-level nuclear targeting to regional proliferators. Prudent or not, this is not a development that is highlighted by U.S. diplomats at NPT conferences.

Description of Document

The declassified document is heavily redacted and consists of 26 of a total of 123 slides from the Revision 03 Periodic Update of the U.S. strategic war plan that went into effect on March 1, 2003. The plan was the first strategic war plan to carry the new name Operations Plan (OPLAN) 8044 Revision 03, which replaced the Single Operational Strategic Plan (SIOP) name used since 1960. OPLAN 8044 Revision 03 replaced SIOP-03 from October 1, 2002.

The document describes six parts of the new plan preparation: Revision 03 production status, planning guidance, target base, committed forces, options, and conclusions.

The document is not dated, but appears to be from October 2002, shortly before the Secretary of Defense was briefed. Targeting intelligence and selection had been completed, warheads allocated to the strike plans, and strike (sortie) planning for Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), Sea-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs), and long-range bombers nearly completed. After a Joint Staff review and production of the final Revision Report 03 in January 2003, final Defense Secretary review and approval by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were scheduled for late January 2003 before OPLAN 8044 Revision 03 went into effect on March 1, 2003.

Declassification of the document took four years. It was released in response to a FOIA request submitted in October 2003 for documents pursuant to remarks made by then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard Myers during a Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearing in July 2002. When asked if there had been a review of the SIOP since the mid-1990s, Myers replied: "Yes, there absolutely has. In fact, the secretary and I spent considerable time revising the SIOP. I think we started that last year and have gotten another major review ongoing." The declassified document was released on October 10, 2007.

Resources: U.S. Nuclear Weapons Guidance | The Matrix of Deterrence | The Post Cold War SIOP and Nuclear Warfare Planning: A Glossary, Abbreviations, and Acronyms

Acknowledgements: This research has been made possible by support from the Ford Foundation, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, and the Ploughshares Fund.

National Academy of Science Report Calls for Putting the Brakes on the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) Program.

2007-10-29T20:49:37Z

This afternoon, a committee of the National Research Council, a research arm of the National Academy of Science, issued a report that is extremely critical of the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership, or GNEP, an administration plan to restart separating plutonium from used commercial nuclear reactor fuel, something the United States has not done for three decades. I have argued that the goals of GNEP, while scientifically possible and perhaps someday economically justifiable, are decades premature. I am relieved to discover that the committee report comes to essentially the same conclusion.

]]> What has been most remarkable about the GNEP program is not simply the ambitious technical goals it sets, rather it is the extraordinary urgency with which the program is promoted. Currently, the GNEP program is planning on moving basically from lab-bench scale experiments to essentially commercial scale operation without intermediate pilot programs and engineering development. Sort of the missile defense approach to plutonium reprocessing. But the press office summary of the report states that “…the technologies required for achieving GNEP's goals are too early in development to justify DOE's accelerated schedule for construction of commercial facilities that would use these technologies…” Except for the political calendar—DOE may be trying to create facts on the ground, quite literally by pouring concrete, before the end of the Bush administration—I cannot figure out what motivates the big rush.

DOE often has a particular reluctance to do serious cost analysis before setting out on even multibillion dollar projects. (DOE seems to take a more empirical approach to cost studies: keep sending them money until they are finished with the project and when they are done they will tell you how much it cost.) The summary says “DOE claims that the program will save time and money if pursued on the commercial scale, but the committee believes that the opposite will likely be true and found no economic justification.”

Perhaps the primary appeal to Congress of GNEP is that it holds out some hope of avoiding a second Yucca Mountain. Whatever one thinks of Yucca, for or against, everyone agrees that it has been a political nightmare not willingly repeated. The summary says “And although a stated goal of the program is to reduce the overall amount of radioactive waste, which would in turn decrease the need for a second geological repository in addition to Yucca Mountain, it was not clear to the committee that such a need currently exists.”

In short, the summary says, “While all 17 members of the committee concluded that the GNEP R&D program, as currently planned, should not be pursued, 15 of the members said that the less-aggressive reprocessing research program that preceded the current one should be. However, if DOE returns to the earlier program, called the Advance Fuel Cycle Initiative (AFCI), it should not commit to a major demonstration or deployment of reprocessing unless there is a clear economic, national security, or environmental reason to do so.”

And this is not a group of anti-nuclear tree-huggers. The report goes on to review the DOE’s nuclear reactor research program and, while it notes pluses and minuses in various programs, the committee strongly and clearly supports a robust research and development effort in nuclear power. Even a group generally sympathetic to nuclear power isn’t sold on GNEP.

Perhaps the basic problem is, as the committee observes, that “Moreover, there has been insufficient peer review of the program.” This report is an important step in correcting that shortcoming.