<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<rss version="2.0"
	xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"
	xmlns:wfw="http://wellformedweb.org/CommentAPI/"
	xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
	xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"
	xmlns:sy="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/syndication/"
	xmlns:slash="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/slash/"
	>

<channel>
	<title>FAS Strategic Security Blog &#187; Nuclear Proliferation</title>
	<atom:link href="http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/category/nuclear_proliferation/feed" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp</link>
	<description>Comments and analyses of important national and international security issues</description>
	<lastBuildDate>Thu, 05 Nov 2009 16:21:31 +0000</lastBuildDate>
	<generator>http://wordpress.org/?v=abc</generator>
	<language>en</language>
	<sy:updatePeriod>hourly</sy:updatePeriod>
	<sy:updateFrequency>1</sy:updateFrequency>
			<item>
		<title>Iran Owned Part of Eurodif &#8211; Document Posted</title>
		<link>http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2009/11/document-on-international-enrichment-supply-posted.php</link>
		<comments>http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2009/11/document-on-international-enrichment-supply-posted.php#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 05 Nov 2009 16:11:32 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>ioelrich</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[France]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iran]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nuclear Proliferation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[uranium enrichment]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/?p=2122</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[
By Ivanka Barzashka
FAS has posted a report on &#8220;Enrichment Supply and Technology Outside the United States&#8221; by S. A. Levin and S. Blumkin from the Enrichment Department of the Oak Ridge Gaseous Diffusion Plant, operated at the time by Union Carbide. The document, prepared for the U.S. Energy Research and Development Administration, reviews international uranium [...]]]></description>
		<wfw:commentRss>http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2009/11/document-on-international-enrichment-supply-posted.php/feed</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>1</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>Waiting for Answers on Fordo: What IAEA Inspections Will Tell Us</title>
		<link>http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2009/10/waiting-for-answers-on-fordo-what-iaea-inspections-will-tell-us.php</link>
		<comments>http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2009/10/waiting-for-answers-on-fordo-what-iaea-inspections-will-tell-us.php#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 28 Oct 2009 20:09:08 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>ioelrich</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Iran]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ivan Oelrich]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nuclear Proliferation]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/?p=1956</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[by Ivanka Barzashka and Ivan Oelrich
After a cascade of disclosures and official announcements, followed by a great deal of conjecture from experts and the media, the Fordo enrichment plant, Iran’s newest enrichment facility located in the mountains near Qom, opened its doors on October 25 to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections. The US, France, [...]]]></description>
		<wfw:commentRss>http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2009/10/waiting-for-answers-on-fordo-what-iaea-inspections-will-tell-us.php/feed</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>CTBT Article XIV Conference</title>
		<link>http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2009/09/ctbt-article-xiv-conference.php</link>
		<comments>http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2009/09/ctbt-article-xiv-conference.php#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2009 21:29:39 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Alicia Godsberg</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Alicia Godsberg]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nuclear Proliferation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nuclear Weapons]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[arms control]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/?p=1734</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[by: Alicia Godsberg
This past Thursday and Friday marked the 6th bi-annual Article XIV Conference, the Conference on Facilitating the Entry Into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).  This year’s conference was held at the United Nations in New York and was met with a measure of cautious optimism – most states voiced [...]]]></description>
		<wfw:commentRss>http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2009/09/ctbt-article-xiv-conference.php/feed</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>The Qom Uranium Enrichment Facility &#8211; What and How Do We Know?</title>
		<link>http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2009/09/the-qom-uranium-enrichment-facility-what-and-how-do-we-know.php</link>
		<comments>http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2009/09/the-qom-uranium-enrichment-facility-what-and-how-do-we-know.php#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2009 13:26:39 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>ioelrich</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Iran]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nuclear Proliferation]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/?p=1723</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[On Friday, President Obama, President Sarkozy, and Prime Minister Brown revealed  a covert Iranian uranium enrichment facility near Qom. Obama announced that “the size and configuration of this facility is inconsistent with a peaceful nuclear program.” In a briefing , Senior White House Administration Officials clarified that the facility is designed to hold about 3,000 [...]]]></description>
		<wfw:commentRss>http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2009/09/the-qom-uranium-enrichment-facility-what-and-how-do-we-know.php/feed</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>9</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>Calculating Output of the New Iranian Uranium Enrichment Plant</title>
		<link>http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2009/09/calculating-output-of-the-new-iranian-uranium-enrichment-plant.php</link>
		<comments>http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2009/09/calculating-output-of-the-new-iranian-uranium-enrichment-plant.php#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 25 Sep 2009 22:20:08 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>ioelrich</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Ivan Oelrich]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nuclear Proliferation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nuclear Weapons]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/?p=1710</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[
On Friday, President Obama announced that the United States knows of a new, undeclared, and hidden underground gas-centrifuge uranium enrichment facility in Iran, near the city of Qom.  Some news reports suggest that 3000 centrifuges will be housed there.  How significant is this discovery?  Well, just in time, our crack FAS researcher, Ivanka Barzashka, has [...]]]></description>
		<wfw:commentRss>http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2009/09/calculating-output-of-the-new-iranian-uranium-enrichment-plant.php/feed</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>Increased Safeguards at Natanz: What Does It All Mean?</title>
		<link>http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2009/08/increased-safeguards-at-natanz-what-does-it-all-mean.php</link>
		<comments>http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2009/08/increased-safeguards-at-natanz-what-does-it-all-mean.php#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 28 Aug 2009 21:44:55 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>ioelrich</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Iran]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ivan Oelrich]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nuclear Proliferation]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/?p=1690</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[by Ivanka Barzashka and Ivan Oelrich

A much anticipated IAEA report on Iran’s nuclear activities was leaked today.  The report indicates that, among other things, Iran has conceded to additional safeguard at Natanz.  This is a welcome development but occurring amidst a contested Iranian election, European threats of increased sanctions, continuing oblique hints of Israeli military [...]]]></description>
		<wfw:commentRss>http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2009/08/increased-safeguards-at-natanz-what-does-it-all-mean.php/feed</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>7</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>The Big Picture &#8211; what is really at stake with the START follow-on Treaty</title>
		<link>http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2009/07/the-big-picture-what-is-really-at-stake-with-the-start-follow-on-treaty.php</link>
		<comments>http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2009/07/the-big-picture-what-is-really-at-stake-with-the-start-follow-on-treaty.php#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 15 Jul 2009 16:59:14 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Alicia Godsberg</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Alicia Godsberg]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nuclear Proliferation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nuclear Weapons]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[arms control]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nonproliferation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[npt]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nuclear weapons]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[START]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/?p=1525</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[by Alicia Godsberg
There is cause for cautious optimism after Presidents Obama and Medvedev signed their START follow-on Joint Understanding in Moscow last Monday – the goal of completing a legally binding bilateral nuclear disarmament agreement with verification measures is preferable to letting START expire without an agreement or without one that keeps some sort of [...]]]></description>
		<wfw:commentRss>http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2009/07/the-big-picture-what-is-really-at-stake-with-the-start-follow-on-treaty.php/feed</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>3</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>North Korea’s Nuclear Test: Another Fizzle?</title>
		<link>http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2009/05/nktest.php</link>
		<comments>http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2009/05/nktest.php#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 25 May 2009 14:28:19 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>hkristensen</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Hans Kristensen]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[North Korea]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nuclear Proliferation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nuclear Weapons]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/?p=1310</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[





The North Korean nuclear test on May 25, 2009, was &#8220;heard&#8221; loud and clear around the world despite its apparent limited size. Detection of small, clandestine nuclear tests seems to work.




.
By Hans M. Kristensen
The Korean Central News Agency reportedly has announced that North Korea &#8220;successfully conducted one more underground nuclear test on May 25 as [...]]]></description>
		<wfw:commentRss>http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2009/05/nktest.php/feed</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>21</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>Briefing on US-Russian Nuclear Forces</title>
		<link>http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2009/04/usrusnukes.php</link>
		<comments>http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2009/04/usrusnukes.php#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 27 Apr 2009 18:08:58 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>hkristensen</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Hans Kristensen]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nuclear Proliferation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nuclear Weapons]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[United States]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/?p=1237</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[





Vast inventories of nuclear weapons remain after the Cold War arms race ended.




.
By Hans M. Kristensen
Russia&#8217;s nuclear forces are expected to drop well below 500 offensive strategic delivery vehicles within the next five years, less than one-third of what&#8217;s permitted by the 1991 START treaty. Unless the next U.S. Nuclear Posture Review significantly reduces the [...]]]></description>
		<wfw:commentRss>http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2009/04/usrusnukes.php/feed</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>1</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>Iran&#8217;s Fuel Fabrication:  Step closer to energy independence or a bomb?</title>
		<link>http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2009/04/1106.php</link>
		<comments>http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2009/04/1106.php#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 10 Apr 2009 19:16:40 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>ioelrich</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Iran]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ivan Oelrich]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nuclear Proliferation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nuclear Weapons]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/?p=1106</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[By Ivanka Barzashka and Ivan Oelrich
Yesterday, on Iran’s national Nuclear Technology Day, President Ahmadinejad announced the country’s latest nuclear advances, which seem to have become an important source of national pride and international rancor.  April 9 marks the day when Iran claimed to have enriched its first batch of uranium in 2006. Yesterday, Ahmadinejad [...]]]></description>
		<wfw:commentRss>http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2009/04/1106.php/feed</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>6</slash:comments>
		</item>
	</channel>
</rss>
