Iran agreed to invest in Eurodif under the Shah, who lent the project $1 billion. The loan would have entitled Iran to buy 10% of the enriched uranium produced by the plant. In 1977, Iran paid another $180 million for future enrichment services. But after the revolution, Tehran canceled its agreement and halted payment because Khomeini wasn’t interested in nuclear power. Iran demanded its loan be repaid with interest.

According to the French, when they settled the dispute in 1991, Iran was reimbursed $1.6 billion for its original 1974 loan plus interest. The deal also rendered Iran an indirect shareholder in Eurodif (AREVA now says “sleeping partner”) through Soldif. This arrangement only entitles Iran to take part in meetings of Eurodif’s supervisory board, collect Eurodif dividents, and redistribute dividends to its shareholders. The 1991 arrangements does not entitle Iran to technology or enriched uranium. Unfortunately, the document we really need to get our hands on is not likely to be released any time soon.

Reply: The “30 plus” are listed in this blog. HK

Reply: All countries have the right to operate in international waters, regardless of their human rights record – China included. The issue is how growing Chinese naval capabilities will influence how Japan and other countries in the region see their own security affected by those capabilities, and what counter-measures they will develop in response. That could increase military competition and tension in the region and thus undermine everyone’s security. The challenge is how to develop a security framework in the region that limits military competition and increases the security for all countries. Got any ideas? HK

I don’t really see the importance of withdrawal, though the storage issue might be worse than I think;
but since the fall of the soviet block, the tactical nukes are obsolete, also: there’s still two nuclear powers within arm’s reach, France and the UK, who are also NATO members.

Reply: Good questions. The importance of withdrawal, as I see it, is twofold: first, to free NATO from a Cold War posture to focus on today’s challenges, and; second, to end the deterrence relationship with Russia. HK

China’s ability to deter the US is minuscule. I believe the US would go to war over Taiwan if the price is worth it but not from now.
The price has gone up and will keep on increasing as the PLA tailor its forces to handle any contingency posed by US forces.
China is not out to attack the US but it’s the other way round. The US is fond of saying it is defending freedom and democracy. Read it as a charade for attacking defenceless countries like Iraq and other Middle Eastern states.

The PLA will increase its nuclear deterrent whether the US implements the missile shield. The Pentagon will have to note that US homeland is not immune if the Americans were to attack China.

But I feel that these tac nukes in Europa are at least aimed as much inwards, as outwards. Sure a lot of folks in the security establishment have a hard time to leave the Cold War behind, but there are also still those who have an even harder time to leave WW2 behind …

We can all figure out how a future contradiction between actual wartime needs on one hand, and limitations of the NPT on the other, would be resolved. Practicing with dummies presents no current contradiction.

Reply: “Contradiction,” oh but it most certainly is. The main issue is not legal but political. Equipping non-nuclear NPT countries with the means, skills, and plans to delivery nuclear weapons is not consistent with the nonproliferation regime and the nonproliferation standards Europe and the United States are promoting. The parallel would be Russia deploying nuclear weapons in Iran, equipping Iranian aircraft to carry the weapons, training Iranian pilots to deliver the weapons, and making the procedures for handing over control of the weapons to Iran in times of war. In such a hypothetical scenario, Russia could argue that it was merely doing so to assure Iran about its security and thereby preventing it from developing its own nuclear weapons. Obviously, it would require enormous changes in Russian and Iranian policies to create such a posture, but I think most would argue that it would be a clear contradiction of the NPT. HK

Reply: Your IP address, Mr. xxx, is in China. Please teach me. I’m more than willing to correct mistakes. HK

Living in Seattle I can without any doubt say, as I have witnessed first-hand, that the Chinese and Russian governments operate military surveillance vessels within 11 miles from the Bangor submarine base and have actually crossed over in to US territorial waters on at least 2 occasions within the last 10 years. On all occasions the US Navy and or Coast Guard has boarded for “safety” inspections and has even in one case that I know of seized advanced sonar equipment from the vessels.

So it’s the pot calling the kettle black so to speak. All countries conduct illict spying, but to what extent civillians never know.

I would like to say that China has the right to protect their terrortories just as any country does. I find the whole Taiwan issue a thorn in the side of both the US and China. I mean how would the US feel if China sided with Alaska in breaking away from the union? Remember the US has had one civil war already where states have tried to leave the Union. I think if politicians stopped to reflex on issues before they pledge support, the world would be less complex.

I am not a China apologist either. China has been allowed to break international laws pertaining to commerce for years. For one they are the only country on earth that does not have their currency valued as all other countries do on the international market; therefore, the Chinese currency is under valued which allows them a more than biais advantage pertaining to the marketing of their own goods and services.

Reply: Your point about specific cases of Chinese and Russian operations near Bangor in the last 10 years is interesting. Can you reference to news articles or other material so we can learn more?

Just a note on “international waters” and how far from shore they begin. Simply speaking it’s anything beyond 12 nautical miles (13.8 miles) from shore, but two other zones provide some national jurisdiction beyond national territorial waters: The Contiguous Zone extends 12 nautical miles beyond territorial waters, and the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) extends out to a maximum of 200 nautical miles (230 miles) from the mean low water mark. So true international waters only exist beyond the EEZ, which sometimes confuses some countries to make territorial claims beyond the 12 nautical miles territorial waters. HK