Reply: Because we know of no indications that any nuclear weapons are stored in Diego Garcia. All U.S. nuclear weapons that used to be deployed in other countries have been withdrawn – except in Europe, where 200 bombs are left over from the Cold War in five countries. Those bombs and the warheads on sea-launched ballistic missile submarines patrolling in the Atlantic and Pacific are the only U.S. nuclear weapons deployed outside the continental United States. HK

I think one thing is missing. Reliability, Surety, Knowledge etc is all here but really RRW is not and was never really driven by these things. These are shields used to try and get the program through Congress.

This is really about changing the US nuclear weapons complex to suit new conceptions of deterrence. By focusing on reliability and so on critics of RRW are in danger of missing the big picture.

This conclusion is implicit in the analysis. Those pushing this know that LEP is up to the job. If the stockpile is reliable and exhibits high surety and can remain so under LEP then there must be other reasons why RRW is being pushed.

How is that everybody ignores this point? The point of RRW analysis should be to discern these true underlying reasons. Just because Arms Control Today states that RRW is about reliability and not new notions of deterrence doesn’t make it so.

Remember when ACT told us that Clinton’s PDD60 didn’t cut against negative security assurances?

Since Russia and China now has a treaty to tell each other about all rocket launches, it seems that even if (1) is correct, China will fill the gap soon, as US is the primary, if not the only, country that wants to hold China at risk for a first strike.

safety: If you drop the sucker on your toe or expose it to a fire or external chemical explosion you do not get a blast and the hazardous materials inside are well contained.

security: No unauthorized users are able to set off the nuclear explosion or safely disassemble the bomb and extract the good stuff for their own uses.

surety: When properly order to explode it does.

India does not have nuclear force levels required for a first strike against the much larger Chinese arsenal. The inadequacy will likely persist for decades to come. A Russian first strike on China is conceivable but far less likely than an US first strike.

If China has to coerce Taiwan into relinquishing its sovereignty or “teach India a lesson” it will need a credible deterrent against a US first strike.

It is unlike the Chinese to not have addressed the US threat and be satisfied with a deterrent against the much lesser threat from Russia.

If the Jin is as noisy as it is believed to be and the Chinese know the US knows, then why would they not be send the Jins on patrol outside littoral waters anyway? If for no other reasons than to develop the Ocean goings skills of their submariners.

A noisy Jin would makes sense only if the JL-2 has the ability to strike the US mainland.

Reply: I don’t know. Is that what really happened? There have certainly been a lot of rumors about that incident, ranging from the U.S. carrier being caught by surprise to it knowing full well the Chinese sub was near. Diesel electric subs can certainly be a challenge, but given that the U.S. Navy practices against allied conventional subs all the time it seems curious that a Chinese conventional sub from a fleet with very little operational experience would suddenly be able to do better. HK

Reply: One fallacy is to assume intelligence estimates are always correct. Another is to assume that because some is incorrect all is incorrect. The ONI report is one reference point that should be critiqued but also takes seriously; after all, it is the Navy’s submarines that are trailing the Chinese submarines. Let me know if there are other sources that provide other information. HK