AGRICULTURAL BIOWARFARE & BIOTERRORISM
AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK & RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FIFTH
BTWC REVIEW CONFERENCE
Mark Wheelis
Section of Microbiology,
University of California, Davis
What goals might
an attack on the agricultural sector serve?
Attack the food supply of an enemy
belligerent
This is the
classical rationale for the inclusion of anti-plant programs in national
biological weapons programs. Every major state BW program we know of has
included an anti-agricultural component, from the WWI German use of anthrax and
glanders against animals to the Iraqi program on wheat cover smut. For most
agents, effective use would require large stockpiles and extensive delivery
efforts; however, there is potential for delivery by secret agent to initiate
point-source epidemics of highly contagious agents.
The relevance of
this to terrorist use is slight; however, BW proliferator states are likely to
include anti-animal and anti-plant agents in their developing arsenal, and if
they also support terrorist groups, there is a slim chance that such groups might
be allowed access to anti-agricultural agents for the purpose of bioterrorism.
Destabilize a government by initiating
food shortages or unemployment
Disruption of
the agricultural sector can cause profound dislocation of societies. Direct
losses of plants or animals could cause food shortages, rises in food prices,
and unemployment. All of these could, if severe, have serious destabilizing
effects on social and political structures. Many developed countries are quite
vulnerable to disruption of the agricultural sector, although their social and
political institutions are fairly robust and the resulting discontent is
probably unlikely to cause institutional collapse. Nevertheless, the potential
for immense economic damage is high in a well-planned attack, and the
consequences for the food supply, export trade, and financial markets could be
very serious. Many developing countries are potentially quite vulnerable to
such destabilization, particularly if they depend heavily on a single food crop
or animal.
Alter supply and demand patterns for a
commodity
A
widespread-epidemic, or any outbreak that triggered the imposition or
relaxation of trade restrictions, could result in significant changes of supply
of the affected plant or animal materials on domestic and international
markets. This in turn would open up or close markets for others (a possible
motivating factor). Biological attack
could also be used to manipulate futures, and for other manipulations of the
financial markets.
Control an undesirable plant or animal
(biocontrol)
The use of
legitimate, peaceful biocontrol is expanding steadily, and provides an
unfortunate body of knowledge and range of ready-made delivery technologies for
the interested agricultural bioterrorist or biowarfare program.
There have been
two recent programs to develop pathogens of drug crops as biocontrol agents.
These have been conducted under UNDCP auspices, funded and performed by the US
(fungal pathogens of coca), and funded by the US and UK and performed by
Uzbekistan (fungal pathogens of poppy). Both of these programs involve the
development of biological agents and delivery devices, and both are presumably
intended for use principally or entirely in other countries. However, none of
the potential target states has agreed to allow the use of these agents for
biocontrol, and several have now stated explicitly that they will not allow it.
As a result of this refusal, UNDCP has now withdrawn its sponsorship of the
anti-coca project. Although there is no evidence that the agents are being
developed for hostile use, the absence of target country approval makes it
equally difficult to demonstrate that they are being developed for peaceful
purposes. This ambiguity raises legitimate concerns about compliance with
Article I of the BTWC. Furthermore, once effective agents have been developed,
the intense concern over the drug trade in drug-consuming states may lead to
pressure to use them covertly, regardless of target country approval.
Terrorists and
individuals might also be interested in biocontrol agents. The deliberate and
illegal 1997 importation of Rabbit Hemorrhagic Disease Virus (RHDV) into New
Zealand constitutes a past instance. And biological attack on genetically
engineered plants might be considered by the more extreme activist groups
opposed to such technology, a use that could in their view be a form of
biocontol.
Who might be
tempted to initiate an attack on the agricultural sector?
Countries
Countries might
consider agricultural attack for military, political, ideological, or economic
reasons. Since there could be quite severe consequences of being recognized as
responsible for a biological attack, such efforts would likely be covert. This
would entail an effort to make the outbreak appear natural—most probably a point-source
outbreak, or multiple outbreaks with an apprently natural common source (see
below).
Countries that
are actively pursuing a secret military BW capability (thought to number about
a dozen) are probably developing anti-agricultural agents for strategic use in
the event of war. Iraq, for instance, was developing wheat cover smut as a
weapon, presumably intended against Iran.
In the 1980’s,
Iraq used chemical weapons extensively against Iran, and internally against
civilian minorities, with virtually no political consequences. This has
undoubtedly lowered the political threshold for use of BW in a regional or
civil conflict.
Corporations
Agricultural
corporations, including producers, processors, and shippers, could benefit
immensely from the economic impacts, market share changes, and financial market
effects of a successful biological attack. Many also employ expert plant
pathologists or veterinarians and have large collections of pathogens. The
combination of motivation, expertise, and materials within a single, closed
organization is worrisome. Of course, corporations, like countries, would run
enormous legal risks if they perpetrated a biological attack, so if they were
to choose to do this, it would be expertly designed to mimic a natural outbreak.
For both
corporations and governments, decision to use bioweapons would be expected to
require approval at the very highest level, thus reducing its likelihood.
However, in both the possibility of mid- or lower-level zealots initiating
unauthorized action has to be considered.
Organized crime
Because of the
huge financial stakes in the agricultural sector, and because the foundation of
the drug industry involves crop cultivation, organized crime may take an
interest in biocriminal activities with agricultural targets.
Terrorist groups
Terrorist groups
might be interested in agricultural bioweapons for a variety of reasons:
international terrorist organizations for the harm they could do to enemy
states or peoples, millennial groups for their potential contribution to
societal collapse, anti-GMO groups for their potential value in deterring
farmers from the use of genetically engineered crops or animals. In many cases
of ideologically-motivated terrorist attack there would be willing assumption of
responsibility by the perpetrator; in other cases there could be an attempt to
disguise the outbreak as natural.
Individuals
Individual
perpetrators (biocriminals) could include disgruntled employees or ex-employees
in the agricultural sector, ideologically motivated individuals, speculators on
the commodities market, or individuals with a profit motive (such as the New
Zealand farmer(s) assumed to have covertly imported RHDV).
What would be
the consequences of attack on the agricultural sector?
Direct losses due to disease
Direct financial
loss due to mortality or morbidity of domestic animals or crop plants can vary
from insignificant to catastrophic. In many cases the direct losses would be
modest and would fall on a small number of farms. One of the major determinants
of the magnitude of the direct losses will be the rapidity with which the
disease is noticed and diagnosed. In developed countries most of the foreign
diseases of greatest concern would likely be identified fairly early, allowing
the direct disease losses to be kept modest.
Losses due to efforts to contain
outbreaks
The control of
an outbreak of an imported, highly contagious animal or plant disease is
routinely controlled by destruction of all potentially exposed healthy host
organisms. With animal diseases, this normally means the slaughter of all host
animals in the immediate vicinity. With plants, thousands of acres of crop
plants may have to be destroyed to contain an outbreak. Thus the losses
attendant on outbreak control can exceed, often by several orders of magnitude,
the direct losses due to the disease itself.
Destruction of
exposed hosts is often the only option when the agent is bacterial or viral.
However, for fungal agents destruction of exposed crops may be reduced by the
use of fungicides. However, this is an expensive process itself, so it adds
significantly to the cost of the outbreak, and it may cause environmental
damage.
A number of
important threats to crop plants are from insect pests, rather than microbial
pathogens. These outbreaks are usually controlled by use of pesticides rather
than destruction of exposed plants, which, as with control of fungal disease,
can cost large amounts. Widespread broadcast of insecticide may also cause
environmental or human health damage as well. The BTWC certainly could cover
pests as well as pathogens, as Article I refers to “microbial or other
biological agents,” and the consultative process of the BTWC has been used to
address concerns about a pest infestation in Cuba. However, this coverage has
never been made explicit, and it would be useful to do so since there are so
many insect pests of great potential for agricultural biowarfare or
bioterrorism.
Losses due to sanitary or phytosanitary
restrictions on international trade
Under the World
Trade Organization, member states are allowed to impose import restrictions on
agricultural products to prevent the importation of pests or disease agents.
Thus importing countries free of a particular disease are usually quick to
block imports from countries in which that disease breaks out. This happens
frequently, as these diseases periodically resurface in areas that they have
been absent from; trade restrictions typically last a month or two when control
of the outbreak is rapid, or they may endure much longer if disease control is
slow and difficult (eg the EU restriction on the import of UK beef due to the
BSE outbreak).
Thus major
agricultural exporters are particularly vulnerable. For instance, the Taiwan
FMD outbreak in swine in 1997 probably only cost tens of thousands of dollars
(US) in direct losses, but it cost 4 billion in eradication and disinfection
costs, and a cumulative 15 billion in lost export revenues. An FMD outbreak in
Italy in 1993 again had trivial direct costs, but nearly 12 million dollars in
eradication and disinfection costs, and 120 million dollars in lost trade
revenues.
Alternatively,
the introduction of a disease into a country previously free of it would
undermine the legitimacy of that country’s import restrictions under the WTO,
forcing the lifting of the restrictions and opening up the market. This could
bring significant additional losses to domestic producers.
Losses due to indirect effects (market
destabilization, etc)
The substantial
market effects of a widespread outbreak, or one that has major impacts on
international trade, could have secondary effects, such as share-holder losses,
revenue losses to processors and shippers, etc. In the extreme, if losses are
very large and if future losses appear likely, significant levels of investor
panic could lead to market destabilization.
What are the
special features of attack on the agricultural sector?
Agents are not hazardous to perpetrators
With the
exception of a few agents of zoonotic disease, most of the diseases that are
likely to be considered for an attack on the agricultural sector are completely
harmless to humans. They are thus much less challenging to produce, stockpile,
and disseminate than lethal human pathogens.
Few technical obstacles to weaponization
A military style
attack by airplane on large acreage of crops would require crop dusters and
large stockpiles of agent. Nevertheless, nothing would be difficult to obtain
on the open market. Less ambitious attacks would require much less in the way
of equipment or agent stockpiles. If the goal is to cause only a few cases in
order to disrupt trade, then no special equipment and only a few microliters of
agent are needed. And, as discussed below, it is possible to introduce
biological agents without even entering the target country.
Low security of vulnerable targets
Many potential
sites for release of an animal agent, such as auction houses, have very low
security. Access to large numbers of animals with destinations all over a
country or region is simple and easy. Seeds, fertilizers, and pesticides
provide routes for infection of crop plants, although of somewhat higher (but
still not robust) security. And of course pastures and fields themselves have
essentially no security at all.
Lower moral barrier to cross
It is often
argued that there is an innate human revulsion to the use of disease as a
weapon; if so, this could constitute an important disincentive to bioterrorism
and biowarfare. However, it is unlikely that this sentiment extends to
biological attack on plants or animals. Furthermore, the response after a
biological attack on plants or animals would be less substantial than if the
attack involved human victims, and the penalties of being identified as the
perpetrator would be lighter.
Maximum effect may not require many cases
If the goal is
to disrupt trade by introducing a highly contagious disease into territory from
which it is absent, then the attack does not have to be constructed to cause a
large number of cases—a handful of cases may be sufficient. Obviously it is
much easier to cause a small outbreak than a large one
Point source to mimic natural
introduction can be effective
Because of the
high background of naturally-occurring disease, it is possible that a deliberately
instigated outbreak could be mistaken for a natural one. If avoiding detection
is important, an attack would be constructed to take advantage of this
confusion. Especially if the goal is disruption of international trade, where
few cases are necessary, it is feasible to construct an attack to appear to be
a natural point-source outbreak.
Multiple point source outbreaks can be
initiated by contaminating imported feed or fertilizer, without even entering
the country
Many countries
import materials such as straw, animal feed, or fertilizer. This provides an
opportunity for introducing serious pathogens, without having to even enter the
target country. It also allows the possibility of initiating multiple outbreaks
over a large geographic area, in a way that mimics a natural event (such as the
recent outbreak of foot and mouth disease in Japanese cattle in two widely
separated prefectures, thought to have been introduced on straw imported from
China).
How will
Genomics and genEtic technology change the threat?
Genomics and proteomics make
genotype-specific weapons possible.
The emerging
sciences of genomics and proteomics are already beginning to transform biology
and medicine. This will continue, at an accelerating pace. One outcome will be
the possibility of constructing genotype-specific biological control or weapons
agents. Although there has been much concern about the possibility of “ethnic
weapons” targeting specific groups of humans, the likelihood is that this will
prove impossible (due to the high and increasing amount of intragroup genetic
heterogeneity). However, equivalent
weapons targeting specific agricultural varieties is a very real possibility.
Agriculture is highly vulnerable to
genotype-specific weapons
Agriculture,
particularly in many developed countries, has several properties that make it
vulnerable to attack with genotype-specific weapons. Typically it employs
monocropping of large acreages with genetically identical cultivars, and
high-density husbandry of genetically inbred animal strains. These agronomic
practices reduce the genetic variability that makes populations resistant to
genotype-specific weapons, and it creates conditions (large, dense populations)
that facilitate disease spread.
High-tech agent design is an option available
only to sophisticated players—eg states and multinational corporations.
At least for the
near future, the construction of novel toxin weapons or genetically engineered
microbes as genotype-specific weapons would require a substantial scientific infrastructure,
ranging from molecular biology to genomics to agronomy. It is unlikely that
most terrorist groups could assemble the necessary expertise and materials for
this. Thus genotype-specific weapons are likely to remain accessible only to
states (and possibly their sub-state clients), and to large agricultural
corporations.
WHAT STATES ARE MOST AT RISK?
The states most
vulnerable to economic attack on the agricultural sector are those with several
or most of the following attributes:
--high-density, large area agriculture
--heavy reliance on monoculture of a
restricted range of genotypes
--free of specific serious animal and
plant pathogens or pests
--major agricultural exporter, or heavily
dependent on a few domestic agricultural products
--suffering serious domestic unrest, or
the target of international terrorism, or unfriendly neighbor of states likely
to be developing BW programs
--weak plant and animal epidemiological
infrastructure
For such at-risk
states, the threat of biological attack against its agricultural sector should
be taken quite seriously, and preventative and punitive measures put in place.
How might attack
on the agricultural sector be deterred?
Enact appropriate legislation
Enactment of
legislation implementing the BTWC is required of all States Parties; however,
many have not yet done so. Such legislation can be a significant deterrent to
biological attack on the agricultural sector. The legislation should, among
other provisions, provide for substantial criminal penalties for the hostile
use anywhere of biological agents against plants or animals as well as people,
and it should provide for extradition for anyone charged with using such agents
against the agricultural sector of another state.
States that
already have enacted such legislation should review its provisions to ensure
that it adequately covers biological attack on plants and animals.
Insure effective epidemiological
investigation to determine origin of outbreaks
Biological
attack on the agricultural sector is likely to be covert if one ever happens.
Such attacks will be options for perpetrators only to the extent that they
maintain plausibility as natural events. Increased epidemiological capacity,
especially in strain identification from molecular sequence data, makes it
increasingly difficult to escape detection, and thus would act as a substantial
deterrent.
Negotiate an effective BTWC Protocol
A BTWC Protocol
that establishes effective measures to deter
States from developing or possessing biological weapons would provide a
powerful tool in making progress towards the goal of complete biological
disarmament. This would reduce the likelihood of BW in regional conflicts, and
the chance that state-supported terrorist organizations would ever get
bioweapons. Provision for internationally sponsored epidemiological
investigation of possible agricultural attacks would deter covert use in the
same manner as national epidemiological capacity.
Reduce reliance on monoculture and expand
the diversity of genotypes cultured
States that
engage in high intensity agriculture of a limited range of varieties could
reduce their vulnerability to both deliberate and natural disease outbreaks by
increasing the use of intercropping, expanding the diversity of genotypes
utilized, reducing the size of plots, and a variety of other agricultural
changes designed to reduce susceptibility to disease outbreaks. However, these
constitute substantial changes in established practice, and are probably not
likely to be instituted without sustained and forceful political leadership.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FIFTH REVIEW
CONFERENCE OF THE BTWC
The analysis
suggests the following recommendations for consideration by the Review
Conference:
With respect to Article I
1. The RC should reaffirm that the
general purpose prohibitions of Article I apply to plant and animal diseases,
and to all agents and toxins regardless of their means of production, including
artificial toxic analogues of natural transmitters, modulators, etc, generated
by genomic or other methods.
2. The RC should affirm that insect pests
are covered by the BTWC.
3. The RC should affirm that the
development of biocontrol agents by a State Party, intended for use within its
borders is a permitted peaceful use. It should consider whether the same is
true if the only possible use is in other states and the developing state does
not have the explicit approval of the country in which they are intended for
use.
With
respect to Article IV
4. The RC should urge all States Parties
that have not yet passed implementing legislation to do so; and all States
Parties with implementing legislation in place to review it to insure that it
adequately covers biological attack on the agricultural sector.
With
respect to Article IX
5. The RC should recognize that novel
chemical weapons will be made possible by the revolutions in genomics and
proteomics, and should communicate this concern by appropriate means to the
first RC of the CWC.
6. The RC should affirm that the General
Purpose criteria expressed in Article I in both the BTWC and the CWC between
them effectively cover every conceivable chemical compound and microbial agent.
The RC should invite the First RC of the CWC to join them in this affirmation,
and to jointly devise a mechanism of cooperative jurisdiction in ambiguous
cases.
ADDITIONAL READING
Ban, J., 2000.
Agricultural biological warfare: An overview. The Arena, Number 9, June 2000. Washington: Chemical and Biological
Arms Control Institute. 8 pp.
Brown, C., 1999.
Agro-terrorism: a cause for alarm. The
Monitor: Nonproliferation, Demilitarization, and Arms Control.
Winter-Spring 1999, pp 6-8.
Frazier, T. W.,
and D. C. Richardson (eds), 1999. Food
and Agricultural Security: Guarding Against Natural Threats and Terrorist
Attacks Affecting Health, National food Supplies, and Agricultural Economics.
New York: New York Academy of Sciences (Annals
of the New York Academy of Sciences, Vol 894). 233 pp.
Gordon, J. C.,
and S. Bech-Nielsen, 1986. Biological terrorism: a direct threat to our livestock
industry. Military Medicine 151, 357-363.
Kohnen,
A. S., 2000. Responding to the Threat of
Agroterrorism: Specific Recommendations for the United States Department of
Agriculture. BCSIA Discussion Paper 2000-29, ESDP Discussion Paper
ESDP-2000-04, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, October
2000. 43 pp. Available online at
http://ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/BCSIA/ESDP.nsf/www/Research.
Rogers, P., S.
Whitby and M. Dando, 1999. Biological warfare against crops. Scientific American, June, pp 70-75.
Van der Plank,
J. E., 1963. Plant diseases in biological warfare. Pp 212-222 in J. E. van der
Plank, Plant Diseases: Epidemics and
Control. New York: Academic Press.
Wheelis, M.,
1999. Biological sabotage in world war I. Pp. 35-62 in E. Geissler and J. E. v.
C. Moon (Eds.) Biological and Toxin
Weapons: Research, Development and Use from the Middle Ages to 1945. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Wilson, T. M.,
L. Logan-Henfrey, R. Weller, and B. Kellman. 2000. Agroterrorism, biological crimes,
and biological warfare targeting animal agriculture, p. 23-57. In C. Brown and
C. Bolin (eds.), Emerging Diseases of
Animals. ASM Press, Washington, D.C.
Whitby, S. and
P. Rogers, 1997. Anti-crop biological warfare—implications of the Iraqi and US programmes.
Defense Analysis 13, 303-318.
HISTORY
First presented
at the Annual Meeting of the Association of Politics and the Life Sciences in
Atlanta, Georgia, September 1999; Expanded version presented as a working paper
at the 14th Workshop of the Pugwash Study Group on the Implementation of the
Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions, Geneva, Switzerland, November
2000. Last update: November, 2000