WRITTEN TESTIMONY
OF
PROFESSOR GRAHAM S. PEARSON
VISITING PROFESSOR OF
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
DEPARTMENT OF PEACE STUDIES
UNIVERSITY OF BRADFORD
BRADFORD, WEST YORKSHIRE,
UNITED KINGDOM
AND PREVIOUSLY
DIRECTOR GENERAL AND CHIEF
EXECUTIVE
CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL
DEFENCE ESTABLISHMENT
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
PORTON DOWN, SALISBURY,
WILTSHIRE, UNITED KINGDOM
TO THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON
NATIONAL SECURITY,
VETERAN AFFAIRS &
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
OF THE COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT REFORM
Washington, D.C.
10 July 2001
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
*********
This
testimony starts by examining the development of the Protocol showing how it
has developed from the Confidence-Building Measures agreed at the Second Review
Conference in 1986 and extended at the Third Review Conference in 1991 through
the considerations by VEREX in 1992 and 1993 leading to the establishment of
the Ad Hoc Group in 1994 and its subsequent negotiations.
It
goes on to address the value of the composite Protocol text by making
comparisons, first between the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC)
with its Protocol regime and the BTWC alone, and then between the BTWC with its
Protocol regime and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) regime, given that
both Conventions overlap -- and rightly so -- in the areas of toxins,
bioregulators and peptides. The
comparison with the BTWC alone shows that the Protocol brings significant and
worthwhile benefits to all States Parties whilst the comparison with the CWC
shows that in respect of the monitoring of dual-purpose materials and
facilities, the two regimes are very comparable, with the Protocol regime
imposing a less onerous but more focussed burden in respect of declarations and
visits whilst the international cooperation provisions are much more extensive
than those of the CWC.
Attention
is then paid to a number of key issues:
a.
The Effectiveness of the Protocol
b.
Export Controls
c.
The Burden of the Protocol
d.
Industry Concerns
e.
Additional Mechanisms under Discussion
f.
Other International Monitoring Systems
g.
More time needed?
In
the final section, a tabular comparison is made between the costs and gains of
signing the composite Protocol text and rejecting the composite Protocol. This leads to the conclusions that:
a.
In signing the composite Protocol text, the US will be seen to have
continued in its leadership role and having
taken all possible multilateral steps
to prevent biological weapons.
b.
Signing the composite Protocol text will reduce the risk of biological weapons proliferation and use. Rejection of the Protocol would send the
opposite signal and it can be argued that the risk of biological weapons
proliferation and use will be increased.
c.
Overall, signing the composite Protocol text enhances US security. It
provides a net gain to US
security. Rejection of the Protocol
misses this opportunity and decreases US security.
Mr
Chairman and members of the Subcommittee.
It is an honour and a pleasure to be invited to submit written testimony
on the “Biological Weapons Convention Protocol: Status and Implications”.
I
am Dr Graham S. Pearson, a Visiting Professor of International Security in the
Department of Peace Studies of the University of Bradford in the United
Kingdom. I was previously, from 1984 to
1995 when I reached the mandatory retirement age in the British Civil Service,
the Director General and Chief Executive of the Chemical and Biological Defence
Establishment of the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence at Porton Down, the
oldest chemical and biological defence establishment in the world established
in 1916.
During
my time as Director-General at Porton Down, I was responsible for changing the
name of the establishment from the Chemical Defence Establishment to the
Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment reflecting the increased
attention and effort paid to biological defence from 1986 onwards. I was responsible for the contributions of
the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment during the Gulf War of
1990/91 to ensuring that the Armed Forces of the United Kingdom were protected
against the threat that Saddam Hussein might use chemical or biological weapons
against them.
I
was also a member of the UK delegation to the VEREX group identifying and
evaluating potential verification measures in Geneva in 1992 and 1993: I served as the rapporteur to VEREX for
“measures in combination”. I was also a
member of the UK delegation to the Ad Hoc Group prior to my retirement in 1995
and for a short period in 1995, I served as the Assistant Chief Scientific
Adviser (Non-Proliferation) in the headquarters of the United Kingdom Ministry
of Defence.
Since
my retirement from the Ministry of Defence in 1995, I sought and was awarded a
John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation grant for Research and Writing
which enabled me to write a book “The UNSCOM Saga: Chemical and Biological
Non-Proliferation” published in May 2000 by St. Martin’s Press. In this I have examined the work of UNSCOM
in respect of chemical and biological weapons in order to extract the lessons
for chemical and biological weapons non-proliferation.
My principal activity over the past five years, which is currently financed by a grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, has, however, been to closely follow the negotiations in the Ad Hoc Group of a Protocol to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the implementation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. In this context, I have written or edited over 30 Briefing Papers and 20 Evaluation Papers which have been presented and distributed to the delegations engaged in the Ad Hoc Group negotiations in Geneva. I have visited Geneva to make these presentations to each session of the Ad Hoc Group and also to discuss with representatives of delegations the progress of the negotiations. I have consequently followed the negotiations and the developments in the Ad Hoc Group more closely than anyone else who is not a member of a delegation. I have written quarterly progress reports over the past four years on the negotiations which have been published in The CBW Conventions Bulletin.
In
my written testimony to the Subcommittee, I am therefore drawing upon my
experience as Director General and Chief Executive of the Chemical and
Biological Defence Establishment, Porton Down where I was responsible for over
ten years for the United Kingdom research and development programme in chemical
and biological defence, my detailed study and analysis of the work of UNSCOM in
uncovering the Iraqi chemical and biological weapons programmes and my close
involvement over the past decade, both within government and then outside
government, in the negotiations first in VEREX and then in the Ad Hoc Group to
strengthen the regime to prevent biological weapons.
The Development of the Protocol
The
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) was opened for signature in 1972
and entered into force in 1975. This
totally prohibits the development, production, storage or acquisition of
biological weapons and was the first international treaty to totally ban an
entire class of weapons. This
Convention has established an international norm that biological weapons are
totally prohibited to which over 160 States have bound themselves -- 143 States
Parties and 18 Signatory States. The
United States together with the United Kingdom and the then Soviet Union are
the co-Depositaries of the Convention which reflected an initiative by both the
United States and the United Kingdom to ensure that biological weapons are
totally banned.
It has,
however, become increasingly clear over the past 25 years that the absence of
an organization and of measures to demonstrate compliance and address
non-compliance concerns is resulting in an erosion of confidence in the
effectiveness of the Convention. This
was highlighted by the admission in 1992 that the former Soviet Union, despite
being a co-Depositary, had continued a massive offensive biological weapons
programme until at least 1992. Further
concerns about the Convention were underlined when the United States at the
Fourth Review Conference in 1996 stated that twice as many states were
currently seeking or had already obtained biological weapons than when the
Convention entered into force in 1975.
The
Convention, however, has no provisions for verification -- other than to take
compliance concerns to the Security Council (which has not happened during the
past 26 years) or for the monitoring of compliance. The developments in the 1970s and 1980s including the release of
anthrax at Sverdlovsk (now Ekatinerburg) in 1980 and the advances in genetic
engineering and biotechnology led the States Parties to the Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention at the Second Review Conference in 1986 to agree four
politically binding Confidence Building Measures. These were extended and a further three Confidence Building
Measures agreed at the Third Review Conference in 1991. As these Confidence
Building Measures were not amended at the Fourth Review Conference in 1996,
they have since 1991 been as follows:
* A simplified proforma on which to
indicate "Nothing to declare" or "Nothing new to declare"
1.
The exchange of data on research centres and laboratories (CBM A, Part 1
& Part 2), extended to include information on biological defence programmes
and activities
2.
The exchange of information on outbreaks of disease and similar
occurrences caused by toxins (CBM B)
3.
The encouragement of publication of results and promotion of use of
knowledge (CBM C)
4.
The active promotion of contacts (CBM D)together with the three new
confidence-building measures added in 1991:
5.
Declaration of legislation, regulations and other measures (CBM E),
6.
Declaration of past activities in offensive and/or defensive biological
research and development programmes (CBM F), and
7.
Declaration of vaccine production facilities (CBM G).
It
has, however, become apparent that these Confidence Building Measures are of
strictly limited value as the data submitted by the States Parties has been
patchy and variable. Just over one half
of all the States Parties have made a single submission and only about 11 have
made the required annual submissions.
The submissions are simply collated as and when they are received and
circulated to the States Parties. They
are not translated into the UN languages and there is no analysis of the
information provided. In sum, they do
not achieve their objective of building confidence because of the variability
between States Parties as to what is considered appropriate to be submitted and
the absence of any means of either seeking missing submissions or clarifying
any uncertainties or ambiguities in the submissions.
At
the Third Review Conference in 1991 following the Gulf War of 1990/91 and the
changes in the Soviet Union and the Warsaw pact, the States Parties agreed to
establish an Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts (known as VEREX) “to identify and examine potential
verification measures from a scientific and technical viewpoint”. VEREX met twice in both 1992 and 1993
producing a Final Report evaluating 21 off-site and on-site measures. This report was considered by a Special
Conference in September 1994 which established an Ad Hoc Group to consider
appropriate measures, including possible verification measures, and draft
proposals to strengthen the Convention, to be included, as appropriate, in a
legally binding instrument.
The
Ad Hoc Group first met in January 1995 and by the time of the last Ad Hoc Group
session in April/May 2001 had held 23 sessions. Initially, Friends of the Chair (FOCs) examined issues such as
compliance measures, definitions and objective criteria, confidence building
measures and measures related to
Article X of the Convention on international cooperation and technical
exchange. It is worth recalling now
precisely what the mandate of the Ad Hoc Group said about compliance measures:
- A system of measures to promote
compliance with the Convention, including, as
appropriate, measures identified, examined and evaluated in the VEREX
Report. Such measures should apply to
all relevant facilities and activities, be reliable, cost effective,
non-discriminatory and as non-intrusive as possible, consistent with the
effective implementation of the system and should not lead to abuse;
It is thus clear that the mandate agreed
by all States Parties is for a
system of measures to promote compliance
with the Convention. During the initial Ad Hoc Group sessions, the FOCs chaired
sessions addressing their particular areas of responsibility and produced
papers that reflected the discussions that had taken place yet were without
prejudice to the positions of delegations on the issues under consideration in
the AHG and did not imply agreement on the scope or content of the paper. However, these FOC papers were considered
by the Ad Hoc Group in plenary session and amended as requested by delegations
so that they reflect the views expressed before they are accepted for
attachment to the procedural reports of the meetings. It is also clear from the reports of the meetings that some FOC
papers have gone through several iterations and have thus been refined and
improved.
In July 1997,
the Ad Hoc Group successfully transitioned to consideration of a rolling text
of a draft Protocol in which square brackets were used to indicate alternative
forms of language. This has now
reached its sixteenth version. As might
be expected, the number of square brackets has passed through a peak and has
subsequently decreased as the language for a number of Articles satisfactorily
met the requirements of States Parties and became free from square
brackets. The remaining issues were,
however, ones which could not be resolved in meetings chaired by individual
Friends of the Chair and by mid 2000, the reduction in the number of square
brackets had reached stagnation.
This led the Chairman, Ambassador Tibor
Tóth, in mid 2000 to commence a series of extensive and intensive bilateral
consultations with delegations and with Friends of the Chair in order to
explore conceptual solutions to the outstanding issues. Following these
consultations the Chairman provided written elements in a stripped down form of text which contained
some ideas which might form the basis of a compromise in some of the areas
where there were differing views. By the end of the February 2001 Ad Hoc Group
session written elements had been provided for almost the whole of the
Protocol. The stripped down text used
in these written elements could not be readily compared with the rolling text
and therefore forced a de novo consideration
of the conceptual solutions identified by Ambassador Tóth in his bilateral
consultations. This led in the February
2001 Ad Hoc Group session to calls by a number of States Parties for the
provision of a complete text.
On 30th March 2001, in capitals as well
as in Geneva, Ambassador Tóth provided the States Parties with the Chairman’s
composite Protocol text that is in its entirety based on language in the
rolling text and incorporating compromises where necessary to strike a balance
in those parts of the text where differing views still remained. It is important to stress that this
composite text was based in very large measure on text that had already been
agreed by all delegations during the negotiations, including the United States.
At the 23rd session of the Ad Hoc Group in April/May 2001, Ambassador Tibor
Tóth provided detailed explanations on an Article by Article basis of the
compromises which were significant for delegations.
Ambassador Tóth in his press conference
at the end of the 23rd Ad Hoc Group session on 11 May 2001 said that the States
Parties at the Ad Hoc Group had welcomed the provision of the Chairman’s
composite Protocol text. In their view it demonstrated that it was possible to
meet the mandate of the Ad Hoc group to complete the Protocol by the Fifth
Review Conference in November/December 2001.
He went on to say that quite a number of delegations had welcomed the
balance of compromises although, as might be expected from the nature of
compromises, there were delegations who were unhappy with the compromises. He said that:
“What was
emerging as a climate in the negotiations was that the delegations which used
to form a silent majority in the negotiations had spoken massively in the
course of the session. They spoke in
favour of the fulfilment of the mandate and concluding the negotiations in the
next session. … the question was whether delegations and capitals participating
in these negotiations for practically seven plus three years would say yes or
no to a Protocol, which in his judgement, would respect legitimate bio-defense,
industrial and non-proliferation interests while providing for efficient,
additional tools to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention.”
The Value of the Protocol
The
Chairman’s composite Protocol text is firmly based on the rolling text – indeed
over 99% is identical to language in the rolling text – in which compromises
have been adopted where necessary. . A
detailed evaluation[1], Article by Article, of the Chairman’s
composite Protocol text prepared by Graham Pearson, Malcolm Dando[2] and Nicholas Sims[3] and distributed to the delegations to
the Ad Hoc Group in April 2001 concluded that "Whilst these compromises will not satisfy the aspirations of all
the delegations to the Ad Hoc Group, they do, in our view, successfully ensure
that the composite Protocol text achieves its mandate of strengthening the
effectiveness and improving the implementation of the Convention. The composite
Protocol text has successfully retained all the essential elements for an
effective Protocol ranging from definitions and objective criteria, through
compliance measures to measures for scientific and technological exchange for
peaceful purposes and technical cooperation." [Emphasis added]
It
is critically important to consider what is actually in the Chairman’s composite text and not to comment, as
several testimonies have, on misperceptions based on incorrect or dated
appreciations; the terminology used in several testimonies indicates a failure
to read or study the Chairman’s composite Protocol text. It has also to be recognized that the
Protocol negotiations have seen the
evolution of a text that reflects the
inputs of the negotiators and the strengths and validity of the arguments put
forward. It is, however, true that the
elements identified in the first version of the rolling text in mid-1997 are
all still there in the Chairman’s composite Protocol text. It is the detail that has been developed and
refined in the light of the negotiations.
It
is now timely and necessary after years of detailed negotiation about
words and paragraphs in the Articles to stand back and examine the Chairman’s
composite Protocol text as a whole in order to consider its value. It is also necessary to recognize that what
has been negotiated is a Protocol to strengthen the effectiveness and improve
the implementation of the Convention – it is not and never has been a
“verification” Protocol. Rather its
whole thrust has been to focus on compliance – to increase transparency as well
as the quantity and quality of information about activities and facilities
within States Parties of particular relevance to the Convention. Over time this
transparency will help to build confidence between States Parties that they are
in compliance with the Convention. Whilst
the Protocol could have been stronger, it has to be recognized that
stronger measures would not have attracted wide support and that the composite
Protocol text is the best that can
be negotiated at this time. A further
period of negotiation would not strengthen the composite Protocol text and
could well lead to unravelling of what is already a good Protocol. In standing
back to examine the Protocol, a useful analogy is to a tree where the Ad Hoc
Group have been considering which way the branches will go and what the shape
of the leaves should be. It is now time
to consider the whole tree.
In
considering the Chairman’s composite Protocol text, it is important to remember
that the BTWC with its basic prohibitions and obligations has been in force for over 25 years and that the
Protocol is to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the implementation of
the Convention. The Protocol makes no changes to the basic prohibitions
and obligations. The Protocol regime is
supplementary and additional to the Convention. It does not undermine the
prohibitions in Article I, but rather the Protocol safeguards Article I -- a
long standing objective of the United States and other delegations.
The
key comparison is thus between the BTWC Protocol regime and the BTWC alone (including
the procedures devolved from its provisions).
A tabulation of the principal measures in the regime, compared with the
procedures of the BTWC alone, clearly brings out the significant benefits from
the Protocol.
Table
1. Comparison of the Convention and its
Protocol Regime with the Convention alone
|
BTWC
and its Protocol Regime |
BTWC
alone |
|
Mandatory
declarations -- measures to ensure submission |
Confidence-Building
Measures -- patchy and variable (if made) |
|
Declaration
follow-up procedures -- analysis of declarations -- randomly-selected transparency visits |
None -- none -- none |
|
Declaration
clarification procedures -- clarification visits |
None -- none |
|
Voluntary
assistance visits |
None
|
|
Non-compliance
concerns -- Consultations >>>
Investigations |
Art
V consultation procedures Art
VI complaint to UN Security Council |
|
Field
investigation |
Possible
UN Secretary-General investigation if invited by State Party concerned |
|
Facility
investigation |
None
|
|
Transfer
procedures |
None |
|
Assistance -- provisions detailed |
Art
VII assistance if UN Security Council decides a Party has been exposed to
danger |
|
International
Cooperation -- elaborated in detail -- Cooperation Committee |
Art
X provisions -- no
implementation procedures -- none |
|
Organization -- CoSP, ExC & Technical Secretariat |
None
|
|
National
implementation -- Penal legislation required -- National Authority |
Art
IV National implementation -- No
penal legislation requirement -- None |
Considering
all the elements that make up the BTWC Protocol regime as a whole, it is clear
that there are overall three particularly
significant benefits that will accrue from the BTWC Protocol regime and which
are not available with the Convention alone:
Table
2: Principal benefits from the BTWC and
its Protocol Regime compared to the BTWC alone.
|
BTWC
and its Protocol Regime |
BTWC
alone |
|
Measures
to increase transparency and build confidence |
Suspicions
not addressed -- and over time reduce international confidence in
the regime |
|
Procedures
to address non-compliance concerns |
Art
V consultations (no teeth) Art
VI complaints to UN SC (not used) |
|
International
cooperation and assistance provisions enhancing infrastructure, transparency
and building confidence |
No action despite aspirations at
successive Review Conferences |
The
above comparisons show that the Protocol regime brings significant and
worthwhile benefits to all States
Parties -- both developed and developing
-- over and above the provisions to uphold the basic prohibitions and
obligations of the BTWC, which remain unchanged. In addition, the Protocol will be effective, over time, in
building confidence between States Parties that other States Parties are indeed
in compliance with the Convention, thereby reinforcing the norm that work on
biological weapons, whether directed against humans, animals or plants, is
totally prohibited. The international
cooperation and assistance provisions address a genuine need to counter
outbreaks of disease and through improvements in infrastructure in areas such
as biosafety and good manufacturing practice to meet internationally accepted
standards bring benefits for health and safety as well as for prosperity. The
Protocol as a whole thus brings improved health, safety, security and
prosperity to all States Parties.
It is
also appropriate to compare the BTWC Protocol regime with the CWC regime --
both Conventions address toxins, bioregulators and peptides and thus rightly have a significant area of overlap,
both have general purpose criteria which embrace all possible agents, past, present
and future, and both address dual use materials and technology.
The
CWC regime is the one of greatest
relevance to the BTWC Protocol regime and it is already evident that National Authorities
for the two regimes are likely to be colocated in a number of countries.
It
is hardly surprising that the BTWC Protocol regime has adopted some concepts
where appropriate from the CWC regime. The Protocol is, however, much more
elaborated than the CWC and has been finely tailored to address the fundamental
difference in the nature of biological agents as well as to capture the
facilities of greatest relevance to the Convention. If we ignore the chemical weapon and chemical weapon production
facility elements[4] of the CWC, then the basic architecture
of the BTWC Protocol regime and the CWC regime is the same. The qualitative
differences between the regimes are in the detail: the BTWC Protocol regime has
built on the confidence-building measures agreed by the States Parties
including the United States at the Second Review Conference in 1986 and
extended at the Third Review Conference in 1991. In respect of the monitoring of dual-purpose materials and facilities,
the two regimes are very comparable, with the Protocol regime imposing a less
onerous but more focussed burden in respect of declarations and visits whilst
the international cooperation provisions are much more extensive than those of
the CWC.
Table
3. Comparison of the BTWC and its Protocol
Regime with that of the CWC
|
BTWC
and its Protocol Regime |
CWC
Regime |
|
Mandatory
declarations -- range of facilities (BL-4, BL-3*, work
with listed agents*, production, …) -- requires declaration of biological
defence -- measures to ensure submission |
Mandatory
declarations -- focussed on chemical production
facilities -- no
declarations yet of chemical defence -- no
measures to ensure submission |
|
Declaration
follow-up procedures -- explicit and structured -- analysis of declarations -- randomly-selected transparency visits |
Declaration
follow-up procedures --implicit and unstructured -- routine inspections of production
facilities for scheduled chemicals and DOCs (discrete organic chemical) |
|
Declaration
clarification procedures -- clarification visits |
No declaration clarification procedures -- implicit not elaborated |
|
Voluntary
assistance visits |
No provision for voluntary assistance
visits -- implicit not elaborated |
|
Non-compliance
concerns -- Consultations >>>
Investigations |
Non-compliance
concerns -- Consultations >>>
Investigations |
|
BTWC
and its Protocol Regime |
CWC
Regime |
|
Field
investigation -- includes investigation of releases |
Investigation
of alleged use -- no
investigation of other releases |
|
Facility
investigation --
team size and duration limited |
Challenge
inspection --
duration limited |
|
Transfer
procedures |
Transfer
controls |
|
Assistance -- provisions similar to CWC |
Assistance |
|
International
Cooperation -- elaborated in detail -- Cooperation Committee --targeted on genuine need to counter
disease -- real benefits over time >>health,
prosperity |
International
Cooperation -- not
elaborated in detail -- no
provision for Cooperation Committee |
|
Organization -- CoSP, ExC & Technical Secretariat -- TS has role to analyse epidemiological
info |
Organization -- CoSP, ExC & Technical Secretariat -- no
parallel role |
|
Confidentiality
Provisions -- elaborated in detail in Article and
Annex |
Confidentiality
Provisions -- no
Article but an Annex -- not as elaborated |
|
National
implementation -- Penal legislation required -- National Authority |
National
implementation -- Penal legislation required -- National Authority |
* Indicates that only selected facilities
meeting certain combinations of conditions, not all such facilities are to be declared.
This
comparison demonstrates that the two regimes are indeed comparable and effective.
Indeed, the quality of the Protocol regime is certainly as good as, if not better
than, that of the CWC. Both
address dual purpose materials and technologies. Lessons have been learned from
the CWC implementation experience. The Protocol text has successfully been
crafted so that it will achieve the requirement for an effective and reliable
regime which, in accordance with the AHG mandate, will strengthen the
effectiveness and improve the implementation of the BTWC and thereby strengthen
the norm against biological weapons.
There is no doubt that the value of the Protocol will be of immense
value to all States Parties -- both
developed and developing – bringing improved health, safety, security and
prosperity. Indeed it should be noted that there is a relationship between the
co-operative measures and international security: improving the international
community’s ability to deal with the consequences of infectious disease will
help make it easier to identify deliberate outbreaks of disease that are the
result of the use of biological weapons.
National improvements in biosafety, good manufacturing practice and the
regulations covering the handling, transportation and use of biological agents
and toxins through the Protocol cooperation measures will improve national
infrastructure as well as transparency and over time will contribute to
building confidence.
The
Protocol is also important for its contribution to the web of deterrence which
comprises:
• A strong international and national
prohibition regime reinforcing the norm that biological weapons are totally
prohibited
• Broad international and national
controls on the handling, storage, use and transfer of dangerous pathogens
• Preparedness including both active and passive
protective measures and response plans that have been exercised
• Determined national and international
response to any use or threat of use of biological weapons ranging from
diplomatic sanctions through to armed intervention,
which
are together mutually reinforcing and lead a would-be possessor, whether a
"rogue State" or a non-State actor to judge that acquisition and use
of BW would not be valuable, would be detected and incur an unacceptable
penalty. Any single element of the web
of deterrence alone is insufficient -- all elements are vital and all need to
be strengthened as they thereby reinforce the deterrent effect. The Protocol through its strengthening of
the international prohibition regime not only reinforces the norm that
biological weapons are totally prohibited.
Its requirements also strengthen the international and national controls
on the handling, storage, use and transfer of dangerous pathogens and the
determined international response to
any use or threat of use of biological weapons.
The
States Parties to the Protocol will over time gain confidence in the compliance
of the other States Parties and any State Party contemplating breaching the
Convention will be deterred through the prospect that such a breach will be
detected by the measures in the Protocol.
Increasingly, States not Party to the Protocol will be isolated and will
effectively be declaring themselves as rogue states -- who can be countered
better by the multilateral body of the States Parties to the Protocol.
The Issues
The Effectiveness of the
Protocol
The
aim of the Protocol throughout has been to create a package of measures that
will increase transparency and build confidence between States Parties that they
are in compliance with the Convention. It is a compliance Protocol not a
verification Protocol – it is misleading to suggest otherwise. The heart of the
Protocol is thus made up of mandatory declarations, the declaration follow-up
procedures and the provisions for investigations. A balance has necessarily to be struck as to which facilities are
to be declared: the Protocol declaration triggers embrace a wide range of the
facilities and activities of most relevance to the Convention:
a. Biodefence programmes and facilities.
b. Maximum biological containment
facilities
c.
High biological containment facilities engaged in certain specified
production or genetic modification activities
d.
Plant pathogen containment facilities over a particular floor area
e.
Work with listed agents and/or toxins of a particular character:
production above a certain capacity; genetic modification activities; and
intentional aerosolisation
f.
Production facilities in excess of certain capacities or producing human
or animal vaccines.
The
scope of the facilities to be declared is thus much broader than those required
to be declared under the comparable elements of the CWC. The CWC declarations primarily address
chemical production facilities and have yet to include agreed modalities, as
required under Article X of the CWC, for declarations of chemical defence
programmes or facilities required under Article X of the CWC. Furthermore, the Protocol has provisions to
help ensure submissions of declarations – provisions that have no parallels in
the CWC, with a variety of tiered penalties, some automatic and some after
consideration – should declarations fail to be submitted.
Those
who argue that the CWC regime is not relevant to considerations of the BTWC
Protocol regime are ignoring the fact that both
regimes address dual-use materials and technology, both have general purpose criteria in the basic prohibition which
ensures that past, present and future agents are all covered and both cover the prohibition of toxins,
bioregulators and peptides. It is
evident that the Protocol regime has been developed from that of the CWC and
had been tailored to address the particular nature of biological agents and
toxins.
The
declaration follow-up procedures comprising the randomly-selected transparency
visits and the carefully tiered provisions for clarification of any ambiguity,
uncertainty, anomaly or omission in a declaration made by a State Party are
vital for ensuring the consistency of declarations. No State Party would make inaccurate or incomplete declarations
if they recognize that the deficiencies in their declaration will be exposed
either by the randomly-selected transparency visits or by the declaration clarification
procedures. The Protocol provisions
enable either the future Organization or individual States Parties to initiate
the declaration clarification procedures.
Consequently, a State Party to the Protocol contemplating violation of
the Convention would have either to carry out its activities in a declared
facility -- and risk exposure both through the Organization or through another
State Party seeking clarification -- or to use an undeclared facility and again
risk exposure both through the Organization or through another State Party
seeking clarification of the omission of that facility from the
declarations. A useful analogy in
considering the necessity of backing up mandatory declarations with follow-up procedures
comes from self assessment under the US (and the UK) tax systems – how accurate
would self assessment be if there were to be no follow up by the IRS?
In
considering the numbers of randomly-selected transparency visits carried out
each year under the Protocol – limited to greater than 60 and less than 90 –
their duration of no more than 2 days involving no more than 4 members in the
visiting team. It has to be recognised that this is a remarkably effective way
of enhancing transparency and generating confidence in the consistency of declarations.
Remember that the purpose is to demonstrate compliance and to deter would-be
violators rather than to find cheaters or catch out States Parties. In building compliance, there is indeed a
bonus in that a State Party would be highly unlikely to carry out prohibited
activities at declared facilities because of the risk that inconsistencies
would be detected. If such prohibited
activities were to be carried out at undeclared facilities, then again there
would be a risk that inconsistencies would lead to clarification being sought
about ambiguities, uncertainties, anomalies or omissions – and such
clarification can be sought directly by a State Party and is not dependent on
the future Organization. Regular visits to States Parties means that the inspectorate
will develop an appreciation of how regulatory frameworks apply in specific
States parties, the national standards that apply and improve understanding of
national processes. All this will be indispensable knowledge in the event of an
investigation. If a facility investigation were ever called in the United
States, would it not better if the inspectorate had some prior knowledge or the
regulatory frameworks (FDA and EPA for example), norms, practices and degree of
sophistication that applied? Such understandings will go a long way in
preventing investigation teams misinterpreting what they see and reduce the
risk that they might draw the wrong conclusion.
The
investigation provisions are for both field and facility investigations of
non-compliance concerns. The Protocol
includes within field investigations provisions for the investigation of
releases of biological agents or toxins.
In
sum, the Protocol regime of declarations, follow-up procedures and
investigations provides a structured and elaborated framework for the provision
of accurate information about the activities and facilities of the most
relevance to the Convention. This
brings immense benefits as was noted by Dr John Gee, Deputy Director General of
the OPCW when he spoke about the success of the declarations made under the CWC
when he said that:
What is significant is the fact that declarations have been made and the key parts of each State Party’s declarations are available to all other States Parties….This has been a considerable confidence-building measure….This process has answered a lot of questions that were out there prior to entry into force….all the other countries had to go on were press reports and intelligence estimates and so forth. The whole process of having declarations available to other States Parties has been a great success and a very substantial confidence-building measure.
If the situation with the Protocol in place is compared with the alternative of simply continuing with the Convention, it is impossible to see how the conclusion -- in other testimony to your Committee -- can reached that “a Protocol would not improve our ability to effectively verify compliance with the BWC either in terms of certifying that a country is in compliance with, or in violation of, its obligation”. Without the Protocol all that any country has to go on are press reports, intelligence estimates and so on; intelligence estimates have necessarily to be worst case assumptions and may well give undue credence to rumour and innuendo or simply fail to recognise perfectly legal reasons for an activity. However, with the Protocol in place, there will also be mandatory declarations from States Parties with the means to clarify any ambiguities, uncertainties, anomalies or uncertainties, providing hard evidence as to activities and facilities within the State Party. Any inconsistencies between parts of declarations can be addressed by States Parties as well as by the future Organization leading to a more comprehensive and soundly based appreciation of the activities and facilities within the State Party.
Export Controls
It is
widely recognised that the provisions in the Protocol relating to controls of
transfers of biological agents or equipment have been one of the most
controversial issues. It is, however,
essential to examine the issue in perspective and not to get carried away by
unsound arguments. First of all, it has
to be recognised that the formula adopted in the CWC in the early 1990s in its
Article XI that the States Parties shall:
c. Not maintain among themselves any
restrictions, including those in any international agreements, incompatible
with the obligations undertaken with the Convention, which would restrict or
impede trade and the development and promotion of scientific and technological
knowledge in the field of chemistry for industrial, agricultural, research,
medical, pharmaceutical or other peaceful purpose.
would
not be acceptable some 10 years later for the Protocol. To think that time has stopped and the same language
would be acceptable would be naďve.
However, it is equally naďve to think that the world has moved to a
situation in which controls of transfers are no longer required and can be
dismantled. The facts are that
governments around the world, especially in the developing countries, are
increasingly requiring prior notification of the imports of any potentially
harmful materials – whether these be banned and severely restricted chemicals
under the Rotterdam Prior Informed Consent Convention, genetically modified
organisms under the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, narcotic drugs and
psychotropic chemicals and their precursors under the various UN Drug
Conventions or chemical and biological materials relevant to chemical and
biological weapons under the CWC and the Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention.
The
obligation under Article III of the BTWC is very clear:
Each
State Party to this Convention undertakes not to transfer to any recipient
whatsoever, directly or indirectly, and not in any way to assist, encourage, or
induce any State, group of States or international organizations to manufacture
or otherwise acquire any of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment or means of
delivery specified in article I of this Convention.
The
mandate of the Ad Hoc Group – to
strengthen the effectiveness and improve the implementation of the Convention
-- is also clear. The
language in the Chairman’s composite Protocol text does precisely that – it
seeks to improve the implementation of Article III of the Convention – by
requiring Each State Party…to review and,
if necessary, amend or establish any legislation, regulatory or administrative
provisions to regulate the transfer of agents, toxins, equipment and
technologies relevant to Article III of the Convention…. There are thus clear benefits – both in
countering proliferation and the availability of materials and equipment for
bioterrorism – for the international
community from this requirement for all
States Parties to establish the regulation of such transfers.
The Burden of the Protocol
The
mandate for the Ad Hoc Group required that consideration be given to:
A
system of measures to promote compliance with the Convention, including, as
appropriate, measures identified, examined and evaluated in the VEREX
Report. Such measures should apply to
all relevant facilities and activities, be reliable, cost effective,
non-discriminatory and as non-intrusive as possible, consistent with the
effective implementation of the system and should not lead to abuse;
In
addition, the mandate also required that
-
Measures should be formulated and implemented in a manner designed to protect
sensitive commercial proprietary information and legitimate national security
needs.
-
Measures shall be formulated and implemented in a manner designed to avoid any
negative impact on scientific research, international cooperation and
industrial development.
The
Ad Hoc Group have been aware throughout of these requirements in the
mandate. It was evident that especially
in developed countries there was concern that any requirements in the Protocol
should be the minimum necessary for an effective Protocol so that the
additional burden whether it be for declarations or for declaration follow-up
procedures should be minimized. Consequently,
there is no requirement for the provision of commercial proprietary information
or national security information in the Protocol declarations. There was also widespread recognition that
many of the facilities to be declared under the Protocol are already subject to
visits from both national and international regulatory authorities be it for
health and safety, for good manufacturing practice or for other reasons. Consequently, the declaration follow up procedures
have been crafted to ensure that the measures are sufficient to encourage the
consistency of declarations and the clarification procedures are carefully
tiered again to minimise the burden.
The declaration formats have been developed and elaborated in the
Protocol – and not left as with the CWC to be developed during the Preparatory
Commission stage. These formats have
been trialled with industry in a number of developed countries to ensure that
they are easy to complete and require the provision of relevant information
that will contribute to the increasing of transparency between the States
Parties. It is simply not true to allege that the Protocol’s
requirements compromise industry’s ability to research and manufacture or that
the Protocol establishes mechanisms to expose confidential information. Rather
the opposite applies, in that the Protocol has gone to great lengths to protect
confidential information, much more so than the CWC did when it emerged from
Geneva.
In
addition to all of this, the Chairman’s composite Protocol text has introduced
limits to the numbers of randomly-selected transparency visits as well as to
clarification visits which skew the burden of the Protocol away from the United
States towards those States with small numbers of declared facilities. There is an overall ceiling to the number
of randomly-selected transparency visits of not more than 90 and not less than
60 a year. Within this ceiling, no
State Party shall receive more that seven randomly-selected visits in any
calendar year – given the range of declared facilities and the requirement that
the randomly-selected visits be spread among a representative range of
facilities, it follows that number of such visits to vaccine facilities in the
US will depend on the numbers of facilities declared by the US in the different
declaration categories and is unlikely to be more than three or four a year at
most – yet this is alleged to be an undue burden on the United States. On the other hand, the composite Protocol
text requires that each States Party that declares facilities shall receive at
least two such randomly-selected visits in any five year period so it again
cannot be argued that the burden is excessively placed upon the States Parties
with the greatest number of declared facilities.
Industry Concerns
The
concerns of industry have been borne in mind by the Ad Hoc Group
throughout. In most countries, those
engaged in the negotiations have maintained a dialogue on a continuing basis
with their national industry to ensure that the emerging Protocol regime would
be effective without being unduly burdensome.
There is no sense in which it can be argued that vaccines are the bull’s
eye of the Protocol! The Protocol
regime has evolved from the agreement by the States Parties some 10 years ago
that declarations should be submitted under the Confidence-Building Measures
for the facilities agreed to be of greatest relevance to the Convention –
maximum containment facilities, biological defence programmes, vaccine
production facilities. The Protocol
declaration requirements have built upon these and added the other most
relevant activities and facilities.
There is
a concern by industry in a number of countries, following on from the CWC
experience, that there should be a uniform requirement on industry around the
world to submit comparable information – or in other words, a level
playing-field. The elaborated
declaration formats coupled with the measures to ensure that declarations are
submitted with its tiered automatic and considered penalties together with randomly-selected
transparency visits will promote the consistency of declarations and, through
the tiered declaration clarification procedures, that declarations are complete
and comprehensive.
The
argument that randomly-selected transparency visits to all declared facilities
is not a useful concept is short-sighted as such visits help to ensure the
consistency of declarations.
Furthermore, in the absence of randomly-selected transparency visits,
the probability will be high that when the first facility investigation is
carried out in that State Party an incorrect conclusion may be reached because
of the lack of knowledge of the future Organization of the normal approaches to
microbiology and biotechnology in that country.
As the
maximum number of randomly-selected transparency visits that any State Party
can receive in a year is 7, this means that for the maximum number of such
visits in any year to the United States is 7 in total to facilities out of all the facilities declared by the
United States -- whether biological defence, maximum containment (BL-4), high
containment, plant pathogen containment, work with listed agents and toxins or
production. The burden on the vaccine
industry is unlikely to be more than perhaps four visits per year -- lasting no
longer than 2 days each and with no more than four members in a visiting
team. This burden is pales into
insignificance when compared to the numbers of FDA and other US regulatory body
inspections of such vaccine facilities.
Additional Mechanisms under
Discussion
The
additional mechanisms being discussed all relate to the surveillance and
reporting of disease through international or voluntary disease reporting
systems. Whilst these disease surveillance and reporting systems are all
helpful and provide information that is complementary to the Protocol, they are
all necessarily voluntary in nature
and cannot be mandatory. It would be unrealistic – and could
actually harm the health monitoring regime of the international community which
depends critically upon participating States having confidence that, in
reporting outbreaks of disease, they will not in some way be penalised – if a
situation were to be sought in which reporting to the WHO, FAO and OIE were to
be made mandatory in order to enable a body associated with the Biological and
Toxin Weapons Convention to use such data to try to determine whether some
outbreak had been deliberate and thus in breach of the Convention. The Chairman’s composite Protocol text
requires the Technical Secretariat of the future Organization inter alia to collect, process and
analyse relevant epidemiological information.
Furthermore, the Technical Secretariat is also explicitly required to
develop a framework for States Parties to support an international system for the
global monitoring of emerging diseases in humans, animals and plants. It is not true to say that the Protocol does
not have any provisions to create, expand or mandate systems to monitor disease
occurrence.
It
should be recalled that there has been agreement between the States Parties to
submit information on outbreaks of disease as a confidence-building measure
under the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. Few States have provided such information and the information
submitted has been variable and raises more queries than answers – yet there is
no mechanism by which such queries could be resolved. The voluntary nature
of disease surveillance and reporting means that the data-sharing system
mentioned as an additional mechanism would not be a credible contribution to
biological weapons prohibition.
However, improved disease surveillance and reporting would indeed be a
valuable adjunct to the Protocol – but this is something that is best addressed
through the relevant international organizations – the WHO, FAO and OIE –
thereby making best use of their competencies and avoiding duplication.
Other International
Monitoring Systems
There
are no other existing international monitoring systems which could make a
legally-binding contribution to the strengthening of the effectiveness and
improving the implementation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention. In other words, there is no
credible or realistic alternative to the Protocol – and the Protocol is needed now to counter the increasing danger
from the already prohibited misuse of microbiology and biotechnology.
In
the longer term, the norm against chemical and biological weapons could be
usefully enhanced by the international criminalization of work on chemical and
biological weapons. This could be
achieved by making such work into a crime against humanity in a similar way to
piracy, hijacking and torture. A draft
treaty to do this has been prepared by the Harvard-Sussex Program – this needs
to be taken by one or more States to the UN General Assembly for consideration
by the 6th Committee. Such an
international criminalization would be complementary to the BTWC and its
Protocol and the CWC.
More time needed?
The negotiations have already taken six years; if we
include the VEREX process then we are looking at a decade of effort. In essence
the core issues have not really changed. Many of the differences between
delegations today are the same as they were in 1995. Another six months or a
year or two of negotiations will not make any significant difference to, for
example, the diverging views on export controls. More time will not make the
text stronger, it will only lead to its unravelling. There were many Western
and non-aligned delegations that would have wished to see stronger procedures for
visits; this was one of the most intensely disputed part of the negotiations.
More time is not going to lead to additional provisions in the visits text or
to persuade others that they should be introduced. What we see is the best
compromise that can be had now, and needed, for the foreseeable future given
the reality of the diversity of views. The whole point of the Chairman’s
composite text was to break the logjam with a balanced text that is aimed at
meeting the aspirations of all delegations, including those of the United States. While
no one will have achieved all of their objectives, that in itself should not be
the criteria by which this achievement is judged. It is vital that all States answer the question -- are they
better with the Protocol regime than without it? Careful consideration
shows that the Protocol provides a net gain to all States Parties with the benefits
significantly outweighing the costs.
Conclusion: The Bottom Line
There
is no doubt at all to those who have closely examined the intricacies of the
Protocol and the details of the prohibition regime of closest relevance to the
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention – the Chemical Weapons Convention –
that the Protocol brings significant benefits to the multilateral regime to
prevent biological weapons. The world
does not stand still and it is important to recognise that the international
community reacts to what happens. The
Chemical Weapons Convention with its attention to the dual use of chemicals was
a significant step forward that is widely recognised as strengthening the
security of all States Parties. The Protocol to the Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention in the form of the Chairman’s composite Protocol text provides
another opportunity to make the world a safer, more secure place. Absent a Protocol to the Convention,
biological weapons will continue to present the greatest danger of all weapons
of mass destruction – a point that is well recognised on both sides of the
Atlantic. The Protocol provides a net gain to all States Parties. There is a real opportunity and a real
benefit here for all States – for the United States to reject the Protocol
would be short-sighted and foolish in the extreme and would not best serve the
interests of the United States or the world.
The
Table below provides a succinct comparison of the gains and costs of signing
the Composite Protocol compared to the costs and gains of rejecting the
Protocol. Overall conclusions are then
drawn about the net value of signing the Composite Protocol -- and the net
costs of rejecting it. Before
examining the detail in the Table, it is important to recognise that there are
areas where US interests will remain the same whether or not the US signs the
Protocol. First, there is no change in
respect of United States offensive weapons programmes as, unlike many other
arms control treaties such as START or CFE, the United States has no biological
weapons and has no intention to have any in accordance with its obligations
under the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. Second, there is no change in the US intelligence priorities for
collection and analysis of potential threats.
The main impact of signing the Protocol will be to make available to the
United States and to all other States Parties, an additional body of
information which can be used nationally in guiding the employment of national
intelligence resources.
The
overall conclusions that emerge from examination of the Table are the following:
a.
In signing the composite Protocol text, the US will be seen to have
continued in its leadership role and having
taken all possible multilateral steps
to prevent biological weapons.
b.
Signing the composite Protocol text will reduce the risk of biological weapons proliferation and use. Rejection of the Protocol would send the
opposite signal and it can be argued that the risk of biological weapons
proliferation and use are increased.
c.
Overall, signing the composite Protocol text enhances US security. It
provides a net gain to US
security. Rejection of the Protocol
misses this opportunity and decreases US security.
THE COSTS AND GAINS FROM THE COMPOSITE PROTOCOL
|
SIGN
COMPOSITE PROTOCOL |
REJECT
COMPOSITE PROTOCOL |
GAINS
|
COSTS |
Reinforcement of international
norm that biological weapons totally prohibited
|
No reinforcement of
international norm that biological weapons totally prohibited
Risk that norm is weakened as US seen to have declined opportunity to strengthen |
Deterrence
of would-be violator significantly enhanced
|
Perception
that biological weapons unimportant
Would-be violator encouraged by continued international inaction on BTWC |
Increased transparency of activities
in other States through mandatory declarations
|
Confidence-building
measure submissions if the State decides to submit
|
Anomalies,
uncertainties and omissions
in
declarations can be addressed
|
No means of addressing
anomalies, uncertainties and omissions
|
Mechanisms
established to address non-compliance
concerns
through investigations
|
Continuing
ineffective/unused provisions (take
concerns to UN Security Council)
|
All States
required to enact penal legislation
-- reduced possibility of bioterrorism |
No requirement for penal legislation |
All States
required to establish transfer
controls
-- reduced
possibility of agent/equipment acquisition by States or by non States actors |
No requirement for
establishment of transfer controls
|
COSTS
|
GAINS
|
Costs of
Protocol implementation
--
Modest. International organization half of OPCW National authority could be colocated
with that for CWC -- additional data
collection modest compared to that for existing CBMs |
Avoidance
of cost of Protocol implementation
|
OVERALL CONCLUSIONS
|
OVERALL CONCLUSIONS
|
US has
taken all possible multilateral steps
to prevent biological weapons
-- continues
leadership shown with negotiation of the BTWC |
US disinterest in multilateral
world community
-- sets US at
variance with collective security objectives of the rest of the world |
Reduced risk of BW
proliferation
|
Continuing (increased?) BW
proliferation risk
|
Reduced risk of BW use
|
Continuing (increased?) risk of
BW use
|
|
US
security enhanced |
Opportunity
missed |
The
Protocol is an opportunity that is available now – to reject it would be to send the message unequivocally that the
United States does not care about establishing a stronger regime to prevent
biological weapons and their proliferation.
It would be contrary to the
leadership that the United States has shown over the past 50 years in building
a world in which weapons of mass destruction are increasingly prohibited and
their proliferation countered by all
possible measures. . If the composite
Protocol text is rejected, the United States is:
-- Missing the opportunity to make a big
step forward to make work on biological weapons a penal offence around the
world with benefits for both international security and for countering
biological terrorism wherever it occurs;
-- Failing
to take the opportunity to require all States Parties to review, amend or establish
controls of the transfers of pathogens and dual use technologies;
-- Failing
to move forward to a world in which there is much greater transparency about
activities and facilities relevant to the Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention and in which over time confidence will be built between States
Parties that they are indeed compliant with the obligations and undertakings
under the Convention.
-- Failing
to realize a world in which there is a mechanism to address concerns about
non-compliance with the Convention. The
quarter century since the entry into force of the Convention has been marked by
the inability of the States Parties to address such non-compliance concerns – a
situation in which the United States at the Fourth Review Conference in 1996
said that twice as many States were then seeking or had biological weapons than
when the Convention entered into force in 1975 is hardly a testimony to a
successful and effective regime; and, finally,
Indeed,
US rejection of the Protocol will undermine any other efforts that the US might
wish to pursue internationally at the bilateral, regional or multilateral
level. Diplomatic leverage may be weakened and attempts to mobilize
international opinion and support will be made much more difficult if the US
has cast aside an internationally negotiated text, especially one which
protects so many avowed US
interests. Rejection of the Protocol
sets the US at variance with every other nation in the world who recognizes
that collective security is vital
for peace and security in the 21st
Century.
A
summary of the key points is provided in the Box:
• The United States, just like the United
Kingdom, needs this Protocol to
enhance its security against the deliberate use of disease against humans,
animals or plants – biological weapons.
• Why do we need this Protocol? Without it, there is no mechanism to
challenge the potential violator. With
the Protocol, there are mechanisms to challenge the potential violator – by
facility or field investigations – and thereby raise the cost to the violator
of pursuing this option.
• To make the challenge mechanism
effective, we must have declarations.
Why? Because they offer the
possibility of finding the smoking gun and if the smoking gun is not found then
may find equipment – such as fermenters or facilities – that should have been
declared and is thus a violation. And
uncertainties, ambiguities, anomalies – or omissions
– in declarations can all be addressed through the clarification mechanisms.
• To make challenge and declarations
effective, we must – as in other security agreements such as the Chemical
Weapons Convention designed under the administration of President George Bush,
Senior – have visits (inspections) to let the potential violator know that work
on biological weapons at a declared site exposes the violator to the risk of
discovery. In the United States, as in
the United Kingdom, the possibility of auditing of income tax returns keeps the
self-assessment tax system from being disregarded.
• All three elements – challenge
investigations, declarations and visits – create an architecture within which
the potential violator faces the risk of being exposed if he uses a declared
facility and if he uses an undeclared facility even the mere presence of
undeclared agents or equipment would raise serious questions.
The composite Protocol text provides all
of this – and more – efficiently and effectively so giving us worthwhile
security gains whilst sending all would be violators a clear message that biological
weapons are totally prohibited and that their acquisition will not be
tolerated.
Any country which doesn’t sign and ratify
the Protocol has declared themselves as rogues, and as the Protocol gains
members, such rogue States will become more and more isolated in many
ways. The United States like the United
Kingdom needs this Protocol. A failure to agree the Protocol sends the
message that the United States is does not care about the danger from
biological weapons.