Opening Statement

Rep. John F. Tierney

Subcommittee on National Security,

Veterans Affairs, and International Relations

Hearing on Biological Weapons Convention Protocol: Status and Implications

 

July 10, 2001

 

 

          GOOD AFTERNOON.  LET ME WELCOME ALL OF OUR VERY DISTINGUISHED WITNESSES.  I AM GLAD YOU COULD BE WITH US TODAY. 

 

          ON JUNE 5TH, THIS SUBCOMMITTEE HELD A HEARING ON THE STATUS AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION PROTOCOL.

 

          WE WERE DISAPPOINTED, HOWEVER, BECAUSE THE ADMINISTRATION PULLED ITS WITNESSES AT THE LAST MINUTE.  AS CHAIRMAN SHAYS SAID AT THE TIME, THEY “ASKED FOR A POSTPONEMENT UNTIL THE ADMINISTRATION IS TOTALLY CERTAIN IN WHAT DIRECTION THEY WANT TO HEAD, AND THEY FEEL THAT WILL HAPPEN IN THE NEXT TWO WEEKS.”

 

          IT HAS NOW BEEN FIVE WEEKS.  HOPEFULLY, THAT HAS BEEN ENOUGH TIME TO COME TO SOME CONCLUSION — IF NOT “TOTAL CERTAINTY” — ABOUT HOW THEY WILL PROCEED.

 

          FROM THE ADMINISTRATION WITNESSES, I WOULD LIKE TO KNOW THESE SIMPLE FACTS:  TO WHICH PROVISIONS IN THE CHAIRMAN’S TEXT DO YOU OBJECT, AND WHY?  SPECIFICALLY — WHAT IS OBJECTIONABLE ABOUT THE REGIME AS IT IS NOW PROPOSED?

 

          ON THE QUESTION OF OVERALL EFFECTIVENESS, THERE CAN BE LITTLE DOUBT ABOUT THE BENEFITS OF GAINING ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND TRANSPARENCY.  SEVERAL WITNESSES AT OUR JUNE HEARING POINTED THIS OUT.

 

          DR. BARBARA HATCH ROSENBERG, FOR EXAMPLE, REPORTED THAT INSPECTORS WHO SUPPOSEDLY ENTERED A “SINGLE CELL PROTEIN PLANT” IN IRAQ “ONLY HAD TO STEP INSIDE TO RECOGNIZE THAT THIS WAS SOMETHING MUCH MORE.”  EVEN THOUGH THE INSPECTORS DIDN’T KNOW EXACTLY WHAT IT WAS, THEY KNEW IRAQ WAS UP TO SOMETHING, AND THEY KNEW THEY HAD TO KEEP THEIR EYE ON THE FACILITY.

 

          DR. AMY SMITHSON ALSO RELATED TO US CONVERSATIONS WITH INSPECTORS WHO EXAMINED SOVIET FACILITIES.  SHE SAID “ONE OF THE THINGS THAT THEY TOLD ME TIME AND AGAIN . . . IS THAT, LITERALLY, THE MINUTE THEY WALKED IN THE DOOR THEY KNEW THEY WERE IN THE MIDDLE OF . . . BIOLOGICAL WARFARE FACILITIES.”

          WE WERE ALSO DIRECTED TO A RECENT ARTICLE BY FORMER DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE C.I.A., DOUGLAS MacEACHEN.  HE EXPLAINED WHY THE PROTOCOL COULD PREVENT PROLIFERATORS FROM USING LEGITIMATE FACILITIES FOR ILLICIT PROGRAMS.  TO AVOID RAISING SUSPICIONS, THEY WOULD BE FORCED TO CONDUCT BIO-WEAPONS ACTIVITIES CLANDESTINELY WITH ALL THE ATTENDANT DIFFICULTIES AND RISKS.

 

          INDEED, AMBASSADOR MAHLEY HIMSELF TESTIFIED TO THIS LAST YEAR BEFORE OUR SUBCOMMITTEE.  HE POINTED OUT THAT WE ARE BEST POSITIONED WHEN WE CAN ACTUALLY TALK TO SCIENTISTS AND PRODUCTION WORKERS ON THE GROUND.  THERE, WE CAN OBSERVE ATMOSPHERICS AT A FACILITY, WE CAN DETECT ANOMALIES, AND WE MAY EVEN ENCOUNTER “WHISTLE­BLOWERS.”  IN HIS WORDS, ALL OF THESE FACTORS “COMPLICATE THE LIFE OF A POTENTIAL PROLIFERATOR.”

 

          SOME ARGUE THAT WE MUST BALANCE THESE BENEFITS AGAINST THE COSTS TO PHARMACEUTICAL INTERESTS.  I AGREE IN PRINCIPLE.  BUT HOW IS THIS BEING DONE?  WHERE IS THE ANALYSIS?  HOW DOES THE ADMINISTRATION WEIGH PREVENTING EVEN A SINGLE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS ATTACK ON A POPULATION AGAINST THE COSTS OF COMPLYING WITH INSPECTIONS? THIS IS THE EVALUATION THAT NEEDS TO BE EXPLAINED BEFORE WITHDRAWING FROM THE PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS.

 

          THANK YOU.