Estimate of
The Number of Declared Facilities⁽¹⁾

In order to provide a more explicit basis for determining the feasibility of the BWC compliance measures under consideration by the Ad Hoc Group, we have made a systematic, detailed survey of the number of US sites containing/working with agents listed in the Rolling Text, the number of US sites with microbial production capability greater than 50 liters, and the number of US BW defense facilities, including contractors. The sources of the information are included. Because of time limitations we have not attempted to calculate exact figures for each sub-category, but have obtained close approximations and have erred on the high side in determining the approximate maximum number of each type of facility. These maximum estimates include a fair amount of overlap. The summary table below presents estimates of the probable numbers of US facilities (after discounting these factors). The degree of uncertainty in these numbers is approximately 20%.

To arrive at estimates for the probable numbers of declarable facilities in all States Parties, it is assumed that the total numbers of facilities with listed agents or microbial production capabilities are three times the US total, and the number of BW defense facilities and contractors is twice the US total (see footnotes for the conditions and assumptions in the table). These are the weakest assumptions made. (The order of magnitude of the total, however, is not highly sensitive to these factors--eg, if the world totals were all four times the US figures, the net world total would be 39% greater).

Essential Facility Triggers Net for Declaration	Approximate No Facilities in U.S.	Total No. Facilities In All States Parties (Est.)	Total
1. Presence of listed priority agent(s)(4) '(5) '(6)	550(2)	<1650(3)	<1650
2. Microbial production capability (9) (capacity >50 liters) (10) '(11)	250(7)	<750(8)	<660
Overlap with trigger 1(12)	30	90
3. BW defense facilities and contractors	200(13)	400(14)	260
Overlap with triggers 1 and 2	70(15)	140
4. Aerosol generation and study capabilities, and field release sites(16)	?	?	est. 100
5. Transfers of listed agents or equipment(17)		Overlap with other triggers, except for manufacturers exporting listed equipment (omitted here)

Conclusions

1. The five facility declaration triggers employed here, chosen to capture the most relevant dual-use facilities, would not capture an unmanageable number of facilities. Properly designed declarations based on these five facility triggers could be broken down by computer analysis to yield additional categories, such as vaccine facilities and high containment facilities.

2. Identification of the approximately 900 US facilities requiring declaration would not be difficult. About 300 of these are commercial.

3. The total number of declared facilities, worldwide, under a BWC protocol with these triggers, will be substantially smaller than the number of declared chemical facilities under the CWC. It would be appropriate to adopt a provision for assistance to States Parties that request help in compiling their lists of declared facilities.⁽¹⁸⁾

4. With 2500 declared facilities, a small number of declaration visits (eg, 50/yr) would be effective to ensure accurate declarations and deter misuse of declared facilities. Declaration visits could be determined through a random, weighted process with quota limits.

^1. Proposed definition of "facility:" A largely independent unit consisting of all operations and services (whether or not a service is shared with other units), that are relevant to one program (e.g., a line of production), and located at a single physical site. If more than one unit at a site is declarable, then all declarable units should be considered as a single "facility." If a unit's program is carried out at more than one site, then the unit occupies more than one "facility," and each will declare separately. Institutions should have some flexibility in defining their facilities, since all are different.

^2. See attached Estimated Number of US Sites With Agents Listed in the Rolling Text, pages 4-11.

^3. Because the US has a much larger number of pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies and research activities than any other country, it is assumed here that the numbers of related facilities, worldwide, are less than three times the US numbers.

^4. Priority agents are those listed in the draft Rolling Text of June, 1997 (see appendix to "Estimated Number of US Sites Containing/Working With Agents Listed in the Rolling Text," pages 10 and11).

^5. Purely diagnostic or therapeutic facilities are excluded here. They should not have to declare unless another facility at the same site is declarable, provided that isolates of listed agents are destroyed immediately following diagnosis and no live samples are retained.

^6. Small quantities of listed toxins, some of which are widely used in research, are excluded here as triggers. A low threshold would eliminate almost all users. Toxins themselves are not self-reproducing, and small quantities below the threshold would not be useful as biological weapons. However, the presence of toxin-producing microorganisms, in any quantity, should trigger declaration. 7.

^7. See attached Estimate of US Sites with Microbial Production Capacity Greater than 50 Liters, pp 12-14.

^8. See footnote 3.

^9. Active, bonafide human food or drink production facilities are excluded; their production could not be interrupted safely for pathogen production on a routine basis. Although they could conceivably be designed for future con-version, their inclusion would not be practical. In any event, such facilities would be subject to challenge inspection. 10.

^10. Microbial production capacity of 50 l is generally considered adequate for significant BW production. There are also many facilities with lesser capacity that could be scaled up quite readily for BW production.

^11. Trigger 2 captures vaccine facilities, which can readily be compiled electronically from declaration forms without the need for a separate trigger, which some believe might damage their public image.

^12. Estimate of overlap is based on the data in the attached Agent and Production estimates.

^13. For the approximate number of facilities, including contractors, in the US Biological Defense Program, see the attached "Estimated Number of US Sites Containing/Working With Agents Listed in the Rolling Text," items 1 and 2: a total of 83 + 79 + ? sites, estimated as approximately 200.

^14. For the following reasons, it is assumed that the number of biological defense facilities worldwide is roughly double that of the US, and that overlap with other triggers is also roughly double. In BWC CBMs, the US has reported 24 biological defense facilities and all the other Parties, 27 (I. Hunger, p. 81 in "Strengthening the BWC: Key Points for the 4th Review Conference," ed. G. Pearson, M. Dando, Quaker UN Office, Geneva, 1996. The US Defense budget is approximately equal to that of the rest of the world. Based on historical evidence (eg, the former Soviet Union), in some countries the number of biological defense facilities may be disproportionate to the overall defense budget, but there are also many Parties that have no biological defense program at all.

^15. For the overlap between BW defense facilities/contractors and trigger 1, see the items cited in footnote 13, but select the number of sites using listed agents: 55 + <20. For overlap with trigger 2, it is estimated that there are at most several microbial production facilities > 50 l under the BDP. Thus, total overlap is probably about 70.

^16. Definition of the aerosol trigger needs futher consideration. It is assumed here that it will exclude small scale industry testing and routine agricultural spraying. There may be substantial overlap with trigger 3.

^17. Transfers of listed priority agents and listed priority equipment for microbial production and aerosol work should be declared. The equipment list should be such that, except for manufacturers, the sources of the transfers would already be declared under other triggers, and the recipients would become declarable upon receipt (if they were not already). Thus, this trigger will add only producers of listed equipment for export to the total number of declared facilities. The number will depend on types of equipment listed and export activity, and is unpredictable at present.

¹⁸ A provision for aid in compiling declarable facilities could be adopted similar to that in the CWC Verification Annex, Part IX-A, paragraph 7.