Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention

The Necessity for Non-Challenge Visits (NCVs)

Executive Summary by Marie Chevrier of the paper by Graham S. Pearson and
Malcolm R. Dando, Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, UK

Full Text at the University of Bradford

Executive Summary

INTRODUCTION

Debate has increased in recent years over the role and value of Non-Challenge Visits (NCVs)--defined as on-site measures in the absence of suspicions of non-compliance--in a legally binding instrument to strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). This paper considers the advantages and disadvantages of including NCVs, drawing on experience with on-site measures in the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and on evidence and findings from VEREX and the Ad Hoc Group (AHG) deliberations. Arguments and supporting data for the advantages and disadvantages of NCVs are taken directly from the working papers of delegations participating in VEREX, the AHG process, from the text of the CWC, and from official reports of UNSCOM.

TYPES OF NCVs

Two main types of NCVs have been proposed:

random visits to declared facilities; and

focused visits to specific declared facilities; to clarify declared information or to resolve discrepancies or ambiguities concerning declarations.

Regular visits to declared facilities, called routine inspections in the CWC, are not under consideration by the AHG.

ADVANTAGES OF NCVs

The principle advantages of NCVs, described by many sources, fall into several broad categories; a number of which are dependent on the random nature of a visit. Any regime to strengthen the BWC will be made up of a set of integrated measures. One goal of the AHG is to devise a set of complementary measures that reinforce one another, thereby leveraging or enhancing the benefits of any single measure. Thus, one of the most compelling reasons to include NCVs is to reinforce the other elements of the protocol--declarations and non-compliance concern investigations (NCCIs)--which would be diminished considerably without NCVs.

1. NCVs Improve the Effectiveness of Declarations

a). by creating an incentive to provide accurate declarations;

b) by strengthening confidence in the accuracy of declarations ;

c) by deterring cheating at a declared site;

d) by clarifying and confirming declarations;

e) by identifying discrepancies or ambiguities pertaining to facilities or activities.

2. NCVs Improve the Effectiveness of Field and Facility NCCIs

a) by gathering information that could raise a non-compliance concern;

b) by allowing States Parties and inspectors to see each other in action, to understand how and why they do things certain ways, and to understand their sensitivities and concerns;

c) by enhancing the preparedness, experience, and effectiveness of BTWC inspectors;

d) by lowering the risk of incorrect assessments (BOTH false negative and false positive) during NCCIs;

e) by avoiding an extensive programme of trial inspections to prepare and train inspectors;

f) by clarifying concerns which might otherwise lead to false judgments or unnecessary NCCIs;

g) by providing an opportunity to pursue lower-level compliance concerns without the intrusiveness and political implications of NCCIs.

3. NCVs Deter Treaty Violations and BTW Proliferation

a) by subjecting all declared sites to continuous uncertainty regarding a possible random visit;

b) by motivating would-be violators to remove any prohibited activities from declared facilities;

c) by eliminating any advantage of using a declared facility as a legitimate cover for a prohibited BW program, thereby raising the cost and difficulty of maintaining such a program;

d) by strengthening the BW organization's capability to detect patterns that may arouse suspicion.

4. Overall, NCVs will

a) increase transparency;

b) enhance confidence in compliance;

c) assist in building a picture over time of national norms in microbiological activities;

d) help the BWC and States Parties keep abreast of legitimate biological activity in each State Party;

e) provide an opportunity to assist States Parties in gathering information for declarations, and upgrading laboratory and manufacturing standards;

f) encourage cooperation among States Parties;

g) serve the interests of health and safety.

DISADVANTAGES OF NCVs

Against this long list of advantages some disadvantages of NCVs have been raised, including:

1. increasing the risk of revealing commercial proprietary information that could have an adverse economic effect on commercial enterprises;

2. increasing the risk of revealing sensitive national security information that could make potential adversaries aware of vulnerabilities that could be exploited;

3. having a low probability of finding conclusive evidence of treaty violations.

DISCUSSION

Any measures, whether on-site or off-site, entail a risk of revealing sensitive commercial or national security information. Delegations that support NCVs and are sensitive to their potential disadvantages have conducted practice visits to identify ways to incorporate managed access techniques to minimize potential loss of sensitive commercial or security information. In doing so, many delegations gained confidence that NCVs can be conducted in a way that protects sensitive information. Furthermore, for public health and safety reasons, commercial biological facilities are currently increasingly subject to intrusive domestic and, in some cases, international, inspections, and subject to challenge inspection under the Chemical Weapons Convention; they need to be ready and prepared for these inspections.

To protect sensitive information, a dedicated BW inspectorate is desirable. Inspectorate costs could be cut only by borrowing ad hoc inspectors from industry and national defense establishments, with the attendant increase in the risk of revealing sensitive information and undermining the effectiveness of NCCIs.

While NCVs alone are unlikely to detect convincing evidence of noncompliance, their incorporation into an integrated regime will enhance the likelihood that the regime as a whole will be successful.

CONCLUSIONS

The advantages of NCVs far outweigh the possible disadvantages. Random as well as focused NCVs are necessary and important for an effective regime to strengthen the BTWC.

Full Text of the Paper