Task Force Scorpio: Civilian Relief after Biological Attack
Making the Biological Weapons Convention Work
Dr Jack Woodall, Director, Nucleus for the Investigation of Emerging Infectious Diseases, Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

 What will happen to civilians caught in the 'fall-out' from a biological attack? In war, a biological agent could spread far from the battlefield, and in a terrorist attack, civilians are likely to be the main target. The military can be expected to take care of their own, but who will care for the civilians? Apart from Israel, which issues its population with gas masks, and some cities in the USA where the emergency services have had training in how to respond to chemical and biological attack, many countries will be expecting succor from international relief agencies such as the International Red Cross and Red Crescent, the High Commission for Refugees, Doctors without Borders and similar groups. But those agencies will be faced with a dilemma-, how will they know when it is safe to enter the affected area? They will not want to risk exposing their relief personnel to contamination and possible death.

 In fact, a prototype 'SWAT' team already exists, whose mission is to arrive at the scene of a biological attack within 24 hours, identify the agent, measure the extent of the contamination, and tell relief agencies when it is safe to send in aid. Its name is Task Force Scorpio, and it is based in Switzerland. -But in the face of the growing threat of biological attacks, clones of Scorpio are needed, based regionally to respond faster and in the local language. Article X of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) calls on States Par-ties to the Convention to facilitate and participate in the exchange of equipment, materials and information for the prevention of disease. Regional collaboration between countries to set up more Scorpios would be a tangible implementation of the treaty, and a big step towards mitigation of the effects of a biological attack on civilians of the countries concerned.
 The need for a biological 'SWAT' team struck me at the time of ' the invasion of Kuwait, when I was working for the disease surveillance division of the World Health Organization (ArHO) in Geneva. I retired from V*rHO in 1994 and now direct the Arbovirus Laboratory of the New York State Health Department, but during 1998 1 am on leave as Visiting Professor at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, where I am setting up a center for the investigation of emerging diseases. My participation in biological defense matters is supported by the Federation of American Scientists. *

The conversion of my idea into the reality of Task Force Scorpio was the work of Dr Robert Steffen of the Institute of Social and Preventive Medicine, University of Zurich, Switzerland. Dr Steffen was also a member of the Swiss Disaster Relief Unit, and he convinced the Unit's leadership to expand it to include the expertise needed to handle biological and toxin agents. Scorpio members had to be immunized against biological threats, including anthrax, but all anthrax vaccine supplies had been pre-empted by the Coalition forces. Dr Hiroshi Nakajinia, then Director-General of WHO, was instrumental in obtaining the release of a limited supply of the vaccine to protect Task Force members. Details of the preparation and equipping of Task Force Scorpio and a proposal to multiply ' it on a regional basis for faster, regionally appropriate response, as a means of implementing Article X of the BWC, will be presented by me at the International Conference on Emerging Infectious Diseases in Atlanta on Tuesday 10 March 1998 at 4:30 pm, in the Poster Session.

 Switzerland has had, for many years, a Disaster Relief Unit that has taken aid to the sites of earthquakes and other natural disasters around the world. It includes physicians, veterinarians, and specialists in communications, logistics and flight control. To convert it into a team able to handle biological, toxin and mixed weapons detection, it was augmented with experts in nuclear and chemical defense, and international specialists in anthrax, botulinurn toxin and viral hemorrhagic fevers. They trained together in protective suits. The volunteer members came from hospitals and institutions all over Switzerland, from where they could be fetched by helicopter at a moment's notice. Scorpio had its own jet transportation, and when in standby mode could leave within 24 hours of a call, traveling under the protection of neutral Swiss diplomatic passports. Task Force Scorpio was put at the disposal of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and was immunized, trained and ready to go when the ground war began on 28 February 1991. Fortunately, as we know, its services were not needed then, nor in the recent crisis with Iraq,

 In today's world of proliferating chemical and biological threats, there is a need for more Scorpios to be placed in readiness. More than one chembio emergency mayarise at the same time, and Scorpio is not large enough to split. Regional task forces should be set up, with language skills appropriate to each area. Regionally based units should also be able to reach local trouble spots faster than a Switzerland-based unit, and their mix of nationalities might be more acceptable than a Swiss team. They should be set up as quickly as possible. A full series of immunizations against anthrax takes 18 months, and against botulinum toxin (botox) takes a year. In the case of Scorpio, one Task Force member who was already immunized against botox donated his immune globulin to be stockpiled in vials in case of need by his colleagues. Anthrax and other vaccines need to be stockpiled before an emergency pre-empts all available supplies. Other essential supplies and equipment, such as protective suits, decontamination materials and portable laboratories, must be readied-, Scorpio travels with a 12-hour supply of food and water.

 One of the provisions of the BWC is the exchange of biodefense information and expertise between States Parties to the treaty. Once protective equipment and supplies become widely available, the biowar option will become less attractive to rogue states, since their intended. victims will be prepared. An immediately useful way of implementing this provision would be for countries with biodefense know-how to offer assistance in setting up regional Scorpios, based on the WHO/Swiss experience. Countries could cooperate in building regional task forces in the same way as they have cooperated to build UNSCOM, the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq, with one country providing air transport, another vehicles, others experts, equipment and supplies. Training could be rotated through participating countries in the region concerned, so that all would have a chance to observe. Joint exercises of simulated biowar or bioterrorist attacks could be held. All of this would raise the level of preparedness of countries and lower the level of effectiveness that an aggressor could expect from a biowar attack.