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[1997 Senate Hearings]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access]
[DOCID: f:39719.wais]

S. Hrg. 105-183

CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

=======================================================================

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

__________

APRIL 8, 9, 15 AND 17, 1997

__________

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
PAUL COVERDELL, Georgia PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming CHARLES S. ROBB, Virginia
ROD GRAMS, Minnesota RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
BILL FRIST, Tennessee PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas

James W. Nance, Staff Director

Edwin K. Hall, Minority Staff Director

(ii)

C O N T E N T S

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Page

Tuesday, April 8, 1997
a.m. session

Rumsfeld, Hon. Donald, former Secretary of Defense............... 13
Prepared statement........................................... 19
Schlesinger, Hon. James R., former Secretary of Defense.......... 5
Letter Submitted by Hon. Richard B. Cheney, former Secretary
of Defense................................................. 5
Weinberger, Hon. Caspar, former Secretary of Defense............. 9

P.M. SESSION

Albright, Hon. Madeleine Korbel, Secretary of State.............. 61
Prepared statement........................................... 64

Wednesday, April 9, 1997

Feith, Douglas J., Feith and Zell, P.C., former Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Negotiation Policy.................... 107
Prepared statement........................................... 110
Ikle, Dr. Fred C., former Director, Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency......................................................... 105
Kirkpatrick, Dr. Jeane J., former U.S. Permanent Representative
to the United Nations, Senior Fellow, American Enterprise
Institute...................................................... 91
Prepared statement........................................... 96
Perle, Richard N., former Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Policy.................................. 99
Rowny, Lieutenant General Edward L., U.S. Army (retired),
International Negotiation Consultant........................... 131
Prepared statement........................................... 133
Scowcroft, General Brent, President, Forum for International
Policy, and former National Security Policy Advisor............ 134
Zumwalt, Admiral E.R., Jr., United States Navy (retired), Member,
President's Foreign Intelligence Avisory Board................. 124

Tuesday, April 15, 1997

Bailey, Hon. Kathleen C., Senior Fellow, Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory............................................ 182
Prepared statement........................................... 185
Letter Submitted by Paul L. Eisman, Senior Vice President for
Refining, Ultramar Diamond Shamrock Corporation............ 182
Letter Submitted by Robert W. Roten, President and CEO of
Sterling Chemicals......................................... 183
Forbes, Malcolm S., Jr., President and CEO, Forbes, Inc., New
York, New York................................................. 153
Prepared statement........................................... 157
Johnson, Ralph V., Vice President, Environmental Affairs, Dixie
Chemical Company, Inc., Houston, Texas......................... 180
Kearns, Kevin L., President, United States Business and
Industrial Council............................................. 174
Prepared statement........................................... 176
Merrifield, Hon. Bruce, former Assistant Secretary of Commerce... 187
Reinsch, Hon. William A., Under Secretary of Commerce for Export
Administration................................................. 189
Prepared statement........................................... 192
Spears, Wayne, Owner and CEO, Spears Manufacturing, Inc., Sylmar,
California..................................................... 178
Prepared statement........................................... 179
Webber, Frederick, President, Chemical Manufacturers Association,
Washington, D.C................................................ 194
Prepared statement........................................... 197

Thursday, April 17, 1997

Goss, Hon. Porter J., U.S. Representative in Congress From
Florida........................................................ 219
Lehman, Hon. Ronald F., former Director, Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency............................................. 236
Odom, General William, U.S. Army (retired), former Director,
National Security Agency....................................... 227
O'Malley, Edward J., former Assistant Director
(Counterintelligence), Federal Bureau of Investigation......... 231

Appendix

Conditions to the Chemical Weapons Convention.................... 261
The Case Against The Chemical Weapons Convention ``Truth or
Consequences'' [Prepared by The Center for Security Policy].... 276
Remarks by President Bill Clinton and Others at the White House,
April 4, 1997.................................................. 321
False Promises, Fatal Flaws: The Chemical Weapons Convention
[Prepared by Empower America].................................. 326
Letters and Other Material Submitted in Support of Ratification
of the Chemical Weapons Convention:
American Ex-Prisoners of War................................. 329
Veterans of Foreign Wars of the U.S.......................... 329
Reserve Officers Association of the United States............ 329
Jewish War Veterans of the U.S.A............................. 330
Prepared Statement of Brad Roberts, Institute for Defense
Analyses................................................... 331
Letters Submitted in Opposition to Ratification of the Chemical
Weapons Convention:
Sterling Chemicals........................................... 335
Small Business Survival Committee............................ 335
Statement by Ronald F. Lehman Before the U.S. Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, June 9, 1994.............................. 337

CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

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TUESDAY, APRIL 8, 1997--A.M. SESSION

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m. in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Jesse Helms
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Helms, Lugar, Hagel, Smith, Thomas,
Ashcroft, Grams, Brownback, Biden, Sarbanes, Dodd, Kerry, Robb,
Feingold, Feinstein, and Wellstone.
The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
I believe it is customary to wait until there is at least
one Senator from each party present.
I would inquire of the minority counsel.
Can you give us some advice as to whether Senator Biden
would wish us to proceed?
I might explain to our distinguished guests this morning--
and, as a matter of fact, everybody here is a distinguished
guest as far as I am concerned--as I just said, it is a
tradition, in this committee, at least, to have at least one
Senator from each party present before the proceeding begins.
Senator Biden is on a train coming in from Delaware, and I
am seeking information as to whether it would be his wish that
we proceed without him until he gets here.
I am told that it is satisfactory with Senator Biden that
we do proceed.
As is obvious, this morning's hearing is the first of the
Foreign Relations Committee's final round of testimony on the
Chemical Weapons Convention, or that's right.
I think it is fair to say that history is being made here
this morning and I believe today is the first time that three
distinguished, former U.S. Secretaries of Defense have ever
appeared together before a Senate committee to oppose
ratification of an arms control treaty. And if ever a treaty
deserved such highly respected opposition, it is the dangerous
and defective so-called Chemical Weapons Convention.
This morning's witnesses include Hon. James Schlesinger,
Secretary of Defense for President Nixon, Hon. Donald Rumsfeld,
Secretary of Defense for President Ford, and Hon. Caspar
Weinberger, Secretary of Defense for President Reagan.
Further, we will have testimony today in the form of a
letter from Hon. Richard Cheney, Secretary of Defense for the
Bush administration. Secretary Cheney's schedule precluded him
from being here in person today. But he has asked Secretary
Schlesinger to read into the record Secretary Cheney's strong
opposition to Senate ratification of the Chemical Weapons
Convention.
So with Secretary Cheney's contribution, this hearing will
consist of testimony by and from Defense Secretaries of every
Republican administration since Richard Nixon, testimony that
will counsel the Senate to decline to ratify this dangerously
defective treaty.
These distinguished Americans are by no means alone. More
than 50--more than 50--generals, admirals, and senior officials
from previous administrations have joined them in opposing the
Chemical Weapons Convention, and if that does not send a clear
signal on just how dangerous this treaty really is, I cannot
imagine what would.
So, gentlemen, we welcome you and deeply appreciate your
being here today to testify. I regret that we cannot offer you
the pomp and circumstance of the Rose Garden ceremony last
week, but our invitation to be there got lost in the mail
somehow.
Your testimony here today will convey to the American
people highly respected assessments of this dangerous treaty.
Now our precise purpose today is to examine the national
security implications of the CWC which is important because the
105th Congress has 15 new Senators, including three new and
able members of this committee who have never heard testimony
on this treaty.
The case against the treaty can be summarized quite simply,
I think. It is not global, it is not verifiable, it is not
constitutional, and it will not work. Otherwise, it is a fair
treaty.
The Chemical Weapons Convention will do absolutely nothing
to protect the American people from the dangers of chemical
weapons. What it will do is increase rogue regimes' access to
dangerous chemical agents and technology while imposing new
regulations on American businesses, exposing them to increased
danger of industrial espionage and trampling their
constitutional rights. Outside of the Beltway, where people do
not worship at the altar of arms control, that is what we call
``A bum deal.''
We have been hearing a lot of empty rhetoric from the
proponents of the treaty about ``banning chemical weapons from
the face of the earth.'' This treaty will do no such thing. No
supporter of this treaty can tell us with a straight face how
this treaty will actually accomplish that goal.
The best argument they have mustered to date is yes, it is
defective, they say, but it is better than nothing.
But, in fact, this treaty is worse than nothing for, on top
of the problems with the CWC's verifiability and
constitutionality, this treaty gives the American people a
false sense of security that something is being done to reduce
the dangers of chemical weaponry when, in fact, nothing--
nothing--is being done. If anything, this treaty puts the
American people at greater risk.
More than 90 percent of the countries possessing chemical
weaponry have not ratified the CWC, and more than one-third of
them have not even signed it. This includes almost all of the
terrorist regimes whose possession of chemical weapons does
threaten the United States, countries like Libya, Syria, Iraq,
and North Korea. Not one of them--not one of them--is a
signatory to this treaty and none of them will be affected by
it.
Worse still, this treaty will increase access to dangerous
chemical agents and technology to rogue states who do sign the
treaty. Iran, for example, is one of the few nations on this
earth ever to use chemical weapons. Yet Iran is a signatory of
the CWC.
I am going to stop with the rest of my prepared statement
today so that we can get to our witnesses, which is what you
are here for.
But I want to say, once more, that I ask the American
people not to take my word for anything that I am saying. I ask
the American people to consider the judgments of these
distinguished former Secretaries of Defense who oppose the CWC.
I am looking forward to hearing from them about the
treaty's scope, verifiability, about its Articles X and XI, and
the assessment of our distinguished witnesses about the overall
potential impact of this treaty on America's national security.
That said, we turn to the witnesses.
Secretary Schlesinger, we call on you first.

[The prepared statement of The Chairman follows:]

Prepared Statement of Chairman Helms

This morning's hearing is the first of the Foreign Relations
Committee's final round of testimony on the Chemical Weapons
Convention. I think it is fair to say that history is being made this
morning. I believe today is the first time that three distinguished
former United States Secretaries of Defense have ever appeared together
before a Senate committee to oppose ratification of an arms control
treaty. And if ever a treaty deserved such highly respected opposition,
it is the dangerous and defective Chemical Weapons Convention.
This morning's witnesses include the Honorable James Schlesinger,
Secretary of Defense for President Nixon; the Honorable Donald
Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense for President Ford; and the Honorable
Casper Weinberger, Secretary of Defense for President Reagan.
Further, we will have testimony today, in the form of a letter from
the Honorable Richard Cheney, Secretary of Defense for the Bush
Administration. Secretary Cheney's schedule precludes him from being
here in person today, but he has asked Secretary Schlesinger to read
into the record Secretary Cheney's strong opposition to Senate
ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention.
So with Secretary Cheney's contribution, this hearing will consist
of testimony by and from defense secretaries of every Republican
administration since Richard Nixon--testimony that will counsel the
Senate to decline to ratify this dangerously defective treaty. These
distinguished Americans are by no means alone. More than 50 generals,
admirals, and senior officials from previous Administrations have
joined them in opposing the Chemical Weapons Convention. If that
doesn't send a clear signal of just how dangerous this treaty really
is, I can't imagine what would.
So, gentlemen, we welcome you and deeply appreciate your being here
today to testify. I regret we cannot offer you the pomp and
circumstance of a Rose Garden ceremony, but your testimony here today
will convey to the American people highly respected assessments of this
dangerous treaty.
Our precise purpose today is to examine the national security
implications of the CWC. This is important because the 105th Congress
has 15 new Senators, including three new and able members of this
committee, who have never heard testimony on the treaty.
The case against this treaty can be summarized quite simply: It is
not global, it is not verifiable, it is not constitutional, and it will
not work.
The Chemical Weapons Convention will do nothing to protect the
American people from the dangers of chemical weapons. What it will in
fact do is increase rogue regimes' access to dangerous chemical agents
and technology, while imposing new regulations on American businesses,
exposing them to increased danger of industrial espionage, and
trampling their Constitutional rights. Outside the beltway, where
people don't worship at the altar of arms control, that's what we call
a bum deal.
We have been hearing a lot of empty rhetoric from proponents of
this treaty about ``banning chemical weapons from the face of the
earth.'' This treaty will do no such thing. No supporter of this treaty
can tell us, with a straight face, how this treaty will actually
accomplish that goal.
The best argument they have mustered to date is: Yes, it is
defective, but it is better than nothing.
But in fact, this treaty is much worse than nothing. For, on top of
the problems with the CWC's verifiability and constitutionality, this
treaty gives the American people a false sense of security that
something is being done to reduce the dangers of chemical weapons, when
in fact nothing is being done. If anything, this treaty puts the
American people at greater risk.
More than 90 percent of the countries possessing chemical weapons
have not ratified the CWC, and more than one third of them have not
even signed it. That includes almost all of the terrorist regimes whose
possession of chemical weapons does threaten the United States--
countries like Libya, Syria, Iraq, and North Korea. Not one of them is
a signatory to this treaty. And none of them will be affected by it.
Worse still, this treaty would increase access to dangerous
chemical agents and technology by rogue states who do sign it. Iran,
for example, is one of the few nations on the earth ever to use
chemical weapons. Yet Iran is a signatory to the CWC.
Why, you may ask, why does Iran support the treaty? Because by
joining the CWC, Iran can demand access to chemical technology of any
other signatory nation--including the United States, if the U.S. Senate
were to make the mistake of ratifying it. In other words, Iran will be
entitled to chemical defensive gear and dangerous dual-use chemicals
and technologies that will help them modernize their chemical weapons
program.
Giving U.S. assent to legalizing such transfers of chemical agents
and technology to such rogue nations is pure folly, and will make the
problem of chemical weapons more difficult to constrain, not less.
For example, if the U.S. were to protest a planned sale of a
chemical manufacturing facility by Russia to Iran, under the CWC Russia
could argue that not only are they permitted to sell such dangerous
chemical technology to Teheran, but they are obliged to do so--by a
treaty the U.S. agreed to. Because Iran's terrorist leaders have
promised to get rid of their chemical weapons.
Is it possible for the United States to verify whether Iran will be
complying with its treaty obligations? Of course not. Even the
administration admits that this chemical weapons treaty is
unverifiable.
President Clinton's own Director of Central Intelligence, James
Woolsey, declared in testimony before this committee on June 23, 1994,
that, and I quote, ``the chemical weapons problem is so difficult from
an intelligence perspective, that I cannot state that we have high
confidence in our ability to detect noncompliance, especially on a
small scale.
So in other words, under this treaty, the American people will have
to take the Ayatollahs' word for it.
And what about Russia--the country possessing the largest and most
sophisticated chemical weapons arsenal in the world? Russia has made
perfectly clear it has no intention of eliminating its chemical weapons
stockpile. In fact, Russia is already violating its bilateral agreement
with the U.S. to get rid of these terrible weapons; It has consistently
refused to come clean about the true size of its chemical weapons
stockpile; and Russia continues to work on a new generation of nerve
agents, disguised as everyday commercial or agricultural chemicals,
specifically designed to circumvent this chemical weapons treaty that
the Clinton Administration is pulling out all the stops to force the
Senate to ratify.
All this, sad to say, is just the tip of the iceberg in terms of
what's wrong with this treaty. There is a whole array of other problems
which I hope we can discuss today. But I think it borders on fraudulent
to mislead the American people, as so many other treaty proponents
have, into to believing that their lives will somehow be made safer if
this treaty is ratified--and that their safety is being put at risk if
the Senate refuses to be stampeded by Rose Garden ceremonies and high-
pressure tactics.
But I ask the American people not to take my word for it. I ask all
Americans to consider the judgments of these distinguished former
Secretaries of Defense who oppose the CWC. I am looking forward to
hearing from them about the treaty's scope, verifiability, its Articles
X and XI, and the assessment of our distinguished witnesses about the
overall potential impact of this treaty on America's national security.

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. SCHLESINGER, FORMER SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE

Dr. Schlesinger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
At the outset, I will allow Secretary Cheney to join us
vicariously. He has sent a letter, as you indicated, and I
shall read it into the record.
This letter is dated April 7, from Dallas, Texas.

Hon. Jesse Helms,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.
Dear Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your letter inviting me to join
several other former Secretaries of Defense in testifying in early
April when the Foreign Relations Committee holds hearings on the
Chemical Weapons Convention. Regrettably, other commitments will
preclude me from participation. I hope that this correspondence will be
sufficient to convey my views on this convention.
During the years I served as Secretary of Defense, I was deeply
concerned about the inherent unverifiability, lack of global coverage,
and unenforceability of a convention that sought to ban production and
stockpiling of chemical weapons. My misgivings on these scores have
only intensified during the 4 years since I left the Pentagon.
The technology to manufacture chemical weapons is simply too
ubiquitous, covert chemical warfare programs too easily concealed, and
the international community's record of responding effectively to
violations of arms control treaties too unsatisfactory to permit
confidence that such a regime would actually reduce the chemical
threat.
Indeed, some aspects of the present convention--notably its
obligation to share with potential adversaries, like Iran, chemical
manufacturing technology that can be used for military purposes and
chemical defensive equipment--threaten to make this accord worse than
having no treaty at all. In my judgment, the treaty's Articles X and XI
amount to a formula for greatly accelerating the proliferation of
chemical warfare capabilities around the globe.
Those nations most likely to comply with the Chemical Weapons
Convention are not likely to ever constitute a military threat to the
United States. The governments we should be concerned about are likely
to cheat on the CWC even if they do participate.
In effect, the Senate is being asked to ratify the CWC even though
it is likely to be ineffective, unverifiable, and unenforceable. Having
ratified the convention, we will then be told we have ``dealt with the
problem of chemical weapons'' when, in fact, we have not. But
ratification of the CWC will lead to a sense of complacency, totally
unjustified given the flaws in the convention.
I would urge the Senate to reject the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Sincerely,
Dick Cheney.

The Chairman. Thank you, sir.
Dr. Schlesinger. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I
thank the committee for its invitation to testify today on the
ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention. I must at the
outset underscore my belief that the proper criterion for
judging the convention is whether or not it is in the interest
of the United States and whether or not it will serve the long-
run purposes of the American people. It should not be approved
simply for reasons of diplomatic momentum or a gesture toward
multilateralism, but as a treaty with which this Nation must
live.
Mr. Chairman, I start with the interesting and somewhat
checkered history of efforts at the control of chemical
weapons. The introduction of poison gas in World War I and then
its widespread use in the later stages of that war led to a
horrified reaction. That reaction, plus the unease concerning
its subsequent use by colonial powers, led to the Geneva
Convention in 1925, which forbids the use of poison gas by all
signatories.
In the period prior to World War II, the European powers
carefully prepared for the possible use of poison gas. In the
actual circumstances of the war, however, the German decision
to refrain from using poison gas came not for humanitarian
reasons, not for reasons of the treaty, which German diplomats
might well have described as ``a scrap of paper,'' but out of
concern for the threat of devastating retaliation by the
Western allies.
Iraq has been and is a signatory to the Geneva Convention.
In the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980's, Iraq used poison gas as a
way of stemming the ``human wave'' attacks of the Iranians.
What was our reaction and the reaction of other Western powers
at that time? In brief, it was to avert our gaze.
Later, as the war died down, Saddam Hussein used gas
against Iraq's Kurds. This time, however, the response was
slightly more vigorous. An international gathering took place
in Paris in January 1989. Not only did the international
community fail to denounce Iraq, most participants were
reluctant even to name Iraq for using gas. Our own reaction,
was to say the least, somewhat muted. After all, Iraq provided
protection in the Gulf against the Ayatollah's Iran. For what
were regarded as sound geopolitical reasons, we failed to take
action to sustain the existing prohibition on the use of poison
gas by a signatory--despite Iraq's blatant violation of the
Geneva Convention. This manifest failure of the existing arms
control regime did stimulate renewed efforts on the Chemical
Weapons Convention that lies before you. Aha! Perhaps if we
were unwilling to enforce the existing ban on the use of poison
gas, we might be more willing to take strong actions against
its manufacture.
Would we actually do more in enforcement when the evidence
is far more ambiguous and the menace more distant? The use of
poison gas is readily detectable; manufacture is not. Tapes and
photographs were widely available of Kurdish women clutching
their children to their breasts in the vain attempt to protect
them against the gas. And yet we did nothing--for then it was
not regarded as in our interest to intervene.
By contrast, in the Gulf War, Saddam Hussein did not use
poison gas against our troops. In the famous letter from
President Bush to Saddam Hussein in early 1991 in which we
demanded Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait, we reminded Saddam that
the United States had nuclear weapons. As Secretary Baker has
said, we also, ``made it very clear that if Iraq used weapons
of mass destruction, chemical weapons against U.S. forces, that
the American people would demand vengeance and that we had the
means to achieve it.''
What are the lessons learned from these episodes? Treaties
alone will do little. To prevent the use or the manufacture of
chemical weapons requires a structure for deterrence backed by
real capabilities. Above all, enforcement will depend upon the
will to take action which, if history is any guide, will in
turn depend upon a careful geopolitical assessment.
Mr. Chairman, let me turn from history to specific problems
in this convention. In this brief statement, I can only deal
with five problem areas. Nonetheless, I would hope that the
members of this committee and your colleagues in the Senate
receive clear reassurance in these areas before you approve the
convention.
First is non-lethal chemicals. Non-lethal chemicals are
necessary for crowd control, for peacekeeping, for rescuing
downed pilots and the like. In the negotiations on the
convention, we were pressed to ban non-lethal chemicals along
with lethal chemicals. President Bush, under pressure from the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, reiterated prior American policy and
indicated that use of riot control agents would not be banned.
The Clinton administration has been far more ambiguous on this
subject, retreating from President Bush's stated exclusion.
Sometime it has suggested that such agents could be used in
peacetime but not in wartime. That raises the question of
defining when the Nation is at war. Was the Vietnam War a war?
Just 2 days ago, the New York Times stated that the
administration ``has also refused to interpret the treaty in a
way that would allow the use of tear gas for crowd control,
mainly because the Pentagon has said it has no need to ever use
non-lethal gases.''
If the latter is true, it represents a remarkable
transformation of Pentagon attitudes, and I recommend that you
check this out. The first part of the quotation reflects the
continuing ambivalence of the administration on the question of
non-lethal chemicals. I trust that the Senate will seek
clarification of the administration's position and indeed
insist that the use of tear gas will not be banned either in
peace or war. Otherwise, we may wind up placing ourselves in
the position of the Chinese Government in dealing with the
Tiananmen Square uprising in 1989. The failure to use tear gas
meant that that government only had recourse to the massive use
of firepower to disperse the crowd.
Second is sharing CW technology. Article X of the treaty
requires that signatories have a right to acquire CW defensive
technologies from other signatories. This may mean that the
United States is obliged to share such technologies with Iran,
Cuba, and other such nations that may sign the convention.
Almost certainly that interpretation will be argued by lawyers
in the government. But, even if the Senate were able to prevent
such obligatory transfers, it is plain that Article X
legitimizes such transfers by other industrial nations which
will argue they are obliged to do so by the treaty.
Clearly, that undercuts any sanctions directed against
rogue nations that happen to sign the convention. And, in any
event, there are still other states that do not agree with our
judgments in these matters and will acquire such chemical
warfare defensive technologies and will share such technologies
with rogue nations whether signatories or not.
Third is the defense against chemical weapons. Continued
and vigorous efforts to develop chemical weapons defenses are
required. In the years ahead, various groups, inclined to
fanaticism, are likely to use chemical weapons as instruments
of sabotage or terrorism. Aum Shin Rikyo, the Japanese
religious cult, is but a prototype of these other terrorist
groups. To deal with such prospective attacks, it is essential
to have continuing efforts on defensive measures to protect our
civilian population as well as our forces.
In this connection, two points must be made. First, the
illusion that this convention will provide protection against
chemical weapons will tempt us to lower our guard and to reduce
our efforts on defensive CW measures. Such temptations should
be formally rejected through safeguards. Second, the sharing of
technologies required by Article X will provide other nations
with the information that will help to neutralize our chemical
weapons defenses and, thus, expose us to greater risk.
Fourth is industrial espionage. The convention permits or
encourages challenge inspections against any facility deemed
capable of producing chemical weapons--indeed against any
facility. This exposes American companies to a degree to
industrial espionage never before encountered in this country.
This implies the possibility of the capture of proprietary
information or national security information from American
corporations by present or by prospective commercial rivals. To
preclude such intrusive inspections requires the vote of three-
quarters of the Executive Council of the Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Such super majority votes are
unlikely to be forthcoming and will grow less so over time.
The committee may wish to inquire how FBI counter
intelligence feels about these arrangements.
Mr. Chairman, I trust that the committee will delve deeply
into this issue because scuttlebutt has it that the White House
has indicated to senior FBI officials that they are to say
nothing against this treaty. Consequently, you may wish to
examine not only present but former counter intelligence
officers.
The Chairman. We will. Thank you.
Dr. Schlesinger. This convention is sometimes compared to
the arrangements under the Atoms for Peace Agreement. But it
should be noted that few of the several mechanisms that provide
protection in the nuclear area exist under this convention.
Five is how do we respond to violations. Is the convention
something more than a feel good treaty? Is it more meaningful
than the more explicit and more relevant ban on use in the
Geneva Convention? If so, what is its operational significance?
Last April, Secretary Perry, reiterating some of the warnings
of President Bush and Secretary Baker to Saddam Hussein stated,
``Anyone who considers using a weapon of mass destruction
against the United States or its allies must first consider the
consequences. We would not specify in advance what our response
would be, but it would be both overwhelming and devastating.''
Administration officials have more recently reiterated that
threat. Does this convention oblige us to take actions beyond
attacks on ourselves or on our allies? Are we prepared to take
action if Iran attacks Tajikistan or even uses gas against its
own minorities? If Syria, or Saudi Arabia, or Israel, or South
Africa manufactures gas, what are we prepared to do? What
actions would we take if we discover that Russia, or Ukraine,
or China is engaged clandestinely--or openly--in the
manufacture of gas?
As the leading world power and as the initial sponsor of
this convention, the United States bears a particular
responsibility for those signatories who have foregone the
right of direct retaliation and who lack the American capacity
for a response, both ``overwhelming and devastating.'' The role
of the United States visibly transcends that of the
Netherlands, or of Sweden, or of other nations that are
prepared to sign the convention. I trust, therefore, that this
committee will press for clear answers regarding how we might
feel obliged to respond in different hypothetical
circumstances.
Mr. Chairman, as this committee proceeds with its
deliberations, I trust that it will carefully examine some of
the exaggerated or false claims that have been made on behalf
of the convention. This treaty will not serve to banish the
threat of chemical weapons. It will not aid in the fight
against terrorism. Only effective police work will accomplish
that.
As the Japanese cult, Aum Shin Rikyo, has demonstrated, a
significant volume of lethal nerve gas can be produced in a
facility as small as 8 feet by 15 feet. Increasingly, are we
aware how vulnerable this Nation may be to terrorist attacks,
and this treaty will do little to limit such vulnerability. Nor
will this treaty ``provide our children broad protection
against the threat of chemical attacks.'' Such statements
merely disguise and, thereby, increase our vulnerability to
terrorist attacks. To the extent that others learn from
international sharing of information on CW defenses, our
vulnerability is enhanced rather than diminished.
Finally, this treaty in no way helps ``shield our soldiers
from one of battlefield's deadliest killers.'' As indicated
earlier, only the threat of effective retaliation provides such
protection. That we would respond in the event of an attack on
our troops has great credibility and, thus, serves as an
effective deterrent. The Chemical Weapons Convention adds no
more to this protection of our troops than did the Geneva
Convention.
Mr. Chairman, some treaty proponents, while conceding the
lack of verifiability, the lack of broad enforceability, and
the other inherent weaknesses of the convention, suggest that
it should be ratified because whatever its weaknesses, it
serves to establish ``international norms.'' If Senators are
moved by that last ditch defense of the convention, they should
vote for ratification. I urge, however, that Senators bear in
mind that most nations do not care a figure for ``international
norms,'' and we already have the Geneva Convention as a norm,
regularly violated. And they remain relatively free to violate
this norm with relative impunity since the treaty is difficult
to verify and more difficult to enforce.
Proponents have simply ignored the evidence of the past
failure to control chemical weapons and have proceeded blithely
with a renewed effort at control which disregards the ambiguity
and the ineffectiveness of the control mechanism. In the rather
forlorn hope to preclude the employment of chemical weapons,
they have produced an agreement with an illusory goal and a
rather gargantuan and worrisome enforcement mechanism. The
manifold weaknesses of the proposed convention deserve careful
attention from every member of the Senate.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I shall be pleased later to
respond to any questions the committee may have.

The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Mr. Weinberger.

STATEMENT OF HON. CASPAR WEINBERGER, FORMER SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE

Mr. Weinberger. Mr. Chairman and Senators, it is always an
honor to appear before a committee of the U.S. Senate and I am
deeply appreciative of that this morning.
I think that both your Chairman's statement and Secretary
Schlesinger's very impressive statement also, both together,
set out the basic reasons why I think all of us on this
Secretary of Defense panel feel so strongly that this treaty
should not be ratified.
I would like to make a couple of points at the beginning
because it is the common practice now for opponents of anything
that is desired by the White House to be painted in as
unenviable a position as possible. I would like to make it
clear that everybody I know detests chemical weapons,
particularly soldiers.
I have some small personal experiences I might share with
you. They stem mainly from the fact of my extreme age. The fact
is that, during World War II, I had been assigned to the
Australian Anti-Gas School. The Australians used very spartan
methods and very rigorous methods of instructing, and they
instructed by showing us the actual effects on our own persons
of mustard gas, a blister agent. They gave us all kinds of
information with respect to the required defense and defensive
equipment.
I was then later appointed one of the gas defense officers
to the 41st Infantry Division, conducted a lot of training with
the soldiers in the gas protective equipment which, as anybody
who served in the armed forces knows, is extremely difficult to
operate in, and this leads, without any question whatever, to
this detestation of these weapons.
So people who oppose this treaty are not people who favor
poison gas. I think it is important to make that rather obvious
point at the beginning because we have heard so much about the
motives of opponents of this treaty. My motive is the security
of the United States, with which I had the honor to be
associated for 7 years as Secretary, and which I think, as a
country, should be maintained, even in the face of very strong
support of a treaty which purports to outlaw and ban the
production of these terrible weapons.
Everybody likes the aims of the treaty. Everybody will
admit, I think, that it is a well intentioned treaty. Everybody
that I know including many of the proponents, admit that it is
a very badly flawed treaty, and it is with those flaws that I
am concerned today.
Primarily the flaws, as Secretary Schlesinger just
mentioned, are that it cannot be verified and it cannot be
enforced. The enforcement mechanism involves going to the
United Nations Security Council, of which Russia and China are
members. It does not require a very big stretch of the
imagination to indicate that they would probably veto any kind
of enforcement action proposed against them.
So you would have not only the lack of verifiability, you
would have, very much like with the Geneva Convention, a very
nice statement of the proper intentions of humankind which
simply cannot be enforced and which basically, sadly,
accomplish nothing.
Now there has been a great deal of discussion also about
the enforcement mechanisms, the international inspectors and
what they can do and their powers. This is not just academic
discussion, Mr. Chairman. These inspectors, under this treaty,
under Articles X and XI, would have powers that basically
American enforcement agents do not. Even the IRS and even the
Department of Justice cannot wander around the country without
search warrants and demand to see anything they want to see in
thousands of factories. There are varying estimates of the
number of factories and commercial plants involved, but they
are all in the thousands. I won't attempt to say which one is
right or wrong, but they are in the thousands. The treaty gives
the right to these inspectors to see what they want to do, to
make analyses and tests, and the other articles of the
convention require that we share any late technologies we might
develop--and we should be working on them; I hope we are; we
always used to--defensive technologies to improve the masks,
the protective equipment, and all of the other things.
As we make some progress in this field, that would have to
be shared and, therefore, would be, consequently, far less
valuable, to put it mildly, in the event that any of our troops
should be attacked with a gas attack.
These inspections are a two-way street in some ways. We
have the right of inspection under what I consider to be the
worst appeasement agreement we have signed and that has been
presented since Munich, and that is the North Korean Agreement
under which we promised to give them two very large nuclear
reactors which can produce plutonium--although it is always
said not to worry, they can't. But, of course, they can. And we
are permitted also to have all kinds of inspection under that
appeasement agreement.
We have not been granted this to the extent that we need
it. What we are allowed is to go where North Korea wants us to
go. It's exactly as with the agreement with Iraq that ended
that war. We are permitted to go where the Iraqis let us go and
after long delays in which they are given the opportunity to
remove any incriminating kinds of evidence.
That is one way that these inspections can work, and those
would be probably the ways that countries like Iran, that have
signed the agreement, would interpret it.
But the permitted inspections and the way we would do it,
because we carry out our word as a country and we do allow
these things once we sign an agreement, would be as intrusive
as anything previously imagined and far more intrusive than our
own officials are allowed under our own laws to investigate
violations of American law.
Jim Schlesinger has covered very adequately and thoroughly
the industrial espionage problems that are involved in this and
in the sharing of these not only offensive, but defensive
technologies that we may be working on. And it is important
that we work on these defensive technologies because, even if
all the countries sign this agreement, the possibilities that
it would be treated as Geneva is always treated are always
there. Indeed, we know that Iraq is stockpiling this VX nerve
agent, which is a rather nasty piece of equipment, and Russia
has been developing the nerve agent A-223, which is purported
to be something like 7 times as fatal as the VX nerve agent.
These are things that are going on now, after these treaties
have been signed and while the whole discussion is there.
The idea that these countries would give up these newly
developed agents on which they spent a great deal of money,
some of it, in Russia's case, our money that we sent over for
economic development, does not seem to me to be very credible.
The requirement that we share all of these technologies
also would remove any kind of deterrent capability that we
might have if we carry out the treaty in full. And one of the
deterrent capabilities is retaliation.
We have had many indications not only in World War II but
in the Gulf and elsewhere, that the fact that we were spared a
chemical attack there simply stems from the ability that we
would have to retaliate. If we give up that retaliatory
capability, along with all but four or five nations, the four
or five nations would still not be nearly as worried about
launching an attack as they were in the case of the Gulf War.
We already know that there is at least a possibility. We
don't know it and I would not claim it as a fact, but there is
at least a possibility that Iraq's storage of these chemical
weapons is resulting in disease and illness to American forces
now. People talk about who is to blame and all of that. The
only important issue, I think, there is that we should
remember, and I hope we always will, that we have an absolute
obligation to take care of these people who did fall ill from
whatever cause in that war for the rest of their lives and take
care of their families. I hope we are prepared to honor that.
All of these are things that have happened with nations
that have either signed or refused to sign the treaty. Iran is
one that has signed. Iran, therefore, would be able to see and
inspect any one of several thousand companies. They would have
to share their technologies and we, as a country, would have to
share our technologies with Iran.
Strong supporters of the treaty, including General
Schwarzkopf, when reminded of the fact, when asked if that is
what he really wanted, said of course not. He said the worst
thing in the world would be to share any knowledge with a
country like Iran in this field.
So there has been, I think, a lack of understanding, and I
congratulate the committee on holding these hearings, because I
hope that we can get a full understanding of how a well
intentioned treaty, the goals of which everybody of course
supports, cannot possibly reach those goals if we are going to
have the kind of provisions that remain in this treaty.
We also have a situation in which we are repeatedly told
that the April 29 deadline must be met, otherwise we will have
no influence in administering the treaty. Mr. Chairman, we are
going to bear 25 percent of the cost of this treaty, and I
suspect any 25 percent owner, so to speak, to use corporate
terms, is going to have a little influence in it. I think that
it is absurd to say that we must rush to judgment simply
because April 29 is the deadline.
There was plenty of opportunity last fall when the treaty
was before the Senate, and was withdrawn by the administration,
to have the kind of discussion that we are now having and that
we should have. If it takes a little past April 29, and if by
any chance we are able, through reservations or other changes,
to make any of these things to which we object so strongly
slightly more acceptable, that would certainly be worth a few
days or a few months delay.
The costs involved, of course, are not just the 25 percent
of the costs of administering the treaty and of all of the
inspections that we would find so intrusive and so violative of
what we believe to be our constitutional rules against
unreasonable search and seizure, seizing property without due
process, and all the rest. We could add the $70 million that we
have already given Russia under the so-called ``Bilateral
Destruction Act'' to start destroying their weapons. And they
have announced publicly and in writing--I guess it has been
released; it's been printed all over the country--that they
will no longer be bound by it, that it no longer serves their
best interests and, therefore, they are not paying any more
attention to it.
They are a signatory of this Chemical Weapons Convention
and they have been held up as a country that is essential to
get into the international order and is willing to destroy
these weapons. But certainly the record thus far is slightly
less than modest.
I think it is important that we emphasize again, as I did
at the beginning, that our opposition to these kinds of weapons
is well known. We were instrumental in getting the Geneva
Agreement approved many, many years ago. We have signed the
Bilateral Destruction Agreement, which had a great deal of hope
behind it, and practically no realization. And now Russia has
walked away from it.
We have showed that we would, of course, not only if we
sign this convention comply with it, but that we would be a
leader in financing it. All of that I think is an ample
demonstration to the world, if any is needed, that we don't
like these weapons. But we don't have to sign a flawed and an
ineffective, unenforceable, unverifiable convention to prove
that; and I don't think that we should worry so much about
being tarred as being pro chemical weapons that we would
disregard completely the flaws in this treaty and ratify it
anyway just to make a statement.
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate very much having had the
opportunity to express these views before you and your
committee, and as Secretary Schlesinger has said, I will be
glad to try to answer questions at an appropriate time.
The Chairman. We thank you, sir. Secretary Rumsfeld.

STATEMENT OF HON. DONALD RUMSFELD, FORMER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Mr. Rumsfeld. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the
committee. I appreciate the opportunity to express concerns
about this convention. Rather than read my entire statement, I
would like to touch on some of the more important points, and I
ask that my entire statement be included in the record.
The Chairman. Without objection.
Mr. Rumsfeld. Certainly, one of the most serious problems
facing our country and our friends and allies around the world
is, indeed, the issue of proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction. The Chemical Weapons Convention before the Senate
would appear to fit in that category. But in my view, it has
serious flaws.
I recognize that there are arguments on both sides of this
and, indeed, that a number of our friends and associates that
we have worked with on these problems over the years find
themselves on opposing sides.
As a former Member, I also recall the difficulty of finding
oneself in the position of opposing a position that is strongly
supported by a President. It is not an attractive position to
be in or a pleasant one. My inclination was always to try to
support the President on these matters.
Certainly in this case, being positioned as appearing to
favor chemical weapons, is also not an appealing position.
So let me be very clear: Were there pending before this
committee a convention that was verifiable and global and that
would accomplish the elimination of chemical weapons in the
hands of nations most likely to use them, I would be appearing
before the committee as a supporter.
Unfortunately, I do not believe that it meets those tests.
First, I don't believe that this is verifiable, nor have I
met a single, knowledgeable person who believes that it is
verifiable. It might reduce chemical weapons in arsenals in
some countries, but it is debatable whether the treaty would
reduce chemical arsenals in any of the nations potentially
hostile to the United States. Countries identified by the
United States as possessing chemical weapons that have not
signed the CWC, let alone ratified it, include Libya, Syria,
Iraq, and North Korea. Certainly these countries are among the
most likely to use chemical weapons against our citizens, our
soldiers, and our allies.
In addition, there are countries that might sign the
convention which would not be reliable with respect to
compliance. Since the convention is not verifiable, that is not
a trivial problem, it seems to me.
For example, even if Iran does ratify the agreement, we
really cannot rely on them to comply with its terms. Also, it
is my understanding that Russia has yet to fulfill its
obligations under the 1990 Bilateral Destruction Agreement, as
Secretary Weinberger pointed out. Also, Washington newspapers
and Jane's have recently reported that the Russians have
developed new nerve agents that are designed in a manner that
would make discovery next to impossible in that they are
apparently comprised of common commercial chemicals. This
raises the question as to the likelihood of their complying
with the convention.
As a Wall Street Journal article recently put it, under the
Chemical Weapons Convention, members to the convention could
look for chemical weapons in New Zealand or the Netherlands but
not in North Korea, Libya, or Iraq, which are countries that
could be chemical warfare threats.
Despite what I believe to be the low possibility that the
convention would result in real arms control accomplishments,
nonetheless a case can be made that it is important for the
world to have standards and values, as Secretary Schlesinger
mentioned. This is the ``speed limit'' argument.
My friend, Dr. Kenneth Adelman, a former Director of ACDA,
recently argued, supporting the agreement, that standards and
values violated are better than no standards and values at all.
I personally think that is probably the most persuasive
case that can be made for the convention. However, I do not
believe that it is sufficiently persuasive to tip the scales.
While standards and norms are important, there is a real
risk that in ratifying the convention and in setting forth high
standards, the U.S. would be misinforming the world by
misleading people into believing that we had, in fact, done
something with respect to the international controls over the
use of chemical weapons, despite the certainty, in my mind, at
least, that this convention cannot provide that assurance.
Furthermore, it is important to consider and weigh not only
potential benefits of the convention, such as standards and
norms, but also its burdens and costs.
It seems to me clear that any advantages of setting forth
such standards by ratifying the convention are more than offset
by the disadvantages.
I note that there would be considerable cost to the
taxpayers in that the convention provides for the use of a
U.N.-style funding formula, which calls for the United States
to pay some 25 percent of the total. In addition, there would
be costs to private industry, which I do not believe can be
properly quantified at present in that it is not possible yet
to know how the mechanisms to police this convention would
actually work. This is to say nothing of the cost to companies
of trying to protect proprietary information from compromise.
These costs would amount, in a real sense, to unfunded
mandates on American enterprise.
These were among the concerns that were expressed by a
number of government, civilian, and military officials in a
letter sent to Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott late last
year, which I signed, and I ask that a copy of that letter and
the signatories be placed in the record at this point.
The Chairman. Without objection, it is so ordered.

[The information referred to follows:]

September 9, 1996.
Hon. Trent Lott,
Majority Leader, United States Senate,
Washington, DC 20510.
Senator Lott: As you know, the Senate is currently scheduled to
take final action on the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) on or before
September 14th. This Treaty has been presented as a global, effective
and verifiable ban on chemical weapons. As individuals with
considerable experience in national security matters, we would all
support such a ban. We have, however, concluded that the present
convention is seriously deficient on each of these scores, among
others.
The CWC is not global since many dangerous nations (for example,
Iran, Syria, North Korea, and Libya) have not agreed to join the treaty
regime. Russia is among those who have signed the Convention, but is
unlikely to ratify--especially without a commitment of billions in U.S.
aid to pay for the destruction of Russia's vast arsenal. Even then,
given our experience with the Kremlin's treaty violations and its
repeated refusal to implement the 1990 Bilateral Destruction Agreement
on chemical weapons, future CWC violations must be expected.
The CWC is not effective because it does not ban or control
possession of all chemicals that could be used for lethal weapons
purposes. For example, it does not prohibit two chemical agents that
were employed with deadly effect in World War I--phosgene and hydrogen
cyanide. The reason speaks volumes about this treaty's impractical
nature: they are too widely used for commercial purposes to be banned.
The CWC is not verifiable as the U.S. intelligence community has
repeatedly acknowledged in congressional testimony. Authoritarian
regimes can be confident that their violations will be undetectable.
Now, some argue that the treaty's intrusive inspections regime will
help us know more than we would otherwise. The relevant test, however,
is whether any additional information thus gleaned will translate into
convincing evidence of cheating and result in the collective imposition
of sanctions or other enforcement measures. In practice, this test is
unlikely to be satisfied since governments tend to took the other way
at evidence of non-compliance rather than jeopardize a treaty regime.
What the CWC will do, however, is quite troubling: It will create a
massive new, U.N.-style international inspection bureaucracy (which
will help the total cost of this treaty to U.S. taxpayers amount to as
much as $200 million per year). It will jeopardize U.S. citizens'
constitutional rights by requiring the U.S. government to permit
searches without either warrants or probable cause. It will impose a
costly and complex regulatory burden on U.S. industry. As many as 8,000
companies across the country may be subjected to new reporting
requirements entailing uncompensated annual costs of between thousands
to hundreds-of-thousands of dollars per year to comply. Most of these
American companies have no idea that they will be affected. And perhaps
worst of all, the CWC will undermine the standard of verifiability that
has been a key national security principle for the United States.
Under these circumstances, the national security benefits of the
Chemical Weapons Convention clearly do not outweigh its considerable
costs. Consequently, we respectfully urge you to reject ratification of
the CWC unless and until it is made genuinely global, effective and
verifiable.

Signatories on Letter to Senator Trent Lott Regarding the Chemical
Weapons Convention

As of September 9, 1996; 11:30 a.m.

Former Cabinet Members:
Richard B. Cheney, former Secretary of Defense
William P. Clark, former National Security Advisor to the President
Alexander M. Haig, Jr., former Secretary of State (signed on September
10)
John S. Herrington, former Secretary of Energy (signed on September 9)
Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations
Edwin Meese III, former U.S. Attorney General
Donald Rumsfeld, former Secretary of Defense (signed on September 10)
Caspar Weinberger, former Secretary of Defense
Additional Signatories (retired military):
General John W. Foss, U.S. Army (Retired), former Commanding General,
Training and Doctrine Command
Vice Admiral William Houser, U.S. Navy (Retired), former Deputy Chief
of Naval Operations for Aviation
General P.X. Kelley, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired), former Commandant of
U.S. Marine Corps (signed on September 9)
Lieutenant General Thomas Kelly, U.S. Army (Retired), former Director
for Operations, Joint Chiefs of Staff (signed on September 9)
Admiral Wesley McDonald, U.S. Navy (Retired), former Supreme Allied
Commander, Atlantic
Admiral Kinnaird McKee, U.S. Navy (Retired), former Director, Naval
Nuclear Propulsion
General Merrill A. McPeak, U.S. Air Force (Retired), former Chief of
Staff, U.S. Air Force
Lieutenant General T.H. Miller, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired), former
Fleet Marine Force Commander/Head, Marine Aviation
General John. L. Piotrowski, U.S. Air Force (Retired), former Member of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff as Vice Chief, U.S. Air Force
General Bernard Schriever, U.S. Air Force (Retired), former Commander,
Air Research and Development and Air Force Systems Command
Vice Admiral Jerry Unruh, U.S. Navy (Retired), former Commander 3rd
Fleet (signed on September 10)
Lieutenant General James Williams, U.S. Army (Retired), former
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Additional Signatories (non-military):
Elliott Abrams, former Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American
Affairs (signed on September 9)
Mark Albrecht, former Executive Secretary, National Space Council
Kathleen Bailey, former Assistant Director of the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency
Robert B. Barker, former Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for
Nuclear and Chemical Weapon Matters
Angelo Codevilla, former Senior Fellow, Hoover Institute (signed on
September 10)
Henry Cooper, former Director, Strategic Defense Initiative
Organization
J.D. Crouch, former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
Midge Decter, former President, Committee for the Free World
Kenneth deGraffenreid, former Senior Director of Intelligence Programs,
National Security Council
Diana Denman, former Co-Chair, U.S. Peace Corps Advisory Council
Elaine Donnelly, former Commissioner, Presidential Commission on the
Assignment of Women in the Armed Services
David M. Evans, former Senior Advisor to the Congressional Commission
on Security and Cooperation in Europe
Charles Fairbanks, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
Douglas J. Feith, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
Rand H. Fishbein, former Professional Staff member, Senate Defense
Appropriations Subcommittee
Frank J. Gaffney, Jr., former Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense
William R. Graham, former Science Advisor to the President
E.C. Grayson, former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy
James T. Hackett, former Acting Director of the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency
Stefan Halper, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State (signed on
September 10)
Thomas N. Harvey, former National Space Council Staff Officer (signed
on September 9)
Charles A. Hamilton, former Deputy Director, Strategic Trade Policy,
U.S. Department of Defense
Amoretta M. Hoeber, former Deputy Under Secretary, U.S. Army
Charles Horner, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Science
and Technology
Fred Ikle, former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
Sven F. Kraemer, former Director for Arms Control, National Security
Council
Charles M. Kupperman, former Special Assistant to the President
John Lehman, former Secretary of the Navy
John Lenczowski, former Director for Soviet Affairs, National Security
Council
Bruce Merrifield, former Assistant Secretary for Technology Policy,
Department of Commerce
Taffy Gould McCallum, columnist and free-lance writer
James C. McCrery, former senior member of the Intelligence Community
and Arms Control Negotiator (Standing Consultative Committee)
J. William Middendorf II, former Secretary of the Navy (signed on
September 10)
Laurie Mylroie, best-selling author and Mideast expert specializing in
Iraqi affairs
Richard Perle, former Assistant Secretary of Defense
Norman Podhoretz, former editor, Commentary Magazine
Roger W. Robinson, Jr., former Chief Economist, National Security
Council
Peter W. Rodman, former Deputy Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs and former Director of the Policy Planing
Staff, Department of State
Edward Rowny, former Advisor to the President and Secretary of State
for Arms Control
Carl M. Smith, former Staff Director, Senate Armed Services Committee
Jacqueline Tillman, former Staff member, National Security Council
Michelle Van Cleave, former Associate Director, Office of Science and
Technology
William Van Cleave, former Senior Defense Advisor and Defense Policy
Coordinator to the President
Malcolm Wallop, former United States Senator
Deborah L. Wince-Smith, former Assistant Secretary for Technology
Policy, Department of Commerce
Curtin Winsor, Jr., former U.S. Ambassador to Costa Rica
Dov S. Zakheim, former Deputy Under Secretary of Defense

Mr. Rumsfeld. Over the coming days, the members of the
committee and the Senate will be faced with two important
questions relating to the convention. First is, can the Senate
responsibly oppose the President on this important foreign
policy issue? Second is, what will happen if the Senate does
reject the treaty and the United States seemingly stands
essentially alone in the world, ex-
cept for the rogue states with whom we would be associated as
non-signatories?
Let me address those questions in order.
First is the issue of not supporting the President. As I
indicated, my inclination has always been to try to do that.
However, we know the Constitution did not grant sole authority
to the President of the United States in the area of foreign
policy. Indeed, it does not provide for a simple majority to
ratify a treaty but, rather, for a two-thirds vote, so that it
would have to be almost beyond doubt that a given treaty is in
our national security interest. So it is certainly within the
right of the Senate to disagree.
Also, not surprisingly, there have been a number of
treaties, conventions, and agreements where the Senate has
disagreed over our history.
The second question, as to what might happen if the U.S.
stands alone, is an important one and one that I suspect will
be a principal focus of the debate over the coming days.
One result of the Senate not ratifying the treaty will be,
admittedly, expressions of concern by some of our friends and
allies around the world that have. But I suspect there will be
no smiles from the rogue states. And the world will be spared
the deception which would follow ratification, because the
world will not be led to have erroneously believed that the
threat of chemical weapons has been effectively dealt with. I
submit that we will be spared the complacency that Secretary
Schlesinger mentioned, which I think would follow ratification.
Further, small and medium sized companies will be spared
the costs and the risks to their proprietary information which
would result from U.S. participation. You know, big companies
seem to get along just fine with big government. They get along
with American government, they get along with foreign
government, they get along with international organizations.
They have the staying power, they have the resources to wait
things out. They have the ability, with all their Washington
representatives, to deal effectively with bureaucracies.
Indeed, that talent and skill, that capability on the part
of big companies actually serves as sort of a barrier to entry
to small and medium sized companies that lack that capability.
So I do not suggest for a minute that the large American
companies are not going to be able to cope with these
regulations. They are. They will do it a whale of a lot better
than small and medium sized companies.
But if you look at that opening round with the Department
of Commerce's regulations and requirements, and having been a
regulator in the Federal government at one point in my life, I
know that if you start with this, you end up with this
(indicating). It does not take long.
That problem of regulation on small and medium sized
companies literally sucks the energy out of those companies.
They are not capable of waiting and finding out the answers to
all those things. They are trying to make money. That is the
area of our society where the energy, the vitality, and the
creativity is. They are the ones who are creating jobs in our
country--not the large companies, which have been downsizing
for the most part.
So the fact that a number of large companies are not
concerned about this does not surprise me the all, I must say.
What would be the result of the U.S. standing alone? Well,
we did this at our Nation's birth. We did it because we had
very different views as to what the appropriate relationship
between the American people and their government ought to be
than other countries did.
Would we be abdicating leadership on this issue of chemical
weapons and the threat by not ratifying, as some have argued? I
say no. I think not.
I say this because the threat of chemical weapons will
remain despite the fact that this agreement gets ratified by a
number of nations. And the world will--must--look to the United
States for leadership in dealing with that threat. Because of
our capacity, our resources, our knowledge, our credibility, we
will retain a significant leadership role.
So, despite the argument, the power of the argument, that
the U.S. would be standing alone, I think the truth is that we
have done it before and it has worked out rather well. Not
every country has the ability to stand alone, but the U.S. is
not just any country.
With our resources, our weight, our capabilities, we can
not only afford to provide leadership, but we have a special
obligation to provide that kind of leadership and not just go
along with the current diplomatic momentum.
Because we are the United States, we have a singular
responsibility to exercise our best judgment on matters such as
this and then to set about the task of fashioning a better
solution.
Other countries look to us for that kind of behavior.
I hope the Senate will decide to take its time and work to
achieve the changes necessary to improve this in material ways.
The proposal introduced by Senator Kyl and others to the reduce
the chemical and biological weapons threat is a practical place
to start.
Mr. Chairman, I commend you and your committee for your
efforts to give such careful consideration to the matter and I
appreciate the opportunity of participating.
Thank you very much.

Prepared Statement of Donald Rumsfeld

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, good morning.
Let me say at the outset that I am not an expert on chemicals, nor
am I a lawyer. I have been in and around the subject of Arms Control
since my service in the Congress in the 1960s, as U.S. Ambassador to
NATO during the early 1970s when we were working on MBFR and SALT, as
well as my service in the Pentagon. So, I am here today not as an
expert on chemicals or international law, but rather as one with a long
interest in U.S. national security.
One of the most serious problems facing the United States, our
friends and allies, and indeed the world is proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction. Surely among the most important treaties of the
decades since World War II are those which effectively enhance U.S.
national security by addressing this problem. The Chemical Weapons
Convention now before the Senate would appear to fit in that category,
but, in my view, it does not.
I recognize that there are arguments on both sides of this issue.
Indeed, a number of the people many of us have worked with on these
subjects over the years and respect, find themselves on opposing sides.
Furthermore, as a former Member of the Congress, I well understand
the difficulty in finding oneself in the position of opposing a treaty
that the President of the United States strongly supports and that has
such broad appeal. Being posi-
tioned both as opposing our President and as favoring poison gas, which
seems to be what happens to those who oppose this convention, is not an
attractive position.
Let me be clear. Were there pending before the Senate a convention
that was verifiable and global and which would accomplish the
elimination of chemical weapons in the hands of the nations most likely
to use them, I would be appearing before this committee as a supporter,
asserting that ratification would be in our national interest.
Unfortunately, I do not believe this convention meets these tests.
Interestingly, the preamble of the convention states in the first
paragraph: ``The states parties to this convention * * *. Determined to
act with a view to achieving effective progress toward general and
complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,
including the prohibition and elimination of all types of weapons of
mass destruction * * * .''
That is a goal that can only be described as monumentally
ambitious. More to the point, it is not clear to me that that is today
the agreed policy of the U.S. government or even that it is realistic.
The history of mankind suggests that the achievement of ``complete
disarmament'' is not a likely prospect, and the idea of ``strict and
effective international controls'' to assure compliance with ``complete
disarmament'' is, to put it mildly, a stretch.
I do not believe that this convention is verifiable. Nor have I met
or heard a single knowledgeable person who believes it is verifiable.
The U.S. intelligence community has acknowledged in congressional
testimony that we cannot have high confidence that violation of the CWC
will be detected.
It might reduce chemical weapons in arsenals in some countries. It
is debatable, however, whether this treaty would reduce the chemical
arsenals of any of the nations potentially hostile to the United
States. Countries identified by the United States as possessing
chemical weapons, that have not signed the CWC let alone ratified it,
include Libya, Syria, Iraq and North Korea. Certainly, these countries
are among the most likely to use chemical weapons against our citizens,
our soldiers and our allies.
In addition there are countries that might well sign the
convention, but which would not be reliable with respect to compliance.
Since the convention is not verifiable, that is not a trivial problem.
For example, even if Iran does ratify can we really rely on them to
comply? Also, it is my understanding that Russia has yet to fulfill its
obligations under the 1990 U.S.-Russian bilateral destruction
agreement. The Washington Times and Jane's have reported that the
Russians have developed new nerve agents that are designed in a manner
which would make discovery next to impossible, in that they are
comprised of common commercial chemicals. This raises the question as
to the likelihood of their complying with this convention.
It appears that this convention is proceeding in a way that it
could conceivably disarm democratic, friendly, non aggressive nations,
that either do not have chemical weapons, or if they have them would be
most unlikely to use them against us, while it will not effectively
apply to totalitarian, enemy and aggressive nations that would be most
likely to use them against the U.S. and its allies. As a recent Wall
Street Journal article put it, under the Chemical Weapons Convention,
members to the convention could look for chemical weapons in New
Zealand or the Netherlands, but not in North Korea, Libya or Iraq--
countries which could be chemical warfare threats.
Despite what I believe to be the low possibility that the
convention would result in real arms control accomplishments,
nonetheless a case can be made that it is important for the world to
have standards and values. Dr. Kenneth Adelman, former director of
ACDA, recently argued in supporting the agreement that ``standards and
values violated are better than no standards or values at all.'' That
is the most persuasive argument for the convention I have heard.
However, I do not believe that it is sufficiently persuasive to tip the
scales.
While standards are important, there is the real risk that in
ratifying the convention and setting forth high standards, the U.S.
would be misinforming the world by misleading people into believing
that there were reasonable international controls over the use of
chemical weapons, despite the certainty that this convention cannot
provide that assurance. The use of various gases during World War I led
to the Geneva Protocol of 1925, which banned first use of chemical
weapons in war. Despite that high standard, that ban has not been
observed, witness Iraq's use of such chemicals.
Furthermore, it is important to consider and weigh not only any
potential benefits of the convention, but also its burdens and costs.
It seems clear that any advantages of setting forth laudable standards
and values by ratifying the convention are more than offset by the
disadvantages.
I note that there would be considerable cost to U.S. taxpayers in
that the CWC provides for use of a U.N.-style funding formula, which as
I recall bills the U.S. to pay some 25 percent of all costs.
Personally, I think that percentage is too high and I cannot see why we
would wish to extend it to still more international organizations.
In addition, there would be costs to private industry, which I do
not believe can be quantified at present, in that it is not possible to
know yet how the mechanisms to police the convention would work. And
this is to say nothing of the costs to companies of trying to protect
proprietary information from compromise.
These were among the concerns expressed by a number of former U.S.
government civilian and military officials in a letter sent to Senate
Majority Leader Trent Lott late last year, which I signed. (I have
attached a copy of the letter to my remarks, and ask that it be made a
part of the record at this point.)
[The letter referred to by Mr. Rumsfeld appears on page 15.]
Other concerns expressed in the letter included: The risk that the
convention would lead to the creation of a new U.N.-style international
inspection bureaucracy at great cost to the American taxpayers; that
the CWC could undermine the standard of verifiability that had been a
key national security principle for the U.S.; and that the convention
could prevent the use of non-lethal riot control agents, to the
disadvantage of U.S. forces.
Over the coming days members of the committee and the Senate will
be faced with two important questions.
First, can the Senate responsibly oppose the President on this
important foreign policy issue; and second, what will happen if the
Senate does reject the treaty, and the U.S. seemingly stands
essentially alone and apart in the world.
Let me address those questions in order.
First, is the issue of not supporting our President on a key
foreign policy matter. As one, with a background in the executive
branch, I begin with a strong preference to support the President on
such matters. Indeed, I felt that pull even as a Member of Congress
with Presidents of the other party. And I so voted. So that is my
inclination.
However, we know the Constitution did not grant the President sole
responsibility in foreign affairs. Indeed, it provides not for a simple
majority vote for the Senate to ratify a treaty, but a two-thirds vote,
so that it would have to be beyond doubt that a given treaty is in the
U.S. national security interest. So, it is not only well within the
right of the Senate to disagree with a treaty as its best judgment may
dictate, but it is its constitutional obligation. In exercising that
responsibility, there have been a number of treaties, conventions, and
international agreements that have not been approved by the U.S. Senate
over our history, and in each case the sun came up the next day and the
world did not end.
The second question as to what might happen if the U.S. stands
apart on this issue, is also an important one, and one which I suspect
will be a principle focus of the debate over the coming days. One
result of the Senate not ratifying this treaty will be expressions of
concern by some of our friends, but there will likely be no smiles from
the rogue states.
Next, the world will be spared the deception which would follow
ratification, because the world will not be led to believe erroneously
that the threat of chemical weapons had been effectively dealt with,
and the complacency which would follow.
Further, small and medium sized U.S. companies will be spared the
costs and the risks to their proprietary information which would result
from U.S. participation. Big companies seem to get along well with big
governments, foreign governments, and international organizations. They
have the resources, the time, and the Washington representatives to
work skillfully with governments. These capabilities of larger
companies serve as an advantage over smaller companies, which lack the
staying power and resources to cope with national and international
regulations, inspections and the like.
Next, U.S. taxpayers will be spared the cost of the convention.
That is not a reason to reject it alone, but it is a fact. The U.S.
would be spared the time and effort of implementing, complying with,
and trying to enforce an agreement which in any event doesn't cover the
nations most likely to use chemical weapons.
So what would be the result of the U.S. standing alone? Well, we
did this at our Nation's birth. We did it because we had very different
views as to the appropriate relationship between the people and their
government.
Also, President Ronald Reagan did it with the Law of the Sea
Treaty, notwithstanding the fact that most every nation in the world
had signed that agreement. He did so because he found objectionable
certain provisions relating to the seabed mining provisions. He refused
to sign that treaty and asked me to serve as his Special Envoy to alert
key countries of the dangers of going forward with that portion of the
treaty.
Would the U.S. be abdicating its leadership on this issue by not
ratifying the convention, as some have argued? The answer is no. I say
that because the problem of chemical weapons will remain despite this
agreement, and the world will look to the U.S. for leadership in
dealing with that serious threat.
So despite the power of the argument that the U.S. would be
standing alone, the truth is, we have done it before and it has worked
out rather well. Not every country has the ability to stand alone. But
the U.S. is not just any country. With our resources, our weight, our
capabilities and our credibility the United States not only can afford
to provide leadership, but it has a special obligation and ability to
not just go along with what seems popular at the moment, but to stand
up for what is right. Because we are the United States we have a
singular responsibility to exercise our best judgment on matters such
as this, and then set about the task of fashioning a better solution.
I hope that the Senate will decide to take its time and work to
achieve the changes necessary to improve it in material ways. The
proposal introduced by Senator Kyl and others to reduce the chemical
and biological weapons threat is a practical place to start.
Mr. Chairman I commend you and your committee for your efforts to
give the most careful consideration to this matter. I appreciate this
opportunity to express my views and my concerns about the convention.
Thank you.

The Chairman. I thank all three of you.
Senator Biden was necessarily detained because of the train
this morning, and we were authorized to begin without him. So
he missed his opportunity, as the ranking member, to make a
statement.
I would just say for perhaps his guidance that I took 14
minutes and he might want to consider that same neighborhood.
Senator Biden. I will try to do less than that, Mr.
Chairman. I thank the committee for its indulgence and I would
like the record to show that, although I am late, it will not
add to the total time. Had I been here, I would have used the
time. And the only manifest failure this morning that I have
observed, to use Secretary Schlesinger's words, is the train
schedule. That has been my most manifest failure this morning.
I may reveal others as I speak, though.
Mr. Chairman, I think this is a defining moment, not only
for the United States but, quite frankly, for this committee
and in your significant effort to reestablish this committee
and its credibility and standing within the Congress. I think
our failure to act on this treaty would be a reflection on us,
as well as an extremely negative reflection on the United
States' role internationally.
Twelve years ago, the United States made a firm commitment
to destroy 30,000 tons of poison gas that we