CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

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THURSDAY, APRIL 17, 1997

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:07 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Chuck Hagel,
presiding.
Present: Senators Hagel, Biden and Kerry.
Senator Hagel. The committee will come to order.
Congressman Goss, thank you, and welcome. You probably were
expecting Chairman Helms. I am sorry to disappoint you and the
other members of the second panel. Chairman Helms had a couple
of responsibilities to attend to this morning and has asked me
to fill in, and I am privileged to do so.
As a 4-month United States Senator, Congressman, we make
progress quickly over here, as you can see. So, if you work
hard and do the right thing, you are Chairman of the Foreign
Relations Committee after 4 months. That is the way it works.
So we are very, very pleased to have you, as well as our
distinguished panel who follow you, Congressman. And I will
just briefly acknowledge our panel, and then I know you may
have a vote coming up soon, so we would get right to business.
The opportunity to have you over here, Congressman, is
significant, because we all know you chair the House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence. Your observations, insights
and contributions will be important to this body, in helping us
make a very difficult decision.
Then, after you are completed with your testimony--I
understand you will have to leave immediately after that--we
will have a panel following you, consisting of General Bill
Odom, former Director of the National Security Agency; Mr. Ed
O'Malley, former Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and head of the FBI's Foreign Counterintelligence
Operations; and the Hon. Ronald Lehman, former Director of the
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. So we are very privileged
to have all of you.
And, again, Mr. Chairman, welcome, and we look forward to
your testimony.

STATEMENT OF HON. PORTER J. GOSS, U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM
FLORIDA

Mr. Goss. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I congratulate
you on your meteoric rise and wish you continuing success in
your endeavors, and I hope you will give my compliments to the
Chairman when he is back.
I also compliment you on the quality of your second panel.
It is obviously made up of folks who know a good deal about
this subject as well. And I greatly appreciate the opportunity
to be here this morning.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, you have clearly
an awesome responsibility in deciding whether to ratify the
Chemical Weapons Convention. As a Member of the House, who does
not have a vote on this matter at this threshold, I am very
especially honored that you have asked for my views as you
pursue your advice and consent obligation.
My testimony today is generally based on my knowledge and
experience, including of course committee assignments on the
House International Relations and the Intelligence Committees.
But I also come as a Member of Congress, charged with
representing views of the good people of Southwest Florida,
views I consider a very rich slice of America.
We all understand that the stakes are extremely high in
what is about here today. No margin for error. Chemical weapons
are so dangerous, so frightening and so difficult to control
that is only natural and proper that the global community seeks
to contain and eradicate them. The question is how to do it
effectively.
I know that those of us charged with our Nation's security
have given this matter very much thought and carefully reviewed
the commentary of many distinguished former leaders, public
servants who have come down on opposite sides of this issue. I
remain deeply troubled about the CWC's ability to meet the
promise of its title and of its proponents. Given my review and
my concerns, Mr. Chairman, in general, I conclude that I cannot
support this treaty. Primarily and specifically, effective and
balanced verification is too doubtful.
My comments today focus on the critical issue of
verification, and then seek to broaden the debate somewhat with
a discussion of how the control of chemical agents and weapons
fits into the overall strategy we all seek to ensure protection
for the American people, for American interests, and for
American allies.
Finally, I want to briefly discuss a very real and
practical aspect of CWC that has great significance to all of
us as we embark on our annual budget process that will not be
news to anybody here--the cost of implementation.
Going to verification, first, Mr. Chairman, let me discuss
this. At the outset, I want to state that I am not an
individual who believes that arms control is a worthless
endeavor. Mr. Lehman, I am sure, will agree with that. We have
talked about this subject many times. On the contrary, I
believe that our arms control efforts during the cold war were
a critical component of a strategy that resulted in the end of
the cold war and, subsequently, the collapse of the Soviet
Union.
Arms control truly has its place in our foreign policy and
national security objectives. The process of arms control and
the treaties that result can build a level of trust between
signatories, and it can provide a measure of insight and
information that is useful to the Nation. Obviously, if this
were the only yardstick needed to measure the worthiness of the
treaty, then CWC would be an undeniably valuable and worthwhile
endeavor.
Certainly, through the provisions found in CWC, some
information would be available, and cooperation among most
signatories could likely benefit our Nation to a degree. In
fact, the acting Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. George
Tenet, rightly stated to the Senate Intelligence Committee that
there are some tools in the CWC--namely, inspections and data
exchange--that, as an intelligence professional, he would find
beneficial. And I certainly concur with that.
For the intelligence community, it is clearly true that
more information and insight is beneficial to analysis.
However, the decision to ratify a treaty is not based on
whether the intelligence community can get more data, but, in
part, on whether we can monitor the provisions of the treaty
and whether we, as a government, can verify that these
provisions have been met or are being broken.
And here, Mr. Tenet confirms what his predecessors have
already stated and what I, too, believe. Monitoring compliance
with CWC provisions will be very difficult. As you have heard,
former DCI Woolsey, who negotiated the CFE treaty, an
understands the complexity and importance of being able to
monitor the provisions of a multinational treaty, stated that,
quote, the chemical weapons problem is so difficult from an
intelligence perspective that I cannot state that we have high
confidence in our ability to detect noncompliance, especially
on a small scale, unquote.
Mr. Tenet, more recently, confirmed that assessment when he
told the Senate Intelligence Committee--again, I will quote--I
will say that our ability to monitor the CWC provisions
probably is still not very good, unquote.
Mr. Chairman, I must say that given the statements of those
who have been in the position of managing intelligence
resources and understanding their capabilities, combined with
my own experience as an intelligence professional--a long time
ago, I would add--and as a member and now chairman of the House
Intelligence Committee, I believe that our ability to monitor
the CWC is very questionable.
I believe that is certainly true if you consider the more
traditional and accepted definition of, quote, effectively
verifiable, unquote. That is, the effectively verifiable means
having a high level of assurance in the intelligence
community's ability to reliably detect a militarily significant
violation in a timely fashion. I do not believe we have those
assurances.
But even if you consider the much more watered down
definition that has been promoted by the current
administration, our capabilities are called into question--and
I am not sure we can fulfill even that mandate. Former DCI John
Deutch, when he was the Deputy Secretary of Defense, stated to
the Senate Armed Services Committee that a CWC verification
regime, quote, should prove reasonably effective, unquote, over
time.
As this committee has heard several times, the language of
the classified National Intelligence Estimate from August 1993
looms very large. And again, I will quote from it. The
capability of the intelligence community to monitor compliance
with the Chemical Weapons Convention is severely limited and
likely to remain so for the rest of the decade. The key
provision of the monitoring regime, challenge inspections at
undeclared sites, can be thwarted by a na-
tion determined to preserve a small, secret program, using the
delays and managed access rules allowed by the convention,
unquote.
I think that Chairman Helms had some interesting comments
on industrial espionage as well, which he put in the record
back--I think it was--on the 19th of March, which fall
generally into this area.
Moving from verification to a broader perspective, Mr.
Chairman, I think that in viewing the CWC, one must put into
perspective what we need do regarding the spread and potential
use of chemical weapons in terms of our own national security.
And I am not discounting our allies or other interests, but
national security comes first.
Put simply, what is the threat and what do we do about it?
I would argue that the threat has continued to evolve over
the past 4 years, since CWC was signed. Among obvious evidence
of the types of new challenges we face was the incident in
1995, when the Aum Shinrikyo cult clandestinely produced sarin
gas and deployed it into a Japanese subway. Although some may
argue that this was simply an act of religious fervor, I fear
that this is precisely the type of MO that terrorist groups may
employ in the future.
The transnational issues of proliferation--and here I refer
specifically to the production and proliferation of chemical
weapons and terrorism, whether state-sponsored or not--directly
affect our Nation's security, perhaps almost as dramatically as
the threat introduced by the incorporation of nuclear weapons
into the inventories of the Soviet Union that we all remember.
But the thought of small-scale production and employment of
chemical weapons by a terrorist organization is one that should
frighten anyone knowledgeable of the ease with which such
weapons of terror can in fact be made. This type of threat must
get special focus from our intelligence community--focus that
could be drawn away by the need to monitor the CWC. It would be
sad, indeed, if while creating a false sense of security by
attempting to monitor this treaty, we found that we had
diminished capacity to attack these transnational threats
specifically.
Then, Mr. Chairman, there is the larger issue of state-
sponsored chemical weapons programs. Some would argue that an
advantage of CWC is the overall pressure that it would place on
states that are not part of the agreement to do the right
thing. Although this may have been true during the cold war at
some time, I am not as confident that it is true today, or will
be tomorrow, for those countries that concern us most. After
all, we call these countries ``rogue'' for very good reasons--
they do not conform and do not care about international norms,
nor accepted behavior.
Let me use the first START treaty to illustrate my point on
what could be the likely effects of CWC on some of these
nations. START is a treaty that has proven to be very effective
and extremely valuable to our national security. Because of the
treaty provisions that can be monitored by the intelligence
community and verified by our government, we have reduced the
threat that once had many of us learning how to take shelter
under our desks at school. Thank heavens those days are gone.
One of the noted values of START was the example it set for
others, by saying that nuclear weapons were bad and that even
the superpowers understood that we needed to walk back from
that brink. However, it is clear that the START treaty did not
set an example that was so dramatic that it prevented other
rogue countries from pursuing their own nuclear weapons
programs, as we all know.
In some cases, these are the same states as those we are
now worried about regarding chemical weapons programs and
whether they might adhere to CWC. Having witnessed the types of
actions and activities of these countries during this decade,
it is hard to believe that they will somehow now cave to the
threat of international reason promoted in the CWC.
The fact is that reasonable nations will abide by
international norms. Efforts like the Australia Group regime
can be effective with reasonable nations. They are good
efforts. The same is probably true for the CWC. But our
greatest concern, certainly from an intelligence perspective,
is not states that we term ``reasonable.'' If everyone were
reasonable, would we be here discussing this today?
Another question is the wherewithal of our signatories to
enforce treaty provisions substantially and to engage actively
non-signatories in adopting CWC principles. I noted with
interest the recent statement by James Schlesinger, former DCI,
regarding the world's incredibly mild reaction to the use of
chemical weapons by the Iraqis, in clear and unambiguous
violation of the Geneva Convention. I have little doubt that
CWC could well suffer the same fate, coming under the same
geopolitical yoke that often tempers the need for forceful,
direct international actions.
And at this point, I am going to insert some recent
history. I must say that I have reservations about our own
government's seriousness in this regard. Just this morning I
learned that this administration made yet another attempt to
sidestep direct action regarding chemical weapons
proliferation. In this case, I understand that the State
Department has attempted to modify its statements to the
Senate, taking a more relaxed approach to the transfers of
dual-use chemicals to Iran. This was recently reported in the
Washington Times, and I am relieved to see that there is
bipartisan outrage to this.
This is not the first time that this administration has
attempted to downplay China's activities in order to protect
China from necessary, lawful sanctions. Many members of the
House Intelligence Committee, on both sides of the aisle--and I
stress that--are increasingly questioning this administration's
response--or, more appropriately, their lack of response--to
blatant proliferation of ballistic missiles and chemical agents
or weapons, as has been reported in the press.
I think Senator Stevens had it right when he indicated that
this administration is so narrowly interpreting our laws that
we will be unable to do anything about the proliferation
problem. And that concerns me. I am very concerned that in
continued attempts to protect policy, the administration
appears willing to ignore the spirit and possibly the letter of
the law. With this in mind, I wonder what hope we have of
implementing the CWC accords in a way that will really be
effective.
Mr. Chairman, regarding the task ahead with those countries
that we know are the bad actors, I point to the hurdles that we
have encountered related to the United Nations inspections in
Iraq. In what many would term a more robust inspection regime
than CWC, proof of a chemical weapons program was concealed
from U.N. inspectors for a great deal of time, and the full
extent of such a program is likely still unknown. This is, in
part, a factor of the ease with which chemical weapons can be
concealed.
I am afraid, however, that some of this probably has to do
with the fact that today much more is known about our national
technical means and other techniques of information collection
and analysis than at any other time in our history. Some of
this has to do with the fact that the technological explosion
that we have witnessed over this decade has made people and
countries generally more knowledgeable. We have lost some of
our edge. Denial and deception is an unresolved challenge that
leaves unacceptable gaps in verifiability.
Unfortunately, another aspect is that we have made our own
job harder. Mr. Chairman, it saddens me to say that I have just
received a highly classified document in my office that relates
to the damage to the effectiveness of some of our sensitive
sources and methods. It appears this damage may have been the
result of a very cavalier--or at least misguided--attitude
toward declassification of information within the Department of
Defense and the intelligence community, apparently in order to
pacify political pressures from senior leaders in the
government. And that is not a good reason.
Obviously, I cannot go into any detail here on this issue,
but I assure you that my colleagues and I on the Intelligence
Committee, and I am sure our counterparts on the Senate side,
will be examining this problem in detail over the next few
weeks and months. Suffice it to say, however, that if
interpreted correctly, the bad actors could well have a leg up
on their ability to conceal activity and our ability to detect
that they did not have previously.
The final area I would like to briefly address for you to
consider, Mr. Chairman, is that of the implementation costs
associated with monitoring CWC provisions. I know that you have
received reports on the overall costs associated with
implementation, and that the United States may pay up to 25
percent of those overall costs. I would like to highlight the
possible effects on the intelligence community.
Often, because monitoring of our agreements and treaties
with other nations is a matter of great importance to us,
obviously, the priority placed on such activity is high in
terms of our requirements, and the costs and the allocation of
our resources are commensurate. I think that this is generally
the right approach. Sometimes, however, this can lead to
intelligence programs and a collection and analytical emphasis
that can place greater priority on monitoring specific
technical aspects of a treaty than on filling in the
intelligence gaps. This is not a complaint of the intelligence
community; it is merely an observation.
My concern about this issue stems from the fact that
dollars for intelligence and defense are at risk in the current
budget environment--and we all know that. Yet, even though the
intelligence community is significantly smaller, the demands
for intelligence have significantly increased. Consequently,
budget decisions within the community and within the
intelligence committees of Congress become more and more
problematic. And that is probably an understatement.
At the end of the day, I must wonder whether intelligence
dollars will be better spent on trying to effectively monitor
CWC provisions that may in fact be unverifiable or focusing on
comprehensive efforts against transnational threats. I use that
term to refer to the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, including chemical weapons, terrorism, narcotics
trafficking, and of course international organized crime.
As the Intelligence Committee reviews this year's budget
submission, the potential tradeoffs between monitoring the CWC
and focusing on other measures against the transnational
threats could be a risky proposition.
Mr. Chairman, I have no doubt that the CWC can be
important. And I know that the motives of those supporting it
are certainly very well intentioned, and I take nothing away
from that effort. But the threat of the so-called transnational
issues is so great that I must wonder to what degree the CWC
helps us meet those challenges ahead. We need your support to
make sure that we have a robust, flexible intelligence
community in the future that can take on all of the challenges
that we have. Unfortunately, when I look at the tradeoffs, the
CWC comes up somewhat short of that mark.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity to insert
my views.
Senator Hagel. Chairman Goss, thank you.
I have been joined here by my distinguished colleague from
Delaware, Senator Biden, who is the ranking minority member of
the Foreign Relations Committee. Welcome.
Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure to have you
here. I served on the Intelligence Committee for 10 years, but
you have served in the intelligence community. You are one of
the only folks here that has that hands-on experience.
I must say, I apologize for not being here for your whole
testimony; the Judiciary Committee is meeting, as well. I know
you know the problem. But I will read your whole statement and
take what you have to say seriously.
The one thing you have said that I do agree with, and I am
not sure how much more relative to CWC, is the need for us to
have a robust intelligence capability unrelated to CWC. I was
one of those guys, back when we had this--when we started the
committee you now chair, that came out of the--that is how
old--that is how long I have been here--it came out of the
Church committee. And I was one of the so-called charter
members. And I remember how upset everyone was in my party and
my part of the party, because I kept proposing spending more
money on the agency.
And I would just say--and I realize it is slightly
extraneous--but it seems to me, at a time when the wall is
down, when other armies are weaker, when we have an
overwhelming predominance of military capability, when we are
cutting our military, this is the time to expand our capacity
and not diminish our capacity relative to two things. One, the
intelligence community and the other, the Foreign Service. This
is a time to move out, not pull in. And so I agree with your
overall admonition to be careful about what we are not doing
for the community.
I think we have a little disagreement on--I know we have a
little disagreement on the efficacy of the CWC, but I will not
engage you in that now. I am told you are off. I know how busy
you are. I appreciate you, as they say, making that long walk
to the other body. It is a long way over here, I know that.
Mr. Goss. Thank you, Senator. I want to congratulate you
for your vision in setting up the oversight committee. It has
proved to be a totally appropriate and worthwhile enterprise.
Senator Biden. I cannot take credit for setting it up. That
was Senator Church. I just got put on it. I was just one of the
first ones put on the committee.
Mr. Goss. Well, if you were there, your fingerprints are on
it, and you will have to accept the praise.
Senator Biden. I am afraid they are.
Mr. Goss. I also want to commend very much the comments you
made last evening. They were very informative to me, and I
think will be very informative in this process. And I was
extremely impressed with your leadership on that point.
Senator Biden. Well, you are very gracious. Thank you very
much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Goss. Thank you, sir.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Hagel. Senator, thank you.
Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
If we could now have the second panel come to the witness
table. Thank you. [Pause.]
Senator Hagel. Gentlemen, thank you.
I have introduced all three of you, and unless my
colleague, Senator Biden has any opening statements, why do not
we get right to it. And we will just go, at least from Senator
Biden and my perspective, we will go left to right, and we will
start with you, Mr. Lehman.
Senator Biden. Does it matter if we let the General go
first.
Senator Hagel. No. That is fine with me. If you would
prefer to have General Odom go first.
Mr. Lehman. I never made general, so I think it is a
protocol question.
Senator Hagel. Well, I am a former sergeant, so I always
put the generals at the back.
Senator Biden. General, were you ever a sergeant?
General Odom. No, I was not, unfortunately.
Senator Biden. Well, then, he outranks you in this man's
army.
Senator Hagel. I am glad we got that straight.
General, let me just reintroduce you, so that everyone
knows, here in the hearing room, who you are and the expertise
that you bring. You are the former Director of the National
Security Agency. You spent a lifetime in the military. You come
to this panel this morning with considerable experience and
expertise. So, we are grateful. Thank you.

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM ODOM, GENERAL, U.S. ARMY (RETIRED), FORMER
DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

General Odom. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and
Senator Biden, minority ranking member. It is a pleasure and an
honor to testify before you today. You have asked me to express
judgments on the verifiability and the verification regime of
the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Now, initially, I considered the Convention rather benign,
a treaty that would probably not prevent any determined state
from violating it secretly, but probably having some marginal
deterrent effect and, therefore, favorably.
In general, I think the public--certainly, the media and a
lot of opinion-makers and Washington political leaders--tend to
favor arms control treaties, not because these treaties
necessarily control arms, but because the sentiments and the
intentions are noble. And to oppose them in this climate is to
appear to be against virtue and for sin.
Unfortunately, I think the record of arms control
agreements is not objectively tracked and audited. And if it
were, and widely published, I think the image of virtue would
become seriously tarnished in several cases. But such a record
is not kept to moderate these illusions and, therefore,
whenever the potential damage for an arms control treaty is not
very great and it may have some marginal advantage or gains,
prudence allows us to support them responsibly, lining up with
public virtue against sin.
Now, upon a little examination of the verification regime,
I began to realize it was not as benign as I had assumed. The
length of the treaty itself immediately raised my suspicion.
Now, one need go no further than the definitions of the terms
at the beginning of the text to see the possibilities for
dangerous ambiguities. This is not to suggest that the
definitions have not been set forth with great care and
thought. It is merely to underscore that some aspects of the
definition task inherently must include ambiguities.
For example, toxic chemicals and precursors, as clear
categories, begin to be vitiated when purposes not prohibited
by this convention are enumerated, especially where they
concern international trade in chemicals. For another example,
production capacity, is not easy to define in all cases with
great certainty. The surge capacity of production facilities is
often deceptive.
Now, moving to the guidelines for schedules of chemicals,
one has to wonder if in the context of rapid technological
change in chemistry, whether or not these schedules can be kept
updated in a practical way. For example, in the early 1980's,
when I was Chief of Army Intelligence, we were concerned with
the possible Soviet production of mycotoxins, substances that
rest ambiguously on the boundary between chemical and organic
substances. A research chemist and a molecular biologist could
debate that, and they could probably provide you numerous other
such ambiguous examples that we will have to deal with if this
treaty goes into effect.
The drafters of the text have probably done about as well
as is possible in these circumstances. That is the point. The
circumstances are not very amenable to arms control treaties.
As a result, the length and the complexity of the treaty is
such that very few people have the depth of expertise--
scientific, technical, legal, military, and intelligence--to
say with even low confidence what the likely consequences of
the treaty would be if implemented.
I am surprised, therefore, that senior officials in the
administration assert their support for it in such an
unqualified manner. And I seriously doubt that any but staff
specialists have read it carefully. And if they have, I doubt
that they fully understood it.
I am not surprised, however, to learn that the acting
Director of Central Intelligence has reconfirmed the
community's position that the treaty cannot be verified today,
nor does he see prospects that it can be in the future.
Now, looking at the verification regime as a former
official of the intelligence community, I am disturbed by it,
not just because it is impossible to verify with a high degree
of confidence, but because it also complicates our security
problems. Take, for example, the U.N.-like organization set up
to make inspections. All of the appointed members may have no
intelligence links whatsoever initially. As they find that they
can tramp around in all kinds of U.S. production facilities,
however, foreign intelligence services are likely to offer to
supplement their wages for a little technology collection
activity on the side. And they will probably provide truly
sophisticated covert technical means to facilitate these
efforts.
Over time, therefore, it is only prudent to assume that a
few members of this group will not be entirely trustworthy. If
the KGB could penetrate the CIA, it and other intelligence
services are likely to be able to penetrate this U.N.-like CWC
inspection agency.
Now, I understand that other witnesses have already raised
questions about Article X and Article XI, which give all
signatories the right to participate in the fullest exchange of
information concerning the means of protection against chemical
weapons. Such information inevitably includes knowledge of
offensive means. Because, without it, one cannot know how to
defend against them.
It seems, from the treaty language, that each signatory is
left to judge what information is to be included in sharing.
And that implies as many interpretations as their are
signatories. If all such information is available, then every
signatory's interpretation governs its further distribution.
Now, the incentive to exploit this ambiguity will only be
great where the most innovative and effective offensive
chemical means are concerned. That is, the very ones one would
hope the treaty would be most effective in restricting.
Pondering the implications, I am forced to conclude that the
treaty could become the mechanism for proliferating the most
dangerous offensive CW means, while becoming reasonable
effective against the far less offensive means.
This highly perverse and probable consequence of the treaty
gives me pause, to say the least.
Another aspect of the treaty puzzles me deeply. This thick
document is entitled ``Instructions to Industry: Chemical
Weapons Convention Data Reporting Requirements,'' which was
drafted by the Commerce Department. It defines a very complex,
tedious reporting system. Unless I am mistaken, one of the
major concerns of the Congress in the last few years has been
to reduce costly and burdensome regulations on U.S. business.
Now, this document, required for the verification regime,
looks like a costly and troublesome stack of regulations. My
discovery of it made me highly suspicious of the convention
itself. Do all of the affected U.S. firms know that they are
about to face these instructions? Do they really know what the
data reporting will cost? Do they know the costs of an
intrusive inspection, even an occasional one, not just in
direct monetary costs, which they must bear, but also the
inherent costs of shutting down production during an
inspection?
Now, when I ask congressional staffers why the business
community was not up in arms about this aspect of the treaty, I
learned that several large chemical companies actually support
this and agree to accept the costs. I also learned that not all
businesses to be affected are aware that they will have to bear
these costs. And, recently, it seems that some such firms,
those in the aerospace industry, for example, have awakened to
the implications and do not like them.
And when I asked why the large chemical firms so happily
accept the idea of paying hundreds of thousands of dollars to
carry the regulatory burden of the convention I got no good
answers. The answers were no more satisfying to my questions
about whether all the firms which will be affected actually
know that they will be, and have considered the cost and the
inconveniences.
Now, today, I pose another kind of question. The red tape
morass, this kind of red tape morass, required by the
verification regime--and even if the U.S. is willing to accept
its costs and impose it on U.S. industry--what are the
prospects that other countries will take equally comprehensive
steps to monitor their own relevant industrial firms? As one
who has devoted more than a little time to studying the nature
of foreign domestic governments and political systems, I doubt
that more than a few dozen have the administrative capacity to
do so. And when the matter of costs is added, their incentives
for making such a system effective will be negative, not
positive.
Now, I am inclined to believe, therefore, that if the
United States ratifies the convention, only it and a few other
states--none of which really needs the treaty to restrain them
from developing and using chemical weapons--will be tying
themselves up in a tangle of red tape while the rest of the
world largely ignores these requirements, even if they promise
to abide by them. And those states posing the biggest problems
for verification will not cooperate in any case.
Now, if one thinks through the implications of these
regulations, therefore, one is encouraged to conclude that a
few countries who do not need to be tied down by the convention
will be engaged in the costly activity of checking one another
while most states in the world go about their business ignoring
the whole affair. Where states sign and ratify the convention
and then are found by inspectors not to have regulations, what
do we do then?
What do we say when they complain that they cannot afford
them? Do we then finance them from our own budget, as we are
doing in Russia in connection with other arms control
agreements? Even if we agreed to do that, whatever the cost, it
would not work; because lack of administrative capacity, not
shortage of funds, is the critical problem in most of these
states.
These are some of my reactions to learning more about the
convention.
As I considered the additional concerns expressed by
several former Secretaries of Defense, I found them also very
compelling. For those who were not persuaded by their
arguments, however, and who approach the convention looking for
reasons to support it, willing to accept only marginal
advantages as sufficient for justifying the ratification, I
strongly advise against following that inclination. The best
intentions can sometimes produce highly undesirable outcomes. I
see more than sufficient evidence to convince me that the CWC
is clearly such a case.
It is not enough to resort to detailed technical arguments
to score debating points against some of the objections I have
raised. The treaty is so complex that it is possible to isolate
a particular concern and to find arguments that seem to allay
the fear. Within an hour of further examination, however, one
can find yet another concern and another, almost endlessly.
This assessment does not mean the drafters and negotiators
did a sloppy job. On the contrary, it means they were asked to
apply an arms control solution to a problem that essentially
defies its very nature. Common sense tells us this unhappy
truth.
It is also implicit, I think, in acting Director George
Tenet's rather candid letter to Senator Kyl about the
intelligence community's own view of its present and future
capacity to verify the treaty.
Now, I think to push ahead in such circumstances strikes me
as imprudent, not a modest step toward controlling chemical
weapons. Rather, it is an effort to use a hopelessly complex
treaty to escape political and military responsibilities that
we will eventually have to face. The several editorials in the
Washington Post on the CWC show this tendency--a growing
recognition that the complexities really are beyond the reach
of treaty drafters, but not yet willing to accept the
implications.
The most recent one today comes remarkably close to
admitting the treaty's perversity, its enormous potential for
very bad outcomes, hidden in its complicated verification
regime, and wrapped in deceptive appeals to our best instincts.
Now, if we deceive ourselves for a number of years by the
illusion that we have escaped these responsibilities, the price
will be higher than had we faced up to them all along.
Ratifying the convention, therefore, strikes me as
unambiguously imprudent, not a close call, by no means a risk
worth taking, certainly not a harmless step that puts us on the
side of righteousness.
Thank you.
Senator Hagel. General Odom, thank you very much.
Let me now introduce Mr. Edward J. O'Malley. Mr. O'Malley
is the former Assistant Director for Counterintelligence,
Federal Bureau of Investigation. Mr. O'Malley, thank you.

STATEMENT OF EDWARD J. O'MALLEY, FORMER ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
(COUNTERINTELLIGENCE), FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Mr. O'Malley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning,
Senator Biden. Something you just said reminded me of an
incident that happened many years ago.
Judge Webster, then director of the FBI, and I were
testifying on the FBI's foreign counterintelligence budget
before one of the two intelligence committees--I do not recall
which one--and he was asked the question whether he thought he
was really asking for enough money for the Bureau's foreign
counterintelligence program, that the committee was quite
willing to give him more.
I have never heard such a question before or since, but
something you just said reminded me of that.
Yes, I did head the FBI's foreign counterintelligence
program. After I retired, I have been employed for about 10
years in private industry, including with IBM, where I worked
out of the Office of General Counsel and was involved in
countering on IBM's behalf those who would steal IBM's trade
secrets, including, I might add, the Japanese and the French.
Alvin Toffler, the futurist, has stated, the 21st Century
will be marked by information wars and increased economic and
financial espionage. The race for information of all kinds will
be motivated not only by a desire to lead, but will be required
to avoid obsolescence.
The energy released in competition for market share has
significantly replaced but has not eliminated the energy that
once drove the cold war military strategies of the West and its
adversaries. The shift from acquisition of global power by
force to one of acquisition by competitive strategy marks what
promises to be a remarkable revolution, remarkable not only in
the sense of its relevance to national power, but also in a
sense of the increasingly disparate nature of the competitors,
which run the gamut from many of the traditional cold war
adversaries to traditional friends and allies.
In terms of a traditional classical espionage threat vis-a-
vis hostile intelligence operations in the United States,
intelligence services of the former Warsaw Pact, the People's
Republic of China, Cuba, North Vietnam, and North Korea, were
of major concern from a counterintelligence standpoint.
The activities of the former Soviet Union and others are as
aggressive as ever, and remain a major threat. What is new,
however, is the increased importance given by them to the
collection of American corporate proprietary information.
Another change in terms of the foreign threat is that it now
includes not only a nation's intelligence services, but also
other governmental ministries and/or corporations.
Chief among their strategies is the acquisition, licit or
otherwise, of the battlefield's strategic targets, a
corporation's sensitive business information and intellectual
property. I think it is clear to anybody that the lifeblood of
any corporation rests on intellectual property, and I might say
the same thing, in my opinion, applies to the lifeblood of a
country.
All of this has not gone unnoticed by our intelligence
community and the Congress, both of which have been very much
engaged in addressing espionage concerns of whatever variety
such as was done in the 1970's. My testimony today will focus
on what was done by both--that is, the Congress and the
community--in the 1970's to address the threat as it existed
then, and what has been done in the 1990's to meet an ever-
increasing and complex intelligence threat.
I will also comment on the concerns I have with the
Chemical Weapons Convention as it relates to certain
counterintelligence initiatives, and also to the extent that
its ratification will result in mixed signals from the Congress
to the counterintelligence community.
I am not arguing that the ratification of the CWC should
succeed or fall because of counterintelligence concerns. What I
am suggesting is that those involved in the strategic
decisionmaking process ought to consider these current concerns
along with many others, such as recently expressed by General
Odom.
Historically, whatever other benefits may have resulted
from the period of detente, there was no corresponding
diminution of intelligence activities in the United States by
the former Soviet Union or, for that matter, its Warsaw Pact
allies. In fact, analysis by the American counterintelligence
community in the 1970's documented a substantial increase in
such activities undertaken with the hope that they would be
overlook because of detente-generated goodwill.
These hostile intelligence services and their counterparts
in other areas of the world used every means at their disposal
to enhance their intelligence collection in the United States,
including the use of their diplomatic establishments, the
United Nations Secretariat, commercial and trade delegations,
students, ``illegals,'' third country operations, false flag
operations, recruitment of third country nationals, and active
major operations. No stone was left unturned in their efforts
to obtain classified American political, scientific, and
military information.
Although all had sophisticated human intelligence
recruitment techniques to recruit their intelligence targets,
it must be stated that volunteers also did a substantial amount
of harm.
The common thread and the most important motivation of
those who betrayed their country was money. This should not be
forgotten in terms of today's threat, and I will comment a bit
later on that point.
Having done its homework in terms of the seriousness of the
intelligence threat, the counterintelligence community made its
case to Congress in the seventies in terms of resources needed
to meet the threat. Congress responded and approved the
resources, enabling the enhancement of the quality and quantity
of people involved, the equipment, analysis, and training.
The many counterintelligence successes of the 1980's were
not accidental. They were the result of close cooperation
between Congress and the counterintelligence community. Let me
now switch to the nineties and the post cold war developments
which are taking place.
During the early 1990's, the United States became
increasingly aware of the economic espionage threat to its
interests on several occasions, the last occurring in February
1995. The White House published national security strategies
which focused on economic security as crucial not only to U.S.
interests but to U.S. national security.
This was further delineated by testimony of Secretary of
State Christopher before the U.S. Senate on November 4, 1993,
when he stated that in the post cold war world our national
security is inseparable from our economic security, emphasizing
the ``new centrality'' of economic policy in our foreign
policy.
To be sure, the intelligence services of Russia, the
People's Republic of China and others remain a very significant
force to be contended with vis-a-vis classical espionage. For
example, the Russian SVR, the successor to KGB, and the Russian
military intelligence service, the GRU, have sustained their
activities aimed at the collection of national defense
information; but they have also begun to pay added attention to
American economic, scientific, and technological information.
President Boris Yeltsin made this perfectly clear in a
policy statement dated February 7, 1996. It was seconded by
Ifgani Primakov, the former head of KGB. I think we ought to
listen to these gentlemen.
It should be recognized that the economic espionage against
the United States should not be considered only in the
abstract, as something which should be only of concern at some
ill-defined time in the future. Know this future is now, and
there is more than ample evidence not only of the threat, but
of the implementation of the threat by human and technical
intelligence as well as significant resulting damages.
Again, it became clear to the counterintelligence community
in 1990 that our counterintelligence policy had to be changed
not only to meet classical espionage threat but also to mirror
more closely the total spectrum of today's economic
intelligence threats to the U.S. and corporations. The
allocation of a large percentage of its counterintelligence
resources to the former Soviet camp and the People's Republic
of China had left it somewhat blind as to whether intelligence
activities were occurring in the United States.
As in the seventies, it was realized that something had to
be done. That something was a new counterintelligence policy
approved by the Attorney General in 1992 known as the national
security threat list, which provides a road map for the
redirection of FBI counterintelligence resources.
The national security threat list contains two elements, an
issue threat list and a country threat list. The latter is
classified. I would like to concentrate, if I may, on the issue
threat list.
Two of the issues significantly involve countering by the
FBI of foreign intelligence activities aimed at illicitly
collecting information regarding weapons of mass destruction,
including chemical weapons. The second issue involves
countering attempts by foreign services to collect proprietary
information of U.S. corporations.
Given the importance of these two issues to U.S. national
interests, the FBI will provide counterintelligence coverage
irrespective of the country involved. A bit more on chemical
weapons later.
In 1994, the FBI initiated an economic espionage
counterintelligence program. In 1 year's time the number of
cases doubled from 400 to 800. In 1995, the Attorney General
revamped the national security threat list to give greater
emphasis to countering foreign economic espionage.
The Director of the FBI testified publicly before Congress
in February 1996 regarding economic espionage, calling it
``devastatingly harmful'' in terms of billions of dollars of
losses and hundreds of thousands of jobs lost. He focused on
economic espionage by some foreign governments which steal U.S.
technology and proprietary information to provide their own
industrial sectors with a competitive advantage.
Economic intelligence collection operations come in various
guises and under different sponsors. There have been
Government-sponsored operations such as France's Direction
Generale de la Securite Exterior, the DGSE, the French
counterpart of CIA, with which I have some familiarity, which
not long ago prioritized a collection effort aimed primarily at
U.S. aerospace and defense industries.
Other operations have been sponsored and run by foreign
competitor firms without the assistance of their government,
and there are examples of operations which combine foreign
governments and industry.
In the late 1980's, IBM learned that IBM France was
penetrated by the DGSE through the recruitment of French
nationals within the company. The information acquired by DGSE
was passed to French companies, including Companie de Machine
Bull, the IBM of France, which was then owned by the French
Government.
There is current information that France has been
developing in the last 2 years a substantial economic espionage
capability involving its business community, the French
commercial attaches, and other. Its principal target is
purportedly the United States.
Despite all the efforts by the FBI and other governmental
agencies, despite all the public and in camera testimony before
Congress, and despite all the recognition on the part of the
White House, the Department of State and others regarding the
relevance of economic security to national security, Director
Freeh and others recognize that in the final analysis there was
little chance in stopping foreign economic espionage because
Federal statutes simply did not allow the government to counter
or deter this activity in any way remotely commensurate with
the damage it was inflicting on the U.S. economy.
As in the 1970's, the Department of Justice and the FBI
again made their case to Congress, this time that a new law was
needed to facilitate the stopping of foreign economic
espionage. Once again, the Congress responded and passed the
Economic Espionage Act of 1996.
The EEA was passed with two goals in mind. First, to thwart
attempts by foreign entities to steal trade secrets of American
corporations. The more severe penalties of the act reflect this
overriding concern regarding a foreign threat.
Second, to allow the Federal Government to investigate,
which had not been done before, at least in the sophisticated
sense, to investigate and prosecute those engaged in economic
espionage. Importantly, section 1839 of the Economic Espionage
Act precludes--precludes--any Federal prosecution for trade
secret theft unless its owner ``has taken reasonable measures
to keep such information secret.''
Let me now conclude by commenting on my counterintelligence
concerns with the Chemical Weapons Convention as it relates to
what I have said and what is going on now.
While the national security threat list, supra, directs the
FBI to focus its counterintelligence resources to prevent the
illicit acquisition of chemical weapons information, the CWC
would appear to facilitate the acquisition of such data through
its challenge inspections. There is not an unrealistic
possibility that these inspections could facilitate collection
of the very kind of chemical weapons information that the FBI
is charged to protect under the national security threat list.
If I were a foreign intelligence officer and my country
needed offensive or defensive information regarding chemical
weapons, I would focus on a group of inspectors to be stationed
at The Hague.
As I indicated previously, there can be no Federal
prosecutions under the Economic Espionage Act unless the owner
of the trade secret has taken measures to keep it secret. This
is standard trade secret law.
The list of chemicals covered by the CWC is huge and open-
ended, and will encompass companies beyond chemical companies
such as pharmaceutical companies, computer companies, and
others with no relationship to chemical weapons or the CWC
except the manufacture of chemicals covered by the convention.
One of the greatest concerns of companies that I have read
about, and I have read a number of letters from major companies
and major associations of companies, all of which--the common
thread running through all of them is their concern that the
CWC will open them up to economic espionage. I think their
concerns are well-justified.
One of the greatest concerns of the companies I have read
about, as indicated, concerns the loss of trade secrets through
inspections, including dual use technologies to foreign
competitors. There seems to be mixed signals to the corporate
world in that the Economic Espionage Act requires them to
protect trade secrets, while the CWC requires them to hand over
to inspectors what they may regard as trade secrets, and which
they otherwise would have treated as such. This confusion in my
opinion ought to be cleared up.
I might add, there was one more issue on that national
security threat list, and that was entitled, national critical
technologies. Again, like proprietary information, the Bureau
was charged with doing what it can from a counterintelligence
perspective to protect against the illicit acquisition of these
national critical technologies, which was decided by a panel at
the White House. In other words, the panel said that these
technologies are crucial to a superior military posture and
also to a strong national economy.
If you read these lists of national critical technologies,
and it is unclassified, materials synthesis processing,
electronic photonic materials, ceramics, composites, a flexible
computer-integrated manufacturing, software, biotechnology,
aeronautics, et cetera, et cetera, you can see that there is a
nexus between some of the chemicals which are mentioned in CWC
and those which are involved with these technologies.
So again, you have somewhat of an inconsistency in terms of
charging the FBI to protect these critical technologies on the
one hand and CWC in effect possibly opening them up to
compromise on the other hand.
Again putting myself in the shoes of a foreign intelligence
officer, I would not bother to go through all the complicated
recruitment efforts to recruit someone within XYZ company. I
would simply recruit an inspector who would be able to
interview XYZ's employees, inspect documentation and records,
have photographs taken, and take samples. I would achieve the
same end, but would be doing so in a way sanctioned by the CWC.
The acquisition of American trade secrets has become a high
stakes business involving billions and billions of dollars, and
I would be able to pay an agent handsomely to acquire such
information.
Thank you.
Senator Hagel. Mr. O'Malley, thank you. We appreciate your
testimony.
Ronald F. Lehman, former Director, Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency. Ron, welcome.

STATEMENT OF HON. RONALD F. LEHMAN, FORMER DIRECTOR, ARMS
CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

Mr. Lehman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me begin with a
bit of a personal note. I was in California 2 days ago when the
staff called and asked if I would come and testify, and of
course I said I would.
I did so in part because of the friendships and the
relationships I have had with this committee over the years,
but there actually is another part of it that I think is a
principled thing, and that is that this is a great deliberative
body, and we need a marketplace of ideas, and we need to work
together to get the facts out, and we need to do that
throughout the negotiating process and beyond that into the
implementing process; and so I will help as best I can.
The second thing is, as I think most of the Members here
who have known me know, I believe that the United States ought
to be the real leader of the world, and I believe that our
military power ought to be unequaled. I am a hawk, and the
Constitution gives me one very powerful tool, especially in the
arms control business, and that is that a third of the Senate
plus one can block a treaty.
You are my ally. I do not need all of you on my side. I
need a third plus one on my side, and I have got a hell of a
lot of leverage. Let me give you just one example. Back in the
Wyoming Ministerial in 1989, we were trying to finish up the
verification protocol on the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, and we
had concluded pretty much most of the technical details that
remained, and we had met all of the concerns of the
intelligence community, all of the concerns of the JCS and the
Defense Department writ large.
Everybody was happy, except I was not happy because I had
not met Senator Helms' standards, so the negotiator and I got
together, and we developed an approach to strengthen that
protocol just a little bit more, and that protocol in the
treaty which--the treaty had been sitting around since 1974--
passed the Senate 98 to noth-
ing. I think that working together with the Senate strengthens
the United States.
The marketplace for ideas gives us better ideas. I had
hoped that it would also improve understanding. I am a little
puzzled that we have a treaty that we concluded 4 years ago
that is very similar to the treaty we tabled 10 years before
that, and negotiated over 10 years, in which essentially all
the issues that were out there today were present throughout
that whole process, but that is why I am here.
Now, I am a straight shooter. I think Senator Biden will
tell you that many times I have told him I have disagreed with
him.
Senator Biden. If I could interrupt you, Mr. Secretary--if
I could interrupt you for just a second, while you were sitting
there I leaned over and I said to my new colleague, and I said,
Lehman, he and I have been on opposite sides of the table. You
find out one thing about him. He is a straight shooter. I used
the exact words you just used.
Senator Hagel. I think he was a little more graphic than
that.
Senator Biden. But I did use the words, straight shooter.
They were modified. There were adjectives attached to it, but
you are a straight shooter.
Mr. Lehman. Let the record show I respect your views toward
me, and your right to have them.
The point I want to make is basically this. I am here, I
represent myself. I am going to give you my views. These are my
personal views. They are not the views of any organization I am
associated with now or in the past or in the future,
necessarily; but I am going to give you my best estimate of
where we are, and let me try to give at least something of a
summary, and then I am yours.
You have asked me to comment on the Chemical Weapons
Convention and on the verification issue. Although the issues
are complex, my advice is straightforward. Ratification of this
convention is essential to American leadership against the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; but ratification
alone is not enough. Strong followup involving all branches of
government will be vital.
This hearing should not signal the end of your deliberative
process, but rather the beginning. You must hold the executive
branch's feet to the fire, and you must hold your own feet to
the fire as well, and you must use your powers of oversight and
the purse to bring about the most effective use of the tools
that will be made possible by this treaty.
In the case of the Chemical Weapons Convention, its
contribution to our security will be determined more by what we
do in the future than what we have done in the past. The past,
however, has given us some important lessons, and the CWC was
designed to take advantage of that learning process.
The CWC offers us important tools which give us more data,
greater access, and more leverage. The chemical weapons threat
is serious, and will grow worse without the CWC. Even with the
CWC, we will never be able to let up on our defenses; but with
the CWC we will have more tools, more allies, and more options.
The United States will be in the lead.
If we now walk away from the CWC, which was carefully
crafted over many years to serve American security interests,
we may try to lead, but few will follow.
I support your giving consent to ratification, because it
is time to take that lead and to get on with the job. The time
has come to stop giving lip service to nonproliferation, and in
this regard I share many of the views of my friend Bill Odom,
and to get on with the hard work.
I am more than aware that the CWC is not a perfect treaty.
No treaty can be perfect, but the challenges facing a treaty
trying to ban chemical weapons are among the most daunting. We
knew that from the beginning. What is more surprising is that
we made as much progress as we did.
The treaty we negotiated is stronger overall than the
treaty we first tabled, and our ability to implement it has
been strengthened in many ways. That was made possible by a
number of factors, some of which I would like to enumerate
briefly today.
First, we did not rush into this treaty. We engaged in a
10-year process of deep and careful study with the widest range
of concerns reflected in the analysis and decisions.
Second, we were able to build upon lessons learned from
both the successes and the disappointments of earlier arms
control experience.
Third, the end of the cold war as we knew it improved some
security considerations, such as reducing the possibility of a
large land war in Western Europe.
Fourth, the collapse of the eastern bloc brought greater
access to what were once incredibly closed regimes, and reduced
the necessity for such heavy reliance, often solely, on
national technical means of verification. Indeed, political
change has given us new sources of information which often
multiply the value of our National Technical Means (NTM).
Fifth, the threat of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction in
the Gulf War generated greater support for a hard-nosed
approach to nonproliferation here and abroad.
Sixth, the conjunction of the collapse of the Soviet Union
and the defeat of Saddam Hussein created, at least for awhile,
much stronger international support for American leadership and
the American view of how to proceed. It was in that period that
we concluded the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Seventh, we could build upon and learn from the experience
of the U.N. special committee and the enhanced IAEA challenge
inspections in Iraq.
Eighth, although no technological silver bullet permits us
to monitor all chemical weapons activity with confidence, some
improvements, including new forensic techniques, continue to
appear.
And ninth, and I hope Senator Biden understands this, we
really were prepared to walk away from this treaty if we didn't
get what we wanted.
Senator Biden. I never had a doubt about that, Mr. Lehman.
Mr. Lehman. This negotiating from strength was very helpful
in getting the provisions we wanted, including in the area of
verification. The real problem initially was to know exactly
what we wanted.
Early on, it became clear that NTM alone could not do the
job. At the same time, even as political pressure built upon
all nations to accept the traditional U.S. approach of more
intrusive onsite inspection, our studies indicated that
inspections were not magic, either. Worse, existence of
inspection regimes could raise false expectations of the
effectiveness of constraints and, if improperly done, the
inspections themselves could produce false positive or negative
results while endangering proprietary and national security
information.
Many of us who raised these concerns throughout the
negotiating process, or the specific concerns we raised, are
often cited in opposition to the convention. What is important
to understand, however, is how we address the problems, and why
we can support the convention on its merits.
Again, we begin with the understanding that monitoring most
CWC activity is a major challenge. In the past, we relied upon
a comprehensive deterrence strategy which included as one
element the ability to respond in kind with chemical weapons.
That element is no longer realistically available to us,
not because of the treaty, but because the United States, both
Congress and the executive branch, including the military, no
longer desire to keep its offensive chemical weapons
capability. Thus, unlike so many other arms control agreements
such as INF, START, or CFE, we are not directly constraining a
military capability we would otherwise retain.
This is an important part of the verification
consideration. Let me explain. Verification has always involved
more than estimates of the likelihood that a specific,
prohibited act could be monitored by NTM. The intelligence
community likes to remind you that they do not make
verification judgments. They make monitoring judgments. They
take great professional pride in that point. It involves a
calculation of risks and benefits.
At the beginning of the administration of President Ronald
Reagan a review was conducted of how we should approach arms
control, including verification. A view had emerged among many
in the arms control community that verification of a nuclear
treaty would be sufficient if the overall military balance
could not be altered by cheating.
The problem was that some of these same people expressed
the view that no amount of inequality or cheating could upset
the nuclear balance. The implication of this, thus, was that no
treaty could be insufficiently verifiable, except, said some,
perhaps at or near zero.
President Reagan, who recognized that absolute verification
was not possible, wanted a different approach which would serve
better the national security of the United States and his
strategy for countering totalitarian regimes. The new, stricter
approach to verification took into account a far wider range of
considerations than just the state of the overall military
balance.
Military significance remained at the core of this
approach, but more based upon standards of equality, stability,
and specific benefits and risks. More attention was to be given
to details, including insistence on detailed verification
provisions actually within the treaties. Emphasis was placed
also on the interaction of restraints, and the clarity of
draftsmanship.
An analysis looked at the incentives to cheat, the
alternatives available to us and to the cheater, and the prices
paid or the gains made, including those associated with greater
access on both sides.
It stressed that intelligence estimates should not be
politicized, and that we should be honest about monitoring
confidence of specific provisions of the treaty. It also took
into account the important questions of deterrence of cheating
by generating the fear of discovery, deterrence of any attack
through strong military forces, the existence of defensive
measures, and the enhancement of compliance enforcement when
you find a violation.
What does this mean for the CWC? Clearly, it meant that the
CWC was going to take a long time to complete, and it did.
Certainly it meant that we would have to develop an approach
which was intrusive and aggressive to take into account the
monitoring challenge. Above all, it required that we do more
than strengthen the international norm. We had to have the
tools and the mandate to put together the support to do
whatever we needed to do, including the use of military force
in coalition or unilaterally to deal with violations.
To the soldier who is wounded by it, every bullet is
militarily significant. The same is true of the use of gas
against our forces, even if it does not deny us victory. A
violation is a violation to be punished and corrected. The CWC
was designed to get more of our allies and other nations to
join with us and to support us. That is, to build upon and go
beyond the experience with Iraq.
With this background in mind, those who oppose U.S.
ratification of the treaty need to address some important
questions. Why should we make it easier for others to use
chemical weapons against us? With the inherent difficulties in
monitoring chemical weapons activities we need all the help we
can get.
We do not have the highest confidence that we will detect
cheating, but the cheater must still worry that we might.
Should we deny ourselves the strategic warning that comes from
the detection of indications of chemical weapons activity, even
if there is not complete proof?
And then, why should we let it be legal for rogue states to
accumulate CW which, if discovered, is then not considered the
basis for tough action because it is legal?
These are some of the many questions which must be
considered.
Mr. Chairman, in my previous statement to the committee,
which I have again made available, I discussed the work we did
in dealing with the balance between intrusive inspections to
deter cheating and the measures necessary to protect sensitive
information.
Today, I would simply like to add that the tradeoffs
between the two are not a zero-sum game. We discovered in our
many studies and trial inspections that, although there will
always be some tension between the two, we could find measures
which would enhance one without too much cost to the other.
Also, I would like to add that our experience with Iraq
continues to point the way to better ways to implement
inspections. It is a contest between skills and tools on the
part of the inspectors, and in evasion techniques by the
proliferators.
What we have learned is that as we gain experience, and as
we learn more and more about legitimate activities for
comparisons, we have gotten better and better at ferreting out
the discrepancies, the inconsistencies, and the outright lies
of those concealing a program. As technology improves, we may
get additional help.
Having Americans involved in the experience was essential.
With respect to the CWC, we need to continue to take the lead
in strengthening enforcement. The time has come to give us the
tools and let us get on with the job.
[Mr. Lehman's 1994 statement appears in the appendix.]
Senator Hagel. Mr. Lehman, thank you, and to all our
panelists we are grateful for your time this morning, your
insights, and your willingness to stay a little longer for
questions. Since it is just my colleague, Senator Biden, and I,
we have agreed that we will just enter into somewhat of a
colloquy here back and forth, and we will handle it that way.
I will begin. General Odom, would you go back into your
testimony and elaborate more on some of the specifics of
Articles X and XI that you referred to?
We have heard an awful lot about that over the last month
in testimony, and I know you would probably have more to say
about it; but there is a legitimate concern about transfer of
technology and what exactly does X and XI say and mean, and
whose interpretation, and I would be interested in your
clarification of those areas, since you brought it up in your
testimony.
Specifically, we have heard a lot about reverse engineering
and that transfer. How deep does that transfer go, in your
opinion?
General Odom. Let me just say first, I do not claim to be
the great expert in this, but I have read it and took it for
what it seemed to mean, and I began to conclude fairly quickly
that, as I said in my testimony, that if you are required to
share all the information, information concerning means of
protection against chemical weapons, part of the means of
protection against chemical weapons requires knowledge of what
they are.
When I was Chief of Army Intelligence, one of the major
concerns in collecting information for our defensive
production, production of defensive equipment such as MOP
suits, gas masks, et cetera, was to know what the agents were
and to understand the chemistry of the agents; and, therefore,
if you are going to develop effective defensive means, it
requires the leading edge knowledge of offensive means or you
cannot produce them.
Therefore, it would seem to me that were I a signatory
under this I could share knowledge of the leading edge
technologies in offensive weapons with anybody, even to the
degree I am obliged to do so.
And then when that crossed my mind I said, well, who makes
the judgment; and it appears in the treaty that it is up to the
signatories, so any signatory can decide with whom he shares
what information, as long as he can make the argument that it
is in the spirit of information concerning the means of
protection against chemical weapons. It would be hard to take
issue with him.
And as I said in my testimony, the kinds of information
that you will be most concerned about from a defensive point of
view are the most vicious and threatening offensive things.
Therefore, the incentives would seem to be to cause the spread
of knowledge about those most advanced and threatening
offensive means and to pay less attention to the less
threatening ones.
From that, it seems to me, as very often is the case in
public policy, the intended consequences turn out not to be
those we anticipated; but we end up getting a very perverse
consequence that was almost impossible to foresee.
Senator Biden. Can I ask a clarification?
Senator Hagel. Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. General, assuming you are correct on that,
if we are not a signatory to the treaty, the same thing
happens.
General Odom. Absolutely.
Senator Biden. I mean, whether or not we are signatory of
that treaty is not--and what you are talking about here is the
motivation of the countries in question who are in the treaty
and we have to assume, in order to reach the conclusion that
you have reached, that the countries that have this advanced
technology, most of whom are our allies, are going to want to
spread this technology around that we do not want spread,
right?
General Odom. And I assume that, and I also assume that our
chemical companies are going to want to do that; and I suspect,
I do not know, that may be why they are for the ratification of
this, so that I think if you are talking about other hidden
land mines of unintended consequences, this brings us right to
that one.
Senator Biden. Well, General, it says the States Parties.
It does not say XYZ company. We are attaching a condition that
everyone is at a disadvantage in this regard.
Senator Helms and I have been negotiating, our staffs for
the last couple of months, and one of the conditions is going
to be, if and when this treaty gets to the floor, will be that
the United States will declare up front that it will only
transfer--it will only--it reads, the paragraphs in question,
as saying that it can choose what to transfer, and it will, if
it transfers anything, only transfer that which has some
medical--what is the exact term of art?--antidotes and medical
treatments capability, so that no American company is going to
be able to go and transfer that material.
I understand your concern, but I think it is one that it
seems as though the negotiators took into consideration when
they were drafting the treaty, but I may be mistaken about
that. I do not know.
General Odom. Senator, let me respond to that. As I said in
my testimony, I think you can take each one of these issues out
and make very good arguments that seem to allay the fears, and
as you have allayed the fear on a particular one out of
context, you can easily--if I want to go down the list I can
bring up others, and we get into sort of an infinite regress
here.
As I said, I came to this thing saying basically it is all
right. I would even say today that I would not get upset if
this treaty would go into effect with no verification regime.
You know, I just do not see why we should have this, when
we know--when you and I are agreeing that it is going to have a
triv-
ial or maybe even perverse effect; and I would be willing to
stand up with those who are against chemical weapons.
So, I have said earlier, I think this is a misconceptual
approach. We have asked the negotiators to do a task that
cannot be done. It is sort of like asking somebody to reach the
wall by going half the remaining distance. By definition, you
never get there.
Therefore, I think we are applying an arms control solution
where it simply is not conceptually appropriate. It makes us
feel good. It is hard to be against it in spirit, but when I
work my way into it I am inclined to say this really is not
very compelling.
Senator Biden. General, as usual your integrity and
intellectual rigor are always apparent. It seems to me this is
the division, the dividing line, between those who support the
treaty and those who do not, and that is not so much whether
any of these provisions are as dangerous or as bad as critics
say. But it seems to me as I look down the dividing line it is
people who say: Look, bottom line is you cannot have a treaty
relating to chemical weapons or biological weapons, ergo I am
against the treaty, notwithstanding the fact you can give me an
argument on each of my criticisms.
I think that is a legitimate, intellectually defensible
position, one with which I disagree; and it comes down to where
we are better off.
But I think when you cut through it, when you and I cut
through it all, in my view most of the criticisms, specific
criticisms of the treaty, have specific answers that are
specifically--I am not saying you agree with this--in my view--
but the bottom line that separates 95 percent of those who fall
on for or against is this issue of, it starts with--and it is
not your view or my view; it is my understanding--that we have
never lost a war or won a treaty.
I might add, by the way, you laid waste to that old saying
when you did START; because if we did not win that treaty I do
not know what in God's name anybody would consider not having
won.
Then it goes from there, I think, General, to people who
say: Look, you just cannot deal with chemical weapons, period.
And if you adopt that view--and I respect it; I disagree with
it, but I respect it--then all these other things kind of
become irrelevant, and you kind of fall from one side or the
other of that spectrum, it seems to me.
General Odom. Can I add one more point on the logic of
this? And I do not mean to be just scoring debating points, but
I am sure you are very familiar with the Luddite movement of
the 1830's.
Senator Biden. Yes, smash the machinery.
General Odom. Right, stop technology, put the lid on it.
One of the things that struck me--I have a colleague at Yale
today who has just done a little paper, Martin Shubick, showing
that the price of killing people is going down. He has done
some calculations, and it happens to be in the BW and CW area
that this calculation turns out to have great effect.
This whole technology area is not standing still. It is in
a state of rapid change.
Senator Biden. See, that is why guys like me and guys like
Lehman would argue you have got to get in it. That is the very
argument why we have got to get in it.
General Odom. Well, but to get in like Ned Ludd is not the
way to get in. We need to get in in a way to recognize that it
is dynamic and that we are probably not by statutory means or
by international agreements going to be able to contain it.
I am not saying we ought not to do something about it, and
I have said I am prepared to sign a treaty, support a treaty
that puts us on the right hand of God in this regard. But when
you get into the details of whether this really delivers
anything you promised, it is hard to be convinced.
Senator Biden. I thank you, General.
I am sorry.
Senator Hagel. No, I think when we have got just a couple
of us we can jump in and do this.
Senator Biden. Mr. Lehman wanted to say something.
Mr. Lehman. Mr. Chairman, if I could just make a point
here. I agree with Bill Odom that we have got to watch the
implementation of each and every provision. I am not privy to
what the negotiations are on these various conditions and
understandings, but anything you can do to reinforce where we
were going with this treaty we would certainly appreciate.
But I would like to make a comment about the Article X,
Article XI situation, just some general remarks; because it is
an important question of subsequent practice, what do we do.
Senator Hagel. I would say incidentally, Mr. Secretary,
that this is one of the key elements of the discussion of the
convention in question, and my guess is if that is not resolved
in some way here this convention is not going to be passed.
Mr. Lehman. Well, I hope you can resolve it. I like to
think we resolved it in the negotiations, and let me explain
why. The issue of assistance--both these issues are not new--
they came up fairly early. In fact, assistance was, I think, in
the initial draft that we tabled back in 1984. So these were
not new issues.
We made it very clear throughout the negotiations that all
of this was subject to Article I, which is the fundamental
obligation not to assist. So we reiterated that again and again
and again.
But the most important, I think, telling factoid in support
of the U.S. interpretation is the fact that after the
convention was done so many of the usual list of suspects were
so unhappy that they did not get what they wanted in these
provisions. That is why I wish the critics would be a little
more careful about asserting that they did get what they
wanted, because they did not.
Now, if you can further strengthen that, then God bless
you.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
I would like to stay with you, Secretary Lehman, on another
issue. We heard an awful lot of conversation last month, and
appropriately so, about how do you really deal with the
uncivilized nations that we refer to as the rogue nations,
those who are most unlikely to sign this--North Korea, Syria,
Iraq, Libya.
Does that give us, if we would ratify this convention, a
leg up, a moral high ground? I mean, does it give us more
ability, better ability to deal with those nations? I mean, we
know from 1925 on we have had the Geneva Convention and other
treaties, conventions, agreements. But when you are dealing
with uncivilized nations, they will resort to uncivilized
means.
I think that is an important part of the dialog here.
Incidentally, I appreciate very much your opening comments
about information, because that is what this should be about.
This should not be about Republican-Democrat, conservative-
liberal. This should be about doing the right thing for this
country. So I appreciate very much your thoughts.
Mr. Lehman. Well, I will tell you, on rogue states we have
such a record of successes and failures that I can package them
any way you want. But I will tell you what I personally think,
which is there comes a time when you simply must not tolerate
this sort of thing and you must take action. And if other
nations will join you, as they did in the case of driving
Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait, then that is what you have to do.
If you have to act alone, as we did in the case of Libya, you
do it.
You have got to make sure that the rogue states understand
that there are severe consequences of their actions.
Again, let me echo Bill. I was in the Pentagon when, in the
very last month of the Reagan Administration, we had the CW use
conference in Paris. Our position was--you name Iraq--but you
know, the foreign policy people were all divided over that, the
allies were divided over that. We did not name Iraq.
My view was that was a big mistake. My administration made
it. I was a part of that administration. I opposed it, but we
did it. OK, we are guilty, too.
There is a consequence to that, and the consequence was
that this policy of sort of constructive engagement with Iraq
because Iraq is this viable Arab country of the future led us
to too often keep a low profile on the enforcement question. As
a result of that, we ended up having a war in which we could
have faced these weapons, and there is still some debate of
what the consequences of the weapons existence was.
I think you have to take a strong stand. I will tell you
right now, Bill alluded, I think, to Korea.
General Odom. No.
Mr. Lehman. I thought I heard you say Korea. But anyway, I
have got Korea on the brain, I guess.
General Odom. Assume I did. It is all right.
Mr. Lehman. Maybe I read something you said some time back
on Korea. But in any case, I will not attribute anything to
Bill any more.
In the early days of this administration, they did in
essence what we did at the Paris CW use conference, on not
supporting the IAEA suspect site inspections on Korea. Indeed,
we had people backgrounding that--what a terrible thing it
would be if North Korea were to withdraw from the NPT--and
therefore we could not do anything to rock the boat.
What we were sending was the signal that we would rather
have a violator stay in the treaty than hold them accountable
for their violations. It was a terrible thing to say. It has
continued to complicate our nonproliferation policy. I am
hoping that the administration has moved beyond that. Things
are developing in North Korea. Some things are not under our
control. Maybe it will all work out fine.
But I think we made some mistakes. We can learn from those
mistakes, though, and move on, and that is what we ought to be
doing.
I think in the CWC have got additional tools and we ought
to use them.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
We have been joined by our colleague Senator Kerry from
Massachusetts. What I think I will do is go back to a 7\1/2\
minute time level so that everybody gets a fair shot at this,
and I do not know who else may come.
Would you defer to Senator Kerry?
Senator Biden. I interrupted him in asking a question.
Senator Hagel. Senator Kerry.
Senator Kerry. Thank you, thank you. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Welcome, gentlemen. Thank you for taking time to join us
today.
It is my understanding, Mr. O'Malley--correct me if I am
wrong, because this is just a staff summary, and I was not able
to hear you. But your principal objection I understand is on
the issue of corporate secrets, trade secrets, intrusive
inspection; is that correct?
Mr. O'Malley. Yes.
Senator Kerry. Help me, if you would, to understand that. I
mean, we have got an industry that obviously has a lot at
stake, the chemical industry, correct?
Mr. O'Malley. Yes.
Senator Kerry. The chemical industry itself supports this
treaty. These are the people that are going to be inspected.
The Synthetic-Organic Chemical Manufacturers Association, the
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers Association of
America, the Biotechnology Industry Organization, the American
Chemical Society, the American Physical Society, the American
Institute of Chemical Engineers, the Council for Chemical
Research, they all support it.
They even went to the extent of creating seven test
inspections to determine how it really worked and what the
threat to them might be. In addition to that, they have the
right to object to any particular inspector coming in that they
suspect of espionage or have reason to believe might spy.
What is it that you know that they do not know?
Mr. O'Malley. Well, I am not sure what I know that they do
not know. In my opinion, though, the kinds of companies that
might be affected by this convention transcend the chemical
companies that you just spoke about. I have an equal number of
letters from different kinds of associations, the aerospace
industry and others, which express serious concerns about the
Chemical Weapons Convention as it relates to industrial
espionage.
Senator Kerry. Well, are they going to be inspected?
General Odom. Yes.
Mr. O'Malley. Yes.
Senator Kerry. By virtue of a challenge, conceivably,
correct?
Mr. O'Malley. Conceivably.
Senator Kerry. But the challenge requires an appropriate
showing. First of all, there is going to be a guarantee,
because we are going to even--I think, with Senator Biden's
leadership--go further on the search and seizure to guarantee
our constitutional rights. Is that correct, Senator Biden?
Senator Biden. That is correct, we are going to have a
provision requiring probable cause be established before a
Federal judge to get a search warrant.
Senator Kerry. Would that change your feeling about it a
little bit?
Mr. O'Malley. It would be helpful, but I am not sure that
that would be totally significant in terms of protecting the
intellectual property.
Senator Kerry. Well now, you know that there is a
compartmentalization capacity with respect to inspections. The
only thing that is available to be inspected are those things
that are directly shown to be with respect to possible
production of chemical weaponry.
In fact, you are allowed to set up a procedure where you
actually close off or avoid any penetration of those other
areas where you may be doing something that is not involved at
all with chemicals.
Mr. O'Malley. Hopefully those procedures would work and
would be effective.
Senator Kerry. But is it not significant that the industry
itself believes they will work and supports the treaty? Is that
not significant?
Mr. O'Malley. Well, again, I do not know what the
motivation of the chemical industry is in this regard. I can
only speak of industry representatives that I have spoken to in
connection with the Economic Espionage Act of 1996, and they
have severe concerns about their inability to protect their
secrets, security or not, against professional foreign
intelligence services.
I mentioned earlier this list of national critical
technologies which the FBI is charged to protect, and it is
very, very broad. I think if you read this list and compare it
with the chemicals identified in the convention you will see a
nexus between those chemicals and the companies involved in
these technologies.
Senator Kerry. Well, let us try to go again to the reality
of this. Are you aware of the limitations on challenge
inspections that could be conducted in any 1 year in this
treaty?
Mr. O'Malley. Yes. If I may, though, you mentioned earlier
that the United States or whatever country is involved in terms
of inspection could object to the presence of an inspector
which they had reason to believe might be an intelligence
officer.
Senator Kerry. Right.
Mr. O'Malley. Well, that is much easier said than done. It
is not all that easy--it might be easy to identify an
intelligence officer, but it is significantly more difficult to
identify an agent of that officer. In other words, if I were an
intelligence officer I would try to recruit a chemical engineer
who might be appointed to be a member of this inspection team.
Senator Kerry. But the point is if you do not have
confidence in the person coming in you can peremptorily just
not let him in. You are only going to let people in you have
confidence in, number one.
Number two, under the budget, under the budget when this is
running at full tilt in 3 or 4 years, it is anticipated that
the most you would be able to have is conceivably two challenge
inspections per month, approximately 20 to 25 globally,
globally. Will you explain to me what the potential threat
ultimately to the United States is of that kind of rate of
challenge?
Mr. O'Malley. Well, you have got the challenge inspections
and you have got the routine inspections. I would not
distinguish between the two of them in terms of the ability to
collect proprietary information.
Senator Kerry. But the routine are as to a more limited
kind of grouping of entities.
Mr. O'Malley. Exactly.
Senator Kerry. More clearly defined.
Mr. O'Malley. What I am suggesting is an inspector does not
have to go into a company and get the total take as to what
that trade secret might be that would be helpful to the person
who had recruited him. There are bits and pieces of information
that can be acquired over a period of time that might add up to
a significant whole at some point in time.
Senator Kerry. So in essence--OK, I follow you. In
essence--I need to cut you off there simply because I
understand what you are saying. I want to be able to ask
General Odom something. But I sense--in essence, I mean, to
sort of reduce it to its lowest common denominator--you are
seeing the potential for some goblins and in effect others
directly involved are not concerned about it. And we just have
to weigh, is your sighting of this potential goblin weighty
enough to reject the treaty or is the sanguinity, if you will,
of the industry itself and those who will be inspected to be
taken at greater value? And I think that is the issue we have
to measure.
Mr. O'Malley. Two points. Number one, I would not label
them goblins. We are talking about the real world here, and to
label them goblins seems to diminish the seriousness of the
threat.
Senator Kerry. I believe in goblins.
Mr. O'Malley. Well, I do not.
Second, I mentioned earlier in my testimony that those who
are charged with making the strategic decisions regarding this
particular treaty ought to make that decision with a full deck
of cards, that it ought not rise or fall on any
counterintelligence concerns expressed by me or anybody else,
but they ought to be considered in the total context of all the
problems that are being considered by the policymakers.
Senator Kerry. Sure. I respect that. And when I say I
believe in goblins, I believe there are nefarious types out
there clearly who want to try to push the envelope. You have to
be on guard about it. But I suspect we would be.
Senator Hagel. Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Mr. Lehman, comment on what Mr. O'Malley had
said, please.
Mr. Lehman. I agree with him that these are not goblins.
There is a real problem. But it is hard to imagine any issue we
spent more time on than this question of how do you balance
intrusive inspection with the risks of losing national security
or proprietary information.
A lot has been said on it. A lot has been said before. But
let me try to bring maybe some new twists or perspectives on
it, just taking into account what has been said. First is, we
ultimately came to the conclusion that there was a risk with
the inspectors, but it was not the biggest risk. So I guess
there I have not seen any study that says that is the big risk.
In fact, what I think we have gotten from industry is, and
of course what the national security community has found, is
that turncoats in your own system can do a tremendous amount of
damage. An inspector who comes in, who is escorted, who has got
rules, people are watching him, yes, he is bright; if he is
recruited, he can do some harm. But at least you have got a
feel for the problem.
If you have got a turncoat inside your system, be it
business or the intelligence community or in the military, you
have got a real problem.
Senator Biden. By the way, when I speak to these guys who
run these companies that is what they say. They would much
rather have the guy coming in in a team, as part of a team,
with the ability to have these management agreements and
facility agreements before they come in. If they were given a
choice of that or somebody coming in, either literally breaking
in, nefariously getting in, or be a turncoat within, there is
no question which side of that equation they would pick taking
their chances on.
You know it, because it is your business. That is how you
make your living, helping these guys prevent against the last
two categories. They would much rather have this than that.
Mr. Lehman. I said ``turncoat,'' but it is even a worse
problem than that. It is not even the question of the person
who is completely dishonest. It blurs into this whole question
of loyalty to your company, when do you change jobs, what
information do you take with you. It is a very complex area.
I share the analysis on the importance of proprietary
information to our leadership in technology. What I am saying
is this is not the big problem. We think we know how to handle
this. There are risks, but we think we worked that.
The other point I want to make is this. When we first
started getting involved, first with the national security
community and then with the national security community, on
this question of intrusive inspections, some strange things
happened. For example, they would say: We think it would be
dangerous to have an inspector come to a certain place. OK,
why? Well, they could learn all of this. OK, what keeps a spy
from coming to that place right now? You would be amazed the
number of times the answer was: Nothing. That in fact the
interaction between the negotiating process having to do with
these inspections and their intrusiveness helped the
counterintelligence community in some cases and helped industry
begin to understand that they had some problems that they
needed to deal with--with or without the CWC. They still need
to do a lot of work.
Whatever you decide to do in the Senate on the CWC, you
need to keep that process going of having the government
experts, including the intelligence community, find some way to
work with industry on this problem; because it is a serious
problem.
Senator Biden. Mr. Secretary, the irony is that the
corollary to ``this will lull us to sleep,'' which is a
concern--I think it is the most legitimate argument against
this treaty in my view, is we will get lulled to sleep and not
have to expend the dollars, the effort, in implementing and/or
in continuing our efforts on countermeasures to deal with
chemical weapons use.
They are the two greatest--I think they are the two from my
perspective most legitimate objections to this treaty. The
corollary to that is, or the irony is, were it not for this
treaty, were it not for this debate, companies would not be
doing 80 percent of what they are doing now. All of a sudden
everybody is figuring out: Whoa, wait a minute, this
spectrometer guy who walks in, that guy does not have to be
part of a team. He can stand outside that company gate right
now.
All of a sudden what has happened is this has sort of
awakened, in my view, the outfits I am familiar with--the
chemical companies, the biotech companies, the pharmaceutical
companies. My colleagues know a lot about what their
constituencies do, because we have to learn. After 24 years, I
have learned about those companies. They are waking up. It has
been a wake-up call to them unrelated to the treaty.
One of the issues, though, that is raised and in the
remaining time I would like to get to, my remaining few minutes
here, is this issue people do think is very significant, and
that relates to the intelligence capacity of the United States
to detect cheating or anyone to detect cheating, and what
constitutes militarily significant.
If I am not mistaken, I remember it was during--I suspect
you may be responsible for it, although I do not know that for
certain. We went from the notion in the Carter administration
of ``adequately verifiable'' to ``effectively verifiable.'' The
terminology changed and so this debate about ``effectively
verifiable,'' what constitutes effective verifiability.
One of the things--and the intelligence community and two
members of our CIA are here today if we need them for any
input, are in the audience, who deal with this issue. The Joint
Chiefs have testified on this. So you are going to hear a lot
of debate, as I need not tell you or you, General Odom, about
this issue of what is effectively verifiable.
But it is a big deal what we determine. What we think is
effective, each of us individually determines whether or not we
think this is a verifiable treaty or whether we should vote for
it, at least as it relates to verifiability.
I want to talk about this notion of military significance.
By the way, Shalikashvili said one ton. What he was talking
about with one ton, he was talking about political impact and
terror capability, not militarily significant. Everybody talks
about the Joint Chiefs saying they have established that one
ton, if you cannot detect one ton, up to one ton, then this is
not effectively verifiable. The Chiefs never said that, but we
will have to deal with that on the floor. I know you both know
that.
One of the things that I get, I think we get confused about
and what confuses the public--and I am diverting slightly here
to make a larger point, trying to make a larger point or get to
a larger issue--is you asked the rhetorical question, Mr.
Secretary, why after all these years do so many people know so
little about this treaty? I think it is for two reasons.
One, those who are for it basically assume there is
inevitability. This is going to pass, because hard-nosed
administrations had ne-
gotiated this thing. Therefore there was sort of a credibility
given. I mean this sincerely. I think this is why. I think this
is the answer.
Second, those who are against it are usually those against
any treaties. Therefore, it is just kind of like there is
inevitability.
Well, everybody has forgotten, there is no inevitability to
this thing passing, so now people are focusing for the first
time, and our colleagues understandably do not know a lot about
it, because they have not, other than those who are involved in
it, they have not focused on it a lot.
Now, if I may, can I ask the question? I appreciate the
time.
So we get down to this verifiability issue and what
constitutes effective verification, and we hear talk from our
witnesses, not today, not from the General, but from many
witnesses we have had, and people use phrases like: well, one
vial, one vial of chemical weapons, and so on, and one ton. And
one ton sounds--God almighty, one ton of a chemical weapon
obviously can win a war, they think.
What I want to talk about is the distinction between a
tactical advantage that could be gained by the use of an agent
and a strategic advantage that could be gained by, say, the use
of up to one ton of an agent. Here is what I want you to talk--
I want you both, General Odom first and then Secretary Lehman.
If you think about the actual use of these weapons, in the
Iran-Iraqi War each side used tons and tons of this. They used
tens of tons of these weapons. And it did not give either the
capacity strategically to save the day.
Now, I think it is bad to use in any event. I am just
trying to get at this part about what constitutes a threat to
U.S. security if we do not detect it.
I would also point out that we have hundreds of thousands
of tons, we and the Russians. Now, the reason why our military
felt there was a need to have more than a ton, or 10 or a 1,000
or 10,000 tons, is because I assume we concluded that one ton
or anything that we possessed did not have the capacity.
One--one--missile, one nuclear warhead on top of a
Peacekeeper missile can ruin somebody's day. It can really
change the dynamic of everything. One ton of chemical weapons--
as the intelligence community tells me, the rule of thumb,
General, is you are about one ton, one square mile, and it
dissipates.
Now, as you said, General, for those troops who are within
that square mile this is militarily significant. It is big
deal. And if you have everybody gathered in a soccer stadium,
it is a big deal. And it is a big deal terror capacity.
But is it militarily significant in a strategic sense, in a
sense that our national security or a major portion of our
capacity in any conflict could be jeopardized by ``a ton''? And
I realize this is a bit artificial, to be using the ton. But it
has become almost a mantra among people who are concerned about
verifiability.
Can you talk a little bit about the significance of it in
that sense, General? Assume we could not detect up to a ton.
And some will argue we could not detect more than a ton. But
let us just artificially, just for the sake of discussion,
assume we could not detect up to a ton and countries, rogue or
otherwise, members of this or-
ganization who signed the treaty, could develop up to a ton and
use it. What consequence for you as a military planner does
knowing the other team had a ton of chemical agents available
to them?
General Odom. Well, Senator, you have made in my view one
of the strongest arguments against the treaty, for making it
largely irrelevant.
Senator Biden. That may be. That is why I want you to talk
about it.
General Odom. It is sort of in line with my argument here
earlier. I do not think--if you look at the record, when one
side has chemicals and the other does not, the probability of
it being used seems to be much higher. When both sides have it,
chemical weapons do not seem to be used.
Senator Biden. How do you explain Iran and Iraq, then?
General Odom. Well, they did not both have it at first.
Senator Biden. But they both ended up having it.
General Odom. Well, but when the Iraqis started out using
it the Iraqis were in trouble.
My own experience in learning to use, target chemical
weapons back when we had them, I was a young armor officer in
Fort Leavenworth doing map exercises. I became very unimpressed
with chemical weapons. You do not like them. They are
unpredictable. There are other ways to blow people away, and
you would rather have something that is easier to control. So I
think the more professionally trained military officers are
likely to be very much against these things.
When it comes to a ton or even 200 or 300 or 400 tons, I
think we have certain capabilities. The prospects of keeping
them from being used in a conflict are very high. And I do not
see that this treaty is going to affect this much one way or
another. It does not seem to bear on it. The people who really
want these weapons are going to get them anyway, and the ones
right now who are troublesome states are clearly not going to
be caught up in this.
Now let me make another point about that there is another
way to look at this. It is hard to weaponeer these new weapons,
but there is a lot of new technology emerging. I do not know
how to judge that. I mentioned Martin Shubick's piece earlier
that the price of killing people is going down because of
technological change in this regard.
It is easy to do that in sort of theoretical calculations.
Whether or not these new technologies can be weaponeered and
brought into the battlefield even for terrorist use is an open
question. So as I said earlier, we are in a period of dynamic
change and that makes me nervous that anybody can write any
kind of regime that is going to catch these kind of things.
That is why I say the spirit of the treaty I have no
trouble supporting. I just do not understand why one would want
to strap themselves to this regulatory system and pay the price
when the probable outcomes of it are trivial.
Senator Biden. Thank you.
Mr. Lehman?
Mr. Lehman. Senator, you often hear people say chemical
weapons have no military utility. I do not believe that. I
think they can. During the mid-eighties when we faced the
Warsaw Pact at the Fulda Gap, I thought it was important to
maintain a continuum of deterrent capabilities and that a
modernized chemical weapons component with the binaries was an
important part of that.
The world has changed since then. We have alternative
weapons, advanced conventional munitions. What you saw in the
Gulf War was that clearly when you ask people who have to deal
with the logistics of warfare, what is it you need on station
ready to go, they wanted weapons they knew they were going to
have to use and they wanted them in large quantities, and they
did not want to waste space with having a chemical deterrent
there.
I remember going through the chemical training facility
down at Fort McClellan, putting on a suit and decontaminating
equipment with live nerve agent. I realized I did not want to
go to war wearing that suit.
In Vietnam I used to carry my gas mask with me on a lot of
the types of operations that we went on, and I hated having to
carry that.
One of the things I learned out of that experience to me
was that in today's world it is much more important--it is less
important that we have chemical weapons than that we do
everything we can to not have them used against our troops and
reduce the chances they will be used. But we also have to make
sure we maintain our defenses.
On the military significance question, I very much fall in
the category of those who say, you know, the bullet that wounds
you is militarily significant. Therefore, we need to have the
tools that deter the use, and we need to have the will to
enforce compliance.
But when you say your example of a ton, what does a ton
mean? Well, in certain types of scenarios a ton can be very
important. But remember, we are the United States. It ought to
make us awfully damn angry, and with the CWC it ought to mean
everybody ought to support us and we go in and we solve the
problem.
Senator Biden. Well, here is the point----
Senator Hagel. Senator Biden, let me ask this. I want to
stay on time here, and I am going to ask a question. I am not
going to take my full 7\1/2\ minutes. I know Senator Kerry
wants to get back to it. I will get back to you as well.
What I want to do is go back to you, Mr. O'Malley, and I
would like you to develop more of your counterintelligence
insight, background, experience, as to how it relates to this
treaty. Where are the real vulnerabilities coming at it from
your years of working in the counterintelligence business?
Mr. O'Malley. I think, again, the concern that I have,
shared by certain elements of industry, is in the illicit
acquisition that this would facilitate, this convention,
illicit acquisition of proprietary information that this would
facilitate. It is not the only means, by any stretch of the
imagination, of acquiring American proprietary information. It
can be done in other ways, including technical means and the
Internet and so forth.
What this does, though, it would give those who are
desirous of collecting such information another avenue of
approach. I mentioned earlier this list of critical
technologies that the Bureau is charged with protecting. I
might also add that this also could con-
stitute essential elements of information, i.e., what the other
side is seeking.
So there is no doubt at all in terms of what Senator Biden
mentioned earlier, that any corporation would prefer to have
someone coming in rather than a recruited agent inside. I mean,
that is somewhat of a false choice in my opinion. That
recruited agent inside ultimately happens as a result of people
coming in and getting to know and have access.
I am not at all convinced that whatever security measures
are present in this Chemical Weapons Convention are adequate.
The primary mission of counterintelligence is to identify,
penetrate, and neutralize such systems. I can give you a
specific concrete example of such an instance.
I formerly represented the U.S. at something called the
NATO Special Committee, which consists of the
counterintelligence chiefs of the NATO member nations. We met
twice a year in Brussels. Security, as you might well imagine,
was extremely tight. They had all the usual bells and whistles.
Everyone was vetted as they should be. And we would meet in
camera and discuss sensitive information.
Lo and behold, one of our discussions ended up in a
Bulgarian newspaper. So something was wrong. The secretariat of
the NATO Special Committee asked for an FBI counterintelligence
officer. We assigned one to the committee and, lo and behold,
the secretary to the head of the secretariat was an East German
agent. None of these security measures were able to identify
this particular woman, who was a British national.
So I am not at all convinced that these security procedures
will be adequate. But if they are, if the government believes
that these security measures are adequate and in a sense acts
as a guarantor of these security measures. And if a company
does lose a trade secret as a result of these kinds of
inspections, then it seems to me it ought to be fair on the
part of the government to reimburse that company for the value
of that trade secret.
Senator Hagel. Mr. O'Malley, thank you.
What I am going to do for my colleagues, if this is
agreeable, I have just been given a note indicating that some
of our witnesses have some pressing time problems. So what I
would recommend that we do 5 more minutes each and then allow
our panel to leave. Senator Kerry, is that fine? We are going
to do 5 minutes each, and that way the panel can get to their
other business.
Senator Kerry. That is fine, absolutely. I have got to go
to another meeting, too, so I appreciate it, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, I have been struggling with this since one of
our earlier hearings, when I went back and read a little of the
history of the negotiations on this. We had Secretary Richard
Perle here, former Secretary Perle here. And when Ronald Reagan
and the administration first proposed this treaty--and they
were the first ones to propose it--they came up with a concept
called--you know, they wanted total verification, correct,
General? I mean, that was the great goal, being really
intrusive in our verifications.
So they came up with something called ``anywhere, any
time.'' We are going to go anywhere, any time. We are going to
be able to challenge anywhere, any time. That is the only way
we can be safe.
Then, whoops, all of a sudden people here said: Un-uh, we
do not want that. Correct?
General Odom. Exactly right.
Senator Kerry. Anywhere, any time? Oh my God, they could
come into one of our places and look anywhere any time. And so
we have got to be a little bit smarter about how we come at
this.
So the negotiators went to work and did a heck of a job, I
think, over a period of time. General Scowcroft, whom I have
great respect for, and General Powell, who this morning was
before the Veterans Affairs Committee testifying in favor of
this treaty, many other players of enormous military
background, intelligence background, national security
background, clearly with the United States of America's
security interests at the forefront of their thinking, said: We
are going to come up with a different scheme. And they did, to
protect our sort of black institutions, as we call them, from
being intruded, but to provide sufficient intrusiveness to be
able to do something effectively with this treaty.
Now, I sort of see the two of you setting up what I have
seen my colleagues on the other side of the aisle setting up
over the last few weeks, which is this Catch 22 situation. You
come in here, General, and you say: It is not verifiable, it is
not verifiable enough. We have got to have more intrusive
verification. But then on the other side, a whole bunch of
other people are sitting there saying: It is too verifiable; we
cannot have this, because you are going to get our secrets.
General Odom. I did not take that position.
Senator Kerry. I beg your pardon?
General Odom. I did not take that position.
Senator Kerry. You do not believe--you think the
verification is strong enough?
General Odom. I would vote for the treaty without
verification. I do not want to vote for the treaty with
verification. I think the verification is the big flaw in it
and that you have got a huge regulatory cost you are about to
strap on American industry. Most of them do not even know it is
coming. The ones who are in favor of it clearly want some other
payoff in terms of----
Senator Kerry. OK, fine, I accept that. It is even easier
to deal with, frankly, from my point of view. I am happier to
accept that.
But you are aware of people saying it cannot be verified
and that has been a major argument, correct?
General Odom. That is true.
Senator Kerry. So is there not a Catch 22 in that? I mean,
you just go around and around in a circle.
General Odom. My conclusion is that we should not bother to
negotiate the treaty. I said in my testimony I think it is a
misconceptual approach. The poor negotiators have been told to
take on a problem that defies being managed with this approach.
You know, I just do not think you can get there from here
with this kind of treaty. And as I made the point in my
testimony, I originally came to it believing that it was a
fairly benign thing and why not support it, it is on the side
of virtue and why should I stand up in favor of sin? But when
you get into it you begin to real-
ize that it has some costs. It probably creates some illusions
and, it just very well could produce a lot of unintended
consequences that we cannot fathom at all.
The length of the treaty was the first thing that raised my
suspicions. I have sort of a little rule: The length of the
treaty is related, inversely related, to its effectiveness.
Senator Kerry. You do not believe that that spells out the
obligations and crosses the t's and dots the i's so that people
really are held accountable?
My light is going to go off in a minute. I want to ask you
a comparative question here.
General Odom. Also, back on the early one when you talked
about the mutual intrusiveness during the Reagan
administration, I saw that coming and could not understand why
they wanted to go anywhere any time.
Senator Kerry. Well, let me ask. I wanted to ask Secretary
Lehman to respond to what I just asked the two of you and
simultaneously to answer this question if you would, because we
keep missing this point. Assuming that the treaty were either
rejected--Mr. Secretary, if you would answer, I want you to
answer the specific issue I just raised; but also add to that,
would you please, what are the implications for the United
States at this moment in time, where we now have 74 nations
that have ratified it--it is up--where we now have 160 or so
have signed it, we can anticipate that if we and Russia come on
board a whole lot of other people are going to, what are the
implications with respect to any possibilities of renegotiating
it, changing it, going back and fixing it in terms of other
countries, given the date and given the momentum of what will
take place here? If you could comment on both.
Mr. Lehman. I would be pleased to. Let me pick up a bit on
what Bill has said about any time anywhere and the Catch 22
aspect of that. There is a lot of--you know, we all look for
slogans to describe what we are doing, and ``any time,
anywhere'' was our way of trying to summarize what we were
trying to do.
But clearly, Ronald Reagan's policy was not to go back to
the old Biological Weapons Convention approach, where you ban
something and God knows what you do about it, you do your best.
But rather, he wanted to have treaties that were well crafted,
that had verification provisions, that gave us some tools.
I am sympathetic with Bill that I wish the treaty were not
so long. I am seeing right here in the debate in the Senate one
of the disadvantages of having long treaties is that you have
got to read the whole thing over a thousand times, and then you
have got to debate it, and then you may not yet have gotten it
right. So for that I apologize.
But what we discovered was in some cases it was very
dangerous not to have a longer treaty. You had to lay out
things. I can give you a lot of examples, but let me go to your
question and use that to sort of find an example, the question
of access and intrusiveness in inspection. When Bill says he
was concerned about this ``any time, anywhere,'' well, he was
not the only one. Ronald Reagan was, too. So the NSDD that was
drafted that implemented this said: Any time, anywhere, but by
the way you have got to protect national security information
and proprietary information; go figure out how, with some
general guidelines.
This notion of managed access was inherent. We did not
invent the phrase until later to bring some people together,
but it was clear from the beginning you were going to have to
balance these factors.
Also, take the question ``any time.'' What we really wanted
was to get to a site quickly. The more we did studies, the more
we discovered several things. One is some things that they hide
at a site, you cannot get there fast enough; it is going to be
gone. It will be gone in seconds or minutes or hours, but
certainly before your plane gets there.
On the other hand, there were other things it might take
months to get rid of, or maybe never, at least not in any human
lifetime. So we had to balance all of that.
Then there was this question of intrusiveness. I think we
could have simplified that, but we did not. The reason we did
not is that the intelligence community and the defense
community wanted more details spelled out in the treaty to give
them specific hooks and rights. And since I did not think we
could get this treaty through the Senate without making sure
that it met their standards, we negotiated to get what they
wanted into that treaty.
So a lot of that length is what the intelligence community
and the defense community wanted to protect themselves. That is
why all of that is in there.
Now, the implications of what happens if you do not ratify.
Well, you heard a lot of discussion of what it will mean for
nonproliferation. I think that is the important thing. We are
going to lose a lot of leadership.
There are some issues that will undoubtedly occur that
people will mention that I think are important, but we ought to
know them for what they are. A lot of people out there, the
rogue states, the usual list of suspects, will use this as an
excuse to do what they want to do anyway and we will just make
it easier for them. But I do not think we ought to excuse it,
no matter what we do.
Businesses will sit there and realize that if you try to
renegotiate you are probably going to see a number of our good
friends who are these very economic competitors decide they do
not want to negotiate; because, frankly they do not care if we
are in the treaty, because if that means more production goes
overseas to their countries and out--hey, you want to
negotiate, fine. But I do not think they are going to want to
fix this quickly.
Senator Kerry. That is because they have an advantage
written into the treaty.
Mr. Lehman. See, the problem is that, because the U.S.
wanted to try to promote universality, you have this provision
that limits certain types of trade. You can look at the near-
term costs, and you can dispute how much are direct and
indirect costs, and it all gets kind of subjective perhaps. But
the real reality is there, is that a lot of sharp-pencilled
businessmen are going to understand that they start moving
production around to take advantage of this treaty.
There are a lot of factors like that. But I will tell you
what my concern is. I am a national security person. My point
is this treaty gives us a lot of useful tools. John Deutch says
it, Jim Woolsey said it, George Tenet says it. We know that. I
think what we got out of the treaty was these very important
tools, and we want to use them.
If you follow Bill's logic, which I can respect, which is
basically the bad guys are going to try anyway and you are not
going to guarantee you are going to be able to stop them; his
real argument then is he says: I would go with the treaty, but
without the verification.
So what is the real issue? The real issue is are these
tools worth the costs? And I think that is a legitimate
question, and I think people can come out, reasonable people
can come out on a different point. What I am finding
fascinating is, though, that this is not a new issue. We
thought we had addressed those costs. We thought we had driven
up the benefits and driven down the risks and costs, and
sometimes it sounds like nobody heard us.
Senator Hagel. Secretary Lehman, thank you.
Senator Kerry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Hagel. Yes, sir.
Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. I have a number of questions, but I do not
know how I could, quite frankly, better summarize where we are.
You have just said better than I have attempted to say it. This
really gets down to that fundamental question. I mean, when all
is said and done, all the talk about verification, all the talk
about the threat to individual companies through espionage, all
of that--I am not suggesting people who make those arguments
are not sincere--but the truth of the matter is it really is
not about that. It really does not get to that.
It gets to what General Odom is talking about, just are the
tools worth the cost? And some believe the costs are much
heavier, some believe they are onerous, and some believe they
are insignificant; or in relative terms clearly the benefits
outweigh the costs, the tools available outweigh the costs we
have to pay.
And from my standpoint, when I take a look at all of these
different scenarios of what it takes for the worst case to
happen, the worst case on the military side is we are in this
treaty, we are lulled asleep, one of the signatories, the 74
nations, is able to amass a significant chemical capability
with emerging technology in such a way that it allows them on a
battlefield and/or in an open conflict with the United States
or one of our allies to prevail or enhance their probability of
prevailing.
Well, the truth of the matter is an awful hell of a lot of
things have to happen for that to happen. It is not merely that
we do not detect one ton or two tons or twenty tons; we do not
detect the reorganization of their military apparatus; we do
not detect the fact of how they maneuver; we do not detect that
they are using protective gear in a different way than they did
before; we do not detect.
We would have to not detect a whole hell of a lot of things
unrelated to whether or not they are making chemicals, in order
to get into a position where our military circumstance changes.
With regard to the issue that Mr. O'Malley raises, we would
have to--one of the reasons, one of the things everybody
misses, Mr. Secretary, is what you did on this managed access
piece. Everybody misses that. Everybody misses that this is not
a matter of being able to come in with 2, or 2 to 15--I met
with the Intelligence, we all did, with the Intelligence
Committee last night for 3 or 4 hours, and we went over this
piece about managed access on these inspections.
It can be a team of from 2 to 15 people. You have to run up
a hell of a scenario to figure out other than how accidentally
some company, who by the way companies now are going to have
the Commerce Department, with the help of the intelligence
agencies, teaching them how they would deal with inspections so
there is transparency with regard to chemical production, but
not transparency with regard to trade secrets or unrelated
activities taking place.
That is a technology, if you will, that will emerge. So you
have got to come up with an incredible scenario other than pure
luck to figure out how such a team is going to either cause
great damage, as was suggested yesterday, by coming out and
implying the Dupont company is making chemical weapons. You
have got to have a lot of collusion for that to happen. You
have got to have a whole lot of things happen of not knowing
how to manage the access.
I mean, they are real stretches. They can be done. They can
be done. It can happen. It can happen. So for me to get to the
end, I get to where you are. If you look at the tools available
to us versus the risk we take, I do not even think it is a
close call.
Yet I do not, General, sit here and say: You know, this
treaty is the be all to end all. You know where I end up, Mr.
Lehman? I end up with your statement from 1994, which I would
like to ask permission to be placed in the record if I may.
Senator Hagel. Without objection.
Senator Biden. I end up at a place where the biggest
benefit from this treaty and us being in it will be the way we
will be able to impact on behavioral patterns of other
countries, behavioral patterns. That is, how it will impact
on--this new regime will not solve the end of chemical weapons,
will not prevent clandestine production of them. It will not.
But it takes a hell of a conspiratorial scenario and a lot of
luck for it to do any damage in my view, any real damage. And
on the other hand, it will modify behavior.
It is a little like what happens--if you want to be part of
the community of nations that are viewed as civilized and have
access to a thousand other benefits when you are in that
economically, you are going to change your thinking. This helps
change the thinking.
I will not take the time now to go back and recount your
statement, but you--actually, do you have that one paragraph--
where you ended your statement by talking about how the mind
set had begun to change. I will put it in the record, but it
goes to this larger issue. You say:

For my part, I believe arms control and nonproliferation
tools can be used to promote the national security and we must
ensure that they do. The Chemical Weapons Convention is clearly
a tool which can enhance our national security. I believe that
unsuccessful conclusion of arms control agreements need not
result in the neglect of our defenses, but it often has.
In giving consent to the ratification of the CWC convention
without reservation, the Senate should take real steps to
support implementation of the treaty, fund strong defense
programs, promote balanced national security strategy, and
recognize the United States must be a leader in a very
dangerous world. This world has undergone dramatic change and
arms controls have been rushing by. In such a world, if we do
not shape the arms control process to serve our interests we
can be certain that some nations will be pressing in the
directions that are not in our interest. The Chemical Weapons
Convention before this committee is in our interests. Again----

This is not the quote I wanted to read, but thank you.
Senator Hagel. Well, it was very eloquent.
Senator Biden. It was. You did very well. It is still
relevant. It is not the quote I am looking for. I will put it
in the record without holding us up.
[The material referred to follows:]

One can see this, in one small example, even in the way our
pursuit of a ban on chemical weapons reinforced our commitment
to the spread of democracy. We sought intrusive verification
measures so that we might reduce the threat posed by the Warsaw
Pact, but also because we knew that totalitarian regimes cannot
long survive when their citizens are exposed to contradictory
information. The requirement for detailed information on
chemical weapons stocks and facilities before reaching
agreement, at the time an innovative negotiating step which led
to the December 1989 U.S./Soviet Phase I data exchange and the
recent Phase II exchange, sparked a controversy which continues
in Russia even today over the history of the Soviet chemical
and biological weapons programs.
Our demand for trial inspections prior to completion of
negotiations aided in crafting a better treaty, but it also
caused Soviet citizens to ask why they themselves could not see
what Americans were allowed to see. Our insistence, first in
the U.S./Soviet Bilateral Destruction Agreement (BDA) of 1990
and later in the CWC that destruction of chemical weapons
stocks be done in a safe and environmentally sound manner has
created a grassroots political process of ``NIMBY''--not in my
backyard--which has complicated agreement on a chemical weapons
destruction plan but also complicates a return of the old
system. One should not exaggerate the role that arms control
has played in promoting our national agenda, but one should not
ignore it either.

Senator Hagel. Senator Biden, thank you.
General Odom, did you want to respond?
General Odom. I just wanted to say, you made my objections
seem far less than they are, and you have made this sound much
more benign. I hope you do realize that I have said that the
very things that you are saying we are going to set in motion
here are likely to produce very serious adverse consequences,
not trivial consequences.
Senator Biden. Well, I did not mean to suggest you thought
they were trivial, General. If I did, I did not mean that. I am
just pointing out that I think that it takes a hell of a lot to
get to the worst case scenario that I think you are most
worried about.
Senator Hagel. Senator Biden, thank you.
Senator Biden. Thank you.
Senator Hagel. Gentlemen, thank you. We are grateful, as
always. If there is anything additional that you want to add
for the record, we would be very pleased to receive that.
The committee is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:21 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]