A P P E N D I X

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Conditions to the Chemical Weapons Convention

(1) Effect of Article XXII

Summary:
The Senate reserves the right to add reservations to the resolution
of ratification, despite the ban (in Article XXII of the Convention) on
reservations to the Convention. This condition asserts the Senate's
right under the U.S. Constitution, but does not exercise it.

Text:
(1) Effect of Article XXII.
Upon the deposit of the United States instrument of ratification.
The President shall certify to the Congress that the United States has
informed all other States Parties to the Convention that the Senate
reserves the right, pursuant to the Constitution, to offer advice and
consent to ratification of the Convention subject to reservations,
notwithstanding Article XXII of the Convention.

(2) Financial Contributions (Helms #3)

Summary:
Requires statutory authorization and appropriation for payments or
assistance to the Organization.

Text:
(2) Financial Contributions.
(A) Notwithstanding any provision of the Convention, no funds may
be drawn from the Treasury of the United States for payments or
assistance (including the transfer of in-kind items) under paragraph 16
of Article IV, paragraph 19 of Article V, paragraph 7 of Article VIII,
paragraph 23 of Article IX, Article X, or any other provision of the
Convention, without statutory authorization and appropriation.

(3) Establishment of an Internal Oversight Office (Helms #4)

Summary:

Requires the equivalent of an independent OPCW Inspector General's
Office by late December 1997; withholds 50 percent of regular U.S.
contributions to the OPCW, beginning April 29, 1998, if the required
independent oversight office has not been established.

Text:

(3) Establishment of an Internal Oversight Office.
(A) No later than 240 days after the deposit of the instrument of
ratification of the United States to the Convention (in this resolution
referred to as the ``United States instrument of ratification''), the
President shall certify to the Congress that the current internal audit
office of the Preparatory Commission has been expanded into an
independent internal oversight office whose functions will be
transferred to the Organization upon its establishment. The independent
internal oversight office shall be obligated to protect confidential
information pursuant to the obligations of the Confidentiality Annex.
The independent internal oversight office shall--
(i) make investigations and reports relating to all programs of the
Organization;
(ii) undertake both management and financial audits, including--
(I) an annual assessment verifying that classified and confidential
information is stored and handled securely pursuant to the
general obligations set forth in Article VIII and in
accordance with all provisions of the Annex on the
Protection of Confidential Information; and
(II) an annual assessment of laboratories established pursuant to
Paragraph 55 of Part II of the Verification Annex to ensure
the Director General is carrying out his functions pursuant
to Paragraph 56 of Part II of the Verification Annex;
(iii) undertake performance evaluations annually to ensure the
Organization has complied to the extent practicable with the
recommendations of the independent internal oversight office;
(iv) have access to all records relating to the programs and
operations of the Organization;
(v) have direct and prompt access to any official of the
Organization; and
(vi) be required to protect the identity of, and prevent reprisals
against, all complainants.
(B) The Organization shall ensure, to the extent practicable,
compliance with recommendations of the independent internal oversight
office, and shall ensure that annual and other relevant reports by the
independent internal oversight office are made available to all member
states pursuant to the requirements established in the Confidentiality
Annex.
(C) Until a certification is made under subsection (A), 50 percent
of the amount for United States contributions to the regular budget of
the Organization assessed pursuant to paragraph 7 of Article VIII shall
be withheld, in addition to any other amounts required to withheld by
any other provision of law.
(D) Notwithstanding the requirements of this paragraph, for the
first year of the Organization's operation, ending on April 29, 1998,
the United States shall make its full contribution to the regular
budget of the Organization assessed pursuant to paragraph 7 of Article
VIII.
(E) For purposes of this paragraph, the term ``internal oversight
office'' means the head of an independent office (or other independent
entity) established by the Organization to conduct and supervise
objective audits, inspections, and investigations relating to the
programs and operations of the Organization.

(4) Cost-Sharing Arrangements (Helms #5)

Summary:

Requires cost-sharing for ``any new research or development
expenditures for the primary purpose of refining or improving the
Organization's regime for verification of compliance under the
Convention, including the training of inspectors and the provision of
detection equipment and on-site analysis sampling and analysis
techniques.'' Permits programs to improve U.S. monitoring without cost-
sharing.
We would not want the United States to do all the expensive
research and development needed to maximize verification of compliance
with the CWC, and not be reimbursed by other countries for such
efforts. It will still be possible for U.S. agencies to pursue R&D
programs so as to improve U.S. monitoring of chemical weapons, however,
and cost-sharing arrangements need not be in place unless and until the
United States wants to share the results with the OPCW.

Text:
(4) Cost-Sharing Arrangements.

(A) Prior to the deposit of the United States instrument of
ratification, and annually thereafter, the President shall submit a
report to Congress identifying all cost-sharing arrangements with the
Organization.
(B) The United States shall not undertake any new research or
development expenditures for the primary purpose of refining or
improving the Organization's regime for verification of compliance
under the Convention, including the training of inspectors and the
provision of detection equipment and on-site analysis sampling and
analysis techniques, or share the articles, items, or services
resulting from any research and development undertaken previously,
without first having concluded and submitted to the Congress a cost-
sharing arrangement with the Organization.
(C) Nothing in this paragraph may be construed as limiting or
constricting in any way the ability of the United States to pursue
unilaterally any project undertaken solely to increase the capability
of United States means for monitoring compliance with the Convention.

(5) Intelligence Sharing and Safeguards (Helms #6)

Summary:
Requires interagency Intelligence Community approval and
sanitization of intelligence information before release to the OPCW,
such that there would be only minimal damage from unauthorized
disclosure. The Director of Central Intelligence may waive these
requirements on a case-by-case basis, with notice to appropriate com-
mittees of Congress. Any unauthorized disclosure by the OPCW must be
reported to Congress within 15 days of after the executive branch
learns of it.

Text:
(5) Intelligence Sharing and Safeguards.--
(A) Provision of Intelligence Information to the Organization.--
(i) In General.--No United States intelligence information may be
provided to the Organization or any organization affiliated
with the Organization, or to any officials or employees
thereof, unless the President certifies to the appropriate
committees of Congress that the Director of Central
Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of State and
the Secretary of Defense, has established and implemented
procedures, and has worked with the Organization to ensure
implementation of procedures, for protecting from unauthorized
disclosure United States intelligence sources and methods
connected to such information. These procedures shall include,
but not be limited to--
(I) offering and provision of advice and assistance to the
Organization in establishing and maintaining the necessary
measures to ensure that inspectors and other staff members
of the Technical Secretariat meet the highest standards of
efficiency, competence, and integrity, pursuant to
subparagraph l(b) of the Confidentiality Annex, and in
establishing and maintaining a stringent regime governing
the handling of confidential information by the Technical
Secretariat, pursuant to paragraph 2 of the Confidentiality
Annex;
(II) explicit recognition, in each case in which intelligence
information is to be provided to the Organization or any
organization affiliated with the Organization, or to any
officials or employees thereof, of the risks of
unauthorized disclosure of the U.S. information to be
provided to the Organization, and determination that such
disclosure would result in no more than minimal damage to
national security;
(III) sanitization of intelligence information that is to be
provided to the Organization or any organization affiliated
with the Organization, or to any officials or employees
thereof, to remove all information that could betray
intelligence sources and methods; and
(IV) interagency United States Intelligence Community approval for
any release of intelligence information to the Organization
or any organization affiliated with the Organization, or to
any officials or employees thereof, no matter how
thoroughly it has been sanitized.
(ii) Waiver Authority.--
(I) In General.--The Director of Central Intelligence may waive the
application of clause (i) if the Director of Central
Intelligence certifies in writing to the appropriate
committees of Congress that providing such information to
the Organization or an organization affiliated with the
Organization, or to any official or employee thereof, is in
the vital national security interests of the United States
and that all possible measures to protect such information
have been taken, except that such waiver must be made for
each instance such information is provided, or for each
such document provided. In the event that multiple waivers
are issued within a single week, a single certification to
the appropriate committees of Congress may be submitted,
specifying each waiver issued during that week.
(II) Delegation of Duties.--The Director of Central Intelligence
may not delegate any duty of the Director of Central
Intelligence under this subsection.
(B) Periodic and Special Reports.--
(i) Periodic Reports.--
(I) In General.--The President shall report periodically, but not
less frequently than semiannually, to the Select Committee
on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives
on the types and volume of intelligence information
provided to the Organization or any organization affiliated
with the Organization, or to any officials or employees
thereof, and the purposes for which it was provided during
the period covered by the report.
(II) Exemption.--For purposes of subclause (i), intelligence
information provided to the Organization or any
organization affiliated with the Organization, or to any
officials or employees thereof, does not cover information
that is provided only to, and only for the use of,
appropriately cleared United States Government personnel
serving with the Organization or any organization
affiliated with the Organization.
(ii) Special Reports.--
(I) Report on Procedures.--Accompanying the certification provided
pursuant to subparagraph (A)(i), the President shall
provide a detailed report to the Select Committee on
Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives
identifying the procedures established for protecting
intelligence sources and methods when sanitized
intelligence information is provided pursuant to this
section.
(II) Reports on Unauthorized Disclosures.--The President shall
report to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
of the House of Representatives, within 15 days after it
has become known to the U.S. Government, regarding any
unauthorized disclosure of intelligence information
provided by the United States to the Organization.
(C) Delegation of Duties.--The President may not delegate or assign
the duties of the President under this section.
(D) Relationship to Existing Law.--Nothing in this paragraph may he
construed to--
(i) impair or otherwise affect the authority of the Director of
Central Intelligence to protect intelligence sources and
methods from unauthorized disclosure pursuant to section
103(c)(5) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-
3(c)(5)); or
(ii) supersede or otherwise affect the provisions of title V of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.).
(E) Definitions.--In this section:
(i) Appropriate Committees of Congress.--The term ``appropriate
committees of Congress'' means the Committee on Foreign
Relations and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
Senate and the Committee on International Relations and the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives.
(ii) Organization.--The term ``Organization'' means the Organization
for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons established under the
Convention and includes any organ of that Organization and any
board or working group, such as the Scientific Advisory Board,
that may be established by it.
(iii) Organization Affiliated with the Organization.--The term
``organization affiliated with the Organization'' includes, but
is not limited to, the Provisional Technical Secretariat under
the Convention and any laboratory certified by the Director-
General of the Organization as designated to perform analytical
or other functions.

(6) Amendments to the Convention (Helms #7)

Summary:
Requires the United States to vote on all proposed amendments and
requires the executive branch to submit all amendments to the Senate
for its advice and consent.

Text:
(6) Amendments to the Convention.
(A) A United States representative will be present at all Amendment
Conferences and will cast a vote, either affirmative or negative, on
all proposed amendments made at such conferences.
(B) The President shall submit to the Senate for its advice and
consent to ratification under Article 11, Section 2, Clause 2 of the
Constitution of the United States any amendment to the Convention
adopted by an Amendment Conference.

(7) Continuing Vitality of the Australia Group and National Export
Controls (Helms #11)

Summary:
Requires the President to certify, before depositing instruments of
ratification, that the CWC will in no way weaken the Australia Group,
and that each member of the Group agrees there is no CWC requirement to
weaken their export controls.
Requires annual certification that Australia Group controls have
not been weakened and remain effective or, if this cannot be certified,
consultation with the Senate on a resolution of continued adherence to
the CWC.
Requires the President to block any attempt within the Australia
Group to change the Group's view of its obligations under the CWC.

Text:
(7) Continuing Vitality of the Australia Group and National Export
Controls.
(A) The Senate declares that the collapse of the informal forum of
states known as the ``Australia Group,'' either though changes in
membership or lack of compliance with common export controls, or the
substantial weakening of common Aus-
tralia Group export controls and non-proliferation measures in force on
the date of United States ratification of the Convention, would
constitute a fundamental change in circumstances to United States
ratification of the Convention.
(B) Prior to the deposit of the United States instrument of
ratification, the President shall certify to Congress that--
(i) nothing in the Convention obligates the United States to accept
any modification, change in scope, or weakening of its national
export controls. The United States understands that the
maintenance of national restrictions on trade in chemicals and
chemical production technology is fully compatible with the
provisions of the Convention, including Article XI(2), and
solely within the sovereign jurisdiction of the United States;
(ii) the Convention preserves the right of State Parties,
unilaterally or collectively, to maintain or impose export
controls on chemicals and related chemical production
technology for foreign policy or national security reasons,
notwithstanding Article XI(2); and
(iii) each Member-State of the Australia Group, at the highest
diplomatic levels, has officially communicated to the U.S.
Government its understanding and agreement that export control
and nonproliferation measures which the Australia Group has
undertaken are fully compatible with the provisions of the
Convention, including Article XI(2), and its commitment to
maintain in the future such export controls and
nonproliferation measures against non-Australia Group members.
(C) (i) The President shall certify to Congress on an annual basis
that--
(a) Australia Group members continue to maintain an equally effective
or more comprehensive control over the export of toxic
chemicals and their precursors, dual-use processing equipment,
human, animal and plant pathogens and toxins with potential
biological weapons application, and dual-use biological
equipment, as that afforded by the Australia Group as of the
date of ratification of this Convention by the United States;
and
(b) the Australia group remains a viable mechanism for limiting the
spread of chemical and biological weapons-related materials and
technology, and that the effectiveness of the Australia Group
has not been undermined by changes in membership, lack of
compliance with common export controls and nonproliferation
measures, or weakening of common controls and nonproliferation
measures in force as of the date of ratification of this
Convention by the United States.
(ii) In the event that the President is, at any time, unable to
make the certifications described in subparagraph (C)(i), the President
shall consult with the Senate for the purposes of obtaining a
resolution of continued adherence to the Convention, notwithstanding
the fundamental change in circumstance.
(D) The President shall consult periodically, but not less
frequently than twice a year, with the Committee on Foreign Relations
of the Senate and the Committee on International Relations of the House
of Representatives, on Australia Group export control and
nonproliferation measures. If any Australia Group member adopts a
position at variance with the certifications and understandings
provided under subparagraph (B), or should seek to gain Australia Group
acquiescence or approval for an interpretation that various provisions
of the Convention require it to remove chemical-weapons related export
controls against any State Party to the Convention, the President shall
block any effort by that Australia Group member to secure Australia
Group approval of such a position or interpretation.
(E) For the purposes of this paragraph--
(i) ``Australia Group'' means the informal forum of states, chaired
by Australia, whose goal is to discourage and impede chemical
and biological weapons proliferation by harmonizing national
export controls, chemical weapons precursor chemicals,
biological weapons pathogens, and dual-use production
equipment, and through other measures: and
(ii) ``Highest diplomatic levels'' means at the level of a senior
official with the power to authoritatively represent their
government, and does not mean a diplomatic representative of
that government to the United States.

(8) Negative Security Assurances (Helms #12)

Summary:
Requires a classified Presidential report regarding the impact of
CWC on U.S. options for responding to chemical or biological attacks,
and on the assurances we offer to other countries that foreswear the
use of nuclear weapons.
Some Members are concerned because ratification of the CWC will
leave the United States unable to threaten retaliatory use of chemical
weapons against a state that used chemical weapons on U.S. or allied
forces. The United States has no in-
tention of using chemical weapons, however, even in response to a
foreign chemical weapon attack. Even before the CWC was negotiated, the
United States committed itself to the destruction of nearly all U.S.
chemical weapons.
This condition requires the President to submit a classified report
on the impact of CWC upon U.S. ``negative security assurances'' to
other countries. Such assurances are the ``umbrella'' that we offer to
countries that agree to forego weapons of mass destruction.

Text:
(8) Negative Security Assurances.
(A) In forswearing the possession of chemical weapons retaliatory
capability under the Convention, the Senate understands that deterrence
of attack by chemical weapons requires a reevaluation of the negative
security assurances extended to non-nuclear-weapon states.
(B) Accordingly, 180 days after the deposit of the United States
instrument of ratification, the President shall submit to the Congress
a classified report setting forth the findings of a detailed review of
United States policy on negative security assurances, including a
determination of the appropriate responses to the use of chemical or
biological weapons against the United States military, United States
citizens, allies, and third parties.

(9) Protection of Advanced Biotechnology (Helms #13)

Summary:
Requires the President to certify, prior to the deposit of the
United States instrument of ratification and annually thereafter, that
the legitimate commercial activities and interests of U.S. chemical,
biotechnology, and pharmaceutical firms are not being significantly
harmed by the Convention.
The Administration is prepared to certify, both now and annually,
that the CWC's limits on the production and use of the most toxic
chemical weapons and their precursors are not significantly harming the
legitimate commercial activities and interests of U.S. chemical,
biotechnology, and pharmaceutical firms.
Most of those firms played a major role in the negotiation of this
Convention, of course, so they have long since signed up to any
sacrifices that U.S. firms may have to make in order to limit the
ability of rogue states to obtain and use chemical weapons. And the
Reagan, Bush and Clinton Administrations have all taken extraordinary
measures to limit the impact of the CWC upon U.S. businesses.

Text:
(9) Protection of Advanced Biotechnology.
Prior to the deposit of the United States instrument of
ratification, and on January 1 of every year thereafter, the President
shall certify to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Speaker of
the House of Representatives that the legitimate commercial activities
and interests of the chemical, biotechnology, and pharmaceutical firms
in the United States are not being significantly harmed by the
limitations of the Convention on access to, and production of, those
chemicals and toxins listed in Schedule 1 contained in the Annex on
Chemicals of the Convention.

(10) Monitoring and Verification of Compliance (Helms #14)

Summary:
Requires detailed annual country-by-country reports on chemical
weapons developments and U.S. intelligence coverage, as well as at
least quarterly briefings on U.S. actions to pursue CWC compliance
issues.
We all know that monitoring and verification of some aspects of CWC
compliance will be difficult. This fact of life has prompted
understandable concern on the part of some Members, and the
administration is prepared to accept a condition that requires both
periodic reports and prompt notice regarding world chemical weapons
programs and the status of CWC compliance. The executive branch would
also offer briefings on current compliance issues, including issues to
be raised in OPCW meetings and the results of those meetings.

Text:
(10) Monitoring and Verification of Compliance.
(A) The Senate declares that--
(i) the Convention is in the interests of the United States only if
all parties to the Convention are in strict compliance with the
terms of the Convention as submitted to the Senate for its
advice and consent to ratification, such compli-
ance being measured by performance and not by efforts, intentions, or
commitments to comply; and
(ii) the Senate expects all parties to the Convention to be in strict
compliance with their obligations under the terms of the
Convention, as submitted to the Senate for its advice and
consent to ratification;
(B) Given its concern about the intelligence community's low level
of confidence in its ability to monitor compliance with the Convention,
the Senate expects the executive branch of Government to offer regular
briefings, not less than four times a year, to the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the Senate and the Committee on International Relations of
the House of Representatives on compliance issues related to the
Convention. Such briefings shall include a description of all United
States efforts in bilateral and multilateral diplomatic channels and
forums to resolve compliance issues and shall include a complete
description of--
(i) any compliance issues the United States plans to raise at
meetings of the Organization, in advance of such meetings;
(ii) any compliance issues raised at meetings of the Organization,
within 30 days of each such meeting;
(iii) any determination by the President that a party is in
noncompliance with or is otherwise acting in a manner
inconsistent with the object or purpose of the Convention,
within 30 days of such a determination.
(C) The President shall submit annually on January 1 to the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on
International Relations of the House of Representatives a full and
complete classified and unclassified report setting forth--
(i) a certification of those priority countries included in the
Intelligence Community's Monitoring Strategy, as defined by the
Director of Central Intelligence's Arms Control Intelligence
Staff and the National Intelligence Council, deter-mined to be
in compliance with the Convention, on a country-by-country
basis;
(ii) for those countries not certified pursuant to clause (i), an
identification and assessment of all compliance issues arising
with regard to the adherence of the country to its obligations
under the Convention;
(iii) the steps the United States has taken, either unilaterally or
in conjunction with another State Party--
(I) to initiate challenge inspections of the noncompliant party
with the objective of demonstrating to the international
community the act of noncompliance;
(II) to call attention publicly to the activity in question; and
(III) to seek on an urgent basis a meeting at the highest
diplomatic level with the noncompliant party with the
objective of bringing the noncompliant party into
compliance.
(iv) a determination of the military significance and broader
security risks arising from any compliance issue identified
pursuant to clause (ii); and
(v) a detailed assessment of the responses of the noncompliant party
in question to actions undertaken by the United States
described in the report submitted pursuant to clause (iii).
(D) On January 1, 1998, and annually thereafter, the Director of
Central Intelligence shall submit to the Committees on Foreign
Relations, Armed Services, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of
the Senate and to the Committees on International Relations, National
Security, and Permanent Select Committee of the House of
Representatives, a full and complete classified and unclassified report
regarding--
(i) the status of chemical weapons development, production,
stockpiling, and use, within the meanings of the Convention, on
a country-by-country basis;
(ii) any information made available to the U.S. Government concerning
the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling,
retention, use, or direct or indirect transfer of novel agents,
including any unitary or binary chemical weapon comprised of
chemical components not identified on the schedules of the
Annex on Chemicals, by any country;
(iii) the extent of trade in chemicals potentially relevant to
chemical weapons programs, including all Australia Group
chemicals and chemicals identified on the schedules of the
Annex on Chemicals, on a country-by-country basis;
(iv) the monitoring responsibilities, practices, and strategies of
the intelligence community and a determination of the level of
confidence of the intelligence community (as defined in section
3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947) with respect to each
specific monitoring task undertaken, including an assessment by
the intelligence community of the national aggregate data
provided by parties to the Organization, on a country-by-
country basis;
(v) an identification of how U.S. national intelligence means,
including national technical means and human intelligence, is
being marshaled together with the Convention's verification
provisions to monitor compliance with the Convention; and
(vi) the identification of chemical weapons development, production,
stockpiling, or use, within the meanings of the Convention, by
subnational groups, including terrorist and paramilitary
organizations.
(E) The report required under subparagraph (D) shall include a full
and complete classified annex submitted solely to the Select Committee
on Intelligence of the Senate and to the Permanent Select Committee of
the House of Representatives regarding--
(i) a detailed and specific identification of all United States
resources devoted to monitoring the Convention, including
information on all expenditures associated with the monitoring
of the Convention; and
(ii) an identification of the priorities of the executive branch of
Government for the development of new resources relating to
detection and monitoring capabilities with respect to chemical
and biological weapons, including a description of the steps
being taken and resources being devoted to strengthening U.S.
monitoring capabilities.

(11) Enhancements to Robust Chemical and Biological Defenses (Helms
#15)

Summary:
Requires the Secretary of Defense to ensure that U.S. forces are
capable of carrying out required military missions in U.S. regional
contingency plans, regardless of any foreign threat or use of chemical
weapons, and that the U.S. Army Chemical School remains under the
supervision of an Army general.
Former Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger and others have
asserted that ratifying CWC could lead to complacency regarding the
need for chemical weapons defenses. This concern is frankly a bit
mystifying. The fear of complacency persists, however, so the
administration has agreed to a condition requiring the Secretary of
Defense to ensure that U.S. forces are capable of carrying out required
military missions in U.S. regional contingency plans, regardless of any
foreign threat or use of chemical weapons. This means not only
improving the defensive capabilities of U.S. forces, but also
initiating discussions on chemical weapons defense with likely
coalition partners and countries whose civilian personnel would support
U.S. forces in a conflict.
The Administration has also agreed to assure that the U.S. Army
Chemical School remains under the supervision of an Army general.

Text:
(11) Enhancements to Robust Chemical and Biological Defenses.
(A) It is the sense of the Senate that--
(1) chemical and biological threats to deployed U.S. Armed Forces
will continue to grow in regions of concern around the world,
and pose serious threats to U.S. power projection and forward
deployment strategies;
(2) chemical weapons or biological weapons use is a potential
condition of future conflicts in regions of concern;
(3) it is essential for the United States and key regional allies to
preserve and further develop robust chemical and biological
defenses;
(4) the United States Armed Forces are inadequately equipped,
organized, trained and exercised for chemical and biological
defense against current and expected threats, and that too much
reliance is placed on non-active duty forces, which receive
less training and less modern equipment, for critical chemical
and biological defense capabilities;
(5) the lack of readiness stems from a de-emphasis of chemical and
biological defenses within the executive branch of Government
and the United States Armed Forces;
(6) the armed forces of key regional allies and likely coalition
partners, as well as civilians necessary to support U.S.
military operations, are inadequately prepared and equipped to
carry out essential missions in chemically and biologically
contaminated environments;
(7) congressional direction contained in the Defense Against Weapons
of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 should lead to enhanced
domestic preparedness to protect against chemical and
biological weapons threats; and
(8) the U.S. Armed Forces should place increased emphasis on
potential threats to deployed U.S. Armed Forces and, in
particular, make countering chemical and biological weapons use
an organizing principle for U.S. defense strategy and
development of force structure, doctrine, planning, training,
and exercising policies of the U.S. Armed Forces.
(B) The Secretary of Defense shall take those actions necessary to
ensure that U.S. Armed Forces are capable of carrying out required
military missions in U.S. regional contingency plans, despite the
threat or use of chemical or biological weapons. In particular, the
Secretary of Defense shall ensure that U.S. Armed Forces are
effectively equipped, organized, trained and exercised (including at
the large unit and theater level) to conduct operations in a chemically
or biologically contaminated environment that are critical to the
success of U.S. military plans in regional conflicts, including--
(1) deployment, logistics and reinforcement operations at key ports
and airfields;
(2) sustained combat aircraft sortie generation at critical regional
airbases; and
(3) ground force maneuvers of large units and divisions.
(C) The Secretaries of Defense and State shall, as a priority
matter, initiate discussions with key regional allies and likely
regional coalition partners, including those countries where the U.S.
currently deploys forces, where U.S. forces would likely operate during
regional conflicts, or which would provide civilians necessary to
support U.S. military operations, to determine what steps are necessary
to ensure that Allied and coalition forces and other critical civilians
are adequately equipped and prepared to operate in chemically- and
biologically-contaminated environments. No later than one year after
deposit of the United States instrument of ratification, the
Secretaries of Defense and State shall provide a report to the
Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services of the Senate and to
the Speaker of the House on the results of these discussions, plans for
future discussions, measures agreed to improve the preparedness of
foreign forces and civilians, and proposals for increased military
assistance, including through the Foreign Military Sales, Foreign
Military Financing and the International Military Education and
Training programs pursuant to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.
(D) The Secretary of Defense shall take those actions necessary to
ensure that the United States Army Chemical School remains under the
oversight of a general officer of the United States Army.
(E) Given its concerns about the present state of chemical and
biological defense readiness and training, it is the sense of the
Senate that--
(1) the transfer, consolidation, and reorganization of the United
States Army Chemical School, the Army should not disrupt or
diminish the training and readiness of the United States Armed
Forces to fight in a chemical-biological warfare environment;
(2) the Army should continue to operate the Chemical Defense Training
Facility at Fort McClellan until such time as the replacement
training facility at Fort Leonard Wood is functional.
(F) On January 1, 1998, and annually thereafter, the President
shall submit a report to the Committees on Foreign Relations,
Appropriations, and Armed Services and the Committees on International
Relations, National Security, Appropriations, and Speaker of the House
on previous, current, and planned chemical and biological weapons
defense activities. The report shall include the following information
for the previous fiscal year and for the next three fiscal years--
(1) Proposed solutions to each of the deficiencies in chemical and
biological warfare defenses identified in the March 1996
General Accounting Office Report, titled ``Chemical and
Biological Defense: Emphasis Remains Insufficient to Resolve
Continuing Problems,'' and steps being taken pursuant to
paragraph (B) of this section to ensure that the U.S. Armed
Forces are capable of conducting required military operations
to ensure the success of U.S. regional contingency plans
despite the threat or use of chemical or biological weapons;
(2) An identification of priorities of the executive branch of
Government in the development of both active and passive
chemical and biological defenses;
(3) A detailed summary of all budget activities associated with the
research, development, testing, and evaluation of chemical and
biological defense programs;
(4) A detailed summary of expenditures on research, development,
testing, and evaluation, and procurement of chemical and
biological defenses by fiscal years defense programs,
department, and agency;
(5) A detailed assessment of current and projected vaccine production
capabilities and vaccine stocks, including progress in
researching and developing a multivalent vaccine;
(6) A detailed assessment of procedures and capabilities necessary to
protect and decontaminate infrastructure to reinforce United
States power-projection forces, including progress in
developing a nonaqueous chemical decontamination capability;
(7) The progress made in procuring light-weight personal protective
gear and steps being taken to ensure that programmed
procurement quantities are suffi-
cient to replace expiring battle-dress overgarments and chemical
protective overgarments to maintain required wartime inventory levels;
(8) The progress in developing long-range standoff detection and
identification capabilities and other battlefield surveillance
capabilities for biological and chemical weapons, including
progress on developing a multi-chemical agent detector,
unmanned aerial vehicles, and unmanned ground sensors;
(9) Progress in developing and deploying layered theater missile
defenses for deployed U.S. Armed Forces which will provide
greater geographic coverage against current and expected
ballistic missile threats and will help mitigate chemical and
biological contamination through higher altitude intercepts and
boost-phase intercepts;
(10) An assessment of the training and readiness of the United States
Armed Forces to operate in a chemically or biologically
contaminated environment and actions taken to sustain training
and readiness, including at national combat training centers;
(11) The progress in incorporating chemical and biological
considerations into service and Joint exercises as well as
simulations, models, and wargames and the conclusions drawn
from these efforts about the U.S. capability to carry out
required missions, including with coalition partners, in
military contingencies;
(12) The progress in developing and implementing service and joint
doctrine for combat and non-combat operations involving
adversaries armed with chemical or biological weapons,
including efforts to update the range of service and joint
doctrine to better address the wide range of military
activities, including deployment, reinforcement and logistics
operations in support of combat operations, and for the conduct
of such operations in concert with coalition forces; and
(13) The progress in resolving issues relating to the protection of
United States population centers from chemical and biological
attack, including plans for inoculation of populations,
consequence management, and progress made in developing and
deploying effective cruise missile defenses and a national
ballistic missile defense.

(12) Noncompliance (Helms #16)

Summary:
In the event of noncompliance by a State Party, requires the
President to inform and consult with the Senate and to take a series of
actions designed to expose noncompliance and to force compliance. These
actions include making effective use of CWC provisions for challenge
inspections, high-level diplomacy and U.N. sanctions.
The President must also implement any sanctions required by U.S.
law. If the noncompliance should persist for a year, the President must
consult with the Senate regarding continued adherence to the
Convention.

Text:
(12) Noncompliance.
(A) If the President determines that persuasive information exists
that a party to the Convention is maintaining a chemical weapons
production or production mobilization capability, is developing new
chemical agents, or is in violation of the Convention in any other
manner so as to threaten the national security interests of the United
States. Then the President shall--
(1) consult with, and promptly submit to, the Senate a report
detailing the effect of such actions,
(2) seek on an urgent basis a challenge inspection of the facilities
of the relevant party in accordance with the provisions of the
Convention with the objective of demonstrating to the
international community the act of noncompliance;
(3) seek, or encourage, on an urgent basis a meeting at the highest
diplomatic level with the relevant party with the objective of
bringing the noncompliant party into compliance,
(4) implement prohibitions and sanctions against the relevant party
as required by law;
(5) if noncompliance has been determined, seek on an urgent basis
within the Security Council of the United Nations a
multilateral imposition of sanctions against the noncompliant
party for the purposes of bringing the noncompliant party into
compliance; and
(6) in the event that noncompliance persists for a period of longer
than 1 year after the date of determination made pursuant to
subparagraph (A), promptly consult with the Senate for the
purposes of obtaining a resolution of support of continued
adherence to the Convention, notwithstanding the changed
circumstances affecting the object and purpose of the
Convention.
(B) Nothing in this section may be construed to impair or otherwise
affect the authority of the Director of Central Intelligence to protect
intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure pursuant
to section 103(c)(5) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
403-3(c)(5)).
(C) If the President determines that an action otherwise required
under paragraph (A) would impair or otherwise affect the authority of
the Director of Central Intelligence to protect intelligence sources
and methods from unauthorized disclosure, he shall report that
determination, together with a detailed written explanation of the
basis for that determination, to the Chairmen of the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence no later than 15 days after making such determination.

(13) Primacy of the United States Constitution (Helms #17)

Summary:
Makes clear that the CWC does not contradict the U.S. Constitution.
Some CWC opponents have said that on-site inspections would be
conducted in violation of the U.S. Constitution. This is simply not the
case. No administration would agree to a treaty that violated the
Constitution, no treaty ever takes precedence over the Constitution,
and only the United States interprets our Constitution.
This condition states those facts.

Text:
(13) Primacy of the United States Constitution.
Nothing in the Convention requires or authorizes legislation, or
other action, by the United States prohibited by the Constitution of
the United States, as interpreted by the United States.

(14) Financing Russian Implementation (Helms #18)

Summary:
Requires the United States not to accept any effort by Russia to
make Russia's CWC ratification contingent upon U.S. financial
guarantees to cover Russian destruction costs.
None of us would want the United States to be stuck with the bill
for Russian destruction of their vast chemical weapons stockpile. So
there is agreement on a condition that the United States shall not
accept any Russian effort to condition its ratification of CWC upon the
United States providing guarantees to pay for Russian implementation of
CWC or of the 1990 Bilateral Destruction Agreement.

Text:
(14) Financing Russian Implementation.
The United States understands that in order to be assured of the
Russian commitment to a reduction in chemical weapons stockpiles,
Russia must maintain a substantial stake in financing the
implementation of both the 1990 Bilateral Destruction Agreement, and
the Convention. The United States shall not accept any effort by Russia
to make deposit of Russia's instrument of ratification contingent upon
the United States providing financial guarantees to pay for
implementation of commitments by Russia under the 1990 Bilateral
Destruction Agreement or the Convention.

(15) Assistance Under Article X (Helms #19)

Summary:
Requires the United States not to contribute to the voluntary fund
for chemical weapons defense assistance to other States Parties, and
limits U.S. assistance to certain states to medical antidotes and
treatments.
Opponents of CWC assert that Article X would require the United
States to provide assistance and equipment to countries like Cuba to
improve their chemical weapons defense capabilities. This is a
misconception of paragraph 7 of Article X, which says: ``Each State
Party undertakes to provide assistance through the Organization.''
Assistance may include ``detection equipment and alarm systems,
protective equipment; decontamination equipment and decontaminants;
medical antidotes and treatments; and advice on any of these protective
measures.''
The rest of paragraph 7 of Article X makes clear that a State Party
may simply declare what assistance it might provide in response to an
appeal by the OPCW. CWC does not compel the United States to give any
country, let alone an enemy like Cuba, anything more than medical
assistance or advice.

Text:
(15) Assistance Under Article X.
(A) Prior to the deposit of the United States instrument of
ratification, the President shall certify to the Congress that the
United States shall not provide assistance under paragraph 7(a) of
Article X.
(B) Prior to the deposit of the United States instrument of
ratification, the President shall certify to the Congress that for any
States Party the government of which is not eligible for assistance
under chapter 2 of Part II or chapter 4 of Part II of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961--
(i) no assistance under paragraph 7(b) of Article X will be provided
to the States Party; and
(ii) no assistance under paragraph 7(c) of Article X other than
medical antidotes and treatment will be provided to the States
Party.

(16) Constitutional Prerogatives (Helms #22)

Summary:
Sense of the Senate that U.S. negotiators should not agree to
treaties that bar reservations and that the Senate should not consent
to ratification of any such future treaties. (See also #1.)
Article XXII of the CWC states: ``The Articles of this Convention
shall not be subject to reservations. The Annexes of this Convention
shall not be subject to reservations incompatible with its object and
purpose.'' Senator Helms rightly notes that although the United States
has ratified other treaties with similar provisions, the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee has maintained that ``the President's agreement to
such a prohibition can not constrain the Senate's constitutional right
and obligation to give its advice and consent to a treaty subject to
any reservation it might determine is required by the national
interest.''
The U.S. Constitution vests in the Senate the power to give its
advice and consent subject to reservations. So I am happy to support
this condition that reminds the executive branch of the Senate's role.

Text:
(16) Constitutional Prerogatives.
(A) The Senate makes the following findings:
(1) The Constitution states that the President ``shall have Power, by
and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make
Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur.''
(2) At the turn of the century, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge took the
position that the giving of advice and consent to treaties
constitutes a stage in negotiation on the treaties and that
Senate amendments or reservations to a treaty are propositions
``offered at a later stage of the negotiation by the other part
of the American treatymaking power in the only manner in which
they could then be offered.''
(3) The executive branch has begun a practice of negotiating and
submitting to the Senate treaties which include a provision
which has the purported effect of inhibiting the Senate from
attaching reservations which the Senate considers necessary in
the national interest or of preventing the Senate from
exercising its constitutional duty to give its advice and
consent to treaty commitments before ratification.
(4) During the 85th Congress, and again during the 102d Congress, the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate made its position
on this issue clear when stating that ``the President's
agreement to such a prohibition can not constrain the Senate's
constitutional right and obligation to give its advice and
consent to a treaty subject to any reservation it might
determine is required by the national interest.''
(B) Sense of the Senate.
It is the sense of the Senate that--
(1) the past ratification by the Senate of treaties containing
provisions which prohibit amendments or reservations should not
be construed as a precedent for such clauses in future
agreements with other nations which require the advice and
consent of the Senate;
(2) United States negotiators to a treaty should not agree to any
provision which has the effect of inhibiting the Senate from
attaching reservations or offering amendments to the treaty;
and
(3) the Senate should not consent in the future to any treaty article
or provision which would prohibit the Senate from giving its
advice and consent to the treaty subject to amendment or
reservation.

(17) Additions to the Annex on Chemicals (Replaces Helms #25)

Summary:
There may well be occasions where it is in our national security
interest to add new chemicals to the list of restricted and prohibited
chemicals when it becomes clear that they have chemical weapon uses.
However, some have expressed a concern that the addition of certain
chemicals to the annex on chemicals might introduce new burdens on U.S.
industry.
This condition requires that the executive branch inform Congress
when a chemical is proposed for addition to the Schedules.
Consultation with Congress at that stage would enable the United
States to object to routine adoption of a change that might have
serious impact upon U.S. companies. Such an objection would force the
OPCW to seek a two-thirds vote in the Conference of States Parties.

Text:
(17) Additions to the Annex on Chemicals.
(A) Presidential Notification.--Not later than ten days after the
Director-General communicates information to all States Parties,
pursuant to Article XV(5)(a) of the Convention, of a proposal for the
addition of a chemical or biological substance to a schedule of the
Annex on Chemicals, the President shall notify the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the U.S. Senate of the proposed addition.
(B) Presidential Report.--Not later than 60 days after the
Director-General communicates information of such a proposal pursuant
to Article XV(5)(a) or not later than 30 days after a positive
recommendation by the Executive Council pursuant to Article XV(5)(c) of
the Convention, whichever is sooner, the President shall transmit to
the Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate a report, in
classified and unclassified form, detailing the likely impact of the
proposed addition to the Annex on Chemicals. Such report shall include,
but not be limited to--
(i) an assessment of the likely impact on U.S. industry of the
proposed addition of the chemical or biological substance to
the Annex on Chemicals;
(ii) a description of the likely costs and benefits, if any, to U.S.
national security of the proposed addition of such chemical or
biological substance to the Annex on Chemicals; and
(iii) a detailed assessment of the effect of the proposed addition on
U.S. obligations under the Verification Annex;
(C) Presidential Consultation.--The President shall, after the
submission of the notification required under subparagraph (A) and
prior to any action on the proposal by the Executive Council under
Article XV(5)(c), consult promptly with the Senate as to whether the
United States should object to the proposed addition of a chemical or
biological substance pursuant to Article XV(5)(c).

(18) Effect on Terrorism (Helms #27)

Summary:
Senator Helms and you have agreed to a condition by which the
Senate will find that the CWC would not have stopped the Aum Shinrikyo
group in Japan and that future terrorist groups will likely seek
chemical weapons.
Both of these statements are probably quite accurate, and no harm
is done by attaching them to the resolution of ratification.

Text:
(18) Effect on Terrorism.
The Senate finds that--
(A) Irrespective of whether the Convention enters into force,
terrorists will likely look upon chemical weapons as a means to gain
greater publicity and instill widespread fear; and
(B) the March 1995 Tokyo subway attack by the Aum Shinrikyo would
not have been prevented by the Convention.

(19) Constitutional Separation of Powers (Helms #30)

Summary:
This condition recognizes the Constitutional responsibility of the
Congress to pay the debts of the United States. It also declares the
Senate's view that the appropriation of funds for financial
contributions to the OPCW are beyond the control of the executive
branch, and that the United States should not be denied its vote in the
OPCW for failing to pay in full its assessed financial contribution.

Text:
(19) Constitutional Separation of Powers.
Article VIII, paragraph 8 of the Convention allows States Parties
to vote in the Organization if that member is in arrears in the payment
of financial contributions provided that the Organization is satisfied
that such non-payment is due to conditions beyond the control of that
member. Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution vests in Congress the
exclusive authority to ``pay the Debts'' of the United States.
Financial contributions to the Organization for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons may be appropriated only by the Congress and thus the
Senate declares that they are, for the purposes of Article VIII,
paragraph 8, beyond the control of the executive branch of the U.S.
Government. Therefore, the United States vote in the Organization
should not be denied in the event the Congress does not appropriate
fully funds for its assessed financial contribution.

(20) The On-Site Inspection Agency

Summary:
In 1994, the Select Committee on Intelligence recommended that
Congress authorize the DoD On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA) to assist
private facilities in the escorting of CWC inspectors. OSIA has done a
fine job over the years in escorting arms control inspectors at U.S.
Government and defense contractor facilities, making sure that treaty
obligations are met with minimal risk to sensitive information.
OSIA's charter restricts it to DoD and contractor sites, so new
legislation will be needed--probably in the CWC implementing
legislation. (Note: The Armed Services Committee will support this so
long as the assistance is provided on a reimbursable basis, but may
object if DoD funds are to be used to help U.S. industry.)

Text:
(20) The On-Site Inspection Agency.
It is the sense of the Senate that--
In advance of any inspection, the On-Site Inspection Agency of the
Department of Defense should be authorized to provide assistance to
United States facilities subject to routine inspections under the
Convention or to any facility which is the object of a challenge
inspection initiated pursuant to Article IX, provided that the consent
of the owner or operator of such facility has first been obtained.

(21) Further Arms Reduction Obligations

Summary:
This declaration builds upon Section 33(b) of the Arms Control and
Disarmament Act of 1961, which was originally intended to ensure that
the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency would be
prohibited from taking any actions in furtherance of arms control
objectives that affect the armed forces of the United States without
the approval of either a two-thirds vote of the Senate or a majority of
both Houses.
This provision, which has been attached to major arms control
treaties in recent years, sets forth the Senate position that any
international agreement that would obligate the United States to limit
its forces in a militarily significant way will only be considered by
the Senate pursuant to Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the
Constitution.

Text:
(21) Further Arms Reduction Obligations.
The Senate declares its intention to consider for approval
international agreements that would obligate the United States to
reduce or limit the Armed Forces or armaments of the United States in a
militarily significant manner only pursuant to the treaty power as set
forth in Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the Constitution.

(22) Treaty Interpretation

Summary:
This provision, commonly referred to as the ``Biden Condition,''
has been attached to all major treaties since the INF Treaty. It states
the Constitutionally based principle that the shared understanding that
exists between the Executive branch and the Senate at the time the
Senate gives advice and consent to ratification can only be altered
subject to the Senate's advice and consent to a subsequent treaty or
protocol, or the enactment of a statute.

Text:
(22) Treaty Interpretation.
The Senate affirms the applicability to all treaties of the
Constitutionally based principles of treaty interpretation set forth in
Condition (1) of the resolution of ratification with respect to the INF
Treaty. For purposes of this declaration, the term ``INF Treaty,''
refers to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-
Range and Shorter Range Missiles, together with the related memorandum
of understanding and protocols, approved by the Senate on May 27, 1988.

(23) Chemical Weapons Destruction

Summary:
This condition requires the President to explore alternative
technologies for the destruction of the U.S. chemical weapons
stockpile. It recognizes that the deadline set in the Convention for
the completion of stockpile destruction, 2007, supersedes the 2004 date
established in an earlier law. It also reassures us that the
requirement under the Convention to submit a plan on the method of
destruction does not preclude the later use of alternative
technologies. Finally, should a safer and more environmentally friendly
alternative technology be discovered, but its employment circumscribed
by the 2007 deadline, the President would need to consult with the
Congress to determine whether the United States should exercise its
rights under the Convention and request a brief extension of the
destruction deadline.

Text:
(23) Chemical Weapons Destruction.
Prior to the deposit of the United States instrument of
ratification of the Convention, the President shall certify to the
Congress that all of the following conditions are satisfied:
(A) Exploration of Alternative Technologies.--The President has
agreed to explore alternative technologies for the destruction
of the United States stockpile of chemical weapons in order to
ensure that the United States has the safest, most effective
and environmentally sound plans and programs for meeting its
obligations under the Convention for the destruction of
chemical weapons.
(B) Convention Extends Destruction Deadline.--The requirement in
Section 1412 of Public Law 99-145 (50 U.S.C. 1521) for
completion of the destruction of the United States stockpile of
chemical weapons by December 31, 2004 will be superseded upon
the date the Convention enters into force with respect to the
United States by the deadline required by the Convention of
April 29, 2007.
(C) Authority to Employ a Different Destruction Technology.--The
requirement under Article III(l)(a)(v) of the Convention for a
declaration by each state party to the Convention, not later
than 30 days after the date the Convention enters into force
with respect to that party, on general plans of the State Party
for destruction of its chemical weapons does not preclude the
United States from deciding in the future to employ a
technology for the destruction of chemical weapons different
than that declared under that Article.
(D) Procedures for Extension of Deadline.--The President will consult
with Congress on whether to submit a request to the Executive
Council of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons for an extension of the deadline for the destruction of
chemical weapons under the Convention, as provided under Part
IV(A) of the Annex on Implementation and Verification to the
Convention if, as a result of the program of alternative
technologies for the destruction of chemical weapons carried
out under Section 8065 of the Department of Defense
Appropriations Act, 1997 (as contained in Public Law 104-208),
the President determines that alternatives to the incineration
of chemical weapons are available that are safer and more
environmentally sound but whose use would preclude the United
States from meeting the deadlines of the Convention.

__________
The Case Against The Chemical Weapons Convention ``Truth or
Consequences''

Prepared by The Center for Security Policy

introduction
As the Senate resumes formal consideration of the controversial
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)--following the Clinton
Administration's decision last fall to withdraw it in the face of
certain defeat--the Center for Security Policy has undertaken to
provide detailed analyses of many of the issues in dispute.
These papers, most of which have been previously issued as part of
the Center's Truth or Consequences series, have been compiled and
organized to maximize their usefulness to those who will be
participating in the coming debate. They address in particular claims
being made by the proponents that appear ill-informed, at best, and
highly misleading, at worst.
The Center for Security Policy, whose mission is to stimulate and
inform debate on vital defense and foreign policy matters, is gratified
by the level of attention now being focused on the problematic Chemical
Weapons Convention. Such attention--if informed and sustained--is
essential to the proper functioning of the deliberative process of a
democracy like ours.
Rarely is that deliberative process more important than with
respect to decisionmaking on a treaty such as the CWC, with its ominous
implications for U.S. national security, proprietary business
information and constitutional rights. For these reasons, efforts now
being made to circumscribe, foreshorten or otherwise attenuate the CWC
debate are to be strenuously resisted.
The Center hopes that the following pages will prove helpful to
those interested in determining the fate of the Chemical Weapons
Convention on its merits. For additional background on the treaty and
future analyses by the Center, please consult our site on the World
Wide Web--www.security-policy.org.

Frank J. Gaffney, Jr.,
Director, 8 April 1997
__________

``Truth or Consequences:'' Center Analyses on the CWC Debate

Table of Contents

Issues Relating to the Senate's Role In Treaty-Making
Truth or Consequences #10: Clinton's White House Snow Job Cannot
Conceal The Chemical Weapon's Convention's Defects (No. 97-D 49, 4
April 1997)

Republicans' Senate Leadership Offers Constructive Alternative To
Fatally Flawed Chemical Weapons Convention (No. 97-D 43, 21 March 1997)

A Place To Start On Campaign Finance Reform: CMA Should Refrain
From Putting Senators In Compromising Positions On The Chemical Weapons
Convention (No. 97-D 34, 26 February 1997)

Truth or Consequences #2: Senate Does Not Need To Sacrifice
Sensible Scrutiny Of CWC To Meet An Artificial Deadline (No. 97-D 18,
31 January 1997)

Clinton's Chemical Power Play: Bad For The Senate, Bad For The
National Interest (No. 97-D 7, 13 January 1997)

Here We Go Again: Clinton Presses Anew For Senate Approval of
Flawed, Unverifiable, Ineffective Chemical Weapons Treaty (No. 97-T 5,
8 January 1997)
The CWC's Impact on the U.S. Military and National Security:
Just Which Chemical Weapons Convention Is Colin Powell Supporting--
And Does He Know The Difference? (No. 97-D 48, 3 April 1997)

Truth or Consequences #7: Schlesinger, Rumsfeld And Weinberger
Rebut Scowcroft And Deutch On The CWC (No. 97-D 37, 5 March 1997)

Gen. Schwartzkopf Tells Senate He Shares Critics' Concerns About
Details Of The Chemical Weapons Convention (No. 97-D 35, 27 February
1997)

Truth or Consequences #3: Clinton `Makes A Mistake About It' In
Arguing The CWC Will Protect U.S. Troops (No. 97-D 21, 6 February 1997)
The CWC's Impact on U.S. Intelligence:
Russia's Covert Chemical Weapons Program Vindicates Jesse Helms'
Continuing Opposition To Phony CW Arms Control (No. 97-D 19, 4 February
1997)
The CWC's Impact on U.S. Business:
Truth or Consequences #5: The CWC Will Not Be Good For Business--To
Say Nothing Of The National Interest (No. 97-D 27, 17 February 1997)
The CWC's Impact on the U.S. Constitution:
Truth or Consequences #1: Center Challenges Administration Efforts
To Distort, Suppress Debate On CWC--Dangers To Americans'
Constitutional Rights (No. 97-D 14, 28 January 1997)
The CWC's Impact on International Terrorism:
Truth or Consequences #6: The CWC Will Not Prevent Chemical
Terrorism Against The U.S. Or Its Interests (No. 97-D 30, 22 February
1997)
The CWC's Impact on Chemical Weapons Proliferation:
Truth or Consequences #8: The CWC Will Exacerbate The Proliferation
Of Chemical Warfare Capabilities (No. 97-D 38, 6 March 1997)
Miscellaneous Issues Pertaining to the CWC:
New National Poll Shows Overwhelming Public Opposition to a Flawed
Chemical Weapons Convention (No. 97-P 50, 10 April 1997)

Truth or Consequences #9: CWC Proponents Dissemble About Treaty
Arrangements Likely To Disserve U.S. Interests (No. 97-D 46, 27 March
1997)

The Weekly Standard Weighs In On the CWC: `Just Say No To A Bad
Treaty' (No. 97-P 40, 17 March 1997)

Truth or Consequences #4: No DNA Tests Needed To Show That Claims
About Republican Paternity Of CWC Are Overblown (No. 97-D 24, 16
February 1997)

__________
No. 97-D 49
4 April 1997

Truth or Consequences #10: Clinton's White House Snow Job Cannot
Conceal the Chemical Weapons Convention's Defects

(Washington, D.C.): The latest installment in the Clinton
Administration's campaign to browbeat the U.S. Senate into ratifying a
fatally flawed Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) failed to live up to
its advance billing--in more ways than one. Despite repeated press
reports to the effect that former President George Bush and General
Colin Powell were to play active roles in an ``event'' on the South
Lawn of the White House, the former was nowhere to be seen and the
latter had a letter he signed acknowledged by the President, but was
otherwise scarcely in evidence. (The Center for Security Policy would
like to think that the force of its argument in a paper released last
night \1\ encouraged these two influential figures to reconsider the
active role as flacks that the Clintonistas have in mind for them.)
Please
Even more disappointing was the case the President made for this
treaty. On issue after issue, he persisted in grossly overselling the
benefits of this Convention, misrepresenting its terms and/or
understating its costs. Consider the following:
<bullet> Item: The CWC Will Not `Banish Poison Gas'
The President declared that by ratifying the CWC, the United States
has ``an opportunity now to forge a widening international commitment
to banish poison gas from the earth in the 21st Century.'' This is the
sort of wish-masquerading-as-fact that has been much in evidence in
Presidential statements to the effect that ``there are no Russian
missiles pointed at our children.''
The truth--as even more-honest CWC advocates acknowledge--is that
not a single country of concern, or for that matter any sub-national
terrorist group, that wishes to maintain a covert chemical weapons
program will be prevented from doing so by this treaty. Neither are
they likely to be caught at it if they do. And even if they are, there
is a negligible chance the ``international community'' will be willing
to punish them for doing so. This is hardly the stuff of which
effective banishment is made.
<bullet> Item: `Poisons for Peace'
The President claimed that: ``The Convention requires other nations
to follow our lead, to eliminate their arsenals of poison gas and to
give up developing, producing and acquiring such weapons in the
future.'' There is clearly no such requirement on the rogue states that
decline to participate in this treaty (e.g., Iraq, Syria, Libya, Sudan
and North Korea).
What is more, the Convention's Articles X and XI may well
accelerate the proliferation of chemical weapon technology. This is
because these provisions obligate parties to ``facilitate the fullest
possible'' transfers of technology directly relevant to the manufacture
of chemical weapons and those used to defend against chemical attack--a
highly desirable capability for people interested in waging chemical
wars. \2\
<bullet> Item: The CWC Will Not `Help Shield Our Soldiers'
President Clinton repeated a grievous misrepresentation featured in
his State of the Union address: On the South Lawn he declared, that
``by ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention ... we can help shield
our soldiers from one of the battlefield's deadliest killers.'' As
noted above, the CWC may actually make our soldiers more vulnerable to
one of the battlefield's deadliest killers--not least as a result of
the insights shared defensive technology will afford potential
adversaries about how to reverse-engineer Western protective equipment,
the better to exploit its vulnerabilities.
<bullet> Item: The CWC Will Not Protect Our Children
President Clinton shamelessly claimed that ``We can give our
children something our parents and grandparents never had--broad
protection against the threat of chemical attack.'' Just how
irresponsible this statement is can be seen from a cover article
published last month by Washington City Paper. The report disclosed
that the people of the Washington, D.C. area and, indeed, the rest of
the Nation are sitting ducks for chemical attacks. \3\ This problem,
which arises from a systematic failure to apply resources to civil
defense that are even remotely commensurate with the danger, will only
grow as people like the President compound the CWC's placebo effect of
this treaty by exaggerating its benefits.
<bullet> Item: The CWC Will Not Help in the Fight Against Terrorism
While the President proclaimed that ratifying the CWC will
``bolster our leadership in the fight against terrorism,'' the reality
is that this treaty may actually facilitate terrorism. This could come
about as a result not only of the dispersion of chemical warfare
relevant technology and the placebo effect but also by dint of the
sensitive information the Convention expects the United States to share
with foreign nationals. At least some of these folks will be working
for potentially hostile intelligence services--including those of
states, like Iran, known to sponsor terrorism. Compromising what U.S.
intelligence knows about international terrorists and their sponsors
will only intensify the danger posed by such actors. \4\
<bullet> Item: Flogging a Phony Deadline
The President further claimed that ``America needs to ratify the
Chemical Weapons Convention and we must do it before it takes effect on
April 29th.'' While the treaty will enter into force on that date, with
or without the U.S. as a party, the dire consequences that are
endlessly predicted if America is not in are being wildly exaggerated.
Anytime the United States joins, the 25 percent of the tab that it is
supposed to pick up will give Washington considerable influence in the
new U.N. bureaucracy set up to implement the CWC.
The Clinton Administration's real--but largely unacknowledged
concern--is that this arms control house-of-cards may collapse if the
United States does not ratify the treaty. After all, in its absence,
not one party to the Convention is likely to be an acknowledged
chemical weapons state. The unfunded costs, combined with the inability
to inspect American companies while possibly exposing their own to
undesired inspections, will almost certainly prompt most states parties
to think better of the whole idea. \5\
<bullet> Item: The CWC Will Harm American Business Interests
President Clinton further claimed that, ``If we are outside this
agreement rather than inside, it is our chemical companies, our leading
exporters, which will face mandatory trade restrictions that could cost
them hundreds of millions of dollars in sales.'' The truth is that no
one has yet been able to document the $600 million cost the Chemical
Manufacturers Association incessantly claims will arise from trade
restrictions on U.S. industry if America is not a treaty party.
What is more, the actual cost (probably closer to $30 million)
arising from such restrictions will be insignificant compared to the
additional costs treaty participation will impose on taxpayers and
private companies (conservatively estimated to be in the billions of
dollars). \6\
<bullet> Jane's Underscores the Irresponsible Nature of the Clinton
Snow-Job
Today's CWC photo opportunity at the White House seems all the more
ignominious against the backdrop of a news item carried in this
morning's Washington Post. It seems that the forward to Jane's Air
Defense 1997-98, a highly respected London-based defense publication,
confirms that Russia has developed a new variant of the lethal anthrax
toxin that is totally resistant to antibiotics''--in flagrant violation
of an earlier ``international norm'' governing biological weapons
activities.
More to the present point, Jane's notes that the Russians have also
developed three nerve agents ``that could be made without using any of
the precursor chemicals, which are banned under the 1993 Chemical
Weapons Convention.'' It added that ``two of the new nerve agents are
eight times as deadly as the VX nerve agent that Iraq has acknowledged
stockpiling, while the other is as deadly as VX.'' (Emphasis added.)
Unfortunately, this information is but the latest indication of bad
faith on the part of the Russian government of Boris Yeltsin. One would
have thought, for example, that the Kremlin's complete reneging on the
Wyoming Memorandum and the Bilateral Destruction Agreement would have
shamed their co-author, former Secretary of State James Baker, into
staying away from the White House fandango for a CWC that was supposed
to have been critically underpinned by these earlier agreements. \7\
The Bottom Line
The Center for Security Policy believes that it is becoming
increasingly clear why the Clinton Administration and its allies on the
Chemical Weapons Convention are relying on razzle-dazzle powerplays
like today's--and eschewing opportunities for a real debate: The CWC is
unlikely to be approved if its fate is determined on the merits.
By contrast, critics of the CWC are committed to fostering a real,
thorough and informed debate. Toward that end, it looks forward to the
start of hearings next week in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
led off by three of this century's most distinguished American public
servants: Former Secretaries of Defense James Schlesinger, \8\ Donald
Rumsfeld and Caspar Weinberger. Let the debate begin!

notes:
\1\ See Just Which Chemical Weapons Convention Is Colin Powell
Supporting--And Does He Know The Difference? (No. 97-D 48, 3 April
1997).
\2\ For more on the absurd `Poisons for Peace' aspect of the CWC,
see Truth or Consequences #8: The CWC Will Exacerbate The Proliferation
Of Chemical Warfare Capabilities (No. 97-D 38, 6 March 1997).
\3\ See ``Margin of Terror: In the two years since the Tokyo subway
incident, local and Federal officials have had a chance to prepare
Washington for a devastating chemical or biological attack. So why
haven't they?'' by John Cloud in the 14 March 1997 issue of the
Washington City Paper.
\4\ For more on the threat of chemical weapons, see Truth or
Consequences #6: The CWC Will Not Prevent Chemical Terrorism Against
the U.S. or its Interests (No. 97-D 30, 22 February 1997).
\5\ For more on this fraudulent timeline, see the Center's Decision
Brief entitled Truth or Consequences #2: Senate Does Not Need To
Sacrifice Sensible Study of CWC to Meet an Artificial Deadline (No. 97-
D 18, 31 January 1997). For more on the non-declaration problem, see
Truth or Consequences #9: CWC Proponents Dissemble About Treaty
Arrangements Likely To Disserve U.S. Interests (No. 97-D 46, 27 March
1997).
\6\ For more on the costs--both direct and indirect to American
firms--see the Center's Decision Brief entitled Truth or Consequences
#5. The CWC Will Not Be Good for Business--To Say Nothing of The
National Interest (No. 97-D 27, 17 February 1997).
\7\ For more on Russia's chemical weapons programs, its behavior on
the Bilateral Destruction Agreement and their implications, for the
Chemical Weapons Convention, see the Center's Decision Brief entitled
Russia's Covert Chemical Weapons Program Vindicates Jesse Helms'
Continuing Opposition to Phony CW Arms Control (No. 97-D 19, 4 February
1997).
\8\ While all three of these gentlemen have held other,
distinguished positions, it is noteworthy in the present context that
Secretary Schlesinger also served as a Director of Central Intelligence
in the Nixon Administration and as a Secretary of Energy for President
Jimmy Carter, a Democrat.

__________
No. 97-D 43
21 March 1997

Republicans' Senate Leadership Offers Constructive Alternative To
Fatally Flawed Chemical Weapons Convention

(Washington, D.C.): The Senate Republican leadership (i.e.,
Majority Leader Trent Lott, Majority Whip Don Nickles, Republican
Conference Committee Chairman Connie Mack and Conference Secretary Paul
Coverdell) has joined the chairmen of the Senate Foreign Relations and
Intelligence Committees (Sens. Jesse Helms and Richard Shelby,
respectively) as sponsors of critically important legislation
introduced yesterday by Sen. Jon Kyl (R-AZ). This bill, known as the
``Chemical and Biological Weapons Threat Reduction Act of 1997'' (S.
495) makes it clear that the debate over the Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC) is not, as some treaty proponents contend, a dispute
between those who are opposed to chemical weapons and those who favor
poison gas.
S. 495 establishes, instead, that the Senate has a real choice--
between a Republican leadership approach toward dealing with the threat
of chemical weapons that is operationally oriented, practical,
enforceable and relatively inexpensive and the CWC approach that is
declaratory, ineffective, unenforceable and costly. This should not be
a hard choice for any thoughtful legislator.
Highlights of the CBW Threat Reduction Act include the following:
<bullet> Creating civil and criminal penalties for the acquisition,
possession, transfer or use of chemical and biological weapons.
<bullet> Lays out a range of sanctions to be imposed upon any country
that uses CBW against another country or against its own
nationals. These include suspending: U.S. foreign assistance,
arms sales and the associated financing, multilateral trade
credits, aviation rights and/or diplomatic relations.
<bullet> Calls for adding enforcement mechanisms to the existing,
multilateral Conventions concerning chemical and biological
weapons.
<bullet> Establishes as U.S. policy the goal of preserving existing
national and multilateral restrictions on chemical and
biological trade. These arrangements are at direct risk from
the CWC's Article XI.
<bullet> Affirms existing U.S. policy governing the right to use Riot
Control Agents (RCAs) in both peacetime and wartime. This would
countermand President Clinton's plan to deny American
servicemen and women the ability to use tear gas and other RCAs
during wartime search-and-rescue operations and when combatants
and non-combatants are intermingled.
S. 495 makes clear the United States' intention to dismantle its
existing stockpile of chemical weapons and to participate in sensible,
effective non-proliferation efforts. It is a valuable contribution to
the debate on curbing the threat posed by chemical weapons--a debate
that is expected to become much more intense as the Clinton
Administration tries to coerce the Senate into rubber-stamping the
Chemical Weapons Convention by the middle of April.

__________
No. 97-D 34
26 February 1997

A Place To Start on Campaign Finance Reform: C.M.A. Should Refrain From
Putting Senators in Compromising Positions On the Chemical Weapons
Convention

(Washington, D.C.): Last night, the Chemical Manufacturers
Association (CMA), an organization representing some 190 large American
and multinational chemical producers, held a Washington fund-raiser for
the Senate Majority Leader, Sen. Trent Lott (R-MS). This event
presumably will help the distinguished Republican leader prepare his
war chest for future electoral campaigns. It seems inconceivable,
however, that this event could have the effect CMA probably hoped for--
namely, inducing Senator Lott to disregard the serious concerns he has
expressed about the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and to secure the
treaty's prompt ratification.
After all, such an initiative occurs at the very moment that Bill
Clinton's presidency is undergoing a Chinese water-torture (pun
intended) of daily revelations about fund-raisers buying access,
influence and policy changes. This event, and other Capitol Hill
occasions like it sponsored by interested parties such as CMA, can only
complicate the position of Senators obliged to act on the controversial
CWC.
The CMA is, nonetheless, reportedly investing millions of dollars
in its campaign for CWC ratification--a campaign being carefully
coordinated with the Clinton Ad-
ministration and others. As the Center has documented in recent weeks
in its Truth or Consequences series of Decision Briefs, \1\ this effort
appears intended to obscure the key problems with this convention that
have been identified by an array of knowledgeable experts--problems
called to the attention of the Senate a few months ago by no less a
figure than Senator Lott.
Senator Lott, On the Record
In fact, on 9 September 1996--shortly before the administration
realized that it did not have the votes to approve the Chemical Weapons
Convention and asked that it be withdrawn from consideration--Senator
Lott made an important floor speech concerning the CWC's myriad flaws.
Highlights of his remarks included the following:
``...As we near consideration of [the CWC], I wanted to share
with my colleagues some of the correspondence that I have
recently received. Late on Friday of last week, I received a
letter of opposition to the Convention signed by more than 50
defense and foreign policy experts, including two former
Secretaries of Defense, former members of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, and many others.
``The letter made four fundamental points: The Chemical
Weapons Convention is not global, it is not effective, and is
not verifiable, but it will have significant costs to American
security. Their letter concludes by stating that, `The national
security benefits of the Chemical Weapons Convention clearly do
not outweigh its considerable costs. Consequently, we
respectfully urge you to reject ratification of the CWC unless
and until it is made genuinely global, effective, and
verifiable.'
``This is not my judgment. It is the judgment, however, of
Caspar Weinberger, William Clark, Dr. Jeane Kirkpatrick, Ed
Meese, Dick Cheney, and many others who served with distinction
under Presidents Reagan and Bush. I think their views deserve
serious consideration from every Member.
``As you will note, two of those names that I read are former
Secretaries of Defense and certainly highly respected. Our
colleague from the House of Representatives, Dick Cheney, is
one that I really had not known exactly what his position was,
so it was of great interest to me to see what his thoughts
might be.
``I have two other letters that I encourage Members to
review. First, the National Federation of Independent Business
wrote to me today expressing serious concern about the impact
of the CWC on the more than 600,000 members of the NFIB. The
letter notes that under the CWC, for the first time small
businesses would be subject to a foreign entity inspecting
their businesses. The concerns that are expressed concerning
increased regulatory burden of the Chemical Weapons Convention
on American small business I think should be weighed very
carefully before coming to a decision about his or her attitude
and what the position would be of that Senator on the
convention. I know my colleagues do not want to vote first and
ask questions later when it comes to small business, which
already bears a disproportionate share of the regulatory burden
from the Federal Government.
``I also received a letter today from retired Gen. James A.
Williams, former head of the Defense Intelligence Agency with
almost four decades of experience in intelligence. General
Williams raises very serious concerns over the potential of CWC
being used to gain proprietary information from American
business. He concludes that `there is potential for the loss of
untold billions of dollars of trade secrets which can be used
to gain competitive advantage, to shorten R&D cycles, and to
steal U.S. market share.' Many businesses have contacted my
office and the offices of other Senators expressing these and
similar concerns about Senate action on this convention. ...
``I wanted to call to the Senate's attention this
correspondence that I have outlined because it is very
important that a range of views be made available to all
Senators. The administration has been making its case for quite
some time, but opponents of the convention have just begun the
serious examination the convention really deserves. ...
``My own personal greatest concern is the question of
verification. What do we do about Iraq? If we pass a convention
like this, that would be applicable to us, sort of the law-
abiding citizens of the world, how do we make sure what is
happening in Iraq, North Korea, and Libya, the renegade
countries of the world? Is this going to be a situation where
we go forward with this convention, this Chemical Weapons
Convention, yet those who are the real threat do not
participate, or deny that they are involved, or we are not in a
position where we can verify what they are actually doing?''
The Bottom Line
As the foregoing remarks indicate, Senator Lott has approached the
controversial Chemical Weapons Convention in a fair, reasonable and
statesmanlike fashion. He has been responsive to the Clinton
Administration's insistence that the treaty be scheduled for a vote
last fall, its request on 12 September 1996 that the order for a vote
be vitiated (in the face of certain defeat) and its demands this year
for negotiations aimed at reviving the CWC's prospects and/or fixing
the accord's shortcomings. At the same time, he has striven to ensure
that the concerns of his colleagues and others opposed to this treaty
are not given short shrift.
It would be a grave disservice to the Majority Leader, to the
institution he manages so ably and to the Nation if the appearance that
strings were attached to the Chemical Manufacturers Association's
largess were to sully Senator Lott's future stewardship of the top CMA
legislative agenda item--the CWC. The Center for Security Policy calls
on CMA to refrain from using its deep-pocketed Political Action
Committee in ways that could compromise the integrity of the debate on
the Chemical Weapons Convention and put key participants in that debate
in compromising positions.

notes:
\1\ These papers--dealing with issues like the Convention's impact
on the U.S. military, on American businesses, on citizens'
Constitutional rights, etc.--can be accessed via the Center's site on
the World Wide Web (www.security-policy.org) or by contacting the
Center.

__________
No. 97-D 18
31 January 1997

Truth or Consequences #2: Senate Does Not Need To Sacrifice Sensible
Scrutiny of CWC To Meet an Artificial Deadline

(Washington, D.C.): A centerpiece of the Clinton Administration's
campaign to obtain expedited Senate action on the controversial
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is the argument that something
terrible will happen if the treaty is not ratified by April 29th.
Precisely what the terrible something is--and what its implications for
U.S. interests will be--has proved to be a little hard to pin down. The
reason for this is because there will be no significant harm if the
Senate declines to rubber-stamp this ill-conceived Convention in
response to what amounts to a wholly artificial deadline.
The CWC Is Incomplete
Clinton Administration officials claim that if the United States
doesn't ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention before 29 April, it will
be unable to participate in deliberations at the Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) which will ``flesh out'' some
critical issues. The Administration thus admits that the treaty
awaiting the advice and consent of the U.S. Senate is not a finished
document.
In the Bush Administration's haste to have a Convention ready for
signature prior to its departure from office, a number of details--for
example, particulars concerning the conduct of on-site inspections--
were left unresolved. They were to be finalized by a preparatory
commission prior to entry-into-force. Such details can have important
consequences.
CWC advocates point to this reality as a compelling reason for
getting the United States to ratify the treaty before April 29th (the
date on which the Convention is supposed to enter into force). But they
cannot have it both ways: If the details yet to be worked out may
materially affect the acceptability of the treaty, the Senate is being
asked to sign on to a work-in-progress--or perhaps a pig-in-a-poke
since the negotiations may or may not come out acceptably. On the other
hand, if the treaty is ripe for Senate approval, the details that
remain to be sorted out should not be so important. In that case, the
argument that the United States must participate in their negotiation
as a state party is not compelling.
The United States is Already Involved in the Ongoing Negotiations
The truth is that the United States is already participating in the
preparatory commission's negotiations on the CWC's outstanding details,
even before the Senate gives its advice and consent. As a result, the
administration is being represented, notwithstanding the fact that the
U.S. has yet to become a state party.
Russia Is Not a State Party, Either
Another nation has to have a keen interest in the outcome of these
negotiations: Russia. In fact, the Kremlin has already served notice
that if the OPCW proceeds to finalize the CWC's implementation and
other outstanding particulars in ways unsatisfactory to Russia's
interests, Moscow will never agree to ratify.
European and other states parties appear to have taken this Russian
threat seriously and seem increasingly disinclined to complete work on
the treaty's details pending Russia's ratification. \1\ If so, the
United States should feel no undue pressure to complete its own
ratification debate. In any event, it is far from clear why the U.S.
should feel compelled to ratify the treaty before Russia does. After
all, Russia has the world's largest arsenal of chemical weapons,
continues to produce new and more dangerous chemical arms and is widely
expected to continue to do so even if Russia becomes a state party.
The United States Will Have Considerable Influence Irrespective of When
It Joins the CWC
By virtue of the immense size, technological advantages and
valuable products of the U.S. commercial chemical industry, the United
States will inevitably be the ``600-pound gorilla'' in the OPCW if and
when it decides to become a state party. The contention that the
preferences of the United States will be ignored in the implementation
of the CWC is, consequently, implausible.
This is particularly true since Washington will be expected to pay
25 percent of the OPCW's operating costs--a substantially larger
portion of the organization's budget than will be borne by any other
nation. Even if, as the Clinton Administration claims, this tithe will
amount to no more than $25 million annually, \2\ such a sum represents
an obvious source of leverage should the United States need to exercise
it to protect its interests in OPCW deliberations.
The United States Will Have Standing Irrespective of When It Ratifies
the CWC
CWC proponents suggest that, if the United States does not ratify
the treaty by 29 April, it will not be an original state party--
condemning it to second-class status with adverse implications for its
ability to have its personnel participate in on-site inspections. In
fact, by virtue of its being among the first nations to sign this
Convention, the United States will in accordance with standard
diplomatic practice be considered to be an original state party
whenever it chooses to join the treaty regime.
While it is true that, until that time, the United States will not
be able to have its personnel conduct on-site inspections, this may
well prove to be the case even if the U.S. does ratify the CWC! In
fact, countries being subjected to challenge inspections have the right
to deny individual inspectors entry. Those nations unfriendly to the
United States and, presumably, of greatest concern from a compliance
point of view, are likely to exercise this right to preclude U.S.
monitors. After all, if there is any prospect that an on-site inspector
will be able to detect an illegal, covert chemical weapons program,
chances are that it will be an American that does it.
(Unfortunately, those chances are likely to be reduced dramatically
should the Clinton Administration succeed in an initiative now being
discussed in the interagency process, one that would start sharing with
the OPCW sensitive U.S. methods for detecting clandestine programs.
Similar training given to the International Atomic Energy Agency gave
representatives of Saddam Hussein's government and other rogue states
invaluable lessons in how to defeat international monitoring and on-
site inspection regimes.)
For its part, however, the United States will find it difficult--if
not impossible as a practical matter--to object to all of the foreign
inspectors whose participation in challenge inspections in this country
will be of concern. Needless to say, this will not be because of any
danger that a covert American CW program will be detected since the
U.S. will have no such program. Rather, it will be because such
individuals will assuredly try to expropriate confidential business
information (CBI) or other sensitive data from the targeted U.S.
facilities.
The Bottom Line
In short, the April 29th deadline is an artificial one, promoted
principally so as to try to force the U.S. Senate to complete action on
the Chemical Weapons Convention without further, substantive
consideration of this accord's myriad shortcomings. So artificial is
this deadline that the Clinton Administration bears considerable
responsibility for creating it. After all, the administration last
October vigorously encouraged Hungary to become the 65th nation to
deposit its instruments of ratification, thereby starting the clock on
the 6-month run-up to entry-into-force. Its trans-
parent purpose in doing so was to intensify pressure on the Senate to
provide its uninformed advice and consent.
If anything, the Administration's efforts to try to foreshorten or
confuse the debate about the Chemical Weapons Convention suggest that
the Senate would be well advised to defer U.S. ratification until after
the treaty enters into force. Doing so would afford an opportunity to
validate--or disprove--the various concerns being expressed by this
treaty's knowledgeable critics. It may, in fact, be the only way such
concerns can be fully and authoritatively addressed without grave risk
to American security, commercial and taxpayer interests.
Last but not least, it must be said that a treaty not worth
ratifying is assuredly not worth ratifying quickly. For reasons
described at length elsewhere, \3\ it would be unsafe to ratify the CWC
at any speed.

notes:
\1\ There are as-yet-unsubstantiated rumors circulating in The
Hague (where the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
or OPCW is located) that the date of entry into force may be postponed,
rather than have the CWC come into effect without the participation of
nations such as Russia and possibly China (which has yet to deposit the
instruments of ratification).
\2\ The truth is, however, that the OPCW is constantly revising its
budget estimates in an upwards direction. A more realistic estimate--
derived from actual experience with another U.N. bureaucracy--the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)--suggests that the budget is
more likely to be on the order of $266 million, which would translate
into a U.S. share of at least $66 million per year.
\3\ See, for example, Truth or Consequences #1: Center Challenges
Administration Efforts to Distort, Suppress Debate on CWC (No. 97-D 14,
28 January 1997). Other products detailing the CWC's fatal flaws can be
obtained via the Center's site on the World Wide Web (www.security-
policy.org).

__________
No. 97-D 7
13 January 1997

Clinton's Chemical Power Play: Bad For The Senate, Bad For The National
Interest

(Washington, D.C.): The Clinton Administration is mounting a
campaign against the leadership of the U.S. Senate that has all the
subtlety of a Mafia hit. The immediate object of its intimidation is
Senator Trent Lott (R-MS), whose knees are at risk of being broken
(presumably, figuratively) unless he bends to the President's will. To
do so, however, the Majority Leader will, in turn, have to ``take out''
the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Jesse
Helms (R-NC)--and with him, the Senate's rules concerning the
consideration of treaties and that institution's way of doing business
more generally.
The Administration is resorting to such tactics for a very simple
reason: Senator Helms is in a position indefinitely to bottle up a
highly controversial treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).
Incredible though it may seem Secretary of State-designate Madeleine
Albright declared last week that ratification of this Convention was
the Clinton team's top, near-term foreign policy priority.
Unfortunately for them--and happily for the national interest--Senate
procedures permit Chairman Helms permanently to pocket veto this treaty
by declining to bring it up for a vote in his Committee.
Jesse Helms--Horatius at the Bridge
This is fortuitous for the national interest because, to his
lasting credit, Senator Helms correctly concluded in the course of
intensive Senate consideration of the Chemical Weapons Convention last
fall that this treaty was fatally flawed. Since a sufficient number of
Senators agreed with him in September 1996 to defeat the CWC, the
Administration decided to withdraw it--hoping it would meet a different
fate if presented later. Apparently, such is the Clinton team's
contempt for members of the Senate--which is exceeded only by its
disdain for their constitutional role in treaty-making \1\--that it
thinks legislators either have forgotten what is wrong with this
Convention or can be euchred into agreeing to it, if only enough
coercive pressure is brought to bear.
Thanks to Chairman Helms and thoughtful colleagues like Senator Jon
Kyl (R-AZ), though, the Senate will be reminded of the overarching
reason for opposing the Chemical Weapons Convention: It is likely to
contribute to the proliferation of chemical weapons, not eliminate it.
Not Global: After all, the Convention will not impose a global ban
on chemical weapons, let alone rid them from the world, as its
proponents often claim. In fact, it will not apply to every country
that has chemical weapons. A number of the most dangerous rogue
states--including North Korea, Syria and Iraq--have announced that they
will not become parties to the CWC. Such nations tend cynically to see
such ``international norms'' not as an impediment to pursuing
prohibited activities but as an invitation to do so.
Not Verifiable: What is more, thanks to the inherent
unverifiability of the Chemical Weapons Convention, even some of those
who do join the regime will retain covert chemical stockpiles. The
unalterable fact of life is that chemical weapons can be easily
produced. By using facilities that are designed, for example, to
manufacture fertilizers, pesticides or pharmaceuticals, they can be
produced in considerable (even ``militarily significant'') quantities
in relatively short periods of time. This is an objective reality that
means the CWC is not simply ``less than perfect''; it is an exercise in
futility.
Indeed, Saddam Hussein has demonstrated that on-site inspections
far more intrusive and timely than those provided for by the CWC cannot
confidently monitor the covert weapons programs of totalitarian regimes
governing closed societies. Consequently, few competent experts believe
that industrialized states like Russia and China will actually get rid
of their existing arsenals, let alone forego future production--
notwithstanding their status as signatories to the CWC.
`Poisons for Peace': Third, the CWC obliges the United States to
help other states parties--including countries like Iran and Cuba--to
gain state-of-the-art manufacturing capabilities that can readily be
used to produce chemical weapons. Unilateral trade embargoes and
multilateral technology control arrangements against such parties to
the CWC would be prohibited. This obligation is a recipe for rampant
chemical weapons proliferation. The prospect that it provides for
expanded overseas sales by U.S. chemical manufacturers, however, is a
principal reason why their powerful lobby is helping the Clinton
Administration make offers to Senators ``they can't refuse.''
Other Fatal Flaws: Opponents of the Chemical Weapons Convention
recognize that it will have other undesirable repercussions, as well.
For one, it will likely create a false sense of security that the
burgeoning problem of chemical weapons proliferation has been
meaningfully addressed. This placebo effect will almost exacerbate the
dangers of chemical attacks by reducing our preparedness to deal with
them. For another, the CWC--as interpreted by the Clinton
Administration--will have the absurd effect of denying our military the
right to use chemical-based Riot Control Agents like tear gas to
protect themselves in situations where the use of lethal force can, and
should, be avoided. Finally, the CWC will grant a U.N. agency the right
to inspect anyplace in America--private or public, factories,
facilities, even homes--on short notice, without a warrant, and without
compensation for the associated costs, including for any proprietary
information that might thus be lost.
The Bottom Line
Today, on the fourth anniversary of the signing of the Chemical
Weapons Convention, President Clinton issued a statement that declared
disingenuously: ``Early CWC ratification by the United States is
extraordinarily important. The security of our soldiers and citizens is
at stake, as is the economic well-being of our chemical industry.'' He
concluded by saying: ``I look forward to working with the Senate
leadership to get the job [of ratifying the Convention] done.''
Notice is thus served. Using such presidential statements and phone
calls, a drumbeat of sympathetic editorials and op.eds. And other
pressure tactics, the Administration hopes to squeeze Senator Lott to
break the CWC loose. It has even asked him to remove the Chemical
Weapons Convention from the jurisdiction of Senator Helms' committee.
Were Sen. Lott to agree, he would be creating a precedent that would
wreak havoc on Senate operations. Fortunately, while the Majority
Leader is committed to cooperate with the President where possible, he
is unlikely to accommodate an Administration power play where
cooperation is neither in the interest of the Senate as an institution
nor the Nation as a whole.

notes:
\1\ See the Center's Press Release entitled Will the Senate Let
Clinton Rewrite the C.F.E. Treaty Without Its Advice and Consent? (No.
96-P 86, 18 September 1996).

__________
No. 97-T 5
8 January 1997

Here We Go Again: Clinton Presses Anew For Senate Approval Of Flawed,
Unverifiable, Ineffective Chemical Weapons Treaty

(Washington, D.C.): In recent days, the Clinton Administration has
launched a new campaign to secure Senate advice and consent to
ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Such a campaign
was made necessary by its decision last September to withdraw the
treaty from scheduled Senate consideration, rather than risk its
certain defeat.
Now, sympathetic columnists like the Washington Post's Mary McGrory
have been enlisted to hammer Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-MS)
to bring the CWC back to the Senate floor. Retired flag officers like
Admiral Elmo Zumwalt are being trotted out to declare that the military
strongly supports this Convention. And just yesterday, the President
used the occasion of the receipt of the interim report of his
commission on Gulf War syndrome--which may be related to widespread
exposure of U.S. servicemen and women to Iraqi chemical weapons--to
imply that ratification of the CWC would ``protect the soldiers of the
United States and our allies in the future'' by ``mak[ing] it harder
for rogue states to acquire chemical weapons in the future.''
Senator Lott has responded to such pressure by announcing yesterday
that he would ask the ``appropriate committee members and chairmen'' to
reopen hearings on the treaty early in this session with a view to
seeing what can be done to address the scourge of chemical weapons and
the threat they pose to world peace. That decision puts the ball
squarely back, first and foremost, in the court of Foreign Relations
Committee chairman Jesse Helms (R-NC), whose opposition to the CWC was
critical to the treaty's withdrawal from consideration last fall.
Let the Debate Begin, Again
The Center for Security Policy welcomes the prospect of new
hearings into the Chemical Weapons Convention, presumably before not
only Sen. Helms' panel but also before the Armed Services, Intelligence
(under new management) and perhaps other committees. With the
installation yesterday of new Members comprising nearly one-fifth of
the Senate, there is clearly a need to review the gravity of the
problem posed by the proliferation of chemical weapons and the
regrettable fact that this convention will not only prove no real
impediment to such proliferation--it will probably serve actually to
exacerbate the problem.
The Center looks forward to continuing during such a review the
educational role it performed last year. As part of that function, it
is attaching for the information of all Senators--and in response to
Adm. Zumwalt's op.ed. In Monday's Washington Post--a letter sent to
Senator Lott on 6 September 1996 by 68 distinguished former senior
civilian and military officials, including notably former Bush
Administration Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney. They conclude
authoritatively that the CWC should be rejected in its present form
since it will not be global in its scope, verifiable or effective. The
Center is confident that sufficient Senators will reach a similar
conclusion should the Foreign Relations Committee decide to report the
treaty out for action by the full Senate.

September 9, 1996.
Hon. Trent Lott,
Majority Leader, United States Senate,
Washington, DC 20510.
Senator Lott: As you know, the Senate is currently scheduled to
take final action on the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) on or before
September 14th. This Treaty has been presented as a global, effective
and verifiable ban on chemical weapons. As individuals with
considerable experience in national security matters, we would all
support such a ban. We have, however, concluded that the present
convention is seriously deficient on each of these scores, among
others.
The CWC is not global since many dangerous nations (for example,
Iran, Syria, North Korea, and Libya) have not agreed to join the treaty
regime. Russia is among those who have signed the Convention, but is
unlikely to ratify--especially without a commitment of billions in U.S.
aid to pay for the destruction of Russia's vast arsenal. Even then,
given our experience with the Kremlin's treaty violations and its
repeated refusal to implement the 1990 Bilateral Destruction Agreement
on chemical weapons, future CWC violations must be expected.
The CWC is not effective because it does not ban or control
possession of all chemicals that could be used for lethal weapons
purposes. For example, it does not prohibit two chemical agents that
were employed with deadly effect in World War I--phosgene and hydrogen
cyanide. The reason speaks volumes about this treaty's impractical
nature: they are too widely used for commercial purposes to be banned.
The CWC is not verifiable as the U.S. intelligence community has
repeatedly acknowledged in congressional testimony. Authoritarian
regimes can be confident that their violations will be undetectable.
Now, some argue that the treaty's intrusive inspections regime will
help us know more than we would otherwise. The relevant test, however,
is whether any additional information thus gleaned will translate into
convincing evidence of cheating and result in the collective imposition
of sanctions or other enforcement measures. In practice, this test is
unlikely to be satisfied since governments tend to took the other way
at evidence of non-compliance rather than jeopardize a treaty regime.
What the CWC will do, however, is quite troubling: It will create a
massive new, U.N.-style international inspection bureaucracy (which
will help the total cost of this treaty to U.S. taxpayers amount to as
much as $200 million per year). It will jeopardize U.S. citizens'
constitutional rights by requiring the U.S. government to permit
searches without either warrants or probable cause. It will impose a
costly and complex regulatory burden on U.S. industry. As many as 8,000
companies across the country may be subjected to new reporting
requirements entailing uncompensated annual costs of between thousands
to hundreds-of-thousands of dollars per year to comply. Most of these
American companies have no idea that they will be affected. And perhaps
worst of all, the CWC will undermine the standard of verifiability that
has been a key national security principle for the United States.
Under these circumstances, the national security benefits of the
Chemical Weapons Convention clearly do not outweigh its considerable
costs. Consequently, we respectfully urge you to reject ratification of
the CWC unless and until it is made genuinely global, effective and
verifiable.

Signatories on Letter to Senator Trent Lott Regarding the Chemical
Weapons Convention

As of September 9, 1996; 11:30 a.m.

Former Cabinet Members:
Richard B. Cheney, former Secretary of Defense

William P. Clark, former National Security Advisor to the President
Alexander M. Haig, Jr., former Secretary of State (signed on September
10)

John S. Herrington, former Secretary of Energy (signed on September 9)

Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations

Edwin Meese III, former U.S. Attorney General

Donald Rumsfeld, former Secretary of Defense (signed on September 10)

Caspar Weinberger, former Secretary of Defense
Additional Signatories (retired military):

General John W. Foss, U.S. Army (Retired), former Commanding General,
Training and Doctrine Command

Vice Admiral William Houser, U.S. Navy (Retired), former Deputy Chief
of Naval Operations for Aviation

General P.X. Kelley, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired), former Commandant of
U.S. Marine Corps (signed on September 9)

Lieutenant General Thomas Kelly, U.S. Army (Retired), former Director
for Operations, Joint Chiefs of Staff (signed on September 9)

Admiral Wesley McDonald, U.S. Navy (Retired), former Supreme Allied
Commander, Atlantic

Admiral Kinnaird McKee, U.S. Navy (Retired), former Director, Naval
Nuclear Propulsion

General Merrill A. McPeak, U.S. Air Force (Retired), former Chief of
Staff, U.S. Air Force

Lieutenant General T.H. Miller, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired), former
Fleet Marine Force Commander/Head, Marine Aviation

General John. L. Piotrowski, U.S. Air Force (Retired), former Member of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff as Vice Chief, U.S. Air Force

General Bernard Schriever, U.S. Air Force (Retired), former Commander,
Air Research and Development and Air Force Systems Command

Vice Admiral Jerry Unruh, U.S. Navy (Retired), former Commander 3rd
Fleet (signed on September 10)

Lieutenant General James Williams, U.S. Army (Retired), former
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Additional Signatories (non-military):
Elliott Abrams, former Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American
Affairs (signed on September 9)

Mark Albrecht, former Executive Secretary, National Space Council

Kathleen Bailey, former Assistant Director of the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency

Robert B. Barker, former Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for
Nuclear and Chemical Weapon Matters

Angelo Codevilla, former Senior Fellow, Hoover Institute (signed on
September 10)

Henry Cooper, former Director, Strategic Defense Initiative
Organization

J.D. Crouch, former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense

Midge Decter, former President, Committee for the Free World

Kenneth deGraffenreid, former Senior Director of Intelligence Programs,
National Security Council

Diana Denman, former Co-Chair, U.S. Peace Corps Advisory Council

Elaine Donnelly, former Commissioner, Presidential Commission on the
Assignment of Women in the Armed Services

David M. Evans, former Senior Advisor to the Congressional Commission
on Security and Cooperation in Europe

Charles Fairbanks, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State

Douglas J. Feith, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense

Rand H. Fishbein, former Professional Staff member, Senate Defense
Appropriations Subcommittee

Frank J. Gaffney, Jr., former Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense

William R. Graham, former Science Advisor to the President

E.C. Grayson, former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy

James T. Hackett, former Acting Director of the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency

Stefan Halper, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State (signed on
September 10)

Thomas N. Harvey, former National Space Council Staff Officer (signed
on September 9)

Charles A. Hamilton, former Deputy Director, Strategic Trade Policy,
U.S. Department of Defense

Amoretta M. Hoeber, former Deputy Under Secretary, U.S. Army

Charles Horner, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Science
and Technology

Fred Ikle, former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

Sven F. Kraemer, former Director for Arms Control, National Security
Council

Charles M. Kupperman, former Special Assistant to the President

John Lehman, former Secretary of the Navy

John Lenczowski, former Director for Soviet Affairs, National Security
Council

Bruce Merrifield, former Assistant Secretary for Technology Policy,
Department of Commerce

Taffy Gould McCallum, columnist and free-lance writer

James C. McCrery, former senior member of the Intelligence Community
and Arms Control Negotiator (Standing Consultative Committee)

J. William Middendorf II, former Secretary of the Navy (signed on
September 10)

Laurie Mylroie, best-selling author and Mideast expert specializing in
Iraqi affairs

Richard Perle, former Assistant Secretary of Defense

Norman Podhoretz, former editor, Commentary Magazine

Roger W. Robinson, Jr., former Chief Economist, National Security
Council

Peter W. Rodman, former Deputy Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs and former Director of the Policy Planing
Staff, Department of State

Edward Rowny, former Advisor to the President and Secretary of State
for Arms Control

Carl M. Smith, former Staff Director, Senate Armed Services Committee

Jacqueline Tillman, former Staff member, National Security Council

Michelle Van Cleave, former Associate Director, Office of Science and
Technology

William Van Cleave, former Senior Defense Advisor and Defense Policy
Coordinator to the President

Malcolm Wallop, former United States Senator

Deborah L. Wince-Smith, former Assistant Secretary for Technology
Policy, Department of Commerce

Curtin Winsor, Jr., former U.S. Ambassador to Costa Rica

Dov S. Zakheim, former Deputy Under Secretary of Defense

__________
No. 97-D 48
3 April 1997

Just Which Chemical Weapons Convention Is Colin Powell Supporting--And
Does He Know The Difference?

(Washington, D.C.): Starting tomorrow, the Clinton Administration
intends to make General Colin Powell--the former Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff--its Poster Child for the campaign to gain Senate
approval of the controversial Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).
According to the Associated Press, this campaign will be kicked off at
a ``highpowered, bipartisan gathering of treaty supporters ...
featuring Congressmen, veterans' group leaders, arms experts, religious
organization heads and military leaders, past and present,'' including
Army Gen. Colin Powell.
Does Powell Know What He Is Endorsing?
A warning to General Powell is in order, however: The Senate was
recently treated to the spectacle of another accomplished retired flag
officer, General Norman Schwarzkopf, who had to acknowledge that--while
he is on record as supporting the CWC--he is not familiar with its
details. For example, under questioning by Sen. Jim Inhofe (R-OK),
chairman of the Armed Services Committee's Readiness Subcommittee, the
following exchange occurred:
Sen. Inhofe: ``Do you think it wise to share with countries
like Iran our most advanced chemical defensive equipment and
technologies?''
Gen. Schwartzkopf: ``Our defensive capabilities?''
Sen. Inhofe: ``Yes.''
Gen. Schwartzkopf: ``Absolutely not.''
Sen. Inhofe: ``Well, I'm talking about sharing our advanced
chemical defensive equipment and technologies, which I believe
under Article X [they] would be allow[ed] to [get]. Do you
disagree?''
Gen. Schwartzkopf: ``As I said Senator, I'm not familiar with
all the details--I--you know, a country, particularly like
Iran, I think we should share as little as possible with them
in the way of our military capabilities.''
Beware the `Bait and Switch'
General Powell and others who served under President Bush should
also be aware that there have been--as the Center noted on 10 February
1997 \1\--significant changes in a number of the assumptions,
conditions and circumstances that underpinned the Bush Administration's
judgment that the Chemical Weapons Convention was in the national
interest. These changes have prompted several of General Powell's
former colleagues--including Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney, Air
Force Chief of Staff Merrill McPeak, Assistant Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency Director Kathleen Bailey, Assistant to the Secretary
for Atomic Energy Robert Barker and Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense J.D. Crouch--to urge that the present treaty be
rejected by the Senate.\2\
A sample of the changes that have materially altered the
acceptability, if not strictly speaking the terms, of the Chemical
Weapons Convention include the following:
<bullet> Item: Russia's Evisceration of the Bilateral Destruction
Agreement
The Bush Administration anticipated that a Bilateral Destruction
Agreement (BDA) forged by Secretary of State James Baker and his Soviet
counterpart, Eduard Shevardnadze in 1990, would critically underpin the
Chemical Weapons Convention. As the Center for Security Policy observed
in early February,\3\ this agreement obliged Moscow to provide a full
and accurate accounting and eliminate most of its vast chemical
arsenal. The BDA was also expected to afford the U.S. inspection rights
that would significantly enhance the more limited arrangements provided
for by the CWC.
These assumptions about the BDA have, regrettably, not been
fulfilled. To the contrary, Russian Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin
declared last year that the Bilateral Destruction Agreement has
``outlived its usefulness'' for Russia. What is more, it is now public
knowledge that Russia is continuing to produce extremely lethal binary
munitions--weapons that have been specifically designed to circumvent
the limits and defeat the inspection regime of the Chemical Weapons
Convention.\4\
<bullet> Item: On-Site Inspections Won't Prevent Cheating
When the Bush Administration finalized the CWC, there was
considerable hope that intrusive on-site inspections would meaningfully
contribute to the detection and proof of violations, and therefore to
deterring them. Five years of experience with the U.N. inspections in
Iraq--inspections that were allowed to be far more thorough, timely and
intrusive than those permitted under this Convention--have established
that totalitarian rulers of a closed society can successfully defeat
such monitoring efforts.
In a 4 February 1997 letter to National Security Advisor Samuel
Berger, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jesse Helms noted
that:
``Unclassified portions of the National Intelligence Estimate
on U.S. Monitoring Capabilities [prepared after Mr. Bush left
office] indicate that it is unlikely that the U.S. will be able
to detect or address violations in a timely fashion, if at all,
when they occur on a small scale. And yet, even small-scale
diversions of chemicals to chemical weapons production are
capable, over time, of yielding a stockpile far in excess of a
single ton [which General Shalikashvili described in
congressional testimony on 11 August 1994 is a level which
could, `in certain limited circumstances ... have a military
impact.'] Moreover, few countries, if any, are engaging in much
more than small-scale production of chemical agent. For
example, according to [the 4 February 1997] Washington Times,
Russia may produce its new nerve agents at a `pilot plant' in
quantities of only `55 to 110 tons annually.' ''
<bullet> Item: Facilitating Proliferation: `Poisons for Peace'
In the years since the Bush Administration signed the Chemical
Weapons Convention, it has become increasingly clear that sharing
nuclear weapons-relevant technology with would-be proliferators simply
because they promise not to pursue nuclear weapons programs is folly.
Indeed, countries like North Korea, Iran, Iraq, India, Pakistan,
Argentina, Brazil and Algeria have abused this ``Atoms for Peace''
bargain by diverting equipment and know-how provided under the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to prohibited weapons purposes.
Unfortunately, commercial chemical manufacturing technology can, if
anything, be diverted even more easily to weapons purposes than can
nuclear research and power reactors. For this reason, recent experience
with the NPT suggests that the Chemical Weapons Convention's Article
XI--an article dubbed the ``Poisons for Peace'' provision--is
insupportable. It stipulates that the Parties shall:
``Not maintain among themselves any restrictions, including
those in any international agreements, incompatible with the
obligations undertaken under this Convention, which would
restrict or impede trade and the development and promotion of
scientific and technological knowledge in the field of
chemistry for industrial, agricultural, research, medical,
pharmaceutical or other peaceful purposes.''
Such an obligation must now be judged a recipe for accelerating
proliferation of chemical weapons, not restricting it. Even if the
United States were to become a party to the CWC and choose to ignore
this treaty commitment, other advanced industrialized countries will
certainly not refrain from selling dual-use chemical manufacturing
technology if it means making a lucrative sale.
<bullet> Item: U.S. Chemical Defenses Will be Degraded
When the Bush Administration signed the CWC, proponents offered
assurances that the treaty would not diminish U.S. investment in
chemical defenses. Such assurances were called into question, however,
by an initiative unveiled in 1995 by the then-Vice Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral William Owens. He suggested cutting $805
million from counter-proliferation support and chemical and biological
defense programs through Fiscal Year 2001.
This was followed by a recommendation from JCS Chairman General
John Shalikashvili in February 1996--a few weeks before he told the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the Department of Defense is
committed to a ``robust'' chemical defense program. He sought to slash
chemical/biological defense activities and investment by over $1.5
billion through 2003.
The rationale for both these gambits? Thanks to a perceived
reduction in the chemical warfare threat to be brought about by the
CWC, investments in countering that threat could safely enjoy lower
priority. Such reductions would have deferred, if not seriously
disrupted, important chemical and biological research and develop-
ment efforts, and delayed the procurement of proven technologies. While
the Owens and Shalikashvili initiatives were ultimately rejected, they
are a foretaste of the sort of reduced budgetary priority this account
will surely face if the CWC is approved.
Changes in the military postures of key U.S. allies since the end
of the Bush Administration raise a related point: Even if the United
States manages to resist the sirens' song to reduce chemical defenses
in the wake of the CWC, it is predictable that the already generally
deplorable readiness of most allied forces to deal with chemical
threats will only worsen. To the extent that the U.S. is obliged in the
future to fight coalition wars, this vulnerability could prove
catastrophic to American forces engaged with a common enemy.
<bullet> Item: Clinton Repudiates Bush Commitment to the JCS on
R.C.A.s
At the insistence of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1992, President
Bush signed an executive order that explicitly allowed Riot Control
Agents (for example, tear gas) to be used in rescuing downed aircrews
and in dispersing hostile forces using civilians to screen their
movements against U.S. positions. The Clinton Administration initially
indicated that it intended to rescind this executive order outright
once the CWC is ratified. The result of doing so would have been to
compel U.S. personnel to choose between using lethal force where RCAs
would suffice or suffering otherwise avoidable casualties.
In the face of Senate opposition to such a rescission, Mr. Clinton
has apparently decided to allow tear gas and other RCAs to be used in
these selected circumstances, but only in peacetime. In wartime,
however, such use would be considered a breach of the treaty. The
Administration has yet to clarify under what circumstances the Nation
will be considered to be ``at war'' since there has been no declaration
of that state of belligerency in any of the conflicts in which the U.S.
has engaged since 1945.
What is particularly troublesome is the prospect that the Clinton
reversal of the Bush Administration position on RCAs will impinge upon
promising new defense technologies--involving chemical-based, non-
lethal weapons (for example, immobilizing agents). If so, U.S. forces
may be denied highly effective means of prevailing in future conflicts
with minimal loss of life on either side.
Other, No Less Distinguished, National Security Experts Disagree
with General Powell
In a letter sent to Senator Trent Lott last fall, when the Chemical
Weapons Convention was last under consideration by the Senate, a host
of former top civilian and military officials expressed their
opposition to this treaty in its present form. Among the distinguished
retired flag officers were:
General John W. Foss, U.S. Army (Retired), former Commanding
General, Training and Doctrine Command; Vice Admiral William Houser,
U.S. Navy (Retired), former Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for
Aviation; General P.X. Kelley, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired), former
Commandant of U.S. Marine Corps; Lieutenant General Thomas Kelly, U.S.
Army (Retired), former Director for Operations, Joint Chiefs of Staff;
Admiral Wesley McDonald, U.S. Navy (Retired), former Supreme Allied
Commander, Atlantic; Admiral Kinnaird McKee, U.S. Navy (Retired),
former Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion; General Merrill A. McPeak,
U.S. Air Force (Retired), former Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force;
Lieutenant General T.H. Miller, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired), former
Fleet Marine Force Commander/Head, Marine Aviation; General John. L.
Piotrowski, U.S. Air Force (Retired), former Member of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff as Vice Chief, U.S. Air Force; General Bernard Schriever, U.S.
Air Force (Retired), former Commander, Air Research and Development and
Air Force Systems Command; Vice Admiral Jerry Unruh, U.S. Navy
(Retired), former Commander 3rd Fleet; and Lieutenant General James
Williams, U.S. Army (Retired), former Director, Defense Intelligence
Agency.
Among the civilian leaders who signed the open letter to Sen. Lott
were: Richard B. Cheney, former Secretary of Defense; William P. Clark,
former National Security Advisor to the President; Alexander M. Haig,
Jr., former Secretary of State; John S. Herrington, former Secretary of
Energy; Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, former U.S. Ambassador to the United
Nations; Edwin Meese III, former U.S. Attorney General; Donald
Rumsfeld, former Secretary of Defense; and one of General Powell's past
bosses, Caspar Weinberger, former Secretary of Defense.
The Bottom Line
The Center regrets General Powell's decision to lend his authority
to a treaty that even he has freely acknowledged is completely
unverifiable. It fears that he may also come to regret it. In any
event, the Nation surely will, if the Clinton-Powell razzle-dazzle
campaign induces the Senate to take its eyes off the ball--namely, the
fatal flaws that make the Chemical Weapons Convention unworthy of that
institution's advice and consent.

notes:
\1\ See the Center's Decision Brief entitled Truth or Consequences
#4. No D.N.A. Tests Needed To Show That Claims About Republican
Paternity of CWC Are Overblown (No. 97-D 24, 10 February 1997).
\2\ See the Center's Transition Brief entitled Here We Go Again:
Clinton Presses Anew For Senate Approval of Flawed, Unverifiable,
Ineffective Chemical Weapons Treaty (No. 97-T 5, 8 January 1997).
\3\ See the Center's Decision Brief entitled Truth or Consequences
#3: Clinton `Makes a Mistake About It' in Arguing the CWC Will Protect
U.S. Troops (No. 97-D 21, 6 February 1997).
\4\ See the Center's Decision Brief entitled Russia's Covert
Chemical Weapons Program Vindicates Jesse Helms' Continuing Opposition
to Phony CW Arms Control (No. 97-D 19, 4 February 1997).

__________
No. 97-D 37
5 March 1997

Truth or Consequences #7: Schlesinger, Rumsfeld and Weinberger Rebut
Scowcroft and Deutch on the CWC

(Washington, D.C.): Today's Washington Post featured an op.ed.
article by three of the most distinguished public servants of the
latter Twentieth Century--James Schlesinger, Donald Rumsfeld and Caspar
Weinberger--concerning the reasons for opposing the present Chemical
Weapons Convention (CWC). Written in response to an earlier op.ed.
favoring this treaty which was authored by former National Security
Advisor Brent Scowcroft and former Director of Central Intelligence
John Deutch, the Schlesinger-Rumsfeld-Weinberger essay (a copy of which
is attached) should be required reading for every Senator and American
citizen following and/or participating in the debate on the CWC.
That should be the case in part simply because of the stature of
the signatories. Dr. Schlesinger, Mr. Rumsfeld and Mr. Weinberger all
served with distinction in the position of Secretary of Defense,
respectively for Presidents Nixon and Ford, Ford and Reagan. It also is
relevant to the present deliberations that Dr. Schlesinger's views are
informed by his service as Director of Central Intelligence under
President Nixon and Secretary of Energy under President Carter.
The joint op.ed. should also command careful attention because of
the clear and persuasive way it, first, applauds Messrs. Scowcroft and
Deutch's admissions about the CWC's flaws (notably, with respect to the
Convention's unverifiability and the treaty's lack of global coverage)
and, second, underscores their warnings about the dangers inherent in
the accord's ratification (notably, with respect to inspiring a false
sense of security, reduced investment in defensive technologies,
transferring chemical weapons-relevant production and defensive
technology to countries of concern and limitations on the use of
chemical-based non-lethal technologies, such as tear gas).
Finally, the Schlesinger-Rumsfeld-Weinberger essay is of singular
importance by virtue of the powerful rebuttal it offers to the
Scowcroft-Deutch argument that the CWC is ``better than nothing.'' The
three Secretaries conclude to the contrary that--due to the combination
of these defects and dangers inherent in the treaty, combined with its
unacceptably high costs for American businesses and taxpayers--the U.S.
would be better off not being a party than becoming one.
The Bottom Line
The Center for Security Policy commends former Secretaries
Schlesinger, Rumsfeld and Weinberger for this latest in a long line of
real contributions to the national security and commends their article
to all those who will be affected by or responsible for this fatally
flawed accord.

No to the Chemical Arms Treaty

[by James Schlesinger, Caspar Weinberger, and Donald Rumsfeld]

The Washington Post/March 5, 1997.--The phrase ``damning with faint
praise'' is given new meaning by the op-ed by Brent Scowcroft and John
Deutch on the Chemical Convention [``End the Chemical Weapons
Business,'' Feb. 11]. In it, the authors concede virtually every
criticism made by those who oppose this controversial treaty in its
present form.
They acknowledge the legitimacy of key concerns about the
Convention: its essential unverifiability; its lack of global coverage;
the prospect that it will inhibit non-lethal use of chemicals,
including tear gas; and its mandating the transfer of militarily
relevant chemical offensive and defensive technology to untrustworthy
countries that become parties. It is our view that these problems are
inherent in the present treaty.
Take, for example, Scowcroft and Deutch's warning against cutting
investment in chemical defensive measures. Unfortunately, treaties such
as the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)--which promise to reduce the
menace posed by weapons of mass destruction but which cannot do so--
inevitably tend to diminish the perceived need and therefore the
support for defenses against such threats.
In fact, in December 1995, the then-vice chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff recommended a reduction of more than $800 million in
investment on chemical defenses in anticipation of the Convention's
coming into force. If past experience is a guide, there might also be a
reduction in the priority accorded to monitoring emerging chemical
weapons threats, notwithstanding Scowcroft and Deutch's call for
improvements in our ability to track chemical weapons developments.
Scowcroft and Deutch correctly warn that the ``CWC [must] not [be]
exploited to facilitate the diffusion of CWC-specific technology,
equipment and material--even to signatory states.'' The trouble is that
the Chemical Weapons Convention explicitly obligates member states to
facilitate such transfers, even though these items are readily
exploitable for military purposes. What is more, the treaty commits
member states not to observe any agreements, whether multilateral or
unilateral, that would restrict these transfers.
In short, we believe that the problems with the Chemical Weapons
Convention in these and other areas that have been identified by Brent
Scowcroft and John Deutch clearly demonstrate that this treaty would be
contrary to U.S. security interests. Moreover, in our view these
serious problems undercut the argument that the CWC's ``imperfect
constraints'' are better than no constraints at all.
The CWC would likely have the effect of leaving the United States
and its allies more, not less, vulnerable to chemical attack. It could
well serve to increase, not reduce, the spread of chemical weapons
manufacturing capabilities. Thus we would be better off not to be party
to it.
Notably, if the United States is not a CWC member state, the danger
is lessened that American intelligence about ongoing foreign chemical
weapons programs will be dumbed down or otherwise compromised. This has
happened in the past when enforcement of a violated agreement was held
to be a greater threat to an arms control regime than was noncompliance
by another party. The United States and the international community
have been unwilling to enforce the far more easily verified 1925 Geneva
Convention banning the use of chemical weapons--even in the face of
repeated and well-documented violations by Saddam Hussein. What
likelihood is there that we would be any more insistent when it comes
to far less verifiable bans on production and stockpiling of such
weapons?
As a non-party, the United States would also remain free to oppose
dangerous ideas such as providing state-of-the-art chemical
manufacturing facilities and defensive equipment to international
pariahs such as Iran and Cuba. And the United States would be less
likely to reduce investment in chemical protective capabilities, out of
a false sense of security arising from participation in the CWC.
In addition, if the United States is not a CWC party, American
taxpayers will not be asked to bear the substantial annual costs of our
participating in a multilateral regime that will not ``end the chemical
weapons business'' in countries of concern. (By some estimates, these
costs could be over $200 million per year.) Similarly, U.S. citizens
and companies will be spared the burdens associated with reporting and
inspection arrangements that might involve unreasonable searches and
seizures, could jeopardize confidential business information and yet
could not ensure that other nations--and especially rogue states--no
longer have chemical weapons programs.
Against these advantages of nonparticipation, the purported down-
sides seem relatively inconsequential. First, whether Russia actually
eliminates its immense chemical arsenal is unlikely to hinge upon our
participating in the CWC. Indeed. Moscow is now actively creating new
chemical agents that would circumvent and effectively defeat the
treaty's constraints.
Second, the preponderance of trade in chemicals would be unaffected
by the CWC's limitations, making the impact of remaining outside the
treaty regime, if any, fairly modest on American manufacturers.
Finally, if the United States declines to join the present Chemical
Weapons Convention, it is academic whether implementing arrangements
are drawn up by others or not. In the event the United States does
decide to become a party at a later date--perhaps after improvements
are made to enhance the treaty's effectiveness--it is hard to believe
that its preferences regarding implementing arrangements would not be
given considerable weight. This is particularly true since the United
States would then be asked to bear 25 percent of the implementing
organization's budget.
There is no way to ``end the chemical weapons business'' by fiat.
The price of attempting to do so with the present treaty is
unacceptably high, and the cost of the illusion it creates might be
higher still.

James Schlesinger was secretary of defense under Presidents Nixon
and Ford, Donald Rumsfeld and Caspar Weinberger held the same post
under Presidents Ford and Reagan, respectively.

__________
No. 97-D 35
27 February 1997

Gen. Schwartzkopf Tells Senate He Shares Critics' Concerns About
Details of the Chemical Weapons Convention

(Washington, D.C.): Under questioning before the Senate Armed
Services Committee today, General Norman Schwartzkopf--commander of the
allied forces in Operation Desert Shield/Storm--acknowledged that he
was ``unfamiliar with all the details'' of the Chemical Weapons
Convention and shared some of the concerns expressed by those who
oppose it in its present form. This is a signal development insofar as
the treaty's advocates had made much of the General's recent
endorsement of the CWC during previous testimony on Gulf War Syndrome.
Q. & A.
General Schwarzkopf was questioned by one of the Senate's most
steadfast leaders on national security matters and a courageous critic
of the Chemical Weapons Convention--the new chairman of the Armed
Services Committee's Readiness Subcommittee, Sen. Jim Inhofe (R-OK)--
about several of the CWC's more troubling aspects as seen from a
military standpoint. Among the most noteworthy aspects of their
exchange (and a brief intervention by Deputy Secretary of Defense John
White, who also participated in the hearing) were the following points:
Sen. Inhofe: ``If the Chemical Weapons Convention were in
effect, would we still face a danger of chemical attack from
such places as Iraq [which has not signed the CWC]--or Iran
[which] actually signed onto it?''
Gen. Schwartzkopf: ``Senator, I think that the answer is
probably yes. But, I think the chances of that happening could
be diminished by the treaty only because it would then be these
people clearly standing up and thumbing their noses at
international law--and it would also help us build coalitions
against them, if that were to happen.''
Sen. Inhofe: ``Aren't they still thumbing their noses right
now in Iraq?''
Gen. Schwartzkopf: ``There's no question about it, Senator--I
mean the fact that they used it in the first place against
their own people but, I still feel--we have renounced the use
of them and I am very uncomfortable placing ourselves in the
company with Iraq and Libya and countries such as ... North
Korea that have refused to sign that Convention. The problem
with those kinds of things is that verification is very
difficult and enforcement is very difficult.
Sen. Inhofe: ``... General Shali[kashvili] I think in August
1994 ... said that `even one ton of chemical agent may have a
military impact.' I would ask the question: Do you believe that
an intrusive, on-site inspection--as would be allowed by the
Chemical Weapons Convention would be able to detect a single
ton or could tell us conclusively that there isn't a single
ton?''
Gen. Schwartzkopf: ``No, no as I said earlier, we can't
possibly know what's happening on every single inch of every
single territory out there where this would apply.''
Sen. Inhofe: ``And as far as terrorists are concerned, they
would not be under this?''
Gen. Schwartzkopf: ``Of course not.''
Sen. Inhofe: ``Like any treaty, we have to give some things
up, and in this case, of course we do ... and there are a
couple of things that I'd like to [explore] ... the
interpretation from the White House changed ... they said that
if the Chemical Weapons Convention were agreed to, that it
would affect such things as riot control agents like tear gas
in search-and-rescue operations and circumstances like we faced
in Somalia--where they were using women and children at that
time as shields. Do you agree that we should be restricted from
using such things as tear gas?''
Gen. Schwartzkopf: ``I don't believe that is the case but I
will confess to you that I have not read every single detail of
that Convention so, therefore, I really can't give you an
expert opinion. I think you could get a better opinion here.''
Secretary White: ``I am going to hesitate to give a
definitive answer because there has been, in the
administration, a very precise and careful discussion about
what exactly, and in what situations, this would apply and when
this wouldn't apply. ...
Sen. Inhofe: ``Do you think it wise to share with countries
like Iran our most advanced chemical defensive equipment and
technologies?''
Gen. Schwartzkopf: ``Our defensive capabilities?''
Sen. Inhofe: ``Yes.''
Gen. Schwartzkopf: ``Absolutely not.''
Sen. Inhofe: ``Well, I'm talking about sharing our advanced
chemical defensive equipment and technologies, which I believe
under Article X [they] would be allow[ed] to [get]. Do you
disagree?''
Gen. Schwartzkopf: ``As I said Senator, I'm not familiar with
all the details--I--you know, a country, particularly like
Iran, I think we should share as little as possible with them
in the way of our military capabilities.''
The Bottom Line
After this morning's hearing, Senator Inhofe announced:
``It is clear to me that the Clinton Administration's full
court press to secure ratification of the Chemical Weapons
treaty ought to be slowed down until the American people are
fully apprised of what this agreement entails. I oppose this
treaty because I have examined it closely and believe there are
serious problems contained in its fine print.
``Before Senators vote to ratify this Treaty, it is
absolutely vital that they be `familiar with all the details.'
The American people should expect no less of their elected
representatives. All of us want to protect America from the
dangers of chemical weapons. But we have no business blindly
endorsing a treaty of nearly 200 pages without carefully
evaluating all of its provisions on their own merits.''
To this the Center for Security Policy can only add, ``Amen.''

__________
No. 97-D 21
6 February 1997

Truth or Consequences #3: Clinton `Makes a Mistake About It' in Arguing
the CWC Will Protect U.S. Troops

(Washington, D.C.): President Clinton used his State of the Union
address Tuesday night to launch his Administration's latest and highest
profile salvo on behalf of ratification of the Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC). Unfortunately, as with other aspects of this campaign
to induce the Senate to advise and consent to a fatally flawed arms
control treaty, Mr. Clinton made statements that simply do not stand up
to scrutiny. One of the most troubling of these was his declaration:
``Make no mistake about it, [the CWC] will make our troops safer from
chemical attack ... We have no more important obligations, especially
in the wake of what we now know about the Gulf War.'' \1\
Far from reducing the risks that American military personnel will
be exposed to chemical weapons, the Chemical Weapons Convention is
likely to exacerbate them. This reality has become increasingly evident
subsequent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsement of the CWC as
originally negotiated by the Bush Administration. For the following
reasons, it would actually be a great disservice to the U.S. armed
forces--and to the national interests they protect--were the Senate to
lend its support to the present convention:
Russia Remains a Chemical Threat
The cornerstone for the Chemical Weapons Convention was supposed to
be a Bilateral Destruction Agreement (BDA) with Russia. Pursuant to
this agreement, Moscow promised to provide a full and accurate
accounting and eliminate most of its chemical arsenal--the world's
largest and arguably the one that poses the most serious menace to the
U.S. military. The BDA was also expected to afford the U.S. inspection
rights that would significantly enhance the more limited arrangements
provided for by the CWC.
Regrettably, Russian Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin declared
last year that the Bilateral Destruction Agreement has ``outlived its
usefulness'' for Russia. He has also announced that the tab for Russia
to implement the Convention's demilitarization arrangements
(conservatively estimated to be at least $3 billion) would have to be
paid for by the West. Under these circumstances, even if the U.S.
agreed to shell out vast sums, chances are that Russia would retain a
sizable, covert chemical stockpile.
As the Center for Security Policy noted earlier this week,\2\ it is
now public knowledge that such a Russian stockpile will probably
include extremely lethal binary munitions--weapons that have been
specifically designed to circumvent the limits and defeat the
inspection regime of the Chemical Weapons Convention. There is reason
to believe that such weapons may also have been engineered to defeat
Western chemical defensive gear. This material danger to U.S. forces
can only grow if, pursuant to the CWC's Article X, the United States
winds up transferring chemical protective technology or equipment to
those inclined to reverse engineer and overcome it.
Other Nations Will Also Have Militarily Significant CW Arsenals
Russia is hardly the only nation likely to pose a chemical threat
to U.S. personnel in ``a world with the CWC.'' Some, like Iraq, Syria,
North Korea and Libya, will refuse to become states parties. Others
will do so, secure in the knowledge that the treaty's inherent
unverifiability will allow them to escape detection.
When the CWC was negotiated there was considerable hope that
intrusive on-site inspections would meaningfully contribute to the
detection and proof of violations, and therefore to deterring them.
Experience, however, with the U.N. inspections in Iraq--an operation
allowed to conduct far more thorough, timely and intrusive inspections
than will be permitted under this Convention--has established that
totalitarian rulers of a closed society can successfully defeat such
inspections.
This reality applies, as Senator Helms noted in a letter to
National Security Advisor Samuel Berger on 4 February, even to
militarily significant stockpiles of chemical weapons:
``General Shalikashvili testified on 11 August 1994 that `In
certain limited circumstances, even one ton of chemical agent
may have a military impact. ... With such variables in scale of
target and impact of chemical weapons, the United States should
be resolute that the one-ton limit set by the Convention will
be our guide.' ''
``Unclassified portions of the [National Intelligence
Estimate] on U.S. Monitoring Capabilities indicate that it is
unlikely that the U.S. will be able to detect or address
violations in a timely fashion, if at all, when they occur on a
small scale. And yet, even small-scale diversions of chemicals
to chemical weapons production are capable, over time, of
yielding a stockpile far in excess of a single ton. Moreover,
few countries, if any, are engaging in much more than small-
scale production of chemical agent. For example, according to
[the 4 February 1997] Washington Times, Russia may produce its
new nerve agents at a `pilot plant' in quantities of only `55
to 110 tons annually' ''
Facilitating Proliferation: `Poisons for Peace'
The Chemical Weapons Convention may actually contribute to the
spread of militarily relevant chemical technology. This could be the
result of a provision (Article XI) modeled after the ``Atoms for
Peace'' provisions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty--which
promised to share dual-use technology with those who might abuse it if
only they promise not to do so. Article XI would oblige the United
States to share inherently militarily useful chemical manufacturing
technology and materials with countries like Iran and Cuba, if only
they become states parties. This is a formula for expanding the threat
to ``our troops'' posed by chemical proliferation, not effective
chemical arms control.
The CWC Will Encourage the Military to Lower Its Guard
A March 1996 study by the General Accounting Office (GAO)
determined that some elements of the U.S. military appear to be
inadequately prepared, trained, or equipped to operate in areas
contaminated by chemical or biological agents. A particularly troubling
finding was the fact that none of the Army's five active divisions
which make up the Nation's crisis response force and none of the
reserve units that are designated to be deployed early in crises (such
as Operation Desert Shield) were properly equipped to deal with a
chemical or biological threat.
In fact, these units were significantly unprepared in a number of
areas. According to the GAO, three of the ``front-line'' divisions had
fifty percent or greater shortages of protective clothing with
shortfalls in other critical gear running as high as eighty-four
percent. Training was also determined to be deficient in a number of
respects. This is not entirely surprising given that, in its first 4
years in office, the Clinton Administration decreased funding for
chemical and biological defensive purposes by some thirty percent, from
$750 million in Fiscal Year 1992 to $504 million in Fiscal Year 1995.
Unfortunately, past experience suggests that matters will only be
made worse by an arms control treaty like the Chemical Weapons
Convention that purports to impose a global prohibition on chemical
weapons, seemingly making such defenses less necessary. For example,
after ratification of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), U.S.
investment in relevant defensive technology, vaccines, detection
equipment, etc. declined precipitously. As a result of years of
inadequate attention to this threat, the United States found itself
extremely ill-prepared to deal with a potential BW threat posed by
Saddam Hussein's Iraq. (In fact, the U.S. may only have detected the
use of biological weapons against our forces after they started dying
en masse.)
That such a fate awaits U.S. chemical defensive efforts in the wake
of a CWC ratification was brought home by a 1995 initiative proposed by
the then-Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral William
Owens. He suggested cutting a further $805 million from counter-
proliferation support and chemical and biological defense programs
through Fiscal Year 2001. This reduction would have deferred, if not
seriously disrupted, important chemical and biological research and
development efforts, and delayed the procurement of proven
technologies. His rationale: Thanks to a lowering in the chemical
warfare threat brought about by the CWC, investments in countering it
could safely enjoy lower priority. While the Owens gambit was
ultimately defeated, similar initiatives must be expected in the future
if the CWC is approved--resulting in increased vulnerability, not
improved safety, for ``our troops.''
Even if the United States manages to resist the siren's song to
reduce chemical defenses in the wake of the CWC, it is predictable that
the already generally deplorable readiness of most allied forces to
deal with chemical threats will only worsen. To the extent that the
U.S. is obliged in the future to fight coalition wars, this
vulnerability could prove catastrophic to American forces engaged with
a common enemy.
Prohibitions on Tear Gas, Other Non-Lethal Technologies
The Clinton Administration has made clear that it intends to
reverse a Bush executive order issued at the insistence of the Joint
Chiefs in 1992--an order that explicitly allowed Riot Control Agents
(for example, tear gas) to be used in rescuing downed aircrews and
dispersing hostile forces using civilians to screen their movements
against U.S. positions. The result could be to force our troops to use
lethal force where it is not necessary or to suffer otherwise avoidable
casualties.
Worse yet, one of the most promising new defense technologies--
involving chemical-based, non-lethal weapons (for example, immobilizing
agents)--may be restricted or prohibited by this Convention. The CWC
defines chemical weapons as ``toxic chemicals and their precursors,
except where intended for purposes not prohibited under this
Convention, as long as the types and quantities are consistent with
such purposes.'' It goes on to define a toxic chemical as ``any
chemical which through its chemical action on life processes can cause
death, temporary incapacitation, or permanent harm to humans or
animals.'' As a result of the CWC, ``our troops'' may be denied highly
effective means of prevailing in future conflicts with minimal loss of
life on either side.
The Bottom Line
In its present form, the Chemical Weapons Convention cannot be
justified by the contribution it will make to the safety of our men and
women in uniform. If anything, the ``contribution'' that will be made
will be a negative one for ``our troops.''
A question that may not be as easily dispensed of is: Precisely
what did President Clinton mean when he said ``in the wake of what we
now know about the Gulf War''? Is that an acknowledgment that chemical
weapons were used against U.S. forces there, after all? Does it mean
that the President is now convinced that American forces were
inadvertently exposed to chemical agents in the process of destroying
Iraqi bunkers--accounting for Gulf War Syndrome? Or is he simply
acknowledging that U.S. chemical defenses are already inadequate and
that ``our troops'' will likely be exposed to chemical threats--even if
the enemy does not initiate their use--with or without the Chemical
Weapons Convention?

notes:
\1\ The fallaciousness of another Presidential declaration--``if we
do not act by April the 29th when this Convention goes into force--with
or without us--we will lose the chance to have Americans leading and
enforcing this effort''--was addressed last week in the second paper in
this ``Truth or Consequences'' series on the Chemical Weapons
Convention, entitled Truth or Consequences #2: Senate Does Not Need to
Sacrifice Sensible Scrutiny of CWC to Meet an Artificial Deadline (No.
97-D 18, 31 January 1997). A third erroneous claim concerning the CWC's
value in fighting terrorism will be the subject of a forthcoming
Decision Brief.
\2\ See the Center's Decision Brief from earlier this week,
Russia's Covert Chemical Weapons Program Vindicates Jesse Helms'
Continuing Opposition to Phony C.W. Arms Control (No. 97-D 19, 4
February 1997).

__________
No. 97-D 19
4 February 1997

Russia's Covert Chemical Weapons Program Vindicates Jesse Helms'
Continuing Opposition to Phony C.W. Arms Control

(Washington, D.C.): The Clinton Administration's campaign to
railroad Senators into approving the fatally flawed Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC) ran into a major new obstacle today: The Washington
Times disclosed that a report published recently in the classified
Military Intelligence Digest confirms that ``Russia is producing a new
generation of deadly chemical weapons using materials, methods and
technology that circumvent the terms of [that] treaty it signed
outlawing such weapons.''
Word of this frightening development was originally leaked by a
Russian scientist, Vil Mirzayanov, who had been involved in the
Kremlin's covert development of a new class of chemical arms. In an
article he courageously published in the Wall Street Journal on 25 May
1994, Mr. Mirzayanov wrote about a new Russian binary weapon [i.e., one
which uses two relatively harmless chemicals to form a toxic agent
after the weapon is launched]:
``This new weapon, part of the ultra-lethal Novichok [Russian
for ``Newcomer''] class, provides an opportunity for the
[Russian] military establishment to disguise production of
components of binary weapons as common agricultural chemicals
because the West does not know the formula and its inspectors
cannot identify the compounds.'' \1\
Now, More Details About Moscow's Ongoing CW Program
Excerpts of the secret intelligence report that appear in today's
Washington Times provide considerable detail about Russia's efforts to
maintain a deadly chemical arsenal, irrespective of its treaty
obligations. According to the Times, these include the following
(emphasis added throughout):
<bullet> ``Under a program code-named `Foliant,' a Russian scientific
research organization has created a highly lethal nerve agent
called A-232, large quantities of which could be made `within
weeks' through covert production facilities. ...''
<bullet> ``A-232 is made from industrial and agricultural chemicals
that are not lethal until mixed and that never had been used
for poison gas.''
<bullet> `` `These new agents are as toxic as VX [a persistent nerve
agent], as resistant to treatment as Soman [a non-persistent
but deadly poison gas] and more difficult to detect and easier
to manufacture than VX.' ''
<bullet> ``The report says A-232 and its delivery means have `passed
Moscow's rigorous military acceptance testing and can be
quickly fielded in unitary or binary form.' ''
<bullet> ``Russia's State Scientific Research Institute of Organic
Chemistry and Technology created the agents and novel ways of
making them to avoid detection by international inspectors. `By
using chemicals not specified in the CWC schedules, the
Russians can produce A-232 and its ethyl analog A-234, in
unitary and binary forms within several chemical complexes.' ''
<bullet> ``The Russians can make the binary, or two part, version of
the nerve agent using a common industrial solvent acetonitrile
and an organic phosphate compound `that can be disguised as a
pesticide precursor.' In another version, soldiers need only
add alcohol to form the agent, the report says.''
<bullet> `` `These various routes offer flexibility for the agent to
be produced in different types of facilities, depending on the
raw material and equipment available there. They also add
complexity to the already formidable challenge of detecting
covert production activities.' ''
<bullet> ``The Russians can produce the new nerve agent in `pilot
plant' quantities of 55 to 110 tons annually,' the report says.
Several Russian plants are capable of producing the chemicals
used in making A-232. One factory in Novocherboksarsk `is
capable of manufacturing 2,000-2,500 metric tons of A-232
yearly.' ''
<bullet> ``Several pesticide plants `offer easy potential for covert
production,' the report says. `For example, substituting amines
for ammonia and making other slight modifications in the
process would result in new agents instead of pesticide. The
similarity in the chemistry of these compounds would make
treaty monitoring, inspection and verification difficult.' ''
The Administration's Unconvincing Response: The CWC Will Solve the
Problem
The Clinton Administration's pollyannish response to these
revelations ought to be instructive to Senators weighing the Chemical
Weapons Convention. Although the Russians are violating their present
obligation not to produce chemical weapons and are doing so in ways
designed to circumvent the CWC's limitations and to defeat even on-site
inspection regimes, an Administration spokesman told the Washington
Times that ``the treaty would make it easier to investigate such
problems'' since ``agents and components can be added to the treaty's
schedule of banned chemicals.'' The National Security Council's David
Johnson is quoted as saying: ``Without the CWC and the verification
tools it provides, you don't have the means to get at problems like
this. With CWC, you do.''
Such a statement is, at best, wishful thinking. At worst, it is
highly misleading since, for reasons outlined above, the Russian
Novichok weapons (and counterpart efforts likely being pursued by other
chemical weapons states) are specifically designed to thwart the CWC's
``verification tools.''
A variation on this disingenuous theme is being circulated in
graphic form by proponents of the Chemical Weapons Convention. They
offer two world maps, one under the heading ``The World Without the
CWC,'' the other ``The World With the CWC.'' The former shows large
areas of the world--notably Russia, China, Iran, India and Pakistan--
with declared or suspected chemical arsenals. The latter, though, shows
the entire world except for Libya, Egypt, Syria, Iraq and North Korea
as being without either declared or suspected chemical stockpiles.
It is deceptive to suggest that the Chemical Weapons Convention
will ensure that Russia, China, Iran, India or Pakistan will actually
eliminate their chemical weapons programs thanks to the CWC. In fact,
any country that is wishes to retain even militarily significant
chemical stockpiles and is willing to flout international law to do so
can be confident of its ability to escape detection and sanction. To
his credit, one of the Convention's preeminent champions and
distributors of these maps--retired Lieutenant General Tom McInerney--
responded, when asked whether he really believed that Russia and China
would give up their chemical arms if they became parties to the CWC--by
saying: ``Of course not.''
Enter Chairman Helms
As it happens, front-page treatment was also given today to another
aspect of the Chemical Weapons Convention drama. A 29 January 1997
letter from Senator Jesse Helms to Majority Leader Trent Lott
expressing the Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman's strong
opposition to the present CWC was featured ``above the fold'' by the
Washington Post. In this letter, Senator Helms declares: ``I am
convinced that the CWC, as it now stands, is fraught with deficiencies
totally inimical to the national security interests of the United
States.''
Chairman Helms goes on to enumerate in an attached memorandum
specific conditions that ``are essential to ensuring that the Chemical
Weapons Convention enhances, rather than reduces, our national
security.'' In particular, he says preconditions are needed to address
six concerns which ``are best expressed in the letter [Senator Lott]
received on 9 September 1996 from Richard Cheney, William Clark, Jeane
Kirkpatrick, Alexander Haig, John Herrington, Edwin Meese, Donald
Rumsfeld, Caspar Weinberger, 12 Generals and Admirals and 47 [other]
officials from the Reagan and Bush Administrations'': \2\
<bullet> Russian elimination of chemical weapons and implementation
of the 1990 Bilateral Destruction Agreement (BDA);
<bullet> Inclusion of countries other than Russia believed to have
chemical weapons;
<bullet> Certification by the U.S. intelligence community that
compliance with the treaty can be monitored with high
confidence;
<bullet> Specification of the actions that will be taken by the
United States in the event of non-compliance;
<bullet> Establishing the primacy of the U.S. Constitution over all
provisions of the CWC; and
<bullet> Protection of U.S. confidential business information (CBI).
Sen. Helms Rebuts the Administration's CWC Point Person
In addition, Senator Helms today sent National Security Advisor
Samuel ``Sandy'' Berger a strongly worded letter concerning
correspondence written by Dr. Lori Esposito Murray--the Special Advisor
to the President and ACDA Director for the Chemical Weapons
Convention--to members of the Senate in response to the Cheney et al.
missive. Calling the Murray correspondence ``offensive,'' the Chairman
of-
fers his own, detailed rebuttal of her claim that there were
``significant misinformation'' and ``misstatements'' in the letter sent
last fall by Secretary Cheney and his colleagues.
Specifically, Senator Helms affirms that:
<bullet> ``The CWC does not--in fact--effectively cover the types of
chemicals used to manufacture chemical weapons. Everything from
Sarin and Soman to VX can be manufactured using a variety of
chemicals which are not identified by the Schedules for the
application of the verification regime.''
<bullet> ``... The CWC will not do one thing to reduce the chemical
weapons arsenals of terrorist countries and other nations
hostile to the United States. ... Not one country of concern to
the United States has ratified this convention.''
<bullet> ``... The CWC is not `effectively verifiable' and Dr. Murray
should not have made representations to the contrary. ...
Declassified portions from [a] August 1993 National
Intelligence Estimate note:
`` `The capability of the intelligence community to monitor
compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention is severely
limited and likely to remain so for the rest of the decade. The
key provision of the monitoring regime--challenge inspection at
declared sites--can be thwarted by a nation determined to
preserve a small, secret program using the delays and managed
access rules allowed by the Convention.' ''
The Bottom Line
The Center for Security Policy commends Senator Helms for his
leadership in insisting that the Chemical Weapons Convention's myriad,
serious defects be addressed and corrected before the Senate is once
again asked to give its advice and consent to this treaty. It looks
forward to working with him, Senator Lott and all others who share
Chairman Helms' determination to ensure that the CWC is only ratified
if it ``enhances, rather than reduces'' U.S. national security.

notes:
\1\ See in this regard Not `Good Enough for Government Work:'
Senate Needs to Hear About Russian Chemical Weapons From Russian
Experts (No. 94-D 100, 5 October 1994).
\2\ Copies of this letter, which was originally circulated by the
Center for Security Policy last fall, may be obtained by contacting the
Center.

__________
No. 97-D 27
17 February 1997

Truth or Consequences #5: The CWC Will Not Be Good for Business--To Say
Nothing of The National Interest

(Washington, D.C.): Proponents of the Chemical Weapons Convention
(CWC) now awaiting consideration by the U.S. Senate often declare that
industry supports this controversial treaty. That claim requires
careful consideration since, on its face, this arms control treaty will
have myriad, and possibly quite adverse, implications for many American
businesses. Such implications arise from the reporting, regulatory and
inspection requirements generated by the treaty's verification regime.
Who Will Be Affected?
A common misconception is that only chemical manufacturing
businesses will be covered by these requirements. To be sure, such
pervasively regulated companies will face additional reporting
requirements and be subjected to routine inspections by foreign
nationals. A trade association representing some of these companies--
the Chemical Manufacturers Association (CMA)--has judged the impacts of
the CWC on its member companies to be acceptable, however.
(Interestingly, some CMA companies--for example, Dixie Chemicals and
Sterling Chemicals--have expressed opposition to the treaty on the
grounds that the costs entailed in further reporting requirements,
additional regulatory burdens and intrusive on-site inspections will be
unacceptable.)
In fact, thousands of companies that do not produce but simply use
a wide variety of chemicals or chemical compounds--notably, Discrete
Organic Chemicals (DOCs) \1\--will also be burdened with new and
potentially onerous responsibilities under the CWC. While the CWC's
proponents frequently claim that many of these companies will be able
to get away with filling out a simple, short form, there is reason to
believe otherwise.
For a good many of the affected companies, the CWC's reporting
requirements will entail a time-consuming, and assuredly expensive,
process of producing declara-
tions, filing reports and complying with new regulations. These
industries may also face challenge as well as routine inspections.
Challenge inspections permit the use of sampling procedures--for
example the use of mass spectrometers--that go beyond those to which
companies facing only routine inspections are exposed and that have
considerable potential for the loss of Confidential Business
Information (see below).
Among the industries facing such prospects are: automotive, food
processing, biotech, distillers and brewers, electronics, soap and
detergents, cosmetics and fragrances, paints, textiles, non-nuclear
electric utility operators and even ball-point pen ink manufacturers.
The following well-known U.S. companies--none of which has anything to
do with the manufacture of chemical weapons--have been identified by
the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency as subject to the CWC's terms:
Sherwin-Williams, Nutrasweet, Jim Beam, Archer Daniels Midland, Lever
Brothers, Kaiser Aluminum, Goodyear Tire and Rubber, Xerox, Raytheon
and Conoco.
Last but hardly least, in addition to the obligations befalling the
foregoing industries, the Chemical Weapons Convention would allow any
site in the United States to be subjected to intrusive challenge
inspections. While proponents downplay the danger that such an
arrangement might be abused by foreign governments, there are no
guarantees that such abuses will not occur.
Who Speaks for All the Affected Industries?
While the Chemical Manufacturers Association has been the most
vocal industry advocate of the Chemical Weapons Convention, it
represents only some 190 of the companies expected to be covered by the
treaty. It has aggressively lobbied Senators and other trade
organizations on behalf of the treaty, evidently persuaded not only
that the CWC will not hurt its businesses but will actually benefit
them. Notably, CMA believes this accord's Article XI will clear the way
for a substantial increase in U.S. exports of chemical manufacturing
equipment and materials.
Since the bulk of this prospective increase may involve markets not
currently open to American chemical concerns--presumably, including
pariah states like Iran and Cuba--it is unclear just how willing
responsible companies and/or the U.S. Government will be to engage in
this sort of trade.\2\ Such exports are currently proscribed by the
supplier-control arrangement known as the Australia Group. If, as seems
likely, the CWC has the effect of vitiating the Australia Group
mechanism, CW-relevant exports may be permitted even to dubious
customers--but it will be hard to contend that the effect on curbing
proliferation of chemical weapons will be a positive one.
The truth of the matter is that no one can say for sure how many
companies will be caught up in the CWC's reporting, regulatory and
inspection regime. It is safe to say, however, that there will be
thousands affected (according to official U.S. Government estimates as
many as 3,000-8,000.) Even if one counts facilities, as few as two-
fifths of those affected are owned by CMA member companies. Indeed, as
Dr. Will Carpenter, formerly Vice President for Technology at the
Monsanto Agriculture Company and a CMA representative, noted in an
article in Ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention:
``The leaders of the chemical industry, through the board of
directors of the CMA have always emphasized support of the
convention. There are, however, another 60 to 80 trade
associations whose members will also be regulated by the
National Authority [set up to implement the CWC]. ... An
overwhelming number of these companies are not aware of the
implications of the Chemical Weapons Convention despite a
continuing effort by ACDA, the CMA and other organizations to
get the word out.''
How Will American Businesses Be Affected?
The impact of the Chemical Weapons Convention on American companies
will occur through two avenues:
(1) Impacts Due to New Reporting and Regulatory Requirements: The
data required by the treaty's verification regime differs in both
quantitative and qualitative respects from that already collected for
other regulatory purposes. For example, current environmental
regulations do not cover all of the chemicals relevant to the CWC.
Moreover, of those that are covered, the production thresholds
triggering current reporting requirements are set much higher than
would be the case under the CWC. In addition, some existing regulations
require reports concerning future actions (whereas the treaty imposes
obligations for considerable retroactive reporting). Some of these
current regulations apply to chemical producers, but not to industrial
processors or consumers of chemicals. And deadlines for reports
required by the CWC will be shorter, and necessitate more frequent
updating, than those presently demanded, for instance, by the
Environmental Protection Agency. For all these rea-
sons, new reporting requirements will have to be levied by the U.S.
government in the implementing legislation for the Convention.
These new requirements may prove to be viewed by large concerns as
simply a marginal additional cost of doing business. Smaller companies,
however, may find these additional requirements to be considerably more
burdensome. This is particularly true since some companies will be
obliged to file detailed declarations for the first time. Such reports
will also have to be updated on an annual basis. The associated costs
for preparing these reports are likely to run to the thousands--and
perhaps hundreds of thousands--of dollars per company.
What is more, the new U.S. bureaucracy dubbed the ``National
Authority'' to whom these reports will be sent, must be notified of
changes in declared activities 5 days before they occur. Complying with
this requirement is likely to prove problematic for companies unable to
predict their activities; it certainly will be burdensome. A failure to
comply with this reporting regime could result in civil and perhaps
even criminal penalties.
(2) Impacts Arising from On-Site Inspections: Any company that
provides declarations to the ``National Authority'' should prepare to
be inspected. Once the U.S. National Authority turns the information
thus supplied over to the new international bureaucracy created under
this Convention--the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons (OPCW) the OPCW's Technical Secretariat will have the authority
to conduct on-site inspections (both routine and challenge inspections)
to verify the data thus supplied.
Depending on the sorts of chemicals declared and the nature of the
inspections, the amount of notice, duration and degree of intrusiveness
of the inspection can vary. For example, advance notice can be as
little as twenty-four hours; the duration can extend to 96 continuous
hours; and the international inspectors can in some instances demand to
examine any data, files, processes, equipment, structures or vehicles
deemed pertinent to their search for illegal chemical manufacturing
activities.
What Will Be At Risk?
It is a virtual certainty that, in the course of at least some such
inspections, confidential business information (CBI) will be put at
risk. In 1993, the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment
identified examples of proprietary information that could be
compromised:
<bullet> The formula of a new drug or specialty chemical
<bullet> A synthetic route that requires the fewest steps or the
cheapest raw materials
<bullet> The form, source, composition and purity of raw materials or
solvents
<bullet> Subtle changes in pressure or temperature at key steps in a
process
<bullet> Expansion and marketing plans
<bullet> Raw materials and suppliers
<bullet> Manufacturing costs
<bullet> Prices and sales figures
<bullet> Names of technical personnel working on a particular project
<bullet> Customer lists
According to the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), the means
by which the foregoing and other sensitive business information could
be acquired by foreign inspectors (at least some of whom may be agents
of their governments' intelligence services and specialists in the
conduct of commercial espionage) include via the following:
<bullet> manifests and container labels that disclose the nature/
purity of the feedstock and the identity of the supplier
<bullet> instrument panels [e.g., networked computer monitors]
revealing precise temperature and pressure settings for a
production process
<bullet> chemical analysis of residues taken from a valve or seal on
the production line
<bullet> visual inspection of piping configurations and
instrumentation diagrams could allow an inspector to deduce
flow and process parameters
<bullet> audits of plant records
A loss of confidential business information either through a
challenge inspection, or through sample analysis, could be particularly
troubling for those in the chemical, pharmaceutical and biotechnology
industries. Many companies have not sought patents for such proprietary
information lest they be compromised by Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) requests, to which patents are subject. Even so, in August 1993,
the OTA estimated that the U.S. chemical industry loses approximately
$3-6 billion per year in counterfeited chemicals and chemical products.
If proprietary formulas are compromised by commercial espionage,
the cost can be very great. For example, it takes an average of 10
years and an investment of $25 million to perfect a new pesticide. U.S.
pharmaceutical companies must invest an average of 12 years and on the
order of $350 million in research and development to bring a
breakthrough drug to market.
Clearly, while it is difficult to assess the potential dollar
losses that may be associated with the compromise of proprietary
business data, information gleaned from inspections and data
declarations literally could be worth millions of dollars to foreign
competitors. A small company whose profitability (and economic
survival) derives from a narrow but critical competitive advantage will
be particularly vulnerable to industrial espionage. The OTA notes that
for a small company, ``even visual inspection alone might reveal a
unique process configuration that could be of great value to a
competitor.''
The Risk is Real
Unfortunately, these are not hypothetical or ``worst case''
scenarios. In preparation for the CWC, the U.S. has conducted mock
inspections at seven government and private sector industrial sites.
The results validate fears that even routine access by the OPCW's
international inspectors could result in the loss of commercial and/or
national security secrets. This would certainly be true of the access
allowed under more intrusive challenge inspection provisions.
These conclusions are evident, for example, in a report submitted
by the U.S. government to the Conference on Disarmament concerning the
third of these so-called National Trial Inspections. It was conducted
by U.S. experts at the Monsanto Agricultural Company's Luling,
Louisiana plant in August, 1991. The report said, in part:
``The Monsanto representative who was on the inspection team
to determine the extent of CBI he could obtain, determined
there would be a loss of such information. He stated he was
able to obtain enough information about the glyphosate
intermediate process merely by equipment inspection to save a
potential competitor considerable process development, time and
dollars. He said a knowledgeable inspector could compromise
Monsanto's proprietary business interests with no access to
their records beyond the quantity of phosphorous trichloride
consumed.'' (Emphasis added.)
Even Exterior Sampling Can Put CBI At Risk: Another mock inspection
revealed that soil and water samples taken even from the exterior of
buildings at a chemical plant three weeks after a production run
revealed the product of the operation and process details. This is
especially worrisome in terms of the implications for confidential
business information since the CWC's Verification Annex (Part II
paragraph (E)(55)) explicitly affords an inspection team the right to
take samples on-site using highly invasive mass spectrometers and, ``if
it deems necessary,'' to transfer samples for analysis off-site at
laboratories designated by the OPCW. And, as Dr. Kathleen Bailey of the
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory told the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee on 21 March 1996:
``Experts in my laboratory recently conducted experiments to
determine whether or not there would be a remainder inside of
the equipment that is used for sample analysis on-site. They
found out that, indeed, there is residue remaining. And if the
equipment were taken off-site, off of the Lawrence Livermore
Laboratory site, or off of the site of a biotechnology firm,
for example, and further analysis were done on those residues,
you would be able to get classified and/or proprietary
information.''
Matters are made worse by the prospect that the OPCW is likely to
allow a number of states parties' laboratories to conduct sample
analysis. Among the nations that have expressed an interest in
providing such laboratory services are several with dubious records
concerning non-proliferation and/or a record of using multilateral
organizations--among other devices--for intelligence collection
(including commercial espionage).
Conclusion
The Chemical Weapons Convention will entail real, if as yet
unquantifiable, costs for thousands of U.S. industries having nothing
to do with the manufacture of chemical weapons. Such costs might be
justifiable if the treaty were likely to be effective in ridding the
world of chemical weapons--or even in appreciably reducing the
likelihood of chemical warfare. Unfortunately, while the CWC's
verification regime will be sufficiently intrusive to jeopardize U.S.
proprietary interests, it is woefully inadequate to detect and prove
non-compliance by closed societies determined to maintain covert
chemical weapons capabilities notwithstanding their treaty
obligations.\3\ As a result, the burdens that American private
industries will be asked to bear--largely without their knowledge--
simply cannot be justified on national security or any other grounds.

notes:
\1\ The CWC defines DOCs only in the following, expansive terms:
``Any chemical belonging to the class of chemical compounds consisting
of all compounds of carbon except for its oxides, sulfides and metal
carbonates.''
\2\ In fact, ACDA Director John Holum has indicated that the United
States' obligations under the CWC would not be allowed to compel it to
sell CW-relevant technology to proliferating states. Even if that
position were actually adopted by the U.S. government after treaty
ratification, Article XI would still provide political cover for other
nations feeling no such compunction and deny Washington grounds for
objecting.
\3\ N.B. The UN's on-site inspection effort in Iraq (UNSCOM) has
been unable to ascertain the true status of Saddam Hussein's weapons of
mass destruction programs despite five years of challenge inspections
under a regime providing for far more intrusive, timely and
comprehensive inspections than those authorized by the CWC.

__________
No. 97-D 14
28 January 1997

Truth or Consequences #1: Center Challenges Administration Efforts To
Distort, Suppress Debate on CWC

dangers to americans' constitutional rights
(Washington, D.C.): Like a saturation bombardment of toxic gas on a
World War I battlefield, proponents of the Chemical Weapons Convention
(CWC) have suddenly unleashed a barrage of Cabinet-level public
statements and op.eds., departmental letters, government fact sheets
and interest group point papers. The purpose seems to be to asphyxiate
informed debate about this treaty with billowing clouds of false or
misleading information, even as the Convention's critics are wrongly
accused of doing the same thing.
For example, in a letter written to Senators on 14 January 1997,
Dr. Lori Esposito Murray--the Special Advisor to the President and ACDA
Director on the Chemical Weapons Convention--took strong exception to
correspondence authored by a large and distinguished group of former
senior civilian and military officials who oppose ratification of the
CWC in its present form. The latter include: former Secretaries of
Defense Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld and Caspar Weinberger, former U.N.
Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, former Secretary of State Alexander Haig
and former National Security Advisor to the President William Clark.
Dr. Murray declared that the Cheney et al. letter ``contains
significant misinformation about the Convention.'' She proceeds to cite
several portions of the letter (which was circulated by the Center for
Security Policy originally last fall and again earlier this month) \1\
which she characterizes as ``misstatements.'' In opposition to these
alleged ``misstatements,'' Dr. Murray offers what she calls ``facts.''
As a contribution to a real and informed debate about the Chemical
Weapons Convention, the Center will be issuing a series of Decision
Briefs in the coming days briefly responding to each of Dr. Murray
points--and similar arguments on behalf of the treaty made by others--
that have the effect of confusing or distorting, if not actually
suppressing, such a debate.
CWC Will Impinge Upon Americans' Constitutional Rights
As Secretaries Cheney, Rumsfeld, Weinberger and their colleagues
noted in the joint letter: ``We are concerned that the CWC will
jeopardize U.S. citizens' constitutional rights by requiring the U.S.
government to permit searches without either warrants or probable
cause.'' Dr. Murray describes this as a ``misstatement'' and declares
as a ``fact'' that:
``The Administration expects that access to private
facilities will be granted voluntarily for the vast majority of
inspections under the CWC. If this is not the case, the United
States Government will obtain a search warrant prior to an
inspection in order to ensure that there will be no trampling
of constitutional rights.''
On 9 September 1996, Department of Justice officials publicly
acknowledged in testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee that in
such cases a criminal warrant would be required. The problem is that
obtaining such a warrant from a court would require demonstration of
probable cause. This will be impossible in most cases because the
nation requesting an inspection need not cite its reasons for making
such a request.
Hence, the Clinton Administration faces a difficult choice. If the
U.S. government respects its citizens' rights not to be subjected
involuntarily to searches in the absence of judicial warrants, it will
be creating a precedent other countries will assuredly cite to refuse
on-site inspections on their territories. If it does not respect those
rights, it will be acting in an unconstitutional manner.
Judge Bork Is Concerned About the Treaty's Constitutional Impact
In a letter sent to Judiciary Committee Chairman Orrin Hatch last
August, a respected constitutional scholar and distinguished Federal
judge, Robert H. Bork, expressed the view that ``there are grounds to
be concerned about [CWC provisions'] compatibility with the
Constitution.'' He wrote:
``Fourth and Fifth Amendment concerns are raised by the
United States' obligation to open to on-site inspections any
facility, whether in the public sector or privately owned.
Apparently, no probable cause need be shown. A foreign state
will have the right to challenge inspection of a U.S. facility
without the grounds that are essential for a search warrant.
``The U.S. is required by the CWC to enforce inspection by an
international team, even over opposition from the owner. On-
site personnel can be compelled to answer questions, provide
data, and permit searches of anything within the premises--
including records, files, papers, processes, controls,
structures and vehicles.
``Whatever the merits otherwise of the claim that the
`pervasively regulated industries' exception avoids the Fourth
Amendment problems, it is my understanding that the majority of
the 3,000-8,000 companies expected to be covered are not
pervasively regulated.
``Additional Fifth Amendment problems arise from the
authority of inspectors to collect data and analyze samples.
This may constitute an illegal seizure and, perhaps, constitute
the taking of private property by the government without
compensation. The foreign inspectors will not be subject to
punishment for any theft of proprietary information.
``American citizens will have fewer rights to information
concerning investigations concerning them or their businesses
than they would if investigated by a U.S. agency. Freedom of
Information requests will not be permitted under the proposed
CWC implementing legislation. ...
``... The owner of a facility will [likely] be faced with an
international inspection team, backed up by the U.S.
government, demanding access to his property and demanding
answers and documents from his employees. No one will be shown
a search warrant and, so far as I can gather, the owner or
employee must decide on the spot whether he has a
constitutional right to refuse what is demanded. If he refuses
and turns out to be wrong, he will face punishment. At least a
citizen shown a search warrant knows that a judge has deemed
the search constitutional.
``The provision in question speaks of constitutional
obligations with regard to property rights or searches and
seizures. That does not cover the Fifth Amendment right not to
incriminate oneself. Yet self-incrimination is a real danger
for people required to answer questions, turn over documents
and other matter.''
Judiciary Committee Chairman Henry Hyde is Also Concerned
On 28 August 1996, Chairman Hatch received a letter from his House
counterpart, Rep. Henry Hyde. It expresses similar misgivings to those
addressed by Judge Bork. Rep. Hyde asked:
``How can we accede to an arrangement that grants an
international inspection agency the right to demand access to
thousands of privately owned U.S. facilities without requiring
the foreign inspectors to demonstrate probable cause necessary
to secure a judicial warrant--except by compromising the
American owners' constitutional rights?
``Similarly, how can those owners be denied due process--or,
for that matter, the right to sue for damages in the likely
event that the foreign inspectors use their eighty-four hours
of on-site inspection to elicit sensitive proprietary data and
then that data finds its way into the hands of competitors
overseas? As you are well aware, there is growing concern about
illegal commercial espionage. If we are not careful, it would
appear that we may be creating through the CWC a legal
opportunity for carrying out such intelligence collection, to
the severe detriment of America's competitive position.
A further concern arises from the fact that the new
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons will be
significantly less accountable than U.S. regulatory agencies
for information collected in the course of international
inspections of American businesses. I understand that the draft
implementing leg-
islation proposes to preclude requests about OPCW inspections that
might otherwise be made under the Freedom of Information act.
``... Whatever one thinks ... about the wisdom of ratifying a
treaty that is inherently unverifiable, unenforceable and
inequitable, the likelihood that it will compromise the
constitutional rights of many thousands of American companies
and their owners and employees should be sufficient grounds for
its rejection.''
The Bottom Line
Clearly, there are grounds for concern about the constitutional
impact of the Chemical Weapons Convention. These cannot be dismissed as
``misstatements'' or ``myths.'' Neither can consideration of such
issues be responsibly deferred--as some treaty proponents are arguing--
until after the CWC is ratified by the United States. At that point,
the theoretical option of building safeguards into the implementing
legislation will be a non-starter, at least from a practical point of
view, to the extent such protections would conflict with ``the supreme
law of the land,'' i.e., a ratified treaty. Accordingly, the Center for
Security Policy encourages members of the Senate to examine the
constitutional and other, serious problems with the Chemical Weapons
Convention prior to any further consideration of this accord.

notes:
\1\ See the Center's Transition Brief entitled Here We Go Again:
Clinton Presses Anew For Senate Approval of Flawed, Unverifiable,
Ineffective Chemical Weapons Treaty (No. 97-T 5, 8 January 1997).

__________
No. 97-D 30
22 February 1997

Truth or Consequences #6: The CWC Will Not Prevent Chemical Terrorism
Against the U.S. or its Interests

(Washington, D.C.): In recent weeks, proponents of the Chemical
Weapons Convention (CWC) have cited the contribution this Convention
would make to combating terrorists armed with chemical weapons as an
important justification for the Senate to approve its ratification. In
President Clinton's State of the Union address, in successive op.ed.
articles by former Bush Administration officials and in news articles
and editorials reflecting the administration's pro-treaty line, the
assertion is made that an admittedly grave problem will be alleviated
by the CWC's ban on the production, stockpiling or use of chemical
weapons.
According to the Wall Street Journal, Senator Richard Lugar--the
Chemical Weapons Convention's principal champion in the Senate--has
even taken to darkly warning his colleagues that they better vote for
the CWC lest there be a chemical terrorist incident in this country
which might have been prevented if only the Convention had been in
place.
The CWC Will Not Impede Terrorists
Such arguments are highly misleading, possibly dangerously so, for
two reasons:
(1) The `Home-Brew' Problem: The ability to produce toxic chemical
agents is so widespread--and the materials required are so universally
accessible and ordinary--that a treaty banning chemical weapons will
have no effect at all on small, non-governmental groups determined to
manufacture such agents. Lethal chemical substances can be manufactured
by virtually anyone with a good understanding of chemistry and access
to commercially available hardware and ingredients.
In fact, the Japanese cult, Aum Shim Rikyo, produced the toxic
nerve agent Sarin it used a few years ago in its terrorist attack on
the subways of Tokyo in just such a fashion--in a room with dimensions
of eight by fourteen feet. Suggestions that such terrorist incidents
will be precluded in the future by a prohibition on governmental stocks
of chemical weapons--a step said to eliminate the danger some chemical
weapons might be stolen and used in an unauthorized fashion--ignore the
reality of this ``home-brew'' option. The effect of the CWC on this
option will be roughly that an international treaty foreswearing bank-
robbery by governments would have on independent bank-robbers, which is
to say no beneficial impact whatsoever.
As a practical matter, neither the limits imposed by the Chemical
Weapons Convention's three schedules of chemicals nor the intrusive
inspection regime mandated by the treaty would prevent terrorist groups
like Aum Shim Rikyo from garnering chemical weapons capabilities. This
would be true even were they to produce quantities of chemical agents
deemed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John
Shalikashvili, sufficient to have a ``militarily impact'' (i.e., one
agent ton).\1\
On this point, a declassified Defense Intelligence Agency report of
February 1996 observed:
``Irrespective of whether the CWC enters into force,
terrorists will likely look upon CW as a means to gain greater
publicity and instill widespread fear. The March 1995 Tokyo
subway attack by Aum Shim Rikyo would not have been prevented
by the CWC.''
(2) The Problem of State-Support for Chemical Terrorism: A number
of the leading state-sponsors of terrorism--notably, Libya, Syria, Iraq
and North Korea--have indicated that they will not become parties to
this treaty. As a result, at least some of those who provide
infrastructural support, training and other assistance to terrorists
will be free to do so in the chemical arena, as well as with respect to
more traditional tools of the trade (e.g., Semetex plastic explosive,
fertilizer-based bombs and other high-explosives).
What is more, since the Chemical Weapons Convention's limitations
cannot be monitored with confidence, it is possible--perhaps even
likely--that at least some of the nations known to have supported
international terrorism who may become parties to the CWC (e.g.,
Russia, China, Iran and Cuba) will also be able to assist those
interested in performing acts of chemical terrorism. If the Convention
cannot ensure that such CWC counties are entirely out of the chemical
weapons business, it certainly cannot assure that those with whom these
countries deal covertly are out of that deadly business.
In the final analysis, of course, state-sponsorship of terrorism is
itself a violation of international law. The idea that nations that
routinely flout treaty obligations and international norms will behave
differently if only a new convention is adopted is absurd. The problem
is not a lack of laws or the ``tools'' they ostensibly provide to deal
with such nations and behavior. The problem is, rather, the absence of
will to use the available laws and tools to penalize state-sponsors of
terrorism and curb their malevolence.
The Bottom Line
The threat posed by chemical terrorism is a real one. Every
American should be concerned about this danger--and insistent that it
be seriously addressed by the elected and appointed officials charged
with providing for the common defense. The predictable effect of the
Chemical Weapons Convention, however, will be to reduce concern out of
a mistaken belief that the chemical threat from terrorists and others
has been appreciably lessened.
What is needed now is effective action, not placebos like the
Chemical Weapons Convention. The Antiterrorism Act demonstrates that
the United States can adopt legislation addressing the threats posed by
terrorists without being compelled to do so by international treaty.
That and other antiterrorism statutes can and should be strengthened so
as to impose severe criminal penalties on those who enable, help or
execute such attacks.
The existing, relatively verifiable international ban on use of
chemical weapons should be given teeth. U.S. intelligence efforts aimed
at identifying, penetrating and neutralizing groups that might be
inclined to engage in such activities need to be intensified and given
substantially greater resources. And a vastly increased effort should
be made to provide protection against chemical attacks not only to the
U.S. military but also to the American government and people.
By contrast, a treaty that will, in all likelihood, have the effect
of reducing investment in chemical defenses\2\ and possibly diminishing
valuable chemical-related intelligence collection by diverting efforts
to the inspection and other activities mandated by the CWC,\3\ may
actually make the U.S. more susceptible--not less--to terrorists
wielding CW. That could also be the case thanks to the treaty's
obligation on states parties to transfer chemical manufacturing
capabilities and defensive equipment to other member nations.\4\ Should
this obligation be honored by the U.S. and/or its allies, it will prove
a recipe for intensified threats emanating from terrorist-sponsoring
countries.
Finally, if--as virtually everyone agrees--chemical terrorism is
likely to occur in the future, Senators would be well advised to think
about whether they wish to be implicated by having voted for a treaty
falsely advertised as a means to prevent such incidents, but that will
be seen in retrospect to have done nothing on that score, and perhaps
actually served to make them more likely.

notes:
\1\ See the Center's Decision Brief entitled Truth or Consequences
#3: Clinton `Makes a Mistake About It' in Arguing the CWC Will Protect
U.S. Troops (No. 97-D 21, 6 February 1997).
\2\ Ibid.
\3\ Douglas J. Feith, a leading critic of the CWC and founding
member of the Center for Security Policy's Board of Advisors, has
likened the Convention's intrusive inspection arrangements to those of
a drunk looking under a streetlamp for keys lost elsewhere simply
because the light was better there.
\4\ See the Center's Decision Brief entitled Truth or Consequences
#5: The CWC Will Not Be Good For Business, To Say Nothing of the
National Interest (No. 97-D 27, 17 February 1997).

__________
No. 97-D 38
6 March 1997

Truth or Consequences #8: The CWC Will Exacerbate the Proliferation of
Chemical Warfare Capabilities

(Washington, D.C.): In recent days, proponents of the Chemical
Weapons Convention (CWC) have taken to dissembling about the clear
meaning--and certain effect--of the treaty's Article XI. Article XI
says, in part:
``... States parties shall ... undertake to facilitate, and
have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange
of chemicals, equipment and scientific and technical
information relating to the development and application of
chemistry for purposes not prohibited under this Convention;
What is more--as noted in the attached article in the current
edition of the New Republic by Douglas J. Feith, a former Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense responsible for chemical arms control
during the Reagan Administration and founding member of Center Board of
Advisors--Article XI goes on to say:
``[States parties shall] not maintain among themselves any
restrictions, including those in any international agreements,
incompatible with the obligations undertaken under this
Convention, which would restrict or impede trade and the
development and promotion of scientific and technological
knowledge in the field of chemistry for industrial,
agricultural, research, medical, pharmaceutical or other
peaceful purposes. ...
In addition, the CWC's Article X declares that ``Every state party
shall have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of
equipment, material and scientific and technological information
concerning means of protection against chemical weapons.''
`Poisons for Peace'
Any reasonable reading of this language shows that these provisions
would require the United States (in the event it ratifies the
Convention) to provide other states parties--including in all
likelihood countries like Iran, Cuba, China and Russia--with state-of-
the-art manufacturing capabilities and defensive technologies with
direct relevance to chemical warfare activities.
After all, advanced facilities designed to manufacture pesticides,
fertilizers and pharmaceuticals have the inherent capacity to produce
chemical weapons in substantial quantities. Supplying potential
adversaries with modern chemical defensive gear could equip them to
engage in chemical war. It could, in addition, aid in efforts to defeat
Western protective equipment. As the Center recently reported,\1\
General Norman Schwartzkopf recently reacted with incredulity and
horror when advised that the CWC, which he has endorsed, would have
such effects.
Will the U.S. Violate the CWC?
Remarkably, the Clinton Administration and other CWC advocates are
now claiming that the United States will not be compelled by this
treaty to transfer to nations like Iran and Cuba chemical technology
that will lend itself to diversion for military purposes. Presumably,
they think they will not have to abide by the treaty's ``obligation''
to provide chemical defensive gear to Teheran or Havana, either. Maybe
so. Still, it would be helpful to establish in advance--and formally
codify in any resolution of ratification--precisely which of the CWC's
provisions the United States will not observe. Such a step would do
much to protect against the predictable postratification demand from
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and State Department lawyers to the
effect that the United States must faithfully observe all of the
treaty's articles and obligations.
Even If We Don't, Who Else Will Observe Export Controls?
As Mr. Feith observes, even if the United States does selectively
adhere to the Convention and maintains export controls (not to say
embargoes) against Iran and Cuba, however, ``Articles X an XI will
invite other countries to transfer dangerous technology to them.
Germany can be expected to invoke the treaty against any U.S. official
who protests a planned sale of a chemical factory to, say, Iran.'' CWC
advocates' assurances to the contrary notwithstanding, voluntary
supplier control arrangements like the Australia Group are likely to
fall victim to the CWC-blessed, trade uber alles appetites of such
``friendly'' nations.\2\
What is more, one can safely predict that the prospect of foreign
competitors closing such sales will cause would-be American suppliers
to seize upon these same provisions to argue that Washington has
neither the right nor an interest in penalizing U.S. firms. This punch
has been telegraphed by the emphasis the frantically pro-CWC Chemical
Manufacturers Association has placed on the opportunity the Convention
will create for increasing exports, presumably to countries where such
U.S. exports are not currently permitted.
The Bottom Line
Douglas Feith's essay in the New Republic and an op.ed. by former
Secretaries of Defense James Schlesinger, Donald Rumsfeld and Caspar
Weinberger which appeared in the Washington Post yesterday \3\ make one
point crystal clear: CWC Articles X and XI are but two of the myriad
reasons why the United States would be better off not being a party to
this Convention.
The Senate would be well-advised to give these arguments careful
consideration. Indeed, it would make sense to defer action on the
treaty's ratification until after it had been in force for some period
so as to evaluate whether these unintended and counterproductive
effects are as serious in practice as in prospect they would appear
likely to be. Either way, the Senate should resist the pressure to
rubber-stamp this accord--pressure that will only intensify as treaty
advocates realize that time is no more on their side than are the
merits of the case.

notes:
\1\ See the Center's Decision Brief entitled Gen. Schwartzkopf
Tells Senate He Shares Critics' Concerns About Details of the Chemical
Weapons Convention (No. 97-D 35, 27 February 1997).
\2\ For more on German behavior unbecoming an ally, see the
Center's Watch on the Rhine series, e.g., Watch On The Rhine: German
Efforts To Extort The Czechs, Forge Relations With Rogue States Are
Ominous Indicators (No. 96-C 127, 10 December 1996) and Watch On The
Rhine #2: Germany Proceeds With Bait-And-Switch Encouraging Sudeten
Claims And Moves To Reschedule Syrian Debt (No. 96-C 131, 19 December
1996).
\3\ See the Center's Decision Brief entitled Truth Or Consequences
#7: Schlesinger, Rumsfeld And Weinberger Rebut Scowcroft And Deutch On
The CWC (No. 97-D 37, 5 March 1997).

Chemical Reaction: A Bad Treaty on Chemical Weapons

[By Douglas J. Feith]

It would seem an indisputable good: a treaty to eliminate poison
gas from Beijing to Buenos Aires. Yet the new Chemical Weapons
Convention is having trouble in the Senate. And the more the treaty is
debated, the deeper the trouble. In congressional hearings and public
forums, even the treaty's champions have been forced to concede our
severely limited ability to monitor compliance and enforce the ban.
As a result, the chief pro-treaty argument is no longer that the
CWC, as the treaty is acronymically known, will abolish chemical
weapons--for it obviously will not--but that the CWC is better than
nothing. Administration officials, in their standard pitch to skeptical
senators, now stress that the treaty is on balance worthwhile, if
flawed, and rebuke critics for measuring the treaty against an
unrealistic standard of ``perfection.'' ``The limits imposed by the CWC
surely are imperfect,'' former National Security Adviser Brent
Scowcroft and former CIA Director John Deutch contended in a recent
Washington Post op-ed, ``but ... it is hard to see how its imperfect
constraints are worse than no constraints at all.''
The it's-better-than-nothing argument has some potency. After all,
no decent person wants poison gas to proliferate. Conservatives and
liberals alike want to continue to destroy the entire U.S. chemical
arsenal regardless of what happens to the CWC. So even a small step in
the direction of global abolition would be valuable. But the treaty is
not such a step. It is not better than nothing. Indeed, it would
eliminate export controls that now impede rogue states from developing
their chemical warfare capabilities. And, as many senators have
discovered after examining the treaty's 186-page text, it would
exacerbate the problem of poison gas proliferation around the world.
Article XI, for instance, states that parties to the treaty shall:
Not maintain among themselves any restrictions, including
those in any international agreements, incompatible with the
obligations undertaken under this Convention, which would
restrict or impede trade and the development and promotion of
scientific and technological knowledge in the field of
chemistry for industrial, agricultural, research, medical,
pharmaceutical or other peaceful purposes.
What this means is that the United States must not restrict
chemical trade with any other CWC party--even Iran and Cuba, both of
which are CWC signatories. Similarly, CWC Article X obliges countries
to share with other parties technology relating to chemical weapons
defense. ``Each State Party,'' the article says, ``undertakes to
facilitate, and shall have the right to participate in, the fullest
possible exchange of equipment, material and scientific and
technological information concerning means of protection against
chemical weapons.''
Once Iran and Cuba ratify the treaty, our current export controls
against them will surely be attacked as impermissible. Furthermore,
those countries, upon joining the CWC, will claim entitlement to the
advanced countries' ``scientific and technological information'' on how
to protect their armed forces against chemical weapons. A crucial
element of an offensive chemical weapons capability is the means to
protect one's own forces from the weapons' effects.
Even if the U.S. government decides to maintain export controls
against Iran and Cuba, Articles X and XI will invite other countries to
transfer dangerous technology to them. Germany can be expected to
invoke the treaty against any U.S. official who protests a planned sale
of a chemical factory to, say, Iran. Indeed, Bonn could not only argue
that its firms are allowed to sell chemical technology to Iran, but
that they are actually obliged to do so, for Iran will have renounced
chemical weapons by joining the CWC.

Articles X and XI are modeled on similar provisions in the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty, called ``atoms for peace,'' which even
admirers acknowledge have spread the very nuclear technology the treaty
was intended to contain. When Iran, Iraq and North Korea became
signatories, they quickly gained access to this sensitive technology,
ostensibly ``for peaceful purposes.'' Yet it helped these outlaw states
to develop their nuclear weapons programs. The CWC encourages the same
abuse. Even Scowcroft and Deutch acknowledge ``we must ensure that the
CWC is not exploited to facilitate the diffusion of CWC specific
technology ... even to signatory states.'' Alas, the perverse product
of the CWC will be ``poisons for peace.''

Without the treaty, any country that wants to destroy its chemical
weapons can do so, as is the United States. But, for the sake of
declaring an unenforceable ban on chemical weapons possession, the CWC
will undermine existing export controls that are, in fact, doing some
good. It is a stunning, though not unprecedented, example of arms
control diplomacy resulting in the opposite of its intended effect. The
treaty brings to mind Santayana's definition of a ``fanatic'' as
someone who redoubles his effort upon losing sight of his goal. As this
absurdity impresses itself upon the Senate, that body appears intent on
rejecting the agreement, thereby sending the administration and the
world a beneficial message: arms control treaties should make us more
secure, not less.

Douglas J. Feith oversaw chemical weapons arms control as Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Negotiations Policy in the Reagan
administration.

__________
No. 97-P 50

10 April 1997

New National Poll Shows Overwhelming Public Opposition To A Flawed
Chemical Weapons Convention

(Washington, D.C.): On 4-5 April 1997, the Luntz Research Companies
conducted a national poll of 900 American adults concerning the
controversial Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). This poll was intended
to ensure that public sentiments about the present treaty were properly
understood--an objective made all the more necessary by earlier canvass
performed by the Wirthlin Group. The Wirthlin poll suggested
overwhelming support for a treaty that ``would ban the production,
possession, transfer and use of poison gas.''

The Luntz Poll

This poll--which was sponsored by the Center for Security Policy, a
non-partisan educational organization specializing in national defense
and foreign policy issues--asked respondents whether they would support
the CWC if it had certain troubling characteristics and/or
implications. The text of the questions and the responses follow
(including a breakout of the views of the respondents who identified
themselves as having voted Republican in the 1996 congressional
election, since the treaty's fate will be decided by the Senate's GOP
members): \1\

``President Clinton will ask the U.S. Senate to vote in the
next few weeks for an arms control treaty called the Chemical
Weapons Convention. It is supposed to ban the production and
stockpiling of nerve gas and other chemical weapons worldwide.
Let me read you two opinions about the treaty [order of
following two paragraphs reversed in every-other question]:

``Treaty supporters point out that more than 160 countries
have signed the Chemical Weapons Convention and believe it
would create international pressure to get rid of such
weapons--and punish those who keep them. They say that, even if
it does not work perfectly, it will still be better than having
no treaty at all.

``Treaty opponents--including four former Secretaries of
Defense--believe there are serious problems with this treaty.
If they are right, it will not rid the world of chemical
weapons and may, instead, have even more undesirable effects.
They believe that such problems could make the result of this
Convention worse than having no treaty at all.

``With these views in mind, I would like to ask you whether
you would strongly support, somewhat support, somewhat oppose
or strongly oppose the Chemical Weapons Convention if it did
the following things:

``1. If only the United States and its allies wound up obeying it while
other, potentially hostile countries like Russia, China, Iran,
Iraq or North Korea keep their chemical weapons?''

Poll Results
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Sample
Republicans
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
15% Strongly support 13% Strongly Support
16% Somewhat support 14% Somewhat support
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Support 31% Total Support 27%
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
16% Somewhat oppose 16% Somewhat Oppose
44% Strongly oppose 50% Strongly Oppose
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Oppose 60% Total Oppose 66%
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
9% Other (No opinion/Don't know/Refused)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

 

``2. If it would result in the transfer of technology that could help
countries like Iran, Cuba or China increase their ability to
fight chemical wars?''

Poll Results
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Sample
Republicans
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
9% Strongly support 7% Strongly support
10% Somewhat support 10% Somewhat support
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Support 19% Total Support 17%
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
17% Somewhat oppose 14% Somewhat oppose
53% Strongly oppose 62% Strongly oppose
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Oppose 70% Total Oppose 76%
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
11% Other (No opinion/Don't know/Refused)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

 

``3. If countries that violated its prohibitions went unpunished?''

Poll Results
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Sample
Republicans
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
7% Strongly support 8% Strongly support
9% Somewhat support 8% Somewhat support
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Support 16% Total Support 16%
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
17% Somewhat oppose 15% Somewhat oppose
56% Strongly oppose 61% Strongly oppose
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Oppose 73% Total Oppose 76%
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
11% Other (No opinion/Don't know/Refused)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

 

``4. If it would authorize UN inspectors to go to any site in the
United States, potentially without legal search warrants and
potentially risking American business or military secrets?''

Poll Results
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Sample
Republicans
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
10% Strongly support 6% Strongly support
12% Somewhat support 8% Somewhat support
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Support 22% Total Support 16%
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
19% Somewhat oppose 19% Somewhat oppose
49% Strongly oppose 57% Strongly oppose
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Oppose 68% Total Oppose 76%
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
11% Other (No opinion/Don't know/Refused)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The CWC Does Have These Flaws
Thanks to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee under the
leadership of its chairman, Senator Jesse Helms, there is now little
doubt that the Chemical Weapons Convention awaiting Senate advice and
consent is defective in each and every one of these respects. In the
course of hearings the Committee held this week, an array of
unimpeachable authorities highlighted the treaty's flaws with respect
to its ineffectiveness, its technology transfer implications, its
unenforceability and its ominous implications for American
constitutional rights and businesses.
Such points were underscored by four former Secretaries of Defense
(James Schlesinger, Donald Rumsfeld, Caspar Weinberger and Dick Cheney
[in the form of a letter]), a former Director of the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency (Fred Ilke), a former UN Ambassador (Jeane
Kirkpatrick) and two other, prominent former Defense Department
officials (former Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle and
former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Douglas Feith).
The Center anticipates with pleasure further hearings next week by
the Foreign Relations Committee that are expected to address in greater
detail the business, constitutional, intelligence and military issues
associated with the Chemical Weapons Convention. It calls upon the
Senate Armed Services Committee and Intelligence Committees to exercise
their respective oversight responsibilities as well before the full
Senate is asked to address this fatally flawed treaty. Such hearings
can only serve to inform the debate about the CWC and reinforce the
need for it to be conducted in a rigorous and deliberate manner--not
the artificially constrained, superficial and disinformed consideration
the Clinton Administration would prefer from the Senate.

notes:
\1\ The Poll has a margin of error of plus or minus 3.3%. Subtotals
reflect rounding of responses.
__________
No. 97-D 46
27 March 1997

Truth or Consequences #9: CWC Proponents Dissemble About Treaty
Arrangements Likely To Disserve U.S. Interests

(Washington, D.C.): In recent weeks, a number of arguments have
been advanced by proponents of the controversial Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC) to counter concerns expressed by the treaty's critics.
The more important of these have been rebutted in previous papers in
this Truth or Consequences series.\1\ Several of the advocates' other
misrepresentations appear, by comparison, to be relatively
insignificant at this moment. To the extent that these statements
encourage Senators to underestimate the problems with this Convention,
however, it is important that the facts be clearly established with
regard to these issues, as well.
Generically, the statements in question fall in the category of
mechanics and other organizational aspects of the institutional
arrangements established by the Chemical Weapons Convention. Of
particular concern are the following points:
`The Laugh Test'--Ha!
In response to concerns that foreign governments might abuse the
CWC's intrusive inspection provisions to acquire proprietary
information from American companies, treaty advocates have claimed that
the Convention provides a mechanism for screening out any requests for
challenge inspections that are frivolous or abusive. Some have called
this colloquially the ``laugh test'': They note that, as long as three-
quarters of the Executive Council (excluding the requesting party and
the party to be inspected) of the Organization for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons (OPCW)--the new UN bureaucracy established in The
Hague pursuant to this treaty--determine that an inspection is
frivolous, the inspection can be foreclosed.
In practice, though, it is hard to see how this ``laugh test'' will
be able to protect American companies, including many that have nothing
to do with the manufacture of chemicals--to say nothing of any
involvement in the production of chemical weapons.\2\ After all, under
the Chemical Weapons Convention, the following factors will be at work:
No Timely Basis for Declaring an Inspection Frivolous: According to
the CWC's Article IX, paragraph 17, the OPCW's Executive Council will
have just 12 hours after receipt of an inspection request to determine
whether it is a frivolous or abusive one. Making such a determination
will be problematic, however, since there is no requirement at that
juncture for the challenging state party to identify the company or
site to be inspected.
The nation requesting the challenge inspection is initially
required only to identify the country in which the site is located, the
port of entry to be used by inspectors and the nature of the concern as
it relates to the treaty (Part X, Section B, paragraph 4). In fact, the
challenging party does not have to name the exact site to be inspected
until 12 hours before inspectors are to arrive at the point of entry
(Part X, Section B, paragraph 6). This will be well after the time by
which a ruling on frivolity must have been rendered.
No Opportunity to Object: There will, as a practical matter, be no
way for a country (or one of its companies) to object that an
inspection is frivolous. Not only will they not know of the precise
inspection request in time to appeal to the Executive Council for
relief but--in the unlikely event that they do learn of the location to
be inspected prior to the Executive Council's timeframe for acting--the
party to be inspected is precluded by the treaty from participating in
Council deliberations on the frivolousness of the request (Article X,
paragraph 17).
Little Chance of Prevailing in the Executive Council: Even if the
United States had the requisite information to argue that a challenge
inspection would be frivolous or abusive and was in a position to make
that argument before the Executive Council, the composition of that
body makes it unlikely that American objections would be respected by
three-quarters of the members. In standard U.N. style, the 41 seats
(held for 2-year terms) are apportioned regionally: 9 African nations,
9 Asian, 7 Latin American and Caribbean, 5 Eastern European, 1 rotating
between Asian or Latin and Caribbean nations and 10 Western European or
``other'' nations (the United States is an ``other'' nation for the
purposes of the CWC).
The United States has neither a guaranteed seat on the Council nor
a veto. If standard U.N. practice applies, Washington will find it hard
to muster a majority--let alone a super-majority of three-quarters of
the membership--in support of its positions. What is more, the U.S.
government will almost certainly be disinclined to object to
inspections of any but the most patently sensitive government
installations on the grounds that doing so will create precedents and
otherwise facilitate foreign efforts to impede valid inspections.
`No Go' on Adding Chemicals to the Schedules
In the wake of revelations that Russia has been covertly developing
new classes of extremely toxic chemical weapons using ingredients
deliberately left off the CWC's Schedules of Chemicals, treaty
proponents have claimed that such chemicals could easily be added to
the list. Unfortunately, such statements ignore two inconvenient facts:
Revealing Formulas for Chemical Weapons May Do More Harm than Good:
In the event the United States learns the composition of a novel
chemical agent--such as the Russian A-232 nerve agent--it is highly
unlikely that the U.S. would seek to add these chemicals (or their
precursors) to the Annex on Chemicals. After all, adding these
compounds to the Annex means making public the chemical structure of
the agent, thereby undermining efforts to limit the spread of chemical
weapons expertise and knowledge, especially to rogue states. Since U.S.
intelligence has low confidence in its ability under the CWC to detect
illicit Novichok-related activities in Russia (assuming Russia
ultimately decides to ratify the treaty) the costs of adding A-232 to
the Annex on Chemicals--measured in terms of abetting chemical weapons
proliferation--far outweigh any potential benefits.
Impediments to Adding Chemicals to the CWC's Schedules: Even if the
United States should wish to add an agent or precursor to the Chemical
Weapons Convention's schedule, the process is not the simple
undertaking that proponents have led the public to believe. To the
contrary, it is a long and complicated one.
For one thing, modifications to the Annex on Chemicals are not
treated as formal ``amendments'' to the Convention. ``Changes'' to the
Annex on Chemicals, including additions of new chemicals to the
schedules, are treated as administrative or technical in nature.
Consequently, special provisions and procedures apply (Article XV,
paragraph 4): Any state party may propose a change to the Annex on
Chemicals. The proposal is then sent to the Director-General, who
forwards it to states parties and the Executive Council (Article XV,
paragraph 5(a)).
Within 90 days of receipt, the Executive Council makes a
recommendation to states parties on whether to accept or reject the
proposal. The decision requires a simple majority of the Executive
Council (Article XV, paragraph 5(c)). If the Council recommends that
the proposal be adopted, it shall be considered approved unless a state
party objects within 90 days, and the changes will enter into force 180
days after formal notification of its acceptance by State Parties
(Article XV, paragraph 5(d) & (g)). If a state party objects, a
decision on the proposal will be taken as ``a matter of substance'' by
the Conference of State Parties at its next session (Article XV,
paragraph 5(c)).
Conferences are only held on an annual basis, however. Even then,
as the treaty puts it, decisions taken in such Conferences on ``matters
of substance should be taken as far as possible by consensus.'' If
consensus is not possible, the Conference shall take a decision by a
two-thirds majority of members present and voting (Article VIII,
paragraph 18). Currently, this would entail garnering the support of 51
out of 70 state parties to the Convention.
To make this process less abstract, assume that the U.S. government
(a) knows the composition of a new chemical weapons agent (or
precursor) and (b) has reached inter-agency agreement to seek inclusion
of the compounds in the Annex on Chemicals--possibly over the objection
of the Chemical Manufacturers Association. The following is a scenario
describing what would be entailed in effecting such a change:
<bullet> C-Day: The United States proposes the change to the OPCW's
Director-General;
<bullet> C + 3 months: The Executive Council recommends acceptance of
the U.S. proposal;
<bullet> C + 6 months: Russia, for example, objects.
<bullet> C + 6-to-18 months: An annual Conference is held to address,
among other things, the proposed change. The United States
musters the two-thirds votes necessary.
<bullet> C + 12-to-24 months: Change becomes effective--up to 2 years
after the initial request.
<bullet> Alternatively, if the United States cannot enlist two-thirds
of the states parties, the change will not be adopted.
It is important to note that, even if the CWC's proponents were
correct in their representations that it will be easy to add chemicals
to the treaty's Schedules, it is not clear that U.S. interests would be
served by that arrangement, either. After all, addition of chemicals to
Schedules 1 or 2, or relocation from Schedule 3 to Schedule 2 over
Washington's objections could impinge significantly on the reporting
and inspection burden imposed on U.S. companies and on American
chemical export opportunities. In theory at least, changes in the
Schedules could broaden the treaty's scope so as to cover hundreds,
possibly thousands, of additional companies. The Senate would have no
say over such changes--even if they were to have the effect of
significantly altering the CWC's costs.
House of Cards
The Chemical Weapons Convention requires states parties to declare
whether they have chemical weapons and where they were produced within
30 days after the treaty enters into force. Since the preponderance of
the CWC's reporting, regulatory and inspection arrangements hinge on
voluntary declarations, unwillingness of parties to provide full and
accurate reports of their capabilities will significantly diminish even
the putative value of this Convention.
Of the countries that have so far ratified the Chemical Weapons
Convention, not one has publicly affirmed that it has chemical weapons.
While they will not be obliged to make a formal declaration until May
29th, the fact that not even India--which is widely believed to have
chemical warfare capabilities--has intimated that it is a CW state
bodes ill for the candidness of future disclosures. What is more, there
is no reason to believe that China, Iran, Pakistan or other states
judged to have active chemical warfare programs will acknowledge that
reality. Even Russia, which has, under the now moribund U.S.-Russian
Bilateral Destruction Agreement, affirmed that it is a chemical weapons
state, has consistently understated and otherwise misrepresented the
nature and size of its chemical arsenal.
It will only be possible to calibrate the gravity of this problem
thirty-days after entry into force (or after countries like Russia,
China and Iran) deposit their instruments of ratification. The United
States would be well-advised to wait until that point to become a state
party.
The Bottom Line
While these issues may appear relatively minor compared with the
Chemical Weapons Convention's other major defects--notably, the United
States' inability to monitor compliance with the treaty with even
moderate confidence; its prospective costs in terms of Americans'
constitutional rights and their businesses' proprietary information;
and the danger that the CWC's Articles X and XI will actually
exacerbate the chemical warfare threat while the treaty's placebo
effect diminishes U.S. preparedness to deal with that threat. Still,
the truth about these ``mechanical'' aspects of the treaty once again
belie assurances provided by the CWC's proponents and further compound
the down-sides associated with U.S. ratification of the present
Convention.

notes:
\1\ To obtain copies of these papers, please check the Center's
Website (http://www.security-policy.org) or contact the Center at 202-
466-0515.
\2\ See Truth or Consequences #5: The CWC Will Not Be Good for
Business--To Say Nothing of the National Interest (No. 97-D 27, 17
February 1997) for more information about the number and kinds of
companies likely to fall under the purview of the CWC's reporting,
regulatory and inspection regime.
__________
No. 97-P 40
17 March 1997

The Weekly Standard Weighs in on the CWC: `Just Say No to a Bad Treaty'

(Washington, D.C.): According to the Washington Post, the debate
over the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) has become one ``between
conservatives.'' A variation on this theme is the claim that it is a
debate ``between internationalists and isolationists''--read, ``good''
conservatives who appreciate the importance of American power and
leadership in the world and ``bad'' conservatives who believe the
United States can safely walk away from international affairs and
responsibilities.
Fortunately, the fraudulent nature of such characterizations is
revealed in the attached editorial which leads the current issue of one
of American conservatism's most influential periodicals--The Weekly
Standard. As the Standard puts it:
``What we really have here is the continuation of one of this
century's most enduring disputes. In the first camp are the
high priests of arms control theology, who have never met an
international agreement they didn't like. In the second camp
are those who take a more skeptical view of relying on a piece
of watermarked, signed parchment for safety in a dangerous
world. The case for ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention
is a triumph of hope over experience.''
The magazine goes on to describe the debate over the CWC as one
essentially between those who subscribe to ``Reaganite
internationalism'' on the one hand and ``the more starry-eyed Wilsonian
version'' on the other--a difference it says is rooted in the principle
that ``treaties must reflect reality, not hope.'' Perhaps even more
important is its practical guidance to conservatives who would prefer
to be in the former camp rather than the latter:
``In the Reagan years, the treaty was mostly a sop to
liberals in Congress, an attempt to pick up some points for an
arms control measure at a time when Reagan was trying to win on
more important issues like the defense buildup and the
Strategic Defense Initiative. And President Bush pushed the
treaty in no small part because he had disliked having to cast
a tie-breaking vote in the Senate as Vice President in favor of
building chemical weapons. Republicans today are under no
obligation to carry out the mistakes of their predecessors.
``In one respect, the debate over the Chemical Weapons
Convention calls to mind the struggle for the party's soul
waged in the 1970's between Kissingerian detente-niks on one
side and the insurgent forces led by Ronald Reagan on the
other. Back then, conservative Republicans like Senate Majority
Leader Trent Lott knew without hesitation where they stood.
They should stand where they stood before, foursquare with the
ideas that helped win the cold war, and against the Chemical
Weapons Convention.'' (Emphasis added.)

Just Say No To A Bad Treaty

The Weekly Standard/March 24, 1997.--The United States Senate must
decide by April 28 whether to ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention.
The press, the pundits, and the Clinton administration have treated the
debate over the treaty as another in a series of battles between
``internationalists'' and ``isolationists'' in the new, post-Cold War
era.
It isn't. What we really have here is the continuation of one of
this century's most enduring disputes. In the first camp are the high
priests of arms control theology, who have never met an international
agreement they didn't like. In the second camp are those who take a
more skeptical view of relying on a piece of watermarked, signed
parchment for safety in a dangerous world.
The case for ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention is a triumph
of hope over experience. It is an attempt to reform the world by
collecting signatures. Some of the most dangerous nations--Iraq, Syria,
Libya, and North Korea--have not ratified the convention and, for all
we know, never will. Some of the nations that are signatories, like
Russia, China, Iran, and Cuba, are manifestly unreliable and are
already looking for ways to circumvent the convention's provisions.
The convention's most prominent American defenders admit that the
agreement is probably not verifiable. And it isn't. Chemical weapons
can be produced in small but deadly amounts in tiny makeshift
laboratories. The nerve gas used by terrorists to poison subway riders
in Japan in 1995, for instance, was produced in a 14 ft.-by-8 ft. room.
No one in the American intelligence community believes we would be able
to monitor compliance with an international chemical weapons regime
with any reasonable degree of confidence.
The Washington Post opines that these failings in the convention--
the very fact ``that the coverage of this treaty falls short and that
enforcement is uncertain''--are actually arguments for ratifying it.
Presumably, signature of a flawed treaty will make all of us work
harder to perfect it.
Great.
At the end of the day, the strongest argument proponents of
ratification can offer is that, whatever a treaty's manifest flaws, it
is better to have one than not to have one. How could it be bad to have
a treaty outlawing production of chemical weapons, no matter how full
of holes it may be?
Well, actually, such a treaty could be worse than no treaty at
all. We have pretty good evidence from the bloody history of this
century that treaties like the Chemical Weapons Convention--treaties
that are more hortatory than mandatory, that express good intentions
more than they require any actions to back up those intentions can do
more harm than good. They are part of a psychological process of
evasion and avoidance of tough choices. The truth is, the best way of
controlling chemical weapons proliferation could be for the United
States to bomb a Libyan chemical weapons factory.
But that is the kind of difficult decision for an American
president that the Chemical Weapons Convention does nothing to
facilitate. Indeed, the existence of a chemical weapons treaty would
make it less likely that a president would order such strong unilateral
action, since he would be bound to turn over evidence of a violation to
the international lawyers and diplomats and wait for their
investigation and con-
currence. And as Richard Perle has recently noted, even after Saddam
Hussein used chemical weapons in flagrant violation of an existing
prohibition against their use, the international bureaucrats
responsible for monitoring these matters could not bring themselves to
denounce Iraq by name. In the end, it would be easier for a president
to order an airstrike than to get scores of nations to agree on naming
one of their own an outlaw.
The Chemical Weapons Convention is what Peter Rodman calls ``junk
arms control,'' and not the least of its many drawbacks is that it
gives effective arms control a bad name. Effective treaties codify
decisions nations have already made: to end a war on certain terms, for
instance, or to define fishing rights. Because they reflect the will of
the parties, moreover, the parties themselves don't raise obstacles to
verification.
But treaties whose purpose is to rope in rogue nations that have
not consented, or whose consent is widely understood to be cynical and
disingenuous, are something else again. They are based on a worldview
that is at best foolishly optimistic and at worst patronizing and
deluded.
One of the important things separating Reaganite internationalism
from the more starry-eyed Wilsonian version is the understanding that
treaties must reflect reality, not hope. The Chemical Weapons
Convention turns the clock back to the kind of Wilsonian thinking
characteristic of the Carter administration. It is unfortunate that
among its strongest backers are some prominent Republicans who have
served in key foreign-policy positions. It is true that the origins of
the Chemical Weapons Convention date back to the Reagan years, and the
convention was carried to fruition by the Bush administration. But
let's be candid. In the Reagan years, the treaty was mostly a sop to
liberals in Congress, an attempt to pick up some points for an arms
control measure at a time when Reagan was trying to win on more
important issues like the defense buildup and the Strategic Defense
Initiative. And President Bush pushed the treaty in no small part
because he had disliked having to cast a tiebreaking vote in the Senate
as vice president in favor of building chemical weapons. Republicans
today are under no obligation to carry out the mistakes of their
predecessors.
In one respect, the debate over the Chemical Weapons Convention
calls to mind the struggle for the party's soul waged in the 1970s
between Kissingerian detente-niks on one side and the insurgent forces
led by Ronald Reagan on the other. Back then, conservative Republicans
like Senate majority leader Trent Lott knew without hesitation where
they stood. They should stand where they stood before, foursquare with
the ideas that helped win the Cold War, and against the Chemical
Weapons Convention.
__________
No. 97-D 24
10 February 1997

Truth or Consequences #4: No D.N.A. Tests Needed To Show That Claims
About Republican Paternity Of CWC Are Overblown

(Washington, D.C.): The Clinton Administration's hole card in its
bid to persuade a Republican-controlled Senate to agree to ratification
of the controversial Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) appears to be
the contention that the fathers of this treaty are Presidents Ronald
Reagan and George Bush. The most recent and visible manifestation of
this gambit was Secretary of State Madeleine Albright's visit to Mr.
Bush in Texas last Saturday to secure a public statement of his support
for the CWC.
The Administration's reasoning seems to be that Republican Senators
will be willing to disregard myriad, serious concerns about the
substance of this accord and vote for it simply because two Presidents
of their party were involved in its negotiation. This tactic may be
explained by the fact that any arms control for which Mr. Clinton is
seen as principally responsible will be viewed with skepticism by more
than a third of the Senate--a number sufficient under the Constitution
to defeat treaties.\1\ Still, the idea that demonstrating Republican
paternity for a flawed agreement will be sufficient to secure its
ratification suggests a low regard for GOP Senators and their sense of
responsibility when it comes to the Senate's constitutional role as
equal partner with the executive in treaty-making.
Not So Fast--This is Not Ronald Reagan's Treaty
This proposition is even more extraordinary since the degree of
Republican responsibility for the treaty as it now stands is, in
important ways, less than the Clinton Administration would have
Senators believe.
For example, in Sunday's New York Times, a letter signed by a
number of senior Reagan Administration officials takes strong exception
to the suggestion that the President they served is implicated in the
agreement ultimately signed in January 1993. The signatories are the
following distinguished former office-holders: Secretary of Defense
Caspar Weinberger, U.N. Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency Director Eugene Rostow, Under Secretary of Defense
Fred Ikle, Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle and Deputy
Assistant Secretaries of Defense Douglas Feith and Frank Gaffney.
This joint letter notes, in part:
``It is a distortion of recent history for supporters of the
controversial new Chemical Weapons Convention to describe it as
a product of the Reagan Administration, implying that the
treaty has Ronald Reagan's imprimatur.
``The Convention now being debated in the Senate is a very
different document from the chemical weapons ban the Reagan
Administration was negotiating. The principal difference is
that the Chemical Weapons Convention is hopelessly
unenforceable. Cynical signatories like Iran, China, Russia and
Cuba know that they could ratify it, make and store nerve gas
in violation of it, almost certainly escape detection and
certainly escape serious penalty.
``The Clinton Administration has recently told Senate leaders
in considerable detail that it has no intention of imposing
meaningful punishment on treaty violators. It has also admitted
that American intelligence cannot certify confidence in our
ability to detect illegal production and stockpiling of
chemical weapons in secretive countries, even in militarily
significant quantities.
``We know that the Chemical Weapons Convention, in its
current form, would never have been accepted as consistent with
President Reagan's policies. President Reagan was clearsighted
and principled in his opposition to arms control treaties that
could be violated with impunity.'' (Emphasis added.)
Changed Circumstances Have Significantly Altered President Bush's
Treaty
What is more, there have been significant changes in a number of
the assumptions, conditions and circumstances that underpinned the Bush
Administration's judgment that the Chemical Weapons Convention was in
the national interest. These changes have prompted several top Bush
Administration officials--including Secretary of Defense Richard
Cheney, Air Force Chief of Staff Merrill McPeak, Assistant Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency Director Kathleen Bailey, Assistant to the
Secretary for Atomic Energy Robert Barker and Principal Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense J.D. Crouch--to urge that the present
treaty be rejected by the Senate.\2\
An illustrative sample of the changes that have materially altered
the acceptability, if not strictly speaking the terms, of the Chemical
Weapons Convention include the following:
<bullet> Item: Russia's Evisceration of the Bilateral Destruction
Agreement
The Bush Administration anticipated that a Bilateral Destruction
Agreement (BDA) forged by Secretary of State James Baker and his Soviet
counterpart, Eduard Shevardnadze in 1990, would critically underpin the
Chemical Weapons Convention. As the Center for Security Policy observed
last week,\3\ this agreement obliged Moscow to provide a full and
accurate accounting and eliminate most of its vast chemical arsenal.
The BDA was also expected to afford the U.S. inspection rights that
would significantly enhance the more limited arrangements provided for
by the CWC.
These assumptions about the BDA have, regrettably, not been
fulfilled. To the contrary, Russian Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin
declared last year that the Bilateral Destruction Agreement has
``outlived its usefulness'' for Russia. What is more, it is now public
knowledge that Russia is continuing to produce extremely lethal binary
munitions--weapons that have been specifically designed to circumvent
the limits and defeat the inspection regime of the Chemical Weapons
Convention. \4\
<bullet> Item: On-Site Inspections Won't Prevent Cheating
When the Bush Administration finalized the CWC, there was
considerable hope that intrusive on-site inspections would meaningfully
contribute to the detection and proof of violations, and therefore to
deterring them. Five years of experience with the U.N. inspections in
Iraq--inspections that were allowed to be far more thorough, timely and
intrusive than those permitted under this Convention--have established
that totalitarian rulers of a closed society can successfully defeat
such monitoring efforts.
In a 4 February 1997 letter to National Security Advisor Samuel
Berger, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jesse Helms noted
that:
``Unclassified portions of the National Intelligence Estimate
on U.S. Monitoring Capabilities [prepared after Mr. Bush left
office] indicate that it is unlikely that the U.S. will be able
to detect or address violations in a timely fashion, if at all,
when they occur on a small scale. And yet, even small-scale
diversions of chemicals to chemical weapons production are
capable, over time, of yielding a stockpile far in excess of a
single ton, [which General Shalikashvili described in
congressional testimony on 11 August 1994 as a level which
could, `in certain limited circumstances ... have a military
impact.'] Moreover, few countries, if any, are engaging in much
more than small-scale production of chemical agent. For
example, according to [the 4 February 1997] Washington Times,
Russia may produce its new nerve agents at a `pilot plant' in
quantities of only `55 to 110 tons annually.' ''
<bullet> Item: Facilitating Proliferation: `Poisons for Peace'
In the years since the Bush Administration signed the Chemical
Weapons Convention, it has become increasingly clear that sharing
nuclear weapons-relevant technology simply with would-be proliferators
simply because they promise not to pursue nuclear weapons programs is
folly. Indeed, countries like North Korea, Iran, Iraq, India, Pakistan,
Argentina, Brazil and Algeria have abused this ``Atoms for Peace''
bargain by diverting equipment and know-how provided under the Nuclear
NonProliferation Treaty (NPT) to prohibited weapons purposes.
Unfortunately, commercial chemical manufacturing technology can, if
anything, be diverted even more easily to weapons purposes than can
nuclear research and power reactors. For this reason, recent experience
with the NPT suggests that the Chemical Weapons Convention's Article
XI--an article dubbed the ``Poisons for Peace'' provision--is
insupportable. It stipulates that the Parties shall:
``Not maintain among themselves any restrictions, including
those in any international agreements, incompatible with the
obligations undertaken under this Convention, which would
restrict or impede trade and the development and promotion of
scientific and technological knowledge in the field of
chemistry for industrial, agricultural, research, medical,
pharmaceutical or other peaceful purposes.''
Such an obligation must now be judged a recipe for accelerating
proliferation of chemical weapons, not restricting it. Even if the
United States were to become a party to the CWC and choose to ignore
this treaty commitment, other advanced industrialized countries will
certainly not refrain from selling dual-use chemical manufacturing
technology if it means making a lucrative sale.
<bullet> Item: U.S. Chemical Defenses Will be Degraded
When the Bush Administration signed the CWC, proponents offered
assurances that the treaty would not diminish U.S. investment in
chemical defenses. Such assurances were called into question, however,
by an initiative unveiled in 1995 by the then-Vice Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral William Owens. He suggested cutting $805
million from counter-proliferation support and chemical and biological
defense programs through Fiscal Year 2001. The rationale: Thanks to a
perceived reduction in the chemical warfare threat to be brought about
by the CWC, investments in countering that threat could safely enjoy
lower priority.
This reduction would have deferred, if not seriously disrupted,
important chemical and biological research and development efforts, and
delayed the procurement of proven technologies. While the Owens
initiative was ultimately defeated, it is a foretaste of the sort of
reduced budgetary priority this account will surely face if the CWC is
approved.
Changes in the military postures of key U.S. allies since the end
of the Bush Administration raise a related point: Even if the United
States manages to resist the sirens' song to reduce chemical defenses
in the wake of the CWC, it is predictable that the already generally
deplorable readiness of most allied forces to deal with chemical
threats will only worsen. To the extent that the U.S. is obliged in the
future to fight coalition wars, this vulnerability could prove
catastrophic to American forces engaged with a common enemy.
<bullet> Item: Clinton Repudiates Bush Commitment to the JCS on
R.C.A.s
At the insistence of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1992, President
Bush signed an executive order that explicitly allowed Riot Control
Agents (for example, tear gas) to be used in rescuing downed aircrews
and in dispersing hostile forces using civilians to screen their
movements against U.S. positions. The Clinton Administration has stated
its intention to rescind this executive order once the CWC is ratified.
The result could be to compel U.S. personnel to choose between using
lethal force where RCAs would suffice or suffering otherwise avoidable
casualties.
Worse yet, the Clinton reversal of the Bush Administration position
on RCAs may mean that promising new defense technologies--involving
chemical-based, non-lethal weapons (for example, immobilizing agents)--
may be restricted or prohibited by this Convention. If so, U.S. forces
may be denied highly effective means of prevailing in future conflicts
with minimal loss of life on either side.
The Bottom Line
The foregoing considerations make clear that Senators should
consider the Chemical Weapons Convention carefully on its merits. They
should, in particular, resist the Clinton Administration's pressure to
ignore this treaty's flaws out of some sense of duty to earlier
administrations. A treaty that has little in common with Ronald
Reagan's approach to arms control and that has undergone material
changes in circumstances since George Bush's presidency must be seen
for what it is: a defective agreement that is unworthy of the
intensive--and increasingly misleading--campaign being mounted for its
ratification by the current resident of the White House and his team.

notes:
\1\ Presumably, it is for this reason, that the administration has
strenuously resisted demands that major changes it has been negotiating
to the Conventional Forces in Europe and Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
be submitted for the Senate's advice and consent.
\2\ See the Center's Transition Brief entitled Here We Go Again:
Clinton Presses Anew For Senate Approval of Flawed, Unverifiable,
Ineffective Chemical Weapons Treaty (No. 97-T 5, 8 January 1997).
\3\ See the Center's Decision Brief entitled Truth or Consequences
#3: Clinton `Makes a Mistake About It' in Arguing the CWC Will Protect
U.S. Troops (No. 97-D 21, 6 February 1997).
\4\ See the Center's Decision Brief entitled Russia's Covert
Chemical Weapons Program Vindicates Jesse Helms' Continuing Opposition
to Phony CW Arms Control (No. 97-D 19, 4 February 1997).

__________
Remarks by President Bill Clinton and Others at White House, April 4,
1997 Chemical Weapons Convention Event

Also Speaking: Vice President Al Gore, Secretary of State Madeleine
Albright, Secretary of Defense William Cohen, Former Secretary of State
James Baker, Former Senator Nancy Kassebaum Baker (R-KS)

Vice President Gore. Please. Be seated, ladies and gentlemen.
On behalf of the President it is my pleasure to welcome all of you
on this beautiful spring day to the White House.
I'm very pleased to be here this morning with a most distinguished
group of Americans joining the President here today: the Secretary of
State, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the Secretary of
Commerce, our U.N. Ambassador, other members of the Cabinet and the
administration; leaders from the legislative branch, Senators Biden and
Levin and others; former government officials and current ones,
Democrats and Republicans; wise patriots like General Colin Powell and
former Secretary of State Jim Baker; Paul Nitze, other strategists; Ed
Rowny; leaders in our strategic thinking in America over the years;
former Senators Warren Rudman and Nancy Kassebaum Baker and David
Boren; General John Shalikashvili and other military leaders; and, I'm
sure, a bunch of others that I may have accidentally overlooked, but
this is quite a distinguished bipartisan gathering--Dick Holbrooke, the
negotiator of the Bosnia accord, and quite a few others.
You look at this group, and you go down the list, and you see
individuals--men and women in different political parties, different
points on the ideological spectrum--and you think immediately of dozens
of important issues that have faced America where these individuals
have argued with one another and been on different sides, passionately.
But on this issue, every single one of them is in agreement
because, looking at this from whatever point of view you want to look
at it, these individuals have concluded this is very definitely in the
best interest of the United States of America. The time has come to
ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention.
From the killing fields of the Ardennes in World War I to those of
Halabja in Iraq, to Tokyo's subways and beyond, over all that distance,
chemical weapons have traced an insidious path of unspeakable horror
through our century. It's been a long time since World War I. Allow me
to say that the oral history of my own family teaches lessons about
what happened there. My father's older brother went from the hills of
middle Tennessee as a teenager to join the Army and served with our
troops in World War I in Europe. He came home a broken man because he
had been a victim of poison gas. He lived for a long time--coughing,
wheezing, limited in his ability to move around. He had one lung
removed and part of another. And his life--he made a lot of his life,
but it was very nearly ruined by that experience.
So many millions of families around the world came into personal
contact with the horrors of poison gas in World War I that the world
arrived at a rare moral consensus that chemical weapons ought to be
forever banned. And it lasted for a while, but then that consensus
started to erode. And when some started using these terrible weapons
again, as is always the case when memories had faded, the world said,
``Now, wait a minute, how should we react to that?'' Those who focused
on it clearly spoke up and said, ``We've got to react strongly, this is
awful, this should be condemned.'' Others were busy with other things,
and it's a natural process.
But now the world has focused again. The time has come to
reestablish that moral consensus. And as always, the world looks to the
United States of America for leadership, and we provided leadership,
starting in former President Reagan's administration when this was
begun. And then it was concluded in the negotiating phase in former
President Bush's administration. And now, in President Clinton's
administration, the cup passes to the Congress.
But our whole country has a chance to say to the Congress: Do the
right thing. Now is the moment, because now, on the cusp of a new
century, we can join in common cause to end this scourge. As we've done
with pride and conviction so many times this past century, we can once
again here in the United States lead the international community on a
new path toward safety and security. This is an opportunity to help
ensure that the 20th century is the first and last century in which our
soldiers and our citizens will live under the dangerous clouds of the
threat posed by chemical weapons. This is our chance to act in a manner
befitting a strong nation and a wise people, so that we can say
confidently to future generations that here in our time, we came
together across party lines, and we did everything we could to control
these weapons of mass and inhumane destruction. On this we must be
clear, bold, and united.
Now it is my pleasure to introduce the individual in the
President's Cabinet who is leading the charge on behalf of the
President to seek confirmation of this important agreement: our
Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright.
Secretary Albright. Thank you very much, Mr. Vice President.
The presence of so many distinguished backers of the treaty here
today demonstrates support that is broad, bipartisan, and growing.
There are some people who say the treaty is flawed because we
cannot assume early ratification and full compliance by outlaw states.
This is like saying that we should not pass a law against drug
smuggling, because we cannot assume full compliance by drug
traffickers. We cannot allow the rules of the international system to
be set by the enemies of the international system.
As Secretary of State and as an American, I'm also concerned about
our leadership in the fight to stop the spread of weapons of mass
destruction. If the Senate were to reject the CWC, we would be isolated
from our allies and on the same side as countries such as Libya and
Iraq. The problem countries will never accept a prohibition on chemical
weapons if America stays out and keeps them company and gives them
cover. We will not have the standing to mobilize our allies to support
strong action against violators if we ourselves refuse to join the
treaty being violated.
The time for Senate action is now. The treaty has been pending in
the Senate for 180 weeks.
It's been the subject of more than a dozen hearings and hours of
briefings. And we have supplied more than 1,500 pages of testimony,
reports, correspondence and answers for the record concerning it.
In summary, this treaty is a test of our ability to follow through
on commitments. It reflects existing American practices, and advances
enduring American interests. It is right and smart for America, and it
deserves the Senate's timely support.
Thank you. (Applause.)
Secretary Cohen. Thank you very much, Secretary Albright. As we
have all seen, you continue to throw the ball straight and hard and
right down the middle. (Laughter.)
Ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention, I believe, is
indeed a critical test of American leadership, but as Secretary of
Defense, I want to urge the Senate to ratify the treaty for another
important reason. Quite simply, this treaty is critical to the safety
of our soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines. The Chemical Weapons
Convention is needed to protect and defend the men and women in uniform
who protect and defend our country. We live in a world today in which
we find regional aggressors, third-rate armies, terrorist groups and
religious cults who may view lethal chemical agents as the cheapest and
most effective weapon against American troops in the field. Our troops,
in fact, may be in greater risk of a chemical attack today than in the
past. Because America's forces are the world's most powerful,
adversaries are more likely to try to challenge us asymmetrically
through the use of nonconventional means such as chemical weapons.
So, to protect against this threat, we've developed an array of
tools, ranging from protective suits to theater missile defenses. By
limiting the chemical weapons threat, the CWC strengthens these tools
and our ability to protect our troops and our nation from chemical
attack. And that's why our military leaders who stand before us stand
firmly behind America's ratification of this treaty. They understand
that we can far better protect our nation working to abolish chemical
weapons from the world rather than stockpiling and threatening to use
them. They believe, as I believe that ratification of the CWC is
critical to America's security. And I am pleased to introduce someone
who has played a major role in negotiating this vital treaty, former
Secretary of State Jim Baker. (Applause.)
Mr. Baker. Mr. President, Mr. Vice President, distinguished guests,
ladies and gentlemen: As we've heard, the Chemical Weapons Convention
was negotiated under Presidents Ronald Reagan and George Bush.
The argument that some have used against ratification of the CWC is
that it would somehow undermine our national security. Frankly, the
suggestion that George Bush and Ronald Reagan would negotiate a treaty
detrimental to this nation's security is outrageous.
Ratification of the CWC is at its core really a test of American
leadership. If we fail to ratify this treaty, we will forego the
influence we would otherwise have had in the continuing international
effort against chemical weapons. If we fail to ratify this treaty, we
will postpone indefinitely any progress on a ban against the equally
dire threat of biological weapons. And if we fail to ratify, we will
also isolate ourselves from our friends in the international arena, and
we will, as the Secretary of State has just told you, throw in our lot
with the rogue states which oppose this treaty.
But most importantly of all, my friends, if we fail to ratify the
CWC, we will be sending a clear signal of retreat from international
leadership, both to our allies and to our enemies alike. This is a
message we should never, never send. Instead, we should send another
message; we should send a message that the United States of America is
a nation aware of our international responsibilities and a nation
confident enough to assume them. In a word, we should send a message
that America is prepared to continue to lead. And that is why all of us
are here--Republicans and Democrats alike. And that is why the Senate
should immediately ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Now its my distinct privilege to introduce to you my kissin'
cousin, the former Senator from Kansas, Nancy Kassebaum Baker.
(Laughter, applause.)
Ms. Baker. Thank you. Mr. President, Mr. Vice President, and to
distinguished friends who are gathered here today, many of whom played
a key and important role over the years in the negotiations and debates
regarding the Chemical Weapons treaty, I'm sure that I would be
expressing on the part of most of the American people a deep sense of
appreciation and gratitude for your dedication which has brought us to
this point today.
As a former member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for 16
years who strongly supported President Reagan's efforts to negotiate
this treaty, President Bush's efforts to complete it, and President
Clinton's efforts to ratify it, I can attest to the strong bipartisan
support for this convention over the years.
Our success in meeting the challenge of stopping the spread of
chemical weapons will depend on our vigilance. No treaty can have
perfect verification. No treaty will be 100 percent successful in
eliminating a threat. But if we hold out for perfection, we will
squander the opportunity, as has been said by all the speakers, to join
with a growing number of nations to deal now with this serious
challenge to our security.
Over the 4 years that the convention has been before the Senate,
valid concerns have been raised. There have been 13 hearings to date,
many questions answered, and numerous reports written. While to a
foreign observer our internal debate may seem confusing, it is in fact
the essential ingredient to forging a consensus. Our democratic
traditions provide the foundation on which U.S. Leadership is built.
I must commend President Clinton and Senate Majority Leader Trent
Lott for the intense and productive negotiations which have been
undertaken to this date to address the concerns that have been raised.
I'm confident that these efforts will lead to a successful ratification
of the Chemical Weapons Convention, and continued U.S. Leadership on
this issue.
As David Boren, Brent Scowcroft, and myself recently wrote the
President, and I quote, ``We believe that the real issue at stake is
American leadership, not only on this critical issue of chemical
weapons proliferation, but also with ramifications far broader--on a
far broader array of issues which directly affect our interests.
It is for these reasons that we urge you, Mr. President, not to
waiver in your efforts to win ratification in the U.S. Senate.''
It's now my honor to introduce a colleague who came at the same
time as I did to the U.S. Senate, in 1978. We've worked together on
many issues. He now is the president of Oklahoma University. But his
leadership over the years in the U.S. Senate has been central to our
efforts to forge bipartisan consensus on such important issues as the
one before us today. David Boren.
Mr. Boren (Former U.S. Senator (D-OK)). Thank you very much,
Senator Kassebaum Baker, and it's a privilege to have another
opportunity to work with you on an important bipartisan cause for our
country.
During the 6 years that I chaired the U.S. Senate Intelligence
Committee, time and time again our intelligence experts came before our
committee to warn us that the greatest threat to our national security
and to the next generation is the spread of weapons of mass
destruction, including chemical weapons. This threat is intensified as
these weapons become available to some of the least responsible nations
in the world and to the terrorist groups which they shelter.
The decision we must soon make about the ratification of the
Chemical Weapons Convention is one of those decisions on which history
will judge us, and I am proud to stand with those gathered today to
urge its ratification.
At the end of World War II, America faced a new world situation
with the beginning of the cold war. We provided as a nation the crucial
leadership through NATO, the Marshall Plan and other measures which
helped make this world a safer place for decades. Now, almost exactly
50 years later, with the end of the cold war, we once again face a
totally new world situation, with growing fragmentation and the spread
of dangerous weapons to rogue states. American leaders in the 1940's
met the test of history. Members of the U.S. Senate in the 1990's must
not fail it.
Congress, as has been said, has had 13 major hearings on the
convention for over 3 years. The issues are clearly understood. It is
time to act.
With the treaty due to take effect very soon, the United States
will make a mistake which we will long regret if we sit on the
sidelines with states we have criticized as being dangerous and
irresponsible.
We will lose our ability to play a major role in assuring
compliance with the weapons ban. But above all, we will lose the moral
basis of our leadership on an issue of urgent importance to our
national security.
As has been said, this is not a partisan issue. This is a question
of American leadership, as has been said by Secretary Baker. This is a
question of meeting our responsibility to the next generation. Earlier
leaders did not fail our generation, and we must not fail those who
will follow us.
And now it is my great privilege to present one who has called us
as a nation to meet our leadership responsibilities on this vital
issue. His effort deserves our strong bipartisan support. Ladies and
gentlemen, the President of the United States. (Applause.)
President Clinton. Thank you very much. Thank you.
Thank you very much, Senator Boren, for your words and your
presence here today. We were laughing before we came out here--Senator
Boren and I started our careers in politics in 1974 together, but he
found a presidency that is not term-limited--(laughter)--and I want to
congratulate him on it.
Mr. Vice President, Secretary Albright, Secretary Cohen, Secretary
Baker, Senator Nancy Kassebaum Baker, General Shalikashvili. Let me
thank all of you who have spoken here today for the words you have
said, for you have said it all. And let me thank all of you who have
come here to be a part of this audience today to send a clear,
unambiguous, united message to America and to our Senate. I thank
Senator General Colin Powell and Senator Warren Rudman; former arms
negotiators Paul Nitze, Edward Rowny and Ken Adelman; so many of the
Congressmen who have supported us, including Senator Biden and Senator
Levin, who are here; the truly distinguished array of military leaders;
leaders of businesses, religious organizations, human rights groups;
scientists and arms control experts.
Secretary Baker made, I thought, a very telling point, which others
made as well: This is, in the beginning, a question of whether we will
continue to make America's leadership strong and sure as we chart our
course in a new time. We have to do that, and we can only do that if we
rise to the challenge of ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention.
We are closing a 20th century which gives us an opportunity now to
forge a widening international commitment to banish poison gas from the
Earth in the 21st century. This is a simple issue at bottom, even
though the details are somewhat complex. Presidents and legislators
from both parties, military leaders and arms control experts have bound
together in common cause because this is simply good for the future of
every American.
I received two powerful letters recently calling for ratification.
One has already been mentioned that I received from Senator Nancy
Kassebaum Baker, Senator Boren, and former national security advisor
General Brent Scowcroft. The other came from General Powell, General
Jones, General Vessey, General Schwarzkopf, and more than a dozen other
retired generals and admirals, all of them saying, as one, America
needs to ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention, and we must do it
before it takes affect on April 29th.
Of course, the treaty is not a panacea. No arms control treaty can
be absolutely perfect, and none can end the need for vigilance. But no
nation acting alone can protect itself from the threat posed by
chemical weapons. Trying to stop their spread by ourselves would be
like trying to stop the wind that helps carry their poison to its
target.
We must have an international solution to a global problem.
The convention provides clear and overwhelming benefits to our
people. Under a law Congress passed in the 1980's, we are already
destroying almost all our chemical weapons. The convention requires
other nations to follow our lead, to eliminate their arsenals of poison
gas, and to give up developing, producing and acquiring such weapons in
the future.
By ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention, as Secretary Cohen
said, we can help to shield our soldiers from one of the battlefield's
deadliest killers. We can give our children something our parents never
had--broad protection against the threat of chemical attack. And we can
bolster our leadership in the fight against terrorism, of proliferation
all around the world.
If the Senate fails to ratify the convention before it enters into
force, our national security and, I might add, our economic security
will suffer. We will be denied use of the treaty's tools against rogue
states and terrorists; we will lose the chance to help to enforce the
rules we helped to write, or to have American serve as inter-
national inspectors--something that is especially important for those
who have raised concerns about inspection provisions of the treaty.
Ironically, if we are outside this agreement rather than inside, it
is our chemical companies, our leading exporters, which will face
mandatory trade restrictions that could cost them hundreds of millions
of dollars in sales.
In short order, America will go from leading the world to joining
the company of pariah nations that the Chemical Weapons Convention
seeks to isolate. We cannot allow this to happen. The time has come to
pass this treaty, as 70 other nations already have done.
Since I sent the Chemical Weapons Convention to the Senate 3\1/2\
years ago, there have been mom than a dozen hearings, more than 1,500
pages of testimony and reports. During the last 3 months, we have
worked very closely with Senate leaders to go the extra mile to resolve
remaining questions in areas of concern. I want to thank those in the
Senate who have worked with us for their leadership and for their good-
faith efforts.
Ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention, again I say, is
important both for what it does and for what it says. It says America
is committed to protecting our troops, to fighting terror, to stopping
the spread of weapons of mass destruction, to setting and enforcing
standards for international behavior, and to leading the world in
meeting the challenges of the 21st century.
I urge the Senate to act in the highest traditions of
bipartisanship and in the deepest of our national interests.
And let me again say, the words that I have spoken today are
nothing compared to the presence, to the careers, to the experience, to
the judgment, to the patriotism of Republicans and Democrats alike and
the military leaders who have gathered here and who all across this
country have lent their support to this monumentally important effort.
We must not fail. We have a lot of work to do, but I leave here
today with renewed confidence that together we can get the job done.
Thank you. God bless you. And God bless America. (Applause.)

__________
False Promises, Fatal Flaws: The Chemical Weapons Convention

Prepared by Empower America as part of its Ideas for the Next Century--
International Leadership Series, March 1997

False Promises, Fatal Flaws: The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)

``The CWC is not global since many dangerous nations have not
agreed to join the treaty regime. * * * The CWC is not effective
because it does not ban or control possession of all chemicals that
could be used for lethal weapons purposes. * * * The CWC is not
verifiable as the US intelligence community has repeatedly acknowledged
in congressional testimony.''
--From a letter to Senator Trent Lott signed by Former National
Security Advisor William P. Clark, Former Secretaries of Defense Caspar
Weinberger and Richard Cheney, and Former US Ambassador to the UN Jeane
Kirkpatrick

The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) purports to ban the
development, production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons, as
well as the destruction of existing arsenals and weapons production
facilities. Various degrees of controls on and prohibitions against
production of and trade in certain chemicals are to be phased in over
several years. The alleged benefits of the CWC, however, are illusory
and obscure serious harm to US strategic, economic, and civil
interests.
<bullet> While claiming to reduce and even eliminate chemical
arsenals, the CWC actually does nothing to remove such weapons
from those states most likely to use them--including Iraq,
Libya, North Korea, and Syria.
<bullet> The CWC creates a mechanism that could lead to the
proliferation of chemical weapons technology among parties and
their client states.
<bullet> The CWC's enforcement provisions would impose serious costs
and economic risks on US businesses, even those not directly
involved in defense industries, and pose serious challenges to
rights protected by the Constitution.

The Empty Threat of ``Being Left Behind''

``[T]he chemical weapons problem is so difficult from an
intelligence perspective that I cannot state that we have high
confidence in our ability to detect non-compliance, especially on a
small scale.''
--Former Director of Central Intelligence James Woolsey

The CWC is due to enter into force on April 29, 1997. The dire
warnings of the Clinton Administration and others that failure to
ratify the Convention before that date will exclude the US from
involvement in the initial organization of the CWC's institutions and
subject US companies to trade sanctions are misleading.
<bullet> Failure to participate in the organization of an inherently
ineffective regime is of questionable concern.
<bullet> Failure of the US to join the CWC would inhibit trade only
to a limited degree. Even the administration's estimate of
potential losses to US companies totals only $600 million
annually, far less than the cost CWC compliance.

Selected Chemical Weapons Programs

Countries with declared programs: Iraq, Russia, US

Countries with undeclared programs: China, Egypt, India, Iran,
Iraq, Israel, Libya, North Korea, Pakistan, Syria, Taiwan, Vietnam,
Ethiopia, Myanmar/Burma

*NOTE: Countries in bold either have or are developing ballistic
missiles.

False Promises

``The CWC would likely have the effect of leaving the United States
and its allies more, not less, vulnerable to chemical attack. It could
well serve to increase, not reduce, the spread of chemical weapons
manufacturing capabilities. Thus we would be better off not to be party
to it.''
--James Schlesinger, Caspar Weinberger, and Donald Rumsfeld,
Former Secretaries of Defense

The Clinton Administration and other supporters of the CWC
acknowledge that the Convention is ``no panacea'' in addressing the
threat of chemical weapons. The truth, however, is that the CWC is far
more ineffective than supporters contend.
<bullet> Several of the states most likely to pose a chemical weapons
threat, including Iraq, North Korea, Libya, and Syria, have no
intention of becoming parties to the CWC. Even states that have
signed the CWC, most notably Russia and China, are unlikely to
respect its provisions--least of all rid themselves of their
current arsenals--if they indeed ratify it. Russia alone has
already developed chemical programs designed to evade
inspections or utilize agents not addressed by the Convention.
<bullet> The CWC does not ban most chemical weapons agents, because
most agents are used extensively for non-military purposes.
Indeed, chemical weapons remain the easiest weapons of mass
destruction to develop and produce in significant quantities
without detection, largely due to the widespread non-military
use of their ingredients.
<bullet> US intelligence officials have acknowledged that significant
difficulties exist in detecting covert chemical weapons
programs. As a National Intelligence Estimate concluded in
1993, ``The capability of the intelligence community to monitor
compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention is severely
limited. * * * The key provision of the monitoring regime--
challenge inspections at declared sites--can be thwarted by a
nation determined to preserve a small, secret program using the
delays and managed access rules allowed by the Convention.''
<bullet> Procedures exist for producing ready-to-use chemical agents
within so short a time that inspections prior to a conflict or
crisis could be meaningless. A recent Pentagon report details
Russia's development of chemical agents that could be produced
in a matter of weeks.
<bullet> The CWC's provisions for punishing violators are
exceptionally vague. The UN Security Council would be charged
with addressing violations. In addition to the traditional
ineffectiveness of sanctions and other punitive actions ordered
by the Security Council, Russia and China could be expected to
limit or veto outright punishment of their client states and
allies.
<bullet> While the Chemical Manufacturers Association (CMA) supports
the CWC, it represents only a small fraction of the companies
that would be affected by the Convention. Indeed, thousands of
companies potentially affected are not even aware of their
exposure to CWC provisions.
<bullet> The Chemical Manufacturers Association's support is likely
based on hopes for increased trade in dangerous chemicals due
to the elimination of restrictions in accordance with the
materiel and technology sharing mandated by the Convention.

Fatal Flaws

``The United States is abandoning * * * one of the most effective
deterrents to chemical use against itself and its allies: the right to
an extant and mature offensive chemical weapons program. * * * [T]he
Senate should understand that it will contribute to the weakening of
deterrence, not to its strengthening, by eliminating the ability of the
United States to respond in kind to chemical attack. A weakening of
deterrence means * * * that American * * * soldiers are more, not less,
likely to be attacked with chemical weapons.''
--J.D. Crouch, Former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense

Beyond the ineffectiveness of the CWC in meeting its purported
goals, its provisions would actually do great harm to the strategic and
economic interests of the US.
<bullet> The CWC requires materiel and technology sharing with states
that would otherwise be denied such assistance; the CWC would
actually spread chemical weapons know-how to parties, such as
China and Iran, and their client states. Similar arrangements
regarding nuclear technology have contributed to the
development of nuclear weapons programs across the globe.
<bullet> The CWC would require the US to destroy its entire chemical
weapons arsenal, while leaving untouched the substantial
arsenals of rogue states like Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and
Syria, which are not party to the treaty. Even potential
parties such as Russia have persistently violated chemical
weapons reduction requirements of past agreements and are
already engaged in programs designed to defy and evade the CWC.
<bullet> The US relies upon a strategy of retaliation to deter
chemical attacks. The CWC, however, would limit US options to
costly conventional operations or a nuclear strike. Contrasted
with a limited in-kind chemical-for-chemical exchange, these
two options are politically difficult to pursue and therefore
not very credible deterrents to a would-be aggressor.
<bullet> As interpreted by the Clinton Administration and
Congressional backers of the Convention, the CWC would prohibit
the use of non-lethal chemicals such as tear gas, leaving US
troops with no effective response other than bullets to
threatening crowds or the use of civilian shields--such as
occurred in Somalia.
<bullet> Almost 8,000 US businesses, even non-defense industries
utilizing potential chemical agents, would have to shoulder
significant reporting and other compliance costs and expose
themselves to the well-precedented risk of industrial espionage
during inspections. Realistic yearly costs related to CWC
compliance run as high as $200 million in government
expenditures and perhaps billions in costs to businesses. In
addition, Russia has already begun to link its ratification of
the CWC to billions of dollars in economic assistance, some of
which would be only tangentially--if at all--connected to
compliance with the Convention.
<bullet> The inspection provisions of the CWC could lead to serious
violations of the Constitution's protection of due process and
privacy as international teams attempt to investigate private
US companies and their employees.
<bullet> The well-precedented tendency of governments to ignore or
downplay violations of arms control agreements so as to
preserve the overall regimes, as well as the extensive
political and diplomatic capital that has been invested thus
far in the CWC, are likely to inhibit enforcement of the
Convention and the pursuit of more effective initiatives.
__________
Letters and Other Material Submitted in Support of Ratification of the
Chemical Weapons Convention

American Ex-Prisoners of War,
Watauga, Tennessee,
February 20, 1997.
Hon. Trent Lott,
Majority Leader, U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC 20510.
Dear Senator Lott: As National Commander of the American Ex-
Prisoners of War, I wish to express my support for the ratification of
the Chemical Weapons Convention Treaty. This is an important step in
reducing the price that Americans who serve their country on the field
of battle must pay in defense of our freedom. Those captured in prior
wars know all too well the enduring price of those sacrifices even
without chemical weapons and their life-long disabling consequences.
While there may, of course, be some risk in adopting this treaty,
Americans must play a leadership role in international efforts to
reduce this price to the extent possible. These risks have been
thoroughly weighed by Presidents Reagan, Bush and Clinton, and the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, and all have supported this treaty.
Sincerely,
Wm. E. ``Sonny'' Mottern,
National Commander

______

News Release,
Veterans of Foreign Wars of the U.S.,
Washington, DC 20002.
for release: vfw supports chemical weapons treaty
Washington, DC, February 13, 1997.--The Veterans of Foreign Wars
today announced its support for ratification of the Chemical Weapons
Convention Treaty which would halt the manufacture, stockpiling and use
of chemical weapons.
VFW Commander in Chief James E. Nier, of El Paso, Texas, in calling
for support for the treaty's ratification said, ``The treaty will
reduce world stockpiles of such weapons and will hopefully prevent our
troops from being exposed to poison gases as we believe happened in the
Gulf War.''
Noting the support of three Presidents for the treaty--it was
initiated by President Reagan, negotiated by President Bush, and
submitted for ratification by President Clinton--and that the treaty is
supported by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Nier said the VFW would support
efforts calling for the treaty' ratification.
``There are risks in adopting this treaty. However, the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff believes the advantages outweigh the
shortcomings and Defense Secretary Cohen has assured me these risks can
be greatly reduced with the ongoing improvements in the defense posture
of our troops against chemical warfare,'' Nier said.
The VFW leader noted that, ``As combat veterans we support this
treaty, but in the future if we perceive that this treaty puts our
country and our troops at a disadvantage, we will be out front and lead
the way in calling for withdrawal from the treaty.''

______

Proposed Resolution No. 97-TS4
Reserve Officers Association of the United States,
Washington, DC.
chemical weapons convention
WHEREAS, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which would ban the
development, production, and stockpiling, as well as the use and
preparation for use of chemical weapons was negotiated by both the
Reagan and Bush administrations; and
WHEREAS, 65 countries, including virtually all of our friends and
allies, have already ratified the CWC; and
WHEREAS, under a law signed in 1985 by then-President Reagan, all
U.S. chemical weapons (many of which are nearly 50 years old) are to be
destroyed by the year 2004; and
WHEREAS, the Congress has repeatedly refused to authorize the funds
necessary to modernize our chemical weapons arsenal, leading us to
abandon that effort in 1991; and
WHEREAS, the CWC will go into force, with or without United States'
ratification, on April 29, 1997; and
WHEREAS, United States' failure to ratify the CWC will place us
among the great outlaw states of the world, including Libya, Iran, and
North Korea; and
WHEREAS, United States' ratification of the CWC will enable us to
play a major role in the development and implementation of CWC policy,
as well as providing strong moral leverage to help convince Russia of
the desirability of ratifying the convention;
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, that the Reserve Officers
Association of the United States, chartered by Congress, urges the
Senate to quickly ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Attest:
Roger W. Sandler,
Major General, AUS (Retired),
National Executive Director

Note: This is not an official ROA resolution until adopted by the
National (Convention/Council).

______

News Release,
Jewish War Veterans of the U.S.A.,
Washington, DC 20004.
for immediate release: jwv supports ratification of chemical weapons
treaty
Washington, DC, February 5, 1997.--The Jewish War Veterans of the
U.S.A. (JWV) calls for the ratification of the Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC) which was signed during the Bush Administration. The
need for the treaty is more critical today than ever before.
JWV National Commander Bob Zweiman stated, ``The events related to
the Gulf War Syndrome revealed that when it comes to chemical warfare,
there may either be an incapacity to recognize the dangers to our
troops in the field or, once shown to exist, there can be a penchant to
cover up the embarrassment for the failure to so recognize. But for the
actions of the Veterans Administration, our Gulf War veterans would
have found themselves without any current avenue of possible relief
and, even now, we must still be concerned with claim time limitations.
``While the CWC may not be perfect in all terms, it provides an
aura of international cooperation into the arsenal of the United States
protecting our national interests without compromising our freedom of
action. There are meaningful provisions in the CWC which will afford
and opportunity to impose economic restrictions and sanctions against
those who develop chemical weapons or deal with the threat of or use of
such chemical warfare.
``As is readily recognizable from the U.N. monitoring of the Iraqi
facilities, there can be no assurances for a security or for a real
defense capability against the use of chemicals by rogue nations or
terrorists without controls as may additionally be made available to us
by the CWC. We are honor bound to protect our Nation and our troops by
minimizing the chances from all obvious or hidden means of chemical
attack in the future.''
Founded in 1896, JWV is the oldest, active national veterans'
organization in America and is known as the ``Patriotic Voice of
American Jewry.'' JWV is currently celebrating its centennial year
which included JWV's hosting of Veterans Day ceremonies at Arlington
Cemetery on November 11, 1998.

__________
Prepared Statement of Brad Roberts, Institute for Defense Analyses

In hearings before this committee a year ago, I had the opportunity
to address a number of specific concerns about the benefits, costs, and
verifiability of the Chemical Weapons Convention and, in so doing, to
argue that the U.S. national interest is well served by ratification of
the Convention and U.S. participation in the new regime. Rather than
again offer a defense of the Convention, I would like to take the
opportunity to help to bring into better focus the nation's stake in
the pending CWC vote. Toward that end, I would like to describe five
messages that would be sent by your rejection of the CWC.
The first message would be that America's elected officials remain
firmly in the grip of the Cold War when it comes to arms
control
The current debate about the CWC was in fact scripted in the early
1980s, when most of the protagonists staked out their positions
(although at that point the treaty itself was nothing more than a
glimmer in the eye of negotiators). On the one hand were those who saw
arms control as a dangerous delusion--a sell-out to the Soviets. On the
other were those who saw any arms build-up as a dangerous folly--a
false remedy to Cold War confrontation. For each, the CWC was but one
front in the larger ideological battle. Today, CWC opponents savage the
treaty as fatally flawed, while administration supporters defend it as
useful for ridding the world of evil weapons. Moderates in both
parties, on the other hand, seem for the most part to have lost
interest and to have anticipated U.S. ratification as a ``no-brainer.''
The antipathy to CW arms control in the Cold War had much to do
with the specific strategic context in Europe. With NATO forces
overmatched by Warsaw Pact forces, if war came it seemed likely that
the West would have to rely on early use of its tactical nuclear
weapons. The Soviets quite possibly could have denied NATO a carefully
considered and effective use of its nuclear weapons with chemical
warfare. Sustained chemical attacks on NATO forces without fear of
reprisal would have enabled the Warsaw Pact to maintain high tempo
attacks with conventional forces and without themselves suffering the
consequences of chemical warfare--namely the cumbersome work of
fighting inside gas masks and chemical protection suits. Hence NATO
needed some in-kind retaliatory capability for the Soviet chemical
threat, which was provided by the United States with its chemical
arsenal. Hence the opposition to a chemical ban because of the belief
that even small-scale cheating on any such ban could have been sharply
destabilizing not just in Europe but to the central strategic balance.
But that strategic landscape is gone. Today, no country of
proliferation concern has the ability to deliver the quantities of
chemical agents with precision for days and weeks against U.S. forces
or to exploit the tactical circumstances created by their use to
inflict operational or strategic defeat on U.S. military forces. It
would take a great deal of cheating to create a chemical arsenal with
potential military significance when used against well-protected U.S.
forces, a scale of cheating that is beyond the reach of these states so
long as they must keep the program secret and underground. Even if they
were somehow able to create a massive chemical arsenal despite
international inspections, none of these states has the Soviet-vintage
capacity to overwhelm U.S. forces by conventional means or to escalate
to tactical and strategic nuclear attack. Their chemical attacks would
have nuisance value--perhaps high nuisance value--but they do not
promise to create the strategic predicament created by the Warsaw Pact.
Thus the United States need not concern itself with detecting any and
all acts of noncompliance by parties to the CWC, but only with
militarily significant cheating--so long as it sustains strong
antichemical defenses. Of course, it will not rely on the CWC to
understand the CW capabilities of potential enemies--that's why a great
deal of money is spent on proliferation-related intelligence
capabilities.
Moreover, the United States does not need to stoop to chemical
retaliation to punish the use of chemical weapons against its forces.
In the current environment, U.S. military interests are best served by
minimizing the role chemicals might play on the battlefield, so that
the superior conventional weaponry of the United States can be used to
best advantage. In fact, the United States has forsworn the right to
use chemical weapons under any circumstance, even in retaliation, in
the wake of the Persian Gulf war. Norman Schwartzkopf is only the
latest of many military commanders to say that the United States does
not need a chemical deterrent for the chemical threats it faces in the
proliferation era. This makes it possible for the United States to
trade its aging stockpile of chemical weapons, the vast majority
produced in the 1950s and 1960s, for a global ban.
This points to the conclusion that the critics' case against the
CWC has been made on the wrong national security criteria. Cold War
thinking says that only the strictest verification and compliance
standards are suitable for arms control and that chemical disarmament
weakens deterrence. Both judgments are wrong for the post-cold war era,
so long as the arms control in question does not touch on the
fundamentals of strategic nuclear stability. The CWC is neither panacea
nor folly. It is not a substitute for all of those other things that
must be done to meet the proliferation challenge. It does not eliminate
chemical weapons nor the risks of cheating. But it does meet strict
national security criteria. And it helps to keep the CW problem
manageable while adding new political tools to the arsenal of
political, economic, intelligence, and military measures that must be
used synergistically if the proliferation threat is to be kept in
check.
I for one am grateful that the debate on the CWC has not turned out
to be a ``no-brainer'', for we now have the chance to rise above the
tired debate of the past and to think through the larger questions of
arms control standards, national interests, and U.S. leadership in
terms suitable for the post-Cold War era. If the administration and the
Congress cannot come to a clearer agreement on these issues, the
national interest seems likely to suffer badly. At the very least,
disagreement will doom the six other arms control measures currently
awaiting U.S. ratification--and with them, some of the few tools
available to the United States for building future political
coalitions.
A second message is that the United States does not understand what is
at stake in stopping the proliferation of chemical weapons.
Chemical weapons proliferated dramatically in the 1980s, to more
than 20 countries. They have appeared, moreover, in precisely those
regions where the United States offers security guarantees and in the
hands of those states that sponsor terrorism. Stemming their
proliferation is essential to dealing with the more general problem of
the proliferation of nuclear and biological weapons, missile delivery
systems, and advanced conventional weaponry. If rogues can use NBC
weapons as trump cards against U.S. military action, or to conduct
attacks on American civilians, our world will change fundamentally--and
for the worse. If the end of the Cold War is what made the CWC
possible, proliferation is what made it necessary.
It would be nice if the CWC were to rid the world completely of
chemical weapons, but it won't (at least, as long as renegade states
exist). So what other interests might it serve vis-a-vis the
proliferation problem? The United States has an interest in preventing
the continued proliferation to ever more states. It has an interest in
getting out of the chemical warfare business those who are only
dabbling (intrigued by Iraq's use of chemical weapons in its war
against Iran). It has an interest in keeping the stockpiles of those
who remain in the business small and unsophisticated. It has an
interest in isolating by political and economic means those states that
remain in the business. And it has an interest in not being isolated
politically when it comes time to deal militarily with those
chemically-armed states that pose real and immediate military dangers.
The CWC will do a good job of safeguarding these interests. Its
verification provisions are sufficient to deter all but the most
committed CW producers. The charge that the CWC will be ineffective
because some important CW possessors are non-signatories misses an
essential point--by self-selecting out of the regime, these states
identify themselves as problem cases and make themselves objects of
suspicion and trade restraints. In each of these ways, the CWC promises
a tangible benefit to U.S. security (which is an answer to those
critics who allege that the CWC offers no such benefits for the United
States).
A third message of non-ratification is that the United States is going
to be irrelevant to the international effort to stem CW
proliferation.
Treaty opponents have offered up a number of substitutes. One is
``reinvigoration'' of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, whose signatories
agree not to use chemical weapons (although some states have reserved
the right to use such weapons in retaliation). The Protocol is
certainly in dire need of help--it was dealt a crippling blow by the
failure to respond to Saddam Hussein's use of chemical weapons
throughout the 1980s in his wars against both Iranians and Iraqis.
Reinvigoration would presumably entail the addition of compliance and
verification provisions--just like those that turned the Protocol into
the CWC! Reinvigoration would also presumably entail some renewed
political commitment to the Protocol. But the United States can hardly
expect others to line up with it behind the Protocol as an alternative
to the CWC when even its closest friends and allies are moving on to
the CWC. Moreover, the United States carries the added burden of
lingering international resentment over its particular failure to
uphold the Protocol in the 1980s because of its grievances against
Iran.
Their second alternative is to supplement the protocol with a new
treaty analogous to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The NPT is
unique in the history of multilateral arms control measures in that it
grants to a set of states certain rights that are denied to others--in
this case, the right to possess nuclear weapons. Under the proposed
chemical parallel, the United States and presumably Russia would be
allowed to keep their chemical weapons while they try to police other
states from acquiring their own. But no countries would join with the
United States in this endeavor--all see U.S. and Russian disarmament as
essential to the political bargain embodied in the chemical control
regime. To suggest that a new treaty could be made without this
cornerstone, or simply imposed, is either naive or disingenuous.
Their third alternative is reliance on unilateral, domestic
measures, such as those detailed in SB495. In fact, most if not all of
those measures would be necessary adjuncts to CWC implementation. But
as a substitute for the CWC, SB495 leaves much to be desired. One
noteworthy, example is in the area of export controls: the United
States can anticipate growing friction with its partners in the
Australia Group process, most of whom will be among the original states
parties to the CWC, if it attempts to rely on economic sticks and
carrots while sitting aside from the CWC. Another example is in the
area of CWC compliance challenges: by walking away from the CWC, the
United States leaves its allies and other prospective coalition
partners to fend for themselves when it comes to dealing with
noncompliance by states parties to the CWC. The United States may be
there when the chips are down militarily, but for circumstances short
of war it will leave its friends and allies to manage largely on their
own the political and economic instruments of risk management. Despite
its many merits, SB495 is little more than window dressing on American
retreat from the CW proliferation problem. Its primary short-term
benefit would probably be in making some Americans feel good about
walking away.
In short, these alternatives are not viable. To reject the CWC is
to consign the United States to irrelevance to the international effort
to manage the CW proliferation problem. This is a course of action of
dubious political merit. The notion that somehow America should sit
aside while others do the hard work of dealing with proliferation will
be an insult to many Americans. Americans are not bystanders. But
rejection of the CWC will marginalize U.S. influence and turn us into
free-loaders on the efforts of others to implement the CWC despite our
having walked away. This is an insult to Americans rightly proud of the
nation's historic role of a power with both military strength and a
vision of a better world--and the will to lend its political prestige
to bring it into being. It is also an insult to the integrity of
American diplomacy--having given our word to participate as a party to
the convention, in the form of then-Secretary Eagleburger's signature,
non-ratification will erode the strength of American political promises
more generally. Others will rightly ask how America can expect to hold
others to their promises when it breaks its own?
A fourth message that would be sent by non-ratification is that America
is going to dish out some vigilante justice when it comes to
dealing with CW-armed proliferators.
Whether or not the United States ratifies the CWC, it enters into
force as international law on April 29. By walking away from the law it
helped to create, the United States will be relegating itself to the
role of vigilante whenever it chooses to undertake military actions
against CW-armed states--as one who professes a commitment to the rule
of law, but places itself above the law when it comes to dealing with
outlaws. By working from outside rather than inside the CWC normative
framework, the United States will turn military acts against
chemically-armed states into solitary exercises of U.S. military
prowess, rather than coalition campaigns to punish transgressors. The
United States will have no one to blame but itself for the political
isolation it will suffer.
This too is a course of action of dubious political merit. America
does not belong above the law--indeed, central to our national
conception is a belief in the moral basis of our politics and power,
and our mission to expand the rule of law. In our de facto role as
``world's policeman,'' will others think of us as a respectful steward
of the common weal or an unreliable bully whose lip service to the rule
of law is cynical and abandoned when it does not suit his needs? To
reject the CWC is to put us on the wrong side of history, especially
our own, and on the side with Iraq, Libya, and North Korea.
A fifth message is that America does not trust itself--more
specifically, that the Senate does not trust itself to do its
oversight job.
One of the arguments used by CWC opponents to persuade freshmen
Senators to join their cause is the so-called lulling effect of arms
control. The argument runs as follows: tyrants will get the better of
arms control with democracies because de-
mocracies want to believe that others are Good and will go far to
delude themselves that the tyrant is living up to his promises. This
delusion paralyzes democracies, which then ignore real military
vulnerabilities and, by looking duped, embolden the tyrant. By this
logic, arms control may lead to war.
This is a view of arms control derived from a rather peculiar
interpretation of the genesis of fascist aggression in the 1930s, one
which flies in the face of the experience of the Cold War when
democracies stood firm against totalitarianism for half a century.
Anyone who today thinks that chemical arms control will lull a sleepy
republic must overlook the huge sums of money invested annually in
chemical preparedness, the existence of an intelligence community
charged with monitoring arms control compliance, and a host of
``friendly critics'' who scrutinize arms control implementation.
For Senators to align themselves with a point of view that is
distrustful of democratic process would be especially odd. Should we
infer that they themselves believed that they are dupes--that they are
not confident that they can or will perform their oversight
responsibilities, by asking the right questions at the right times
about U.S. military readiness and compliance findings by U.S.
intelligence?
Like it or not, this is what the Senate will signal to the world--
and to the American voter--if it rejects the CWC. America as nostalgic
for the Cold War. America as ignorant of its special stake in stopping
NBC proliferation. America as free-loader. America as dupe of foreign
tyrants, timid and unreliable. An America enjoying unparalleled
military strength, but unable to bank on its strengths to take small
risks for large payoffs. An America that says no to change, that has
lost its bearings and its mission to promote the change that makes a
better world possible.
In short, the vote on the CWC comes down to a vote about U.S.
leadership. It presents the Senate with a basic choice. The United
States can lead, by safeguarding common interests and protecting U.S.
national interests by exercising a political-military influence
commensurate with the nation's weight and moral compass. It can follow,
by freeloading on the efforts of others while pretending that domestic,
unilateral measures are enough to meet its needs. Or it can get out of
the way, as a new wave of proliferation occurs and fuels the ambitions
of those who would try to use their weapons of mass destruction to
intimidate U.S. allies and to veto the use of U.S. military power to
honor its security guarantees.
Many on this panel had the privilege to serve with one of the great
American leaders of this century. Ronald Reagan's special gifts as a
leader, it seems to me, were his intuitive understanding of the
American public myth--our view of ourselves as a people with a certain
historic mission and a strong moral compass--and his ability to
translate the decisions of current moment into this larger framework.
He understood that Americans expect their country to stand tough
against aggressors--and to know how to safeguard that essential part of
the nation's political power that flows not from the barrels of
American guns but from its traditions and values. A vote for the CWC
would be consistent with this sense of national purpose. A vote against
would be an insult.
______

Brad Roberts is a member of the research staff at the Institute for
Defense Analyses in Alexandria, Va. The views expressed here are his
own.
__________
Letters Submitted in Opposition to Ratification of the Chemical Weapons
Convention

Sterling Chemicals,
April 15, 1997.
Hon. Jesse Helms,
Chairman, Foreign Relations Committee,
United States Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: Sterling Chemicals, Inc. strongly supports a
worldwide ban on the production, possession and use of chemical
weapons, but we are concerned about the mechanics and cost impacts
associated with the proposed Chemicals Weapon Convention (CWC). We have
made our concerns known to the Honorable Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison
last August. Highlights of our concerns are:
1. We have serious misgivings about the ability to protect
confidential business information. Having a foreign inspection team
inside our facility with almost unlimited access to process knowledge
and data is not acceptable to Sterling.
2. Cost impact will be significant! We project the costs just to
prepare for, manage, conduct and complete an inspection to be at least
$200,000-$300,000. This doesn't include performing duplicate sampling
and analysis, as well as calibration and verification of process
instrumentation.
3. We cannot comply with the treaty provisions within our current
annual budget and headcount. Sterling has reduced headcount to maintain
our competitiveness. We are doing more with less. We believe the
additional data record-keeping and paperwork burden associated with
this treaty cannot be managed with existing resources.
4. The EPA and OSHA, while participating as part of the inspection
team, may become over zealous with their enforcement philosophy and
begin citing violations as part of their own agenda--while they're
supposed to be monitoring the foreign inspection team.
Sterling Chemicals is not a foreign policy expert, yet we have
serious misgivings about the foreign policy implications of the
proposed CWC. For example:
1. How will chemicals weapon control be enforced in other countries
(Mexico, Columbia, North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Croatia,
etc.)? Since they probably will not cooperate, how does this treaty
produce a ``worldwide ban''?
2. How will international security and foreign policy issues
related to protection of trade secrets be handled?
3. Will the cost and implementation of the treaty put American
industry at a competitive disadvantage with foreign industry whose
compliance is less regulated?
Sterling emphasizes its desire to see a worldwide ban on chemical
weapons. We hope this submittal provides the information you seek for
an informed decision which is best for America.
Sincerely,
Robert W. Roten,
President and CEO.
______

Small Business Survival Committee,
April 14, 1997.
Hon. Jesse Helms,
Chairman, Foreign Relations Committee,
United States Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Helms: On behalf of the Small Business Survival
Committee (SBSC) and its more than 40,000 members across the nation, I
wish to express our opposition to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
treaty due to be voted upon soon by the U.S. Senate. Also, I apologize
for not being able to testify before the Foreign Relations Committee
due to severe time constraints.
It seems to us that a wide array of defense and foreign policy
experts have raised legitimate questions about the CWC, including
several former U.S. Secretaries of Defense. They see the CWC as non-
verifiable, non-enforceable and not serving U.S. national interests,
and SBSC agrees.
Though the CWC offers nothing in terms of improving U.S. security
interests, the CWC accomplishes much by way of raising regulatory costs
on already over-regulated U.S. businesses. For example, the CWC would
inflict the following on U.S. entrepreneurs and businesses:

<bullet> For the first time, U.S. private industry would be subject
to foreign inspection as a result of a treaty. Inspectors would
come from a new international agency in the Hague, Netherlands.
<bullet> Businesses must prove to the U.S. government and
international inspectors that they are not producing or
stockpiling chemical weapons, with noncompliance fines reaching
as high as $50,000 per incident. Forms would have to be filed
on chemical types each year and changes in a process using
certain chemicals would have to be reported five days in
advance. Noncompliance could result in a $5,000 fine. And of
course, with government bureaucrats issuing fines, the threat
that fines shift from a means of deterrence or punishment to a
source of revenues always looms.
<bullet> Firms would be open to a real threat from international
industrial espionage. The loss of proprietary information could
seriously weaken international competitiveness. The treaties
protections are frivolous, and any court challenge likely would
come after the horse left the barn.
<bullet> U.S. firms producing, processing, or consuming a scheduled
chemical will carry a paperwork/declaration burden. The U.S.
Department of Commerce estimated that it will take companies 9
hours to fill out paperwork for every Schedule I chemical, 7.2
hours for Schedule 2 chemicals, 2.5 hours for Schedule 3
chemicals, and 5.3 hours for each Discrete Organic Chemical.
Estimates range from 2,000 to more than 10,000 U.S. companies
that will be forced to bear these paperwork burdens.
<bullet> Congress's Office of Technology Assessment estimated that
inspections will cost U.S. firms anywhere from $10,000 to
$500,000 per visit.
<bullet> Smaller businesses will be hit hardest by increased
regulatory burdens. Interestingly, the Chemical Manufacturers
Association (CMA) supports ratification of the CWC, apparently
claiming that the new regulations would not be a burden.
However, the CMA is a group of generally large chemical
manufacturers, and reportedly more than 60 percent of the
facilities likely affected by the CWC are not CMA members.
Large companies possess far greater resources and experience in
dealing with regulators of all kinds. Indeed, new regulatory
burdens can perversely give large firms a competitive edge over
smaller companies due to such resource and experience factors.
As economist Thomas Hopkins has shown, the per employee cost of
federal regulation runs almost 50 percent higher for firms with
fewer than 500 employees vs. companies with more than 500
employees--$5,400 per employee vs. $3,000 per employee,
respectively.
<bullet> Chemical companies would not be the only types of businesses
subject to CWC regulations. Firms in the food processing,
pharmaceutical, paint, petroleum, biotech, electronics,
textiles, fertilizers, rubber, brewing, and distilling
industries would be impacted as well.
<bullet> Significant legal questions arise for U.S. businesses as
well. Distinct possibilities exist that rights of due process
could be violated in relation to warrantless searches and
personnel being compelled to answer questions, and provide
information and access; and a ``takings'' could occur when
government reveals information harming a business.

There are CWC supporters who would have the public believe that
treaty supporters do not care about chemical weapons and U.S. security;
in fact, the exact opposite is true. Anyone who really cares should
stand up and oppose this deeply flawed, dangerous and costly treaty.
SBSC believes the Chemical Weapons Convention to be a deeply flawed
treaty that will do nothing to enhance and may indeed weaken U.S.
national security, while imposing new regulatory burdens on U.S.
businesses. The Chemical Weapons Convention should be rejected by the
U.S. Senate.
Sincerely,
Raymond J. Keating,
Chief Economist, Small Business Survival Committee.

__________
Statement by Ronald F. Lehman Before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, June 9, 1994

Mr. Chairman, Distinguished Members of this Committee: In
Islamabad, Pakistan, last week, I received your invitation to appear
before the Committee to discuss ratification of the Chemical Weapons
Convention. It was an honor to be asked to appear before you once
again, and I am particularly pleased to join several close and valued
friends who made major contributions to the revolutionary national
security and arms control achievements which took place during the
Reagan and Bush administrations. It is in that same spirit of public
service that they are here today.
The best friends of real arms control are those who have demanded
the highest standards. Better is not really the enemy of the good. In
particular, the U.S. negotiating position is always strengthened when
we negotiators are reminded that one-third of the Senate plus one might
someday decide that the treaty we conclude falls short of their
expectations for advancing the national interest.

During the negotiation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, I and
others consulted regularly with members of the United States Congress
including the members of this Committee. We sought your advice on how
to negotiate the best possible treaty. A process of consultation,
however, must never substitute for a rigorous examination of the final
product such as is now underway, taking into account the contributions
of critics as well as proponents.

For my part, I am a proponent. I speak today as a private citizen;
the views I express are my own and not necessarily those of any
institution or administration. Let me make clear up front where I
stand. I urge the Senate to give its consent to the ratification of the
Chemical Weapons Convention and to move quickly to complete a process
of careful deliberation. I say this, not because of my personal
involvement in its negotiation, but on its merits. I won't repeat the
many arguments which have already been made on behalf of the treaty,
but I would like to present a few additional considerations.

The negotiation and completion of the Chemical Weapons Convention
in the twilight of the Cold War was a valuable element in a bigger,
balanced strategy to increase the security of the United States and to
promote political change around the world. We negotiated from a
position of economic, political, and military strength. We energized
our technology and economy, while reducing subsidies to the Communist
bloc. We recognized the ``evil empire'' for what it was and rejected
attitudes of ``moral equivalence'', which undermine our resolve and
strengthen our adversary. We modernized our defenses, including our
chemical weapons deterrent, even as we made arms control an integral
part of that overall foreign and national security strategy.

One can see this, in one small example, even in the way our pursuit
of a ban on chemical weapons reinforced our commitment to the spread of
democracy. We sought intensive verification measures so that we might
reduce the threat posed by the Warsaw Pact, but also because we knew
that totalitarian regimes cannot long survive when their citizens are
exposed to contradictory information. The requirement for detailed
information on chemical weapons stocks and facilities before reaching
agreement, at the time an innovative negotiating step which led to the
December 1989 U.S./Soviet Phase I data exchange and the recent Phase II
exchange, sparked a controversy which continues in Russia even today
over the history of the Soviet chemical and biological weapons
programs.

Our demand for trial inspections prior to completion of
negotiations aided in crafting a better treaty, but it also caused
Soviet citizens to ask why they themselves could not see what Americans
were allowed to see. Our insistence, first in the U.S./Soviet Bilateral
Destruction Agreement (BDA) of 1990, and later in the CWC, that
destruction of chemical weapons stocks be done in a safe and
environmentally sound manner has created a grassroots political process
of ``NIMBY''--not in my backyard--which has complicated agreement on a
chemical weapons destruction plan but also complicates a return of the
old system. One should not exaggerate the role that arms control has
played in promoting our national agenda, but one should not ignore it
either.

Arguably, the CWC is more important in today's violent and changing
world than it was when it was being negotiated during the Cold War. The
end of the Warsaw Pact, America's sole superpower status, its changing
global military missions, and its advanced conventional munitions have
reduced the circumstances under which the United States would decide to
deploy chemical weapons into an operational theater as a deterrent.
Increasingly circumstances are such that it is more important to reduce
the likelihood that others will use them than that we have them.

The Chemical Weapons Convention plays an essential role in our
efforts to curb the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and
their means of delivery. In the long run, our non-proliferation,
counter-proliferation, or anti-proliferation efforts may be doomed to
failure if we cannot bring about political change and greater stability
around the globe. As I have suggested, the CWC continues to be a small,
but important part of that effort. In the near term, however, the CWC
may actually play its most important role.

We will fall dangerously short in our efforts to stop the
proliferation of more destructive nuclear and biological wcapons if we
cannot even codify and build upon the international norms which emerged
in the negotiation of the ban on chemical weapons. At a time when we
must build support for long term monitoring of Iraq and ``special
inspections'' by the International Atomic Energy Agency in North Korea
and elsewhere, entry into force of the CWC will commit ever more of the
international community to the unprecedented openness increasingly
necessary if we are to prevent disaster. At a time when the global
economy reduces trade barriers, but also undermines controls on
proliferation-related technologies, the CWC codifies the principle that
no nation should trade in dangerous materials with those who will not
accept international non-proliferation norms. At a time when threats to
international security may require military forces of the United States
to be deployed within range of the weapons of outlaw regimes, the CWC
can reduce the dangers our troops will face and help provide the basis
in international law and public opinion for strong measures that we and
others may be forced to take.

These are important external effects of the CWC, but what of the
substantive workings of the Convention itself? They are revolutionary.
Given the inherent technical difficulty of achieving a meaningful ban
on chemical weapons, they need to be. The text of the Chemical Weapons
Convention has pushed the envelope of multilateral arms control far
beyond what was once believed negotiable. It may be that the special
circumstances at the end of the Cold War and the Gulf War made it
possible for a very experienced international and American team to
achieve what otherwise could never have been done. But more than
opportunity was involved. Years of careful preparation and experience
led the way. The former Reagan and Bush officials here today played a
key role in that process.

Important lessons learned from the on-going arms control process
were applied over the course of the negotiation of the Chemical Weapons
Convention. In negotiation, we were not afraid to ask for far more than
an acceptable bottom line. Great emphasis was placed on more precise
draftsmanship, more detailed data exchanges, greater openness and
interaction, an organization with the power to conduct intrusive
inspections and recommend sanctions.

Every effort was made to make cheating by parties less attractive,
more difficult, more likely to be discovered, and more certain to
result in a stiff penalty. Nations which refused to become parties to
this new international norm would also pay a heavy economic and
political price. Nations which joined could expect reasonable
assistance if threaten by chemical weapons.

Although our process was not perfect, careful study came before
making most decisions. A marketplace of ideas often resulted in
disagreements, especially when facts were few and concepts vague. In
the end, however, a vigorous interagency process which ensured that all
of the relevant information was considered and that senior officials
were exposed to key technical information and alternative views
resulted in better decisions. Sometimes a consensus developed,
sometimes difficult, divisive decisions had to be made.

Diplomatic and political considerations often influenced fine
tuning and presentation, but I think the record will show that in the
CWC, as in the INF treaty, the START I and II treaties, and in the
Verification Protocol which made possible a 98-0 vote in the Senate for
consent to ratify the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, national security was
the overwhelmingly central determinant.

One example from the Chemical Weapons Convention is that of
challenge inspections. Everyone knows that no magic telescope exists
which will tell us where in the world on any given day someone will be
violating some provision of the CWC. But everyone also knows who are
the most likely threats and where potential threats to our forces must
be considered most seriously. Information is gathered, intelligence
estimates are made, and military precautions taken. In the past, it has
usually stopped there for lack of more intrusive measures including
challenge inspections which might provide a basis for international
action without compromising sensitive sources and methods. A
verification and enforcement regime for the CWC needed a challenge
inspection mechanism.

At the same time, we recognized that challenge inspections were not
magic either. They may or may not find the evidence you need, depending
on circumstances, procedures, and skill. Worse, such intrusive
inspections could be abused or backfire revealing important proprietary
information or national security secrets. Constitutional questions
related to property and privacy also needed to be addressed.

No technical challenge in arms control over the twelve years of the
Reagan and Bush administrations received more careful consideration at
all levels than that of implementation of a challenge inspection
regime. Working with professionals and experts inside and outside of
government, we sought to find a path which would maximize the
effectiveness of inspections while minimizing costs including the risk
to sensitive information.

We learned much along the way. More often than not, the real
problems and real solutions were to be found in the field and among the
operators rather than within the Washington-based bureaucracy. We found
that different sites and activities posed different problems. We
discovered that some sensitive information was less vulnerable than we
had believed, but that some was more vulnerable. We learned that with
or without a CWC, some security measures should be strengthened. We
discovered that at many sensitive sites concern about illegal chemical
activity could be dispelled without much risk. We also feared that at a
few sites we could offer little meaningful access without great risk.

Out of this continuous process, we developed an approach which can
work and which gives us what we need to protect highly sensitive
information. Conceptually, the approach was simple. Access would be
granted to any challenged site, but access would be managed at that
site to protect sensitive information. If, at a particular site,
timeliness or intrusiveness were not considered sufficient to resolve
legitimate concerns, then the inspected party had an obligation to
resolve those concerns by other means.

To meet diverse concerns, however, the desired U.S. package
involved some complexity. Moreover, it involved far more intrusiveness
than some nations desired and more rules for managed access than other
nations favored. The more nations studied the proposal, the more they
understood that it could work. To obtain the U.S. position as an
outcome was made easier because it could be portrayed as a natural
compromise between opposing views. In the end, however, I had no doubt
that we would get our position because we had made it clear that we
would not join consensus on a treaty that did not meet our security
concerns. Other nations understood that we had done our homework and
that we meant what we said.

Still, the conclusion of the CWC does not come without a price, and
its contributions to our security will not be fully achieved without
effective implementation not only of the CWC itself but also of a sound
foreign policy and national security strategy. One of the inherent
dangers of engaging in arms control negotiations is that success will
have a soporific effect on the nation's attention to its national
defense and that of its friends, allies, and interests around the
world.

When treaties are seen as solutions to our security challenges
rather than tools to be used to help address those challenges, danger
grows. When the Biological Weapons Convention was concluded, too many
people assumed the threat of biological warfare had been eliminated.
Research on defenses received inadequate support, and we saw too much
of the ``Sverdlovsk'' phenomenon--a propensity to explain away what one
does not want to be so. One hopes that we are not seeing this again
with respect to North Korea and the NPT.

Some would argue that this danger that arms control will lull us
into neglecting our defenses means that we should never negotiate or at
least never reach agreements. The problem with that conclusion is that
it assumes we cannot trust our own nation to negotiate in its own
interest or provide for its own defense. When this becomes a problem,
it is a problem the American people and its representatives have the
power to solve. We must make certain they get the facts. Hearings like
this are an important means for doing that.

For my part, I believe that the arms control and non-proliferation
tools can be used to promote our national security, and we must ensure
that they do. The Chemical Weapons Convention is clearly a tool which
can enhance our national security. I believe that the successful
conclusion of arms control agreements need not result in the neglect of
our defenses, but it often has. In giving its consent to ratification
of the Chemical Weapons Convention without reservations, the Senate
should take real steps to support implementation of the treaty, fund a
strong defense program, and promote a balanced national security
strategy which recognizes that the United States must be the leader in
a very dangerous world.

The world has undergone dramatic change, and arms control trains
have been rushing by. In such a world, if we do not shape the arms
control process to serve our interests, we can be certain that some
nations will be pressing in directions that are not in our interest.
The Chemical Weapons Convention before this committee is in our
interest. Again, Mr. Chairman, Distinguished Members of the Committee,
I believe that the United States Senate should give its consent to
ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Thank you.