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Arms, Aid, and the War with Iraq |
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Military aid as a diplomatic toolIn the leadup to the war on Iraq, there were numerous accusations that the United States was using military aid as a tool to buy allies. Such aid would presumably show up either in the regular appropriation bill for 2004, or in the war supplemental for 2003. There is little indication that the regular appropriation was used as diplomatic leverage for the war. Most of the countries on the White House list of the "coalition of the willing" did not see substantial aid increases, nor did members of the Security Council who were reportedly being courted by both France and the U.S. (Turkey is a significant exception--more information below.) On the other hand, the request for supplemental appropriations (aka the war supplemental), which the President submitted to Congress on March 25, 2003 includes a substantial amount of military aid which appears to be linked to the administration's earlier efforts to win diplomatic support for the war on Iraq. For example, the war supplemental includes military aid for ten countries of "New Europe" which lined up behind the U.S. as the Iraq crisis played out at the United Nations. These countries include seven of the "Vilnius 10," whose February communiqué was frequently cited by the U.S. as evidence that its actions had European backing. Other aid is slated for the Philippines, where President Arroyo quickly moved to support the U.S. on Iraq. The request also includes billions in additional aid for Israel, which the Administration desperately wants to stay out of the conflict. Finally, Bahrain and Oman are slated to receive foreign military financing through the supplemental. While not publicly identified with the coalition, are reportedly providing logistical support for the war. The Administration justifies the military aid package as "providing vitally needed equipment, supplies, and training" for "our partners and allies in operations in Iraq and the ongoing war against terrorism." The urgent need for money for the war effort is expediting the passage of the supplemental and, as a result, individual requests will not be subjected to the same level of scrutiny and debate as comparable requests in the regular appropriations bills. For this reason, only funding needs that must be met immediately - and relate directly to the war on Iraq - should be included. While much of the money requested in the war supplemental fits this criteria, the urgency of several of the individual requests is not readily apparent. Those requests should go through the regular appropriations process. Key aid provisions in the supplemental include the following:
Turkey also benefited from the regular 2004 foreign aid request, which was released while the U.S. was still negotiating for its help with the Iraq war. The regular military aid request for Turkey increased from $17.5 million in FY 2003 to $50 million in FY 2004, ostensibly to help its armed forces modernize and operate alongside other NATO members. The Administration also requested $200 million in new economic aid for Turkey "to mitigate the economic stress Turkey is experiencing as a result of its support for combating international terrorism." This aid is separate from the huge package of $6 billion in grants and $12 billion in loan guarantees that was offered in exchange for U.S. use of Turkey as a staging area for ground troops. That aid package was pronounced dead by White House spokesman Ari Fleischer after Turkey rejected the troops. However, the Export-Import bank did approve a separate $324 million loan guarantee for the purchase of S-70B Sea Hawk and UH-60 Black Hawk attack helicopters on January 16, 2003, as negotiations with Turkey were ongoing. Not every aid provision in the proposed supplemental is related to Iraq--some large packages are couched in terms of support for the war on terror. These include the following:
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