To the Editor:
Lieutenant Colonel Collin A. Agee's article on the
Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (Joint STARS) in
Bosnia was informative. ["Joint STARS in Bosnia: Too Much Data, Too
Little Intel?," Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin,
October-December 1996.] In it, he raises some quetions about force
structure. This letter is the official response from the
Directorate of Combat Developments at Fort Huachuca.
LTC Agee noted that the Modified Table of Organization and
Equipment (MTOE) Ground Station Module (GSM) Company at XVIII
Airborne Corps was to be deleted. There are discrepencies between
what is doctrine and what units are changing as part of their MTOE
force. The GSM Company was an MTOE vice a proponent-approved Table
of Organization and Equipment (TOE). Joint STARS supports artillery
and aviation units as well. Ownership of this targeting resource by
the Battlefield Operating Systems (BOSs) that need it will ensure
that we do not break faith with the commitments we have made to our
fellow soldiers.
LTC Agee also addresses the requirements for the GSM's follow-on,
the Common Ground Station (CGS). Both of these systems are intended
for the Now Battle taking perishable data from not only Joint STARS
but also the commander's tactical terminal and joint tactical
terminal (CTT/JTT), and the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and
feeding a product or report to the supported unit. Those same units
have the All-Source Analysis System' s Remote Work Station (ASAS
RWS) or a complete Analysis and Control Element (ACE). It is the
responsibility of these latter elements to develop the common,
relevant picture and disseminate it to the warflghter. Currently,
there is no requirement to export that picture to the GSM/CGS. We
are working on that fix. While the GSM/CGS is evolving, it remains
to be seen whether its functions will be limited or training
expanded. There are analyst tasks in the current Imagery Ground
Station Operator (IGSO) course.
LTC Agee cites the need for an information manager at corps and
division. Personnel are not available and any change to the force
would have to be offset by a like amount. Rather than reduce
intelligence slots, we need to assure personnel assigned to the ACE
bring to the job the necessary skills.
Lastly, LTC Agee suggests the Joint STARS squadron be relooked. The
applicable TOE 34-534A, Military Intelligence Company (Joint
STARS), (297th MI Battalion, 513th MI Brigade) calls for staff
personnel as well as command and control. The effective date for
this TOE is October 1998. Until then, task organization is the
answer.
John K. Quinn
Fort Huachuca, Arizona
To the Editor:
The purpose of this letter is to correct what I
perceive to be an error in several recent issues including the
April-June issue of the Military Intelligence Professional
Bulletin. The error appears in the Editor's Note found on page 43
in the article "Intelligence and the Peacekeeper in Haiti."
The term "Operations Other Than War" used throughout this article
is no longer doctrinally accurate. Precise terminology while
discussing peacekeeping operations, humanitarian assistance, and
operations in aid of civil authorities should replace "OOTW." A
message from the Joint Staff, DJS 311514Z Aug 1995 released this
guidance.
The term "Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)" first
appeared in Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations. Since its
establishment in Joint Pub 3-0, MOOTW has progressively gained
wider acceptance and usage; the term was not challenged during the
preliminary or final coordination of Joint Pub 3-07, Joint Doctrine
for Military Operations Other Than War. Furthermore, the concept of
MOOTW is embedded in other capstone and keystone joint doctrine
publications including Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed
Forces of the United States; Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action Armed
Forces; and Joint Pub 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint
Operations.
Subsequent to the approval of Joint Pub 3-07, disagreement over the
use of the MOOTW framework has surfaced. In spite of
recommendations to create a different terminology construct, no
adequate substitute has as yet been suggested which better depicts
what MOOTW was meant to, and in fact does, convey. "Stability and
support operations," "other military operations," and "peacetime
operations" are less precise than MOOTW and do not supplant the
existing doctrinal framework. Furthermore, deviating from
doctrinally approved concepts and definitions, where no
"exceptional circumstances" exist, is inconsistent with the
established policy for the use of joint doctrine. To do so is in
conflict with the Chairman's Title X function of "Developing
doctrine for the joint employment of the armed forces" and the
authoritative-guidance nature of this doctrine.
In my opinion, the intent of the Defense Joint Staff (DJS) message
of 31 August 1995 sought to minimize the confusion about the term,
not to discontinue the use of an approved and doctrinally sound
term. The message states that
"Military Operations Other Than War is a category for a
variety of operations and not an operations itself. There is a
clear understanding that some types of military operations other
than war can involve combat, presenting commanders and forces with
a set of uncertainties with which we previously have not had to
cope. In all military communications and correspondence, it is
vital to address the specifics of the operation being discussed and
not rely on the categorical title of military operations other than
war. If peace operations are the topic of a message, use peace
operations in the subject line and the text. Improper usage of the
term military operations other than war can create confusion and
may imply there is a diminished need to provide for the security of
U.S./Multinational forces."
Joint Pub 3-07 establishes the Chairman's authoritative guidance
for Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War. As the
DJS message concludes,
"Active discussion of the principles of military operations
other than war, particularly where they overlap with and diverge
from the principles of war, and the training and planning for them,
will help in resolving any confusion that has arisen while this
publication was being developed. We request your assistance in this
endeavor."
Commander George McCaffrey, USN
Washington, D. C.
Editor's Note:
While the MIPB is not intended to be
a doctrinal Army reference, it is an approved publication with the
mission of professional development. We strive to ensure use of
correct doctrinal terminology in the articles published in MIPB.
According to the final drafts of Army publications FM 100-20,
Stability and Support Operations (SASO), dated April 1996, and FM
101-5-1, Operational Terms and Symbols, dated July 1996, SASO is
the recognized Army term replacing Operations Other Than War
(OOTW). Miltary Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) is a term used by
the joint community in accordance with Joint Publication 3-07,
Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War.
To the Editor:
I appreciate the opportunity to comment on the
article ["Victory in Egypt: 3d ID(M) DISE," Military Intelligence
Professional Bulletin, October-December 1996] about the 3d Infantry
Division (Mechanized) (3d ID(M)) intelligence operations and their
good use of a Deployable Intelligence Support Element (DISE). The
authors, Lieutenant Colonel Boll, Major Holachek, and Captain
Ellington, obviously "have the bubble." It was refreshing to read
a precisely correct understanding of current doctrine and the
excellent implementation of it that is obviously going on in the 3d
ID(M). My reading of how they have used JDISS and INTELINK brought
other thoughts to mind that might prove interesting to your
readers.
The combination of JDISS and INTELINK provides access to enormous
amounts of data through a common "window." In most cases, data
linked using hypertext to a server and homepage is accessible to
potential users, be they using JDISS applications or a browser
application. The power of JDISS is that these systems are in many
places where relevant data is analyzed. The standard packages
enable a user to "open the window" to another user and get what
they have. This is a simple but powerful capability. The JDISS
established the paradigm.
The same idea is behind the All-Source Analysis System (ASAS)
implementation of browser technology to ride either Analysis and
Control Element (ACE) software or remote workstation (RWS) software
to enable the surf-and-pull of relevant data by the ASAS
intelligence operator-analyst. While recent versions of the ASAS
software have put the browser into the systems, the key operational
impact will not be realized until the multi-level security (MLS)
server and the ASAS Trusted Workstation (TWS) are accredited and
fielded to the force. Once fielded, the ACE operator can post all
available intelligence from his own echelon (and accessed from
higher) to the server and allow any RWS working with TWS to browse
all the available information. Furthermore, the capability provided
by the TWS to allow the user to establish intelligence requirement
profiles will enable the user to tell ASAS and the TWS what areas
and entities he is interested in and let the workstation do the
monitoring of existing data as it becomes available. This will
automatically identify when the "good stuff" shows up. Such a
capability at brigade and below can give these echelons a much
higher probability of successfully weeding through the volumes of
intelligence available to them and finding the nuggets that answer
the priority intelligence requirements. The use of a RWS and TWS in
the TROJAN Special Purpose Integrated Remote Intelligence Terminal
(SPIRIT), as explained by the 3d ID(M) authors, might be the
perfect place to incorporate this capability.
The realization of another important requirement to fully integrate
all necessary JDISS 2.0 applications into the ASAS Block II
software will complete a greatly needed capability. In essence, the
entire ACE will become a virtual JDISS workstation. Other JDISS
users will look through their windows to data in an ACE in the same
way that they open a window to another JDISS today. Likewise, this
ACE will "see" and be able to work seamlessly with any stand-alone
JDISS.
These two powerful capabilities of the future will build upon the
methodologies and architectures being used by the 3d ID(M) and
other units. Used together, they can more effectively address the
need to seamlessly supplement the outputs of national intelligence
producers with the particular and much more focused needs of the
tactical commander. The trick is to get it done now!
Colonel Theodore G. Chopin,
TRADOC System
Manager ASAS
Fort Huachuca, Arizona
To The Editor:
Dr. Robert J. Bunker's article ["Internetted
Structures and C2 Nodes," Military Intelligence Professional
Bulletin, April-June 1996] makes a fair theoretical argument as to
why future armies with nonhierarchical command structures will be
more difficult to defeat simply because, if I may use any
elementary analogy, "cutting the head off no longer kills the
snake." But this relates to the center of gravity concept only if
the center of gravity is command and control (C2).
For example, he states that striking "the center of gravity of a
hierarchical structure can paralyze its decisionmaking
capability..." but would "have almost no effect on a
nonhierarchical structure." First, this assumes the center of
gravity is the command structure. Secondly, he misses the point
that information is a tool only. Also, while it may fundamentally
alter how we communicate, it will not replace the requirement for
structured command that is not only fundamental to the very nature
of military orders execution, but required for coordinated and
synchronized military operation.
In fact, the information age may have the exact reverse effect of
the nonhierarchical trend Dr. Bunker predicts. For example, 20
years ago it was not uncommon for a division G3 planner to sit down
and write an entire division contingency operations plan, done as
a project over a 6-month period with little or no staff
interaction. As any division planner who has spent weeks
participating in Battle Management Center planning cells will tell
you, that would be unthinkable today. This is simply because the
overload of information requires much more detailed planning and
cooperative mission analysis among battlefield operating system
(BOS) staff elements. In this case, information has contributed to
a more structured hierarchy, due to increased dependence, reliance,
and interaction with other staff elements.
Dr. Bunker rightly seems to acknowledge that center of gravity may
not just mean C2, for he states that
" ...development of internetted structures is likely within
societal organizations. Isolating national will, public opinion, or
even key individuals as a likely center of gravity will no longer
be feasible."
Perhaps I am missing something, but I do not understand, nor does
he argue how, "internetted structures" will bring about a weakened,
noncohesive national will, or fragmented public opinion, against a
perceived common threat.
Next, if for example, we are facing an enemy whose center of
gravity is his artillery forces, I fail to see how his possible
complex internetted structure will prohibit us from identifying
this as a center of gravity or from successfully defeating this
center of gravity. How does this structure eliminate his artillery
as a center of gravity? I certainly agree with his assessment that
an enemy's "advanced battle command structure" will make it more
difficult to defeat him. To jump to the conclusion that this
somehow eliminates a specific center of gravity makes no sense to
me, especially when dealing with "physical strength," a potential
component of center of gravity per FM 100-5, Operations.
I accept Dr. Bunker's encouragement for junior officers such as
myself to take a risk in writings and actively participate in new
doctrinal concepts. But Captains Neidrauer and Bennett were not
defending an outdated concept when they articulated the center of
gravity concept at the lower echelon maneuver level. Down here in
tactical units such as the 82d Airborne where "the rubber meets the
road" and where most junior officers operate, maneuver commanders
want S2s who can identify enemy strengths and weaknesses, and the
enemy's center of gravity. They may then employ a defeat mechanism
to achieve victory. Until the time centers of gravity may no longer
exist, maneuver S2s such as myself must be proficient in their
identification and articulation.
Captain Paul T. Carter
Fort Bragg, North Carolina
To the Editor:
Captain Jeffrey Steel made an outstanding point about
where an aviation S2 belongs during the battle ["Apache S2:
Improving Intelligence Support to Combat Aviation," Military
Intelligence Professional Bulletin January-March 1996]. The only
place for an aviation unit S2 to be during tactical operations is
in the Air Tactical Command Post (ATAC). Having served as the 82d
Aviation Brigade S2, I can tell you this is true for three primary
reasons.
The distances involved in a deep attack or air assault generally
prevent direct communications over the operations and intelligence
(O&I) net (FM radio). Sitting back at the command post (CP) in the
rear monitoring the dead O&I net is not productive. If you want to
influence the current battle, you must be able to talk to the
aircraft.
Once an aviation operation is underway, all communications are
generally passed over the command net (that is reality). Even the
S3 shop in the rear is relatively quiet once an operation begins
and the aircraft go across the forward line of own troops (FLOT).
Credibility in any S2 job is critical. Lead from the front. Pilots
notice when the S2 is fully involved and risking his or her own
neck by flying cross-FLOT. It shows you have enough confidence in
your own analysis to risk your own life, as well as the unit's
aircraft and pilots.
Flying in the ATAC keeps the S2 fully apprised of the situation,
better then any other intelligence officer in the division or
corps. You are there to make those critical assessments as combat
information flows in. You can relay critical data to the G2 and
save "the weeds" for later. The S2 noncommissioned officer in
charge back at the command post is fully capable of monitoring the
operations and intelligence nets and passing critical information
to you in the ATAC.
Finally, having the S2 fly in the ATAC with the commander or S3 and
the fire support officer fuses the staff team. You develop a
routine in training and reduce reaction time during actual
operations. Remember, the S2 should be "ALWAYS OUT FRONT" and in
this case "ABOVE" as well.
Major Stephen K. Iwicki
Washington, D.C.