Achieving a Balance

Operational Considerations

CONV HAE and LO HAE. The dual-HAE approach has already been discussed. Initial analysis projected a 4-to-1 CONV-to-LO HAE mission mix to gather the requisite deep-look intelligence in a range of world-wide scenarios. (Costs are being controlled from the outset via streamlined acquisition strategy). Initial indications are that a force mix is the cheapest approach to areas of mixed threats: higher initial costs of two systems yield to savings deriving from optimized capabilities and avoidance of attrition. When both designs are flying in the late 1990s, live performance data will begin to replace simulation projections.

Endurance and Tactical UAVs. Operationally, our UAV systems respond to different ranges of user needs. As described earlier, the tactical UAVs will provide tactical commanders with close and near battle area intelligence while the extended-range MAE-HAE UAVs will support higher-echelon commanders' needs across the theater force. In short, each UAV type is being optimized to meet different needs to ensure the best, cost-effective solution at each echelon.

At the same time, depending on sensor and communication payload capabilities, different UAVs could be adapted to support multiple needs. For example, the joint Hunter-Predator demonstration planned for late-1995 will enable the users to assess the synergy of these two systems.

Finally, it should be noted that Hunter is already a full acquisition program with associated life-cycle costs (LCC), while Predator and the two HAE UAVs are still being developed as ACTDs; force-size production and support data are required for them to be assessed as life-cycle programs. We expect to know more about Predator's LCC next year, but measurable HAE data will take longer to acquire.

UAVs and Manned Aircraft. The DARO's Objective Architecture for future airborne reconnaissance requires migration to a complemenary mix of platforms. This will be achieved by a consolidation of manned platforms as tactical and endurance UAVs are fielded. Today, manned platforms represent critical capabilities; however, there are insufficient numbers to meet stated warfighter needs. One of the key requirements for reconnaissance capabilities is the need to stare at the battlefield. UAVs with extended endurance can fulfill this need, thereby freeing manned aircraft for other, potentially more dynamic missions.

From a resources standpoint, investments in manned systems exceed UAV investment several-fold. However, as UAVs enter full rate production, this ratio will decrease.

Analytic Metrics

Currently, the DARO is reviewing a variety of metrics and measures of effectiveness that are available to support the definition of the trade space available through force mix analysis. We seek to establish the sort of top-level measures of utility that will enable universal comparisons. One of these measures includes the cost-effectiveness of placing and maintaining a reconnaissance payload on station. But being there is only half the objective. Other metrics are in development to assess such parameters as payload product utility (e.g., measured in pixel quantity over time per dollar), given access to the target. This approach seeks to compare the usefulness of the intelligence product of the various platforms, beyond the effort needed to acquire it.

We recently documented a UAV System Effectiveness Tool (USET) that will provide us with the ability to quickly and credibly assess the impact of different force mix decisions on cost- and mission effectiveness. USET's output, for example, will illustrate how changes in operational sensor employment, sensor/platform capability, data link capability and number of concurrent sorties affect the collection and transmission of imagery data, and consequently the number of targets detected and correctly classified.

Near-Term Projection

The DARO is helping the Services and Joint Staff to develop MS&A approaches and to structure live exercises as UAVs proceed through their early user evaluations and, in selected cases, contingency deployments. This steady increase of knowledge and experience will help us prepare for the force structure trades that will be key milestones on our way to an objective reconnaissance force mix.

At this point, immediate decisions on the type and quantity of specific UAVs to be pursued may be premature, as the different systems are at different stages of maturity; however, we will consider system-level trades in the FY98 budget to ensure the development and fielding of optimal reconnaissance capabilities.