Airborne Reconnaissance System Trade Space
WHEN OUR EARLY RECONNAISSANCE UAV programs were developed as highly classified ("black") programs, inventories were small and their budget environment was more stable. There was little need for military planners to consider the relative trade space between space-based, manned and unmanned reconnaissance collection systems. However, today's post-Cold War budget environment, evolving warfighting and expanding OOTW concepts, and the increasing recognition of UAVs' unique capabilities all require a reexamination of our overall reconnaissance force structure. To ensure a complementary mix, we have instituted an approach that is:
- Acceptable to the users, with the understanding that we cannot force UAVs into the force structure before they can be supported logistically and integrated operationally
- Flexible, so that our acquisition strategy is adaptable to unforeseen and extraordinary changes in our threat and budget environments
- Measurable, so industry and users understand what is to be achieved and when
- Suitable to the broad goals of our Objective Architecture, joint war-fighting doctrine, Service tactics, and C3I architectures
- Achievable, so that we do not overemphasize those capabilities that have a high technological risk
- Affordable, to ensure that the user gets the capability that satisfies his requirements at the best cost.
We realize that this trade-off process is continuous and is based upon a national strategy, military doctrine, commercial as well as military technology advances, and defense budget forecasts. We are increasingly relying on a range of analytical tools and on modeling, simulation and analysis (MS&A) to identify specific criteria to measure the effectiveness of various force-mix solutions. UAVs present a new paradigm in the way we conduct reconnaissance and surveillance operations, and we are beginning to see an intense effort in the defense community to develop analytical methods that can capture and compare the true attributes of these systems. It is also important that we not be forced to make critical resource decisions prematurely, otherwise migration toward an optimal airborne reconnaissance force mix will be precluded. For example, our investments in endurance UAVs need time to mature -- both to demonstrate a system's potential value and to make the appropriate system-level trades in light of the knowledge gained. Similarly, each of our reconnaissance systems responds to differing validated operational requirements and should be assessed in terms of cost-effectiveness in meeting the varied battlefield needs of its potential users.
User priorities change as a natural response to evolving threats and missions. In April 1995, the JROC reviewed the requirements and status of the current UAV programs. The JROC endorses development and fielding of both tactical and endurance UAV capabilities. The JROC-chartered Special Studies Group (SSG) is reviewing UAV required quantities and priorities with the CINCs; these findings are to be presented to the JROC later in 1995.