



ACQUISITION,
TECHNOLOGY
AND LOGISTICS

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

AUG 30 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Terms of Reference – Defense Science Board Task Force on Red Lessons Learned

You are requested to form a Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force on Red Lessons Learned.

Each U.S. Military engagement provides ample opportunity for an adversary to observe U.S. capabilities and respond to them. The opportunity is enhanced, today, by the documentation provided by embedded and otherwise intrusive news media.


Adversaries can learn about long-lead-time U.S. material capabilities, some kept secret and unveiled for the first time. They can study the evolution of our doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures and when successive conflicts are closely spaced in time—most recently, OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) AND OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF)—they can witness our ability to adapt quickly. Insofar as we publicize our lessons learned, they may be able to intuit our next evolution. Adversaries can exploit this wealth of information to guide their own strategies and make future U.S. efforts more difficult.

Moreover, U.S. practice is to rush technology to the area of operations to solve specific problems. This use of the battlefield as a laboratory poses a quandary. Rapid insertion of technology offers great payoff but risks divulging capabilities before adequate security precautions are implemented. An adversary response to such a rapid insertion can stymie a promising technology not yet sufficiently developed thereby wasting valuable resources and time. More generally, such rapid insertions may provide undesirable insights into U.S. industrial and scientific capabilities in aid of our future battlefield prowess.

The problem we introduce when we demonstrate our skills may be particularly acute given today's adversaries. Historically, capable nations—would-be peer competitors—maintained extensive espionage and analysis efforts to obtain and exploit such information. Today's asymmetric adversaries generally would not have this clandestine advantage so they are even more reliant on our exhibited capability. Moreover, their transnational character means they may have first-hand observations on which to base their adaptations.



The Task Force will operate in accordance with the provisions of P.L. 92-463, the "Federal Advisory Committee Act," and DoD Directive 5105.4, the "DoD Federal Advisory Committee Management Program." It is not anticipated that this Task Force will need to go into any "particular matters" within the meaning of Section 208 of Title 18, U.S. Code, nor will it cause any member to be placed in the position of acting as a procurement official.


Michael W. Wynne
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