[Page: H1132]
Mr. BONIOR. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the Committee on Rules, I call up House Resolution 127 and ask for its immediate consideration.
The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:
Resolved, That at any time after the adoption of this resolution the Speaker may, pursuant to clause 1(b) of rule XXIII, declare the House resolved into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H.R. 1750) to implement the Bipartisan Accord on Central America on March 24, 1989, and the first reading of the bill shall be dispensed with. All points of order against the bill and against its consideration are hereby waived. After general debate, which shall be confined to the bill and which shall not exceed four hours, to be equally divided and controlled by Representative Foley of Washington and Representative Michel of Illinois, or their designees, the bill shall be considered as having been read for amendment under the five-minute rule. No amendment to the bill shall be in order except the amendments recommended by the Committee on Appropriations, which may be offered en bloc and shall be considered as having been read, which shall be debatable for not to exceed ten minutes, to be equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on Appropriations, or their designees, and which shall not be amendable or divisible in the House or in the Committee of the Whole. All points of order against the amendments are hereby waived. At the conclusion of the consideration of the bill for amendment, the Committee shall rise and report the bill to the House with such amendments as may have been adopted, and the previous question shall be considered as ordered on the bill and amendments thereto to final passage without intervening motion except one motion to recommit, with or without instructions, only if offered by Representative Michel of Illinois, or his designee, and said motion shall be debatable for not to exceed twenty minutes.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Mineta). The gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Bonior] is recognized for 1 hour.
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Mr. BONIOR. The Speaker, before I yield the customary 30 minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. Solomon] for purposes of debate and reserve the time for myself, I yield for purposes of debate only to my colleague, the gentleman from Hawaii [Mr. Akaka], who wishes to make a statement with regard to a matter of concern to him.
I yield 1 minute to my friend, the gentleman from Hawaii [Mr. Akaka].
(By unanimous consent, Mr. Akaka was allowed to speak out of order.)
Mr. AKAKA. Mr. Speaker, on Saturday, April 15, the people of Hawaii and Belgium will commemorate the centennial of the death of one of the greathearted humanitarians of all time.
The Blessed Reverend Joseph Damien Deveuster, in 1873, made a voluntary sojourn to live among the lepers at Kalaupapa on the island of Molokai.
Father Damien, who we commemorate in the Capitol's Statuary Hall, was the rarest kind of man. To the amazement of his bishop and his peers, he could not walk away from the apathy, and rotting flesh that he found in Kalaupapa, a place that was called a `living graveyard.'
Instead, Father Damien established the Philomena Church. For 16 years he ministered to the physical and spiritual needs of Hansen's disease victims until he succumbed to the disease at age 49.
Those afflicted with Hansen's disease were banished from the conscience of society, yet Father Damien opened his heart, his eyes and his arms to their needs and sufferings. By living among them and restoring their dignity he also uplifted mankind's dignity.
It gives my joy that we continue to revere Father Damien 100 years after his death.
Mr. BONIOR. Mr. Speaker, for the purpose of debate only, I yield the customary 30 minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. Solomon], pending which I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, House Resolution 127 is a closed rule providing for consideration of H.R. 1750, the legislation to implement the bipartisan accord on Central America of March 24, 1989.
The rule provides for 4 hours of general debate to be equally divided and controlled by the majority leader, Mr. Foley and the minority leader, Mr. Michel or their designees. After general debate, the bill shall be considered as having been read for amendment under the 5-minute rule.
The rule waives all points of order against the bill and against its consideration.
No amendments are made in order under this rule except the amendments recommended by the Committee on Appropriations which shall be offered en bloc. These are technical amendments which are necessary to ensure that the budgetary impact of this legislation will be neutral.
The en bloc amendments shall be debatable for no more than 10 minutes to be equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on Appropriations or their designees. These amendments shall not be divisible in the House or in the Committee of the Whole, and all points of order are waived against them.
Finally, the rule makes in order one motion to recommit, with or without instructions, if offered by Mr. Michel or his designee. This motion to recommit shall be debatable for up to 20 minutes.
Mr. Speaker, on March 24, the Democratic and Republican leadership of both the House and Senate joined President Bush in signing a bipartisan agreement on Central America.
The agreement, I believe, signals a major change in U.S. policy toward the region. For the first time in over 7 years of war, the administration has expressed its full support for the Central American peace process.
The administration has acknowledged that the military approach has failed and has actively embraced the diplomatic approach to the region's problems. With this agreement, the administration has foresworn military aid for the Contras and has, instead, stated that it is the goal of United States policy to reintegrate them into the democratic process inside Nicaragua. For the first time, the administration expresses support for the voluntary reintegration and regional relocation of the Contras in a manner consistent with the Central American peace accords.
The bipartisan accord calls for a continuation of the cessation of hostilities now in effect between the Contras and the Nicaraguan Government. Secretary of State Baker has assured the House leadership that the United States will provide no assistance to any member of the resistance who is engaged in offensive military actions or who is involved in human rights abuses. The Secretary of State and I have discussed this issue at great length, and I have been assured that a letter affirming these commitments will be forthcoming.
This bipartisan agreement has wide support among the leaders in central America. President Oscar Arias, of Costa Rica, has hailed the agreement. Of this agreement, Arias has said: `Realism and pragmatism have prevailed. Now I feel a sincere support for the peace plan, something I never found in the past.' Arias went on to underscore the point: `For a very long time we have been insisting to the world that dialog has to replace the military path. We're seeing an end to a warlike policy and support for the peace plan * * * .'
The legislation we have before us today has been crafted pursuant to this bipartisan agreement. It has the support of the leadership on both sides of the aisle. It provides for a simple extension of nonlethal assistance to the Contras at the current rate, and in current form from March 31, 1989, until February 28, 1990.
The only addition in the definition of `humanitarian assistance' from last year is the sitpulation that funds may be provided for voluntary reintegration and regional relocation of the Contras. The delivery of this assistance will be arranged solely by AID in a manner that is consistent with the bipartisan accord. That accord makes it clear that, when the Central American Presidents develop their plan for reintegration and relocation of the Contras, these funds will be available to support such reintegration and regional relocation.
This legislation explicitly repeals all expedited procedures as well as every other reference to the provision of military aid. It does contain, however, a clear prohibition on the provision of military assistance, on the delivery of military assistance, and on the provision of any additional assistance not explicitly authorized by law.
Finally, in a side agreement, the administration has agreed that, no funds can be spent after November 30, 1989, without the written approval of the House and Senate authorizing and appropriations committees. This provision, which will be spelled out in a letter from Secretary Baker to the Congress, will allow the relevant committees to review the administration's implementation of the bipartisan accord and the extent of its support for the peace process in Central America.
Mr. Speaker, I believe the bipartisan agreement represents an important step forward in the effort to achieve peace and democracy in Central America.
It sends a clear signal to the leaders of Central America that we are willing to support the peace agreements that they have so carefully worked out. And it sends a clear signal to the Contras that it is time to begin the process of peacefully reintegrating themselves into the democratic process in Central America.
I hope this body will join in the effort to forge a policy for the United States that is, at long last, supportive of the peace process in Central Amercia.
Mr. Speaker, I urge adoption of the rule and H.R. 1750.
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[TIME: 1020]
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I might consume.
Mr. Speaker, this is the second time this week I have come before the House to urge support, particuarly from my side of the aisle, for a proposed rule.
Yes, it is true that we have before us today a modified closed rule; and as the Members know, I and other Republicans are usually critical of this kind of rule. But the House will be considering today in extraordinary piece of legislation, which is the product of extraordinary negotations between the White House and a bipartisan group of leaders from both Houses of Congress.
The leadership of both parties in the House have requested this specific rule. H.R. 1750 is a very delicately-balanced bill. And the leadership of both parties, considering the unusual and intense negotiations which wrote the bill, have thought it wise to preserve the bill against amendment.
The gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Bonior] has accurately described this rule, but I would just now reiterate a couple of points in the rule.
First, it provides for 4 hours of general debate. That should be enough time to allow all concerned Members to be heard. And certainly there is no intention under this rule, despite it closed nature, to deny any Member the right to be heard.
Second, the rule provides the minority; namely, the minority leader or his designee, the right to offer a motion to recommit with or without instructions.
Under the unusual circumstances attending H.R. 1750, this is an appropriate rule--at this point I will not take the time to argue the merits of the Contra aid package but I will be strongly supporting the Contra package later in the debate.
I urge all Members to support this rule.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. BONIOR. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Foglietta].
(Mr. FOGLIETTA asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. FOGLIETTA. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in opposition to the rule and I also oppose the bill.
First, I would like to say I believe that the bipartisan accord represents a significant achievement on the part of the leadership of this body. I would especially like to note the great work of the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. David Bonior, the gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. David Obey, the gentleman from Washington, our leader, Mr. Tom Foley, and Speaker Jim Wright in bringing this bipartisan agreement on Nicaragua. I would like very much to be able to support this legislation. However, I cannot and will not support the bill as it now stands.
This legislation would allow the United States, or could allow the United States to be a positive force in this war torn region, but only if it specifically states that these funds be used to reintegrate the Contras into Nicaraguan society.
[TIME: 1030]
As it stands now, reintegration is listed as No. 6 of a `maybe' voluntary six possible uses for the money in H.R. 1750.
Yesterday I sought the opportunity to introduce an amendment to this bill mandating that at least 20 percent of these funds be used for resettlement and repatriation of the Contras. There is a consensus in this Congress and among the Presidents of the Central American nations that continuing to support the Contras as a military force would derail the peace process.
Maintaining a standing army in Honduras is dangerous and destabilizing. It is not in the spirit of this bipartisan accord. However, as this legislation stands now, I fear we may be doing just that, keeping the Contras in place and intact for another year.
This bill does not say that 1 cent of the money must be used for resettlement. This bill does not say that the ultimate goal of this legislation is the reintegration of the Contras back into the political process in Nicaragua. This bill does not say that United States money cannot go to armed bands of Contras still inside of Nicaragua.
Thus, this accord hinges on winks, nods, and handshakes.
I would like to say, I really would like to say that I can trust this new administration, the Bush administration to implement a program of resettlement of Contras. But how can I? How can I when I read on the front pages of the newspaper just today that the then-Vice President Bush played a significant role in providing covert aid to the Contras after denying vehemently that he played such a role?
My colleagues today my strong desire would be to vote for this bill, for a bill, for reintegration and for peace, but not for a bill full of `maybes.'
I urge my colleagues to join me in voting against this rule and against H.R. 1750.
Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, today we are considering passage of an agreement between the leadership of this Congress and President Bush that I greatly hope will keep the possibility of a democratic Nicaragua alive. In seeking an end to the repression brought about by the Sandinista party, supporters of democracy inside and outside Nicaragua have always faced a difficult choice--either pursue the means to overthrow their oppressors by force or trust the Sandinistas to actually allow democracy in that country. Through passage of this agreement today, we will choose the second route and will again take Sandinista promises at face value. This bipartisan agreement in fact has its very roots in the Sandinistas so called commitments to democratization under the Central American Peace Plan and in their recent commitment to at last hold truly free elections.
I will support this agreement today, despite serious reservations I have over its structure, because it provides the men and women of the resistance with the means they vitally need to remain an organized force pending fulfillment of these latest Sandinista promises. If I am skeptical of the Sandinistas' intentions, however, I believe I simply share the outlook of a great many Nicaraguans--Nicaraguans who in many cases have already participated in an election of sorts by voting with their feet and escaping from Nicaragua by bus, car, boat and plane. We might, in fact, ask ourselves here today whether the present Nicaraguan regime might win free elections in that country next year simply because so many Nicaraguans who would have voted against them had already fled.
My reading of the press reports out of Nicaragua over the course of the last year leave me with the impression that there remains little belief among the Nicaraguan people that life under the Sandinistas will ever really change.
For one thing, the Sandinistas' economic policies have made life in Nicaragua almost intolerable for the average working Nicaraguan. But it is not just the economy that is driving Nicaraguans to give up hope of meaningful change in their country--it is a broad range of actions taken by the Sandinistas last year while most of us here focused on their talk of peace.
For the sake of the Nicaraguan people's future, I think it is right and proper that we today take a long look at these Sandinista actions. First of all, let's not overlook some mysterious murders that were carried out in Nicaragua last year. What were the real circumstances surrounding the murders of Conservative Party official Eliazar Herrera and Independent Liberal Party official Francisco Aguilera? And what about the several dozen reports of Sandinista political assassinations of alleged resistance supporters throughout the countryside, some of which the Americas Watch organization stated were: `numerous enough to suggest tolerance or complicity by higher authorities.'
Do we here really believe that the Nicaraguan people's hope in Sandinista promises of democracy were encouraged by Sandinista mob attacks on political gatherings? Sandinista harassment, arrests, and firings of striking trade unionists and similar job attacks on their meetings certainly didn't contribute to that hope.
Over the last year, we have witnessed numerous Sandinista closings of private radio stations, which are supposed to have uncensored operations under the peace plan. And why is it still impossible for Nicaraguans to be allowed to watch a privately owned television station? Nearby El Salvador, despite its on-going war, not only has four private TV stations, but Salvadorans watch hours of broadcast interviews with armed Salvadoran guerrillas. And why is it still so difficult for the last remaining opposition newspaper, `La Prensa,' to get newsprint?
Is this continuing censorship, inflicted at whim by the Sandinista commandantes, supposed to encourage our belief in their democratic intentions? If there is true freedom of expression under the Sandinistas, why did they harass Catholic priests who dared last year to raise the subject of hunger in their sermons?
We recently saw the release of Nicaraguan national guardsmen held in prison these last 10 years. We have to ask, however, what has become of the many Nicaraguans sentenced to prison by political courts since 1979? Where are they? Have they been freed? And what has been the fate of those Nicaraguan civilians reportedly arrested last year in areas from which the resistance was forced to withdraw?
The Sandinistas continue to conscript young Nicaraguan boys into their party's army, often cordoning off entire neighborhoods and dragging the young men off. This continues despite the many demonstrations and protests against it and despite last year's truce. Why is such forced conscription necessary if there is to be peace? In fact, why is the Nicaraguan army run by one political party and not by the Nicaraguan people?
Mr. Speaker, this is just a short list of such actions taken by the Sandinista last year. I urge my colleagues to consider these facts and questions today as we consider this bill. Let's truly hold the Sandinistas to their promises for democracy this time!
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
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[TIME: 1040]
Mr. BONIOR. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to my distinguished colleague on the Committee on Rules, the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Derrick].
(Mr. DERRICK asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. DERRICK. Mr. Speaker, well, here we are. We have been here dealing with this issue I do not know how long. If I stay in Congress another 10 years, we will still be dealing with it, I guarantee it, and the argument will be basically the same that I hear this morning.
What has happened here is that the Democrats here in Washington have looked deep through the eyes into the soul of Secretary Baker and President Bush and have found in their wisdom that they want to end the hostilities in Nicaragua. They want to end them. And as all inside-the-Beltway settlements, it is done at taxpayers' expense. This is not a settlement in Nicaragua. This is a political settlement here in Washington.
I have heard and I have heard, I remember one time, I think it was back in 1985, that we voted humanitarian aid to send down to the Contras. As I recall, sometime after that we asked for an accounting and we found a substantial portion of that money in banks in Switzerland, banks in Miami. I suggest to Members that if we are so foolish as to send $68 million or $50 million or whatever it comes out to down there, a large part of this will once again end up in the banks of Switzerland, the banks of Miami.
When are we going to learn as a Nation about Central and South America? We have certainly had enough lessons over the years. The problem down there is a low standard of living and we can send this kind of money down there for the next 50 years. We can send military aid or whatever, and we are going to still be faced with the same problem that we are faced today. No one truly believes that this is humanitarian aid in the strict sense of the word. This money is sent to Nicaragua to keep afloat a group of desperadoes that have found a way to live way above the average standard of the average Nicaraguan family in Nicaragua, which the average per capita income, I think for the region is around $900, and at least for the Contra family income this comes out to around $4,800 or 900.
Sure, I could tell Members that we could setup one of those things here in the United States and get all sorts of volunteers. When are we going to learn that we cannot throw money at problems like this and walk away? That is exactly what we intend to do. We think here inside the Beltway that we can salve our conscience by sending $50 million down, and we are going to be able to turn around and walk away, but let me say that we are going to be here next year and next year and next year. We have spent $360 million down there. If we send this money, what has it done except to bring disgrace and shame upon this great country of ours?
I ask Members to vote against the legislation. I ask Members to vote for the rule, however. I think that the rule is well structured, and it will get a fair opportunity for everyone in the House with 4 hours of general debate and a couple of amendments to address themselves on that issue, but as far as the legislation is concerned, please let us think about this thing very, very strongly before we send another $50 million down there. Who will benefit, if Members are so strong against the Sandinistas, whose economy do Members think this money is going in? They are having all these problems down there, but what Members are really doing is helping the Sandinistas. That is going right into that economy, a large part of it, that part that does not end up in Miami and Switzerland.
Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
The previous speaker in the well talks about the moneys in this bill as being foreign aid. The gentleman, I think, may or may not know that in the 11 years I have been in this Congress I have voted against the foreign aid package bill 10 out of the 11 years. I do not know how I happened to make a mistake in one of the years.
Nevertheless, Members have to look at what has been happening around the world. I mentioned earlier that communism has never been thrown out of a country by election. But when we look around the world it is what is happening today, and look at Mr. Gorbachev and look at the glasnost and look at perestroika and Members have to ask, what is happening out there? Is Mr. Gorbachev really sincere? Is he really truly about peace?
Well, I just did a study looking at the Soviet economy over the last 20 years and Members can really see what is happening there. Communism is a failed philosophy which will not work. The Soviet economy 7 years ago was racing along at about 3 1/2 percent growth rate. Just in the last couple of years, it dropped to 1 1/2 percent, and this last year, the Soviet economy growth rate is down to one-half of 1 percent. Does that tell Members something? Does that tell Members why Mr. Gorbachev is now running around the world telling Angola and telling Cuba and telling Nicaragua and other countries that we cannot afford to keep giving all these arms and tanks and planes? The reason is, communism does not work. It is failing in all of the countries over there behind the Iron Curtain. We can see it in Hungary, we can see it in Georgia, the Ukraine, and yes, now is the time for Members to push democracy across this world and especially right here in Nicaragua.
The ranking Republican member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Broomfield], he and his staff and his committee have done an exhausting study, and I wish Members would take the time, we do not have the time, I know, as individual Members, but in this committee report there is a 10-year exhaustive study of what has been happening down there. Now is the time for Members to act, to pass this bill, because this is not foreign aid for foreign countries. This is aid for American democracy. It is protecting our democracy.
Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to a member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Burton].
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Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, I look across the aisle at my colleagues and I see disdain, I guess, because once again we are debating an issue with which of course they disagree with this side. But I think this time, today, most of them who have been supportive of the Sandinista government in Nicaragua and opposing the Contras feel like they have won a victory.
It is unfortunate that the gentleman from South Carolina, spoke of the Contras calling them a bunch of rogues, bandits, and a number of other things. At the same time I noticed he not once mentioned that the Sandinistas are Communists. He did not mention once that there is severe repression in Nicaragua, that the people do not want it. He did not mention once that there is 30,000 percent inflation and the people that used to have a fairly decent standard of living have no standard of living at all anymore because of the Communist Sandinista government. He did not mention once the Communist threat to the neighbors of Nicaragua.
I was in Chalatenango Province in El Salvador and talked to captured guerrillas that showed us weapons that they said came through Nicaragua.
[TIME: 1050]
They told us their training camps were just outside Managua in Nicaragua. But that was not mentioned once. He did not mention once the freedoms that have been lost in Nicaragua that were promised in Esquipulas, at Sapoa, and in 1979 to the OAS. Freedoms that were promised by the Sandinistas to the people of that country that have not been realized.
The Communists have broken promise after promise after promise, but that was not mentioned. There is no freedom of the press, there is no freedom of religion--there is no freedom of assembly. There are no true political parties that can participate in free elections. They talk about free elections, but we all know that is a ruse, used to confuse and divide us.
He did not mention the political torture that takes place in the prisons. He did not mention the people that have been incarcerated without trial or due process, many of whom are still there. He did not mention the beatings that have taken place.
When I was down there, I went to Leon and spoke to about 4,000 people in that little town who came out in spite of the Sandinista threats, to tell us of their problems and how they abhorred the Communists that have taken over that country. They told us of the beatings that have taken place and the torture that has been perpetrated upon people who took issue with that government. I talked to wives of political prisoners who had been promised that they would see their husbands or their sons, and told that they would be released, but they were not released. One woman who complained with others in a demonstration had her clothes torn off of her in public, and she was beaten. I brought her clothing back to the well of the House and showed it to the Members of this body. It did not have much of an impact. But those stories are not told by Members on the other side of the aisle.
They talk about the terrible Contras. What are the Contras? Most of them are campesinos who have gone to the hills with their families and are living in squalor and who want to fight for freedom down there. But they cannot do it with sticks, and they cannot do it with rocks, and you know that. Time and again you have cut off the military assistance they need to fight the Communist Sandinistas; those who have an expansionist policy and who want to expand their revolution throughout Central America and up into Mexico.
We know that in Afghanistan the Mujaheddin have driven out the Soviets. They have driven out one of the greatest military forces in the world. We know how and why they drove them out. They drove them out because the United States of America gave them military assistance. We gave them stingers, surface-to-air missiles to shoot down Hind helicopters, and because of that the Soviets left with their tail between their legs.
The same thing would happen in Central America. They could drive the last vestiges of communism out of our hemisphere if you guys had the same guts you showed when we gave support to the Afghan freedom fighters. But you do not have that. You want those people fighting for freedom in Nicaragua to use sticks and rocks. They cannot win that way, and you know it.
So I think the facade should be cut away. The fact
of the matter is that you support the Sandinista government; you do not want them driven out of power, and because of that you are indirectly supporting a Communist movement that threatens the very existence of those other democracies and ultimately that of the United States as well. There is peace in Nicaragua today, but there is no freedom, and one thing that should be said clearly time and again is that peace without freedom is not peace, it is slavery. Peace without freedom is slavery, and because we are not helping those people who want freedom in Nicaragua, we are signing on to a slave state.
Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.
Mr. BONIOR. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. Bosco].
Mr. BOSCO. Mr. Speaker, we have had many visions for the Contras here in the Congress and from time to time we get together to mold them.
There have been times in this room when we envisioned the Contras as a fighting force. We've given them the wherewithal to shoot down helicopters, take over villages, perhaps topple the Sandinista government of Nicaragua. And there have been other times when we've waited them to go away altogether and we have left them stranded in the jungles without guns or butter. Today we have a compromise between these two visions--neither a fighting force nor a thing of the past--the Contras will be sent to summer camp--spending their days drinking beer and playing volleyball in the jungles of Honduras. Standing neither vertical as soldiers nor horizontal as vanquished they will be suspended at a 45 degree compromise angle--the beneficiaries of bipartisan accord.
During the hearing at the Foreign Affairs Committee, I asked Deputy Secretary Eagleburger what the Contras actually do on an average day. Although Mr. Eagleburger didn't know for sure himself, another witness said they remained remarkable cohesive and did exercises. There are some 10,000 of them with their families, whiling away the time in Honduras. Abandoned by their leaders, there are peasants, campesinos most of them young. Remaining cohesive isn't hard to figure out--the stipend of the equivalent of $4,000 or $5,000 each from United States taxpayers is far more than their countrymen make, either in Nicaragua or elsewhere in Central America. While the legislation envisions the possibility of relocation, one would have difficulty finding a rationale for any of these poor peasants to get off the U.S. gravy train.
Blessed are the peacemakers, and all of us are sincerely grateful for the hard work of the Speaker and Mr. Bonior and others who put this compromise together. It does mark that historic moment when the Contra's go from being a fighting force `the equivalent of our own Founding Fathers' to being yet another American Entitlement Program. This metamorphosis effective ends a sad and misguided chapter of United States foreign policy, but I think we would be wiser today to close the book and let these poor people make their way home without perpetuating the myth that they will play a role in the peace process initiated by the people of Central America themselves.
Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. BONIOR. Mr. Speaker, I yield 6 minutes to the gentlewoman from California [Mrs. Boxer].
Mrs. BOXER. Mr. Speaker, I thank my friend, the gentleman from Michigan, for his generosity of spirit and time.
Mr. Speaker, I rise against this rule because it does not allow for amendment to the bill, amendments which could cut its costs or put further restrictions on the Contras, or move us more quickly toward peace, amendments such as Mr. Foglietta had asked to be made in order.
So I shall vote against this rule and I do appreciate being given time by Mr. Bonior and by Mr. Foley during the general debate, to speak against the bill.
I would like to use this time to state why I will be voting and working against this compromise and in doing so set the stage for those who will speak in opposition to Contra aid during the general debate.
Yesterday I met two of the world's most innocent victims--Dora Lopez, 22, and Eric Lopez, her son, age 4. Last year, during the time when there was no military aid or lethal aid allowed by Congress to the Contras, Dora was taking her infant son to the hospital.
The truck was attacked by the Contras; 12 people were killed, among them Dora's infant son. Dora lost her leg and sight in one eye. Four-year-old Eric suffered permanent damage to his face and an AK-47 blew open his shoulder.
This my colleagues during the period of nonmilitary or humanitarian aid.
This picture is worth a thousand words and Dora sits outside this House Chamber praying that we vote this compromise down.
How many others faced the same fate as Dora and her familiy since so-called humanitarian aid has been in place?
According to Witness for Peace from June 1988 until March 1989 about 600 civilian killings, woundings, and kidnapings have taken place. And that is only a report of those verified by this very reputable organization.
So don't kid yourself, you can call it by any other name, nonlethal, nonmilitary, defensive military, humanitarian, call it anything but it's still murder, kidnap and maiming.
Now we have a lot of problems in our country today.
Our Secretary of Housing Jack Kemp is trying as hard as he can to bring basketball into housing projects.
Maybe he should rename these housing projects Contra villages, Contra villages have volley ball, here's a picture that shows it. There's volley ball and other sports, there's food and housing, it's not luxury by any means but it is sustenance, unfortunately more sustenance than many of our American families have today. Here's a photo of a homeless family, mother and son, more and more the faces of the homeless look like this. This mother would like food and shelter and volleyball for her son. His mother would stand in line to get the $5,000 per year each Contra will be receiving; $5,000 per Contra, in an area where the average income is $900 a year.
I have no question of the motivation of many of my colleagues who will support this package. Many feel it is a step toward peace. But what do the Contras say?
On March 26, before they got the PR line on how this would be sold they said and I quote.
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This is a major step forward. It will keep us together as a fighting force.
I ask my colleagues to stand up and be counted on this issue again today. Let us not have to witness any more Doras or Erics. Let's not lavish millions on a failed policy.
Let us vote `no' on this plan and allow the peace process to continue.
Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from California [Mr. Hunter], a real freedom fighter in his own right.
(Mr. HUNTER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. HUNTER. My colleagues, I was going to talk about the fact that I am also going to vote no on this package for very different reasons than the gentlewoman from California [Mrs. Boxer]. I am going to vote no because I think that the hope for freedom is lost in Nicaragua. The Contras as a fighting force have been effectively destroyed by the vote that was made by the Congress on February 2 of last year. We are really giving the American people false hopes in making them think that somehow, having lost the only leverage that we have really had to achieve any part of movement on the part of the Sandinistas, and that is the military force of Contras, somehow hardcore Marxists like Bayardo Arce and Tomas Borge, the head of the secret police in Nicargua, and other hard-core Marxists are going to watch C-SPAN to pick up the niceties of democracy and are going to voluntarily turn over power if they are voted out of office.
However let me, having had the gentlewoman from California [Mrs. Boxer] precede me, let me just make one comment about her remarks that I think needs to be addressed by the American people. We have a State Department report that was put out reviewing the statements and the interviews of a man named Baldazon. Baldazon was one of the top lieutenants of Tomas Borge when Tomas Borge was head of the secret police, and Baldazon gave us indepth interviews on the inside of the communist Sandinista operations.
One thing that he talked about was deceiving visiting international delegations, and he mentioned that Borge read the Bible regularly even though he was a hardcore Marxist, so that, when church groups came in, he could quote the Bible to them.
He precedes this by telling about times in which Tomas Borge ordered executions and personally stood by while innocent people in Nicaragua were machinegunned.
So, Mr. Speaker, we are talking about a very hard, very brutal head of the Sandinista gestapo, Tomas Borge, and yet he knew that propaganda is important. He knew that giving a good image to these well-thinking Americans coming down on these tours was important, so he read the Bible, and he would quote Bible phrases to them. He would have biblical pictures in his office.
In one incident that Baldazon mentioned particularly, Borge would ask Baldazon and others to have him in the act of doing nice things for poor people when these visiting delegations walked in, and maybe he would be giving a prosthetic device to a peasant that he called in off the street, and then they would shoo him out after the visiting delegation left.
One time he even asked to get an accordion for an old man who liked to play the accordion, and he was in this process of playing this accordion for the peace delegation. Of course, as soon as the delegation left, they took the accordion away from the old man and kicked him back in the street.
Mr. Speaker, I think that it is unfortunate that Americans have not read between the lines, have not really looked in great depth at the enormous propaganda that comes out through the Sandinista government.
Mr. Borge also sent what he called his chance-encounter teams out when these peace groups would tour the country, and he would have people that were dressed up like
peasants just happen to bump into the American peace delegation, and they, of course, would report to him that the Contras had participated in great atrocities, and the peace delegation would come back and hold a press conference in the United States and basically carry that information, and Mr. Borge considered those operations to be very, very successful.
Mr. Speaker, let me go to the bottom line for the gentlewoman from California [Mrs. Boxer]. The Soviet Union has pumped over $500 million worth of weapons, and ammunition, and arms, and killing machines into Nicaragua in the last year for their side, the Sandinistas, after we in the House of Representatives cut off our side without any bullets. We said, `You can fight for freedom, but you can't have bullets.'
In this ensuing package that we are going to talk about we are going to take away their opportunities to even engage in battles, albeit unequal battles.
I have heard very few speakers from the other side associate those killing machines like the Hind helicopters that can fire 6,000 rounds per minute, the tanks, all of the Kalashnikov rifles, and the millions of rounds of ammunition. I have heard from very few people who are anti-Contra comment on the relationship between those Russian killing machines and people who lose their legs or lose their limbs.
Let me simply assure my colleagues that I have gone into the United Nations refugee camps unannounced, unescorted and not telling anybody whether I was a Democrat, Republican, liberal or conservative. The last time I was there I had about 100 people come up to me.
I said to the first man, `Why are you here?'
He said, `The Sandinistas cut my throat,' and he pulled down the bandage around his neck, and he had a bayonet mark all the way around his throat.
The next man said, `The Sandinistas killed my brother and hung him on a coffee bush,' and this was in the Jacaleapa United Nations camp in Honduras.
The next person said, `They hooked up electrodes to my head and to my legs.'
[Page: H1138]
Mrs. BOXER. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Speaker, I will try to yield at the end, but I have some things I want to say, and I would appreciate the gentlewoman from Calfornia [Mrs. Boxer] suffering me.
The point is that everybody that I talked to with that camera, out of those hundreds of people picked randomly, all talked about Sandinista atrocities.
Now 2 weeks ago I was down at Brownsville, TX, where Nicaraguans are streaming across the border. I might note that Nicaraguans are streaming across the border after we cut off aid to the Contras. Now theoretically everything was going to be fine after we cut off aid, but it has not been. Every one of them talked ill of the Sandinistas.
The Miami Herald reporter who was given great respect by people who read that particular publication, who took the trip all the way from Nicaragua up here with a band of refugees coming north, said, `Nobody in their private conversations said anything good about the Sandinistas.'
[TIME: 1110]
Mrs. BOXER. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. HUNTER. I cannot yield on that point, because I only have about a minute left.
The point that I want to make is this. I think we are fooling the American people. I think that we are putting off the real moment of truth, because the Sandinistas, the same Sandinistas who machinegun their enemies, who killed George Salazar, who was the one person who could have been a president of a free Nicaragua in 1981, are not going to voluntarily turn over the reins of power with absolutely no mechanism or lever for enforcement.
We are giving up, and we gave up in February of 1988, that only mechanism of enforcement that we had, and that was the Contras, the Democratic Resistance.
The last point I want to make to the gentlewoman from California is this. There are not 8 or 10,000 men down there that the gentlewoman points to. There are about 40,000 family members. There are old women. There are old men. There are amputees. There are children. The Contra force, in fact, are people who have been dispossessed by Nicaragua, created by the brutality of the Sandinistas, not created by the United States.
Mrs. BOXER. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield for just half a second?
Mr. HUNTER. I am happy to yield to the gentlewoman from California.
Mrs. BOXER. Mr. Speaker, I agree with the gentleman that violence from the left and violence from the right must be condemned. What we want is to stop the violence from all sides.
I thank the gentleman for yielding.
Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman. I wish she could come up with a blueprint for keeping the $500 million worth of military aid that the Soviet Union is stuffing into Nicaragua to their side over the next year, because without stopping that we are going to see continued oppression by the Sandinistas, and I hope that I have more than rhetorical support from the gentlewoman for that.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman from California has expired.
Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, I yield one additional minute to the gentleman.
Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Speaker, this problem is not going to be resolved until the American people get involved.
I have the same feeling that I had when we had the S&L crisis come up the first time. We said we were going to vote a $5 billion package and everything is going to be fine, and people forgot about it and it became a catastrophic crisis and one that we had to deal with on a much higher level.
There is a catastrophe in Central America. Nicaragua is lost. Freedom is gone and there is no chance of having free and fair elections where you have the requirement of giving up power by people who have told us they will not give up power.
Mr. Gorbachev stated in Cuba that he is not going to cease the aid that we appealed him to cease before he visited Castro a few weeks ago.
We need military aid, and that is why I am voting no when the substantive question comes up.
Mr. DORGAN of North Dakota. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield to me?
Mr. HUNTER. I am happy to yield to the gentleman from North Dakota.
Mr. DORGAN of North Dakota. Mr. Speaker, the gentleman's point about violence is an appropriate one. Let me just observe that when the Sandinistas commit violence against innocent victims, they are probably committing that violence with Soviet weapons. When the Contras commit violence against innocent victims, and indeed they do, unfortunately they do it with bullets paid for by us, and that is what we object to.
Mr. HUNTER. The difference is that we punish the people who commit violence on our side, just as we court martial our soldiers. The Sandinista state condones the machinegunning of individuals by the head of the Secret Police and the Secretary of the Interior, Tomas Borge.
Mr. BONIOR. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to my friend, the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Traficant].
Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to support the rule and allow the debate, but to oppose and will oppose the Democrat compromise.
The simple truth is, in my opinion, we spend too much time worrying about Central America and not enough about Uncle Sam.
For those of you who may not realize this, there were 20,000 murders in this country last year; 55,000 people killed on our highways; street crime is exploding, and we are going to vote for the 70th time to send new humanitarian aid to Nicaragua.
I say today it is time to vote on humanitarian aid for America, for Cleveland, for Detroit, for Chicago, for Pittsburgh, for Philadelphia, for Youngstown, for Los Angeles.
You know, one thing the Iran Contra scam should have taught us, what Robert Owens said in that private memo, he said that sending money to Nicaragua is like pouring it down a sinkhole. We do not want to send it. We want to push it down there by Federal Express now. We have not had enough.
In the 8 years they have been there, these Contras do not control one crossroad, have not had one major military accomplishment.
Let us face facts. We are here today worried about the Soviets and Castro, and that is valid, but I think it is time for our President, Mr. Bush, to say, `Read my lips. Get out.'
What we are saying is, `Read my pocketbook. There is a problem and we are going to cure it. We will give you some money.'
Look here. We have a $300 billion defense budget shoved down our throats every year, and I do not like it. We have F-16's. We have tanks.
Mr. Speaker, it is time to tell these Communists that we do not fund this $300 billion defense budget to go toward a neighborhood crime watch. It is time to tell these Communists to get out. It is time for President Bush to say, `Read my lips.'
The greatest freedom fight going on today is not in Central America. It is in America with frustrated citizens who cannot own a piece of the rock, and God forbid when they get a chance they have to import it from Mount Fuji.
I am tired of having here in the House the 70th vote on this issue.
I am not taking issue with any Republican. I believe you mean well, but I believe the people in Indianapolis need more aid than the people in Central America.
We are not going to buy respect, folks. They are still saying, `Uncle Sam, Yankee go home, get out. Quit meddling.'
I am not going to yield. I lost 55,000 jobs in my district. I want a Democrat compromise that says we are going to help you with those jobs. When we do some work on jobs and stop talking about the Sandinistas, start talking about soybeans, stop talking about Contras and campesinos, start talking about jobs, America will be safer because our greatest threat is not a missile. It is not the Sandinistas. It is this economy where the American citizens are frustrated and some of our cities are literally out of control.
I want some help for jobs in my area. That is what I am talking about today. I want help for jobs in Youngstown and Warren, OH.
[Page: H1139]
Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Burton].
Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding this time to me. I did not plan to say more in this particular part of the debate on the rule, but since my honorable colleague, the gentleman from Ohio, mentioned my particular city and me--I would ask the gentleman not to leave yet--I thought I ought to respond.
We are all concerned about jobs and we think that the first priority of this Congress ought to be the people of the United States of America. I agree with that; but there is one other thing that I think ought to be taken into consideration, and that is why we have debated this time and again and again. Many of us believe there is a Communist threat, not only to Nicaragua, but to all of Central America and ultimately Mexico. If we do not help those people who are fighting for freedom down there, as we did the Mujahideen in Afghanistan, then what we fear is that one day the Communist sphere of influence will spread all the way up into Mexico and we will have to send our boys down there to spill their blood in a needless war.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman from Indiana has expired.
Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 additional minute to the gentleman from Indiana.
Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. BURTON of Indiana. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.
Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Speaker, I would like to say this, that we had a lot of valiant American soldiers die in Vietnam, supposedly fighting Communism. The soldiers fought, Congress did not. We have too much rhetoric here.
I do not disagree, I am not questioning the gentleman's integrity. I believe the gentleman means well and he might be right, but I would like to see us start worrying about America.
Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, reclaiming my time, the fact of the matter is that many of us feel there is a threat down the road that is very real and if we do not help those people who are fighting for freedom down there right now, we are going to reap the whirlwind.
I think it is improper for people to come to this body then to say that we do not care about American jobs, that we do not care about our districts, because that is our No. 1 priority; but I am also concerned about the future of this Nation and the possibility of young men and women having to spill their blood in a needless war in Central America because we do not do what is necessary today by helping the freedom fighters in Nicaragua.
Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, just in closing in the 1 minute remaining, I just point out to the gentleman from Washington, and I do not question his integrity, either, he is a fine Member of this body; but you know, when communism takes over a country, as it always has, you always have 15 percent of those people fleeing from that Nation. In the past when they came from Vietnam, they came by boat.
[TIME: 1120]
If they fall in Central America and we get 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 million aliens coming into this country, legal and illegal, just think what that is going to do to this economy.
We are a humane nation. We are a democratic people. We love our neighbors. We love people all over the world. But how much can we do for them, and what kind of a strain would that place on us?
I would just remind the gentleman from Youngstown, OH, that I have some unemployment and factory shutdowns in my district, too. I am concerned about it, and I do not want the situation to get worse. I want it to get better around the world. That is why I am reluctantly supporting this package. I am not satisfied with it either, but I think it is the only thing we have, and I am going to support it.
Mr. Speaker, I would appreciate it if everybody else would support the rule.
Mr. BONIOR. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 1 minute, the remainder of my time.
Mr. Speaker, I believe the accord in this legislation signals a major change in U.S. policy toward the region.
For the first time in over 7 years of war the administration has fully expressed its support for the Central American peace process. They have acknowledged publicly that the military approach of the past has failed. They have actively embraced the diplomatic approach to the region's problems.
They have, indeed, before us in the committees and the legislation forsworn military aid and, instead, have stated that it is the goal of United States policy to reintegrate the Contras into the Democratic process within Nicaragua.
Mr. Speaker, this is a dramatic change. It behooves all of us, I think, to look at it in light of the fact that it is, indeed, a change.
This agreement and the legislation has been hailed by literally every Latin American leader. I would hope we could work together on this issue and hopefully within the next 10 months we will see progress on the democratic side in Nicaragua; that we will see a cessation or, at least, a beginning of a cessation of arms flows from the Soviet Union into Cuba, and we will, indeed, see the reintegration of the Contras back into the normal flow of Nicaraguan life.
Mr. Speaker, with that, I end my remarks.
Mr. Speaker, I move the previous question on the resolution.
The previous question was ordered.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Mineta). The question is on the resolution.
The resolution was agreed to.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 127 and rule XXIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill, H.R. 1750.
[TIME: 1125]
Accordingly the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H.R. 1750) to implement the Bipartisan Accord on Central America of March 24, 1989, with Mr. McCloskey in the chair.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the bill is considered as having been read the first time.
Under the rule, the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Foley] will be recognized for 2 hours, and the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Michel] will be recognized for 2 hours.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Foley].
Mr. FOLEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield, for purposes of debate only, 37 1/2 minutes to the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Fascell]; following that, I yield 37 1/2 minutes to the chairman of the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. Obey]; and following that, I yield 45 minutes to the gentlewoman from California [Mrs. Boxer].
[Page: H1140]
Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Chairman, I have a parliamentary inquiry.
Mr. Chairman, it is our understanding that there are 4 hours of debate, 2 hours to this side, 2 hours to that side, and that 1 hour of the minority time was going to be yielded to the ranking minority member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and 1 hour to the Appropriations ranking minority member. I do not now quite understand what they are doing over there. How does that affect our time?
Mr. FOLEY. Mr. Chairman, if I may be heard, I assume that the Chair is following its usual practice of alternating recognition back and forth among those who are controlling time on each side of the aisle. What I was proposing to do and doing was to yield the control of the debate of the 2 hours on our side to the three Members en bloc that I mentioned in my statement: the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Fascell], the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. Obey], and the gentlewoman from California [Mrs. Boxer]. Obviously, their time is subject to the usual alternate recognition between each side.
Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Chairman, as a further parliamentary inquiry, we assume that the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Fascell], is going to lead off with how much time?
The CHAIRMAN. The Chair might say that the Chair will alternate recognition from side to side in the appropriate way.
Mr. FOLEY. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield further, it is typical in our debates that the Chair will recognize, I assume, the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Fascell], who will either speak or yield time for so many minutes, and then the Chair will recognize the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Broomfield], I assume, or the distinguished leader, the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Michel], to speak or recognize for a certain number of minutes on their side, and back and forth and back and forth.
After the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Fascell] has controlled his full 37 1/2 minutes of time, the transfer will be made to the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. Obey], who will then control 37 1/2 minutes of time on our side, again, alternately with Republican recognition and, finally, the gentlewoman from California [Mrs. Boxer] will control 45 minutes of time under her direction, alternately with Members on the Republican side.
Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Chairman, I assume that is the intention of the Chair. Just for our own benefit, over on this side of the aisle, the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Broomfield] was prepared to carry the first hour, but the gentleman is going to be shifting it to his Appropriations Committee after 37 1/2 minutes, so I guess that the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Conte] had better be prepared after 37 1/2 minutes to be around here so we can just keep things together.
Mr. FOLEY. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield further, that is the judgment, I might say, for the Republican leadership to make.
Mr. SOLOMON. We have no objection.
Mr. MICHEL. Mr. Chairman, might I be recognized?
The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Illinois.
Mr. MICHEL. Mr. Chairman, I apologize, first, to the Chair and to my distinguished colleague for my tardy entrance to the floor, feeling that there was probably going to be a vote on the rule.
It is my understanding that the distinguished majority leader has laid out how the debate would unfold on his side. On our side the time would be divided equally between the distinguished minority member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Broomfield], and the distinguished member of our Appropriations subcommittee, the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. Edwards].
I would expect, if the distinguished majority leader is going to lead off the debate on his side, that I would probably then request of my distinguished colleague permission to do likewise on our side so that we might have the two positions laid out quite clearly at the front of the debate, and then let it flow from there.
I thank the Chair for its indulgence.
Mr. FOLEY. Mr. Chairman, in answer to the gentleman, I intend to make a very, very brief statement stating my support for this resolution and then yield the time as I have indicated.
[TIME: 1130]
The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Foley].
Mr. FOLEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, this is a most important bill which comes to the floor after what may well be an historic agreement between the leadership of Congress on both sides of the aisle and the President of the United States acting through the Secretary of State. It has been the most contentious and difficult, in some ways the most devisive issue that has reached the Congress in many years, and it has, more than any other, with the possible exception of disagreements over policy toward South Africa, been an item of dispute between the majority of our two parties on each side.
I hope this bill which brings together the policy on a common basis for the first time in many years will attract a majority of support on both sides so that we can have a strong majority of the whole House for this legislation.
Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Michel], the minority leader.
(Mr. MICHEL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. MICHEL. Mr. Chairman,
on March 24, 1989, the President of the United States and the bipartisan, bicameral leadership of Congress joined in announcing the bipartisan accord on Central America.
Today we debate the legislation that will, among other provisions:
Continue the authority to provide assistance at prior authorized levels until February 28, 1990.
Authorize the transfer of $49,750,000 in DOD funds to AID for humanitarian assistance, as well as $4,166,000 for the Medical Program and $5,000,000 for AID operating expenses.
This legislation is intended to unite Americans in, and I quote from the accord: `* * * support of democracy, peace and security in Central America * * *.'
When we say democracy, we mean real democracy,--not just a facade of democratization behind which lurks the armed power of a brutal totalitarian state.
When we say peace, we mean real peace--not the peace of the grave, or the peace where military power can be brought into play by only one party.
When we say security, we mean real security--not some temporary arrangement to protect human rights that can be withdrawn when it pleases the Sandinistas.
The accord states:
To be successful the Central American peace process cannot be based on promises alone. It must be based on credible standards of compliance, strict timetables for enforcement, and effective, ongoing means to verify both the democratic and security requirements of those agreements. We support the use of incentives and disincentives to achieve these U.S. policy objectives.
The accord says the funds provided must `also be available to support voluntary reintegration or voluntary regional relocation by the Nicaraguan Resistance.'
The key word is `voluntary'. That means without coercion, without even the semblence of pressure from any quarter.
As part of this process Secretary Baker sent a letter to the chairman of House and Senate Authorization and Appropriations Committees, and the Senate and House leadership.
The letter says that the assistance will not be obligated beyond November 30, 1989, except in consultation with the appropriate House and Senate leaders and committee chairmen. In order for aid to continue past that date, there must be a letter of affirmation from all of those same leaders.
The letter goes on to state:
This bipartisan accord on Central America represents a unique agreement between the Executive and the Legislative Branches. Thus, it is the intention of the parties that this agreement in no way establishes any precedent for the Executive or the Legislative Branch regarding the authorization and appropriation process.
That is about as clear as you can get. In no way does this letter set any kind of precedent concerning the future ability, the limits or the right of the President to conduct foreign policy in line with his constitutional rights, prerogatives and obligations.
Mr. Chairman, Secretary of State Jim Baker deserves great credit for putting together this legislation.
He spent 40 hours on the Hill, talking face to face with the bipartisan leadership. He was candid in letting us know exactly what is at stake, what he believes is needed and how far the administration was willing to go to get an agreement they could in all good conscience live with.
To those on my side of the aisle who have reservations about this legislation, I say: `President Bush didn't create the conditions in which this legislation was forged.'
I wish he had been given a better hand to play. I wish we could do more for the Nicaraguan resistance. But you know as well as I do that the question here is not one of military aid versus humanitarian aid. It is a question of supporting the democratic resistance now or for all practical purposes abandoning them now.
Let me now speak to the four entities affected by this legislation:
To the leaders of the democracies of Central America I say: This legislation will not conflict with the Esquipulas accord. The peace, freedom and very survival of your nations depend upon your willingness to hold the Sandinistas to their sworn agreements.
The time for pious platitudes from the region is past. The time for insistence on `credible standards of compliance, strict timetables for enforcement, and effective, ongoing means to verify' Sandinista compliance has arrived.
To the Nicaraguan resistance I say: I wish from the bottom of my heart that we could help you more than we can in this bill. But this is the best we can do at the present--and I believe it will help you to continue to work for real democracy in your country.
To the Sandinistas I say: Don't think for one moment that you can get by with gestures, media events, and rhetoric. This legislation demands results, not gestures. No more destabilization and subversion of neighbors. No more `Potemkin Village' reforms.
The accord states:
[Page: H1141]
The United States need not spell out in advance the nature of type of action that would be undertaken in response to threats to U.S. national security interests. Rather it should be sufficient to simply make clear that such threats will be met by any appropriate constitutional means.
Let the Sandinistas heed those words. They are not mere rhetoric. They are a bipartisan pledge by the United States to act in ways it deems appropriate against any kind of threat to national security that might arise from the situation in Central America--any kind.
To my colleagues I say: I hope there will be big majorities on both sides of the aisle in support of this legislation. What it lacks in perfection, it makes up in real, effective help for the cause of democracy, justice, and progress in Nicaragua and in Central America.
As I said, I wish we could do better. But as legislators, it is not given to us to act only when conditions are perfect. We must do all that is possible within the framework of the limitations imposed upon us by the makeup of our two Houses of Congress.
What we have done, if its principles are put into practice, can, I believe, help the cause of democracy in Nicaragua and Central America.
Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Broomfield] for yielding me this time at the outset of the debate. I appreciate it.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Florida [Mr. Fascell] is recognized for 37 1/2 minutes.
[TIME: 1140]
Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of H.R. 1750. At the outset I would like to commend the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Bonior] as well as the majority leader, the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Foley], the Speaker, and other members of the leadership both of the majority and the minority, who have devoted untold time and effort to addressing the difficult issue of United States policy toward Nicaragua.
I would also like to thank my ranking Republican, the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Broomfield]. In committee we moved expeditiously, but thoroughly, with considerable discussion and debate on the issue. We had a strong bipartisan vote in the Committee on Foreign Affairs in support of this bill, 6 negative votes and 32 affirmative. It is obvious that there is a broadbase of support at long last in the Congress with regard to a consensus policy on Nicaragua.
Now, I am not speaking here to try to convince anybody. I have better sense than that. I just want to relate basically what has happened and why I think it is important for us to support this bill.
The issue, and the resolution of the issue, has evaded us the last decade. There obviously are strong differences of opinion, honestly and sincerely held, that give rise to tremendous emotions with regard to the solution of the problem or what the solution should be.
All of that is good in a democratic society, but we have seen the adverse effect that a division has, even though it is honestly and sincerely and strongly held, on the implementation of a policy. It does no good, in my judgment, and this is one man's opinion, to go back and point fingers about what we should have done or did not do.
I think that there are lessons to be learned. One of the major lessons as far as I am concerned as chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, one which I have reiterated over and over again not only on this issue but on other major foreign policy issues in which the United States has played an important part, and that is that no President, no Government, can or should commit the sovereignty and the power of the United States on a narrow, split, weak division among the American people and the American Congress.
You just cannot do that. It is no victory for a policy decision to be based on a margin of a few votes, and to raise the issue constantly time and time again with the same result.
I would hope that we--the American people, the Congress and all Administrations--would never forget that lesson. No Foreign policy can be maintained or implemented successfully unless the American people throughly understand and support it. This must be a matter of very careful
consideration for us in the Congress as well as for any President.
This is the major lesson as far as I am concerned. And I say again I am not trying to convince anybody. I think the time has long since passed to argue the merits or the demerits of past policy, or to point the finger, although I am sure that is a lot of fun for a lot of people and it will continue in this body of ours since this is a democratic institution and everybody has their own ideas of what they think should be done, what ought to be done, and what ought to be said. But at last we have what seems to be more than a narrowly based majority on trying to deal with the issue.
It also appears to me that, while some people will say the administration has won a great victory, I do not think that is the issue either, whether the administration has won a great victory or lost, although that is certainly a fair measuring stick for anybody who wants to measure something here.
The point is that we have had a change in policy which has been agreed upon, albeit reluctantly by some on both sides. Whether you are on the right or on the left or in the middle, we have to admit there has been a change which holds out a hope.
Now that is an important factor. The other factor that we ought to recognize is that at long last the leaders of the area, themselves, have undertaken the responsibility for dealing with the problem. What they have been looking for, for a long time has been the support of the United States in their efforts, and they now have that. That is the reason they support the concepts of this legislation which gives them the further opportunity to move forward. There is no assurance it is going to solve all the problems. What it indicates, however, is the political support of the U.S. Government to the efforts of the Presidents of Central America who have stepped out on their own to see if they could deal with the difficult problems of the turbulence--political, military, economic--that exist in Central America.
That is why I believe it is very important to support this legislation, to give substance to the efforts of the negotiators.
I certainly want to pay my respects to the Secretary of State and others who worked very, very hard with the leadership both in the other body and in this body, in order to forge a broad base consensus which is supportable, both on the Republican side of the aisle and on the Democratic side of the aisle.
The support it does not have to be unanimous, Mr. Chairman; I realize that. There is no way that it could be, unfortunately.
But it is certainly a policy which is better based, has a better foundation, because of the fact that it was not narrowly arrived at. That is the important thing.
Yes, we can debate it, and there will be strong debate here, and, yes, there will be strong differences of opinion. But what we need is a strong vote on my side of the aisle and on the other side of the aisle so that we can demonstrate that the administration and the Congress have a broad consensus to try to bring stability and peace to this tragic area. We can then go on to other steps that are absolutely essential to give people political opportunity where they do not have the opportunity to participate politically. Regardless of our position on this issue, we are all strong believers--are we not--in the process of self-determination. I would hope that most people could support the concept that people have the right to determine the political rationale of their own Government and that participatory democracy is far better than a dictatorship, regardless of the color of the dictatorship, whether it is red, blue, pink, left, or right. Having talked to every single member of the Sandinista Directorate over a long period of time.
I would opt for something different myself, I do not have any illusions. However, I would say that if the other leaders in Central America can bring about a change in that torn country, a policy which the United States now can support, I think it is a major step forward and well worthy of support.
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As I say, I not only talked to the director, I talked to the original junta and a lot of leaders in that government, and I do not have any doubt about what they would do if they were left to their own devices. They would simply consolidate their power. However, because the other Central American leaders have gotten together and made it possible to pull in the leadership of the Sandinista government, there appears to me, at least, to be a better opportunity now to deal with those problems.
I remind Members, this Congress has not been blind to the underlying problems that exist in Central America. We have supported economic change. We have supported political change. When the Kissinger report came in with a recommendation of $8 million in additional economic, educational, and health assistance to the countries of Central America, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, with a broad spectrum of political opinion, quickly authorized that money, $8 billion over a period of 5 years.
We approved that and the Committee on Appropriations under the distinguished chairman of the subcommittee, Mr. Obey, provided the money. So while there is a lot to be criticized, I just wanted to be sure that we get in the Record the fact that we have in the past and even now are not blind to the underlying root causes of the difficulties in the region.
I can sum it up by saying that when there is 70 or 80 percent of the people of any country who are illiterate, who are ill-fed, who are ill-housed, who are ill-clothed, and who have no future in terms of participating in their country, you have got an underlying problem, and it does not make any difference what the political ideology is at the top.
We in the United States have taken the position, and I think rightfully so and we ought not to be ashamed, although we can argue about it, that we will support the efforts of people for self-determination. We will try to provide assistance where it is appropriate. Not only that, we will try to foster, encourage, and inculcate, if necessary, those concepts that we hold dear that deal with human dignity.
The last paradox, if you will, Mr. Chairman: we have on occasion been known to fight for what we believe in, and therefore, while it is easy to take potshots at other people, I find it sometimes a little awkward, myself, to do that. I think people have a right to fight for their ideals, and so I am not ready to castigate folks who want to do that. I think Members have to be very careful, very selective, Mr. Chairman. I think this bill represents an important change in policy. It has broad based support. It is an agreement between the Congress and the President to allow the people in Central America to move forward along their own concepts, not ours.
Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
(Mr. BROOMFIELD asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, for 10 years now, the Sandinistas have had an unwitting accomplice in their efforts to eliminate political opposition and secure their own dictatorship. That accomplice has been a divided American Government.
With full acceptance of this bipartisan accord, the American Government is saying with one voice that it will no longer tolerate Stalinist rule in Central America.
I am sure there are very few Members on this floor who don't have at least a few reservations about the accord. That is in the nature of compromise.
The important thing is that we now have a policy that has the support of those on both sides of the issue. Hopefully, the policy will enjoy the broad support of the American people.
Yet it would be a mistake to agree on a policy simply because it promotes domestic political harmony. If the accord is to truly deserve all of the praise that accompanied its announcement last month, it must achieve real changes in Nicaragua.
It must put Daniel Ortega on notice that the United States Government is serious about political reform in Nicaragua and that we fully intend to ensure that such reform is implemented.
Secretary Baker wisely included incentives and performance standards in the plan to encourage the Sandinistas to make the necessary reforms and to judge their success or failure. This plan is policymaking at its best.
I hope that Congress will have the good sense and strength of purpose to see it through to a successful resolution of the whole Central America issue.
President Bush and Secretary Baker have achieved an important breakthrough. I sincerely hope that the majority party allows this policy accord an opportunity to work. No President can sustain a foreign policy initiative, no matter how sound, in the face of unrelenting criticism.
I am, in fact, more hopeful than in several years, that with this accord we have started down the path of true bipartisanship which will lead us to our ultimate objective of bringing peace, democracy, and security to Central America.
I must say that I remain deeply concerned that the Sandinistas will live up to their side of the deal.
Since 1979, the Sandinistas have repeatedly made commitments to implement democratic and political reforms. They have made these commitments to the OAS, the Contadora nations, the other Central American countries, the Nicaraguan resistance, and implicitly, to the United States.
In actual deeds, however, the Sandinistas, while partially complying with the provisions of Esquipulas II, have left a trail strewn with broken promises, unfulfilled commitments, and, at times, outright deceit.
In that vein, I would urge every Member to read the additional views of the committee on this bill which include an exhaustive study analyzing the record of the Sandinistas in fulfilling their commitments in all of the agreements they have entered into over the past 10 years.
We should strongly support the bipartisan accord which implements a policy emphasizing diplomatic initiatives through which a negotiated, political settlement in Nicaragua and in the region can be achieved. However, we should never lose sight that progress toward our goals and objectives in the region depends primarily on future Sandinista behavior.
The Sandinistas should fully understand that we will proceed with the carrot offered, but they should always know that, if necessary, the stick can and will be used.
Several of my colleagues have registered concern over the nature of the agreement we are discussing today. I share their concern. Yet, I can never recall in my 33 years in Congress a foreign policy situation that is as difficult, as divisive as the legislative standoff on the issue of continuing funding for the Nicaraguan democratic resistance. This legislative impasse has created a necessity for an unusual, unique form of compromise. I believe Secretary Baker has made the best of the truly impossible situation.
There is no question that I am concerned about the proposed side letters that were read into the record at Tuesday's markup at the Foreign Affairs Committee. I am not sure about the status they have in the mind of members; certainly they have little or no legal standing. Yesterday in the Rules Committee hearing similar concerns were expressed. Yet I do understand that they were necessary to bring about the accord.
I would like to draw the attention of my fellow Members to the proposed draft letter from Secretary of State Baker to the chairmen of the House and Senate Authorization and Appropriation Committees and Senate and House leadership. It states in part:
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This bipartisan accord on Central America represents a unique agreement between the Executive and the Legislative Branches. Thus, it is the intention of the parties that this agreement in no way establishes any precedent for the Executive or the Legislative Branch regarding the authorization and appropriation process.
I believe any reasonable person reading the last paragraph of this letter would understand the meaning of the Secretary of State's statement.
We are in a difficult situation that calls for some creative diplomacy between the executive and legislative branches. I believe the Baker plan is not just the best, but it is the only solution possible at this time.
[TIME: 1200]
Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 11 minutes.
Mr. Chairman, I have opposed our Contra program ever since it began, and when the Speaker some weeks ago showed me the original compromise which had been worked out between the Senate and the administration, I opposed it. But I am supporting this compromise today, and I would like to explain why.
I am supporting it for a couple of very simple reasons. No. 1, I think this compromise essentially ends the Contra war. Second, it expressly provides that this Government is going to, for the first time in this whole sorry business, have a unified policy here at home.
I think this compromise today is much less directed to what is happening in Nicaragua and much more directed to the question of how this country ought to proceed with respect to any foreign policy.
Mr. Chairman, my views on the Sandinistas, I think, are well known. I have minimum high regard, to put it politely, for the intentions, the techniques of governance, or any other techniques associated with the Sandinistas. But I think that the Sandinistas are a very visable manifestation of the failure of American policy in this hemisphere for the last 60 or 70 years. Because in my judgment, had the United States been sufficiently identified with the needs of the working classes in Central and Latin America, had we been sufficiently attentive to the rights of those classes, the Sandinistas would not have come to power in the first place. The Sandinistas came to power because we backed for too long a discredited Somoza regime, and moderate forces left the country because they gave up hope of being able to work out a decent relationship with Somoza or to forestall the coming to power of the Marxists.
So I do not like the fact that the Sandinistas are in Nicaragua. I do not like the Sandinista government, but neither do I think that it makes sense for the United States to go to war with every government we do not like, even if it is a proxy war. It seems to me, however, that the best way for America to defend our legitimate interests in this hemisphere and the best way for us to limit the opportunities that Marxism or any other foreign ideology has in the region is to support the aspirations, the legitimate aspirations of the vast majority of people in that part of the globe. I think our Contra policy got in the way of that, if for no other reason than the fact that many of the leaders involved in the Contra operation were so hopelessly tarred with their past association with the Somoza regime and the national guard that enforced its existence, that in fact that the Contras were never a credible alternative.
I think the virtue of this package is that it recognizes two realities: No. 1, we have anywhere beween 55,000 and 65,000 Contras and their dependents who are being fed and clothed by U.S. resources at this point. And whether we like the policy or not which led to our moral obligation to these people, we do have a moral obligation to see to it that those people do continue to have adequate food and adequate clothing while the process by which they may be reintegrated into the Nicaraguan society is still being worked out.
The second reality that I think this package recognizes is that the Contras have no remaining military utility. I think this proposal today recognizes that reality. The virtue of this package is that it, for the first time in my view, puts the United States Government and the United States administration specifically on record in support of, rather than in opposition to--as was the case in the past--the efforts at negotiation being engaged in by the Central American Presidents. And that means that it is going to be a force for both peace in the region and for democratization throughout the region, hopefully including Nicaragua. It recognizes in my judgment that the best way for us to do that is through economic and diplomatic rather than military pressure.
People will say, `Well, why should you trust this administration when you didn't trust the last one?' I have hearing records of my subcommittee at this table, and if anyone cares to look at them, they will see that it is obvious that my committee was lied to by representatives of the previous administration when it came to Contra policy. Newspaper reports in the last 2 weeks make that quite clear. But the fact is that I do believe that Secretary Baker and the others with whom we have talked are on the level in their intention to be supportive of that Central American peace process.
Now, we could be wrong. If we are, we have a safety valve, because we have that much maligned side agreement which Secretary Baker and a number of us negotiated, under which we will simply have the opportunity to review the manner in which the administration is expending this money. And if we conclude that the administration is performing in a manner inconsistent with the assurances given the Congress, then we have an ability to cut off that money at the end of November. I do not expect that that is going to happen because I think we have achieved a clear understanding of how the administration is going to proceed.
But to those who suggest that that agreement represents an effort on the part of the Congress to unfairly invade the administrative prerogative of the executive branch, I would simply say that that is not correct. I think, given the bleak record of the previous administration in terms of providing the truth to this Congress, we have a fiduciary responsibility to the taxpayer to maintain a short leash until it can be demonstrated with certainty that the administration is in fact abiding by the understandings
which have led to the appropriation of this money in the first place. So I made absolutely no apology for that side agreement because it is what has enabled us to move forward. And I would follow up on what the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee said. We all have widely different views about how we ought to proceed in Central America, and as I said, I do not believe one whit in providing aid to the Contras, but the one thing that I kept hearing from every major source in Central America as I traveled down there was this: They would say, `Look, what matters to us is not so much what your policy is; what matters to us is that you have a policy that we can understand and follow, and that America has a policy which is supported by a majority of both parties so that it can be sustained through a series of administrations and so that it does not constantly lurch from one extreme to another.'
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`We would like to be able to find you where we left you'; that is what they said to me. And I think the virtue of this policy, in addition to effectively ending the war, is that that is what this agreement is going to do today. And I think it is terribly important in this and all other future foreign policy endeavors, that we truly do have a bipartisan majority and support of whatever initiatives are taken in all regions of the world. That is the only way that we can institutionally, over a long period of time, sustain needed administration foreign policies whether they be popular or not.
Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. Lagomarsino], the vice chairman of the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.
Mrs. BOXER. Mr. Chairman, I have a point of order.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentlewoman will state her point of order.
Mrs. BOXER. Mr. Chairman, could it be explained to me when our people will get called for the time to oppose? We have 45 minutes. In what rotation will we be called?
The CHAIRMAN. The Chair's understanding is to alternate. Both sides are tracking the time. If and when the gentlewoman from California [Mrs. Boxer] wants to be recognized in a proper order, please stand.
Mrs. BOXER. Could I say to the Chairman that that is not the way it was explained to me by the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Foley], that it was going to be alternated, and I would like to be recognized at this time because we have 45 minutes, and we have not even had our first.
The CHAIRMAN. The Chair would say to the gentlewoman from California [Mrs. Boxer], that the last speaker was on the Democratic side.
It is true that the parameters changed a little bit since the beginning of the debate, but, the Chair will recognize the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Broomfield] now, and the gentlewoman from California [Mrs. Boxer] will duly be recognized next.
(Mr. LAGOMARSINO asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of H.R. 1750, legislation implementing the bipartisan accord on Central America and while it does what I would prefer if it were not for the agreement remained in strong opposition to the Dornan motion to recommit.
The fact that House and Senate Democrats and Republicans have been able to agree on a common stategy to work toward solving the crisis in Central America is a significant step toward peace in the region. It reflects the strong commitment of the Bush administration to work cooperatively with the Congress in developing effective foreign policies which protect and promote U.S. national security interests. It also reflects a commitment by the Congress to meet responsibly the challenges and threats to United States interests in Central America represented by forces opposed to democracy--and it helps and encourages our allies in the area.
The bipartisan agreement reflects the imperative for the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua to make irrevocable progress toward instituting democratic reforms as called for in the peace agreement signed by the Central American Presidents in El Salvador on February 14, 1989. The great benefit of this bipartisan accord is the fact that it represents an agreement among the congressional leaders, both Democratic and Republican, on the requirement for the Sandinistas to move toward democracy. If the Sandinistas do not make the necessary reforms to make their government a democracy, they should no longer have leaders in this Congress ignoring their own promises. The Sandinistas won't be able to count on American legislators to make excuses for them in their failure to live up to their commitments to make Nicaragua a democracy.
When I spoke with Costa Rican President Oscar Arias when he was in town last week, I asked him about his view on the need for the Sandinistas to make democratic reforms. He told me he was concerned not only about the process but also about the results in Nicaragua. He truly wants to see democracy in Nicaragua. I also asked President Arias his views on continuing humanitarian aid for the Contras, and he told me directly that he supported continued humanitarian aid, as provided for in this bipartisan accord and that it is in compliance with the Tesoro agreement.
I am sure each of us would offer some differing provisions in this agreement which we feel would enhance U.S. interests. But, I do not believe we could arrive at an agreement in a different form which would represent the kind of bipartisan consensus we have achieved with this accord.
I strongly urge my colleagues to resist the impulse to support the motion to recommit with instructions. I know most of us on this side would like to see those changes, but to approve them would be to kill the bipartisan agreement and we would be worse off than before. The administration opposes the motion to recommit, and I urge my colleagues to reject it. To approve it would give at least the impression of bad faith and would undermine the authority of the President.
I believe President Bush and Secretary of State Baker deserve high praise for their commitment in seeking a policy that the majority in the Congress can support and which finally offers the promise of achieving peace in Central America.
I urge my colleagues to give their strong support to this legislation and to the bipartisan accord on Central America.
Mrs. BOXER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from North Dakota [Mr. Dorgan].
Mr. DORGAN of North Dakota. Mr. Chairman, this morning, a Federal court is hearing a crucial case on national security. There is a case in the Federal courthouse not too far from here that deals with years of deception and lying to Congress about policies in Central America.
Recent newspapers have suggested that the head of the new administration was involved in one way or another with respect to some of the deception that may have gone on with the U.S. Congress. That is the backdrop in which we debate Central American policy.
The new Secretary of State and the new administration come to us and say, `We have a new policy. Trust us.'
Some of us say, `Show us.'
They say, `We have got a new policy,' and some of us say, `Well, it's not really very new at all.'
If my colleagues were to refinish furniture, they will start stripping layers, and they will strip some varnish and paint, and all my colleagues understand that. I say to my colleagues, `What do you have when you get done? You have the same core, the same wood.'
Mr. Chairman, I think the policy here is pretty much the same policy, once the rhetoric and embellishments are stripped away. What did the administration want when it started? Money to fund the Contra soldiers. What does it get under this agreement? Money to fund the Contra soldiers, who have committed untold numbers of crimes against the civilian population.
Now it is a given that we do not like the Sandinistas. Look, all of us in this Chamber think the Sandinistas behave badly.
The question is not whether we like the Sandinistas or the Contras. The question is: What kind of interest does this country have in the region, and how do we develop policies that further our interests?
Mr. Chairman, we have a legitimate disagreement on that. How do we craft something that furthers this country's interest in the region and especially helps the people of that region? How do we do that?
I think in that region, those of us who have been there, and that is most of us, have found people who are desperately poor, hungry, and sick. We ought to send food and medicine to that region. I am a big supporter of sending the right things that help people in that region reclaim hope and rebuild their economies.
Mr. Chairman, last year I thought we were kind of turning the corner. We enacted a children's survival fund with funding equal to Contra aid. Two hundred young people now have arms and legs because we helped them. These are people who lost their arms and legs in the fighting between the Contras and Sandinistas. We were starting to do the right thing.
But once again almost all of our help today is not for people, but for armies, and that is the wrong direction.
Let me mention also some other policies that I am concerned about. The Contras are the evidence of failed policies. They are not the real refugees in the region. This administration has not changed its policy with respect to refugees from Salvador. If someone is a refugee from Nicaragua, it is, `Come on in. You get asylum; just apply for it.' For Salvador, it is, `Sorry, no dice.'
Mr. Chairman, I told this story before, but I am going to tell it again. There was a young woman picked up in this country by the Immigration Service, thrown in jail in Prince Georges County. She had two young children, young boys under 5, and she was nursing a third, a 6-week-old baby, breast-feeding a 6-week-old baby with a viral infection, and they threw her in Prince Georges County jail.
I helped get her out, and sad to say that she is not getting asylum here. She is a Salvadoran, raped in front of her family as a young woman, afraid to go back. Canada fortunately has taken that family because this administration's policies prevent that.
Mr. Chairman, those are the policies we ought to be talking about on this floor. We ought to be changing those policies and helping the people through a strategy that sends money to procure shelter, medicine, and food to help the people of Central America recover from years of war.
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Mrs. BOXER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. Miller].
(Mr. MILLER of California asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. MILLER of California. Mr. Speaker, 20 years ago in the midst of the Vietnam folly, Senator George Aiken recommended that we declare victory and go home.
Today, in the midst of the Central American policy, a policy which the administration admits has not worked, we are asked to declare failure, and spend another $67 million.
My friends, George Aiken was right, and this bill is wrong. This bill is not designed to save the Contras. Clearly, the Bush administration obviously has decided to jettison them. This bill is designed to supposedly save the credibility of this administration. It represents an acknowledgement that the policy of subverting the Sandinistas through the Contra war is an utter failure.
At least in the past they have come to the Congress and sought Contra aid on the fallacious assumption that the policy was working. It never was and it never will. Now they come to us, admitting failure, admitting that the Contras cannot win, that the Contras are not a threat to the Sandinistas, that the underlying policy is a failure, admitting that the killing and the economic destruction in Nicaragua was futile. But what did they want? They want another $67 million to take care of the care and the feeding of the Contras in Honduras.
How often have we heard on the floor of this House and in the Budget Committee of this House and in the Appropriations Committee of this House that we have got to make tough choices because of the unprecedented problems of our national deficit? Every year we tell Americans, older Americans, working Americans, students, the homeless, infants, and the disabled, that we have to cut back essential policies to take care of them, that we cannot even afford to invest in successful programs that help the elderly and the young of this Nation because we are short on money.
So while we are trying to figure out how to help these individuals in this country, along comes Secretary of State Jim Baker and asks for a $67 million gift for a policy which he has admitted time and again is a failure.
If we are choosing priorities, I think we could do much better. I think we could do much more good for the American people than to spend this $67 million for the Contras. Instead, we are told that the best interests of our Nation lie in bankrolling the failure of the Contras.
I, for one, will remember this debate very well when we bring to the floor important legislation later this year on child care, on education, on nutrition, and when we debate these programs, which are not failures, but which are successes, which save lives, which educate our children, which improve the health of the elderly, I will remember that when those programs are not able to meet the needs of our constituents, the needs of our citizens, I will remember that the Congress voted to send $67 million down to a group of people who are there because of illegal acts of this Government, who are there in violation of the charters and the treaties to which we are signatories.
I will remember when we tell the elderly that we cannot afford their health care and when we tell working parents that we cannot afford to help them out with child care that we could afford the care of the Contras, and so should you. So should all Americans, because this is no longer about some viable policy to free Nicaragua from communisim. This is about how does George Bush get off stage, because he recognizes that the Contras have failed. Do we really have to pay $67 million for the President to say what his Secretary of State has already said, the policy is a failure and should not be continued.
The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde] stand in the place of the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Broomfield] for the purpose of yielding time?
Mr. HYDE. In his absence, Mr. Chairman, I am going to try to fill his shoes, and I yield myself 5 1/2 minutes.
(Mr. HYDE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I am certainly going to support this legislation. I think it has several desirable aspects, but the bottom line is it is like chemotherapy. It makes you sick to take it, but it just might save your life.
What we are doing is we are fighting for time. The gentleman from California may well have this analyzed properly. It does keep the Contras surviving.
Jesse Jackson, a great Democratic leader from whom we shall hear more in the next election I am sure, coined a phrase, `Keep hope alive.'
Well, it is a wonderful phrase. I think the $47 million, I did not know it was $67 million, but I will accede to the gentleman's higher number, will keep the Contras surviving, keep them not in bullets, God knows we have cut them off in February of 1988 from any military assistance in the naive credulous hope that if we cut them off, that would demilitarize the contest and there would be no more shooting, no more killing, and perhaps we could negotiate our way toward freedom. Unfortunately, the Soviet Union, which is an important player in this entire equation, poured in 500 million dollars' worth of military aid, plus $400 million in economic aid during the year. We put an antiseptic immunization on giving any military assistance to the Contras; so the playing field got more unlevel and more tilted but we are here today not asking for money to arm the Contras, although the armed Contras are the reasons the Sandinistas came to the bargaining table in the first place; but like an alcoholic fighting for the next half hour of sobriety, we are fighting for the next 7 months, the next 9 months, to keep the Contras alive, body and soul together, people who trusted us as the leader of the free world, to support them in their struggle for freedom; so we will keep them together, hopefully, and not forcibly repatriate them as we did to Soviet refugees after World War II in Operation Keelhaul, one of the darkest chapters in this country's history; but the Contras can go back home with assistance, if indeed democracy, utopia, Valhalla, Camelot ever develops inside Nicaragua.
Now, I frankly am skeptical that Leninists, and that is what the Sandinistas are, they are not Socialists in a hurry, which some of you may think they are, they are Sandinista Communists on the Cuban model, I am very skeptical that free and fair elections can never be had in a country where the army belongs to a political party, where the media belongs to the same political party.
How would you like to go into your town and vote with the Republican army on each street corner, the police being Republicans, access to the media having to go through the Republicans? Control of the newsprint by the government?
How do you have elections without a free press, without access to the media?
Well, we hope that is going to happen. We hope we will have a fair supreme court. We hope we will have a supreme electoral commission that is fair.
You know, this country and the Democratic Party takes justifiable pride in the Voting Rights Act of 1975. It is a marvelous act and it shows a sensitivity to people's right to vote.
Let me tell you, I hope we have one-tenth as much concern about the people's right to vote in Nicaragua as we continue to isolate the Contras and move them toward refugee status.
President Ortega said 2 months ago that the changes brought by the revolution are irreversible; so the notion, as I say, of free elections in the next few months is a triumph of credulity over experience.
The trail of broken promises by the Sandinistas is from here to San Francisco. The OAS agreement in 1979, the Contradora agreements of 1983, the Esquipulas I and II, the Sapoa agreement of 1988, and soon the Tesoro Beach agreements of 1989 join a litany of shame.
But keep hope alive. I believe in redemption. Who would have thought the ethnic uprisings in the Soviet Union would occur but yet they are occurring? A year ago one would never expect to see the Estonians marching with their national flag, but they are marching.
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[TIME: 1230]
Change can happen. I believe in redemption. I believe as we keep the Contras alive, as we keep them together, they will serve as an option. They will serve as therapy for the Sandinistas as they continue in their magnificent con game of promising the world free and fair elections, and so I support this bill on the theory `If you cannot get dinner, take a sandwich, and yes, keep hope alive.'
Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. Skelton].
Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, a critical turning point has been reached in the conduct of American foreign policy in Latin America. Today we bury the past, 8 years of bitter partisan effort that ultimately left us divided, Democrats from Republicans, legislative branch from executive, and Americans from Latin Americans.
Mr. Chairman, here today we are considering a bill to implement the bipartisan accord on Central America agreed to by the President and congressional leaders on March 24. It is a new beginning, a bipartisan approach toward dealing with the problems of Central America.
Make no mistake about it, a bipartisan approach is an indispensable requirement for the conduct of successful foreign policy. America must speak with one voice on foreign affairs.
While the Bush administration was off to a slow start in addressing the problems of Central America, the agreement of March 24 is a good one. However, it is only a first step in an effort to put together a comprehensive policy toward not just Central America but toward all of Latin America itself. The first part of the policy includes a good-faith effort on the part of the Bush administration to make the Arias peace plan work, the Esquipulas accords, the Sapoa agreements, and the latest agreements by the Central American Presidents on February 14 in El Salvador. That is why there will be no request for military aid this year.
Mr. Chairman, a good-faith effort is not enough. A well-formulated plan is also indispensable, one that has the support of the various players in the administration, the support of Congress and, equally important, the support of our friends in Latin America.
The key elements of a well-formulated plan include humanitarian assistance to the Contras, encouragement of democratic elements inside and outside Nicaragua to get ready for the elections next February, and a genuine United States support of the efforts of Latin American countries to resolve the problems of their regions.
A fourth and critical element of such a well-formulated plan must call for getting the Soviets to cut military aid to Nicaragua. This is important. We must make the point that U.S. assistance with perestroika, in terms of credits and trade, is tied to Soviet support of the peace process in this hemisphere.
Let it be known that the spotlight of this hemisphere will be on the Soviets and their actions. Now that we have the absence of military conflict in Nicaragua, the effort will be to promote a genuine democratic opening, using the diplomatic and political tools provided by the various agreements.
Mr. Chairman, last year the Congress voted for peace in Central America. Today we are voting for democracy. Woodrow Wilson once talked of making the world safe for democracy. That was a grand vision that proved to be illusory, but making the Western Hemisphere safe for democracy is a goal within our reach. If we are to promote both peace and prosperity and, most of all, democracy in this region, we must do these things. We must pass this bill.
Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield 6 minutes to the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Burton].
(Mr. BURTON of Indiana asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. Obey] said earlier today this will end the Contra war. It probably will. It is intended to end the Contras, that is for sure, and relocate or repatriate them, and it probably will.
Members of the liberal side of the aisle, on the left, are to be congratulated. They put us in a real trick bag. If we do not vote for this package, the freedom fighters die now. If we do vote for it, they die in 7 months. Why do I say 7 months? Because the letter of agreement that was signed by the President and the people who concocted this idea mandate that all nine of the leaders and the committee chairman involved have to send a letter in 7 months OK'ing the additional aid for the last 3 months between November and the end of February when the elections take place, and many of those leaders have never ever voted for Contra aid.
Mr. Chairman, what is to lead us to believe they are going to vote for Contra aid by sending this letter in November? I do not believe they will. The Contras will die as a force in all probability, as I said, in the next 7 months, and they will for sure if the aid is cut off after that.
What can the other Central American leaders do besides talk about this? Their combined armies, the combined armies of El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Costa Rica, are smaller than the Communist Sandinista army. All they can do is talk. This does not even take into consideration that those armies, if they were as big as the Sandinistas', cannot meet them in firepower, because the Soviets have sent literally billions of dollars of weaponry in there over the last several years, $1.5 billion in the last 18 months, which amounts to thousands of tons of war materials.
The Sandinistas have said time and again that they will never give up power that they have gained out of the barrel of a gun even though there is an election process. They are not going to give it up to the election process. They told us that. The elections will be a farce.
The Sandinistas constitution says that even if there are elections, they will still retain control over the military. If they have control over that military, any election is a farce, because they will still retain power. They will not give up.
Major Miranda, who was one of the top leaders down there as assistant to one of the comandantes, defected to the United States. He told us that they were building a 600,000-man army; that was their goal. I talked to Bayardo Arce, one of the nine comandantes, at the Managua airport, and he told me that was absolutely correct. This little country of 3 million people is going to build a 600,000-man army. Does that sound like they want peace? Does that sound like they want democracy?
They continue to export revolution to El Salvador and the surrounding countries. The Soviets continue to pour in military assistance.
We cannot give the freedom fighters military assistance like we gave the Afghan freedom fighters, who drove the Soviets out of Afghanistan with their tails between their legs, but the Soviets can continue to give military assistance to the Communists.
Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Fascell] said that it makes no difference who is in charge if there is poverty, people cannot have homes or jobs or education, but it does make a difference, because when they are under the shackles or held by the shackles of communism, there is no hope. It is so repressive that the people cannot throw off the chains of communism. People in other countries have overthrown totalitarian governments, but we do not see Communist regimes overthrown, because the Soviets and her surrogates make sure it does not happen.
We cannot expect the freedom fighters to have been successful, because we cut off their aid time and again. We did not cut off the aid to the mujahedin in Afghanistan. We did cut off the aid to the freedom fighters down there, and it was that side of the aisle that did it time and again.
They cannot whip a Soviet helicopter with a stick. They cannot beat a gun with a rock.
Mr. Chairman, I want to end up by just asking a few questions. First of all, is it wise or is it constitutional to allow nine Members of these two bodies to have the ability to cut off aid that is granted today? That is exactly what is going to happen in November. The last 3 months before the elections, the aid will be cut off, because they will not all sign that letter, and every one of them has to.
Mr. Chairman, what is to keep the Sandinistas on track, if they were going to anyhow, if there is no Contra force the last 3 months before the election?
Our Secretary of State has indicated we would use the carrot-and-stick approach to get compliance from the Sandinistas.
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I see a carrot to the Sandinistas. The aid is going to be cut off in November, and there will be no viable opposition, in my view, after that to the Communists down there. But what is the stick? I see no stick, and it concerns me.
For those who agree to the voluntary repatriation, I would like to put that in quotes, voluntary repatriation provision, need to tell us what that means. Does that mean that they will be encouraged to return to Nicaragua even if the Sandinistas once again do not keep their commitment, like they did not in 1979 and they did not in Esquipulas and in Sapoa? Or will they be brought to the United States of America? It is clear the other Central American leaders do not want to be left holding the bag without United States military support for the Contras. So does voluntary repatriation really mean forced relocation back into Nicaragua, into the Soviet-style gulags, or does it mean we are going to bring them to the good old United States, another 25,000 people who want to stay in their own country and fight for freedom?
Many say give peace a chance. What about giving freedom a chance? What about giving freedom a chance?
I hope everybody in this body will remember one statement: Peace without freedom is not peace, it is slavery. Peace without freedom is not peace, it is slavery.
Mrs. BOXER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 1/2 minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. Weiss].
(Mr. WEISS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. WEISS. Mr. Chairman, what is wrong with this legislation and the so-called bipartisan compact is underscored by the fact that the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Burton] and I have both concluded that it ought not be approved, and the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde] and the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. Obey] have both concluded that it ought to be approved. Why? How can people who have been on diametrically opposite sides during the long tragic history of this issue suddenly find themselves on the same side? Because this compact was drafted deliberately to give different impressions to different people; to be able to be interpreted differently and by different people.
It is the view of the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Burton] that this legislation means the demise of the Contras. It is my view and interpretation that this legislation means the continuation and the survival of the Contras. Mr. Obey believes that the agreement terminates the Contras as a military force, Mr. Hyde believes it keeps them alive. The Bush administration likes this confusion. It wants each of us to believe exactly as we do, because that puts them in a position where 6 months from now, 8 months from now or 9 months from now, they can do as they please--terminate or reinvigorate the Contras.
We have had a policy, up to this point at least, where the policy of the Reagan administration and the policy of the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Burton] was to support the Contras in their efforts to undermine and overthrow the Nicaraguan Government. Most of the Democrats opposed that policy, believing that it was not the appropriate role of the United States to create and fund a military force to overthrow another sovereign government. Now in the name of so-called bipartisanship we have joined together to do that which nobody really understands. It is wrong to be in this kind of position.
I do not question the motivation of the Democratic leadership. They see it as a way of bringing the war in Central America to an end. But whatever the good intentions of those who drafted the legislation, it preempts and stifles the efforts of the Central American presidents to bring peace to that war-torn region.
The Central American presidents provided in an agreement that there would be a plan to voluntarily repatriate and demobilize the Contras. We asked at the hearing of the Foreign Affairs Committee why that language was not tracked in this legislation, and we were told that the administration would not go along with it. So what we have is so-called voluntary reintegration and regional reintegration.
What does that mean? Does that mean that Honduras is going to have to continue to allow the Contras to subsist on its soil indefinitely?
This is a terrible agreement, because it is so wide open it confuses everybody as to what it is about.
We had a remarkable hearing in the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs earlier today. The distinguished gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Crockett] chairman of the committee, had four people from Nicaragua participate, two representing the opposition parties and two from the Government itself. The remarkable thing was that all of them agreed that the economic embargo ought to be brought to an end because it was destroying Nicaragua. But by the terms of this agreement the embargo continues. We ought to be working with the Central American Presidents to bring peace to that strife-torn area, not keeping the situation so argue that the Contras can be revived to start the war up all over again.
I urge a no vote on this package.
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Mrs. BOXER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Durbin].
Mr. DURBIN. Mr. Chairman, for 8 years many in this House have argued with conviction that the Reagan-Contra strategy was wrong. We have argued that the future of the region should not be tied to the whims of the superpowers, but rather to the aspirations of those who live in Central America.
We have condemned the violence and the barbarism of the Contras, and we have wept openly for the innocent children who have been maimed and murdered by the failed strategy of the Reagan administration. These principles which have guided many of us in opposing the Reagan Contra strategy have been endorsed by the overwhelming majority of the American people we represent.
Now, today, even George Bush knows the American people are right about Central America. President Bush knows the Reagan Contra strategy has failed. He wants out, but he has asked the Democrats for $67 million to save face, $67 million to bankroll the Contras for just 1 more year.
This agreement is a significant departure for the Republicans, but it is also a significant departure for the Democrats. Our goal today, simply stated, is bipartisanship. Bipartisanship in foreign policy is valuable, but it should never be our only goal. bipartisanship should be the natural outgrowth of consensus on principles we share, principles that rise above party.
Unfortunately, the goal of bipartisanship, the goal of