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The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 254 and rule XXIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill, H.R. 2748.
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Accordingly the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H.R. 2748) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1990 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the U.S. Government, the Intelligence Community Staff, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, with Mr. Moody in the Chair.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the bill is considered as having been read the first time.
The CHAIRMAN. Under the rule, the gentleman from California [Mr. Beilenson] will be recognized for 30 minutes, and the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde] will be recognized for 30 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California [Mr. Beilenson].
Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 2748, the Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 1990. The principal purpose of this bill is to authorize appropriations for all of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the U.S. Government during fiscal year 1990. As in the past, the actual amounts authorized are contained in a classified schedule of authorization, which is incorporated by reference into H.R. 2748, and which is available to all Members in the Committee offices, along with a classified annex to the Committee's report.
The administration requested a small percentage of real growth for fiscal year 1990 over the amount Congress appropriated for intelligence in fiscal year 1989. The Committee recommends a slightly lower level of funding than that requested by the President. Some proposals have been recommended for deferral or deletion, while a few have been increased. The Committee believes that the recommended authorization is a reasonable balance between needed capabilities and prudent cost.
Members should understand that the Intelligence budget is largely a subset of the Defense budget. Almost all of the Intelligence budget is contained within the Defense budget, both for reasons of security, and because the majority of intelligence activities are conducted by elements of the Department of Defense. Thus, increases and decreases for intelligence are largely changes within the defense budget, and are not direct changes to the Federal budget as a whole.
Mr. Chairman, as it does every year, the Committee has worked very closely with the Committee on Armed Services to produce recommendations for the authorization of appropriations for intelligence-related activities over which the two committees share jurisdiction. The amounts authorized for intelligence-related activities by H.R. 2748 are, therefore, fully consistent with those authorized by H.R. 2461, the fiscal year 1990 Defense authorization bill, which passed the House on July 27. Both committees agreed on these amounts, I want to say that I, and other members of Intelligence Committee, appreciate the advice and cooperation of the members and staff of the Committee on Armed Services in this effort.
Mr. Chairman, in addition to the authorization of appropriations, H.R. 2748, contains a number of legislative provisions.
Of greatest interest to the Members, perhaps, will be provisions relating to Nicaragua.
Section 104 is a provision similar to that enacted in the fiscal year 1987, 1988, and 1989 Intelligence Authorization Acts. It provides that any assistance to the military or paramilitary activities of the Contras by any department or agency of the United States must be explicitly authorized by law for that purpose. No such assistance has been authorized by H.R. 2748.
Of more topical importance is H.R. 2748's restriction on funding connected with the Nicaraguan election to be held in February.
As you know, the administration has said that it will not seek covert aid for the opposition in the Nicaraguan election. H.R. 2748 authorizes no funds whatsoever for covert support to opposition parties or candidates in that election. Furthermore, the classified schedule of authorizations prohibits use of the CIA's reserve for contingencies, for such purpose. The only mechanism left to the administration, should it change its mind, is a reprogramming--that is, an official administration request to take funds appropriated for another purpose and reprogram them for this purpose. However, such a reprogramming would require the approval of four separate congressional committees--the House and Senate Intelligence Committees and the House and Senate Appropriations Committees.
Mr. Chairman, there are several other legislative provisions in H.R. 2748.
Title III contains provisions which make conforming and corrective changes in legislation affording retirement, survivor and death-in-service benefits to former spouses of CIA employees and which establish special retirement annuity computation and portability rules regarding overseas service for certain CIA employees covered by the Civil Service Retirement System.
Title IV contains provisions relating to the CIA, including section 401, which exempts the CIA from a provision of law requiring that all Federal agencies procure commercial remote sensing data from the Defense Mapping Agency.
Section 402, which requires the CIA to provide the House and Senate Intelligence Committees with a list of each audit, inspection, or investigation conducted by the CIA inspector general, and to provide the committees with a copy of any report of such audit, inspection, or investigation which the committees request.
Title V contains several provisions relating to intelligence components of the Department of Defense, among others.
Section 501, which authorizes the Secretary of Defense to provide foreign language proficiency pay to civilian employees of the Department of Defense who are proficient in a foreign language the Secretary determines is important for the effective collection, production and dissemination of foreign intelligence and who are serving in an intelligence or intelligence-related position.
Section 502, which authorizes the Secretary of Defense to accept, use and maintain gifts made to further the educational activities of the Defense Intelligence College.
Section 601 makes change to the OPM/FBI demonstration project applicable to the New York FBI office, authorized in the fiscal year 1989 Intelligence Authorization Act, in order to permit the project's cost of living allowance to be provided to all support employees in the FBI's New York office.
Section 703 directs the President to issue financial reporting and disclosure regulations applicable to the members of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.
Officially, section 704 requires the President to submit a report to Congress by April 1, 1990 setting forth a plan to integrate counternarcotics intelligence activities.
All of these legislative provisions were approved by the Committee without objection from either side of the aisle.
Mr. Chairman, H.R. 2748 enjoys strong bipartisan support within the Committee. It is the product of an excellent working relationship among Members and staff who have carefully assessed the needs of intelligence and bring before the House recommendations that, we believe, are consistent with both our national security needs and with the state of the Nation's finances.
Mr. Chairman, I want to commend the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde], the ranking Republican member of the Committee, for his wise counsel, his help, and his very collegial and cooperative approach to the Committee's business has been enormously helpful.
I also would like to pay tribute to the hard work, dedication, and professionalism of all of the Committee's staff members, and particularly note the contributions of three staff members who have served the committee exceptionally well since its inception in July 1977 and who now go on to other endeavors: Marty Faga, who is now Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space; Duane Andrews, who has been nominated for the post of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence; and Michael O'Neil, who now serves as an assistant to the Speaker of the House. Each has made a major contribution to the successful conducting of this Nation's intelligence activities.
In closing, Mr. Chairman, I urge Members to support H.R. 2748. It provides what is needed of America's intelligence agencies, and it strengthens the ability of the House, through its Intelligence Committee, to exercise meaningful oversight of intelligence activities.
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Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 5 minutes.
Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to support this bill. My good friend, the distinguished chairman of the Intelligence Committee, has ably summarized the provisions of this legislation. I wish to assure the House that your intelligence committee has comprehensively reviewed the administration's authorization request for the various U.S. intelligence programs, and under the auspices of our program and Budget Authorization Subcommittee, members of the Intelligence Committee heard, during a series of 11 hearings, more than 30 hours of testimony on the programs covered by this authorization bill. After thorough consideration of these programs and further discussions between members of the committee and administration officials on some matters, I believe we have been able to bring a bill to the floor which is basically acceptable to all or nearly all of our committee. In no small part this achievement has been due to the exceptional leadership of Chairman Beilenson. The gentleman from California's conscientious, scrupulously fair and thoughtful approach to our committee's serious responsibilities continues to be a model of professional legislative conduct for all of us who have had the privilege of serving with him. These qualities and his lively good humor have earned him the admiration and respect of every member of the committee, and mine in particular.
Perhaps at this point, it would be appropriate to note also that the work of the committee on the often complex and difficult issues addressed by this bill could not have been so effectively accomplished without the long hours of excellent supporting work by our exceptionally talented staff. Therefore, I would like to specifically recognize the efforts of Tom Latimer, Mike O'Neil, Tom Smeeton, Marty Faga, Duane Andrews, Bob Fitch, Ken Kodama, Virginia Callas, Bernie Raimo, Diane Dornan, Louis Dupart, Steve Nelson, Jeannie McNally, Sharon Curcio, Dee Jackson, Cathy Eberwein, Karen Schindler, Jack Keliher, Bernie Toon, Calvin Humphrey, Dick Giza, Merritt Clark, and Angel Torres. In particular, however, I want to extend my sincere gratitude and warmest wishes to Marty Faga and Duane Andrews, the two most senior members of our Program and Budget Authorization Subcommittee staff. After more than 12 years of exemplary service to our committee, this is the last intelligence authorization bill on which we will have the benefit of their unparallelled expertise and sage advice. Both of these dedicated gentlemen have provided us with scrupulously nonpartisan professional staff support. Regrettably for our committee, their talents and achievements have been widely recognized beyond the attic confines of our committee offices, and both will be assuming senior positions of responsibility in the executive branch. Marty will shortly be sworn in as assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space Programs. Duane has been nominated for the position of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence. We are profoundly sorry to be losing them, but we wish them the best good fortune in their new duties.
In addition, I congratulate Mike O'Neil, the committee's chief counsel from its creation and a guiding light in our legislative actions over all of those years. Mike has assumed a new position of responsibility on the Speaker's staff.
Let me now return to the substance of this bill and mention two important aspects of it. First of all, the administration's policy decision, after its lengthy consultations with the congressional leadership, has been not to seek covert aid to the internal political opposition in the forthcoming Nicaraguan elections, but to rely just on the package of overt aid to the election process through the National Endowment for Democracy [NED]. I have the highest respect for NED's capabilities and efforts, and I am a strong supporter of NED programs, which are designed to assist the democratic process rather than provide direct aid to any candidate.
Second, H.R. 2748 calls for the President to submit a report to the Congress by April 1 next year, describing how counternarcotics intelligence activities can be integrated, including coordinating the collection and analysis of intelligence information, ensuring the dissemination of relevant information to the various officials responsible for narcotics policies and activities, and coordinating and controlling all counternarcotics intelligence activities. This report should help to focus our attention better on the degree of progress we are making on this important aspect of our war on drugs and on problem areas where more intensive or imaginative efforts are required. At this point, our committee has concluded that there is no focal point for counternarcotics intelligence. Nevertheless, we believe the Director of Central Intelligence has taken the first step in that direction through the creation of a Counternarcotics Center. Hopefully, such steps will help us develop a better integrated system for assessing the value of counternarcotics intelligence information available, pinpointing the necessary requirements for further collection and analysis, and coordinating the collection, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence information needed to support U.S. counternarcotics activities.
In conclusion, I urge the House to pass H.R. 2748.
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Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Stokes], our distinguished former chairman.
Mr. STOKES. Mr. Chairman, I rise to speak to section 504 of the bill which directs the Secretary of Defense to establish an undergraduate training program at the Defense Intelligence Agency aimed at facilitating the recruitment of women and minorities.
During my tenure on the Intelligence Committee, I became concerned about the minimal representation of women and minorities throughout the intelligence community. I found that they were vastly underrepresented throughout the professional grade structure. Several reasons were offered in explaining this problem. Generally, it was that the intelligence agencies could not compete with the private sector in attracting women and minorities with skills critical to the performances of their mission.
Consequently, in an effort to level the recruitment playing field between the private sector and the intelligence agencies, the fiscal year 1987 Intelligence Authorization Act directed the Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense to establish an undergraduate training program at the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency. To date, this program is viewed with wide approval by both CIA and NSA, and presently has over 80 students participating. While overall success of the program will be judged in future years, both CIA and NSA acknowledge that they expect this program to have a positive effect in eliminating the problem of underrepresentation in the professional grades of women and minorities.
Section 504 establishes a similar program at the Defense Intelligence Agency which is also experiencing difficulty in attracting women and minorities with skills critical to its mission. Not only is DIA not able to compete with the private sector, but they are presently faced with a situation whereby they cannot compete with their colleagues in the intelligence community. This unfortunate circumstance is a result of the undergraduate training program, not being extended to the DIA. Section 504 rectifies this situation, not only as it relates to the private sector, but also within the intelligence community itself. It is expected that the same success experienced by NSA and CIA will occur with the initiation of the undergraduate training program at DIA.
I would like to commend the chairman, Mr. Beilenson, for his leadership in fashioning section 504 of this bill. I think it is going to make a significant difference at DIA.
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Shuster], one of the more valuable members of our committee.
Strike `Ohio,' and make it `Pennsylvania.'
Mr. SHUSTER. Mr. Chairman, Pennsylvania intends to annex Ohio, but, as a matter of intelligence, that is still classified.
(Mr. SHUSTER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
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Mr. SHUSTER. Mr. Chairman, I wish we lived in a world where it was not necessary to have intelligence agencies. I wish we lived in a world where we could trust the other governments with which we deal, where we had no need for gathering intelligence and where we had no need, especially, for covert operations against terrorists and dictatorships around the world, but that unfortunately is a world of make-believe.
Mr. Chairman, if we, as Americans and as Members of this body, do not see the world as it is rather than as we wish it were, then we in our country stand to suffer at the hands of tyrants. From the code breakers of World War II, to the Berlin tunnel, to saving Italy from communism, to more recent intelligence successes of which we cannot speak, intelligence has helped secure our country. Intelligence has helped make not only America a better land, but the world a freer and safer place, and yet we see our intelligence agencies denigrated. We see their hands tied. We see them attacked.
What we need, Mr. Chairman, is not only this authorization for funds for intelligence. What we need is a new authorization which embraces our commitment to intelligence necessary to secure and defend our country and the free world. What we need, Mr. Chairman, is a reconfirmation, a recommitment, to the importance of sound, strong intelligence to help secure America.
A very, very immediate case in point is the Panamanian situation. We criticize what happend last week in Panama, and Mr. Chairman, I was prepared as I went into briefings on the Panama situation, I was prepared to be very critical of this administration. Yet I must say that after hearing the facts I came almost reluctantly to the conclusion that the administration made reasonable judgments, perhaps not gutsy judgments, but reasonable judgments based on the facts available to them at the time. Yet who could expect, who could expect this administration or any administration, who could expect the intelligence agencies of our Government to make gutsy decisions when we have lashed them, put them under the whip, tethered them, told them they best not do anything or we will have them in front of a grand jury; we will have them, as a distinguished career CIA agent now is, under indictment. Who could expect them to do anything but become cautious, if indeed not timid?
Yes, there are those on this Hill who recently have said that they have given this President everything he wanted with regard to Panama, and yet we know there are those who have gone to the White House and threatened them, threatened them with exposure for classified information, have said, `You dare not engage in covert operations.'
We cannot have it both ways, Mr. Chairman. We cannot talk out of both sides of our mouth. We had either better decide that we are going to support intelligence necessary for the security of our country, or we should decide that we are simply going to let the bad guys of the world have their way.
So, let us hope that the Panama situation of the last week might be a turning point, that it might be a catharsis, an educational experience for some of us on this Hill. Let us hope that it might make us say that it is time that we recognize that a President, duly elected President, is indeed responsible for foreign policy and that the intelligence agencies of this Government have duly constituted responsibilities. And let us support the effort of our intelligence agencies and of our administration, be they Republican or Democrat. Let us support them as they do the patriotic, yet sometimes dirty, job of securing this country.
Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. McCurdy], our distinguished ranking member.
(Mr. McCURDY asked and was given permision to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. McCURDY. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of H.R. 2748, the Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 1990. Section 402 of the bill requires the Director of Central Intelligence to provide the Congressional intelligence oversight committees, at their request, any inspection, investigation, or audit report prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency Inspector General. I would like to briefly explain this provision to my colleagues.
This provision was arrived at in bipartisan fashion and is the result of an inquiry by the Oversight and Evaluation Subcommittee into the effectiveness of the Agency's Inspector General Office. As chairman of this subcommittee, I worked closely with Congressman Bud Shuster and the members of the subcommittee in drafting this requirement.
During the subcommittee's inquiry, we requested full access to the inspection, investigation, and audit reports prepared by the CIA Inspector General. We did so not to conduct a `fishing expedition,' but to assess the overall quality of these reports and the responsiveness of the Agency in implementing any corrective actions identified in them. After some negotiation, we were granted access to audit and investigation reports. Committee access to investigation reports, however, became a matter of some sensitivity to Director Webster. After a long protracted period of some 4 months of negotiations, we were unable to obtain assurances that full access would be granted.
Director Webster initially ruled that we would have no direct access to these reports. Later, he indicated that committee staff could review selected reports but would not be allowed to take substantive handwritten notes on their content. Finding this situation unacceptable, I met with the Director personally to see if something could be worked out. While staff access to one report was eventually granted, we were unable to obtain assurances that any subsequent access to additional reports would be forthcoming.
Just before marking up the Intelligence authorization bill, I again attempted to reach agreement with CIA Director Webster on full access to these reports and was unable to do so. Mr. Shuster and myself therefore felt it necessary to draft section 402, so that committee access to these important reports would be assured in the future.
Mr. Speaker, I think I speak for all the members of the Oversight and Evaluation Subcommittee when I say that we on the Intelligence Committee have a clear responsibility to the Members of the House in assuring that CIA programs are effectively managed and that the resources we authorize are well spent. The CIA Inspector General is supposed to be on the front line in this area, and we have a legitimate and clear mission to see that he is performing his job. We simply cannot make such an assessment without full access to the product that he produces.
I would stress to my colleagues, as I have to Director Webster, that it is in the best interest of the CIA and his inspector general [IG] to keep the intelligence oversight committees fully informed on specific improvements made as a result of IG inspections. It is his responsibility to ensure that appropriate controls are in place to see that managers entrusted to operate programs and activities at the CIA are accountable--and that the intelligence oversight committees can attest to that accountability. Section 402 of H.R. 2748 takes a solid step in this direction, and I urge its passage.
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Mr. SHUSTER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. McCURDY. I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.
Mr. SHUSTER. Mr. Chairman, I would point out to my friend that I not only concur with what he says, but I would emphasize that the Intelligence Committee on a unanimous bipartisan vote adopted the gentleman's amendment.
Mr. McCURDY. Mr. Chairman, I certainly thank the gentleman for his sincerity and for his support throughout this process. As one who is a strong supporter of the intelligence community, I believe he agrees with all of us that this is an important addition to the Intelligence Authorization Act.
I thank the chairman again for his leadership and support and urge adoption of the bill.
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Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Combest], one of the most able and productive members of our committee.
Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of this authorization bill and urge its adoption.
This committee has a keen interest in counterintelligence, an interest first sparked by the wave of espionage cases in 1985. Most recently, the Hall, Conrad, and Bloch cases show that we continue to suffer losses that are devastating in every way, including financially.
Some progress is visible, but it has been all too difficult to achieve and sustain movement. In its report this year, for instance, the committee notes continued disarray in Embassy security policy and organization, a full 5 years after massive problems were discovered. We have also requested that DOD focus on apparent security lapses during weapons acquisition, which compromise our technology and allow the Soviets to develop countermeasures well before new U.S. systems are deployed.
Especially with today's budget problems, we cannot tolerate these compromises and the financial burdens they impose. The Moscow Embassy fiasco likely will cost us several hundred million dollars. Recovery from the Walker case probably would cost us billions in premature submarine, antisubmarine, and communications investments. Even if we do not or cannot recover our previous relative security in a case like the Walkers', large prior investments are wasted.
While consciousness and even action has been heightened in some areas, one sometimes despairs over the likelihood of fundamental attitudinal changes. The Director of Central Intelligence has publicly warned that Soviet intelligence activities actually have increased during this period of glasnost, however forthcoming the U.S.S.R. might be in other areas. Yet we are instituting new policies and relations with little or no thought to their long-term counterintelligence implications. This is true in areas such as visas, emigration, cultural and business exchanges, arms control verification policies, numbers of diplomatic officials, and diplomatic travel. Sometimes the bad effects could be tempered with only a little forethought, but these policies often are rushed through with virtually no thought at all, and usually with no organized or detailed input from the counterintelligence community.
There are not enough agents in the whole FBI, much less in the Intelligence Division, to even attempt to cope with the resulting threat. I'd be willing to bet a great deal that we'll soon be asked to pony up large additional funds for partial countermeasures. But as we all know, the well is drying up. It is time for the counterintelligence agencies to unite and become more aggressive in highlighting dangers to the national interest. And, for their part, top policymakers throw on the table new and seemingly innocuous `symbols' adding `momentum' to the United States-Soviet relationship.
Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. Kastenmeier], who has been a long-time distinguished member of the committee.
(Mr. KASTENMEIER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. KASTENMEIER. Mr. Chairman, as a member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, I want to congratulate the chairman, the gentleman from California [Mr. Beilenson], for his leadership and, indeed, specifically for his management of the annual authorization bill for the Intelligence agencies. This is the committee's highest priority and this bill is the product of very thoughtful deliberations and an excellent working relationship certainly by Members on both sides of the aisle, including and I should commend as well the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde], and certainly the staff, in carefully judging the needs of the Intelligence agencies.
I am somewhat saddened by either the immediate loss or prospective loss of several key staff members who have been with the committee for many years and upon whom we have been very dependent, as they go on presumably to better and higher responsibilities.
I would also like to commend the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. McCurdy] and his counterpart, the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Shuster], for their work in bringing some accountability as far as the Central Intelligence Agency is concerned, particularly with reference to audit and review activities of the inspector general's office.
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I think that is extremely important work on their part. I would, however, comment that while this year, for various reasons I think this bill is less controversial in terms of its implications, perhaps because it is not concerned with Iran or Central America or something else which has been controversial over the years, that I think that is an excellent development.
At the same time I think it should be observed that the Intelligence budget is still too overclassified. Granted, we have come a long way from the days when we did not acknowledge the existence of the CIA or its location or even in what Department budget most of the accounts were authorized. However, a lot more information relating to the Intelligence budget should be made available to Members and the public without running the risk of national security.
For example, although the bill authorizes a classified level of expenditures for the Intelligence agencies, there are estimates in the press as to the size of the Intelligence budget. Certainly, Members and the public have a right to know the amount of money being spent by the intelligence agencies, and I am hopeful we are reaching a time, a level of maturity, which will enable us to provide more information and a lot less classification with respect to this budget.
Mr. Chairman, in any event, I am pleased to support the bill and recommend its passage.
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Kansas [Mr. Bereuter], one of the more thoughtful and productive Members--Nebraska. My geography is very poor today.
(Mr. BEREUTER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, we were authorized by the same act.
Mr. Chairman, this Member rises in support of H.R. 2748 as a member of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, also, this Member wishes to join with the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Combest] in addressing the importance of counterintelligence, and the need to consider counterintelligence improvements.
The Reagan administration focused on counterintelligence much more than did its predecessors. It now appears that the Bush administration may carry the work further. This certainly is desirable, because progress addressing counterintelligence deficiencies requires high-level attention, initiative, and followthrough.
It is this Member's understanding that the Bush administration will be considering counterintelligence program improvements as a part of a major National Security Review policy paper. This policy initiative is expected to reach the President in the next month or two.
Mr. Chairman, this Member served as a military counterintelligence officer, so I have a particular interest and appreciation for this important and often neglected area of national security. This Member has a special interest in methods to improve training for counterintelligence specialists and is committed to that end.
Presently, counterintelligence responsibilities currently are widely scattered throughout the Government. For instance, in addition to FBI intelligence specialists, there are various counterintelligence contingents within the CIA, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the State Department. Not surprisingly, coordination among the various contingents in their training methods is not as good as it could or should be.
It seems unlikely that each of these agencies will individually have the best possible and effective training program covering security countermeasures and the many types of foreign intelligence threats. Those threats range from human agents to very sophisticated signals intelligence collection techniques.
Cooperative or joint training programs should lift the quality of U.S. counterintelligence and reduce overall training costs. Resulting personal contacts could also help wear down the barriers between agencies, which have hindered information exchanges as well as operations.
Therefore, this Member hopes and requests that training improvements will be among the actions covered by the forthcoming National Security Review. The House Intelligence Committee awaits these executive decisions and recommendations with considerable interest. Our involvement often will be necessary to implement these decisions successfully, particularly if significant budgetary implications are involved, as some anticipate.
In closing, I urge my colleagues to support the passage of H.R. 2748.
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Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Kansas [Mr. Glickman], a valued and hard-working member of our committee.
(Mr. GLICKMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. GLICKMAN. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 2748, the Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 1990, and commend Chairman Beilenson and the ranking Republican member, Mr. Hyde, for forging a nonpartisan consensus in support of the bill's budget and legislative provisions. There are, I believe, no significant differences among the Intelligence Committee's 19 members on the bill's money provisions. To a large extent, this is due to the integrity and intellectual capability of the chairman, Mr. Beilenson.
The Intelligence Committee's Subcommittee on Program and Budget Authorization, on which I serve, spent many hours conducting thorough hearings on this Nation's many and diverse intelligence activities.
In these hearings and in other deliberations at both the subcommittee and full committee level, we examined the intelligence needs of the United States, analyzed the President's budget request, and kept in mind the fiscal constraints under which the Congress is laboring. The result, contained in the bill before us, is a carefully crafted and well-measured intelligence program that is both protective of the Nation's security interests and fiscally prudent.
The funds authorized in H.R. 2748 support a necessary array of intelligence programs in support of our many national security concerns. None in my opinion is more important to our national security than those programs aimed at the collection, production, and dissemination of economic intelligence.
In the ever-changing and challenging world we live in, the intelligence community must take the lead in collecting accurate information on international banking, financial, manufacturing, trading, and related activities by whatever legitimate means it can employ, and in providing expert and timely analyses of such information to the executive branch and to the Congress. The relevant intelligence agencies have taken some strides in this direction, and I commend them. But they must do more. The quantity of Soviet weapons in the Urals is important but so is the quality of wheat in the Ukraine.
Furthermore, it is imperative that our Government have competent, up to date accurate information on the role of foreign governments, foreign banks and their affiliates in asserting their influence and control in the world economy, and more specifically in the American economy. America's economic security is being challenged and threatened by new forces in the world. A revitalized and unified Europe, a strengthened Japan and Pacific Rim specifically come to mind. These forces will dramatically affect U.S. jobs and economic power. They represent a direct competitive threat to the United States, in a similar sense that the Soviet Union has been a threat to United States as the world changes, our intelligence community must recognize that our national security will be influenced by these economic forces as much as they will be by the Soviet threat and perhaps it is time to reallocate some of our limited intelligence resources to accomplish these objectives.
Our intelligence activities must be based on our foreign policy objectives. My point is that in this changing world, economic issues will dominate our foreign policy agenda, beginning to crowd out the historic East-West agenda of the past 40 years. It's time that our intelligence operations have this modern agenda as well, in order to properly serve American foreign policy.
I look forward to discussing these issues with Director Webster and others during the fiscal year 1991 budget cycle and urge all Members to support this year's bill, H.R. 2748.
Mr. LIVINGSTON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. GLICKMAN. I am happy to yield to the gentleman from Louisiana.
Mr. LIVINGSTON. Mr. Chairman, I want to congratulate the gentleman on his statement and tell him I agree with him. I think that our intelligence community really does need to pay attention to the economic circumstances abroad and to do everything in their power to advance the United States' interests. I would just also add to the gentleman's comments that the intelligence community has to be made free to do its job, and I guess that is a certain degree of self-criticism, because I think that sometimes Members of Congress tend to impede the intelligence community in their ability to do that job.
Mr. GLICKMAN. Mr. Chairman, I am not exactly sure what the gentleman is referring to. We usually are on the same wavelength on most issues.
Mr. LIVINGSTON. If the gentleman will yield further, the comment was enlarging on the gentleman's comments and not at all intended or directed at what he said but to imply that perhaps in the last couple of weeks there have been events in which the intelligence community has been restricted, and we have suffered because of it.
Mr. GLICKMAN. Mr. Chairman, I cannot speak to that. My point is in this statement that as the world changes, as we face the threat of Japan and Western Europe and the whole slew of forces in the world which challenge American economic superiority and affect the jobs of our people and their living standards, the intelligence community has to be keenly aware and be interested in economic intelligence in the world and not just be focused on the historic East-West relationships which have dominated us for the last 40 years. Those are clearly important and critical, but these other objectives are as important as well.
Mr. LIVINGSTON. The gentleman's statement is well taken.
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I am informed that the identity of the States of the different Members is no longer classified, so I need not indulge in disinformation.
Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. Frenzel].
(Mr. FRENZEL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. FRENZEL. Mr. Chairman, I thank the distinguished ranking member for his cartographical exactitude.
Mr. Chairman, this bill creates, among other things, a new entitlement authority by increasing the retirement accrual rate for employees who have served overseas in the line of duty. It applies to retirees covered by CIA retirement and disability systems as well as NSA and DIE retirees covered in their respective CSRS plans.
None of the agencies, nor the House Select Committee on Intelligence, nor the CBO seem to know the exact number of employees or retirees who will eventually be affected by this legislation.
[TIME: 1450]
I am glad to know in one instance the committee has not leaked this important security information. However, the entitlement will only apply to employees covered by the closed Civil Service Retirement System available to employees hired before January 1, 1984.
Initial outlays are expected to be small. However, they will rise as the number of retiring employees increases. A formal CBO cost estimate has not been made available to me and I believe none is available at all. Analysts are reluctant to render any estimate at this time, and I do not blame them, other than to say it will probably cost less than $1 million in fiscal year 1990.
That, however, puts the bill in violation of section 302 (f)(1) of the budget act which prohibits the creation of new entitlement authority in excess of the respective subcommittees' 302 allocation. Neither of the committees handling this bill had any 302 allocations.
It is, I am told, a wonderful bill. I am not anxious to impede its progress. However, to flaunt the budget act and ignore it in small amounts means that we will eventually do it in larger amounts.
Mr. Chairman, we are indulging in a dangerous precedent by ignoring the budget act on this very small and perhaps insignificant item, and for that reason I am compelled to oppose the bill.
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Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Wolpe].
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Wolpe] is recognized for up to 8 minutes.
(Mr. WOLPE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. WOLPE. Mr. Chairman, today's floor debate on the intelligence authorization bill is an appropriate moment to focus on a foreign policy issue that has long been neglected by Congress but which is of increasing importance to United States national interests, namely, United States policy toward Angola.
Let me begin by saying: It is an open secret that the United States provides assistance to the UNITA insurgency in Angola.
President Bush, in a letter sent in early January to the UNITA leader Mr. Jonas Savimbi, before President Bush had even taken office, pledged continued U.S. assistance to UNITA. That followed several similarly open statements by President Reagan. On many subsequent occasions, high ranking officials of the administration have publicly referred to U.S. material support of UNITA. Moreover, Mr. Savimbi himself has spoken openly about the levels and nature of U.S. assistance that UNITA receives, most recently in the July 5 issue of Jeune Afrique and in a press conference he held July 5 in Abidjan, Ivory Coast.
These facts speak for themselves: In practice the U.S. support of UNITA remains covert in name only. It is a reality known to any and all persons concerned with this issue.
Yet astonishingly, Congress currently engages in no open public debate on this most central fact of United States policy toward Angola.
In the almost 4 years that this program has been in existence, Congress has voted only once, 3 years ago, on the Hamilton amendment to the intelligence authorization bill, on anything that concerned U.S. assistance to UNITA. The intelligence authorization bill before us today contains not a single overt statement on Angola. All congressional business in this area has been handled in a closed and secretive manner; the administration faces no significant reporting requirements to Congress on its Angola policy, and all major decisions are reached behind closed doors.
This is an approach that Congress refused to tolerate with respect to United States assistance to the Nicaraguan Contras; it can hardly be tolerated in Angola. So long as it is tolerated, U.S. policy will remain hostage to Jonas Savimbi's personal agenda.
It is especially important to open debate today, given important new developments in southern Africa that pose new challenges to American policy.
The United States-brokered Angola-Namibia accord of 1988 laid the basis for the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola and the transition to independence in Namibia. That has been followed by the Gbadolite summit of last June, when President Mobutu and 17 other African heads of state brought President Dos Santos and Mr. Savimbi into agreement on a cease-fire and negotiations aimed at a national reconciliation.
If current U.S. policy is in fact sound, it will certainly be capable of withstanding public scrutiny and debate in Congress: The proponents of aid to UNITA should join me today in appealing to Congress to reopen debate on United States policy toward Angola.
In the 3 years since Congress last took any stand on this issue, a multitude of things have happened which make it absolutely imperative that Congress systematically reappraise U.S. policy:
First, Cuban forces are on their way out of Angola. Under the term of the United States-brokered Angola-Namibia accord,
50 percent of the Cuban forces will be gone by November 1, two-thirds by April of next year. Further, Soviet military assistance to Angola is dropping significantly
The Cuban presence in Angola, it should be recalled, was the original rationale for United States support of UNITA; that is now a rapidly receding factor.
Second, current U.S. policy is failing.
Rising, unconditional assistance to UNITA has only encouraged Mr. Savimbi to become even more hardline, and to place new obstacles in the way of peace talks.
Following the Gbadolite summit in June, Savimbi rejected proposals for cease-fire protocols, denied that he had agreed to `integration' of UNITA into existing structures in Angola, in direct contradiction of the African heads of state, attacked President Mobutu's mediation efforts, abandoned the peace process, and failed to attend the round of talks scheduled for September 18 in Kinshasa, despite direct urgent appeals from President Bush and Assistant Secretary of State Cohen.
Against the backdrop of these events, the question has to be asked: Is U.S. patience with Savimbi inexhaustible? Does United States assistance to UNITA undercut other diplomatic efforts to encourage both UNITA and the Angolan Government to moderate their demands and reach fair compromises that lay the basis for an enduring, negotiated settlement?
In fact, the harsh truth is that America's Angola policy is now in disarray. Hardline, pro-UNITA forces have pushd the administration to embrace Savimbi's self-serving interpretation of the understandings reached at Gbadolite and to endorse many of Savimbi's maximum bargaining demands. In the meantime, administration officials must scramble to convince Mr. Savimbi and President Mobutu to get the negotiating process back on track. Not surprisingly, the African heads of state involved in the peace process show less and less confidence in U.S. intentions and evenhandedness.
Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, would the gentleman yield?
Mr. WOLPE. I am pleased to yield to my distinguished colleague, the gentleman from New Mexico.
Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, let me say I support the thrust of the remarks of my colleague. I have been concerned about the breakdown of negotiations. I think the President acted a little unexpectedly and not in the best interests of the peace process when he spurned President Mobutu and negotiations broke down. He was here in Washington recently and met with a number of Members. I believe he has told President Bush he will resume negotiations with the Angolan Government shortly, I think that is critically important.
I do support the gentleman's thrust that we should have a much closer look at developments there, especially if there is a barrier toward the peaceful settlement in that part of the world. The Cubans are leaving. South Africa is reducing their presence. I think there has got to be pressure to bring both sides to the negotiating table.
Mr. McCURDY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. WOLPE. Mr. Chairman, how much time do I have remaining?
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Mr. CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from California [Mr. Beilenson] has 2 minutes remaining.
Mr. WOLPE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to reserve 1 minute of the time.
Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Oklahoma.
Mr. McCURDY. I just want to say to my friend, the gentleman from Michigan, that it is my understanding that Dr. Sivimbi is going to not only meet with President Mobutu, but also has agreed to renewed negotiations. Unfortunately, and I was not there, there was not a clear written statement of agreement in that the Angolan Government did not want to even shake hands in front of the cameras.
It would certainly be easier if there were direct negotiations between UNITA and the Angolan Government and there were not mediators and we had front line states making one statement and other African leaders making others.
But the bottom line is, those Members who would like to see national reconciliation in Angola support negotiations, would like to see negotiations without preconditions, would like to see direct negotiations if possible. We would like to see those negotiations lead to multiparty states and elections. Certainly those Members who believe that bringing democracy to Angola would be a tremendous goal would like to meet with President Santos and others on a basis to further these discussions with Congress as well.
[TIME: 1500]
Mr. WOLPE. I thank the gentleman for his observations. Let me say I certainly hope that the cease-fire will be resumed and the negotiation process will again get under way. The point of what I am trying to raise today, however, is there are elements of American policy, not only in my judgment but in the judgment of most of the African heads of states who are involved in trying to facilitate national reconciliation in Angola, that are counterproductive to that end, to the end of national reconciliation.
The administration has not followed through on its expressed desire to demonstrate a degree of balance and impartiality through steps which would begin to normalize relationships with the Government of Angola. We do not have time to expand upon that. Hopefully we can as we move into discussion under the 5-minute rule.
The administration has not followed through on its expressed desire to demonstrate a degree of balance and impartiality through steps which would begin to normalize relations with the Government of Angola. Instead, there is continued, strained communication with the Government of Angola and no evidence whatsoever of a commitment by the Administration to reward the Government for the withdrawal of Cuban forces under the Angola-Namibia accord, for its extensive macroeconomic reforms, and for its decision to negotiate with UNITA. There is still no United States liaison office in Luanda. Nor has the administration supported Angola's full participation in the IMF and World Bank. This implicitly denies us any serious leverage in our dealings with the Angolan Government.
Fortunately, an important and varied segment of Congress has endorsed the call for a more moderate and balanced approach to Angola. House Concurrent Resolution 203 has 74 cosponsors--15 Republicans, 59 Democrats. This signals a growing dissatisfaction with a U.S. policy held hostage of UNITA.
I would make one final observation: There is a deepening awareness, I think, in this country among some of the strong supporters of Jonas Savimbi, of systematic human rights abuses which ought to give us serious pause about the degree of our commitment there.
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Connecticut [Mr. Rowland], one of the more thoughtful members of our committee.
(Mr. ROWLAND of Connecticut asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. ROWLAND of Connecticut. Mr. Chairman, I rise to join my colleagues on the Intelligence Committee in strong support of this year's intelligence authorization bill. Mr. Chairman, we have held extensive hearings on a number of aspects of funding for the numerous intelligence programs that are funded by this authorization bill. I am pleased to report that it represents an excellent utilization of scarce resources, both financial and personnel. Our Nation's security depends on good intelligence, and this bill assures that the intelligence community remains solid and able to meet the many challenges that it faces in the coming decade.
I would also like to bring to the attention of my colleagues the very successful meeting that we in the intelligence community had with Dr. Savimbi during his visit to Washington just last week.
One issue that we have looked at in depth is the allegation of human rights abuses by UNITA. Without revealing any classified information, we have found no information that substantiated the allegations that have surfaced both in Europe and the United States that Dr. Savimbi has tortured or killed close associates.
Allegations first surfaced that Savimbi had killed a number of colleagues, one of whom was Gen. Anthony Fernandez. Ironically, Fernandez appeared with Dr. Savimbi last week. Another, Tito Chinjungi, the former Washington UNITA representative, categorically denied allegations that he had been tortured by Savimbi. Indeed, Congressmen Drier, McEwen, Burton, and Shumway met with Tito shortly after the allegations surfaced. They found him to be in good health and very indignant that anyone would insinuate that he had been tortured. Finally, there is an often repeated allegation that Dr. Savimbi had several individuals burned at the stake in 1983. This story also has not been substantiated. While many Africans still believe in witches, and burning at the stake has been a punishment accorded suspected witches, UNITA has discouraged such activity and, in fact, has established a village where individuals thought to be witches are protected from being burned or stoned to death.
Among all of these alleagations an important issue has been lost, MPLA human rights violations. The April 1989 African Watch Report on human rights entitled `Angola, Violations of the Laws of War by Both Sides' listed violations committed by the MPLA such as indiscriminate mining of civilian areas, forced conscription and unwarranted attacks on civilians. Perhaps the most damaging accusation is the mining issue. We have already seen in El Salvador and Afghanistan the damage and lost limbs that carelessly, or even worse, knowingly have been caused by mines. The MPLA, following classic Soviet military theory, has placed mines all over the countryside. Their legacy will be untold numbers of lives lost and innocent civilians maimed.
In closing, Mr. Chairman, I would like to state that I think the intelligence community and agencies that have been coming before our committee over the past year have done an excellent job in their testimony. I would also like to indicate that as a new member of the committtee, I am greatly impressed with the quality and professionalism and commitment of the staff.
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. ROWLAND of Connecticut. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.
Mr. HYDE. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask the gentleman a question. In view of the remarks of the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Wolpe], does the gentleman not think that with the Cubans on a timetable leaving Angola, with the Soviets decreasing their aid to the Communist Government of Angola, if indeed that is true, that our policy is working and that a reexamination of our policy really is unwarranted? We are on a roll, would you not say, if the statements of the gentleman from Michigan are true.
Mr. ROWLAND of Connecticut. The gentleman is absolutely correct. We have had success, things are changing. There may be stipulations at times where people on different sides of a political issue disagree upon what is happening exactly. Indeed, the results have shown that.
Mr. HYDE. Does the gentleman not think that our policy should be determined in this country rather than by the heads of state of African nations, as the gentleman seemed to suggest, that our policy did not meet with their approval? Does the gentleman not think it should stay in the domestic realm?
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Mr. ROWLAND of Connecticut. Mr. Chairman, the ranking member is exactly right.
Mr. HYDE. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. Gallo].
(Mr. GALLO asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. GALLO. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Illinois for yielding me this time.
Today the House considers the intelligence authorization for fiscal 1990.
In this bill, there is a provision to expand a demonstration project so that all FBI employees in New York City will receive a cost-of-living increase between 20 and 25 percent.
Mr. Chairman, I fully support the committee's efforts to increase the pay of FBI personnel who serve our country so diligently. I applaud the committee for recognizing the important role that clerical and support personnel play in Government service.
I support a cost-of-living increase for FBI agents in New York City. At the same time, I believe that New Jersey's Federal workers must receive equal treatment.
There are roughly 400 FBI agents and support personnel in northern New Jersey who face the same high housing costs, high property taxes, skyrocketing car insurance premiums, and transportation expenses.
In fact, we are losing many of our agents to New York City for the very reason that they will receive a substantial pay increase.
This concern is not limited to northern New Jersey. Federal workers from the suburbs of Washington, DC, Los Angeles, Boston, and Chicago are all in need of a locality pay increase to make ends meet in high cost areas.
Clearly, the current situation demonstrates that the time has come for Congress and the White House to carefully consider revising the general Federal pay schedule so it takes into account differences in local costs of living.
That is why I introduced a bill to provide locality pay for all Federal workers in high cost urban and suburban areas.
The fact that my bill has cosponsors from coast to coast demonstrates that the problem has reached crisis proportions throughout the country.
Mr. Chairman, I support today's action, but I urge my colleagues to support a more comprehensive solution, such as my bill H.R. 3319.
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Louisiana [Mr. Livingston].
(Mr. LIVINGSTON asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. LIVINGSTON. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of this legislation. Over the last 9 months the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence has worked very hard to scrub the proposed budget for the intelligence community.
We have made a number of changes, and I believe the legislation we have before us today will provide for a strong intelligence program that will address the areas of critical importance to our Nation.
With respect to my remarks earlier in response to Mr. Glickman, I was simply referring to the Panamanian situation last week, and I have to tell this body that I believe very strongly that we in Congress have to free up the intelligence community to do its job and to do so without congressional over-micromanagement. Or else we cannot be very comfortable when we get up and blame them for not doing their jobs.
I also point out that last week our committee had an opportunity to meet with Dr. Jonas Savimbi, president of UNITA. During that meeting we heard of his explanation of the failure of the peace talks progress in Angola and genuine talks on national reconciliation to begin.
Dr. Savimbi assured us of his desire to meet with President Mobutu of Zaire, and I understand that he will be meeting with President Mobutu very shortly in Europe.
Of course, Mr. Mobutu is the mediator of talks between UNITA and the Marxist-Leninist MPLA.
In addition to that meeting that is going to come about between Dr. Savimbi and President Mobutu, to get the peace talks back on track, hopefully they are going to agree on terms to establish a comprehensive lasting ceasefire.
[TIME: 1510]
Peace talks, however, cannot be successful if the MPLA clings to the past and continues to insist on integration of UNITA into the ranks of MPLA. That is unreasonable, but the MPLA refuses to rewrite the constitution which provides for a one-party state, governed by the MPLA. That is unreasonable. They, likewise, refuse to talk directly to UNITA in these peace negotiations. Of course, that is unreasonable.
Finally, and most importantly, the MPLA refused to hold free internationally supervised elections, in which every Angolan will have the right to cast his vote for the party of his choice. Certainly, that is unreasonable.
In one month, Namibians will vote for the first time in free elections that will lead to their country's independence. The agreements that led to resolution of this problem were achieved through long and patient, but also direct, face-to-face negotiations between arch rivals, South Africa on one side and Cuba and Angola on the other. If the MPLA is sincere about ending its civil war, which led to the deaths of countless innocent civilians, it should sit down and talk with Dr. Savimbi and UNITA in direct negotiations and talk seriously about ending the war.
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I neglected, when I introduced the gentleman from Louisiana [Mr. Livingston] to mention that he is one of the most productive and creative members of our committee.
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Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the bill is considered under the 5-minute rule by titles and each title shall be considered as having been read.
The amendments printed in section 2 of House Resolution 254 are considered as having been adopted and shall be considered as original text for purposes of further amendment under the 5-minute rule.
The Clerk will designate title I.
The text of title I is as follows:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the `Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1990'.
Sec. 101. Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 1990 for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the following elements of the United States Government:
(1) The Central Intelligence Agency.
(2) The Department of Defense.
(3) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
(4) The National Security Agency.
(5) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force.
(6) The Department of State.
(7) The Department of the Treasury.
(8) The Department of Energy.
(9) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(10) The Drug Enforcement Administration.
Sec. 102. The amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101, and the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 1990, for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the elements listed in such section, are those specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations as amended on September 27, 1989, by the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence to accompany H.R. 2748 of the One Hundred First Congress. That Schedule of Authorizations shall be made available to the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives and to the President. The President shall provide for suitable distribution of the schedule, or of appropriate portions of the schedule, within the executive branch.
Sec. 103. The Director of Central Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess of the numbers authorized for fiscal year 1990 under sections 102 and 202 of this Act when he determines that such action is necessary to the performance of important intelligence functions, except that such number may not, for any element of the intelligence community, exceed 2 percent of the number of civilian personnel authorized under such sections for such element. The Director of Central Intelligence shall promptly notify the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate whenever he exercises the authority granted by this section.
Sec. 104. Funds available to the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, or any other agency or entity of the United States may be obligated and expended during fiscal year 1990 to provide funds, materiel, or other assistance to the Nicaraguan democratic resistance to support military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua only as authorized in section 101 and as specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102, or pursuant to section 502 of the National Security Act of 1947, or pursuant to any provision of law specifically providing such funds, materiel, or assistance.
The CHAIRMAN. Are there any amendments to title I?
Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the remainder of the bill be printed in the Record and open to amendment at any point.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California?
There was no objection.
The text of the remainder of the bill is as follows:
Sec. 201. There is authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Staff for fiscal year 1990 the sum of $28,400,000.
Sec. 202. (a) The Intelligence Community Staff is authorized 250 full-time personnel as of September 30, 1990. Such personnel of the Intelligence Community Staff may be permanent employees of the Intelligence Community Staff or personnel detailed from other elements of the United States Government.
(b) During fiscal year 1990, personnel of the Intelligence Community Staff shall be selected so as to provide appropriate representation from elements of the United States Government engaged in intelligence and intelligence-related activities.
(c) During fiscal year 1990, any officer or employee of the United States or a member of the Armed Forces who is detailed to the Intelligence Community Staff from another element of the United States Government shall be detailed on a reimbursable basis, except that any such officer, employee, or member may be detailed on a nonreimbursable basis for a period of less than one year for the performance of temporary functions as required by the Director of Central Intelligence.
Sec. 203. During fiscal year 1990, activities and personnel of the Intelligence Community Staff shall be subject to the provisions of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) and the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (40 U.S.C. 403a et seq.) in the same manner as activities and personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency.
Sec. 301. There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal year 1990 the sum of $154,900,000.
Sec. 302. The Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees is amended--
(1) by redesignating section 236 as section 237; and
(2) by inserting after section 235 the following new section:
`Sec. 236. A participant must complete, within the last two years before any separation from service, except a separation because of death or disability, at least one year of creditable civilian service during which he or she is subject to this title before he or she or his or her survivors are eligible for an annuity under this title based on the separation. If a participant, except a participant separated from the service because of death or disability, fails to meet the service requirement of the preceding sentence, the amounts deducted from his or her pay during the period for which no eligibility is established based on the separation shall be returned to him or her on the separation. Failure to meet this service requirement does not deprive the individual or his or her survivors of annuity rights which attached on a previous separation.'.
Sec. 303. Section 232(b) of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees is amended--
(1) by adding at the end of paragraph (1) thereof the following new sentence; `Payment of death in service benefits for former spouses is also subject to paragraph (4) of this subsection.'; and
(2) by adding after paragraph (3) thereof the following:
`(4) If a former spouse eligible for death in service benefits under provisions of this section is or becomes eligible for survivor benefits under section 224, the benefits provided under this section will not be payable and will be superseded by the benefits provided in section 224.'.
Sec. 304. Section 224(a)(2) of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees is amended by striking out `and also by an amount' and all that follows through `by the United States'.
(b) The amendment made by this section shall be effective as of October 1, 1986.
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Sec. 305. The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403a et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new section:
`Sec. 18. (a) Nothwithstanding any provision of chapter 83 of title 5, United States Code, the annuity under subchapter III of such chapter of an officer or employee of the Central Intelligence Agency who retires on or after October 1, 1989, is not designated under section 203 of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees, and has served abroad as an officer or employee of the Agency on or after January 1, 1987, shall be computed as provided in subsection (b).
`(b)(1) The portion of the annuity relating to such service abroad that is actually performed at any time during the officer's or employees' first ten years of total service shall be computed at the rate and using the percent of average pay specified in section 8339(a)(3) of title 5, United States Code, that is normally applicable only to so much of an employee's total service as exceeds ten years.
`(2) The portion of the annuity relating to service abroad as described in subsection (a) but that is actually performed at any time after the officer's or employee's first ten years of total service shall be computed as provided in section 8339(a)(3) of title 5, United States Code; but, in addition, the officer or employee shall be deemed for annuity computation purposes to have actually performed an equivalent period of service abroad during his or her first ten years of total service, and in calculating the portion of the officer's or employee's annuity for his or her first ten years of total service, the computation rate and percent of average pay specified in paragraph (1) shall also be applied to the period of such deemed or equivalent service abroad.
`(3) The portion of the annuity relating to other service by an officer or employee as described in subsection (a) shall be computed as provided in the provisions of section 8339(a) of title 5, United States Code, that would otherwise be applicable to such service.
`(4) For purposes of this subsection, the term `total service' has the meaning given such term under chapter 83 of title 5, United States Code.
`(c) For purposes of subsections (f) through (m) of section 8339 of title 5, United States Code, an annuity computed under this section shall be deemed to be an annuity computed under subsections (a) and (o) of section 8339 of title 5, United States Code.
`(d) The provisions of subsection (a) of this section shall not apply to an officer or employee of the Central Intelligence Agency who would otherwise be entitled to a greater annuity computed under an otherwise applicable subsection of section 8339 of title 5, United States Code.'.
Sec. 306. The special accrual rates provided by section 303 of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees and by section 18 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 for computation of the annuity of an individual who has served abroad as an officer or employee of the Central Intelligence Agency shall be used to compute that portion of the annuity of such individual relating to such service abroad whether or not the individual is employed by the Central Intelligence Agency at the time of retirement from Federal service.
Sec. 401. In the performance of its functions, the Central Intelligence Agency may use its funds to procure commercial remote sensing data by whatever means the Agency deems to be appropriate notwithstanding any provision of law directing the procurement of such data through other Government agencies.
Sec. 402. Section 17 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q) is amended by striking the first period in subsection (c) and inserting in lieu thereof `and listing the title or subject of each inspection, investigation, or audit conducted during the reporting period.', and by adding at the end thereof the following new subsection:
`(f) Any report of an inspection, investigation, or audit conducted by the Office of Inspector General which has been requested by either committee.'.
Sec. 501. (a)(1) Chapter 81 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new section:
`1592. Foreign language proficiency: special pay
`(a) The Secretary of Defense may pay special pay under this section to a civilian officer or employee of the Department of Defense who--
`(1) has certified as being proficient in a foreign language identified by the Secretary of Defense as being a language in which proficiency by civilian personnel of the Department is important for the effective collection, production, or dissemination of foreign intelligence information; and
`(2) is serving in a position, or is subject to assignment to a position, in which proficiency in that language facilitates performance of officially assigned intelligence or intelligence-related duties.
`(b) The annual rate of special pay under subsection (a) shall be determined by the Secretary of Defense.
`(c) Special pay under this section may be paid in addition to any compensation authorized under section 1604(b) of this title for which an officer or employee is eligible.'.
(2) The table of sections at the beginning of such chapter is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new item:
`1592. Foreign language proficiency: special pay.'.
(b) Section 1592 of title 10, United States Code, as added by subsection (a), shall take effect on the first day of the first pay period beginning on or after the later of--
(1) October 1, 1989, or
(2) the date of the enactment of this Act.
Sec. 502. (a) Chapter 155 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new section:
`2607. Acceptance of gifts for the Defense Intelligence College
`(a) The Secretary of Defense may accept, hold, administer, and use any gift (including any gift of an interest in real property) made for the purpose of aiding and facilitating the work of the Defense Intelligence College and may pay all necessary expenses in connection with the acceptance of such a gift.
`(b) Subsection (c) of section 2601 of this title applies to property that is accepted under subsection (a) in the same manner that such subsection applies to property that is accepted under subsection (a) of that section.
`(c) In this section, the term `gift' includes a bequest of personal property or a devise or real property.'.
(b) The table of sections at the beginning of that chapter is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new item:
`2607. Acceptance of gifts for the Defense Intelligence School.'.
Sec. 503. (a) Section 1590(e)(1) of title 10, United States Code, is amended by striking out `, during fiscal years 1988 and 1989,'.
(b) Section 1604(e)(1) of such title is amended by striking out `, during fiscal years 1988 and 1989,'.
Sec. 504. (a)(1) Chapter 83 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new section:
`1608. Financial assistance to certain employees in acquisition of critical skills
`(a) The Secretary of Defense shall establish an undergraduate training program with respect to civilian employees of the Defense Intelligence Agency that is similar in purpose, conditions, content, and administration to the program which the Secretary of Defense is authorized to establish under section 16 of the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) for civilian employees of the National Security Agency.
`(b) Any payments made by the Secretary to carry out the program required to be established by subsection (a) may be made in any fiscal year only to the extent that appropriated funds are available for that purpose.'.
(2) The table of sections at the beginning of that chapter is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new item:
`1608. Financial assistance to certain employees in acquisition of critical skills.'.
Sec. 505. (a) Section 1605(a) of title 10, United States Code, is amended--
(1) by striking out `who are subject to chapter 84 of title 5,' in the last sentence; and
(2) by striking out the period at the end and inserting in lieu thereof `and in section 18 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949.'.
(b) Section 9(b) of the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (1)(B), by striking `(including special' and all that follows through `note)); and' and inserting in lieu thereof a semicolon;
(2) by striking the period at the end of paragraph (2) and inserting in lieu thereof `; and'; and
(3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
`(3) special retirement accrual in the same manner provIded in section 303 of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees (50 U.S.C. 403 note) and in section 18 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949.'.
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Sec. 601. (a) Section 601(a)(2) of the Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1989 is amended by striking out `who are subject by policy and practice to directed geographical transfer or reassignment'.
(b) The amendment made by this section shall take effect on October 1, 1989.
Sec. 701. Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits authorized by law.
Sec. 702. The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or laws of the United States.
Sec. 703. (a) The President shall ensure that the provision of classified information to a member of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, or to a member of any successor board performing the same or similar function, is consistent with the goal of avoiding any conflict of interest involving the use of such information in connection with a business or financial transaction of the member.
(b) In furtherance of the President's responsibilities under subsection (a), the President shall issue regulations regarding--
(1) periodic disclosure of information on the business and financial interests of each member of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, including any business or financial relationship of a member with a foreign government, or any entity directed and controlled by a foreign government, or with any corporation or other commercial entity doing business outside the United States; and
(2) the circumstances in which, based on such business or financial interests, a member shall not be provided classified information.
(c) The regulations required by subsection (b) shall take effect not later than March 1, 1990, and shall be provided to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives at least 30 days prior to such effective date.
Sec. 704. Not later than April 1, 1990, the President shall submit to Congress a report describing how intelligence activities relating to narcotics trafficking can be integrated, including coordinating the collection and analysis of intelligence information, ensuring the dissemination of relevant intelligence information to officials with responsibility for narcotics policy and to agencies of the United States Government responsible for interdiction, eradication, law enforcement, and other counternarcotics activities, and coordinating and controlling all counternarcotics intelligence activities.
Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The Clerk read as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. Richardson: at the end of the bill, add the following:
`Sec. 705. None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act may be obligated or expended to support military or paramilitary operations by the Noncommunist Cambodian Resistance if, after the date of enactment of this Act, quantities of arms, ammunition or other military equipment are provided by the Noncommunist Cambodian Resistance to the military forces of Democratic Kampuchea (know as the Khmer Rouge) or if the Noncommunist Cambodian Resistance engages in joint military operations with military forces of Democratic Kampuchea.'
Mr. RICHARDSON (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the Record.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New Mexico?
There was no objection.
(Mr. RICHARDSON asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, the reason that I have this concern is that in this legislation that we are debating today we are authorizing contingencies for the agency. Funds are not restricted. They are used at the discretion of the President, and basically, does not require congressional approval. Therefore, I am offering this amendment, or considering offering this amendment for the possibility that such funds may be used for this purpose. The amendment that I have is directed at the Khmer Rouge, and basically we have had, recently, a breakdown of the peace negotiations between the non-Communist forces, the Khmer Rouge, the various parties involved in the Cambodia dispute.
However, most importantly, the telling cruelty of the Khmer Rouge has been manifested once again. The failure of the peace conference, the Khmer Rouge proved to be once again, the bloc that, once again, disrupted negotiations. They refused to accept language that condemned their past genocide. They refused to be linked to a process of peace.
I am concerned about our policy in that region, and the reason I am raising this matter is to, once again, hope that American policy somehow directly or indirectly does not link up with the Khmer Rouge.
Now, it is my understanding that in the Foreign Affairs authorization bill of last year, there is a provision that the gentleman from New York [Mr. Solomon] offered which reads as follows:
Prohibition on certain assistance to the Khmer Rouge--notwithstanding any other provision of law, none of the funds made available to carry out this section may be obligated or expended for the purpose or with the effect or promoting, sustaining, or augmenting, directly or indirectly, the capacity of the Khmer Rouge or any of its members to conduct military or paramilitary operations in Cambodia or elsewhere in Indochina.
My amendment, basically, says that should there be this eventuality, there would be no military or paramilitary assistance that would go to the Khmer Rouge, through an error of joint military operation by the non-Communist forces or through other factors by which American assistance might in some way be used by the Khmer Rouge, and in that event, link up the United States and those that we are backing with this dreaded community of not just traitors, but killers, that right now are threatening any kind of peace in Cambodia.
I would like, if I could, to ask the chairman of the committee, the gentleman from New York [Mr. Solarz], if in his judgment, the foreign assistance legislation that passed in 1987 covers the intelligence concern that I have raised in this amendment.
Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Chairman, I would say to the gentleman, my good friend and our valued colleague on the committee, this gentleman is not the gentleman from New York [Mr. Solarz], but he was originally from New York.
However, I appreciate and concur in the gentleman's concerns, as I am sure all Members, both on and off the committee do.
I would say to the gentleman, it is my understanding as well, that the gentleman's amendment is not necessary, that section 908 of the International Security and Development Act of 1985, I believe, already provides that no funds can be used to directly or indirectly promote, sustain, or augment the military or paramilitary capacity of the Khmer Rouge, a broader prohibition than the gentleman's amendment would impose, and accordingly, the amendment of the gentleman, it seems to this gentleman, is not necessary and need not be offered.
Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, what the gentleman is saying is this amendment that he just read does cover intelligence activities?
Mr. BEILENSON. If the gentleman will continue yielding, that is this gentleman's understanding.
Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde].
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, we get the States confused and this gentleman gets the names confused, so now that all Members are thoroughly confused, I agree with the gentleman from California that the concern of the gentleman from New Mexico is covered by existing law.
No Member supports the Khmer Rouge directly or indirectly, and it is a matter of considerable concern for our committee and other relevant committees, to see that the Khmer Rouge does not receive any benefit from any programs whatsoever, in view of their record.
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Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, let me add that the reason I spoke of the gentleman from New York [Mr. Solarz] is that the gentleman very much wanted to speak on this provision, and regrettably I do not see him.
Mr. Chairman, in the wake of the failure of the Paris Conference on Cambodia, all parties involved in the Cambodian conflict appear increasingly entrenched. The possibility of civil war is greater than ever. The United States must assure that, should United States military assistance be made available to the non-Communist Cambodian resistance, none of this assistance would fall into the hands of the Khmer Rouge.
During its bloody 7-year reign, the Khmer Rouge presided over the murder of over 1 million Cambodians. This was genocide on the greatest scale.
Throughout the Paris conference the Khmer Rouge refused to accept language in the accord condemning their murderous rule. To this day, the Khmer Rouge continues to defend its actions in Cambodia. Moreover, there is no evidence to suggest that the Khmer Rouge's genocidal agenda has been altered in the least.
In the Foreign Assistance Authorization Act, passed on June 29 of this year, there was a recognition of the need to preclude any U.S. assistance from reaching the Khmer Rouge or from assisting its activities.
U.S. policy in the region must be clear. In the wake of the Vietnamese withdrawal, the United States should do all it can to support the Democratic aspirations of the Cambodian people and to prevent the return of the Khmer Rouge--a return to the killing fields.
By precluding any assistance to the non-Communist resistance should the Khmer Rouge benefit the United States is stating firmly that the Khmer Rouge's return to power is unacceptable.
(b) Prohibition on Certain Assistance to the Khmer Rouge: Notwithstanding any other provision of law, none of the funds made available to carry out this section may be obligated or expended for the purpose or with the effect of promoting, sustaining, or augmenting, directly or indirectly, the capacity of the Khmer Rouge or any of its members to conduct military or paramilitary operations in Cambodia or elsewhere in Indochina.
Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to withdraw my amendment, in light of the assurances of the Chairman and the ranking member.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New Mexico?
There was no objection.
Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The Clerk read as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. Solomon: Page 19. after line 2. insert the following new section:
SEC. 705. RANDOM DRUG TESTING.
The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall require random drug testing of officers and employees of the Central Intelligence Agency.
(Mr. SOLOMON. asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Chairman, let me say I will not read those prepared remarks, but I would like to say this amendment is one in a series that I am offering to all department authorization bills which does require random drug testing of all Federal employees. I do so, without passing anything on the CIA, because the CIA most certainly has an excellent program whereby they can identify illegal drug users, and that program does work very effectively. However, to be fair to all the other Federal employees, if we are going to include some, we must include all. That is what my amendment would do.
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, would the gentleman yield?
Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I think the gentleman has produced a very good amendment. It is consistent with the amendment he has offered to other agencies, and the Republican side is prepared to accept the amendment.
Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for his support.
To finalize my remarks, Mr. Chairman, we all know interdiction is important, if we are to stop the terrible drug war.
[TIME: 1520]
We know that education of the American people is terribly important. We know that rehabilitation of drug addicts is terribly important. But all these things that we can do will not help unless we stop the demand of the 20 million-plus Americans using illegal drugs. Therefore, I think the American Government has the obligation to set the example.
We already have in the military the fact that 8 years ago 27 percent of the All-Volunteer military admitted to using illegal drugs. Today, because of a random testing program extensively used throughout the military, that figure has dropped to 4.5 percent. That is an 82 percent drop. Think what we could do to the demand for drugs in this country if we could reduce the demand to 82 percent of all the American people. We could win the war on drugs, and the Members can be of help today by agreeing to this amendment.
Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
Mr. Chairman, let me respond breifly to the gentleman's remarks and to the amendment which he has proffered to the Committee of the Whole. I feel it is incumbent upon those of us who oversee the CIA to respond at least briefly before we accede, as we shall, to the gentleman's amendment.
Let me say that I was a little disturbed by the gentleman's amendment--not a lot, but a little. On the one hand, it does deal with what I am sure we all consider to be the most immediate threat to national security these days, which is the drug problem. On the other hand, by mandating what may be an unnecessary and redundant program, it probably does not make as much sense as it might when applied to other agencies of the Government.
Mr. Chairman, this is basically why this gentleman has asked to be recognized: Members should know that the CIA already maintains an active drug awareness and prevention program, and is actively committed to preventing and detecting drug use among CIA employees.
The CIA's drug detection program includes background investigations of all applicants, specifically focussing on whether applicants may use or abuse drugs or alcohol. Applicants are also given medical examinations that screen urine and blood samples. Pyschological assessments are made of applicants to determine behavior that could indicate abuse of drugs or alcohol. Finally, every applicant is given a polygraph examination to determine whether the applicant has abused drugs or alcohol.
The CIA's program for a drug-free workplace does not end with the acceptance of an applicant for employment. The agency continues to be vigilant against drug abuse among its employees. Current agency policy requires that new employees be subject to reinvestigation after 3 years. This reinvestigation includes another medical examination and another polygraph examination that specifically covers substance abuse during the time of employment at the agency. Agency employees are also subject to periodic routine reinvestigations. A specific issue polygraph examination and/or a fitness-for-duty medical examination may be conducted at any time if there are any indications of drug abuse.
So the gentleman suggests that there may be a point of diminishing returns. The gentleman from New York [Mr. Solomon] has concluded presumably that that point has not been reached at the CIA, and I will not quarrel with his conclusion at this time. With some ambivalence, therefore, and with the understanding that the Director of Central Intelligence would be free to fashion a reasonable program to meet what he determines may be the scope of the problem, I will not oppose the gentleman's amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from New York [Mr. Solomon] for offering the amendment, but I did want to take this opportunity to make clear to the membership that the agency already takes this problem very seriously, and it has had in effect for some time, I think, quite a substantial program directed toward those ends.
Mr. Chairman, we accept the amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York [Mr. Solomon].
The amendment was agreed to.
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Mrs. KENNELLY. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
Mr. Chairman, I ask the forbearance of the Members. I was in another meeting, and as a member of the Intelligence Committee, I was not able to get here for general debate on the Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 1990. I am just here now to say that having been a part of the considerations and having been a part of the committee, I want to put on record my thanks and my regard for our chairman, the gentleman from California [Mr. Beilenson], and our ranking member, the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde].
We have had a difficult year in this first session of the 101st Congress. However, I believe, and I think others believe, that within the Select Committee on Intelligence of the House we have had a very good year. We have had some rather difficult times previously, especially due to the Iran-Contra affair. I think every Member has made every effort on both sides of the aisle to put these things behind us. We have seen a coming together, and we have seen an attitude of responsibility and attempts definitely to work together.
So, Mr. Chairman, I would just like to say to our committee chairman that I support the Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 1990, and I look forward to carrying out the pieces of this act, knowing in fact that this is the type of committee where we do have bipartisanship and where we leave our difficulties at the door whenever possible.
Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The Clerk read as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. Traficant: Page 19, after line 2, insert the following new section:
SEC. 705. BUY-AMERICAN REQUIREMENT.
(a) Determination by the Director: If the Director, with the concurrence of the United States Trade Representative and the Secretary of Commerce, determines that the public interest so requires, the Director is authorized to award to a domestic firm a contract that, under the use of competitive procedures, would be awarded to a foreign firm, if--
(1) the final product of the domestic firm will be completely assembled in the United States;
(2) when completely assembled, not less than 50 percent of the final product of the domestic firm will be domestically produced; and
(3) the difference between the bids submitted by the foreign and domestic firms is not more than 6 percent.
In determining under this subsection whether the public interest so requires, the Director shall take into account United States international obligations and trade relations.
(b) Limited Application: This section shall not apply to the extent to which--
(1) such applicability would not be in the public interest;
(2) compelling national security considerations require otherwise; or
(3) the United States Trade Representative determines that such an award would be in violation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade or an international agreement to which the United States is a party.
(c) Limitation: This section shall apply only to contracts for which--
(1) amounts are authorized by this Act (including the amendments made by this Act) to be made available; and
(2) solicitations for bids are issued after the date of the enactment of this Act.
(d) Report to Congress: The Director shall report to the Congress on contracts covered under this section and entered into with foreign entities in fiscal years 1990 and 1991 and shall report to the Congress on the number of contracts that meet the requirements of subsection (a) but which are determined by the United States Trade Representative to be in violation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade or an international agreement to which the United States is a party. The Director shall also report to the Congress on the number of contracts covered under this Act (including the amendments made by this Act) and awarded based upon the parameters of this section.
(e) Definitions: For purposes of this section--
(1) Director: The term `Director' means the Director of Central Intelligence.
(2) Domestic firm: The term `domestic firm' means a business entity that is incorporated in the United States and that conducts business operations in the United States.
(3) Foreign firm: The term `foreign firm' means a business entity not described in paragraph (2).
Mr. TRAFICANT (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the Record.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Ohio?
There was no objection.
Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, I will start this out by commending the chairman of the committee, the gentleman from California [Mr. Beilenson] and the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde] of Xelienople, PA.
I want to take off before I explain my amendment and pick up on the words of the gentleman form Kansas [Mr. Glickman] in the House earlier. I would hope that our intelligence network would begin to focus on what the American people consider to be our greatest threat. In a national poll, the American people rated Japan a greater threat to our national security than either the Soviet Union or communism. They fear the economic intrusion, the investments of a great foreign power. They are very concerned about what Congress's efforts would be to not only analyze but abate that tremendous invasion. So I would say, before I explain my amendment, that when we keep shouting about `the big bad bear' down here, I think we had better start looking at the big Rising Sun and the shadow that is beginning to be cast all over this country.
I lost another 3,000 jobs just today when the van plants in Ohio closed. I would like to ask some Member of the House what the exact cost of a General Motors van is inside Korea or what tariffs and duties and taxes, there are on a General Motors van in Japan.
So, Mr. Chairman, I will not belabor the debate further. I have offered a standard `buy America' amendment. It has been approved to most authorization bills, and I would hope that the Committee would find favor with it and approve it.
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Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. TRAFICANT. I yield to the chairman of the committee.
Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Chairman, the committee has had an opportunity, I would say to the gentleman and to other Members, to examine the gentleman's amendment. We note among other things that the amendment includes an exemption for compelling national security considerations, which I take it will resolve any serious problems the agency or others might have with it.
With that understanding, Mr. Chairman, we on this side of the aisle at least have no serious objections to the amendment and can accept it.
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. TRAFICANT. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I associate myself with the remarks of the gentleman from California [Mr. Beilenson]. We think the gentleman has produced a good amendment, and we are happy to accept it on this side.
Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the gentleman's acceptance of the amendment, and let me say that my comments earlier about Pennsylvania were made just to try to get the gentleman's attention. I say to the gentleman this: `We wish you were in our region, Mr. Hyde. We know where you are from.'
Mr. FRENZEL. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. TRAFICANT. I yield to the gentleman from Minnesota.
Mr. FRENZEL. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
In reading the gentleman's amendment, in subparagraph (A), may I interpret that to mean that the Director must have the approval of the USTR and the Secretary of Commerce to go forward under the amendment with his `buy America' award?
Mr. TRAFICANT. No; I do not particularly feel it is compelling unless it would be an issue that might require another section of the amendment, that national security section, to be on consideration.
Mr. FRENZEL. Mr. Chairman, I would ask, will the gentleman take a look at the language? It says, `If the Director, with the concurrence of the U.S. Trade Representative and the Secretary of Commerce determines * * *.'
My interpretation of that language would be that if he does not have the concurrence, then he is not authorized to award that contract under the special conditions.
[TIME: 1530]
Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, as the amendment is drafted, it would appear that, but would not be the intent of the amendment to limit the hands of the Director, and I would like to make that clarification here, and I ask unanimous consent to have that placed into the amendment.
Mr. FRENZEL. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the right to object.
The CHAIRMAN. Would the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Traficant] state the language that he wishes to have inserted in the amendment?
Mr. TRAFICANT. `If the director with the concurrence of the United States Trade Representative and Secretary of Commerce determines that the public interest to requires'; that the language I would like to have changed where the director can make that determination and without such concurrence.
The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Traficant] wish to strike `with the concurrence of the United States Trade Representative and the Secretary of Commerce'?
Mr. TRAFICANT. Only if, in fact, that section is being considered and opposed by the gentleman. If the language in its current form would be acceptable.
Mr. FRENZEL. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. TRAFICANT. I yield to the gentleman from Minnesota.
Mr. FRENZEL. Mr. Chairman, I tell the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Traficant] that the language, as it is written, is acceptable to me, because it requires the concurrence.
If the gentleman seeks unanimous consent, I will certainly object to a change.
Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, I certainly withdraw my unanimous-consent request to make such change.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Traficant].
The amendment was agreed to.
Mr. WOLPE. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
(Mr. WOLPE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. WOLPE. Mr. Chairman, I take this time to make a few concluding remarks about the subject of American policy toward Angola, and to respond to some of the commentary that occurred in the course of general debate with respect to the human rights dimension of American policy.
The issue of human rights, as it relates to our Angolan policy, is an important one, not because the Angolan Government has not itself been engaged in very serious violations of fundamental human rights, but because the entire case that has been painted in support of our policy of giving assistance to Mr. Savimbi has been based upon the characterization of him as an individual who shared and embraced American democratic values and basic human rights commitments. It is my concern that much of that characterization has been based upon myth and upon very substantial public relations efforts in this country that bears little relationship to the reality, and I do not think it makes sense for American policy to continue to be guided on the basis of myth.
I have spoken for a number of years to my colleagues about authoritarianism in Angola, as well as authoritarianism in other African states. The point that I have tried to make with respect to Angola is that the authoritarianism of the MPLA government is not a unique fact; authoritarianism is alive and well also in Jonas Savimbi's UNITA. In fact, until almost the moment he began to receive American assistance in 1986, Mr. Savimbi was publicly on record as favoring the Chinese socialist model and believing that, and I quote, `there was no fundamental ideological conflict between the two parties,' MPLA and UNITA.
It is most significant that, in the past several months, independent human rights organizations and some prominent former supporters of UNITA, groups that have no brief whatsoever for the MPLA government in Angola, have made detailed revelations of the lack of democracy and respect for human rights in UNITA.
Among these revelations, the most recent is an article that appeared in the National Review of August 18, hardly an apologist for the Angolan Government. It was written by the journal's roving correspondent, Radek Sikorski. Sikorski, who perceives UNITA as representing a major political constituency in Angola and a movement with significant military and organizational achievements, nevertheless concluded after a lengthy personal visit to Jamba, and I quote:
Let us have no illusions. Savimbi cannot bear men of independent thought around him, and, instead of sharing our wariness of autocratic power, his officers accord him the reverence due to a traditional despotic African chief. `UNITA, c'est moi,' Savimbi can say with more reason than Louis XIV could ever have dreamt of for France * * * The last UNITA Congress in 1986 was a farce.
Mr. Sikorski continues:
Allegations of human rights abuses within UNITA are too persistent and come from sources too well placed to ignore.
Finally, in passages which I would strongly commend to some of my colleagues who have been approached by UNITA's $2 million per year lobby, the author says:
To begin with, UNITA officers, including top leaders, are compulsive liars. Lying is so pervasive one comes to think that many UNITA officers have not assimilated the concept of integrity or understood the dangers of forefeiting trust.
In the end, Radeski portrays both MPLA and UNITA as `two ramshackle totalitarianisms' while expressing hope that a compromise between them `might create some space in which the Angolan people would have room to breathe.'
There is other recent evidence of human rights violations by UNITA.
Mr. Chairman, I would refer, first of all, to the Human Rights Watch investigation of `Violations of the Laws of War by Both Sides' in Angola, and again I make the point in full acknowledgment that there have been human rights violations on both sides, and I would also note that we do not use American tax dollars to support that side. We do send American tax dollars to Mr. Savimbi, and that Human Rights Watch contains several highly disturbing conclusions:
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(a) That UNITA indiscriminately deploys land mines against civilians;
(b) That UNITA has taken hundreds of foreigners hostage;
(c) That UNITA has captured thousands of civilians and conscripted them as combatants or unpaid agricultural labor;
(d) That UNITA has indiscriminately and deliberately attacked and killed civilians in government-controlled areas, and attacked and killed civilians in government-controlled areas, and attacked medical facilities and burned civilian homes; and
(e) That UNITA has deliberately attempted to starve civilians;
(2) British journalist Fred Bridgland wrote a very supportive biography of Jonas Savimbi whose cover featured statements by Ronald Reagan, Senator Robert Dole and Jeanne Kirkpatrick. He and his book were presented to Congress two years ago by the UNITA lobby. No Western journalist has followed UNITA as long or is thought to have had such good access to UNITA as Bridgland. Yet on March 12, 1989 Bridgland wrote in the London Daily Telegraph that his own argument `that UNITA Offered Angola some sort of democratic future * * * began to look pretty thin'. The day before he told British TV, that he believed 80 to 90 percent of what UNITA dissidents Sousa Jamba and Chingunji have been saying about extensive UNITA political repression. Even the State Department characterizes UNITA `as it exists in the bush today as a basically authoritarian movement'.
(3) The main allegations that have been made by Fred Bridgland, the UNITA dissidents in London and Lisbon, as well as other journalists and professors, follow:
(a) Bridgland writes that `Numerous UNITA officials have `disappeared',' and that `According to sources, few Western governments doubt that the men are dead, probably executed'. Among the most prominent mentioned by Bridgeland and others are (1) Jorge Sangumba, former Foreign Secretary of UNITA, (2) Antonio Vakulukuta, an ethnic leader who has been reported to have been beated to death, (3) Waldemar Pires Chindondo, former Chief of Staff, and (4) Jonatao Chingunji, former UNITA leader said by his grandson Dino Chingunji and by `reliable sources' who have spoken to Amnesty International to have been beaten to death along with his wife. In most cases these disappearances followed reports of Savimbi perceiving these individuals as a political threat. According to the State Department, `Jorge Sangumba dropped out of sight in 1982, Antonio Vakulukuta in 1986; evidence about their fate is inconclusive. We have no independent information on the fate of Janatao Chingunji'.
(b) Other prominent UNITA officials are also reported to have been demoted, detained and even tortured under orders from Savimbi. The most recent case is that of Tito Chingunji, a close friend of Bridgland's who was dismissed as Foreign Secretary last November. According to Bridgland, who visited Jamba in late December, Chingunji looked `extremely nervous' and `From sources I do trust very much, I've heard that there was a kind of trial, and that four very senior members of the UNITA Politburo demanded of Tito that he confess to crimes of witchcraft and plotting to overthrow Savimbi. People who were there have told me privately that they heard screams. And I think one can only draw one's own conclusions from that kind of description'. In addition, former members of the UNITA youth organization and office in Lisbon have said that Wilson dos Santos, a prominent leader who accompanied Savimbi to the U.S. in 1986 has been demoted and cannot interact freely with others in Jamba.
(c) According to Bridgland, `The theme of witchcraft runs through the whole UNITA tragedy, unspoken to outsiders but a reality in
the lives of people. Allegations of witchcraft can easily be made against people who are politically `difficult'--just as they were in medieval Europe.' Specifically, he writes that `Amnesty International has the names of at least 12 people burned to death on public bonfires at Jamba, the UNITA headquarters, in September 1983 * * *. One woman, Aurora Katalayo, was thrown into the flames carrying her child; she was the widow of former UNITA interior minister Mr. Mateus Katalayo, executed the previous year. According to Amnesty, one entire family was consumed on the bonfires--Mr. Joao Kalitanui, his wife Isabel, their three children aged seven to sixteen, and a twelve year old niece'. This account is supported by Ermelindo Kanjungu, a UNITA dissident in Lisbon whose father is said to be Savimbi's office manager, who told Portugal's press last year that he personally witnessed the burning and that it was directed by Savimi. Amnesty International included the case in its Annnual Report last year.
(d) UNITA dissidents in Lisbon last year revealed a secret `Practical Guide to the Cadre', a set of lessons taught to a small number of leading UNITA cadres at the Command Kapessi Kafundanga Study Center in Jamba. A leading academic authority on Africa recently wrote that the guide's authenticity had been confirmed by a high UNITA representative. This guide emphasizes a Soviet-style `democratic centralism' for Angola, and stresses the preeminent role of the political police and the secret goal of overthrowing the MPLA Government rather than sharing power with it. The followng quotes give the flavor of this Marxist-Leninist style document.
`Democratic centralism means that the top decides and the base carries out the orders through the cadres', `The grand bourgeoisie is the class that oppresses the other classes in society. It is the class that is involved with international imperialism', `The idea of reconciliation is part of our tactical position. But it does not form part of our strategy, because it is not possible'.
At this point, I would like to insert into the Record a House Subcommittee on Africa staff analysis of UNITA's response to some of these allegations:
UNITA: Bridgland has written a letter to the N.Y. Times saying that its reporting on the alleged abuses by UNITA attributes opinions to him that he does not share.
Response: Bridgland's letter covers minor inaccuracies and do not touch the major areas of political executions, witchburning and lack of democracy that he raised in both his own March 12th London Telegraph article and his appearance on British TV the previous evening.
UNITA: Tito Chingunji is alive and well as Deputy Secretary-General of the Party. He has met privately with Western politicians, carried a pistol, and publicly denied allegations about his status.
Response: Concern about Chingungi voiced by Bridgland who recently saw him at Jamba as well as his nephew must be taken seriously. Under Savimbi's control in the isolated Jamba headquarters, he cannot be expected to speak freely. In Government circles it is generally recognized that he has been demoted and is believed to be a threat by Savimbi.
UNITA: With regard to charges of political executions, Dinho Chingunji's grandfather and his wife died of natural causes, and the dates of their deaths are being established. Vakulukuta died of an uncontrolled hemhorrage from his nose en route to a hospital. Jorge Sangumba is alive and working somewhere in the north. General Vinama, known as Chendo, died in a freak accident falling under the wheels of his truck after climbing back into it. Col. Waldemar (Chindondo) is alive and commanding the northern forces.
Response: UNITA has not produced any of the people alleged to have been killed. Assertions that four died of natural causes cannot simply be accepted given the range of testimony to the contrary. Certainly the causes of death mentioned by UNITA seem extremely unusual.
UNITA: The alleged witch burnings never took place. We have never heard of Joao Ka