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The legislative clerk read as follows:
A bill (S. 1352) to authorize appropriations for fiscal years 1990 and 1991 for military functions of the Department of Defense and to prescribe military personnel levels for such Department for fiscal years 1990 and 1991, and for other purposes.
The Senate proceeded to consider the bill.
Mr. WIRTH addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Colorado.
Mr. WIRTH. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. DIXON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The Chair recognizes the Senator from Illinois, Mr. Dixon.
(The remarks of Mr. Dixon pertaining to the introduction of S. 1379 are located in today's Record under `Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions.')
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, what is the pending business?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The pending business is S. 1352.
Mr. NUNN, Mr. President, I am pleased to bring before the Senate, S. 1352, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991. This bill provides the authorization required in law for almost all of the major functions under the jurisdiction of our Committee on Armed Services, including the activities of the Department of Defense; the Department of Energy Nuclear Weapons Programs; and the Military Construction Program.
Two years ago at the beginning of the 100th Congress, the Armed Services Committee reported the first 2-year authorization bill for the Department of Defense. President Reagan submitted a 2-year budget request for the Defense Department in January, and President Bush's budget amendment in April endorsed this biennial approach for fiscal years 1990 and 1991. This year the committee again recommends authorization of national defense programs for a 2-year period.
The committee's work on the second-year of this 2-year budget was made more difficult by the fact that the April budget summit agreement between Congress and the President covered only 1 fiscal year, fiscal year 1990. Without agreement between Congress and the administration on an overall National Defense figure for fiscal year 1991, the committee was not able to authorize the total National Defense Program for fiscal year 1991. However, we continue to believe that 2-year budgeting will not only improve congressional oversight of defense programs but also achieve long-term savings and better management as the Defense Department stabilizes its planning and procurement.
For fiscal year 1990, the bill reported by the committee authorizes programs totaling $305.5 billion in budget authority, the level agreed to in the budget summit agreement. For fiscal year 1991, the committee has approved 85 percent of the defense authorization request. The committee focused its work on the second year of the budget request on stable, noncontroversial programs, and activities. Programs and activities not authorized for fiscal year 1991 were not done so with prejudice as to their merits.
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Most Members are aware that the Congressional Budget Office has estimated that outlays for the Defense Department in the amended fiscal year 1990 budget will be $3.8 billion higher than the administration estimate and the outlay level in the bipartisan budget agreement. I have urged the leadership of the Senate as well as people at the White House to get CBO and DOD together, as well as OMB, discuss why this estimating difference exists, and to see if some resolution is not possible.
This continuing technical scoring difference threatens to cause major disruptions in our national security policy. Since it is virtually impossible to hit both the budget authority and outlay target as estimated by CBO in the bipartisan budget agreement, we faced two equally unpleasant prospects in marking up this bill. One choice, either cutting fiscal year 1990 defense budget authority by $8 to $10 billion below the level of the bipartisan budget agreement to get the necessary $3.8 billion in outlay savings; or cutting faster-spending accounts, which are personnel, operations, and maintenance, and adding funds to slower spending investment accounts. This approach would let us meet both the budget authority and outlay target of the bipartisan budget agreement, but it would also drastically reorder our defense priorities in ways no one would support.
We believe the committee bill solves this dilemma by putting a mandatory, legal ceiling on expenditures or outlays in the Defense Department for fiscal year 1990. This binding expenditure ceiling will force the Defense Department to manage its obligations in order to live within the outlay target of the bipartisan budget agreement and the fiscal year 1990 budget resolution. The Defense Department has maintained all along that their budget for fiscal year 1990 meets this outlay target--this provision will simply make sure that they live up to their word.
For instance, it would be very easy for the committee to meet the budget authority and the outlay targets given to us by the leadership of the Congress and the White House if we, for instance, put in three or four new ships that spend out at a very slow rate, over 6 or 7 years, which would obligate the taxpayers of this country for a lot more in future years in defense expenditures while at the same time cutting the pay or cutting the operations and maintenance, which are fast-spending accounts.
We could meet the budget authority and outlay targets by doing that, but it would be counterproductive to our national security and also counterproductive to deficits in future years. We would be increasing the deficits in future years in order to meet an outlay target in this year.
I want to commend Secretary Cheney for the approach that the took in meeting the targets of the bipartisan budget agreement. He realized that the budget pressures facing the Defense Department required a long-term, multiyear approach and could not be dealt with simply on a 1-year basis. This long-term approach is essential if we are to bring the strategy and programs of the Defense Department back in line with fiscal reality.
Secretary Cheney's priorities in this budget were ensuring the continued well-being of our uniformed personnel; preserving the gains in readiness and sustainability of our forces, even if it means reducing their overall size; maintaining efficient production rates of weapons systems, even if major procurement programs must be terminated; and continuing the modernization of our strategic land-based missiles.
The authorization bill reported by the committee endorses these priorities. The committee's actions are described in detail in Senate Report 101-81, which accompanies S. 1352. I want to take a few moments to summarize some of the committee's actions in this bill.
Secretary Cheney took a controversial step in his amended budget request by recommending termination of eight major new weapon systems.
Not really new, but they are being terminated at a time where they are producing new units and these are, of course, very controversial cuts. They are: V-22 tiltrotor, F-14 D (new production), F-15E (after fiscal year 1991), AH-64 (after fiscal year 1991), Army Helicopter Improvement Program, M88 Recovery Vehicle, SSN-688 submarine, and the Phoenix missile (after fiscal year 1990).
These program terminations represented $3 billion, or 30 percent, of the budget savings Secretary Cheney had to achieve in fiscal year 1990, and 28 percent of the total savings made by the Defense Department in the amended budget request over the 5-year defense plan.
The committee spent considerable time debating and reviewing these programs. We concluded that all of them, with the exception of the V-22, should be terminated as recommended by Secretary Cheney.
With respect to the V-22, the committee provided $255 million of research and development funds in fiscal year 1990 to complete the flight test program for the V-22.
I have heard a lot of people say there is commercial potential there. I hope there is. But that potential will never be realized if the program is not completed in terms of flight testing.
(Mr. FORD assumed the chair.)
Mr. NUNN. If a substantial commercial market for the V-22 is demonstrated, and if a number of other questions posed by the committee are answered satisfactorily, the committee will reconsider the issue of whether the program is affordable for our defense needs.
Mr. President, the committee voted by a wide, bipartisan margin to support these program terminations. Unless the Senate gives us different instructions during the debate on this bill, we intend to strongly argue the committee position in conference with the House, since the House has added many of these terminated programs back into the budget.
The committee approved funds as requested by the administration for the modernization of the land-based ICBM force and for the Trident submarine programs. The committee increased funds for the procurement of Trident II missiles to bring the production rate closer to the level requested by the Navy 2 years ago for fiscal year 1990.
The committee established a comprehensive set of restrictions on the obligation of funds for the procurement of B-2 aircraft in the current low rate initial production phase. These restrictions are tied to demonstrated flight milestones, such as first flight, completion of the initial block of flight testing, and initiation of low observable testing. The committee reduced the procurement funding requested for the B-2 by $300 million in fiscal year 1990, and directed a clarification in the process by which responsibilities for correction of deficiencies in the production of the aircraft, if any, are determined.
For the advanced cruise missile, the committee fenced funding until the missile demonstrates improved flight test performance. The committee also applied the `fly-before-buy' principle to the B-1 modification program by limiting modifications to the aircraft's electronic countermeasures system to six aircraft, and mandating a flight test program as a condition for further modifications to the aircraft fleet.
The committee authorized a total of $4.5 billion for the strategic defense initiative research in the Defense and Energy Departments, a reduction of $66 million from the combined amended budget request. The committee again extended the restriction on SDI development and testing which requires the Defense Department to conduct SDI consistent with the plan it submitted to Congress this year. In a hearing last month, administration witnesses testified that the plan wold not involve any development or testing under the so-called broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty.
In the national security programs of the Department of Energy, the committee provided $418 million above the budget request for environmental restoration and waste operations activities to speed the cleanup of the extensively contaminated facilities in the nuclear weapons complex.
The amount of $418 million is a lot of money, but this is only a small down payment on the bills that we face in cleaning up the nuclear mess that has accumulated over the years.
The committee also added $100 million to the budget request to fund the creation of a new program to accelerate the development of innovative cleanup technologies, for a total of $1.819 billion in waste cleanup accounts.
Additional environmental, safety and management provisions recommended by the committee include establishment of a Presidentially appointed Blue Ribbon Task Group to review the long-term funding of and requirements for environmental restoration and defense waste activities; special personnel management authority for critical DOE positions; regular reporting requirements for major national security programs; 5-year planning for all DOE defense programs; authorization of a management training program; and recognition that environmental restoration is one of the major missions of DOE's national security programs.
Mr. President, these environmental, safety and management provisions, along with authorization of $1.8 billion in cleanup funds, were reported as a separate bill by the committee and will be offered as an amendment to this bill.
We are doing that for several reasons, but one of the reasons is we want everyone to focus on this cleanup problem and focus on the amount of money that is going to be required over the long haul for this major effort.
In the nuclear materials programs, the committee fully funded the new production reactor program. The committee also reduced funding for the special isotope separation [SIS] project by $75 million in recognition of the Secretary of Energy's decision to prepare an environmental impact statement on the SIS test facility, delaying the construction program by at least 1 year. The committee further required that the Secretary of Energy certify that the SIS technology has been proven and that all environmental requirements have been met before construction funds beyond those authorized in the bill are obligated.
I want to commend Senator Exon and Senator Thurmond for their strong and capable leadership of the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces and Nuclear Deterrence.
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The committee concluded that the reductions in advanced conventional munitions proposed in the budget are militarily unwise and economically unsound. The Commanders in Chief from the principal war-fighting commands face serious shortages of these critical weapons. In addition, the proposed cuts in missile production would have raised unit costs and nullified any benefits from dual-source competition. The price of five key munitions programs, for example, increased by 19 percent in fiscal year 1990 because of program stretchouts. As a result, the committee authorized an increase in the fiscal year 1990 purchase of the Army Tactical Missile System [ATACMS], Hellfire, Stinger, Multiple Launch Rocket System [MLRS] rockets, TOW, and HARM missiles. This munitions initiative was reported by the committee as a separate bill and will be offered as an amendment to this bill, and indeed I hope we will be voting on that later this afternoon.
The committee also reaffirmed its commitment to help the Army improve its armor-antiarmor capability. The committee added funds for the block II M-1 tank upgrade program; the Heavy Forces Modernization Program; research and development of electromagnetic gun technology; and the use of the fiber optic guided missile for antiarmor missions.
The committee found that the Army and the Marine Corps emphasize research and development of sophisticated weapons systems at the expense of weapons and equipment for the individual soldier and marine. The committee believes that the effectiveness of our Nation's foot soldiers can be significantly increased through more aggressive efforts to identify and purchase, as well as develop, better weapons and equipment for our soldiers and marines. These efforts should include surveying foreign armies and commercial sources for items that can be procured off the shelf.
We do not have to invent everything and have Army specifications or Marine specifications for every piece of equipment. We need to go ahead and make decisions and get some good equipment out there to the people who have to do the fighting if there ever is a war.
The committee authorized $30 million in research and development funds for the Army and Marine Corps to develop lighter, more lethal infantry weapons; better, lighter antiarmor weapons; and improved field gear and equipment.
The committee also continued its emphasis on improving equipment for the Reserve and National Guard. The committee approved $397 million for additional equipment in this area above the amount requested in the budget.
These two initiatives--the Soldier/Marine Enhancement Program and the Reserve and National Guard procurement initiative--were reported as separate bills by the committee, and will be offered as amendments to this bill during the course of the debate.
Senator Levin and Senator Wilson, the chairman and ranking member of the Subcommittee on Conventional Forces and Alliance Defense, deserve a great deal of credit for their hard work in this area.
For programs other than fleet ballistic missile submarines, the committee recommended $8.4 billion in the Navy shipbuilding and conversion account for the construction of 16 ships and the conversion of 2 others. Ships authorized for construction were one 688-class submarine; five DDG-51-class guided missile destroyers; three mine countermeasures ships; one MHC-51-class coastal minehunter; one cargo variant of the LSD-41-class landing ship dock; one TAGOS ocean surveillance ship; one AOE-6-class fast combat support ship; and three AGOR oceanographic research ships. Fourteen landing craft air cushion vehicles were recommended for authorization.
Advance procurement for one fast sealift ship was recommended, as well as advance procurement for two SSN-21-class submarines and one LHD-1-class amphibious assault ship. Authorization of funds was recommended for the aircraft carrier Enterprise service life extension program and for the jumbo conversion of one fleet oiler. Funds to provide a moored training ship for nuclear propulsion plant training were recommended as well.
For strategic airlift, the committee recommended authorization of $885.2 million in research and development and $1.42 billion in procurement for the C-17 transport aircraft program. Six aircraft will be procured in fiscal year 1990.
Finally, funding for research and development programs and procurement of equipment for special operations forces were recommended as requested.
I want to commend Senator Kennedy and Senator Cohen, the chairman and ranking member of the Projection Forces Subcommittee, for their leadership in this important area.
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As in past years, the committee is recommending increased funding for several important technology programs, including digital gallium arsenide; high temperature superconductors; high resolution displays; high performance computers; manufacturing technology; concurrent engineering; and x-ray lithography. A total of $296 million was authorized to continue the balanced technology initiative to develop and deploy revolutionary conventional weapons technologies. The committee believes these programs have excellent potential to make a significant impact on the capabilities of future weapon systems.
The committee remains concerned over the ability of the Defense Department laboratories to adequately support the technology base and weapons system acquisition process. The committee bill directs the Secretary of Defense to establish demonstration programs in each service to evaluate laboratory performance gains where laboratory management is given greater flexibility, authority, and accountability.
Confidence in the ability of the Defense Department to develop and acquire new weapons has been repeatedly shaken as a result of cost overruns, delays, defective products, fraud, and difficulties in attracting and retaining quality people to the acquisition work force. In 1986, the Packard Commission described the system as `fundamentally ill' and prescribed a series of reforms to streamline the acquisition process. This year the committee received disturbing testimony about deficiencies in the Department's implementation of the Packard Commission reforms. Little progress has been made in streamlining the acquisition process, making greater use of commercial products, and improving the responsiveness of the Department's regulatory reform process.
The committee is recommending a number of provisions to address these problems, including measures concerning simplification of the source selection process; use of streamlined
procedures for procurement of `off-the-shelf' items; consolidation of reporting requirements; development of uniform rules on the treatment of sensitive procurement information; and revision of the Defense Enterprise Program concept to promote procurement reform.
Witnesses at the committee's hearings on defense acquisition policy consistently stressed the need to give the highest priority to acquisition personnel reform. This bill includes provisions establishing alternative personnel management demonstration programs; providing the Secretary of Defense the authority to remove the pay cap now imposed on former military personnel who choose to work as civilians for the Department; authorizing special pay for a limited number of scientists and engineers in critical positions; and requiring the Department of Defense to issue rules clarifying the impact of various postemployment restrictions on DOD personnel.
I want to commend Senator Bingaman and Senator Wallop for the outstanding leadership of the Subcommittee on Defense Industry and Technology which overseas these critical areas of our defense effort.
In reviewing the budget request in this area, the committee identified those programs where funding shortfalls will cause readiness and sustainability problems in the future, and, where possible, found offsets in lower priority programs to increase funding in these areas. The committee approved increases above the amendment budget request for Army, Navy and Air Force depot maintenance programs; for supply activities; for ammunition; and for spare parts to repair the extensive damage to the Army helicopter fleet sustained during the severe storm at Fort Hood, TX, on May 13, 1989.
Funding for overseas military construction programs was reduced in light of uncertainties over future overseas deployments of U.S. forces. The bill reported by the committee authorizes $300 million in fiscal year 1990 and $500 million in fiscal year 1991 to begin the process of closing and realigning military bases in line with the recommendations of the Commission on Base Realignment and Closures.
Senator Dixon and Senator Gorton, the chairman and ranking minority member of the Subcommittee on Readiness, Sustainability and Support, deserve a great deal of credit for their strong
efforts to preserve the readiness and sustainability of our military forces.
In the area of manpower strengths, the Department of Defense requested an active duty end strength of 2,121,500 for fiscal year 1990, and an active duty end strength of 2,120,000 for fiscal year 1991. The committee reduced the requested active duty end strengths by 1,305 in both fiscal years.
The committee supported the increases requested by the Department of Defense in part-time and full-time manning in the Reserve and National Guard needed to accommodate the transfer of certain missions from the Active to the Reserve and National Guard Forces.
In a package of improvements to military pay and benefits, the committee approved a 3.6-percent pay raise for military personnel and a substantial increase in aviation career incentive pay to aid the Department of Defense in retaining military aviators. In addition, the committee increased the amount of money that the Army can pay above the basic GI bill benefits to assist the Army in recruiting quality enlistees in critical skills. The committee also increased the selective reenlistment bonus ceiling from the current $30,000 to $45,000 to help the Navy retain nuclear qualified personnel.
In the area of health care for military personnel and their families, the committee approved a number of initiatives to enhance the recruiting and retention of military health care providers. This is one of our critical needs. In addition, the committee approved several initiatives to hold down the cost of health care and to improve the efficiency of health care delivery to military personnel and their families.
I want to congratulate Senator Glenn and Senator McCain for their excellent work as chairman and ranking member of the Manpower and Personnel Subcommittee.
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Section 908 of the committee bill establishes a nine member, independent Commission to make a systematic, comprehensive study of the concept of national service. Three members of the Commission will be appointed by the President, and six members by the leadership of the Congress.
This Commission will survey the community needs that could be met through a program of national service; determine the costs as well as the potential benefits to the nation of such a program; and make recommendations on the advisability of different types of national service programs and how such programs could be implemented. The provision requires the Commission to report its findings to the Nation by February 15, 1991, and requires the President to provide his written views on the report 90 days after its publication.
Mr. President, I want to reiterate my earlier comment that the committee believes this bill meets the budget authority and outlay targets of the bipartisan summit agreement and the fiscal year 1990 budget resolution. This means that any amendment that adds money to the bill will cause the bill to be over the budget targets. For that reason, the committee will generally oppose any amendment that adds additional budget authority or outlays to the bill unless the amendment includes offsets to pay for the add-on.
In closing, Mr. President, I want to thank the ranking member of the committee, Senator Warner, for all of his assistance. The committee voted unanimously to report this bill, which is an indication of the strong sense of bipartisanship and cooperation which marked the committee's work on this bill. It has been a pleasure to serve with Senator Warner on the Armed Services Committee, and I look forward to working closely with him throughout the remainder of this Congress.
Mr. President, this National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal years 1990 and 1991 represents the culmination of a great deal of hard work by the members and staff of our committee. Hugh Evans and Greg Scott of the Legislative Counsel's Office also made an indispensable contribution in preparing this bill, and of course we will be calling on them as changes are made and as we go to conference. This is a good bill which will strengthen the Nation's defense posture. I urge my colleagues to support it.
Mr. President, I understand that we have a letter from President Bush that states his very strong views on this bill and on the importance of the budget submission that was made available to the Congress earlier this year. We had a very constructive meeting at the White House this morning between people involved in this defense debate and the President and his key advisers. I felt that he laid out his support for the Cheney approach on this overall defense posture very clearly and very forcefully this morning. I ask unanimous consent that this Presidential letter be printed in the Record. It particularly refers to the strategic modernization program, the question of the B-2, which I am sure we will be debating, the question of the MX and the Midgetman Program as well as other strategic concerns. I ask unanimous consent this letter be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:
The White House,
Washington, July 24, 1989.
Hon. Sam Nunn,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, Washington,
DC.
Dear Chairman: When the Fiscal Year 1990 Defense Authorization Bill comes to the floor next week, you and your colleagues will make critical decisions affecting the future of deterrence and arms control for the balance of the century. Before you vote, I want to be certain that you understand my reasons for the strategic modernization program I have proposed.
Taken together, these strategic programs are essential to preserve a capable, survivable and effective deterrent. They are an integrated package that deals with the evolving threat and is flexible enough to hedge against uncertainties. They also undergird our arms control negotiations and provide incentives to the Soviets to continue the internal changes they appear to be making. Each represents, not simply modestly improved capability but fundamental change in strategy or system performance.
I am optimistic about what we are beginning to see in the Soviet Union. The Soviets may finally be willing to make significant changes in the character and size of their military forces. This willingness is at least in part the result of our commitment to a modern, capable deterrent force. Weakening the commitment now could undermine the positive trends we see emerging in Soviet forces.
I have taken another hard look at SDI and confirmed that the goal of the program--providing the basis for an informed decision on deployment of defenses that would strengthen deterrence--remains sound. We owe it to ourselves and our children to pursue that goal. I am personally and deeply committed to doing so.
Moreover, SDI is at a critical juncture. The technological progress we have made means that we need to conduct large scale realistic, and therefore expensive, tests to prove the feasibility of defenses. Already, because of cuts required in the overall Defense budget, I have reluctantly submitted a revised budget, cutting over $1 billion from the program. If the Congress cuts even more deeply, our ability to investigate and test the most promising options will be seriously damaged. We will be unable to determine, in a meaningful way, whether we can rely more on defenses for our security. The American people are entitled to that assessment.
The B-2 is also at a critical point. The aircraft is based on revolutionary technology that will guarantee the effectiveness of the penetrating bomber well into the next century. Without it, the strategic Triad, which has been the bedrock of our nuclear strategy, will virtually disappear. The B-2 is also the core of our START strategy for achieving stable deterrence at reduced levels. Indeed, under the terms of our current arms control proposal, the bomber force will be assigned a very large percentage of our targets. I have no doubt that the B-2 is worth its cost and deserves your support.
ICBM modernization has been marked with considerable controversy and strong opinion. Yet there is broad agreement that mobility is required for our land-based missiles to improve their survivability and enhance their unique capabilities. After careful review of the issue, I have determined that we should deploy, in a carefully phased manner, the Rail-garrison Peacekeeper and the Small road mobile ICBM. I am committed to doing so.
Rail-garrison Peacekeeper will improve the survivability of the ICBM force quickly and at modest cost, while preserving the considerable military capability of this system. The Small ICBM represents the future of the ICBM force. It offers a high degree of survivability, even with virtually no warning. But, it will not be ready to deploy as soon as Rail-garrison and will obviously be more expensive than a multiple warhead system. We can field Rail-garrison in the near term while at the same time continuing development of the Small ICBM for 1997 deployment. We likewise need to commit to an ICBM mobility program to avoid a deadlock in the START negotiations on the mobile issue.
In addition to the requirement for these forces as the heart of our nuclear deterrent strategy, in which they form an integrated and inseparable whole, there is the role which this modernization program plays in our arms control strategy. We are entering a very important and promising stage in our strategic arms control negotiations. We have already introduced some changes in our position and we are actively considering others which could make a significant contribution to the stability of the nuclear balance. To pull the rug out from under me at this crucial juncture by weakening my program could destroy this opportunity to make real progress. Indeed, it could even prevent the conclusion of an arms control agreement. I need the negotiating flexibility which this dynamic and sensible modernization program provides. Don't prevent me from achieving a treaty which could make great strides toward reducing the chances of nuclear conflict.
Let me add two cautionary notes. First, good arms control cannot be legislated. I seek and welcome the advice and counsel of the Congress and regularly consult you on the full range of arms control issues. But, in the final analysis, I must be responsible for negotiating arms control agreements. The many arms control amendments that are customarily proposed to the defense bills only undercut me and our foreign policy and frequently have an effect opposite to that intended by their sponsors.
Second, the pressures to play one modernization program off against another or to pay for one with cuts in another threaten the balanced strategy behind our programs. Secretary Cheney and I have had to make hard choices in these times of tight budgets--this budget is the best balance of needs and affordability and represents an integrated strategic approach.
As you begin final debate on the defense bill, I ask you to carefully consider the affordable, integrated plan we have designed to strengthen deterrence, to reinforce the incentives for change in the Soviet Union, and to further our goal of negotiating arms control agreements that will reduce the likelihood of nuclear war. We cannot afford to lower our defenses because of Gorbachev's rhetoric; we cannot afford to pull the rug out from our negotiators, and we cannot afford to forfeit the investments we have made in strategic modernization. We can afford to make the needed improvements provided by this cohesive, fiscally sound package. It deserves your support.
Sincerely,
George Bush.
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Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished chairman for his words with respect to bipartisanship.
Throughout the formulation of this bill, and the hearings, open and closed, in meetings, the chairman strove to have bipartisanship. Indeed, he recounted the fact that this bill supports the President and Secretary of Defense in almost every respect, the one exception being an intentional, I think a beneficial, exception, the restoration of the R&D funds for the V-22.
Otherwise, it was a remarkable bipartisan effort, and I join in complimenting our staff. In the 11 years I have been privileged to be a member of this committee, I have never seen staff work better to serve the full committee.
Indeed, there was active participation by all Senators on our committee throughout the formulation of this bill, beginning of course in the subcommittee hearings through and including the markup which took an entire week.
I am especially pleased that the committee again under the strong able leadership of the chairman was able to deal with each of the major issues. Unlike in earlier years we did not have a single party line vote throughout the deliberations of this bill, both in subcommittee and in full committee.
I am also pleased that the Committee, after full discussion and debate, chose not to reverse any major defense policy decision reflected in the President's amended budget request. The committee, by a strong bipartisan vote, refused to reduce DOD funding for the strategic defense initiative below $4.3 billion; the committee, by an overwhelming vote, refused to alter the President's dual track ICBM modernization funding plan; the committee, by clear bipartisan votes, refused to reverse the President's decisions to terminate production of the V-22 Osprey and of the F-14D Tomcat, and the decision to terminate production of the AH-64 Apache helicopter after 1991. Finally, the committee, by an overwhelming and bipartisan vote, refused to terminate production during fiscal year 1990 of the B-2 program, but rather made the availability of funds for that program subject to a number of specific testing and developmental milestones. These statutory milestones truly do convert the B-2 program into a `fly-before-we-buy' endeavor.
Now turning to some of the other important provisions contained in this bill. In the manpower and personnel areas, the committee recommended full funding of the proposed 3.6-percent pay raise for military personnel in fiscal year 1990. Maintaining a proper standard of living for our military personnel is the responsibility of each of us in this body, and this becomes even more important in this fifth straight year of declining defense budgets.
I think, parenthetically, I would like to say that at the meeting with the President this morning Senator Inouye, the chairman of the Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense, reiterated again his intention to lead his subcommittee in affirming what we have done to protect the quality of the men and women of the Armed Forces of the United States.
Additionally, the committee has recommended several improvements in retention incentives for military aviators and health professionals, two areas in which there are growing demands for highly trained personnel in the private sector.
In Navy shipbuilding, the committee recommends that the Senate authorize funding for all ships requested.
Of course the committee backed the President's decision not to include that last submarine which was in an earlier iteration by President Reagan.
The carrier Enterprise will be overhauled and the committee recommends that funding for that project be consolidated in the shipbuilding account.
Title VIII of the bill contains several provisions intended to streamline defense acquisition. Some of the provisions would allow the Department of Defense more flexibility in acquisition of professional and technical services, commercial products, and products under the Foreign Military Sales Program. The committee also took action to stress the importance of maintaining the health of the U.S. defense industrial and technological base. We have provided the basis for better monitoring the state of industries supporting national defense, and increased support for such key programs as the Manufacturing Technology [Mantech] Program.
Mr. President, in the conventional forces area, the committee adopted three important initiatives, each of which the committee believed was important enough to bring to the Senate floor so that all Members may vote on them. During the course of debate on the bill, amendments will be offered on behalf of committee members on funding for procurement of equipment for the Guard and Reserve, for procurement of modern smart missile systems, and `foot soldier' equipment enhancement initiatives. These types of programs are often included in a committee reported defense authorization bill, but they are often overlooked in the debate on the Senate floor. This year, the committee members felt that the committee's action in these areas was important enough to be brought to the attention of all Members of the Senate, so that each Member can cast a vote on these important programs.
Finally, Mr. President, this morning as mentioned by the chairman, a number of Senators had the opportunity to confer with President Bush and his top advisers to discuss many of the national security issues to be addressed in this bill. The President made clear his views that the elements of his strategic modernization program, including dual track ICBM modernization, SDI, and B-2, are interrelated. Each of these elements is important, not only because of the improved military capabilities offered by each, but also because each element provides a vital link in the chain of our overall national security strategy, including our goals in ongoing arms control negotiations.
The President addressed these same issues in a letter sent today to Members of the Senate, which has been put in the Record by the chairman.
I would like at this time, Mr. President, to read the last paragraph of the President's letter to various members of the Senate Armed Services and Appropriations Committees:
As you begin final debate on the defense bill, I ask you to carefully consider the affordable, integrated plan we have designed to strengthen deterrence, to reinforce the incentives for change in the Soviet Union, and to further our goal of negotiating arms control agreements that will reduce the likelihood of nuclear war. We cannot afford to lower our defenses because of Gorbachev's rhetoric; we cannot afford to pull the rug out from our negotiators, and we cannot afford to forfeit the investments we have made in strategic modernization. We can afford to make the needed improvements provided by this cohesive, fiscally sound package. It deserves your support.
Sincerely,
George Bush.
Last, Mr. President, I believe the President of the United States makes a strong case for keeping his strategic modernization program intact. Not only this letter, but certainly the debate on the floor will reinforce his arguments and those which are vital to the continuation of this program.
Mr. President, the President of the United States has now presented the Congress with such an approach. The program is coherent, is integrated, and it enhances deterrence while fully recognizing the possibilities offered for arms control.
I urge my colleagues to consider this letter very carefully, and then to actively participate in the debate on this bill which I hope in every major respect will be adopted as recommended by the Senate Armed Services Committee.
I thank again my distinguished chairman for his leadership, and for the privilege and pleasure of working with him in the formulation of this bill.
I yield the floor.
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The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nebraska.
Mr. EXON. Mr. President, I have been listening with keen interest to the chairman and the ranking member of the Armed Services Committee. I simply want to thank them for their leadership in the whole complicated area of national defense.
I suspect that the meetings of the subcommittee and the full committee probably were a little more contentious than ever before, but even with that, I think we have come to a consensus, an agreement. As has been pointed out by both Chairman Nunn and Senator Warner, the measure passed out of the Armed Services Committee unanimously.
Mr. President, I strongly support the Armed Services Committee's version of the defense authorization bill, particularly those portions which are the responsibility of my Subcommittee on Strategic Forces and Nuclear Deterrence.
The committee showed tremendous responsibility and good sense in `holding the line` against funding for nonrequested programs and items. It acted wisely by not mortgaging our future through the restoration of the programs terminated by the Secretary of Defense. The only significant addition to the request was the restoration of limited research and development funding for the V-22 Osprey and the committee did not make a commitment to that aircraft's production.
We can always find a few tens of millions to keep a program alive. But we cannot afford the price which such a decision inevitably commits us to further down the road. Indeed, our current defense morass is largely due to the failure of the previous administration and this body to demonstrate proper fiscal responsibility. We are facing our fifth consecutive year of declining defense budgets. The unchecked defense buildup is history.
Our task is now to maintain our security in a changing and unpredictable world and to do so with less money. The committee bill is a step in this direction. I will strongly oppose any effort to return to the old ways of doing business, which was to buy anything that `pop's' without consideration for present and future budget considerations.
As chairman of the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces and Nuclear Deterrence, I would like to take a few moments to describe for the Senators the main features of the bill that bear upon the programs and issues under the subcommittee's purview.
Let me begin by discussing the nature and magnitude of the problems in the area where we made the largest increases. It will surprise no one to learn that the area is the Department of Energy's defense programs, and that the sizable increases are for cleanup activities. The major problem before the committee this year, next year, and for the forseeable future, will be to provide enough funds to allow the Department of Energy to make significant progress in three areas simultaneously:
First, to upgrade its current operating facilties to bring their operations into compliance with existing laws and safety standards;
Second, to prevent further deterioration and make a substantial start on the cleanup of hundreds of inactive storage sites contaminated with nuclear, toxic, and mixed wastes; and
Third, to start construction on new, modern, safe facilities to allow us to phase out older facilities that can be kept in safe and compliant operation only with increasing effort and needless cost.
Many of my colleagues, Mr. President, have expressed sticker shock at the cost of the B-2. To them I say, `you ain't seen nothin' yet!'
I cannot tell you with any confidence what the final bill for these three tasks will be, because the Department of Energy has not yet even bounded the problem. But the most recent estimates we have seen for the parts that have been assessed with some care is a cost of well over $150 billion--that is in today's dollars, not out year dollars. For illustration, that is more than twice the cost of the sticker shock price of the B-2. Sticker shock is the newest buzz word for some who customarily have not addressed in depth the overall demands of national security in our dangerous world.
Put another way, the Department of Energy's defense programs will need more than $4 billion more per year than they have been getting from the Office of Management and Budget.
Mr. President, we have not increased the Department of Energy's programs by $4 billion this year, not by a long shot because we do not have that money. We have reluctantly transferred some $500 million from the Department of Defense to the Department of Energy's defense programs.
I say reluctantly, not because the committee is reluctant to address the cleanup problem; rather, I am reluctant because this transfer from one agency to another causes problems with the budget and appropriations committee, and, if the practice were continued, would lead to friction between the Department of Defense and the Department of Energy.
I say in the strongest possible terms to the President and to the Office of Management and Budget--you must provide the needed resources to the Department of Energy in the annual budget requests. In the report accompanying this bill, we reiterate this point and set out the priorities that will govern this committee's markups in future years.
Now, if those are the committee's stated priorities, and if the committee does not intend to transfer funds from the Department of Defense to the Department of Energy to make up shortfalls, where will the money come from?
Well, let me point out to the Office of Management and Budget and to the President that apart from modernization, cleanup, and compliance accounts that will have first priority, there is not much left except money for nuclear weapons productions and money for nuclear materials production for nuclear weapons.
Of the roughly half a billion dollars transferred into the Department of Energy from the Department of Defense, the committee increased the cleanup and remediation funds by $418 million above the requested amount by the administration. The committee is confident that these funds can all be productively utilized. Another $100 million went into a new program to develop new kinds of cleanup techniques.
Cleanup will be a multi-billion-dollar effort spread over several decades, and there are some contaminated sites for which there are no known cleanup techniques, unfortunately. Clearly, research now on new cleanup approaches and technologies could potentially reduce the ultimate cleanup costs substantially. These are the major funding initiatives we have taken in this bill to address the cleanup problem.
We have a number of other initiatives affecting the Department of Energy which I will discuss a little later, but I would now like to turn to the major strategic programs and issues in the Department of Defense part of the bill.
First, the bill fully funds the ICBM modernization worked out between the administration and the congressional leadership earlier this year.
Second, the SDI account is reduced by $300 million, which is largely being used to beef up the Department of Energy Cleanup Program that I have just addressed. This reduces the SDI funding in the Department of Defense from $4.6 billion to $4.3 billion, which is still and increase of 16 percent of the current level.
Some will no doubt consider $4.3 billion too high. I believe we must recognize that the House Armed Services Committee is already at $3.5 billion, which is well below the current level, and they may go lower during their floor debate.
Some will no doubt consider $4.3 billion too low. To them, I simply make two observations: First, SDI cannot justify full funding, and second, last year on the Senate floor we needed five rollcall votes to turn back by one vote an effort to cut $600 million out of SDI--after the committee had cut $271 million. The year before, the Vice President cast the tie-breaking vote to sustain the committee's mark, and the year before that, the committee's mark was sustained by only two votes.
My own judgment is that this proposed SDI mark may still be a bit high, but I urge its acceptance as part of the package, and for us to deal with the House during conference.
The bill reduces the B-2 procurement account by $300 million and those funds are also helping to pay for environmental restoration.
The committee thoroughly reexamined the B-2 program to see whether concurrency could be reduced without doing serious violence to the vendor base and to production schedules, which would require widespread layoffs and add substantial costs for qualifying vendors and reclearing employees. Some procurement funding must also be provided to keep in force an advantageous, firm, fixed price contract covering numerous avionics and electronics components.
To meet these conditions means that only a few hundred million dollars can be cut from the program this year. However, the bill also contains numerous restrictions on the obligation of funds for the procurement of additional production aircraft. I hope all Members will read these provisions carefully. I think they serve to fully protect the taxpayers' interest in this program so that we do not get ahead of ourselves.
If the B-2 test schedule from here on follows the planned course, then the fences and limitations on the B-2 in the proposed package are fully adequate to ensure there will be no undue concurrency, without doing great damage to the program or greatly increasing its costs, as the House Armed Services Committee cuts of $800 million will surely do. Or as some of their suggested floor amendments would do.
Let me highlight quickly a few of the other `good government' reductions, the meritorious `add-backs,' and the policy guidance offered in the Defense bill. The largest of these are $100 million from the air defense initiative, $66 million from the nuclear directed energy research in the Department of Energy, and $85 million from the special isotope separation project in Idaho.
An amount of $101 million was added to increase Trident II missile productions rates to try to get them back toward the milestone authorization levels the committee established in the fiscal year 1988 authorization bill. There are also minor adds for traditionally underfunded projects like ASMS, Lightsat, SSBN security, nuclear and chemical monitoring, and the use of the Department of Energy National Labs to support the development by the services of `smart' conventional weapons.
Finally, the bill contains a number of legislative initiatives and requirements for studies and reports. Several initiatives are aimed at the Department of Energy's continuing problems. We propose to set up a blue ribbon task force to advise the Department and Congress on how best to set priorities for allocating scarce cleanup funds to a multibillion, multiyear cleanup problem. We also grant the Department of Energy some relief from salary, revolving door, and ethics legislation to allow them to draw more heavily on the scientific and technical talent at our national laboratories to help in the management of the Department's activities and programs. We also require them to develop 5-year plans, as the Department of Defense already does.
For the Department of Defense, we propose legislation restricting concurrency in the ACM and B-1 defensive avionics programs as well as the B-2, extending the requirement for robust testing before further production investments in these programs also.
In summary, let me say that I think this is a solid recommendation to the Senate, and I want to thank Senator Thurmond for all of his aid and assistance as the ranking minority member on my subcommittee in preparing our part of the bill.
Strategic issues are complex and controversial. Arriving at a reasonable package with bipartisan support is tremendously challenging. That we have such a package before us today is largely due to the tremendous knowledge, hard work, and undying patience of many committee staff members. On the majority side, I would like to express my gratitude and admiration to Bill Hoehn, Sherri Goodman, Bob Bell, Kirk McConnell, Jan Wise, and Cindy Pearson. On the minority side, I would like to thank Jack Mansfield and Brian Dailey for their superb efforts as well, and certainly to Pat Tucker, who is always there for advice and counsel of a very wise nature, the Strategic Subcommittee `team' is truly first rate in all ways.
Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to carefully study this bill. There may be ways to improve it, possibly, but, for the most part, it is a very sound and a very responsible bill. I hope that the full Senate will act expeditiously in approving it.
Mr. President, I thank the Chair and I yield the floor.
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The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. DIXON. Mr. President, I am pleased to support S. 1352, the national defense authorization for fiscal years 1990-91. This is a good bill that will strengthen our national defense, and I urge my colleagues to support it.
As chairman of the Subcommittee on Readiness, Sustainability and Support, I want to take a few moments to summarize the recommendatins of the committee in this area.
Mr. President, jurisdiction of the Subcommittee on Readiness, Sustainability and Support covers approximately one-third of the Defense budget, including the operation and maintenance accounts; spare parts and ammunition procurement; the defense stock funds; and military construction and family housing.
The good news this year is that we have not had to make large reductions to the budget request to meet the budget resolution targets.
The bad news, though, is that there are still some important programs under the subcommittee's jurisdiction, particularly in the area of sustainability, which were underfunded in fiscal year 1990-91 budget request. The committee did its best to provide additional funds to meet some of the shortfalls. I think we improved on the budget request, but there remain some important shortfalls in sustainability programs, particularly ammunition and maintenance programs.
In the operation and maintenance area, the subcommittee has identified about $800 million in funding reductions--most of them financing adjustments--and applied these savings to high priority readiness-related programs: depot maintenance; real property maintenance; Army supply operations; and the proposed civilian pay raise.
Members will recall that the amended budget request called for a 2-percent pay raise for Federal civilan employees and a 3.6-percent pay raise for military personnel in fiscal year 1990. Congress and the administration have since agreed to a 3.6-percent pay raise for Federal civilian employees in fiscal year 1990. Since almost all Defense Department civilians are paid out of the operation and maintenance accounts, this higher pay raise needs to be funded--or other readiness-related activities will end up paying the bill. The committee bill adds $219 million to the budget for this higher civilian pay raise, which will fund 80 percent of the total cost of the 3.6-percent pay raise, meaning the Defense Department will have to absorb 20 percent of the pay raise costs. This level of absorption is consistent with past practice.
The operations and maintenance recommendations also include a reduction of $200 million to the fiscal year 1990 request of $500 million for the base closure account. This reduction is based on the testimony of the base closure commissioners that $300 million would meet the minimum requirements for this account in fiscal year 1990.
In the area of revolving funds the committee bill includes a modest reduction of 10 percent, or $75 million, largely to fund some of the readiness-related increases in the operation and maintenance and procurement accounts.
The committee made two major recommendations in the procurement area:
An increase of $73.2 million for high priority conventional ammunition programs recommended by the Army; and
An increase of $130 million for repair parts to fix the large number of Army helicopters damaged in the recent severe storm at Fort Hood, TX.
In the military construction area, there are very few reductions to projects in the United States in the committee bill. The request for overseas projects is reduced by approximately one-third in light of uncertainties of U.S. forces. The $15.4 million in funding for the proposed new Air Force base at Crotone, Italy, was deleted from the bill.
There are two legislative provisions I want to mention. The first is the requirement for the Secretary of Defense to submit to the Congress a master plan for environmental restoration activities in the Defense Department. This is becoming an increasingly visible and important area of Defense Department activity, and one the subcommittee is monitoring very closely.
The second provision is the approval of the Defense Department's request to transfer management of the Pentagon from the General Services Administration to the Defense Department. In doing so, though, we have restricted the amount that the Defense Department would otherwise pay to the General Services Administration for Defense Department leases in the National Capital region in order to finance the cost of the Pentagon renovation. Our subcommittee's hearing on the question showed that the General Services Administration, I regret to say, has been a very poor landlord for the Pentagon for the last decade.
The committee's recommendations include authorization of fiscal year 1991 programs in operation and maintenance and the revolving funds at the levels requested. In the ammunition and spare parts programs, the committee authorized the full request for the second year, except for the increases in the Army ammunition area necessary to maintain efficient production of the at-4 and the new M864 155mm artillery round. Approximately half of the military construction programs for fiscal year 1991 are authorized--primarily multiyear programs or projects which support ongoing investment programs.
That is a brief overview of the recommendations of the committee in the area of readiness, sustainability and support. I want to thank my friend and colleague Senator Gorton, the ranking member of the Subcommittee on Readiness, Sustainability and Support, for his fine cooperation and assistance. It has been a pleasure working with him this year on the subcommittee.
Mr. President, I would like to add a few more comments regarding the base closure account, and the Base Closing Commission in general. My opposition to the legislation that created the Base Closing Commission, and the report of the Commission, is well known. The process provided for and followed by the Commission was fatally flawed in several respects. The Commission was given too much power, insufficient time was allowed for an unbiased, independent analysis, and no oversight activity was included. Five hearing were held in my subcommittee ot examine the recommendations of the Base Closure Commission. At one of those hearings, the General Accounting Office described errors in the data the Commission used, and discrepancies in the analytical techniques. The General Accounting Office has been directed to provide a full report of their findings by November 15. I feel very strongly that where errors have been identified in the Commission's analysis utilized to close a base in a category where excess capacity exists, the bases cited should not be closed until the category is reevaluated.
Mr. President, I want to thank the chairman of the committee and the ranking member for the outstanding work they did this year and I am delighted to enthusiastically support this fine result of the markup of the Armed Services Committee. I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississppi.
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It has been a distinct privilege for me as a new Member of this body, to work with my colleagues on the committee in establishing this workable framework for national security. Although the continuing downward trend in defense spending concerns me, I believe we have produced a well balanced program for the Nation's future defense given the realities of a curtailed resource environment.
I want to commend the distinguished chairman and ranking minority member of the Armed Services Committee for their leadership in charting our course through a series of very tough decisions that will clearly influence the future of our national security well into the next century.
I also want to commend my colleagues on the committee on both sides of the aisle. We certainly have worked very closely together at the subcommittee level and I have been very much impressed with the bipartisan way in which we have dealt with this most important legislation. We deliberated long and hard over many important issues.
Some members of the committee had amendments they felt they had to offer and they did so. Certainly the other members understood. But when the votes were taken, very strong, courageous positions were taken by the committee and I am very much impressed with that. The resulting decisions ultimately formulate the policies that will fulfill one of our fundamental constitutional responsibilities this Government has: to provide for the common defense.
The real story of this defense bill is courage. It is the moral courage to make the tough and painful decisions now and not put them off to another day when the consequences to our national security will only be more serious. It is stepping up to the big problems and putting national interests ahead of parochial interests. In the recent past we have had the luxury of a funding environment that allowed support of nearly every defense program that had any reasonable merit. Unfortunately, those days are past and we can no longer cover every base--we have to be wiser in making the critical choices between weapon systems we buy and how we structure our armed forces in a changing world.
Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney also deserves a lion's share of credit for his courage in sending over a lean and mean defense budget that addresses the difficult and unpopular choices that have to be made. Instead of taking the easy way and `nickeling and diming' existing programs across the board, he performed `triage' and did the unexpected--canceled major weapons systems.
In the past, many of us in the Congress have been critical of Secretaries of Defense because they wanted to have every program. If not the full amount, they wanted at least a little bit. And so these programs were quite often continued on and on, and no tough choices were made. This tough, unusual courage of conviction in the face of an avalanche of criticism from vigorous and well-meaning advocates of some weapons programs was a very important step.
Secretary Cheney should also be commended for his effort to protect the most important component of our defense establishment--the men and women of our armed services. Without them the most expensive and capable weapon systems are useless. Their morale and well-being are an invisible `force multiplier' in any potential conflict. We must contiue to place a top priority on the quality of the soldiers, marines, sailors, and airmen who man our defenses and ultimately hold the Nation's security in their hands. We must never return to those times of a hollow Army where low morale was manifested by one of the poorest quality of discipline rates in recent history. His proposed budget recognizes the importance of those in uniform by placing a priority on pay and benefits at the necessary expense of weapon systems. Finally, Secretary of Defense Cheney has helped the Armed Services Committee immeasurably by giving us the realistic baseline from which to operate in developing the bill before us.
This is a changing world, but the only certainty is uncertainty itself. The enduring question for national defense has been, and always will be, `what is the acceptable risk?' Clearly, momentous change appears to be at hand in the Soviet Union, which has posed such great danger to the United States and our allies for over four decades. But, as we have seen so recently in China, unexpected events can sharply influence the course of national policy. There, a Communist government appeared to be slowly embracing democratic change but violently reversed course with tragic consequences for the most courageous and creative people of that ancient culture.
When it comes to national security, we must always be prepared for the unexpected--prepared to deal with the world as it is and not as we wish it to be. The strategy of deterrence has stood the tests of uncertainty for nearly half a century. But when it failed, because we did not put credible forces behind it Korea in 1950, we paid the price in blood. In Europe, deterrence has delivered the longest peace in the long history of that war-torn continent and it presided over a phenomenal era of economic prosperity for a free Europe. A similar policy of deterrence has worked for our allies along the Pacific Rim since the Korean war.
So, as we draw on the experience of past success and failure, we must continue to place our trust in deterrence and provide the essential resources to make that strategy credible.
At the beginning of this century, the Secretary of War dedicated the Army War College only a short distance from where we are assembled here today. On that day he made one of the wisest of all propositions:
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I believe that this defense authorization bill meets the test posed by those prophetic words, and I urge my colleagues to support it.
If we on the floor of the Senate begin to take this legislation apart piece by piece, we will have missed a great opportunity to support one of the best bipartisan packages I have seen in my years of service in the Congress.
So I urge my colleagues to support the measure before us and to back up the tough decisions that were made in the Committee on Armed Services. I thank the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arkansas.
Mr. BUMPERS. Mr. President, I guess I am the first person to rise and say that I am not sure I am going to support this bill. I was telling the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee a while ago I might offer an amendment to buy some new smoke and some new mirrors because the ones we have been using are not working.
Ever since Gramm-Rudman-Hollings passed, we have been supposed to reduce the deficit every year, and every year we finesse it and wait until the time passes when we have to make that critical decision as to whether or not we are going to be within the budget or not. And every year, because of the time of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings we are able to say yes, we are going to be able to meet the budget targets--and everybody knows we are not--but we go through that little smoke and mirrors exercise to try to tell the American people we are really up here doing their work for them.
We are supposed to have a budget deficit this year, 1989, of $100 billion. Nobody thought it was going to be that when we voted for it, and everybody knows it is not going to be that on September 30. Yet, in August when the snapshot is taken, I promise you OMB, CBO, they will all figure out somehow or another, yes, it is going to be within the $100 billion target. Everybody in the United States knows it is not and this is despite the fact that revenues from income taxes are $15 billion higher this year than we projected, and we still will not even get close to the $100 billion mark.
The thing that is really interesting, and the things that ought to be talked about in the coffee shops across America, is this point: that if you fund defense, Medicare, Medicaid, Social Security, interest on the debt, civil service pensions and veterans' pensions, just those 7, out of the 500 programs we finance in this country, you just fund those 7 and do not cut, funds for education, do not cut funds for the Environmental Protection Agency, do not cut funds for drugs, cancer research, AIDS research. If we eliminate all the other 493 programs we fund, you still have a deficit.
Do you know that, I say to my colleagues? You just fund those seven and you have a deficit. You only have 15-percent funds in the budget that are discretionary for this body to work with, and that has to cover education and all the other things I mentioned, plus a lot that I did not.
We are budgeting $2 billion in the National Institutes of Health this year for AIDS research. Not one person here would take a dime of that out.
We make these long pontificating statements about how our children are dead last in education in comparison with the children of other developed countries. This has been going on ever since that study called `A Nation at Risk' came out. What has happened? Nothing. We are still last in global studies among other countries. We are still last in math and science.
The Japanese continue to eat our lunch because they spend 1 percent of their budget on defense and we spend 6. Paul Kennedy, the very able professor at Yale who wrote `The Decline and Fall of the Great Powers,' said the United States will never overtake the Japanese as long as you have 30 percent of the scientists in this country working on weapons. Almost all of Japan's scientists, 98 percent of them are working in the civilian sector taking American business right and left.
Mr. President, the reason for this outburst today was just over this weekend I began to think about the insanity of what is going on. I got to thinking, where is the real threat to this country? Is it within or is it without? I made a speech here the night after my grandson was born, my first grandchild. That was on the day care bill, but I could not help think today--he was at my house last night--he will be 5 weeks old tomorrow. Do you know what we in Congress have been doing and continue to do and what we are going to do all this year? We are going to mortgage his future. At 5 weeks old, he is not in a position to defend himself. He has to look to 100 Senators and 435 House Members to be concerned about what kind of life he is going to have.
As the President's own OMB Director said this week, Bob Darman--and I was impressed with his speech; I have not heard an administration official speak with that kind of candor in the last 8 1/2 years--he said, we are still living as though there is a free lunch and as though there is no tomorrow.
But I guess the thing that really kicked this off in my mind is the President cavalierly standing out in a press conference, saying: `We need to go to Mars; we need to go back to the Moon, too.' I do not know why you want to go back. As my friend from South Carolina, Senator Hollings, has said, there is no education in the second kick of the mule. What are you going to learn the second time that you did not learn the first time? The trip to Mars will be $400 billion. The President did not say where the money is coming from. He just said we ought to go to Mars.
I am not nearly as interested in going to Mars as I am assuring this grandson of mine that he is going to have a reasonable, decent future where he can breathe clean air, where
he can drink clean water, where if he happens to get AIDS or cancer or whatever, that a sensitive, caring Congress is going to have done everything they can to provide him good health, a decent chance at a house, a decent chance at a good education and all the other things that we consider to be quality life for all of us.
The President says $400 billion to go to Mars. Read my lips. He said do not put on budget the $200 billion it is going to cost to bail the S&L's out because that makes the deficit look bad. Put it over here, you guys know the smoke-and-mirrors routine. You figure out how to do it. Put it anyplace, but do not put it on the budget where it will show. So everybody comes tiptoeing over here and they vote not to put it on budget so it will not show. Now we are going to spend $200 billion to clean up all the plutonium-producing sites in the United States.
The Senator from Ohio, my good friend from Ohio sits here and his State has been a victim--is that not right, I say to my colleague--of the inefficient operation of a plutonium-producing facility in Ohio. I want to take care of his constituents, and I am going to vote to do whatever we have to do to clean that mess up. But that is $200 billion over the next 10 or 20 years. The President did not tell us where to get the money. He just said, read my lips.
Now the President says, `I want the rail mobile MX and the Minuteman. I want them both, and I want that B-2 bomber at a cost of $530 million, too.' God help the poor pilot who ever bails out of one of those.
Mr. President, where are we going to get the money? Read my lips. I suggested to one of our negotiators--I was in Geneva and Vienna a couple weeks ago--I suggested to our negotiators, why do we not say to the Soviet Union, as has been suggested by no less than the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee, you give up the SS-24, your 10 warhead MIRV'd mobile missile, and we will not build the MX. This negotiator said, you are not ever going to get the Soviet Union to talk to you about that. What you have to do is to build it and then talk to them about giving it up.
What we have to do is to appropriate the money in this bill to build the rail garrison MX and then go to the Soviets and say, `now, look, we have a 10-warhead missile, too, on rails. Now let us trade out, let us bargain those two away. That will leave you with the SS-25, the single-warhead mobile missile, and it will leave us with the Midgetman.'
That does not make any sense to me. It does not make any sense to General Akhromeyev, who testified before the House Armed Services Committee in a precedent-setting testimony last week and then later in an interview said, yes, the Soviet Union would consider giving up the SS-24 if the President of the United States will say that we are not going to build the MX. What a deal. How many times have you been offered a deal like that? Now, that is not an offer. I am not saying Akhromeyev has the ability or the authority to make that deal. But he said, yes, we would entertain that idea.
He is just recently the top military defense official in the Soviet Union, so he did not just fall off a watermelon truck. He knows what he is talking about.
And then you add to all of the predictions on the economy. Thirty-seven economists have written to the President saying we have big problems ahead, a recession that could turn into a depression. Bob Darman, head of OMB, says the growth rate next year is not going to be 3.5 percent. Do you remember when we debated the budget? The projection for arriving at a $100 billion deficit was that the economy would grow at 3.5 percent and for every point you miss, you have to add $20 billion to the deficit. If the growth rate next year is 1 percent, add somewhere between $40 and $50 billion to the deficit. And Bob Darman is saying that is a distinct possibility. Alan Greenspan, head of the Federal Reserve Board, is saying that is a very distinct possibility.
The President wants a lower capital gains tax because it gives us a little extra revenue next year, but how about the next 4 years? A net loser. I am not voting for the President's capital gains tax; I am announcing that right now. I have said it all along. I am not going to do that. Do you know where 90 percent of capital gains goes? People who make over $100,000. Did you know that according to at least one study the bottom 20 percent of the people in this country have lost 9 percent of their disposable earnings in the past 8 years and the top 20 percent have increased theirs by 16 percent. And that is not enough. They want capital gains to make the disparity even worse than it already is.
The other day the New York Times said we had a little leak from the Pentagon saying that our Joint Chiefs of Staff do not think SDI will work and that we ought to start pulling back from it and support the ABM Treaty which the Soviets are in a much better position to break out of plan wear. That's what the Joint Chiefs are saying. But everybody has been apologizing ever since. Now, that happened while I was in Geneva so I did not get all the facts on it, but apparently the Joint Chiefs of Staff are having serious second thoughts about SDI.
I promise you, Mr. President, there is going to be an amendment to cut SDI from where the committee wound up on it. The House is already way below this committee. There is going to be an amendment to at least fence the amount for MX for some period of time to give our negotiators an opportunity to negotiate with the Soviet Union so they give up the SS-24 and we do not have to spend the $5
billion on the MX rail garrison.
Incidentally, we are negotiating in Geneva saying we want everybody to give up mobility. We want the Soviets to give up their two mobile missiles, the SS-24 and the SS-25. That is our official position there. And here in the United States the President comes over here and asks us for the money to fund both of our mobile missiles. Does that sound like a contradiction? It certainly does. Do you know why? Because it is. How can you say to the Soviets in Geneva both sides ought to give up mobility and come over here and ask us for money for two mobile missiles?
`If we were to suddenly tomorrow agree with the Soviet Union that everything came out--6,000 warheads each--that is a 50-percent cut from our 12,000 and roughly their 12,000. Let us assume we both agree tomorrow on 6,000 warheads each. We are buying longlead items for the Trident submarine in this bill that you could not possibly build unless you are willing to put virtually all of those warheads on the Trident. Why are we buying longlead items for the 19th Trident submarine when everybody will concede to you that we may not be able to have more than 18 Tridents under any START agreement?
I am on the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, and I forget which of the admirals testified to it. He says, well, we are thinking about pouring concrete in some of the 24 tubes on the Trident or similar steps. As everybody knows, the Trident carries 24 missiles. That's dandy for us. But do we want the Soviets doing that? The verification problems on that would be horrendous.
If you put 10 on each Trident II missile, that would be 240. We are not planning to do that. But I have often said if the Soviet Union launched a preemptive strike and destroyed every bomber we had on the ground, destroyed every ICBM we had on the ground, destroyed every single submarine we had except for one lonely Trident, that one Trident submarine has the ability to obliterate every city in the Soviet Union of over 100,000 people. And yet we just continue to build more and more and more.
Mr. President, there will also be a move to slow down funding for the B-2 until they will prove to us that the B-2 will fly. I voted against the B-1 bomber, not because I did not think it would fly, not because I thought when they finished it they were going to want another $2 billion to $5 billion to make it do what it was supposed to do in the first place. I voted against it because I had a lot the faith in the B-2 Stealth bomber. If I had known then that that successor was going to cost $530 million each, believe you me, I would have had some real soul searching before I voted for it.
And then, Mr. President, there is going to be an amendment, probably withdrawn, offered just to get the debate going on what we are doing in Korea. Forty-three thousand troops in Korea, $2.6 billion a year to maintain 43,000 troops. South Korea has twice as many people as North Korea. They have a gross national product almost eight times greater than North Korea. And South Korea's commitment to defense spending has dropped from almost 6 percent of gross national product to 5 percent. In other words, their economy is growing but their commitment as a percentage of gross national product is declining, and South Korea has a $10 billion trade deficit against the United States. I have nothing against Korea, and our amendment would have nothing to do with our commitment to South Korea that if they are ever attacked, we will come to their defense. How would you like to go to the hospital and say, `Doc, take my appendix out; it is hurting.' He takes your appendix out. Three days later you are feeling pretty good. You say, `Doc, I am ready to go home.' `No, sorry, you have to spend the rest of your life here.' Is not that what we are doing in Korea? We went there to defend South Korea in 1950, and we did it. We helped them rebuild their economy. And now they are one of the most vibrant economies on Earth, a burgeoning democracy. They are actually voting for what they want for that country in the future. That is what we want. And yet every dissident group in South Korea, what do they do, every time something goes wrong? They go burn an American flag. That is a pastime in South Korea, burning flags.
I read this in the International Herald Tribune. So I guess it is suitable to tell it here. It is the story about the Englishman, the Frenchman, and the Korean. Each one caught his wife in bed with another man. The Englishman politely excused himself and walked out. The Frenchman grabbed the guy, beat him up, and threw him out. And the Korean went down to the American Embassy and started a demonstration. [Laughter.]
So now you tell me. This has nothing to do with our affinity for South Korea, whether you think they ought to be defended. Of course, they ought to be defended. And our amendment incidentally would only remove 10,000 troops between now and 1992. That is not some kind of a headlong assault on our commitment to South Korea. But we are a lightning rod. We are an irritant to all the dissident groups in South Korea. I say it is time not just to ask them to pick up some of the tab. I noticed they agreed with Secretary Cheney the other day to give us another $30 million a year. Considering our budget constraints, I am not
denigrating $30 million a year but that is not the problem.
Mr. President, the opportunities in the world are unbelievable. And yet the rhetoric goes on. It is just the same thing. I could not watch television yesterday. You would have thought--this was worse than any political election I have ever seen. Here is a 30-second spot showing that Stealth bomber flying, shows it as such an ominous looking plane, and this mellifluous voiced announcer comes on and says `The B-2, America has to have it for its security.' That is followed by one on the Osprey, `The Osprey is absolutely essential to the defense of this Nation,' and they show that plane flying around.
And then the F-14 Tomcat--you see it take off from the carrier, and land on the carrier. All these television ads, television networks, saturated with ads, calculated to get your constituents to write me and say: `Please don't scrub the Osprey; please don't cut funding for B-2; please don't do this,'--all of this because they know the appropriations process is going on now.
You do not vote for weapons because the guy that builds the weapons wages a public relations campaign on television, do you? If you do, you ought to resign your seat in the Senate and say, `I don't know what is going on around here. I am just voting according to what I see on television.'
But the rhetoric, Gorbachev may not make it. I tell you one thing. I hope he does. James Baker says he hoped he did. George Bush said he hoped he did. We have been waiting for 70 years for the old Bolsheviks to die out; they die out and we get a leader that is charismatic, intelligent, and says to all the world, without actually using these words, that communism has been an unmitigated disaster socially, politically, culturally, and certainly economically. What do we want them to do--unilaterally disarm and let the New York Times editorial bureau witness it and report back to us?
It is the greatest time in the world to be alive so far as world peace is concerned. The President went to Poland, Hungary, and they are talking about democracy--our style of democracy.
Mr. President, I tell all these high school kids I do not want them with their diaper down. You know, Gorbachev's rating in Germany is twice as high as George Bush's. It is higher in Maggie Thatcher's England than George Bush's. And I can tell you, if you talk to the scholars of Europe, they will tell you that is a mindset that is changing in Europe.
You know what Einstein said after the first bomb went off. `Everything has changed except man's thinking.' I believe that man's thinking is beginning to change. It is the most positive thing I have seen, and it is downright exciting.
I get rhapsodic when I think about the possibilities. Let me also say, Mr. President, in Vienna our negotiators at the conventional forces Europe talks said it is absolutely amazing what the Soviets are offering. We said, `Why don't you destroy 35,000 tanks?' They came back a month later and said, `That is not a bad idea.' I told the Soviet Ambassador that we have a new steel mill in Arkansas, and we would love to have those 35,000 tanks and melt them down. They are selling their scrapped tanks to Sweden right now. In Stockholm they are melting Soviet tanks and making other things out of them. And the Soviet Union needs the money.
We have this brandnew $250 million steel mill up in northeast Arkansas. I told the Ambassador `I am going to put them in touch with you because if and when this deal is cut and you decide to destroy 25,000 to 40,000 armored personnel carriers and 35,000 tanks, we would like to have the right to buy that scrap metal from you.' He seemed genuinely pleased by it. They are already selling to the Swedes. Why would they not?
Mr. President, you know if I were going to sit down with President Bush for just 2 minutes, it would only take me 2 minutes to sum up what I am trying to say to this body; that is, if you read Barbara Tuchman or any other good historian you will find that virtually all of the wars, and all of the world's plagues have come about because some politician wanted to stay in office forever, so he put his finger to the wind, and said, `That is the way I am going.' Or he did not even see the opportunities when they existed.
When I think of the lost opportunities, I have said it before on this floor. You know Robert E. Lee did not want Virginia to secede from the Union, did not want that war, and when it was over he said to one of his aides one day, `That war should never have been fought. At a time when this country needed a few men of vision, forbearance, and courage, all we got were a bunch of demagogues feeding their hostilities, their prejudices, and their bigotries until this war became inevitable.' So I am pleased with this body as we debate this bill probably the rest of this week, and to the President, the Secretary of Defense and everybody else that is an opinion maker and a policy maker, do not let these opportunities pass us by. We have a chance for the first time in 4,000 years to provide a lasting peace on this Earth.
I want it just for my grandson.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
[Page: S8577]
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Ohio.
Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I rise to comment on the defense authorization bill that is before us today. Mr. President, I want to commend the chairman of the Armed Services Committee for his leadership in crafting a very solid defense authorization bill for fiscal years 1990 and 1991. Under the budget limitations which we had to operate, this was no simple task. There were some very difficult choices that had to be made.
Mr. President, as chairman of the Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel, I am very pleased to report that the actions we took on the bill on military personnel and compensation programs continue to support strongly the combat readiness of our men and women in uniform, and the quality of life of their families.
Mr. President, I think the one area where there is no question about the return on our investments in defense over the last 8 or 9 years is in manpower. Working together, the Congress and the administration have substantially improved manpower readiness. In the late 1970's our military leaders warned of gaping shortfalls in noncommissioned officer and petty officer manning that threatened the combat readiness of our forces. The Army was characterized by the Chief of Staff of the Army as a `hollow Army.' The Navy faced the prospect of tying up ships for lack of trained and experienced personnel.
The problems which were severe then have largely been corrected. The Congress working with the administration provided two large pay raises in 1980 and 1981 at a cost of about $13 billion in first-year costs. These raises equalized military pay levels with private sector levels. Concurrently, the Congress authorized a variable housing allowance which now costs $1.2 billion annually. That has gone a long way, despite some appropriations caps, to closing the gap between actual off-station costs and housing reimbursements.
The Congress also invested in targeted compensation initiatives, such as enlistment and reenlistment bonuses, sea pay and submarine duty pay, aviation bonuses, nuclear duty pay, and medical pay. In addition, the Congress invested in improved permanent change of station reimbursements--even though there is still more that needs to be done in this area--and in improving the overall quality of life of military members and their families through substantial upgrades in facilities, such as child development centers and housing.
As a result of these initiatives, recruiting and retention of quality people have improved significantly and have stabilized at record levels over the last 4 years. For example, last year, 93 percent of non-prior-service recruits were high school graduates and 95 percent scored average or better on the mental category entrance examination. Comparable percentages for 1980 were 68 percent and 65 percent respectively, so what we have here is an improvement in recruit quality of 37 percent in the rate of high school graduates and an increase of 46 percent in the rate, of average or above mental categories.
The gains in retention are equally dramatic. Last year, first-term and career retention rates came in at 49 percent, and 86 percent respectively. Comparable figures for 1980 were 39 percent and 71 percent. So what we have here is an increase of 26 percent in the rate of first-term retention and an increase of 21 percent in the rate of career retention.
This is not to say that the recruiting and retention picture in the military services is perfect. There are obviously problems, such as the declining youth population and nagging shortages in specific skills that continue to require our attention. However, the point I want to make with these examples is that the Congress does care about manpower readiness and the welfare of military personnel and their families and has continued to invest in the personnel accounts even in these difficult fiscal times.
Like the rest of the Defense budget, the manpower program came under pressure and was reduced by the administration in the amended budget request.
For example, the amended budget proposed a 3.6-percent pay raise for military personnel--a cutback from the 4.6-percent pay raise
advertised by the administration last year. Also, in order to tighten the manpower belt, the administration proposed a reduction in Active Force strength of 16,700, from the original Reagan request for fiscal year 1990.
Nonetheless, of the $10 billion that had to be cut out in the amended Defense budget, the manpower account was reduced by only $700 million or 7 percent of the required cut, so the manpower account came out relatively unscathed.
Mr. President, in our action on the manpower portion of the amended budget request, we were guided by the general philosophy that we should support the difficult choices of the Secretary of Defense had to make in arriving at the amended budget level. At the same time, however, we have our own responsibility in the Congress to assess the Secretary's proposals in light of our best judgments on security needs. We followed the principle that the hard won gains in personnel readiness should be protected, that manning levels should adequately support the programmed force structure, and that military personnel should be treated equitably in terms of compensation and benefits.
In the area of manpower strengths, we approved, with minor modification, the active duty and Reserve strengths requested for fiscal years 1990 and 1991. The approved strength levels represent a reduction in Active Force strength of 16,900 in fiscal year 1990 from the authorized fiscal year 1989 level, and an increase of 5,250 in Reserve Force strength in fiscal year 1990 from the authorized fiscal year 1989 level. These manpower changes essentially reflect the shifting of misions from the Active to the Reserve Forces, a matter we believe requires attention in context of a total force policy review.
Specifically, we require the Secretary of Defense to report to us on the operation of the total force policy--in other words, the effectiveness of the integration of Active and Reserve Forces--in the Department of Defense.
Mr. President, in hearings the Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel had this year, I was surprised to learn that there has been no comprehensive, authoritative study on the operation of the total force policy since its implementation over 15 years ago, in 1973.
Up until the promulgation of this policy, we traditionally relied on our Reserve and National Guard Forces during periods of national emergency or war to augment relatively small standing Active Forces. During peacetime, National Guard and Reserve Forces trained to the extent resources allowed them to do so to be prepared for callup. That is history.
Since the promulgation of the total force policy in the Department of Defense over 15 years ago, our National Guard and Reserve Forces have been designated as full partners with the active components in deterring aggression during peacetime and in waging war if peace should fail. Under this policy, substantial missions were assigned to the National Guard and Reserve components. They were no longer just standbys; they were part of that force we depended on. Therefore, our National Guard and Reserve components are no longer only forces held in reserve for a future use, nor are they just a cadre force. Instead, National Guard and Reserve units are an integral part of theatre operational plans, and successful combat operations cannot be carried out without them.
For example, the Army Reserve is relied on to provide 70 percent of the Army's combat support an combat service support forces. Combat support missions including engineer, signal, intelligence, and chemical activities. Combat service support missions include medical, maintenance, supply, transportation, and ammunition activities. Obviously, an Army cannot fight for very long without this support, and if 70 percent of this support comes from Army Reserve Forces, it is crystal clear that the Army has a big stake in the readiness of these forces. In those Army Reserve Forces involved with combat support and combat service support, what is their status now? Well, 45 percent are not combat-ready. I repeat, 45 percent are not combat-ready.
In a conventional war in Europe, Active Army Forces depend heavily upon rapid reinforcement from Army National Guard and Army Reserve units within the first 10 to 30 days after the conflict begins--without fail within 4 to 6 weeks. Without these reinforcing units, the Active Forces cannot sustain themselves and would become ineffective.
This situation is demonstrated in war game scenarios which indicate that shortfalls in the Reserve reinforcing forces quickly
become `war stoppers.' Another example: Some 80 percent of our medical combat support is supposed to come from the reserves--80 percent. Specifically, medical shortfalls in early deploying reserve units fall in this category. According to the Department of Defense, these units are short of their wartime requirements for physicians and nurses by 7,000--71 percent--and 31,000--66 percent--respectively. This is not solely an Army Reserve problem, but a serious total Army problem because it seriously affects Army combat readiness. It is a priority problem that the Army leadership must give priority attention to solving.
Every year since I have been on the Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel of the Armed Services Committee, every single year, we have heard about a new plan, and yet another plan that is going to somehow remedy this problem. And yet, the figures remain nearly the same year in and year out.
In fact, this year's report omitted the readiness figures that were reported in the past. They do not want them compared anymore, so they just omitted the readiness percentages that were normally reported so we no longer have those figures, uinless we specifically ask for them. What a head-in-the-sand approach that illustrates.
I make these points because I believe that the Department of Defense must critically and systematically review warfighting capability in a total force context, a context which must recognize the interactive dependencies among Active and Reserve Forces and the timetable for their deployment in event of war.
We need this study, Mr. President, to validate that current missions and roles are properly assigned and can be carried out, rather than a report year after year after year of the inability certain elements of our Reserve Forces to do the job they are depended on to do. We either have to have those missions and roles carried out or redo the assignments of the missions and roles to provide one basic thing, and that is effective combat capability. It either will work or not. We either can rely on it or not.
So when it comes to combat--and, God forbid that we ever have to get to that time again--but if we do, in combat there are no excuses. We either have a system that works or it does not. And if it does not, we lose and a lot of people get killed unnecessarily. That is the bottom line of what we are talking about here.
Now, before the picture gets too bleak as far as the Reserves go, let me say the Air Reserve and Guard components seem to be in very great shape in terms of combat readiness. They are performing admirably and perhaps could accept more missions. That too should be looked into in this review of our total force concept.
One other element. As we look ahead toward substantially smaller Active Forces in the future, there will, of necessity, be an even greater reliance on our Guard and Reserve and the missions they may be called upon to perform. So I think we need to, in this evaluation we are asking for, make sure there is a real comprehensive framework for evaluating the capability tradeoffs as we move in this direction.
So I look forward to receiving the mandated report so that we can use it as a basis for a plan of action to correct, on a systematic basis, persistent problems that have plagued the effective operations of the total force policy in the Department of Defense.
Now, let me turn to our action on military personnel compensation and benefits.
We approved the requested 3.6-percent pay raise for military personnel. We also asked that a study be done to review the whole military pay structure. It has not been done, except on a very piecemeal basis, for a long time.
The second area we acted on, we increased aviation career incentive pay by 60 percent, $400 per month, up to $650 per month for aviators with over 6 years of service, to help the military services retain aviators.
Let me expand on that just a little bit. Most people are unaware that we are right now, 1,500 Navy pilots short--1,500 pilots short in the Navy. We are short in the Air Force right now about 250 pilots. That is forecast, by the year 1992, to go up to 2,500 pilots short in the Air Force.
What is the problem? Is it that people do not want to serve? No, it is not.
The problem is we have a great need for airline pilots and as soon as the commitment of these service pilots reaches a certain point where they no longer have to stay in, they are off to the airlines at equal pay, about, starting out, much increased pay after a few years, and really big-time increased pay and health benefits and retirement once they have been with the airlines for, say, a 9- or 10-year period.
So we find ourselves with a problem of losing our pilots--pilots that we spend a great deal of money on to train. We spend somewhere around $500,000 just to train a pilot up to the day he pins his or her wings on. Then we send them to a replacement air group or combat crew training that costs another couple of million dollars over the next year to a year and a half. Then we send them to a squadron and they then put in a 3-year tour with that squadron and at that time you spend another $2 million to $2.5 million on that particular person. You have invested, say, $4.5 to $6 million in that person. Then we say, `you have a limited commitment'--the Air Force 7 years, going to 8 now; Navy, 7; Army, 5; Marine Corps, 4 1/2 . And we say, `OK, that is your commitment, and beyond that you are on your own.' And they get out and we start over again with another $5 million to $6 million invested in the training of a pilot to get him up to a real true combat status.
Now, I know the kind of training those people get, so I am very comforted when I get on an airliner and I know that I have a former military pilot up front. That is all good. Maybe it is to the benefit of our country overall that we have pilots like that flying for our airlines.
But we do not provide a military training program for just that purpose. That is the point. And the point is this: over the next 10 years, it is estimated the airlines and commercial air interests will be hiring pilots at a rate of about 7,000 per year. So we have to do something. Some of our incentive programs before, particularly with regard to the Navy, have worked out pretty well. So we are expanding this now with what we have proposed within this bill. But along with this we are also going to require a 9-year commitment beyond the date of pinning on the wings for fixed wing jet pilots and 7 years for other aviators, which I think is quite reasonable. I do not have any problem with that at all.
I know there has been some discussion of that in the military as to whether or not that is going to be too long. I would say to my friends in the military who are pilots right now, this does not apply to you. The old ground rules apply to you. This would be prospective. This would start with the new people signing up, new people who are just starting out on their flight training program.
I do not have any doubt at all that we can get quite a sufficient number of good people that will still sign up and want to be military pilots, even with the 9 and 7 year commitments.
In another area, we increased the ceiling on education benefits, kickers, that the Army can pay in addition to basic GI bill benefits from $400 a month to $700 per month, a $25,200 benefit over 3 years, to help the Army recruit highly qualified enlistees in critical skills, those that we are having a lot of difficulty filling.
In another area, we increased the ceiling on selective reenlistment bonuses for nuclear qualified personnel by 50 percent from $30,000 per contract for 6 years to $45,000 for 6 years.
In another area, we enhanced the survivor benefit plan, the SBP, a plan to provide an annuity to survivors of retirees by reducing the premium to a flat rate of 6.5 percent of designated retired pay; providing a supplemental option that would afford a level payment of 55 percent of retired pay to a survivor--the standard option is 55 percent until age 62, at which point the benefit drops to 35 percent; and, finally, providing a 1-year open season to allow participation in the enhanced program.
In the area of health care for military personnel and their families, we approved a number of initiatives to enhances the recruiting and retention of health care providers.
We extended the authority for the Department of Defense to pay a retention bonus of up to $20,000 per year for retention agreements entered into by certain physicians based on critical needs of the Department of Defense.
We increased medical officer monthly special pays by 35 percent.
We provided new authorities to recruit and retain nurses including: A nurse accession bonus of up to $5,000; a nurse anesthetist incentive pay of up to $6,000 per year to encourage retention; and a Navy nurse candidate program targeted at recruiting nurses who have completed 2 years of a 4-year nursing program.
We increased medical specialty pay for reservists when on active duty for training to encourage more participation by physicians in the selected Reserve.
Mr. President, this concludes my summary of the action we took in the manpower and personnel area. I think they are good actions and I recommend them for support by my colleagues in this body.
I want to close by recognizing the hard work that Senator McCain, the ranking minority member of my subcommittee, put in the manpower portion of this bill. We worked very closely together in a spirit of teamwork and cooperation in forging a responsible package--one that takes care of readiness requirements as well as our commitments to our individual soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines. I want to thank the Senator from Arizona for his hard work and counsel.
Mr. President, I also want to thank the staff--Fred Pang and Ken Johnson of the committee staffs; Fred Pang with the majority and Ken Johnson with the minority committee staff. Also Phil Upschulte and Milt Beach of my personal staff, for their hard work. As usual, they did a great job.
In particular, it has been a real pleasure to work with Fred Pang, who is here with me on the floor today. He is an outstanding committee staff member. I can vouch for that. He is very pleasant to work with, very thorough in the work that he does. It is a real pleasure to work with him on these very complex matters of pay and compensation and retirement benefits and all of the things that go into making military life palatable for people who are willing to serve their country.
It is not an easy job and some of these things that Fred works on, has worked on, are particularly beneficial to our men and women in uniform.
As usual, he has done a great job. Ken Johnson on the minority side, also, has done an outstanding job and I am sure Senator McCain will wish to address that when he makes his remarks.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the `Study on Total Force Policy,' from the committee report, be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:
[Page: S8580]
There is no doubt in the committee that our National Guard and Reserve forces are vital to our national security. We have traditionally relied on these forces during periods of national emergency or war to augment relatively small standing active forces. During peacetime, National Guard and Reserve forces trained to the extent resources allowed them to do so to be prepared for call-up. That is history.
Since the promulgation of the Total Force Policy in the Department of Defense over 15 years ago, our National Guard and Reserve forces have been designated as full partners with the active components in deterring aggression during peacetime and in waging war if peace should fail. Under this policy, substantial missions were assigned to the National Guard and Reserve components. Therefore, our National Guard and Reserve components are no longer only forces held in reserve for a future use nor are they just a cadre force. Instead, National Guard and Reserve units are an integral part of theater operational plans, and successful combat operations cannot be carried out without them.
For example, the Army Reserve is relied on to provide 70 percent of the Army's combat support and combat service support forces. Combat support missions include engineer, signal, intelligence, and chemical activities. Combat service support missions include medical, maintenance, supply, transportation, and ammunition activities. Obviously, an Army cannot fight for very long without this support, and if 70 percent of this support comes from Army Reserve forces, it is crystal clear that the Army has a big stake in the readiness of these forces.
In a conventional war in Europe, active Army forces depend heavily upon rapid reinforcement from Army National Guard and Army Reserve units within the first 10 to 30 days after the conflict begins. Without these reinforcing units, the active forces cannot sustain themselves and would become ineffective.
This situation is demonstrated in war game scenarios which indicate that shortfalls in the Reserve reinforcing forces quickly become `war stoppers.' Specifically, medical shortfalls in early deploying reserve units fall in this category. According to the Department of Defense, these units are short of their wartime requirements for physicians and nurses by 7,000 (71 percent) and 31,000 (66 percent) respectively. This is not solely an Army Reserve problem, but a serious total Army problem because it seriously affects Army combat readiness. It is a priority problem that the Army leadership must give priority attention to solving.
The committee makes these points because it believes that the Department of Defense must critically and systematically review warfighting capability in a Total Force context, a context which must recognize the interactive dependencies among active and reserve forces and the timetable for their deployment in event of war.
The committee looks forward to receiving the mandated report so that it can use it as a basis for a plan of action to correct, on a systematic basis, persistent problems that have plagued the effective operation of the Total Force Policy in the Department of Defense.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Reid). The Senator from South Carolina.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I rise in support of the 1990-91 defense authorization bill. While the authorization bill is not ideal, it represents the best compromise given the current budget problems that face our Nation. As ranking member of the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces and Nuclear Deterrence, I can assure my colleagues that this bill continues to provide our Nation with a strong strategic nuclear triad, which has been so critical in keeping the peace between the United States and the Soviet Union.
I do, however, wish to express a few serious concerns about the defense bill before us today, Mr. President. Over the years, I have made my position clear with respect to ICBM modernization. I have been, and continue to be, a strong supporter of the MX Program and the rail garrison basing concept. This year, though, I announced my support for the small ICBM, which President Bush included in his defense request. I have done so for two reasons. First, I believe that if we are to end the protracted and seemingly internecine debate over ICBM modernization, we must seek a bipartisan consensus on how a two-missile program should proceed. I believe President Bush may have achieved that consensus.
Second, the President and Vice President have indicated that support for the two-missile program is related to the funding of the strategic defense idnitiative or SDI. I am a strong supporter of SDI, and agree with the President that we must fund the program well above last year's authorization level. This is the only way that the President can make an informed decision about the program during his first term in office. My continued support for the small ICBM Program is, therefore, contingent upon the Congress funding SDI at a much higher level than last year. I am concerned, however, that the House is moving to cut SDI even further than the already drastic House Armed Services Committee reduction of $1.1 billion. Further reductions by House Members on the floor will only make an adequate conference outcome more difficult and possibly even jeopardize the bipartisan consensus on ICBM modernization.
I am also concerned about the B-2 Program. While I support the President's program, I am very concerned that the cost of the bomber may ultimately result in its cancellation. I realize that some have argued that the B-2 is only 20 percent more than the B-1B in so-called flyaway cost; that it is cheaper per warhead than the MX; and that the MX and small ICBM together are slightly less expensive than the B-2. But the bomber is still too expensive given the current budget situation. I am not sure that the American people will support the program given the high cost.
Mr. President, the committee bill also contains $303 million for the design and development of new production reactors. The country is rapidly approaching a critical shortage of nuclear materials. The Department of Energy does not have a single reactor producing plutonium or tritium for nuclear weapons. Unless we get on with building new production reactors, our supply will decay--leaving the effectiveness of our strategic deterrent forces in question and preclude our ability to meet new military requirements. Such an outcome could seriously undermine deterrence and stability. While there are adequate supplies for the moment, there is no hope, I repeat, no hope, of satisfying our requirements 10 years from now unless we get on with the new production reactor program, today.
For the interim, the Department of Energy has prudently developed a special isotope separation program, to refine already existing plutonium, if needed, before the new production reactors are finished. The President's report to Congress calls this project time-critical and essential, yet some would prefer to stop this program, in part, because we have no immediate need for plutonium. This SIS project will be the country's only source of weapon-grade plutonium. It is essential that we get on with its construction.
Finally Mr. President, as we begin the floor debate on this defense bill, I would like to make a few observations to my colleagues and the American public. As always, there will be amendments by Members to change or cut the defense bill. There are some Members, in particular, that will argue that the defense budget is unnecessarily large given certain changes in the international situation. Many will point to changes in the Soviet Union as justification to reduce defense spending--particularly funds for our nuclear deterrent forces.
I join my colleagues in welcoming Mr. Gorbachev's pronouncements to reduce his country's vast arsenal of weapons and to truly turn the Soviet Union's abundant resources to peaceful use. But in considering whether or not to cut our defense posture based on Mr. Gorbachev's recent announcements, it is important not to confuse words with deeds. Mr. Gorbachev, for example, has declared his intention to cutback Soviet military forces by 20 percent, to reduce troops and equipment in Eastern Europe and along the Chinese border, and to cut defense spending by 14 percent. All of these are welcomed gestures, if they materialize. We must, however, also look at other actions taken by the Soviets since Mr. Gorbachev assumed power.
Soviet military production and modernization are important indicators of intentions. Yet, in these arass we still see little change form past practice; in fact, in many areas of Soviet military production there have been significant increases. For example, when Mr. Gorbachev assumed power in 1985, the Soviet Union produced 3,000 tanks annually. Over the past 3 years, Soviet tank production has increased to 3,500 annually. Compare this to the United States, which only produced 775 tanks last year, and will produce even fewer this year. Indeed, the Soviet Union produces more tanks than all NATO countries combined.
In the area of strategic nuclear forces, the Soviet Union has yet to make a single reduction. The Soviets are continuing, unabated, their strategic nuclear modernization program. According to the Department of Defense, the Soviet Union produced eight submarines per year in 1986 versus three for the United States. In 1988, the Soviets produced nine submarines compared to five for the United States. The Soviets have substantially out produced the United States in ICBM production. In 1985, the Soviets produced 100 ICBM's, the United States none. In 1988, the Soviets produced 150 ICBM's versus only 19 for the United States. All of these increases occurred during Mr. Gorbachev's tenure.
While I may be willing to concede that Mr. Gorbachev is serious about his declared intentions, history tell us not to be precipitious in our desires to reduce military spending based on promises alone. Mr. President, during my more than 30 years in this distinguished body, I have heard these declarations of change in the Soviet Union many times before. During the 1950's, Mr. Khruschev alledgedly attempted to liberalize Soviet society only to have the initiatives reversed upon his removal from power. Many of my distinguished colleagues in the Senate believed that during the euphoria of detente we should reduce reduce military spending and expand high technology trade with the Soviets, which we did, only to watch Soviet military power and aggressiveness grow at unprecedented rates during the 1970's. During these periods of so-called change many of my colleagues considered Soviet attempts to liberalize their society `irreversible' and `unprecedented.' We hear these same words, today.
History shows that we should welcome peaceful change, but only, and I repeat `only,' when deeds match words. The outcome of declared Soviet reforms and intentions has not been determined and will not be for many years to come. More important, we must understand fully what the objectives of Soviet reforms are, and the implications of those objectives for U.S. national security.
Additionally, we cannot pin our hopes for true democratic change in the Soviet Union, on one leader. As recent events in China illustrate, threre can be dramatic reversals in intentions and behavior. China initiated major economic and political changes, indicating a desire to become more democratic; yet, it reverted to brutal totalitarian methods to quash democratic demonstrations and purged empathetic leaders. The same could happen in the Soviet Union and, in fact, has in certain Soviet republics. Recent strikes by Soviet miners and discontent among some Soviet leaders over the direction of Mr. Gorbachev's reforms should give us pause before making further cuts to an already austere U.S. defense budget.
Mr. President, in light of this, we must ensure that our defenses and military production base are able to maintain deterrence and stability. Mr. President, I ask my distinguished colleagues to consider these factors during their deliberations of this defense budget. We must not engage in further cuts to the defense budget or attempts to add back terminated programs. Secretary Cheney has made tough choices, and we should su