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The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is the request for unanimous consent to proceed to the immediate consideration of Calendar Order No. 317, S. 1324, a bill to authorize appropriations for fiscal years 1990 and 1991 for intelligence activities community staff, and the Central Intelligence Agency retirement and disability system, and for other purposes?
Mr. MITCHELL. Yes, Mr. President, I renew my request.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The bill will be stated by title.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:
A bill (S.1324) to authorize appropriations for fiscal years 1990 and 1991 for intelligence activities of the United States Government, the intelligence community staff, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the immediate consideration of the bill?
There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the bill, which had been reported from the Committee on Armed Services, without amendment; and which had been reported from the Select Committee on Intelligence, with amendments; as follows:
(The parts of the bill intended to be stricken are shown in italics, and the parts of the bill intended to be inserted are shown in boldface brackets.)
(1) The Central Intelligence Agency.
(2) The Department of Defense.
(3) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
(4) The National Security Agency.
(5) The Department of the Army, the Department of Navy, and the Department of the Air Force.
(6) The Department of State.
(7) The Department of the Treasury.
(8) The Department of Energy.
(9) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
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(1) by redesignating section 236 as section 237; and
(2) by inserting before the heading `Limitation on Number of Retirements,' the following:
(1) by adding at the end of paragraph (1) thereof the following new sentence: `Payment of death in service benefits for former spouses is also subject to paragraph (4) of this subsection'; and
(2) by adding after paragraph (3) thereof the following:
`(4) If a former spouse eligible for death in service benefits under provisions of this section is or becomes eligible for survivor benefits under section 224, the benefits provided under this section will not be payable and will be superseded by the benefits provided in section 224.'.
(b) The amendment made by this section shall take effect on November 15, 1982.
`(i) has five years of civilian service credit toward retirement under such subchapter III of chapter 83, title 5, United States Code;
`(ii) has not been designated under section 203 of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees, as amended (50 U.S.C. 403 note), as a participant in the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System;
`(iii) has become disabled during a period of assignment to the performance of duties that are qualifying toward such designation under section 203; and
`(iv) satisfies the requirements for disability retirement under section 8337 of title 5, United States Code--
shall, upon his own application or upon order of the Director, be retired on an annuity computed in accordance with the rules prescribed in such section 231, in lieu of an annuity computed as provided by section 8337 of title 5, United States Code.
`(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in the case of an officer or employee of the Central Intelligence Agency subject to retirement system coverage under subchapter III of chapter 83, title 5, United States Code, who--
`(i) has at least eighteen months of civilian service credit toward retirement under such subchapter III of chapter 83, title 5, United States Code;
`(ii) has not been designated under section 203 of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees, as amended (50 U.S.C. 403 note), as a participant in the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System;
`(iii) prior to separation or retirement from the Agency, dies during a period of assignment to the performance of duties that are qualifying toward such designation under such section 203; and
`(iv) is survived by a widow or widower, former spouse, and/or a child or children as defined in section 204 and section 232 of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees, who would otherwise be entitled to an annuity under section 8341 of title 5, United States Code--
such widow or widower, former spouse, and/or child or children of such officer or employee shall be entitled to an annuity computed in accordance with such section 232, in lieu of an annuity computed in accordance with section 8341 of title 5, United States Code.
`(c) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an officer or employee of the Central Intelligence Agency subject to retirement system coverage under chapter 84 of title 5, United States Code, who--
`(i) has completed at least eighteen months of civilian service creditable under section 8411 of title 5, United States Code;
`(ii) has not been designated pursuant to section 302(a) of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees, as amended (50 U.S.C. 403 note);
`(iii) has become disabled during a period of assignment to the performance of duties that are qualifying toward such designation pursuant to such section; and
`(iv) satisfies the requirements for disability retirement under subchapter V of chapter 84, title 5, United States Code--
shall, on the officer's or employee's own application or an application by the Director, be retired on an annuity computed as if the officer or employee, prior to becoming disabled, had been designated pursuant to section 302(a) of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees, as amended (50 U.S.C. 403 note), in lieu of the annuity amount that would otherwise be computed under subchapter V of chapter 84 of title 5, United States Code.
`(d) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in the case of an officer or employee of the Central Intelligence Agency subject to retirement system coverage under chapter 84 of title 5, United States Code, who--
`(i) has at least eighteen months of civilian service creditable under section 8411 of title 5, United States Code;
`(ii) has not been designated pursuant to section 302(a) of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees, as amended (50 U.S.C. 403 note);
`(iii) prior to separation or retirement from the Agency, dies during a period of assignment to the performance of duties that are qualifying toward such designation pursuant to such section; and
`(iv) is survived by a widow or widower, former spouse, and/or child or children as defined in section 8441 of title 5, United States Code, who would be entitled to a lump-sum survivor benefit, a survivor annuity and/or if applicable, a supplementary annuity, under subchapter IV of chapter 84, title 5, United States Code--
the survivor benefit or benefits of such widow or widower, former spouse, and/or child or children shall be computed as if the officer or employee, prior to death, had been designated pursuant to section 302(a) of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees, as amended (50 U.S.C. 403 note), in lieu of the benefit amount or amounts that would otherwise be computed pursuant to subchapter IV of chapter 84, title 5, United States Code.
`(e)(1) The annuities provided under subsections (a) and (b) of this section shall be deemed to be annuities under chapter 83 of title 5, United States Code, for purposes of the other provisions of such chapter and other laws (including the Internal Revenue Code of 1986) relating to such annuities, and shall be payable from the Civil Service Retirement and Disability Fund established under section 8348 of such title.
`(2) The annuities and/or other benefits provided under subsections (c) and (d) of this section shall be deemed to be annuities and/or benefits under chapter 84 of title 5, United States Code, for purposes of the other provisions of such chapter and other laws (including the Internal Revenue Code of 1986) relating to such annuities and/or benefits, and shall be payable from the Civil Service Retirement and Disability Fund established pursuant to section 8348 of title 5, United States Code.'.
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`2606. Gifts to support the Defense Intelligence College
`(a) The Secretary of Defense is authorized to accept, hold, administer, and use gifts, to include bequests or devises, money, securities, or other property, both real and personal, for the purpose of aiding and facilitating the work of the Defense Intelligence College.
`(b) Gifts of money and proceeds from sales of property received as gifts shall be deposited in the Treasury and shall be available for disbursement upon the order of the Secretary.
`(c) For purposes of Federal income, estate, and gift taxation, gifts accepted by the Secretary under this section shall be considered to be to or for the use of the United States.
`(d) The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe regulations to carry out this section.'.
(b) The table of contents of chapter 155 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end thereof the following:
`2606. Gifts to support the Defense Intelligence College.'.
(a) the National Security Council determines that such increase is essential to the effective functioning of the United States Mission to the Soviet Union; and
(b) the FBI is provided sufficient additional resources to fulfill its responsibilities resulting from the increased number of permanent positions at the Soviet Mission to the United States.
`(1) create an objective and effective office, appropriately accountable to Congress, to initiate and conduct independently, inspections, investigations, and audits relating to programs and operations of the Central Intelligence Agency;
`(2) provide leadership and recommend policies designed to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration of such programs and operations, and to detect fraud and abuse in such programs and operations; and
`(3) provide a means for keeping the Director of Central Intelligence fully and currently informed about problems and deficiencies relating to the administration of such programs and operations, and the necessity for and the progress of corrective actions, and, in the manner prescribed by this section, to ensure the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (hereinafter referred to as `the intelligence committees') are kept similarly informed of significant problems and deficiencies as well as the necessity for and the progress of corrective actions,
there is hereby established in the Central Intelligence Agency an Office of Inspector General.
`(b) Appointment; supervision; removal.--
`(1) There shall be at the head of the Office an Inspector General who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advise and consent of the Senate. This appointment shall be made without regard to political affiliation and shall be solely on the basis of integrity, compliance with the security standards of the Central Intelligence Agency, and prior experience in the field of foreign intelligence. Such appointment shall also be made on the basis of demonstrated ability in accounting, financial analysis, law, management analysis, or public administration.
`(2) The Inspector General shall report directly to and be under the general supervision of the Director of Central Intelligence.
`(3) The Director may prohibit the Inspector General from initiating, carrying out, or completing any audit, inspection, or investigation if he determines that such prohibition is necessary to protect vital national security interests of the United States.
`(4) If the Director exercises any power under subsection (3), above, he shall submit an appropriately classified statement of the reasons for the exercise of such power within seven days to the intelligence committees. The Director shall advise the Inspector General at the time such report is submitted, and, to the extent consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, provide the Inspector General with a copy of any such report. In such cases, the Inspector General may submit such comments to the intelligence committees that he may deem appropriate.
`(5) In accordance with section 535 of title 28, United States Code, the Director of Central Intelligence shall report to the Attorney General any information, allegation, or complaint received from the Inspector General, relating to violations of Federal criminal law (title 18, U.S.C. et seq.) involving any officer or employee of the Central Intelligence Agency, consistent with such guidelines as may be issued by the Attorney General pursuant to subsection 535(b)(2) of title 28, United States Code. A copy of all such reports shall be furnished the Inspector General.
`(6) The Inspector General may be removed from office only by the President. The President shall immediately communicate in writing to the intelligence committees the reasons for any such removal.
`(c) Duties and Responsibilities.--It shall be the duty and responsibility of the Inspector General appointed under this section--
`(1) to provide policy direction for and to conduct, supervise, and coordinate independently, the inspections, investigations, and audits relating to the programs and operations of the Central Intelligence Agency to assure they are conducted efficiently and in accordance with applicable law and regulations;
`(2) to keep the Director fully and currently informed concerning violations of law and regulations, fraud and other serious problems, abuses and deficiencies that may occur in such programs and operations, and to report the progress made in implementing corrective action;
`(3) to take due regard for the protection of intelligence sources and methods in the preparation of all reports issued by the Office of Inspector General, and, to the extent consistent with the purpose and objective of such reports, take such measures as may be appropriate to minimize the disclosure of intelligence sources and methods described in such reports; and
`(4) in the execution of his responsibilities, to comply with generally accepted government auditing standards.
`(d) Semiannual Reports; Immediate reports of Serious or Flagrant Problems; Report of Functional Problems:
`(1) The Inspector General shall not later than June 30 and December 31 of each year, prepare and submit to the Director of Central Intelligence a classified semiannual report summarizing the activities of the Office during the immediately preceding six-month period. Within thirty days, the Director shall transmit such reports to the intelligence committees with any comments he may deem appropriate. Such reports shall, at a minimum, include:
`(i) a description of significant problems, abuses, and deficiencies relating to the administration of programs and operations of the Central Intelligence Agency disclosed by the Office of Inspector General during the reporting period;
`(ii) a description of the recommendations for corrective action made by the Office of Inspector General during the reporting period with respect to significant problems, abuses, or deficiencies identified in subparagraph (i), above;
`(iii) an identification of each significant recommendation described in previous semiannual reports on which corrective action has not been completed;
`(iv) a certification that the Inspector General has had full and direct access to all information relevant to the performance of his functions;
`(v) a description of all cases occurring during the reporting period where the Inspector General could not obtain documentary evidence relevant to any inspection, audit, or investigation due to his lack of authority to subpoena such information; and
`(vi) such recommendations as he may wish to make concerning legislation to promote economy and efficiency in the administration of programs and operations undertaken by the Central Intelligence Agency, and to detect fraud and abuse in such programs and operations.
`(2) The Inspector General shall report immediately to the Director of Central Intelligence whenever he becomes aware of particularly serious or flagrant problems, abuses, or deficiencies relating to the administration of programs or operations. The Director shall transmit such report to the intelligence committees within seven calendar days, together with any comments he may deem appropriate.
`(3) In the event that--
`(i) the Inspector General is unable to resolve any differences with the Director of Central Intelligence affecting the execution of his duties or responsibilities;
`(ii) an investigation, inspection or audit carried out by the Inspector General should focus upon the Director or Acting Director; or
`(iii) the Inspector General, after exhausting all possible alternatives, is unable to obtain significant documentary information in the course of an investigation,
the Inspector General shall immediately report such matter to the intelligence committees.
`(e) Authorities of the Inspector General.
`(1) The Inspector General shall have direct and prompt access to the Director, when necessary for any purpose pertaining to the performance of his duties.
`(2) The Inspector General shall have access to any employee or any employee of a contractor of the Central Intelligence Agency whose testimony is needed for the performance of his duties. In addition, he shall have direct access to all records, reports, audits, reviews, documents, papers, recommendations or other material which relate to the programs and operations with respect to which the Inspector General has responsibilities under this section. Failure on the part of any employee or contractor to cooperate with the Inspector General shall be grounds for appropriate administrative actions by the Director, to include loss of employment or the termination of an existing contractual relationship.
`(3) The Inspector General is authorized to receive and investigate complaints or information from an employee of the Central Intelligence Agency concerning the existence of an activity constituting a violation of laws, rules, or regulations, or mismanagement, gross waste of funds, abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to the public health and safety. Once such complaint or information has been received--
`(i) The Inspector General shall not disclose the identity of the employee without the consent of the employee, unless the Inspector General determines that such disclosure is unavoidable during the course of the investigation; and
`(ii) No action constituting a reprisal, or threat of reprisal, for making such complaint may be taken by any employee of the Central Intelligence Agency in a position to take such actions, unless the complaint was made or the information was disclosed with the knowledge that it was false or with willful disregard for its truth or falsity.
`(4) The Inspector General shall have authority to administer to or take from any person an oath, affirmation, or affidavit, whenever necessary in the performance of his duties, which oath affirmation, or affidavit when administered or taken by or before an employee of the Office of Inspector General designated by the Inspector General shall have the same force and effect as if administered or taken by or before an officer having a seal;
`(5) The Inspector General shall be provided with appropriate and adequate office space at central and field office locations, together with such equipment, office supplies, maintenance services, and communications facilities and services as may be necessary for the operation of such offices;
`(6) Subject to applicable law and the policies of the Director of Central Intelligence, the Inspector General shall select, appoint and employ such officers and employees as may be necessary to carry out his functions. In making such selections, the Inspector General shall ensure that such officers and employees have the requisite training and experience to enable him to carry out his duties effectively. In this regard, it is the sense of Congress that the Inspector General should create within his organization a career cadre of sufficient size to provide appropriate continuity and objectivity needed for the effective performance of his duties; and
`(7) With the concurrence of the Director of Central Intelligence, the Inspector General may request such information or assistance as may be necessary for carrying out his duties and responsibilities from any federal agency. Upon request of the Inspector General for such information or assistance, the head of the federal agency involved, shall, insofar as is practicable and not in contravention of any existing statutory restriction or regulation of the federal agency concerned, furnish to the Inspector General, or to an authorized designee, such information or assistance.
`(f) Separate Budget Account.--Beginning with fiscal year 1991, and in accordance with procedures to be issued by the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation with the intelligence committees, the Director of Central Intelligence shall include in the National Foreign Intelligence Program budget a separate account for the Office of Inspector General established pursuant to this section.
`(g) Transfer.--There shall be transferred to the Office of Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency, the office of that agency referred to as the `Office of Inspector General'. The personnel, assets, liabilities, contracts, property, records, and unexpended balances of appropriations, authorization, allocations, and other funds employed, held, used, arising from, or available to such `Office of Inspector General' are hereby transferred to the Office of Inspector General established pursuant to this section.
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`(a) keep the intelligence committees fully and currently informed of all intelligence activities, other than covert actions, as defined in subsection 503(e), below, which are the responsibility of, are engaged in by, or are carried out for or on behalf of, any department, agency, or entity of the United States Government, including any significant anticipated intelligence activity and significant failures; and
`(b) furnish the intelligence committees any information or material concerning intelligence activities other than covert actions which is within their custody or control, and which is requested by either of the intelligence committees in order to carry out its authorized responsibilities.
`(1) Each finding shall be in writing, unless immediate action by the United States is required and time does not permit the preparation of a written finding, in which case a written record of the President's decision shall be contemporaneously made and shall be reduced to a written finding as soon as possible but in no event more than forty-eight hours after the decision is made;
`(2) A finding may not authorize or sanction covert actions, or any aspect of such activities, which have already occurred;
`(3) Each finding shall specify each and every department, agency, or entity of the United States Government authorized to fund or otherwise participate in any significant way in such activities: Provided, That any employee, contractor, or contract agent of a department, agency, or entity of the United States Government other than the Central Intelligence Agency directed to participate in any way in a covert action shall be subject either to the policies and regulations of the Central Intelligence Agency, or to written policies or regulations adopted by such department, agency, or entity, to govern such participation;
`(4) Each finding shall specify whether it is contemplated that any third party which is not an element of, contractor or contract agent of, the United States Government, or is not otherwise subject to United States Government policies or regulations, will be used to fund or otherwise participate in any significant way in the covert action concerned, or be used to undertake the covert action concerned on behalf of the United States;
`(5) A finding may not authorize any action intended to influence United States political processes, public opinion, policies or media; and
`(6) a finding may not authorize any action which violates the Constitution of the United States or any statutes of the United States.
`(b) To the extent consistent with due regard for the protection from unauthorized disclosure of classified information relating to sensitive intelligence sources and methods, or other exceptionally sensitive matters, the Director of Central Intelligence and the heads of all departments, agencies, and other entities of the United States Government involved in a covert action shall--
`(1) keep the intelligence committees fully and currently informed of all covert actions which are the responsibility of, are engaged in by, or are carried out for or on behalf of, any department, agency, or entity of the United States Government, including significant failures; and
`(2) furnish to the intelligence community any information or material concerning covert actions which is in the possession, custody or control of any department, agency, or entity of the United States Government and which is requested by either of the intelligence communities in order to carry out its authorized responsibilities.
`(c)(1) Except as provided by subsections (2) and (3) below, the President shall ensure that any finding approved, or determination made, pursuant to subsection (a), above, shall be reported to the intelligence committees prior to the initiation of the activities authorized.
`(2) On rare occasions when time is of the essence, the President may direct that covert actions be initiated prior to reporting such actions to the intelligence committees. On such occasions, the President shall fully inform the intelligence committees in a timely fashion and shall provide a statement of the reasons for not giving prior notice.
`(3) When the President determines it is essential to meet extraordinary circumstances affecting vital interests of the United States, the President may limit the reporting of findings or determinations pursuant to subsections (1) and (2) of this section, to the chairmen and ranking minority members of the intelligence committees, the Speaker and minority leader of the House of Representatives, and the majority and minority leaders of the Senate. In such case, the President shall provide a statement of the reasons for limiting access to such findings or determinations in accordance with this subsection.
`(4) In all cases reported pursuant to subsections (c)(1), (c)(2), and (c)(3), above, a copy of the finding, signed by the President, shall be provided to the chairman of each intelligence committee.
`(d) The President shall ensure that the intelligence committees, or, if applicable, the Members of Congress specified in subsection (c)(3), above, are notified of any significant change in a previously-approved covert action, or any significant undertaking pursuant to a previously-approved finding, in the same manner as findings are reported pursuant to subsection (c), above.
`(e) As used in this section, the term `covert action' means an activity or activities conducted by an element of the United States Government to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad so that the role of the United States Government is not intended to be apparent or acknowledged publicly, but does not include--
`(1) activities the primary purpose of which is to acquire intelligence, traditional counterintelligence activities, traditional activities to improve or maintain the operational security of the United States Government programs, or administrative activities;
`(2) traditional diplomatic or military activities or routine support to such activities;
`(3) traditional law enforcement activities conducted by United States Government law enforcement agencies or routine support to such activities; or
`(4) activities to provide routine support to the overt activities (other than activities described in paragraph (1), (2), or (3)) of other United States Government agencies abroad.'.
Sec. 903. Section 502 of title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 414) is redesignated as section 504 of such Act, and is amended by deleting the number `501' in subsection (a)(2) of such section and substituting in lieu thereof `503'; and is further amended by adding the following new subsection (d):
`(d) No funds appropriated for, or otherwise available to, any department, agency, or entity of the United States Government, may be expended, or may be directed to be expended, for any covert action, as defined in subsection 503(e), above, unless and until a Presidential finding required by subsection 503(a), above, has been signed or otherwise issued in accordance with that subsection.'.
Sec. 904. Section 503 of title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 415) is redesignated as section 505 of such Act.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma.
Mr. BOREN. Mr. President, in a moment I will make a request in relationship to consideration of this legislation dealing with the application of the Budget Act. We have advised the Budget Committee of this request and it is my understanding that they pose no objections to it.
This waiver is necessitated by section 403 of the bill, which, in effect, provides that the death and disability benefits for CIA employees who are killed or disabled in the course of official duties overseas are calculated at the same rate, regardless of the particular retirement program in which the employee is enrolled.
The CIA reports that only one or two employees are expected to be affected by this provision, resulted in an estimated annual cost to the government of only $10,000 per year.
In view of this negligible cost involved with this provision, and the desirability of treating all CIA employees similarly in such circumstance, the committee feels this additional entitlement is justified and a waiver of possible points of order under the Budget Act is appropriate.
So, Mr. President, at this time, I ask unanimous consent that in regard to the consideration of this bill, the Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal years 1990 and 1991, that any points of order under the Budget Act be waived, as they might apply to title IV of the bill as reported by the Select Committee on Intelligence.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is so ordered.
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Mr. BOREN. Mr. President, it is an honor for me to present to the Senate the intelligence authorization bill for fiscal years 1990 and 1991. This is indeed the 13th consecutive year, dating back to the creation of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in 1976 that the Senate has had the opportunity to consider an intelligence authorization bill.
Joining me in offering this bill is the distinguished Senator from Maine, the vice chairman of the Intelligence Committee. This is Senator Cohen's next-to-the-last-year of service on the Intelligence Committee and I can think of no one who has made a greater contribution to the work of the committee than he has made. He has become extremely knowledgeable in this area during his 7 years of service on the committee and his insights and judgments have enormously benefited all of us on the committee and have been of great benefit to our country. It has been a privilege for me to work with him to fashion what I believe are sensible bipartisan policies and programs in this critical area of national security.
In addition to Senator Cohen, I also specifically want to thank those Members of the Intelligence Committee who also serve on the Armed Services Committee--Senator Nunn, the distinguished chairman of that committee, Senator Warner, the ranking member, and Senator Glenn. Without the interests, contribution and support of these crossover Members, the Intelligence Committee's work would be undoubtedly much more difficult and much less successful.
I should also note that the work of the Strategic Forces and Nuclear Deterrence Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee makes an important contribution to the review of U.S. intelligence activities. As such, I thank Senator Exon and Thurmond, the chairman and ranking member of that subcommittee, for their careful review and continuing support of our efforts.
Mr. President, because of the sensitivity of the matters dealt with in the intelligence authorization bill, I cannot discuss some of the details in open session. However, the committee's recommendations on these matters have been set forth in the classified supplement to the committee's report on S. 1324 which has been available to Members under the provision of Senate Resolution 400 since early September.
U.S. intelligence is clearly in a period of transition. The late 1970's and early 1980's saw dramatic growth in virtually every aspect of the intelligence budget, and we continue to see improvements in our capabilities as the systems and activities supported by past investment come on line. These improved capabilities were designed to meet the intelligence requirements of the 1980's and, as a result of this growth, I believe that U.S. intelligence is stronger today than it was 10 years ago. Obviously, it is important that these capabilities be maintained and we continue to try to strengthen them.
The budgets we are working on today represent the first ones that will be executed in the decade of the 1990's and, like the budgets of the early 1980's, will determine how well U.S. intelligence will be able to do its job in the latter part of this decade. It is clear, however, that with the budgetary environment today, we are dealing with a situation that is markedly different than it was 10 years ago. Resources are more scarce and the Department of Defense cannot be as generous in allocating funds for those new or improved intelligence programs deemed necessary by intelligence program managers. As such, there is an intense competition for resources between those intelligence activities and initiatives aimed at meeting present needs and those aimed at meeting future needs. The choices to be made are difficult ones and very important ones.
Given this situation and understanding that the budgetary picture is probably going to get worse before it gets better, the committee conducted its review consistent with the following broad framework: First, we took into account the tough budget environment. While we continue to believe that national intelligence activities should be assigned a very high priority in the allocation of our national security resources, we also recognized that savings, wherever possible, in intelligence programs should be desirable and should be undertaken.
Second, we wanted to protect our current intelligence capabilities. Specifically, we wanted to assure adequate support of what we considered to be the core intelligence activities; that is, those activities that clearly are central
to the performance of the intelligence mission. We define this category broadly so as to include all types of collection, processing and analysis, as well as counterintelligence and security activities.
I think we have been successful in this goal. None of the potential changes in the budget that we recommend would harm our current capabilities. On the contrary, while I cannot go into detail, I can say that we have removed to correct deficiencies we found in the budget request in this regard, including improvements in our human resource capability in key areas.
Our third goal was to assure adequate investment for the future. We reviewed all intelligence programs against future requirements to insure that imnportant initiatives to address future threats were properly funded. We have recommended accelerating certain initiatives aimed at improving our national technical means capabilities for arms control moitoring and weapons assessments. We have also funded a number of initiatives aimed at improving our capability to monitor nuclear developments in a peaceful nuclear explosion treaty and threshold test ban treaty environment, and thanks to an amendment by Senator Warner, the committee has directed the intelligence community to identify new collection and analytical initiatives to help monitor Soviet compliance with a conventional forces arms agreement, as might be expected in the foreseeable future.
Our fourth goal was to look for ways of making intelligence operations more effective with an eye toward achieving savings. In this regard, we have addressed certain organizational, intelligence processing, and personnel issues, which will lead, in our judgment to more cost effective intelligence operations in the future. Further, we took a hard look at management and administrative costs for potential savings and here too we were successful in identifying prudent areas in which savings could be made.
In conducting the review in this fashion, it should not be implied that we were dissatisfied with the overall quality of the budgets submitted to us by the administration. I have the utmost confidence in our Nation's intelligence leadership
and recognize that they must cope with budgetary and other difficult decisions every day. The budget requests submitted to us by the Director of Central Intelligence, the various intelligence managers in the Department of Defense, and the other departments were sound. In the end, they earned the strong support of both the Intelligence and Armed Services Committees for the overwhelming majority of their budgetary recommendations.
The authorization bill we are considering today is the principal means by which the committee and the Senate annually establish policies and set priorities for the U.S. intelligence community. As usual, it represents the product of long hours of closed hearings and meetings, and of the review of thousands of pages of highly classified documentation. This year's bill comes to the floor by a somewhat different route, however, than previous authorization bills. The committee reported out this bill initially as an original bill on July 15, 1989, and it was sequentially referred to the committees on Armed Services, Judiciary, and Foreign Relations under the provisions of Senate Resolution 400. During the period of sequential referral, there were additional developments which prompted the committee to ask unanimous consent that the bill be returned to it for consideration of additional amendments. This request was granted by the Senate on October 3, 1989.
The committee subsequently considered and approved two additional amendments to the bill, both of substantial consequence. The first is an amendment, originally offered by Senator Specter, to create an independent statutory inspector general for the Central Intelligence Agency. The second is an amendment, offered by Senator Cohen and myself, to add to the bill the noncontroversial portions of a bill reported by the committee 2 years ago, S. 1721, which was previously reported by the committee and approved by the Senate on March 15, 1988 by a vote of 71 to 19. These sections of the bill codify several extremely important procedures under which findings will be issued including such provisions as requiring findings to be in writing and not retroactive.
In addition, Senator Cohen proposed an amendment to require the President to notify the intelligence committees within 48 hours of his authorizing a covert action.
In recent days, Mr. President, the committee was able to reach a compromise with the Bush administration in terms of when covert actions will be reported to the intelligence committees. With this commitment, the 48-hour issue was removed as a source of controversy in the pending legislation.
I am going to ask Senator Cohen later to explain to you the nature and significance of this compromise but suffice it to say the committee believes this agreement should permit the Congress to enact noncontroversial but nonetheless important improvements in the congressional oversight process that was developed last year.
Before I turn to Senator Cohen let me return to the amendment to establish the independent inspector general at the CIA.
This amendment represents a modification of S. 199, introduced by Senator Specter earlier this year. S. 199 was virtually identical to another bill, S. 1818 introduced by Senator Specter during the 100th Congress. Responding in part to the report of the Iran-Contra committees which had recommended the creation of a statutory inspector general at the CIA, the Intelligence Committee held hearings on S. 1818 in 1988 but deferred any action on the bill largely on the basis of a request from Judge Webster, the Director of Central Intelligence who had only been in the position for 8 months at that time. He requested that he be given more time to implement actions to improve the performance of the existing Office of Inspector General.
Since that time the committee has continued to monitor the status of such actions as well as the activities of the office itself. The committee has in fact asked the DCI to institute inspector general inquires into several matters being investigated independently by the committee, giving us an independent basis to assess the performance of the inspector general's Office. While it is true that the committee has asked for and evaluated a relatively small percentage of the total number of reports produced by the CIA inspector general, we do not believe that review of additional reports would alter our overall perception. In general, we assess such performance as uneven. Some investitations and inspections appear to have been thorough and to have been arrived at through objective consideration and to have arrived at objective conclusions. Others have appeared otherwise. I hasten to add the committee does not attribute the shortcomings it perceives to the competence of individuals involved. The committee has ordinarily found them dilligent and earnest, and I would say honest and honorable. Rather, we believe the shortcomings can largely be the attributed to the institutional framework in which the inspector general at the CIA now operates. He is appointed by and reports to the Director and serves at the pleasure of the Director. He is part of the management team at the Agency. Much of his staff is comprised of CIA employees who rotate into the office for a year or two and then are rotated back into the other jobs within the Agency.
While clearly it is important that the inspector general's staff have Agency experience, the committee does not believe that the current structure promotes thorough and objective investigations and inspections.
It is simply very difficult for someone serving a short-term stint in the inspector general's office seeking promotion in the regular course of Agency professional development and other career work within the Agency to have the same kind of approach to these investigative matters as would be the case with a core staff of professionals who are really following a career path within the inspector general service.
We also cannot ignore the experience of other departments and agencies which now have inspector general under the Inspector General Act of 1978. All Cabinet-level departments and agencies in fact including those with responsibility in the national security area have statutory inspector generals except for the CIA. Their experience seems to have been that the status of the inspector general was enhanced and the performance of these offices improved by such legislation.
That is not to say the CIA is like other departments and agencies. It is not. It has a unique and highly sensitive mission, and its Director has unque and extraordinary authorities under the law. Its employees must meet extraordinarily high standards both for security and suitability. By and large, they are unusually capable and devoted Government employees literally willing to risk life and limb for their country and to work under very difficult conditions.
Mr. President, I would simply add that by the very nature
of the work of the Agency, many successes are never known to the American people and many sacrifices and risks of life that are made to serve the national security interests of this country will never be made public. I have never worked with a more extraordinarily capable and dedicated group of individuals. They deserve great credit.
We all have great confidence in the integrity, the honesty, and character of the current Director of the Central Intelligence Agency as well as those who serve immediately with him. And this legislation creating a statutory inspector general at the CIA should not be taken as a reflection on either the Director or any of the employees of the Agency.
We are not recommending this initiative because we have evidence that there are problems with CIA personnel that need to be rooted out. These are hard-working, dedicated people of integrity and judgment, as I have said, making a very significant contribution to the Nation's security. With any department or agency, however, there may occasionally be bad apples. This has historically been a rare exception.
The committee favors creation of an independent inspector general not because we sense there is some wrongdoing waiting to be uncovered out there but, rather, because we see it as an important functional area of the Agency's operation that can and should be improved and strengthened. In the end, we believe it will strengthen the Agency and well serve its Director, providing even greater assurance that applicable laws and policies are being followed.
I know some members of the committee are concerned we not place too heavy a burden on CIA employees, that we not so overload the system with inspectors, lawyers, and accountants that we discourage initiative and risktaking. I share that concern. But I do not believe that creating an Office of Inspector General should or will have this effect. We are talking about ensuring compliance with the law and ensuring compliance with applicable policy in the orders of the President. How can an inspector general discourage innovative and creative operations if they are permitted by law and policy? And if they are not permitted by law or policy, we certainly do not want them in the first place.
Thus, with all due respect to those who genuinely share this concern, I do not find it a pervasive reason to reject this proposal.
Mr. President, I think we have produced a sound proposal that prudently takes account of the unique mission and authorities of the Central Intelligence Agency in creating this statutory Office of Inspector General. We could not simply place the CIA under the Inspector General Act of 1978. It would not fit into this framework. We have, however, crafted a bill that adapts those provisions in the Inspector General Act which can be applied to the CIA, consistent with its existing statutory authorities. We believe it will work.
For example, the Director has the final right to decide whether the inspector general may use the services of other Government agencies and contractors under this bill. The Director may also order the cessastion of an investigation or limit its scope for national security reasons, provided that the intelligence committees are advised of the Director's actions.
Before relinquishing the floor to my distinguished colleagues and vice chairman, let me take one moment also to acknowledge Senator Specter's unique contribution as the sponsor and prime mover of the inspector general amendment. He recognized this need, and he has persistently and persuasively advocated this change within the committee, eventually bringing a substantial majority to his position. He has also been sensitive to the uniqueness of the Central Intelligence Agency and changes in the system that needed to be made to make this bill applicable to the special circumstances.
I wish to acknowledge the significant contribution made to this effort by Senator Glenn as both a member of the committee and the distinguished chairman of the Governmental Affairs Committee. The Governmental Affairs Committee is, of course, the committee of primary jurisdiction over the Inspector General Act of 1978. With the fortunate circumstance of having Senator Glenn on the Intelligence Committee and also chairing that very important Committee on Governmental Affairs, we were able to ensure that the concerns of that distinguished committee were addressed, and I believe adequately resolved in our action on the bill. We appreciate the tremendous amount of input that we
had from the members of the Governmental Affairs Committee and the members of their staffs as well.
Before I close, Mr. President, let me also summarize the other unclassified provisions of the bill before us.
Title I, indeed, authorizes appropriations for U.S. intelligence activities for fiscal years 1990 and 1991. It also incorporates authorized personnel ceilings for U.S. intelligence agencies for these years.
Title II authorizes appropriations and establishes personnel ceilings for the intelligence community staff for fiscal years 1990 and 1991, the staff which supports the DCI in the execution of his functions as head of the U.S. intelligence community.
Title III authorizes appropriations for the CIA retirement and disability fund for fiscal years 1990 and 1991.
Title IV contains three provisions making adjustments in certain administrative authorities granted the CIA.
Title V contains several provisions relating to the intelligence activities of the Department of Defense, including a 1-year extension of the authority enacted last yeart to pay increased death benefits to defense attaches killed in the line of duty.
Title VI of the bill contains three provisions pertaining to the counterintelligence authorities of the FBI. One of these is particularly significant and that is a provision which makes the FBI responsible for the conduct of all espionage investigations at U.S. diplomatic establishments overseas. The committee has been concerned that in such situations, there has been no U.S. agency expressly in charge. It makes sense to us that we have the FBI, the premier Federal agency in the counterintelligence area, placed in charge of such cases. While we do not intend that the personnel, resources, and authorities of other Federal agencies not be utilized where appropriate in such cases, we believe it will impove the effectiveness of such investigations to place them under FBI supervision.
Title VII of the bill authorizes increases in employee compensation and benefits as may otherwise be authorized by law.
In conclusion, Mr. President, let me simply acknowledge the contributions of all of the members of the committee, as well as our very competent and dedicated staff, to the development of this legislation.
It was a cooperative, productive, and bipartisan effort of which the committee and the Senate, as a whole, can be proud. I urge the adoption of the legislation that is now before us.
Mr. President, I now relinquish the floor so that my colleague, the distinguished vice chairman, for whom I have such admiration, can now make his opening remarks.
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Mr. COHEN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, first let me thank my good friend and colleague from Oklahoma. It is customary that we exchange flatteries on the Senate floor. I recall last year I got up and praised the chairman, and I said, `On no other committee can I recall that I have had such cooperation, such a consensus, and such a fine individual to work with as Senator Boren.' Of course, I failed to look out of the corner of my eye. Senator Nunn, the Senator from Georgia was there, and I serve on the Armed Services Committee with Senator Nunn. He pointed out that he had a similar track record, of course, of cooperation, consensus building, and indeed working in a bipartisan fashion to forge a consensus on defense policy, as well as foreign policy. So with that caveat, let me say once again how pleased and proud I am to have served with Senator Boren, who indeed does try his level best to build a well-considered, bipartisan, common ground among our membership. He truly has been impressive in terms of not only the way he conducts the meetings but in the product we manage to produce.
Senator Boren has highlighted some of the key provisions of our intelligence authorization bill. I wish to focus on one key provision. That has to do with the notice of covert actions. Last year we passed a measure in this Chamber, S. 1721, which mandated a notification of covert actions--prior notification where possible; but in the event that there could not be prior noification, the measure permitted subsequent notification within 48 hours.
That measure passed by a vote of 71 to 19. There was overwhelming support for that provision. That measure stemmed from the controversy that arose during the Iran-Contra investigation. But the issue goes back to 1980, when Congress amended the National Security Act, specifically section 501(b), to provide that the President must give prior notice of covert actions. In the event that some exigency prevented prior notice, however, he was required to provide notification in a timely fashion.
The phrase `timely fashion' was somewhat ambiguous--I must say deliberately so. But it was framed in order to give the President some flexibility so that in the event that time did not permit, he could delay notice for a few days. That was always the working understanding that the committees, the oversight committees on intelligence, had with the President of the United States.
That worked fine. We had no difficulty whatsoever. In fact, during the first 6 years--at least 5 years of the Reagan administration--there was not only timely notice, but actually prior notice. In virtually every case but one, possibly two, that I am aware of, we always had prior notice--except for that situation called the Iran-Contra scandal.
At that time, during the course of the Iran-Contra hearings, the Justice Department made a determination that the language contained in the 1980 amendments gave the President virtually unfettered discretion to withhold notice for a day, a week, a month, or even a year. They concluded that this was the President's prerogative, and further, that it was recognized as such under the 1980 statute.
We simply could not accept that. That is an intolerable interpretation of what was intended by the 1980 amendments. During that time, there was a colloquy between Senator Javits and Senator Huddleston, in terms of what Congress was seeking to do. Basically, Senator Javits indicated that a President may assert a constitutional power to withhold prior notice. Congress might not agree with it, but he recognized that the President might assert that. But he also indicated during that colloquy, during that debate on the amendment itself, that timely notice meant that the President did not have unfettered discretion.
That is correct, we did not
recognize a constitutional power in the President to withhold notice indefinitely or even beyond a few days.
Congress cannot change the President's constitutional authorities. We cannot give him power he does not have. We cannot take away constitutional power he does have. Senator Javits said, `But we are leaving that dispute for another day, specifically reserving both of our positions on this issue, and nothing in this statute should be interpreted as a change in that situation.'
Well, we did reserve the dispute for another day. The dispute occurred during the Iran-Contra investigation. That was the constitutional confrontation, as such. In view of the Justice Department's interpretation that timely notification meant whenever the President wants to give notification, the Iran-Contra Investigating Committee recommended a specific, strict 48-hour rule; prior notice in almost all cases, but definitely within 48 hours after the signing of a finding.
Well, Mr. President, I did not reintroduce that legislation this year. It was passed in the Senate; it was not even taken up in the other House last year, due to a number of difficulties the Speaker of the House encountered at that time.
I believe we have the votes to pass a 48-hour notice provision this year. I do not know what the other Chamber would do with that particular measure, but assuming it would pass there, it is clear that the President is going to veto the measure. I do not believe that we have sufficient votes to override a veto. I decided early in this administration that I would work with the White House to try and find an acceptable compromise, something that would return us to an atmosphere of comity and cooperation, giving some flexibility to the President, but recognizing that Congress has a constitutional authority of its own and constitutional responsibilities of its own.
What we decided was the following, Mr. President: After months of negotiation, President Bush sent a letter to Senator Boren outlining the nature of the controversy that we have encountered over section 510(b), in which he cites the Justice Department's interpretation that a number of factors combine to support the conclusion that timely fashion language should be read to leave the President with unfettered discretion to decide the right moment to provide notification. The President cites that opinion in his letter, dated October 30, 1989, to Senator Boren.
The key paragraph is the following. He said in essence, notwithstanding what I have just said:
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I intend to provide notice in a fashion sensitive to congressional concerns. The statute requires prior notice or, when no prior notice is given, timely notice. I anticipate that in almost all instances, prior notice will be possible. In those rare instances where prior notice is not provided, I anticipate that notice will be provided within a few days. Any withholding beyond this period would be based upon my assertion of the authorities granted this office by the Constitution.
That may seem to be of minor significance to some Members. Let me suggest to my colleagues that it is of major importance to our committee, because the President has gone on record saying that notwithstanding the Justice Department's prior interpretation of section 501(b)--it is going to be his practice to give prior notice in virtually all cases; and in those rare cases where he does not give prior notice, he will provide subsequent notification within a few days. If he is going to defer notice beyond that period of time, it will have to be not by virtue of any power granted him through the 1970 statute or through any implicit authority we gave him to defer notice indefinitely, but rather through his assertion of constitutional power.
Where does that leave us? Precisely where we were in 1980, when Senator Javits recognized there is always going to be a constitutional tug of war. The President believes he has constitutional power that we believe he does not have. That will have to be fought out at a future time, much as we had the Iran-Contra investigation and fought that issue out at that time.
I think it is important to recognize that any President, this President, any future President, who chooses to defer notice beyond a few days does so at his peril. He does so at his peril because, No. 1, it will certainly undermine the confidence that is necessary for the Executive to function effectively with the congressional oversight committees; No. 2, he certainly runs a risk of having another investigation such as we had with the Iran-Contra affair, threatening to virtually unravel the Presidency depending on the nature of the covert activity; and, indeed, on a third point, he runs the risk, or she runs the risk, depending on who is President at that time, of incurring further restrictions on covert actions.
So I think this is an acceptable compromise, it achieves what I was seeking to achieve, that is, to return us to the working relationship the President had with the oversight committees going back to 1980.
There is an amendment I will offer, after several of my colleagues who wish to speak, that will make a minor change in the amendment itself. It is a technical amendment, so I will not take the time right now. I have two more points, however, that I would like the make rather quickly.
I really cannot leave this discussion without a reference to the reason the President asserts that there are circumstances which he might encounter that would require him to defer notice for a length of time. One case cited has been the Canadian Government assistance in the escape of hostages from Tehran. That is always cited as the reason why the President might want to withhold notice, because the Canadians alledgedly said, `If you notify Congress, we will not work with you.'
I have tried to find out where that story came from, and, frankly, I cannot find any documented evidence to support the assertion that the Canadian Government insisted that the President not notify Congress that they were assisting us in a covert activity.
Because of the importance of this matter, we went back and looked at the debates during the passage of the amendment in 1980 and found no reference to any assertion that the Canadian Government had insisted upon such a withholding of notice. The Senate Intelligence Committee had two public hearings within a month of the time the escape was made public in January 1980: One in which the Director of Central Intelligence testified and one in which the Director of Operations testified. And the principal focus of the hearing was to find out why notice was not given to the oversight committees. No mention was made at that time of the Canadian Government making any request, either to the CIA, the State Department, or the President, that Congress not be advised. We are told that the House Intelligence Committee also is lacking in such documentation. But in the absence of documentation, we went back further on our own. We went to Cyrus Vance, who was Secretary of State at that time, and presumably would have known of such a request by the Canadian Government. He has indicated that he is not aware of any request by the Canadian Government to withhold notice to Congress. We also contacted Adm. Stansfield Turner, who was Director of Central Intelligence at that time. He also had no recollection of such a request from the Canadian Government, and the same was true of the then Deputy Director of the CIA, John McMahon. We then turned to the current Director Judge Webster, and also to the former Secretary of Defense, Secretary
Carlucci. We asked them to locate any documentary evidence that they had that a request had been made. Again, there were no documents in any file indicating that the Canadian Government had ever made such a request. Both Mr. Webster and Mr. Carlucci advised us that an oral request may have been made at a lower level with CIA officials during a meeting back in 1979 in CIA headquarters, and the CIA identified four employees who recalled such a meeting. Two of them remembered a verbal request, two did not remember any such request. But what is clear is that apparently no formal request was ever made to the heads of our Government, not to the CIA Director, not to the Secretary of State, and apparently not to the President of the United States.
So, Mr. President, the allegation that somehow the Canadian Government had intruded upon our constitutional process is not borne out by the record.
It may be that President Carter, because lives were at stake, decided that since there were eight committees that he had to report to at that time, he should withhold notice. But the law has been changed. We do not have eight committees now. We have two committees, one in the House and one in the Senate. And as a matter of fact, notice can be limited to the big eight or perhaps only the House leadership and the Senate leadership. But I think it is important to point out that the rationale that is frequently offered for withholding notification to the congressional oversight committees is found lacking.
One final point, Mr. President. We spend a lot of time talking about intelligence capabilities, including the technologies involved, and we devote a considerable amount of time to discussions of covert action--but not nearly enough time is devoted to the subject of counterintelligence.
The committee report in this bill reflects some of our efforts to assess the security of our diplomatic establishments. Over the last year we made a broad, comprehensive review of counterintelligence and security programs. We intend to issue a public report of our findings in the very near future. Let me say that, notwithstanding this breakout of glasnost and democratic reforms that are spreading across Europe, it is important that we not lose sight of the fact that these countries place a high premium on obtaining information about the United States' intentions and capabilities. Espionage has not abated in this country. The United States is still a target and indeed, with the lowering barriers of immigration and the burgeoning of contacts at both the governmental and private levels, the present environment is very conducive to espionage. While we are welcoming improved relationships, we have to be sure that our counterintelligence and security capabilities remain strong. I must tell you I am seriously concerned about the insufficient intention given to FBI resources in particular and the Bureau's ability to cope with a vastly changing landscape. The budget request made by the FBI does not appear to be adequate to meet the need. After the FBI counterintelligence budget is folded into the overall FBI budget, and after the FBI budget is folded into the Justice Department budget, and Justice Department budget is folded into the President's budget, the amount of money reserved for counterintelligence is meager indeed. I am going to ask the committee to carefully review this situation in the coming year. If we find a great disparity in terms of money requested in the President's budget and our counterintelligence needs, I am going to be inclined to recommend that the Congress add funding at its own initiative.
Mr. President, let me conclude my remarks with the simple recommendation to my colleagues that they support this legislation. It has received the broad bipartisan approval of the committee and merits the support of our colleagues.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the full text of the President's letter to the committee be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:
The White House,
Washington, October 30, 1989.
Hon. David L. Boren,
Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
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Dear Senator Boren: The purpose of this letter is to state how I intend to provide notice to Congress of covert action under section 501 of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended. On December 17, 1986, the Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, provided the then Attorney General with an opinion as to the meaning as a matter of law of section 501(b) of the National Security Act. That provision requires the President to `fully inform the intelligence committees in a timely fashion of intelligence operations in foreign countries, other than activities intended solely for obtaining necessary intelligence, for which prior notice was not given. . . .' The opinion, at page 24, stated that `a number of factors combine to support the conclusion that the `timely fashion' language should be read to leave the President with virtually unfettered discretion to choose the right moment for making the required notification.'
I intend to provide notice in a fashion sensitive to congressional concerns. The statute requires prior notice or, when no prior notice is given, timely notice. I anticipate that in almost all instances, prior notice will be possible. In those rare instances where prior notice is not provided, I anticipate that notice will be provided within a few days. Any withholding beyond this period would be based upon my assertion of the authorities granted this office by the Constitution.
I am sending a similar letter to Senator Cohen.
Sincerely,
George Bush.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I rise today to support the provision in the intelligence authorization bill to create an independent inspector general at the Central Intelligence Agency. In my view, this provision would improve the mechanism within the CIA for insuring adequate oversight of intelligence programs. It elevates the authority of the office of inspector general within the agency; it enhances the office's independence; and it strengthens the office's auditing capabilities. The result, in my view, will be a more objective and effective inspector general.
Here, I might add, the Department of Defense has considerable responsibilities in the field of intelligence and has accepted a comparable structure with an inspector general.
Mr. President, in urging my colleagues to support this provision, I emphasize that the CIA Inspector General Act of 1989 is a prudent and considered piece of legislation. I stress the word `considered,' because, since the mid-1970's, Congress has periodically studied the operations of the CIA's inspector general, and has repeatedly expressed concerns about its independence, capabilities, and effectiveness. Moreover, within the last 2 years, the Intelligence Committee has renewed its interest in the performance of the CIA's inspector general, and
has held three sets of public hearings. It has also held innumerable discussions with leading experts, both in and out of Government, who have had experience with inspector general audits of sensitive national security programs. Members of the committee have discussed the issue at great length both with the DCI and among ourselves. As a result of these deliberations--both past and present--our committee has concluded that we need a stronger, more independent inspector general at the CIA.
I also mentioned that the act is `prudent.' Crafted over the course of 2 years of careful deliberations, it recognizes the sensitive nature of CIA operations. Thus, while some of the authorities of the CIA inspector general are similar to those of other insector generals, others are somewhat different. The act contains the following major provisions:
The inspector general will be independent--appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate;
The inspector general will be under the general supervision of the DCI, but only the President can remove him from office;
The inspector general will be given the necessary operating powers--access to CIA facilities, power to administer oaths, imposition of GAO audit standards, ability to select staff, and ability to determine audits;
Unlike most other inspector generals, the DCI may prohibit the CIA inpector general from conducting an investigation on national security grounds, but the DCI must then report such a decision to the intelligence committees. This is an appropriate limitation on this inspector general's authority and is very similar to the ability of the Secretary of Defense to prohibit DOD inspector general investigations on national security grounds, with reports to appropriate congressional committees.
And finally, in order to address the civil liberty concerns associated with an intelligence agency investigating domestic activities, the CIA inspector general will have no subpoena power. However, the legislation makes clear that failure to cooperate with an inspector general investigation can be grounds for termination of employment or contract.
Mr. President, as the ranking member on the Senate Armed Services Committee, I believe that no discussion of the issue of an independent inspector general for the CIA is complete without reference to the performance of the inspector general at the Department of Defense. I say this because the same arguments used to oppose an independent inspector general at CIA were used to oppose an independent inspector general at DOD--particularly the argument that certain DOD programs were too sensitive to be audited by an inspector general. Yet, despite the concerns raised, the performance of the DOD inspector general has been universally acclaimed. Information from Defense Department testimony given this past year to Congress has indicated that since its creation in 1982--just 7 years ago--the DOD inspector general resulted in 4,200 management improvements within program offices. This has led to an estimated savings of $9.5 billion. Moreover, its work has led to nearly 1,500 indictments and over 1,100 convictions, with monetary recoveries of nearly $685 million. According to the Defense Department, all of this has been done with no addition security problems for the department. In fact, DOD officials have noted that improved management practices resulting from such inspections have resulted in tightened physical and personnel security procedures in various programs, an outcome that few of us foresaw at the time we debated the DOD inspector general.
Mr. President, before finishing my remarks, I should like to note that the CIA Inspector General Act was reported out of committee by an 11-to-4 vote--a testimony to its strong bipartisan support. I commend Senator Specter for proposing this legislation, and Senator Glenn for the many fine suggestions his Governmental Affairs Committee staff offered to help strengthen the bill. As usual, Senator Boren, our chairman, and Senator Cohen, our vice chairman, provided superb leadership in judiciously directing this important piece of legislation. We owe them all a debt of gratitude.
In concluding, Mr. President, I wish to state that I am a long time friend and supporter of the CIA. In the budget process, I have consistently worked to insure a strong U.S. intelligence capability. In short, I believe that intelligence is the foundation of an effective diplomatic and military policy. At the same time, those of us who oversee our intelligence community have a special responsibility to insure that our intelligence programs are run efficiently, legally, and responsibly. It is with this background of strong support for our intelligence agencies and sincere concern for good government that I support the CIA Inspector General Act. I believe that the provisions as currently crafted strike the proper balance between inadequate oversight and excessive oversight, between the inspector general's need-to-know and the need for security. In the long run, the net effect of this legislation will be to increase the confidence that Congress and the American people have in our intelligence operations.
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Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I want to compliment the chairman of the Intelligence Committee, the distinguished Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. Boren] and the vice chairman of the committee, the distinguished Senator from Maine [Mr. Cohen] for bringing before the Senate this authorization measure. In particular, I wish to congratulate the committee for creating a statutory independent inspector general at the Central Intelligence Agency. This provision will make a vital contribution to the integrity of the Agency and help ensure the appropriate oversight role of the Congress, particularly in the wake of the Iran-Contra fiasco.
The CIA will become the 25th department or agency with an Inspector General appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. This group already includes every cabinet department and every major executive agency, except the CIA. While the trend over the last decade has been toward more oversight throughout the Federal Government, the CIA has resisted, and Congress has been reluctant to push for, an independent inspector general. In some ways I can understand why there has been such a reluctance to create an independent watchdog to oversee these important programs; we all realize the extremely sensitive and sometimes dangerous nature of intelligence work. These considerations make it easy to frame this debate in terms of the need to protect sources and to avoid compromising covert foreign operations, but the secrecy surrounding these critical programs is exactly why such an office, within the organization of the CIA, with appropriate safeguards to assure both its independence and the security of the CIA itself, is absolutely necessary.
The current Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. Webster, has stated that an independent inspector general would be counterproductive because agency employees would be less candid with someone they saw as an arm of the Congress. The Director's arguments are not new. All 14 of the agencies covered by the Inspector General Act of 1978 originally opposed the concept of statutory inspectors general. Many of the officials at those agencies used the same argument as Mr. Webster, but once established the offices quickly gained acceptance as a valuable management tool for fighting waste and abuse. According to OMB, the inspector general offices have saved the American taxpayers over $100 billion since 1978. This pattern of opposition followed by acceptance has continued as agencies have been added to the act.
The Defense Department was particularly adamant in its opposition to an independent inspector general. But since its establishment in 1982, the DOD Office of the Inspector General has become a model, and has gained wide respect, both within and outside of DOD, for its integrity and independence. I was pleased to cosponsor Senator Bentsen's amendment in 1982 which created the DOD Office of Inspector General. At the time we hoped to reap considerable benefits from such an office, and we have not been disappointed. Within a year of its inception, the DOD Inspector General's Office had uncovered major problems with the procurement of aircraft engine spare parts. The inspector general has continued to produce substantial savings and has played a key role in uncovering wrongdoing such as the Ill Wind procurement scandal.
Efforts to overhaul and reorganize the existing internal CIA Office of Inspector General have sputtered along for almost 15 years. In 1975 the Rockefeller Commission found that both the staff and the duties of the office were being cut back. The Commission called for strengthening the inspector general reporting requirements. A year later the House Select Committee on Intelligence, headed by Congressman Otis Pike, recommended establishing a powerful, independent inspector general, not only for the CIA, but with jurisdiction over the entire intelligence community. Also in 1976, the Senate Select Committee to Study Intelligence Activities, chaired by Senator Frank Church, found that the internal inspector general at the CIA had been denied access to information which was vital to conducting investigations, and had been blocked from uncovering possible illegal activities. The Committee called for mandatory notification of the Attorney General and the Congress anytime the inspector general suspected illegal activity. In 1987 the Iran-Contra Committee found that the CIA Inspector General did `not appear to have the manpower, resources, or tenacity to acquire key facts uncovered by other investigations.' The National Security Reform Act of 1987, introduced by Senator Spector, would have established an inspector general very similar to the one we are considering today.
Mr. President, we have examined this issue long enough. We do not need to wait for another crisis before we take action. From the revelations of the mid-1970's to the Iran-Contra scandal, we have seen too many instances of manipulation, abuse of the system, and even illegal activity for political gain. We must never return to the days when the CIA spied on U.S. citizens and published instructional manuals on assassination.
Mr. President, this legislation and my remarks are in no way meant as an accusation of the current administration or the current Director. Mr. Webster has worked hard to accommodate congressional concerns about the inspector general's current operation. He has improved the inspector general's access to records and increased the responsibilities assigned to the Office. But Mr. Webster will not be the Director of Central Intelligence forever. Some future Director might not share his desire to have an effective inspector general. Furthermore, despite improvements, Mr. Webster has remained reluctant to provide the Intelligence Committees complete access to reports from the current inspector general. I have an article from the Washington Post, July 14, 1989 titled `CIA Chief Fights Congress on Access to Documents.' The only way to insure continued effectiveness and proper congressisonal oversight is through this legislation creating an independent inspector general.
As the various commissions and committees discovered, it was during the periods of unscrupulous and illegal activities at the CIA that the internal inspector general was either weak and ineffective, or was blocked from uncovering suspect activities. When oversight was needed most, the internal inspector general was powerless. This legislation is an attempt to avoid any repeat of such a situation. I also think that once this office is created it should be included in the current effort to provide a separate appropriation for each of the inspectors general covered by the Inspector General Act. This would give an additional measure of independence to these offices. There have been examples in the past of agencies attempting to blunt the effectiveness of a new inspector general office by not providing adequate resources. Again, I in no way suggest that the current administration would take this approach, but separate funding would prevent any future attempt to circumvent the intent of this legislation by understaffing the inspector general office.
Opponents of this proposal have expressed concern about the security problems an independent inspector general could create. Although security obviously poses a special problem for an independent observer at the CIA, several other agencies in similar situations have successfully overcome this obstacle. Every other part of the national security establishment has an independent inspector general. That includes the Departments of Defense, Energy, Justice, State, and Treasury. Even the very sensitive activities of the National Security Agency are subject to review by the DOD inspector general and the General Accounting Office. Even with the provision before us, the CIA will remain exempt from GAO oversight.
To protect sensitive and classified programs, the Department heads at Defense, Justice, and Treasury are given the authority to restrict or halt an audit or investigation under special circumstances. The Inspector General Act allows such interference if it is necessary to preserve national security, protect U.S. national interests, or prevent the unauthorized disclosure of classified information. When the Secretary of Defense or Treasury, or the Attorney General, uses this power, Congress must be notified within 30 days. Similar procedures will be available to the Director of Central Intelligence, and will provide more than enough protection for sensitive operations.
Mr. President, only a truly independent inspector general with sufficient power to audit, inspect, investigate, and evaluate these important areas of national security can do this job. This person must be independent and therefore should be appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. The position must be created by law, not subject to administrative fiat. This person should be completely accountable to Congress and the people of the United States to insure that U.S. programs are executed properly and efficiently.
It is perhaps understandable that the CIA and its Director have not supported the creation of such an independent office. Perhaps it is human nature not to want an independent authority looking over your shoulder, but I believe the American people deserve to have such a powerful watchdog monitoring the execution of these critical programs.
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Mr. CONRAD. Mr. President, I realize the Intelligence Committee negotiated this agreement with the President in good faith, but I do not believe it is enough. Unfortunately, under this agreement the President can basically do what he wants, and only afterward inform the Congress.
During the Iran-Contra affair we witnessed an administration that had little regard for the essence of democratic procedures. I refer to the idea that a popularly elected Congress is responsible for overseeing the conduct of the executive branch.
Three years ago, we saw national security operatives running a secretive, unsupervised foreign policy harmful to U.S. interests.
With good reason, we had openly promised that we would never negotiate with terrorists. And yet unknown to Congress the President's subordinates were selling weapons to Iran.
With good reason, Congress had shut off military aid to the Nicaraguan Contras. And yet high-level National Security employees were finding ways to evade the laws this Congress had enacted.
Now we have the President's promise that will give Congress timely notification, in most cases, prior to covert operations. Of course, in those rare cases where time is of the essence, he has discretionary authority to withhold notification until after the fact. And the President has reserved the option not to tell Congress, if he believes the Constitution so warrants.
Let me repeat--the President can claim it is his constitutional prerogative to withhold information from the elected representatives of the people.
I find nothing in the Constitution that says the President has this authority. Our country needs a strong, effective intelligence capability, but only within the proper system of checks and balances designed by the architects of our Constitution. The greatest threat to democracy is not undue restrictions on the conduct of covert operations; it is the insidious and dangerous justification of constitutionally questionable actions for reasons of national security.
In many case, I find nothing in the committee's agreement with the President that would prevent another Iran-Contra fiasco.
Last year the Senate passed S. 1721, requiring the President to notify Congress of all covert operations within 48 hours. I voted for that legislation, as did a majority of my fellow Senators. In fact, the vote was 71-19 in support of that bill. Now we are told a 48-hour reporting provision would result in a Presidential veto, a veto that would likely be sustained. So the alternative is to allow the President a free hand in covert operations, free from congressional interference.
Granted, the idea of an independent inspector general for the Central Intelligence Agency is a step in the right direction. But simply adding another level of bureaucracy to the CIA is not the answer. It does not get to the heart of the problem.
The answer, Mr. President, is to find the correct balance between Presidential authority in foreign policy and intelligence matters, and congressional oversight of those policies. I do not believe the legislation before us will improve accountability on the part of the administration, nor will it create more effective oversight on the part of Congress. For that reason, I plan to vote against S. 1324.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma.
Mr. BOREN. Mr. President, it is necessary before we proceed with the consideration of further amendments to clarify the situation to make clear that the committee amendments which were adopted when we last reported the bill back to the committee be considered as original text for purposes of further amendment. I will ask unanimous consent at this time that the committee amendments be adopted en bloc and that the bill, as amended, be considered as original text for purposes of further amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the unanimous consent request? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.
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Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, despite the best efforts of a few Senators and a handful of dedicated executive branch officials, for a long time counterintelligence has been seriously neglected by most of the U.S. Government. That is why I have been trying for several years to do something to improve American counterintelligence.
Mr. President, the distinguished chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence supports my efforts to improve counterintelligence. Our distinguished colleague, Senator Boren, has taken an important leadership role in this area himself.
Indeed, our distinguished colleague, Senator Boren, has been one of the key leaders of the Senate and of the entire Congress in trying to improve counterintelligence, and the American people owe him a lot of credit for his efforts.
Senator Boren has already in this new fiscal year 1990-91 intelligence authorization bill linked any increase in Soviet diplomatic representation in Washington to an interagency National Security Council decision. This would prevent the State Department from unilaterally bowing to Soviet political pressure to allow an increase in Soviet intelligence officers in the United States.
In addition, such an NSC decision would have to be linked to an increase in the resources of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to maintain counterintelligence surveillance of an increased number of Soviet diplomats.
Afterall, we know that at least one-third of all Soviet diplomats are KGB or GRU intelligence officers. Even a higher percentage are cooptees of Soviet intelligence services. Indeed, all Soviet citizens within the U.S.S.R. or abroad must be considered to be potential Soviet intelligence agents. This Boren initiative is an important addition to the bill.
Moreover, our distinguished colleague, Senator Boren, and his committee, have given the Federal Bureau of Investigation a new role in counterintelligence operations abroad against American diplomatic personnel. These are all important new capabilities for improving American counterintelligence.
Nevertheless, despite these proposed valuable reforms, recent news reports increase my concerns about counterintelligence. But before I turn to current problems, there remain some old counterintelligence problems.
I am reminded that the former United States Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Mr. Arthur Hartman, sent back a cable from Moscow in 1987 after it was revealed in the press that the new United States Embassy building being constructed by the KGB for the United States in Moscow was riddled with KGB espionage devices and bugs. Mr. Hartman's cable also came at the time of the espionage scandal involving the United States Marine guards at the United States Moscow Embassy.
Mr. President, I think that it is important for us to remember the title of this highly classified State Department cable from Ambassador Hartman. The title of the Hartman cable, which title is unclassified, was: `Counterproductive Counterintelligence.'
Mr. President, as one Senator, I certainly do not believe that counterintelligence is counterproductive. I do not believe that the Senate regards counterintelligence to be counterproductive. Indeed, I do not believe that the American people think that counterintelligence is counterproductive.
However, counterintelligence may seem to be counterproductive to Ambassador Hartman and to the rest of the elitist, accommodationist State Department, and counterproductive even to the equally elitist CIA, which is, of course, the operational arm of the State Department.
After all, I would remind my colleagues that in the late 1970's and early 1980's the State Department twice nominated a certain individual with severe counterintelligence prolems to be Ambassador to two countries.
But the State Department twice also failed to inform the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations that this individual had been seriously compromised by the Communist intelligence services in the Communist-bloc country to which he had previously been assigned as the U.S. Ambassador.
Because of our ignorance of the compromise by Communist-bloc intelligence services of this U.S. Ambassador, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations voted twice to give its advice and consent to reconfirm this U.S. Ambassador.
Moreover, Mr. President, the full senate also voted twice to reconfirm this U.S. Ambassador to be the American Ambassador to two other countries.
Mr. President, I would in summary emphasize that the State Department twice deliberately decided not to inform the Foreign Relations Committee or the full Senate that this U.S. Ambassador has been seriously compromised by the intelligence service of the Communist country to which he had previously been posted. It is reasonable to conclude that the State Department covered up this whole affair.
In fact, the Central Intelligence Agency also knew all about this Communist bloc intelligence service compromise of an American Ambassador, and the CIA also covered it up.
In sum, Mr. President, I would re-emphasize that the full Senate voted twice to reconfirm an American Ambassador who was clearly subject to blackmail by the intelligence services of Communist powers, and who could easily have been working, unwittingly or wittingly, for Communist powers.
So the Senate was deceived by the executive branch twice on an important counterintelligence issue, and we did not even find out the truth about our credulity until the real facts were finally published in a book authored by a defector from the Communist-bloc intelligence service.
Mr. President, I believe that this important case is merely the tip of the iceberg of a severe American counterintelligence and security problem in our diplomatic community.
I am reliably informed that the CIA has knowledge that many other U.S. Ambassadors and diplomatic personnel have likewise been compromised by the intelligence services of Communist powers. But all of these other comparable compromises have been similarly covered up.
So we have a serious counterintelligence and security problem with our diplomatic personnel overseas.
Mr. President, subsequent to the Senate's unanimous approval of my 1986 counterintelligence improvement amendment to the intelligence authorization bill, there have been five more probable State Department and CIA espionage cases reported in the media. These reports on the five new Soviet mole cases suggest that the CIA and the State Department should have treated my original amendment more seriously.
Mr. President, I was therefore interested in some of the language in the Intelligence Committee's report on this bill that pertains to shortcomings in counterintelligence and security at our embassies abroad. Referring to the grave deficiencies in embassy security that have come to light in recent years, the Intelligence Committee concludes that those deficiencies have not been rectified, and the State Department has been derelict in failing to implement actions that are indispensable for the protection of U.S. diplomatic facilities. That is strong language.
Mr. President, I must agree; I have seen nothing that would make me quarrel with this language. We have had our Embassy typewriters bugged in Moscow; we've had the Marine Guard espionage cases; we've discovered that our new Embassy building in Moscow and our new consulate building in Leningrad have been thoroughly bugged; and, more recently, we've had the investigation of Felix Bloch who was a senior Foreign Service officer and the deputy chief of mission at our Embassy in Vienna, based upon information that he may have been working for Soviet-bloc intelligence.
Mr. President, there are a total of at least five new State Department and CIA espionage cases reported since my 1986 amendment.
It makes me wonder how many more Soviet spy scandals are out there in the State Department and the CIA that have not been uncovered, and why the State Department and the CIA are not doing more to address these counterintelligence problems.
I know that the Intelligence Committee has been actively involved in trying to improve American counterintelligence, and the Committee has also been doing an admirable job improving embassy security. I
applaud these efforts. But I must ask the distinguished chairman, what more needs to be done to improve counterintelligence and Embassy security?
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Mr. BOREN. Let me say that you are correct, the Intelligence Committee has been deeply concerned with what appears to us to have been very slow progress at the State Department and at the CIA in addressing what appear to be critical security problems.
To give you one glaring example, the Intelligence Committee was first notified in 1985 that bugging devices had been found in the new chancery building under construction in Moscow. In 1987, after our own review of the situation, the committee recommended that the structure be demolished to ground level, and that we start again. A year and a half later, after more studies, President Reagan reached the same conclusion. It has taken another year to get a decision out of the Bush administration about what to do with a shell of a building, where construction was halted 4 years ago. Why is this decision so difficult?
Senator Helms is also correct that the Intelligence Committee has made counterintelligence and security problems at diplomatic establishments a focus of its oversight for the last several years. We will, in fact, be issuing a public report on counterintelligence later this year that describes much of our work.
In the meantime, you ask what can be done. I believe it is important for us to obtain the Secretary of State's own assessment of the threat to, and vulnerabilities of, U.S. diplomatic establishments, and that such assessments be supported by the U.S. intelligence community, which in some respects is able to provide a unique source of such information. Moreover, we ought to have a clear picture of precisely what is being done to address these vulnerabilities, and what more needs to be done. The picture is not entirely bleak. The CIA and the State Department have set in motion several initiatives which we believe hold promise for improving the counterintelligence and security posture of our embassies.
Mr. HELMS. Could the distinguished Senator elaborate on some of these initiatives?
Mr. BOREN. Within the limits of classification, I can certainly give you a general idea.
The State Department has established an Office of Counterintelligence Programs within its Bureau of Diplomatic Security which is charged with looking at reports that may indicate possible espionage at U.S. diplomatic establishments, and, as necessary, investigating those reports in the field in cooperation with the FBI. To its credit, the State Department brought in an experienced FBI agent to head this Office, and it seems to be producing results. The Intelligence Committee has been concerned, however, that in the face of budget and personnel pressures, the commitment of the State Department to maintain and support this capability may well wane.
We have been considering whether the budget for this Office should properly be included within the National Foreign Intelligence Program, as are other intelligence elements at the State Department, where it could be integrated with other elements of the U.S. Government involved in counterintelligence activities. In any case, we think there is a compelling need that the status and staffing arrangements for this crucial function be enhanced, whether it stays in the State Department budget or is moved to the intelligence budget.
While our bill would give the FBI overall responsibility for supervising investigations of espionage at all U.S. diplomatic missions, the first critical line of defense will continue to be the State Department's own security officers working under the guidance of the Office of Counterintelligence Programs.
The Department has also considerably enhanced its technical security capabilities in terms of hiring personnel who are able to identify and remedy technical vulnerabilities at diplomatic establishments, as well as involving them in new embassy construction and the security evaluation of new office equipment going into high threat areas. Again, however, the committee fears that these initiatives which are relatively new and are only beginning to show results, could succumb to fiscal limitations.
Secretary Shultz also created a new element within his office of inspector general, shortly before he left office, to do inspections of diplomatic establishments to assess them for compliance with State Department standards. This Office of Security Oversight has been continued by Secretary Baker, who brought in a former head of security at NATO to direct this Office. The committee supports this initiative, but again it is too early to see results. We are aware that the new office has done several inspections and we have received some initial reports, but we have not been able to evaluate for ourselves how well the job is being done. The inspector general has indicated his willingness to cooperte with such an evaluation.
Mr. HELMS. The report also criticizes the failure of the State Department to cooperate with an office established by the Director of Central Intelligence called the Security Evaluation Office, or SEO, which was established as the focal point within the intelligence
community for diplomatic security matters. As I understand it, one purpose of this office was to serve as a place where decisions on security being made by the State Department could be challenged by the intelligence community.
Mr. BOREN. The Senator is correct that the report criticizes the State Department for its failure to cooperate with the SEO, although we also note that the intelligence community bears a share of the blame for failing to meet legitimate State Department concerns. In any case, what happened has happened. We believe that it is time to put aside past differences and get on with the job. It appears to us that there is no real dispute that the responsibility for the security of U.S. diplomatic establishments must rest with the Secretary of State. Nor does there appear to be any dispute that the intelligence community can make a unique contribution to the formulation of such security policies, and, indeed, that the DCI, as head of the U.S. intelligence community, should have an opportunity if he should choose to do so, to weigh-in with the Secretary before final decisions are made. This whole area will be subject to discussion with the House Intelligence Committee in our conference on this bill, and I am hopeful that we can reach an agreement on a clear mandate for SEO as a result.
Mr. HELMS. I am, indeed, glad to hear that some progress is being made on counterintelligence, and that the Intelligence Committee is following these developments so closely. I have, as you know, Mr. Chairman, suggested a number of other initiatives in this area which I set forth in a recent letter to the Intelligence Committee.
Mr. President, I ask unamimous consent that my letter of October 18, 1989, to the distinguished chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Senator Boren, and to the distinguished vice chairman, Senator Cohen, be printed in the Record at the close of my remarks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered
(See exhibit 1.)
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I strongly request that the distinguished chairman and the distinguished vice chairman muster a majority of their committee in order to require the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Secretary of State, to submit to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence all of the reports that are requested in my letter. I would like to read and study these reports when they are submitted, and I am certain that all of my colleagues on the Foreign Relations Committee would also like to have these reports.
Mr. President, I ask my distinguished colleague, the chairman, this in all seriousness, but in a spirit of cooperation, because I know that if there is any reluctance or recalcitrance by these executive branch officials to provide these reports so necessary to the Senate's oversight, the Senate may take note, and the reports may wind up being required by law the next time around. After all, protection of American national security requires this, and the American people expect their Senators to protect our national security.
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Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC, October 18, 1989.
Senator David Boren,
Chairman.
Senator William Cohen,
Vice Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Senators: As you know, competitive analysis has been demonstrated by the 1975-1976 A Team-B Team exercise to be beneficial to better intelligence support to protecting our national security. It turns out that the Central Intelligence Agency's benign view of the Soviet military threat in the mid-1970s was far too complacent, but we would never have had available the more accurate warning of the growth of Soviet strategic superiority provided by the B Team had it not been for the exercise of competitive analysis. Contending points of view and varying schools of analysis and interpretation are inevitable in the art of intelligence, and experience has shown that we should encourage competitive analysis.
On September 24, 1986, the Senate unanimously agreed to my amendment to S. 2477, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987, directing the CIA to conduct competitive analysis on 32 important intelligence issues. One of these issues, numbered 24, was `The possibility that the CIA and the State Department have been penetrated by the KGB at various levels.' The CIA's classified report to the Senate on this topic was received in 1987. It was, however, only a short and cursory paragraph, and it was not the result of competitive analysis.
Since then there have been five probable espionage cases reported in the media which suggest that the CIA and the State Department should have treated my amendment more seriously.
First, the senior foreign service officer Mr. Felix Bloch has been placed on administrative leave by the State Department because he was detected engaging in unreported contacts with Soviet Intelligence and is suspected of espionage. These contacts reportedly even included the passing of a briefcase from Mr. Bloch to a known Soviet Intelligence Officer.
Second, there are recent media reports that the late CIA senior analyst Mr. John Paisley may have been a long-term Soviet mole at the CIA. A recent book has described the details surrounding Mr. Paisley's suspicious death in September, 1978, and the evidence that he might have been recruited during his World War Two Merchant Marine voyages to the Soviet Union to be a long-term Soviet Intelligence mole inside the CIA. Mr. Paisley apparently lied about his wartime visits to the Soviet Union when he entered CIA.
Third, this book also reports that the senior CIA officer Mr. James Speyer Kronthal was a Soviet Intelligence mole inside CIA. Mr. Kronthal apparently committed suicide in 1953, when his treachery was discovered.
Fourth, this book and another recent book have reported the details of the damage caused by the convicted spy Mr. Karl Koecher, a CIA contract employee who was a mole inside the CIA for Soviet/Czech Intelligence.
There is also a fifth probable espionage example that comes from other reports. The State Department's man who supervised the construction of the new U.S. Embassy building in Moscow, which is riddled with Soviet electronic bugging devices for espionage, reportedly was a probable KGB agent. This man has now disappeared, and is believed to be back in the Soviet Union, where he reportedly was promoted by the KGB.
Because the CIA and the State Department did not take my original amendment seriously, and because of the subsequent evidence suggesting serious Soviet Intelligence penetrations of the CIA and the State Department, it is clear that counterintelligence at CIA and the State Department must be strengthened. In accordance with the 1986 Helms amendment, I therefore request that the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence require the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Secretary of State to submit reports, utilizing the method of competitive analysis, on the following:
1. The reason why the 1987 CIA report on this topic was only cursory and failed to fulfill the original 1986 Senate directive for a competitive analysis of whether the CIA and the State Department were penetrated by Soviet-block intelligence services.
2. The evidence which would determine whether the senior foreign service officer Felix Floch, the late CIA senior analyst John Paisley, the former CIA contract employee Karl Koecher, the late senior CIA officer James Kronthal, and the former State Department Moscow embassy building supervisor were spies for Soviet-block intelligence services, including any evidence indicating when they may have first begun spying for Soviet-bloc intelligence services.
3. The circumstances of the detection of Mr. Bloch's, Mr. Paisley's, Mr. Koecher's, Mr. Kronthal's, and the State Department
building supervisor's reported dealings with Soviet-bloc intelligence services.
4. The reasons why it took the United States Government an inordinate length of time to suspect Mr. Bloch's, Mr. Paisley's, Mr. Koecher's, Mr. Kronthal's, and the State Department building supervisor's probable espionage dealings with Soviet-bloc intelligence services.
5. The likelihood that there could be similar, though as yet undetected, cases in the State Department and the CIA suggesting the probability of espionage, including a list of all former and current State Department and CIA employees who have had unreported contacts with Soviet-bloc intelligence services, or were involved in false flag entrapments, or were possibly compromised by Soviet-bloc intelligence services.
6. An assessment of the possible damage that Mr. Bloch, Mr. Paisley, Mr. Koecher, Mr. Kronthal, and the State Department building supervisor may have done to United States foreign policy, intelligence, and national security interests by their actions, including an analysis of the damage that they may have done as Soviet-bloc intelligence agents of influence over United States policy.
7. An assessment of whether the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Secretary of State, and the Director of Central Intelligence, should establish a joint Security Evaluation Office. The joint Security Evaluation Office would set personnel and physical security standards for all U.S. embassies abroad. These security standards would apply to all personnel of the State Department and all its agencies, and also to all U.S. Government personnel belonging to all U.S. diplomatic missions abroad. These security standards would also apply to all facilities and buildings of all U.S. diplomatic missions. The joint Security Evaluation Office would also monitor the compliance of the State Department and all U.S. mission personnel and facilities with these security standards.
8. An assessment of whether the CIA Chief of Station at each U.S. embassy should make an annual mission security report on each U.S. mission. This annual mission security report would focus upon any possible security breaches by all U.S. mission country team members and any possible compromises of all country team members by foreign intelligence services. It would include all reports of unauthorized foreign contact by mission personnel, and all reports regarding the implementation of the State Department's non-fraternization policy, issues relating to lifestyle, as well as a report on all attempted foreign intelligence penetrations of the physi