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The SPEAKER. Pursuant to House Resolution 487 and rule XXIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill, H.R. 5422.
The Chair designates the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Nelson] as Chairman of the Committee of the Whole, and requests the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Kanjorski] to assume the chair temporily.
[TIME: 1425]
Accordingly the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H.R. 5422) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1991 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the U.S. Government, the Intelligence Community Staff, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, with Mr. Kanjorski, Chairman pro tempore in the chair.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Kanjorski). Pursuant to the rule, the bill is considered as having been read the first time.
Under the rule, the gentleman from California [Mr. Beilenson] will be recognized for 30 minutes, and the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde] will be recognized for 30 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California [Mr. Beilenson].
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Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 5422, the Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 1991.
H.R. 5422 authorizes funds for all intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the U.S. Government for fiscal year 1991. These funds are allocated between the National Foreign Intelligence Program, which consists of those U.S. intelligence programs which provide information to the President and other national decisionmakers, and the tactical intelligence and related activities programs which supply intelligence to military commanders.
The bill is the product of more than 70 hours of hearings by the Budget Subcommittee and the Subcommittee on Legislation. It enjoys the bipartisan support of the Intelligence Committee's 19 members, which is a testament to the constructive and cooperative spirit which the members brought to their work.
I want to thank in particular the committee's ranking Republican member, the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde], for his invaluable counsel and assistance. The work of the committee reflects his many contributions and was greatly facilitated by his efforts. I also want to commend the committee staff for the dedicated and professional manner with which they assist all members in carrying out the committee's business.
On behalf of the Intelligence Committee, I also want to extend my appreciation to the members and staff of the Armed Services Committee for their assistance in our work. Because elements of the Department of Defense conduct the majority of U.S. intelligence activities, and for reasons of security, the intelligence budget is contained within the defense budget. The committee has worked closely, as it does each year, with the Committee on Armed Services to produce a package of recommendations which treats the programs over which there is shared jurisdiction in as consistent a manner as possible.
While the actual amounts authorized are contained in a classified schedule of authorizations incorporated by reference into H.R. 5422 and explained in a classified annex to the committee's report, those documents are available for the examination of members in the committee's offices. I urge Members who have not already done so to review this material.
The powerful political and social forces which have rocked the world in the past year will have a profound effect on the way in which our intelligence agencies pursue their mission. The focus of our intelligence efforts is changing as threats such as narcotics, international terrorism, and the spread of chemical and biological weapons vie with traditional adversaries like the Soviet Union and its allies in Eastern Europe for attention and resources. Redeployment assets to meet new threats, while continuing to address the remaining security concerns posed by the old, will require careful planning, flexibility, and resourcefulness.
As the intelligence agencies enter this period of transition, they must contend with the same fiscal constraints which beset other elements of the Federal budget. The growth which characterized the intelligence budgets of the 1980's is over, and the challenges presented by new intelligence priorities will have to be reconciled with the reality of reduced resources.
This bill begins that process. The sum of the committee's recommendations is not only below the President's budget request, but below the amount authorized in fiscal year 1990 as well.
While the committee believes that H.R. 5422 assured adequate funding for all essential intelligence programs and activities, a high degree of cooperation between the agencies and the Congress will be critical if the lean budget years likely in the future are not to impair the ability of the United States to meet its intelligence needs.
The recent changes in the world should produce a reexamination of more than just intelligence budget numbers. The means by which to achieve those foreign policy objectives supported by intelligence programs must also be reviewed. It will be asserted in debate today that U.S. foreign policy goals should not be pursued by secret means, and that important policy decisions should be publicly debated, and openly implemented. That is an argument with which I find myself in substantial agreement.
We will also hear that there are times when, for a variety of operational reasons, U.S. assistance programs cannot be undertaken or sustained if they are publicly acknowledged. As much as I might wish it were otherwise, I believe that there is validity to that argument as well.
A degree of tension therefore exists between the desire of many in this House that policies be determined through open debate, and the likelihood that some policies can be most effectively promoted only through secret means. That tension increases the longer policies are pursued in secret, and it is exacerbated when the details of supposedly covert programs are regularly reported in the media. The result is that we spend far too much time debating whether a policy should be pursued in secret and far too little time considering whether it should be pursued at all.
The Intelligence Committee has tried for a year or more now, to do two sometimes consistent, sometimes conflicting things to resolve this issue.
First, we have attempted to encourage the administration to wind down or bring to an end, a small number of programs which originated some time ago under different conditions--during the height of the cold war. The circumstances under which they were originally undertaken have changed considerably; many of the arguments originally given in justification of pursuing them have themselves since changed because of those changing circumstances.
In the alternative, we have urged the administration, if it feels it necessary to continue any of these programs, to ask publicly for our--and for the American peoples' support for them through public discussion and debate, and through an open vote in the Congress.
These are programs which are, in fact, quite well known to the public, and well covered and reported by the media. Everyone is free to discuss and debate them except for those of us who are members of the committees which must consider the policy the programs are designed to support, and authorize their funding. We are the only ones who cannot discuss them publicly. In my view, such programs should be debated publicly and voted on publicly. If they are policies worth pursuing, the Congress will support and authorize them and thereby strengthen the position of the administration; if they are not supported, it is likely that they are policies the Government should not be pursuing.
In sum, major component parts of U.S. foreign policy should not be secretly authorized and voted upon unless there are terribly compelling reasons for that procedure. I think it is obvious that there is in general less reason to pursue some of these policies secretly now, than there may well have been just a very few years ago.
Those are the feelings of a great many members of the Intelligence Committees of both Houses of the Congress, but I must also tell you that, most of us at least, have also been trying to help the administration in its effort to wind down some of these programs. Democrats as well as Republicans on the committee are persuaded that this administration seriously is searching for the best way to bring them to a close.
Mr. Chairman, I want to make it clear that members of the Intelligence Committee are determined to promote a review of the general issue of the appropriateness in certain cases of the maintenance of secret means of furthering foreign policy. I again commend the classified documents accompanying H.R. 5422 to the Members' attention. These documents reflect the committee's intention to pursue this issue in the coming months with the administration. I am hopeful our efforts will lead to clear understandings about the limits on the effectiveness of secret means of policy implementation, and on an agreement as to how policies originally pursued in secret can be brought into the open in ways that will allow for a debate on their merits without ending their utility.
Before explaining in summary form the legislative provisions of H.R. 5422, I want to make some comments about the oversight title, title VII, of the Senate version of this legislation. I know that many Members have been contacted by constituents concerned that title VII will convey to the President broad new authorities in the area of covert action which will enable such actions to be conducted without fear of interference by the Congress.
I want to assure the Members that, in my judgment, nothing could be further from the truth. I can think of few legislative provisions which have been so badly misinterpreted as has title VII of the Senate intelligence authorization bill.
No new authority for the conduct of covert action is provided to the President by title VII. No congressional powers or prerogatives are transferred to the executive branch.
In fact, the existing system of congressional oversight of covert action programs is substantially strengthened by improvements that these title VII provisions would make in the procedures by which information about these programs is provided to Congress. More information would be available to Congress as a result of the enactment of title VII. The procedure for approval of covert actions by the President would be tightened, and oversight would be enhanced rather than weakened.
Why am I so certain? Because provisions essentially the same as those contained in title VII comprised a bill reported 2 years ago as a response to the Iran-Contra affair by the House Intelligence Committee. For reasons unconnected to those particular provisions, that bill never reached the House floor. It may be that some drafting improvements can be made in the Senate's language to make more clear what the bill does, and does not do, with respect to oversight of covert action. We will be discussing necessary changes in conference and I can assure Members that any provisions we agree to will result in strengthened oversight.
At this time, I would like to briefly describe the major legislative provisions of H.R. 5422.
Title III contains provisions developed in cooperation with the Post Office and Civil Service Committee which are intended to bring the CIA's retirement systems into conformance with the retirement systems in effect at other Federal agencies. I want to note in particular the following sections:
Section 304 which will enable a retiree who failed to elect a survivor benefit before retirement to make that election for a spouse married after retirement;
Section 305, which will reduce from 60 to 55 the age before which the remarriage of a former or surviving spouse shall terminate that person's entitlement to retirement or survivor benefits; and
Section 307, which will provide for a restoration to former spouses of the benefits they lose upon remarriage should the remarriage and in death, divorce, or annulment.
Title IV contains recurring provisions which, among other things, provide that authorizations in the bill are not to be construed as authorizing intelligence activities not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or laws of the United States.
Title V contains provisions of particular relevance to the Department of Defense. I want to highlight the following sections:
Section 501, which will enable the Secretary of Defense to charge the CIA the same rate for airlift services that is charged to components of the Department of Defense;
Section 502, which was developed with the assistance of the Government Operations Committee, creates a limited exception to the Freedom of Information Act to permit the withholding from public disclosure of certain unclassified products of the Defense Mapping Agency. This exception would only apply when classification of the products is not feasible, but provision of them pursuant to a Freedom of Information Act request would reveal the sources and methods by which they were produced, or military operational or contingency planning;
Section 503, which will enable the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Director of Central Intelligence, to better protect the identity and mission of those DOD clandestine human intelligence collectors needing a commercial cover for their activities. Under current law, a DOD human intelligence collection operation may hold itself out to be a business, but may not engage in routine business activities such as establishing checking accounts, buying and selling products, or furnishing an office. This section will provide the authority for the conduct of those kinds of activities so that the necessary security for the cover operation is provided. The new authority may be used only to support intelligence collection activities conducted abroad, and the intelligence committees must be informed each time a commercial entity is established. In addition, the provision contains a 5-year sunset clause which is intended to ensure that the need for the authority, and its operation in practice, is reviewed.
As the official U.S. defense presence declines in many parts of the world, the execution of the defense intelligence mission may depend to a greater degree than in the past on the ability to gain access to a country through the use of a nonofficial cover. The committee was persuaded that a valid need existed for a reliable nonofficial cover alternative for the Defense Departments human intelligence collectors. The proposal presented by the Department was well developed and well coordinated within the intelligence community. The committee was persuaded that the limited use envisioned by the Department for the authorities provided will adequately address current shortcomings in nonofficial cover arrangements.
Finally, I want to mention section 504 which contains the text of an amendment adopted by the Armed Services Committee during its sequential referral of the bill. The provision requires the Secretary of Defense to provide any Member of Congress with access to a certain classified report concerning the operation of the Defense Department's POW/MIA office.
Mr. Chairman, H.R. 5422 is a well-balanced response to the needs of our intelligence agencies, and I urge its adoption.
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Mr. KASTENMEIER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. BEILENSON. I am happy to yield to the gentleman from Wisconsin.
Mr. KASTENMEIER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
I would like to commend him for his leadership as chairman of this committee. As a person who has served with him for 6 years on this committee, I am delighted with the sort of leadership that, as chairman, he has given, the good will that he has promoted, and the good sense, in my view, and I would like to associate in general with his assessment of the report.
This is a subject which by its very nature involves many controversial areas and policy decisions. We could not possibly come to a conclusion with respect to a report which would satisfy everyone. The fact is that we are in a new age, the post-cold-war age, in which some of the assumptions are being challenged openly through the amendatory process. This is something we accept.
In any event, I do want to express my appreciation to the chairman.
Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for his kind comments.
Mr. SCHEUER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. BEILENSON. I am happy to yield to the gentleman from New York.
Mr. SCHEUER. Mr. Chairman, I congratulate the gentleman and the committee on their fine record and especially for the gentleman's desire to wind down or bring to an end certain covert programs.
There is an urgent need for Congress to have more information than it does on the long-term military threat that we face in the world today, either regional threats or whatever in this postcold war world, in order for us to wind down or bring to an end many of the very comprehensive military programs that we wonder whether they are relevant to the world that we live in. Is the B-2 bomber relevant to a current threat that we face? Is star wars relevant? Is the mobile missile system relevant? Is there any likelihood that Congress is going to get a sophisticated long-term military threat appraisal from the collection of intelligence agencies under the jurisdiction of the gentleman's committee? Are we going to get it from the Defense Department? Are we going to get it from the National Security Agency in cooperation with the President?
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Mr. BEILENSON. The answer to my friend, to the gentleman's question, is yes, without question, and I think in the relatively near future.
As the gentleman may know, such material has been requested already of the Defense Department and of the Secretary of Defense who has responded and is in the process of responding.
Both Mr. Nunn on the other side and the other House, the other body, the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. Aspin], the distinguished chairman of our own Committee on Armed Services have requested such information. In fact, yes, that will be available to us, I would say to my friend, in the relatively near future.
Mr. SCHEUER. If the gentleman will yield further, will it be made available to all Members of this House?
Mr. BEILENSON. I am not sure I can answer the gentleman with respect to that partcular question. It may well come in both classified and unclassified form. Quite obviously the relevant material would be available to all Members.
Mr. SCHEUER. As long as it is made available, even in classified form, as the gentleman mentioned, the information about these covert activities is available to us in classified form, that would be sufficient for our public-policy judgments as to whether these major weapons systems, new ones that we are being called upon to fund, are relevant to the military threat that we face in the world, and the world signified by Mikhail Gorbachev's receiving the Nobel Peace Prize yesterday.
Mr. EDWARDS of California. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. BEILENSON. I am happy to yield to the gentleman from California.
Mr. EDWARDS of California. Mr. Chairman, I join my colleague in complimenting the chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence and the subcommittee chairs and other ranking members, the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. Kastenmeier], the gentleman from New York [Mr. McHugh], and the very splendid staff you have that has worked very closely with the staff of the Committee on the Judiciary and, in particular, the staff of my subcommittee that has jurisdiction over the FBI chiefly regarding the budget, laws affecting the FBI, and general day-to-day oversight of activities here in the United States that are not necessarily within the jurisdiction of the Intelligence Committee.
In the many years that I have been here, I have found that this is the best-run Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in my experience, and it is really a great relief to all of us to understand that and to see the working of the committee and realize that the intelligence agencies are being subjected to daily strict scrutiny as is absolutely necessary.
There are some of us here who had the unpleasant experience of living through the 1970's where the intelligence agencies got out of control, and we had to establish select committees in the House and Senate to find out what was going on.
I assure the Members it was a great disappointment to all of us to find out what was going on back on those days.
The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence here in the House and its sister committee in the Senate have really done a spendid job, and I compliment the gentleman. I compliment the gentleman and his committee on this good bill that is coming up.
The gentlewoman from California [Mrs. Boxer], I believe, has an amendment later on that perhaps will not pass, but I want to commend it to my colleagues. It is a pretty darn good amendment.
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. HYDE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, profound changes have occurred in the world since the Intelligence Committee brought last year's intelligence authorization bill to the House floor. Many of these far-reaching developments were somewhat surprising, even by those closest to the situations involved. For example, some of the most astute German politicians were saying less than a year ago that the two Germanys were a long way from reunification. Yet, just a few weeks ago, in a breathtaking rush of popular will, Germany was officially reunified after 45 years of division.
Meanwhile, the experts on the Middle East were taken by surprise. Saddam Hussein's sabre-rattling threats suddenly gave way to the `blitzkreig' seizure of his small but resource-rich neighbor, Kuwait.
Some of these unforeseen changes have encouraged a degree of optimism, while the implications of others are profoundly sobering. Amidst all of this stunning turmoil, our committee has studied the intelligence budget and programs with great care. We have attempted to grasp the significance of these changes in the world situation vis a vis U.S. intelligence requirements and resources. Perhaps the most important conclusion the committee reached is that the world is still a terrible uncertain place, and consequently we must strive to maintain a strong and flexible national intelligence capability. Therefore, I would like to commend the whole committee for its cautious approach toward the budget cuts we have recommended in this intelligence authorization bill.
Moreover, in the course of our authorization hearings, our committee has endeavored to impress upon the intelligence community that it should continue to reevaluate carefully intelligence requirements and priorities in light of the changes in the international arena which are still unfolding.
I also wish to take this opportunity to thank Chairman Beilenson for his exceptional leadership of the committee's work on this legislation. Under his stewardship, the process of developing this legislation has been characterized by comity and openness to the views and input of all Members, including the minority. In fact, a number of the important topics discussed in the committee's unclassified report reflect specific concerns of minority members.
One very important thrust of this bill is a strong and well-focused effort to reduce unnecessary redundancy among various intelligence programs. I believe our committee has been successful in accomplishing that task. This authorization bill will, in fact, result in more bang for the buck in the intelligence budget.
In short, Mr. Chairman, I am generally satisfied with this bill, as reported by the Intelligence Committee. I believe that the other members of the committee from this side of the aisle are as well. I would note, however, that counterintelligence remains a major concern of mine. In this regard, I believe that there is a need for better coordination among intelligence agencies responsible for sensitive classified programs and U.S. arms control negotiations. Improved coordination is essential if we are to minimize potentially serious counterintelligence problems in connection with on-site-inspection regimes which are likely to be included in arms control agreements. Nevertheless, I urge the House to pass H.R. 5422.
In conclusion, let me add a special word of appreciation for the dedicated efforts of our committee's very capable staff: Dan Childs, Tom Smeeton, Mike Sheehy, Bob Fitch, Diane Dornan, Cathy Eberwein, Louis Dupart, Joyce Pratt, Virginia Callis, Merritt Clark, Sharon Curcio, Calvin Humphrey, Dee Jackson, Jack Keliher, Ken Kodama, Jeannie McNally, Larry Prior, Bernie Raimo, Karen Schindler, Jeannie Seelbach, Bernie Toon, Angel Torres, and Steve Nelson. Without their loyal and diligent assistance, our legislative responsibilities would be virtually overwhelming.
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Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 6 minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. McHugh], chairman of our Subcommittee on Legislation.
Mr. McHUGH. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of this Intelligence Authorization Act and urge my colleagues to support it. I would like to commend our chairman, the gentleman from California [Mr. Beilenson], our ranking Republican, the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde], and all the members of the committee for working together to forge a consensus on intelligence funding during this challenging time of transition brought about by the remarkable and welcome events that have occurred in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.
The budget figures authorized by this bill, while less than last year, are significant. Given our interests in the world and our intelligence requirements, I think that these figures are reasonable. They represent a sensible accommodation of diverse pressures and interests during this unique transition year.
It is clear, however, that much of America's massive intelligence effort must be refocused to reflect both the new strategic environment and the urgency of our budget crisis. I believe that the intelligence requirements of the Nation in this decade and beyond can be met adequately with less money than is now being spent. Therefore, while supporting this year's authorization, I look forward next year to a leaner intelligence budget, a budget that realistically responds to changing conditions while continuing to protect the national security.
Mr. Chairman, in addition to authorizing spending levels for intelligence activities, this bill also contains several nonbudget legislative provisions considered by the Subcommittee on Legislation which I chair. I believe that they are reasonable provisions and can be briefly summarized as follows:
Sections 301 through 307 make several technical or conforming changes to the laws applicable to the CIA retirement system so as to more equitably treat surviving spouses and former spouses.
Section 502 authorizes the Secretary of Defense to withhold from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act certain maps and other geodetic products of the Defense Mapping Agency that are properly classifiable, but are not classified because to do so would limit their utility and availability and would unnecessarily increase costs for storage and handling.
Section 503 permits the Secretary of Defense to authorize certain intelligence elements of the Department of Defense to engage in commercial activities necessary to provide more secure cover for authorized intelligence collection activities conducted abroad. Our subcommittee agreed to this provision, which has been reviewed and refined during several years of consideration by the intelligence committees, only after concluding that the underlying intelligence collection activities are
legitimate and necessary, that the new cover authority is needed to protect these activities from disclosure, and that the Department of Defense and the Defense Intelligence Agency are fully and irreversibly committed to careful implementation and rigorous oversight of the commercial activities to be conducted. I would also point out that section 503 contains a number of important safeguards which would:
Restrict the use of commercial cover to collection activities, ensuring that it cannot be used for covert action;
Require that the Director of Central Intelligence concur in the use of the commercial activities authorized;
Mandate strict internal financial controls, as well as full reporting to the intelligence committees of activities conducted pursuant to the cover authority, including prompt notice to the committees each time a corporation, partnership, or other legal entity is established; and
Terminate the authority in 5 years, a provision that would ensure a thorough review of this authority by the intelligence committees before it could be renewed.
With all of these oversight safeguards, I am confident that the Department of Defense will utilize the proposed authority prudently, paying close attention to the intelligence risks involved as well as to the potential for financial abuse.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, there are two matters of particular interest to me that, while not treated in the bill before the House today, involve significant issues of intelligence oversight.
The first concerns provisions contained in the intelligence authorization bill passed by the Senate dealing with congressional oversight of intelligence activities in general and approval and reporting of covert actions in particular. These provisions, found in title VII of the Senate bill, are not contained in this House authorization. However, our committee's decision not to include them reflected a desire to pursue related issues with the administration, not a judgment that the Senate provisions are not acceptable. If, as is likely, the House conferees bring most of the provisions in title VII back in the conference agreement, I will, of course, discuss their content and background fully at that time. I would note now, however, that most of these provisions were endorsed by the Foreign Affairs and Intelligence Committees in 1988, and recommended by the Iran-Contra committees in their 1987 joint report. I mention this now only because I participated directly in the drafting of the 1988 provisions upon which title VII is based and because a recent lobbying effort seeks to portray the Senate provisions as providing broad new authority for the conduct of covert actions, with a corresponding lessening of congressional oversight. That is not an accurate characterization of these provisions. In fact, title VII would impose a number of new requirements, limitations, and prohibitions on the process for Presidential approval of covert
actions and the reporting thereof to Congress, thereby increasing the ability of the intelligence committees to conduct adequate oversight.
The second issue I would like to mention involves physical searches conducted in the United States to collect intelligence information. I believe it would surprise most Americans, including many Members of Congress, that such searches, including the surreptitious entry of the homes of American citizens, occur periodically--without a court order of any kind and without statutory authorization. I and other members of the committee have been troubled by this state of affairs for several years and believe it is important to impose a requirement that a court order be obtained to safeguard the privacy rights of our citizens whenever the FBI seeks to conduct a physical search for the purposes of intelligence collection. My subcommittee conducted a hearing on this issue in May, and had hoped to include physical search legislation in this authorization bill. However, because our legislative recommendations were going to be reported so late in the session, sufficient time did not remain for the Judiciary Committee to fully consider the measure. Therefore on September 12, primarily for discussion purposes I introduced H.R. 5588, the Intelligence Search Procedures Act. It would subject physical searches to essentially the same court order requirements that were successfully applied to foreign intelligence electronic surveillance in 1978. I want to alert my colleagues to the issues addressed in H.R. 5588, and I look forward to addressing its provisions in the next Congress. In my judgment, due process and the fourth amendment to the Constitution require that independent judicial review and a court order be secured before a private citizen is subjected to a physical search by the Government.
Mr. Chairman, during the course of our consideration of this bill a number of important amendments will be offered relating to so-called covert operations. I look forward to debating those issues. Regardless of how they are disposed of, however, I urge my colleagues to support this authorization bill on final passage.
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, as I was reciting the litany of excellent staff people, I forgot one of our most valuable staff members, Mr. Dick Gieza. Forgive me, Mr. Gieza. Also, Mr. Mike O'Neill, our very skilled clerk.
Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Combest].
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Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, I want to also join with the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde] and others in expressing appreciation to the Chair, and to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde] and other members as well as the staff of the committee. I think those who are on the committee, in the atmosphere in which we work, work very well together, with concern for the best interests of the country.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of this authorization for the intelligence community for the next year. I would encourage my colleagues who have not made it available to themselves to go to H.R. 405 of the Capitol and look at the Classified Annex which is available to Members of Congress to see what it is that some of these funds are expended for.
As was mentioned earlier, it is difficult and I guess impossible to speak about some of the things that are in the budget for intelligence authorizations. I think it is very important that Members look at what is happening in terms of reality and what is happening in terms of, I think, responsibility by the intelligence community, and certainly by the committee. As we are experiencing and have been now for several months a basic breaking out of peace all over the world, certainly in some of the most sensitive areas, and areas we have been concerned of in the past, primarily the Soviet Union, I think it is important to note that there are still real problems which exist, as evidenced today in the Persian Gulf, and in what is referred to as the gulf crisis.
[TIME: 1500]
I think it is such incidents that point out that in fact while there may be a peaceful breaking out in the world in many areas, there is also a very tremendous need for continuation of a very active and very adequate intelligence community.
In fact, some of us, certainly myself, Mr. Chairman, are of the basic feeling that maybe at a time of build down in other areas this may be a time to look for potential building up of intelligence. As we are pulling back and we are becoming fewer in numbers of Americans around the world in sensitive areas, it becomes more and more important that we know exactly what is going on. We can do this basically and primarily only through adequate and efficient intelligence.
We need to make certain that what is being said and being done is actually what is being done.
I think we need to look very carefully that while in the past there has been a tendency to link somewhat the spending levels of the Department of Defense and of the intelligence commuity, that those need to be separated and looked at based on what their own needs, are what their requirements are, and yet while they are many times linked very closely together, they do serve different purposes.
I did not coin the phrase or the idea and I am not even certain who did Mr. Chairman, but I think it is important to point out that intelligence and defense and the consequences of defense and peace are the two areas in this country that every American shares equally in, regardless of income level, regardless of race. Everyone who is in America shares equally in the freedom that we have. I think it has been due to lot of adequate capability that we have had in the past, and I want to be very careful as we move forward that we do not throw away 40 years of potential problems because of 1 year of peace and that we do not move faster than some of our adversaries would like to see us move, that we do not build down in areas in which they would be willing to give up something in their own regard to see us build down in, but rather that we recognize this as something positive, but we also recognize very quickly that can change as rapidly in the other direction as we have changed in the breakout of peace.
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate this opportunity and I thank the gentleman for yielding the time to me.
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Shuster], a formidable opponent in this coming election, I might add.
(Mr. SHUSTER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. SHUSTER. Mr. Chairman, I thank my friend, the gentleman from Illinois, for yielding me this time.
Mr. Chairman, several months ago one of America's top spies who had just recently retired was pushing a shopping cart through one of the grocery stores here in the Washington, DC, area and he heard a voice calling to him saying, `We won, we won,' and he turned around to look and see who was calling and what it was all about. It turned out it was another one of America's top spies who also had recently retired, both men having put their lives on the line for their country many times, saying to each other as they stood there with their shopping carts, `We won the cold war. Finally, after 40 years, we won.'
And indeed, Mr. Chairman, we have and it is a cause for celebration, but is also a cause for caution, because we find ourselves in te very American condition of wanting to be so thankful and celebrate and assume that because we have won the cold war, our worries are over, America is indeed secure.
We find ourselves really in a transition year, in a year where the cold war is behind us, a new world order is in front of us with the opportunity for us to help mold that new world order, and yet a world which is still dangerous and te challenge and the risk to us is that we refuse to see the world as ir really is, that we as Americans so naturally want to see it through rose colored glasses because of our fundamental optimist and do not recognize that indeed, it still is a very dangerous world.
As we speak today, Mr. Chairman, throughout Washington in the Embassies of our enemies and up at the United Nations, there are literally hundreds of intelligence agents watching C-SPAN and watching this debate. We have a different kind of audience today who are not only watching the debate, you can bet they are taping the debate as well to send it back home so that they can analyze what we say here today, hoping to discern some shift in our direction, hoping to understand not only what we plan to do in America to preserve and protect the security of our country, but even more importantly, perhaps, hoping to measure the extent of our resolve to continue providing security for our country as we move into this new world order.
Now, we have heard much talk and we are going to hear more today about the idea of eliminating covert operations. Why should we have covert operations when the cold war is over? And yet if we stop and pause and think for a moment, is there any among us who does not wish that we would have had covert operations to tell us what is happening in Iraq? Is there any among us who does not wish that we had very effective convert operations to tell us what was happening in Iran for the past 10 years? Is there any among us who does not wish that we had the kind of operations necessary to know what was happening in Libya and Lebanon so we could get our hands on our hostages and indeed in the killing fields of Cambodia? Is there anybody who eally does not believe that covert operations are very necessary to help provide us with the kind of information we need in order to protect America and to protect American citizens in this dangerous world in which we live?
Yes, it is a changing world, and the targets for intelligence have got to change. The intelligence community, it is no secret, many of them have made their careers by focusing on the Soviet threat, and indeed the Soviets still are the only ones who could blow us to smithereens, but we all acknowledge that there are other threats today. There are other threats which must get more attention. Certainly we must give more emphasis to the narcotics threat, not only to the narcotics threat, per se, but to the narcoterrorism which may well engulf our country in the years ahead.
We have had mnay successes. The intelligence community has had many successes in dealing wiht the narcotics threat. I wish we could talk about them in detail here, but as we all know in the intelligence business, it is only the failures that we can talk about and it is the successes which must go unheralded.
And yes, the terrorism threat, certainly we must focus on that as well. There are new threats. They are very serious threats and we must focus on those threats. We must give the support to the intelligence community which it needs so that it can indeed focus and address these very serious threats facing our countries.
I would close by quoting Felix Dzerzhinsky, the founder of Cheka, the Soviet intelligence system from which came the KGB and virtually the model for all the Marxist intelligence systems and operations in the world. He was talking to Lenin one day and Dzerzhinsky said to Lenin, `the people in the West are wishful thinkers, so what we must do is give them what they want to think.'
We must be very careful, Mr. Chairman, that we do not let this dangerous world in which we live beguile us and guide us and soothe us into thinking that there are not serious dangers out there. We must more than ever provide and protect America, and as we do that we must also reorder our priorities in intelligence to focus on the real and most pressing threats facing us in the decade ahead.
[Page: H10026]
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. Dornan].
Mr. DORNAN of California. Mr. Chairman, there has been some interesting philosophizing in the well today, and I would like to make a contribution to it.
But, first, let me add my congratulations to the staff of the Select Intelligence Committee. I have never seen a better staff on either side of the Hill on any committee or one that operates in a more bipartisan fashion.
Also let me just reiterate what I said yesterday before our discussion on the floor was interrupted with trying to balance the budget of our great country about the people who work for our intelligence agencies. I am just sick and tired of the incessant Hollywood image that most of these fine people are either engaged in drug running or looking the other way when it accurs. And this is not a recent accusation, but goes back to the Vietnam period, indeed all the way back to the middle fifties. The truth is contrary to what one of the greater intellectual fops of our generation, Bill Moyers, perpetrated on television in his pseudo-documentary called `The Secret War', in which he viciously castigated both parties and every administration from Truman on forward. Moyers' argued that somehow or other intelligence agencies run the Government of the United States, not the executive branch or our great parties on this Jenkins Hill. This, of course, is delusional. A leftist fantasy that was shot down when the left-wing loonies at the Christie Institute brought the secret team conspiracy theory into court.
[TIME: 1510]
The intelligence communities of the United States, those excellently trained men and women who come before us as analysts or as advocates of various programs, are the finest public servants I have ever seen in my life.
Now, if the chairman will indulge me just a bit of philosophy: I said on the House floor during the debate on our defense bill to one of our better orators, if not the best, the gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums] that Plato--the greatest of the Greek philosophers--had said that only the dead have seen the end of war. Mr. Dellums got up and said that it was a cynical remark.
Well, a lot of philosophers are cynics.
Other great historians from Josephus to Toynbee have said all of history is military conflict interrupted by very brief periods of peace. Another cynical remark, but historically accurate, unfortunately.
Take one of the oldest of all warlords, Szun Zsu of China, whose books are still taught after three millenia, from Sandhurst to West Point, to the Air Force Academy to the Naval Academy. He said this about warfare: The greatest victor of all is that who wins without ever firing a shot. And that is what every Member in this Chamber dreams for, prays for, will be the outcome of Desert Shield. A victory for freedom. A collapse of the vicious tyranny. An end of the atrocities committed by `Sadist Insane' and his gang in Baghdad. And an end to his cruel occupation without firing a shot.
Now, how do you do that? Well, no less a person than Szun Zsu said that the principal, the cardinal rule of anybody who is faced with conflict or trying to avoid it is to `know thy enemy.' That is what intelligence is all about.
When President Carter was sworn in, bless his peanut-pickin' heart, he did away with about 700 or 800 hardworking, talented people within the CIA with an institutional memory of about a quarter of a century each. We paid a heavy price for that for years to come because there is no replacing the infantrymen. Ask two majority Members who have sons over there involved in Desert Shield right now, Mr. de la Garza and Mr. Costello. The ultimate weapon on the ground is that young soldier, that marine, that sailor. And the ultimate person in intelligence is what we refer to in our abbreviation, humint, human intelligence. That we had no human assets in Baghdad is one of the reasons they were able to mount an operation, even though some voices were saying that an attack was coming. Those voices were heard least by the Kuwaiti Government. We need people of high skill and talent in our intelligence agencies so that we can know in an ever-dangerous world, in spite of the collapse of communism, what is happening around the world.
I mentioned yesterday a General Electric commercial that has been running, it seems like 2 years now, on every serious discussion show across the networks and PBS and CNN. I will close with the two opening lines of that: `Freedom is wonderful, freedom is everything.'
One of these great clerks behind me said every time he sees it he gets goose pimples.
In the defense of freedom, the first line of defense is intelligence, the people who are trying to find out what we are up against.
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I have no more requests for time, but I ask unanimous consent that I be permitted to yield whatever time I have left to the gentleman from California [Mr. Beilenson].
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Kanjorski). Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Illinois?
There was no objection.
Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for that.
Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as she may consume to the gentlewoman from Connecticut [Mrs. Kennelly], a very valuable member of our committee.
(Mrs. KENNELLY asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.)
Mrs. KENNELLY. I thank the chairman.
Mr. Chairman, I rise to support the authorization, I thank the chairman and take this opportunity to commend the staff.
Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to gentleman from Kansas [Mr. Glickman], a member of the committee.
(Mr. GLICKMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. GLICKMAN. Mr. Chairman, first of all, I want to compliment both the gentleman from California [Mr. Beilenson] and the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde] for doing an excellent job of making sure that our intelligence operations are properly monitored and that there is effective oversight to ensure that the appropriate role for intelligence is carried out by our Government.
The purpose of intelligence is to provide informational support for our Government to carry out its defense and foreign policy objectives.
Intelligence does not set policy. On the contrary, it provides the support base and relevant information so that the policymakers in the administration and in Congress can achieve this country's foreign policy and defense objectives.
Intelligence operatives are the servants of others in Government, not the actors; not the initiators of policy. Intelligence must do that in order to not create the mistakes of the past.
I would say that not only Mr. Beilenson and his staff have done an excellent job, but I would compliment the administration, this administration, for doing a better job of understanding the proper role of intelligence and not making the terrible mistakes of the previous administration as it related to intelligence and its role in foreign policy.
Now, as Mr. Shuster and others talked about, those defense and foreign policy objectives of the United States have changed dramatically in the last year. I will not run through the litany of world change in 1989 and 1990, but there is one thing that has changed that I think needs to have more focus by the intelligence community. That has to do with economic intelligence.
With respect to the economic realities of the world, it is important to remember that in this changing world the greatest threat to America is in the economic arena now. It is not in the military arena, it is in the economic arena, both from our allies as well as from our adversaries that we will experience our greatest challenges. These economic challenges are the threats to the American way of life, to jobs, to our ability to produce, to our ability to provide a standard of living second to none in this world.
The intelligence agencies of our Government must be alert to that and must provide appropriate information so that our Government and our policy-makers are able to make those decisions necessary to protect America's interests. And whether those interest have to do with ownership of U.S. assets, U.S. companies, U.S. patents and trademarks, scientific and technical data, or whether they have to do with the protection of U.S. jobs, unfair competition, and all sort of other things that relate to the economic structure of our country, our intelligence agencies must be collecting and providing information and disseminating it to Government policymakers to make sure we know what the rest of the world is doing with respect to economic matters that affect our national interests.
The impact of economic competition in the world on the average U.S. citizen is great. It affects his job; his or her economic security is at stake with what is happening in the world as it is changing. The challenges from Japan, the European Community, Brazil, and a host of other countries to our economic security are significant. Opportunities with respect to changing United States-Soviet relations are great, but so are the emerging challenges from other nations in the world that want to take the lead from the United States in manufacturing, in research in technology and in the financial markets. That is why we must focus as much as possible, and as relevant, making sure our intelligence agencies provide that information base on economic issues.
It has been said that political theory is simply the rationalization of economic self-interest. Our intelligence agencies can and should be a powerful information base to protect our economic self-interest.
[Page: H10027]
Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to our friend, the gentleman from New Mexico [Mr. Richardson].
(Mr. RICHARDSON asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, first, this is a very exciting committee to serve on, one of the most interesting. Unfortunately, you can never talk about what you do.
The chemistry between the chairman and the ranking minority member I think has made this committee especially interesting and positive, especially the Chairman who, I think, in his opening remarks laid out what we are trying to do with this intelligence budget.
First it is to scrutinize. Second it is to ensure that we get the best bang for the buck. And I think we are doing that.
I think large credit goes to him and the very fair and impartial and gentlemanly way that he runs the committee. We have to move faster into the new arenas of American national security. The cold war is over. Our intelligence community needs to move into these new areas that have already been discussed, whether they be international narcotics, nuclear proliferation, economic intelligence, drugs, the whole variety of new challenges that are equally of danger to American national security.
[TIME: 1520]
Mr. Chairman, there are going to be two good amendments today on Angola that I commend to this body, good amendments that relate to the end of the cold war and the United States moving into new relationships in the Third World. They are moderate amendments. They are amendments that deal with incentives for peace.
I also commend to my colleagues one amendment that I will have on Cambodia that I believe is consistent with this process of moving away into new challenges, away from cold war issues and into new priorities for American foreign policy.
Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 of the minutes allotted to me by the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde] to the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Traficant].
Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, there was a comment made earlier that intelligence now should be able to tell us what Mr. Hussein is doing. I would like to say that I look at intelligence a little differently.
Mr. Chairman, I think our intelligence community should have played a part in preventing Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in the first place.
I would like to say this to the Members: I think that we are a little preoccupied with war ourselves. Our priorities reflect that in our budget.
Second of all, we have several major government academies. They are all military. We teach our brightest young minds how to be military warriors.
In fact, Mr. Chairman, I have a bill that called for the creation of a national academy of science and technology. I had over 100 cosponsors. After graduation students shall serve 4 years in some Government service other than military and, after it is all over, these students come back and work for the government.
Mr. Chairman, 100 cosponsors said, `Gee, that's a lot of money. We better not look at that this year.'
Mr. Chairman, I would like to just caution our Members about one thing. It is a fact. I heard about Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on the CNN news, just like most of my colleagues did. I literally wonder if our strong chairman with close ties with the intelligence network knew, but I want to know why our intelligence community has satellites that can read the small print off a pack of cigarettes from outer space, but did not see the mobilization of 120,000 troops and 5,000 tanks on the border moving on Kuwait.
Mr. Chairman, I think those are legitimate questions that Congress should ask, and I do not think there are any two better chairmen in the House than the gentleman from California [Mr. Beilenson] and the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde], and I would hope they would work toward those ends.
I have a little amendment today that I am going to be bringing up. I do not care what the chairmen do with it respectively to make it appropriate for this bill. I do not want to see it thrown out in conference. If they are going to be purchasing goods covertly, they can buy American goods overtly, and that is what my amendment does.
Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. Dymally].
Mr. DYMALLY. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from California [Mr. Beilenson], my very good friend, for giving me these 2 minutes, and the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde] for releasing this time so that I could speak.
Mr. Chairman, most of the Members are going to talk about the strategic importance of stopping aid to UNITA. I want to deal with a very human problem today, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. I want to talk about these children who we have maimed with our bombs.
These beautiful children in the face of tragedy, Mr. Chairman, continue to smile. Why are we doing this to these children? Is it because they are Angolans? I think not. Is it because they are Africans? I think not. Is it because they are Marxists? Certainly we would not be so preposterous to think that these beautiful children are Marxists.
Mr. Chairman, we are doing it because we are blind politically. We are doing it because the cold war continues to rage in Africa, and the victims are these beautiful, innocent children, Mr. Chairman.
We need to stop the armed aid to UNITA so that these children, 55,000, Mr. Chairman, more than the people who reside in the city of Bellflower, CA, which I represent, more than the people who reside in the city of Gardena, which I represent, 55,000 of these innocent children, these women, are maimed because of our bombs in the coffee plantations, and in the schoolyards and on the country roads. That is the reason why I come to the well of the House to appeal to my colleagues as mothers and fathers and uncles, so that they can see the tragedy of our policy in Angola.
I ask my colleagues, `As you listen to the debate today, think about these children. Think about what we are doing to them.'
[Page: H10028]
Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to our distinguished colleague, the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. McCurdy].
(Mr. McCURDY asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. McCURDY. Mr. Chairman, I spoke the other day on the rule, so I do not intend to take all this time today, and I will reserve time for addressing the question of Angola during the debate on the amendments.
However, Mr. Chairman, I wanted to rise and comment briefly about the changing environment in intelligence and some of the new challenges that face us.
I think the gentleman from Kansas [Mr. Glickman] spoke articulately on some of the challenges that lie before us, and the gentleman from New Mexico [Mr. Richardson], and I am sure others in this Chamber have as well.
I was also taken by the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Traficant] about CNN. As my colleagues know, it is true that television, mass media, has had a tremendous impact on the change in the world this year. I believe that the television coverage of the events in Eastern Europe accelerated the pace of change that occurred there, and it provides a tremendous resource to us today.
I think many of these political changes, the globalization of the communications, has allowed the aspirations and hopes of people all over the world to be expressed and to feel that they are not isolated. It is only in those countries like Iraq and others, where they do not have free communication, where they do not have free press. Countries such as in Angola, where they still have one-party systems, that do not allow for freedom of expression, we do not see this dramatic change.
So, Mr. Chairman, what I would argue is perhaps it is not a question of whether the U.S. Government ought to be funding CNN, which has been advocated. I think what we need to do is to continue to use our resources in this Government, and the prestige and the diplomacy of this Government, to try to open up those systems so that communication can get there so we can have this cross-fertilization of democratic ideas around the globe.
Also I would like to indicate that the agencies in the intelligence community are going to have to change. They are going to be challeged in a way that they never have been before.
Some have mentioned satellites and capabilities. The real issue is how do we get into the intentions of individuals.
We knew there was a mobilization on the Kuwaiti border, but we did not know the intentions of a dictator because there is no freedom of communication in that one-party country.
We have to improve our human capability to not only understand the intentions of tyrants, and dictators, and people that threaten militarily other nations and freedoms, but also those of competitor governments. It is becoming more that governments are competing economically against the United States, and I think we have to have an understanding of their intentions and capabilities as well.
Mr. Chairman, it is true that the cold war is over.
[TIME: 1530]
The Warsaw Pact threat has diminished, if not totally collapsed. I believe that the changes in the Soviet Union are positive. I am pleased that Mikhail Gorbachev was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. But obviously he did not get the Nobel Prize for economics, because they have a long way to go there, and there is going to be much turmoil and difficulty as they try to make the shift from a Marxist system to more of a cpaitalist system.
Furthermore, when you look at the trends in the future, I think that the nature of threats will change. We have to understand them better. By year 2020 the population of Africa will exceed the combined populations of Japan, North America, Europe, and the Soviet Union. China's population will be eclipsed by India. Brazil will double in population. The claims on global resources will be greater.
We have to have an appreciation of where those strains and challenges are going to be. We need to use our intelligence capabilities to further improve the world's ability to feed itself and to deal with strains on the ecostructure and, of course, the economic competition that could arise as well.
Mr. Chairman, all of these changes are going to challenge the intelligence community, and I believe that a valid, robust intelligence capability is vital to our overall national security.
Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Burton].
Mr. BURTON of Indiana. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
Mr. Chairman, I would just like to say in response to my friend, the gentleman from California [Mr. Dymally], that we are all concerned about the loss of life of young children in Angola and the maiming that is taking place of women and children because of the indiscriminate bombing that is taking place and the mines that have been placed in the fields of battle and around villages. But I would just like to say that much of these terrible tragedies have occurred because of Soviet weapons and Cuban weapons that have been used by the Communist MPLA.
As a matter of fact, when the recent attack on Mavinga took place, because they could not bomb at low levels, the MPLA was doing carpet bombing from 30,000 and 35,000 feet so they would not be hit by ground-to-air missiles.
I would just say that we must make absolutely sure, when we are talking about this issue, that we do not misplace the responsibility.
Mr. DYMALLY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. BURTON of Indiana. I am happy to yield to the gentleman from California.
Mr. DYMALLY. Mr. Chairman, I stated that to Mr. Savimba. I am not here to place blame on UNITA or the MPLA. I am simply here to say, let us stop bombing. Let us save the children.
The CHAIRMAN. All time has expired.
Pursuant to the rule, the bill is considered under the 5-minute rule by title and each title is considered as read. The amendments recommended by the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Armed Services printed in the reported bill are considered as having been adopted, and are considered as original text for the purpose of further amendment.
The Clerk will designate title I.
Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the bill be printed in the Record and open to amendment at any point.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California?
There was no objection.
The text of the bill is as follows:
SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 1991 for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the following elements of the United States Government;
(1) The Central Intelligence Agency.
(2) The Department of Defense.
(3) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
(4) The National Security Agency.
(5) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force.
(6) The Department of State.
(7) The Department of the Treasury.
(8) The Department of Energy.
(9) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(10) The Drug Enforcement Administration.
[Page: H10029]
SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.
The amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101, and the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 1991, for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the elements listed in such section, are thoe specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared by the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence to accompany (H.R. 5422) of the One Hundred First Congress. That Schedule of Authorizations shall be made available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives and to the President. The President shall provide for suitable distribution of the Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within the Executive Branch.
SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.
The Director of Central Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess of the numbers authorized for fiscal year 1991 under sections 102 and 202 of this Act when he determines that such action is necessary for the performance of important intelligence functions, except that such number may not, for any element of the Intelligence Community, exceed two percent of the number of civilian personnel authorized under such sections for such element. The Director of Central Intelligence shall promptly notify the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate whenever he exercises the authority granted by this section.
SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There are authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Staff for fiscal year 1991 $27,900,000.
SEC. 202. AUTHORIZATION OF PERSONNEL END STRENGTH.
(a) The Intelligence Community Staff is authorized 331 full-time personnel as of September 30, 1991. Such personnel of the Intelligence Community Staff may be permanent employees of the Intelligence Community Staff or personnel detailed from other elements of the United States Government.
(b) During fiscal year 1991, personnel of the Intelligence Community Staff shall be selected so as to provide appropriate representation from elements of the United States Government engaged in intelligence and intelligence-related activities.
(c) During fiscal year 1991, any officer or employee of the United States or a member of the Armed Forces who is detailed to the Intelligence Community Staff from another element of the United States Government shall be detailed on a reimbursable basis, except that any such officer, employee or member may be detailed on a nonreimbursable basis for a period of less than one year for the performance of temporary functions as required by the Director of Central Intelligence.
SEC. 203. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF ADMINISTERED IN SAME MANNER AS CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
During fiscal year 1991, activities and personnel of the Intelligence Community Staff shall be subject to the provisions of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) and the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403a et seq.) in the same manner as activities and personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency.
SEC. 301. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There are authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal year 1991 $164,600,000.
SEC. 302. CIA FORMER SPOUSE QUALIFYING TIME.
Section 204(b) of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees (50 U.S.C. 403 note) is amended by inserting before the period at the end of paragraph (4) `during the participant's service as an employee of the Central Intelligence Agency'.
SEC. 303. ELIMINATION OF 15-YEAR CAREER REVIEW FOR CERTAIN CIA EMPLOYEES.
Section 203 of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees (50 U.S.C. 403 note) is amended by striking out the second sentence and inserting in lieu thereof the following: `Any officer or employee who elects to accept designation as a participant entitled to the benefits of the system shall remain a participant of the system for the duration of his or her employment with the Agency. Such election shall be irrevocable except as and to the extent provided in section 301(d) of this Act and shall not be subject to review or approval by the Director.'.
SEC. 304. SURVIVOR ANNUITIES UNDER CIARDS FOR CERTAIN POST-RETIREMENT SPOUSES.
(a) Computation of Annuities for Other Than Former Spouses: Section 221(n) of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees (50 U.S.C. 403 note) is amended by inserting `or elected under section 226(e)' after `(unless such reduction is adjusted under section 222(b)(5))'.
(b) Survivor Annuities: Section 226 of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees (50 U.S.C. 403 note) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:
`(e) Upon remarriage occurring on or after the date of the enactment of this subsection to a spouse other than the spouse at the time of retirement, a retired participant whose annuity was not reduced (or was not fully reduced) to provide a survivor annuity for the participant's spouse or former spouse as of the time of retirement may irrevocably elect by means of a signed writing received by the Director within one year after such remarriage, a reduction in the retired participant's annuity for the purpose of providing an annuity for such retired participant's spouse in the event such spouse survives the retired participant. The reduction shall be effective the first day of the month nine months after the date of remarriage. For remarriages that occurred prior to the date of the enactment of this subsection, the retired participant may make such an election within two years after the date of the enactment of this subsection. The retired participant, to the greatest extent practicable, shall pay a deposit under the same terms and conditions as those prescribed for retired employees under the Civil Service Retirement and Disability System under section 8339(j)(5)(C)(ii) of title 5, United States Code. A survivor annuity elected under this subsection shall be treated in all respects as a survivor annuity under section 221(b).'.
SEC. 305. REDUCTION OF REMARRIAGE AGE.
(a) Reduction of Remarriage Age for Survivor and Retirement Benefits: The Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees (50 U.S.C. 403 note), is amended--
(1) in section 221--
(A) in subsections (b)(1)(A) and (b)(3)(C), by striking out `age 60' each place it appears and inserting in lieu thereof `age 55'; and
(B) in subsection (g)(1), by striking out `age sixty' each place it appears and inserting in lieu thereof `age 55';
(2) in section 222--
(A) by striking out `60 years of age' each place it appears in subsections (a)(2), (a)(3)(A), and (b)(2) and inserting in lieu thereof `55 years of age'; and
(B) by striking out `age 60' each place it appears in subsections (b)(3), (b)(5)(A), (c)(3)(C), (c)(3)(D), and (c)(4) and inserting in lieu thereof `age 55'; and
(3) in section 232(b)(1), by striking out `attaining age sixty' in the last sentence and inserting in lieu thereof `attaining age 55'.
(b) Effective Date of Amendments: (1) The amendments made by subsection (a) relating to widows or widowers shall apply in the case of a surviving spouse's remarriage occurring on or after July 27, 1989, and with respect to periods beginning after such date.
(2) The amendments made by subsection (a) relating to former spouses shall apply with respect to any former spouse whose remarriage occurs after the date of enactment of this Act.
SEC. 306. ELECTION BETWEEN CIARDS ANNUITY AND OTHER SURVIVOR ANNUITIES.
Section 221(g) of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees is amended by adding at the end the following paragraph:
`(3) A surviving spouse who was acquired after the participant's retirement shall be entitled to a survivor annuity payable from the fund under this title only upon electing this annuity instead of any other survivor benefit to which he or she may be entitled under this or any other retirement system for Government employees on the basis of a marriage to someone other than the participant.'.
SEC. 307. RESTORATION OF FORMER SPOUSE BENEFITS AFTER DISSOLUTION OF REMARRIAGE.
(A) Survivor Annuity: Section 224 of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees (50 U.S.C. 403 note), is amended--
(1) in subsection (b)(1) after `fifty-five' by inserting `, except that the entitlement of the former spouse to such a survivor annuity shall be restored on the date such remarriage is dissolved by death, annulment, or divorce';
(2) in subsection (c)(1)(B) after `fifty-five' by inserting `, except that the entitlement of the former spouse to such a survivor annuity shall be restored on the date such remarriage is dissolved by death, annulment, or divorce'; and
(3) by adding at the end thereof the following new subsection:
`(e) Notwithstanding subsection (c)(2)(A) of this section, the thirty-month application requirement for a survivor annuity under this section to be payable shall not apply in cases in which a former spouse's entitlement to such a survivor annuity is restored under subsection (b)(1) or (c)(1)(B) of this section.'.
(b) Retirement Benefits.--Section 225 of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees (50 U.S.C. 403 note), is amended--
(1) in subsection (c)(1)(B)(i) by inserting `, except that the entitlement of the former spouse to benefits under this section shall be restored on the date such remarriage is dissolved by death, annulment, or divorce' after `fifty-five years of age';
(2) in subsection (b)(1) after ""fifty-five' by inserting `, except that the entitlement of the former spouse to benefits under this section shall be restored on the date such remarriage is dissolved by death, annulment, or divorce';
(3) by redesignating subsection (e) as subsection (f); and
(4) by adding after subsection (d) the following new subsection (e):
`(e) Notwithstanding subsection (c)(4)(A) of this section, the thirty-month application requirement for benefits under this section to be payable shall not apply in cases in which a former spouse's entitlement to such benefits is restored under subsection (b)(1) or (c)(1)(B) of this section.'.
(c) Health Benefits: Section 16(c) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403a et seq.) is amended by adding after paragraph (2) the following new paragraph:
`(3)(A) A former spouse who is not eligible to enroll or to continue enrollment in a health benefits plan under this section solely because of remarriage before age fifty-five shall be restored to such eligibility on the date such remarriage is dissolved by death, annulment, or divorce.
`(B) A former spouse whose eligibility is restored under subparagraph (A) may, under regulations which the Director of the Office of Personnel Management shall prescribe, enroll in a health benefits plan is such former spouse--
`(i) was an individual referred to in paragraph (1) and was an individual covered under a benefits plan as a family member at any time during the 18-month period before the date of dissolution of the marriage to the Agency employee or annuitant; or
`(ii) was an individual referred to in paragraph (2) and was an individual covered under a benefits plan immediately before the remarriage ended the enrollment.'.
(d) Effective Date: The amendments made by this section shall take effect October 1, 1990. No benefits provided pursuant to the amendments made by this section shall be payable with respect to any period before such effective date.
(e) Compliance With Budget Act: Any new spending authority (within the meaning of section 401(c) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974) provided pursuant to the amendments made by this section shall be effective for any fiscal year only to such extent or in such amounts as are provided in advance in appropriation Acts.
[Page: H10030]
SEC. 401. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS AUTHORIZED BY LAW.
Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other benefits for federal employees may be increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits authorized by law.
SEC. 402. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or laws of the United States.
SEC. 501. REIMBURSEMENT RATE FOR CERTAIN AIRLIFT SERVICE.
(a) The Secretary of Defense is authorized to grant the use of the Department of Defense reimbursement rate for military airlift services provided by the Department of Defense to the Central Intelligence Agency if the Secretary of Defense determines that such services are provided in support of authorized intelligence activities.
(b) As used in subsection (a), the term `Department of Defense reimbursement rate' means the amount charged a component of the Department of Defense by another component of the Department of Defense.
SEC. 502. PUBLIC AVAILABILITY OF MAPS, ETC., PRODUCED BY DEFENSE MAPPING AGENCY.
(A) In General: (1) Chapter 167 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new section:
`2796. Maps, charts, and geodetic data: public availability; exceptions
`(a) The Defense Mapping Agency shall offer for sale maps and charts at scales of 1:500,000 and smaller, except those withheld in accordance with subsection (b) or those specifically authorized under criteria established by Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order.
`(b)(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Secretary of Defense may withhold from public disclosure any geodetic product in the possession of, or under the control of, the Department, of Defense--
`(A) that was obtained or produced, or that contains information that was provided, pursuant to an international agreement that restricts disclosure of such product or information to government officials of the agreeing parties or that restricts use of such product or information to government purposes only;
`(B) that contains information that the Secretary of Defense has determined in writing would, if disclosed, reveal sources and methods used to obtain source material for production of the geodetic product; or
`(C) that contains information that the Director of the Defense Mapping Agency has determined in writing would, if disclosed, reveal military operational or contingency plans.
`(2) In this subsection, the term `geodetic product' means any map, chart, geodetic data, or related product.
`(c)(1) Regulations to implement this section (including any amendments to such regulations) shall be published in the Federal Register for public comment for a period of not less than 30 days before they take effect.
`(2) Regulations under this section shall address the conditions under which release of geodetic products authorized under subsection (b) to be withheld from public disclosure would be appropriate--
`(A) in the case of allies of the United States; and
`(B) in the case of qualified United States contractors (including contractors that are small business concerns) who need such products for use in the performance of contracts with the United States.'.
(2) The table of sections at the beginning of such chapter is amended by adding at the end the following new item:
`2796. Maps, charts, and geodetic data: public availability; exceptions.'.
(b) Deadline for Initial Regulations: Regulations to implement section 2796 of title 10, United States Code, as added by subsection (a), shall be published in the Federal Register for public comment in accordance with subsection (c) of that section not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.
SEC. 503. USE OF COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES AS COVER SUPPORT FOR INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.
(a) In General: Chapter 21 of title 10, United States Code, is amended--
(1) by inserting after the chapter heading the following:
`Subchapter
Sec.
`I.
`II.
and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
`431. Authority to engage in commercial activities as security for defense intelligence collection activities.
`432. Use, disposition, and auditing of funds.
`433. Relationship with other Federal laws.
`434. Reservation of defenses and immunities.
`435. Limitations.
`436. Regulations, internal oversight, and legal review.
`437. Congressional oversight.
`431. Authority to engage in commercial activities as security for defense intelligence collection activities
`(a) Authority: The Secretary of Defense, subject to the provisions of this subchapter, may authorize elements of the Department of Defense to engage in such commercial activities as may be necessary for the purpose of providing security for the conduct of authorized intelligence collection activities abroad undertaken by the Department of Defense. The authority of the Secretary under the preceding sentence may not be delegated. No commercial activities may be conducted pursuant to this subchapter after September 30, 1995.
`(b) Interagency Coordination and Support: Any such activity shall--
`(1) be coordinated with, and (where appropriate) be supported by, the Director of Central Intelligence; and
`(2) to the extent the activity takes place within the United States, be coordinated with, and (where appropriate) be supported by, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
`(c) Definitions: In this subchapter:
`(1) The term `commercial activities' means activities that are conducted in a manner consistent with prevailing commercial practice. Such term includes--
`(A) the acquisition, use, sale, storage and disposal of goods and services;
`(B) entering into employment contracts and leases and other agreements for real and personal property;
`(C) depositing funds into and withdrawing funds from domestic and foreign commercial businesses or financial institutions;
`(D) acquiring licenses, registrations, permits, and insurance; and
`(E) establishing corporations, partnerships, and other legal entities.
`(2) The term `intelligence collection activities' means the collection of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence information.
[Page: H10031]
`432. Use, disposition, and auditing of funds
`(a) Use of Funds: Funds generated by a commercial activity authorized pursuant to this subchapter may be used to offset necessary and reasonable expenses arising from that activity. Use of such funds for that purpose shall be kept to the minimum necessary to operate the activity concerned in a secure manner. Any funds generated by the activity in excess of those required for that purpose shall be deposited into the Treasury as miscellaneous receipts. The Secretary of Defense shall ensure that such deposits are made as often as may be practicable.
`(b) Audits: (1) The Secretary of Defense shall assign an organization within the Department of Defense to have auditing responsibility with respect to activities authorized under this subchapter.
`(2) That organization shall audit the use and disposition of funds generated by any commercial activity authorized under this subchapter not less often than annually. Upon the completion of any such audit, the Secretary shall promptly notify the intelligence committees (as defined in section 437(d) of this title) of the results of the audit.
`433. Relationship with other Federal laws
`(a) In General: Except as provided under subsection (b), a commercial activity conducted pursuant to this subchapter shall be carried out in accordance with applicable Federal law.
`(b) Authorization of Waivers When Necessary To Maintain Security: (1) If the Secretary of Defense determines, in connection with the establishment or operation of a commercial activity pursuant to this subchapter, that compliance with the provisions of certain Federal laws and regulations pertaining to the management and administration of Federal agencies would create an unacceptable risk of compromise of an authorized intelligence collection activity, the Secretary may, to the extent necessary to prevent the disclosure of the commercial activity concerned as an instrumentality of the United States, authorize the establishment and operation of the activity notwithstanding those laws or regulations.
`(2) Any determination and authorization by the Secretary under paragraph (1) shall be certified by the Secretary in writing and shall include a specification of the laws or regulations for which compliance by the commercial activity concerned is not required consistent with this section.
`(3) The authority of the Secretary under paragraph (1) may only be delegated to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, an Under Secretary of Defense, or an Assistant Secretary of Defense.
`(c) Federal Laws and Regulations: For purposes of this section, Federal laws and regulations pertaining to the management and administration of Federal agencies are those Federal laws and regulations pertaining to the following:
`(1) The receipt and use of appropriated and nonappropriated funds.
`(2) The acquisition or management of property or services.
`(3) Information disclosure, retention, and management.
`(4) The employment of personnel.
`(5) Payments for travel and housing.
`(6) The establishment of legal entities or government instrumentalities.
`(7) Foreign trade or financial transaction restrictions that would reveal the commercial activity as an activity of the United States Government.
`434. Reservation of defenses and immunities
`Commercial activity undertaken pursuant to this subchapter, including the submission to judicial proceedings of a State, shall not constitute a waiver of the defenses and immunities of the United States.
`435. Limitations
`(a) Lawful Activities: Nothing in this subchapter authorizes the conduct of any intelligence activity that is not otherwise authorized by law or Executive order.
`(b) Domestic Activities: Personnel conducting commercial activity authorized by this subchapter may only engage in those activities in the United States to the extent necessary to support intelligence activities abroad.
`(c) Supply to Department of Defense: Commercial activity may not be undertaken within the United States for the purpose of providing goods or services to the Department of Defense, other than as may be necessary to provide security for the activities subject to this subchapter.
`(d) United States Persons: (1) In carrying out a commercial activity authorized under this subchapter, the Secretary of Defense may not permit an entity engaged in such activity to employ a United States person in an operational, managerial, or supervisory position, and may not assign or detail a United States person to perform operational, managerial, or supervisory duties for such an entity, unless that person is informed in advance of the intelligence security purpose of that activity.
`(2) In this subsection, the term `United States person' means an individual who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence.
`436. Regulations, internal oversight, and legal review
`The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe regulations to implement the authority provided in this subchapter. Such regulations shall--
`(1) specify all officials authorized to approve commercial activities under this subchapter;
`(2) designate a single office within the Department of Defense to implement, and to maintain accountability for, all activities authorized under this subchapter;
`(3) require that each commercial activity proposed to be authorized under this subchapter be subject to legal review before the activity is authorized; and
`(4) provide for appropriate internal audit controls and oversight for such activities.
`437. Congressional oversight
`(a) Proposed Regulations: Copies of regulations proposed to be prescribed under section 436 of this title (including any proposed revision to such regulations) shall be submitted to the intelligence committees not less than 30 days before they take effect.
`(b) Current Information: The Secretary of Defense shall ensure that the intelligence committees are kept fully and currently informed of actions taken pursuant to this subchapter, including any significant anticipated activity to be authorized pursuant to this subchapter. The Secretary shall promptly notify the committees whenever a corporation, partnership, or other legal entity is established under this subchapter.
`(c) Annual Report: Not later than January 15 of each year, the Secretary shall submit to the intelligence committees a report on all commercial activities authorized under this subchapter that were undertaken during the previous fiscal year. Such report shall include (with respect to the fiscal year covered by the report)--
`(1) a description of any exercise of the authority provided by section 433 of this title to the Secretary of Defense;
`(2) a description of any expenditure of funds made pursuant to this subchapter (whether from appropriated or nonappropriated funds); and
`(3) a description of any actions taken with respect to audits under section 432 of this title to implement recommendations or correct deficiencies identified in such audits.
`(d) Intelligence Committees Defined: In this section, the term `intelligence committees' means the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.'.
(b) Effective Date: The Secretary of Defense may not authorize an activity under section 431 of title 10, United States Code, as added by subsection (a), until the later of--
(1) the end of the 90-day period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act; or
(2) the effective date of regulations first prescribed under section 436 of such title, as added by subsection (a).
SEC. 504. DISCLOSURE TO MEMBERS OF CONGRESS OF CLASSIFIED DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY REPORT RELATING TO MILITARY PERSONNEL LISTED AS PRISONER, MISSING, OR UNACCOUNTED FOR.
The Secretary of Defense shall provide to any Member of Congress, upon request, full and complete access to the classified report of the Defense Intelligence Agency commonly known as the Tighe Report, relating to efforts by the Special Office for Prisoners of War/Missing in Action of the Defense Intelligence Agency to fully account for United States military personnel listed as prisoner, missing, or unaccounted for in military actions. The Secretary may withhold from disclosure under the preceding sentence any material that in the judgment of the Secretary would compromise sources and methods of intelligence.[H17OC0-X2]{H10031}elligence.
Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The Clerk read as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. Beilenson: On page 4, line 7:
Strike our `331' and insert in lieu thereof `240'.
Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Chairman, this amendment merely corrects an error in the drafting of the bill. It is purely technical. I have discussed this and cleared it with my friend, the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde], and I ask for adoption of the amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from California [Mr. Beilenson].
The amendment was agreed to.
Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The Clerk read as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. Richardson: On page 25, after line 18, add the following:
SEC. 601. RESTRICTIONS ON ASSISTANCE FOR THE CAMBODIAN NONCOMMUNIST RESISTANCE FORCES.
(a) Restrictions: Funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act may be obligated and expended for assistance for the Cambodian noncommunist resistance forces only as follows:
(1) Any such assistance shall be limited to nonlethal assistance.
(2) Any such assistance shall be consistent with section 906 of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985 (relating to the prohibition on assistance to the Khmer Rouge).
(3) Any funds to be made available for such assistance shall be allocated for that purpose within 30 days after date of enactment of this Act.
(4) Within 30 days after the conclusion of a comprehensive political settlement involving the 4 Cambodian factions, the unexpended balance of the funds allocated for assistance for the Cambodian noncommunist resistance pursuant to paragraph (3) shall be transferred to such agency of the United States Government as the President may designate. The President may not designate an intelligence agency for purposes of this paragraph. Such funds shall be expended in ways that are consistent with the comprehensive political settlement.
(5) After funds are transferred pursuant to paragraph (4), funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act (and any other funds available to any intelligence agency during fiscal year 1991) may not be obligated or expended by any intelligence agency for assistance for the Cambodian noncommunist resistance forces.
(b) Relation to Foreign Assistance Funds: Funds made available for assistance for the Cambodian noncommunist resistance forces pursuant to this section are in addition to any funds that are made available for assistance for the Cambodian noncommunist resistance forces under the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1991.
(c) Intelligence Sharing and Collection: Subsection (a) does not apply with respect to intelligence sharing or intelligence collection.
(d) Definition of Intelligence Agency: As used in this section, the term `intelligence agency' means any agency within the intelligence community, within the meaning of section 3.4(f) of Executive Order 12333 (December 4, 1981).
[Page: H10032]
Mr. RICHARDSON (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the Record.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New Mexico?
There was no objection.
(Mr. RICHARDSON asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, this amendment I think is very necessary. I believe it has been worked out. It deals with Cambodia. The purpose of the amendment is to provide a clear expression of congressional approval for the adoption of a consistent approach by the United States in its support for the non-Communist resistance in Cambodia.
Mr. Chairman, it has the further effect of establishing a mechanism within this bill by which the United States will be able to assist in the implementation of a negotiated settlement for Cambodia, as soon as the four factions have concluded an agreement.
Mr. Chairman, I believe that United States policy should seek to advance the Cambodian peace process, which is at a critical juncture. A negotiated solution to the civil war in Cambodia will best guarantee the ability of the people of that country to freely determine their own destiny. That result, which is the best insurance possible against a return to power of the Khmer Rouge, appears to be closer at hand than at any time in memory.
Mr. Chairman, I believe this amendment creates a framework which encourages both the conclusion of the peace agreement and the smooth transition to the challenging days such an agreement will herald. I urge adoption of this amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from California [Mr. Beilenson].
Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Chairman, the amendment of the gentleman from New Mexico [Mr. Richardson] is acceptable to members of the committee on this side of the aisle. The desire for a peaceful end to the conflict in Cambodia is as bipartisan as the intentions that the Khmer Rouge not be permitted to return to power.
To the extent that this amendment contributes to those ends, it represents a worthwhile addition to the bill. It is my understanding the administration does not object to the amendment. Accordingly, we are prepared to accept the amendment.
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. RICHARDSON. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, we are prepared to accept the amendment, with the proviso that the distinguished gentleman from New Mexico [Mr. Richardson] will support his amendment in conference unyieldingly.
Mr. RICHARDSON. The gentleman is correct.
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, we are pleased to accept the amendment.
Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. RICHARDSON. I yield to the gentleman from New York.
Mr. SOLARZ. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
Mr. Chairman, I want to commend the gentleman for what I think is a very constructive amendment, which should make it possible for us to achieve a broader measure of bipartisan support for our policy toward Cambodia than we have had in this House for some time.
As the gentleman will undoubltedly recall, a few months ago we had a rather vigorous debate on our aid program for the non-Communist resistance in the context of our consideration of the foreign aid bill. Those Members who believed that that kind of assistance is important as a way of facilitating progress toward a peaceful settlement of the Cambodian conflict prevailed.
Since that time, some very significant developments have taken place, the most important of which has been the agreement among the five permanent members of the Security Council on a framework for peace in Cambodia, which was subsequently deemed acceptable by each of the four Cambodian factions, and which has brought us very, very close to the conclusion of an agreement which will end the fighting in Cambodia, provide for the introduction of a U.N. peacekeeping force, and make possible an internationally supervised free and fair election.
This amendment, by making explicit what was implicit, and for making a provision for the transfer of these resources in the intelligence bill to other agencies of the Government once a comprehensive settlement is agreed upon and actually implemented and begins to take effect, has created I think the basis for broad bipartisan support in pursuit of our policy, which represents in my judgment the last best chance we have of bringing peace to Cambodia, and preventing Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge from returning to power in that country.
Mr. Chairman, I want to commend the gentleman from New Mexico [Mr. Richardson] for his efforts, and I urge the adoption of the amendment.
Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the gentleman from New York [Mr. Solarz]. As the gentleman and others have said, the purpose of the amendment is so that this issue is openly debated before the American people.
[Page: H10033]
Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask the gentleman from New Mexico [Mr. Richardson] a question. The language of this amendment indicates that the unspent funds that the gentleman is talking about would be transferred to any agency recommended by the President.
[TIME: 1540]
There are no limitations on what agencies that could be transferred to.
Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. OBEY. I yield to the gentleman from New Mexico.
Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, it cannot be an intelligence agency. The transfer would be to any kind of defense account; it would not be to a foreign assistance account.
Mr. OBEY. What language does the gentleman have defining how it might be spent?
Mr. RICHARDSON. The second page of the amendment which deals with the language says, `shall be transferred to such agency of the United States Government as the President may designate. The President may not designate an intelligence agency for purposes of this paragraph.'
Mr. OBEY. But my question is how may this money be spent? May it be spent only for operations with respect to Cambodia, or might it be spent in other ways?
Mr. RICHARDSON. Exclusively for Cambodia.
Mr. OBEY. Where does it say that?
Mr. RICHARDSON. I believe right where I just referred, `shall be transferred to such agency of the United States Government as the President may designate.'
Mr. OBEY. It says the money shall be transferred to another agency, but it does not, as I read the language, have any kind of limitation on how that money might be used once it is transferred.
Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. OBEY. Surely, I yield to the gentleman from New York.
Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Chairman, I think the text of the amendment makes it clear that these funds are authorized and appropriated and can be obligated and expended solely for assistance for the Cambodia non-Communist resistance forces.
The amendment also provides in section (a)(2) that: `Any such assistance shall be consistent with section 906 of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985,' which relates to the prohibition on assistance to the Khmer Rouge.
Mr. OBEY. I understand. I am not concerned at this point about how the money might be spent within Cambodia. My question is could the President use this money to fund any other program he wanted to outside of Cambodia?
Mr. SOLARZ. My interpretation of the amendment is absolutely not.
Mr. OBEY. I would like to know how the gentleman interprets that language, because that is not my interpretation.
Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. OBEY. I yield to the gentleman from New Mexico.
Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, let me read to the gentleman another relevant section, section (b) of the amendment:
Funds made available for assistance for the Cambodia nonCommunist resistance forces pursuant to this section are in addition to any funds that are made available for assistance for the Cambodian non-Communist resistance forces under the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act.
It is strictly to the Cambodian non-Communist resistance.
Mr. OBEY. It is at this time. The gentleman is telling me that he is certain that it is after the transfer?
Mr. RICHARDSON. That is correct.
Mr. SOLARZ. If the gentleman will yield further, and if I can supplement the observation of the gentleman from New Mexico, I think that is absolutely clear. If there is any ambiguity about it, I think this legislative history should make it absolutely clear. In discussions with the administration which consented to this amendment it was clearly understood that the only purpose for which these funds could, or would or should be used would be for the purposes referred to in the legislation itself, which is the non-Communist resistance in Cambodia.
Mr. OBEY. Let me ask two other questions.
How would the 302(b) numbers be affected with respect to budget authority if there is any remaining funds?
Mr. RICHARDSON. If the gentleman will yield, the funds would go strictly within the Defense Department accounts. They would not go outside of those Defense Department accounts.
Mr. OBEY. Is the gentleman telling me that the funds cannot be transferred to AID?
Mr. RICHARDSON. They could be.
Mr. OBEY. AID is not within the Defense Department account.
Mr. RICHARDSON. Under the purposes of this amendment, the funds subject to the budget act are strictly within the defense appropriaitons account.
Mr. OBEY. Does the gentleman from New York want to comment on that?
Mr. SOLARZ. If the gentleman will yield, my impression is that under this amendment, if the President chooses to transfer money, it cannot be transferred to any other intelligence agency of the Government. But there is no restriction on what other agencies it might be transferred to, so long as they are not intelligence agencies.
Now I would imagine there are all sorts of practical administrative and bureaucratic problems. I doubt that he is going to transfer the money to the Coast Guard. But under the terms of the amendment, if he should choose to transfer it, it can be transferred to any agency which is not an intelligence agency.
Mr. RICHARDSON. If the gentleman will yield, let me just assure the gentleman that we are going to go to conference on this issue very shortly, and I want to assure the gentleman that his concerns would be taken care of, specifically that it would be relegated to the purposes the gentleman said.
Mr. OBEY. How does the gentleman know what purpose it is I want to relegate it to? I mean, here is my problem.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Kanjorski). The time of the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. Obey] has expired.
(By unanimous consent, Mr. Obey was allowed to proceed for 5 additional minutes.)
Mr. OBEY. We have a bill which is classified. We cannot talk about the numbers contained in this bill. We have a program which is classified, moneys which might be, or some which might be, transferred out for another purpose, and at this point I cannot tell what purpose that money might be used for. I cannot tell whether that is going to be counted against the 302(b) ceiling for function 150 account in the budget, for either BA or outlay, and we are supposed to accept the amendment.
Frankly, I am very confused at this point, because we are in the process of adopting a budget which sets specific ceilings for defense, for foreign assistance and for domestic discretionary spending. The administration went to great lengths to try to get a separate cap for foreign assistance, and now my question is whether or not this is going to wind up, or I am wondering whether this may wind up being additional spending within the foreign assistance account above and beyond the 302 numbers, whether this will be counted against our ceiling, whether it will not, and I am trying to figure out about 20 hours after we have passed the initial budget resolution whether we are going to stick to it or not.
[Page: H10034]
Mr. SOLARZ. If the gentleman will yield further, let me say first that if the gentleman from Wisconsin will look on page 2 of the Richardson amendment, it says that such funds shall be expended, assuming they are transferred, `in ways that are consistent with the comprehensive political settlement.' So one thing we do know is that it does have to be for Cambodians.
Second, on the question of how this relates to the 302(b) allocations, I think the answer to that is that that question, which you now raise for the first time, but which is a very legitimate question and in which you certainly have a very real interest, is going to have to be worked out. I have discussed this with people in the administration, and my impression is that insofar as the cap on foreign aid is concerned that they would be prepared to agree to exceptions with that cap with respect to this money.
Mr. OBEY. If that is the case, then therein lies the rub, because the administration wants exceptions to the cap. I do not want exceptions to the cap. I did not want that `turkey' arrangement which the administration worked out with the Congress, but if we get it, I want to know that it is going to be enforced, and I do not want to see foreign aid assistance ceilings breached 20 hours after we have agreed to a budget.
Mr. SOLARZ. I would say, if I may, to my very good friend from Wisconsin, that we may have an honest difference of opinion on this. What I can tell the gentleman is that the overall amount of money requested for Cambodia is not, and which is actually spent on Cambodia will not be increased by this amendment. As the gentleman knows, we have money for Cambodia in a number of different pots. This presumably is one of them, and your bill is another.
Mr. OBEY. If I can reclaim my time, with all due respect, that is not my concern. I am not talking about how much money is going to be spent within Cambodia. My concern is that under the powers given to the OMB under the budget arrangement passed by the Congress, OMB is going to have extraordinary powers to decide who exceeds spending ceilings and who does not. We are giving the administration additional authority to define where money is going to go. We do not know how much. We do not know where and we do not know how it is going to be counted. But we are supposed to support it.
As far as I am concerned, count me out under those circumstances.
Mr. McCURDY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. OBEY. Certainly, I yield to the gentleman from Oklahoma.
Mr. McCURDY. Mr. Chairman, I do not want to interfere with the gentleman's amendment. I share the gentleman's concern. I am curious if in the amendment there was a requirement that a reprogramming action be taken which would thus require votes by the relevant committees, whether that would be preferable or answer the concerns of the gentleman as opposed to a blanket transfer authority that exists in the amendment today?
[TIME: 1550]
Mr. OBEY. That might marginally decrease my concern, but it would not remove my opposition, because as far as I am concerned, the administration has gained incredible authority for scorekeeping under the new budget arrangement. I think we are going to have runaway accounting in OMB under the budget arrangement. In addition to that, we are giving them additional holes through which they can pour money. I think that is a very bad precedent, and I think we ought not to support it.
Mr. RICHARDSON. If the gentleman will yield further, I do not know if he was here in the earlier part of the discussion of this amendment. We cannot discuss these issues as openly as the gentleman wants, but let me just tell the gentleman that the purpose of this amendment is to make the policy, the assistance, open, to open it up.
Mr. OBEY. I understand the purpose. The problem is the effect. Purposes are always wonderful around here. The effects are often screwy. This is one time when I think you achieve that result, and so I simply am going to oppose the amendment if there is a rollcall on it.[H17OC0-X3]{H10034}all on it.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Kanjorski.) The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from New Mexico [Mr. Richardson].
The amendment was agreed to.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Are there further amendments to the bill?
Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The Clerk read as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. Traficant: Page 13, after line 14, insert the following new section:
SEC. 403. BUY-AMERICAN REQUIREMENT.
(a) Determination by the Director.--If the Director, with the concurrence of the United States Trade Representative and the Secretary of Commerce, determines that the public interest so desires, the Director is authorized to award to a domestic firm a contract that, under the use of competitive procedures, would be awarded to a foreign firm, if--
(1) the final product of the domestic firm will be completely assembled in the United States;
(2) when completely assembled, not less than 51 percent of the final product of the domestic firm will be domestically produced; and
(3) the difference between the bids submitted by the foreign and domestic firms is not more than 6 percent. In determining under this subsection whether the public interest so requires, the Director shall take into account United States international obligations and trade relations.
(b) Limited Application.--This section shall not apply to the extent to which--
(1) such applicability would not be in the public interest;
(2) compelling national security considerations require otherwise; or
(3) the United States Trade Representative determines that such an award would be in violation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade or an international agreement to which the United States is a party.
(c) Limitation: This section shall apply only to contracts made related to the issuance of any grant made under this Act for which--
(1) amounts are authorized by this act (including the amendment made by this act) to be made available; and
(2) solicitation for bids are issued after the date of the enactment of this Act.
(d) Report to Congress.--The Director shall report to the Congress on contracts covered under this section and entered into with foreign entities in fiscal years 1990 and 1991 and shall report to the Congress on the number of Contracts that meet the requirements of subsection (a) but which are determined by the United States Trade Representative to be in violation of the General Agreement or an international agreement to which the United States is a party. The Director shall also report to the Congress on the number of contracts covered under this Act (including the amendments made by this Act) and awarded based upon the parameters of this section.
(e) Definitions.--For purposes of this section--
(1) Secretary.--The term `Director' means the Director of Central Intelligence.
(2) Domestic Firm.--The term `Domestic Firm' means a business entity that is incorporated in the United States and that conducts business operations in the United States.
(3) Foreign firm.--The term `foreign firm' means a business entity not described in paragraph (2).
Mr. TRAFICANT (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimoius consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the Record.
the CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Ohio?
There was no objection.
Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, last year we passed this similar amendment. It was removed in conference.
I could understand the sensitivity of purchases made in these accounts. I am willing to make the following statements, understanding those dynamics, I am going to request of both the minority vice chairman and the majority chairman that they accept the amendment and tailor and make such classified structural language that may be necessary so that this emphasis be placed on maintaining some taxpayer purchases on our side of the balance line.
I realize there are some significant questions. I appreciate the fact that you had accepted it last year, but I am going to encourage you to make such adjustments and to try and keep it in as a procurement policy with whatever changes you deem so necessary.
Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
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Mr. TRAFICANT. I am happy to yield to the gentleman from California.
Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
Mr. Chairman, I would say to the gentleman and to my colleagues that the committee has had an opportunity to examine the gentleman's amendment.
We note that the amendment makes discretionary with the Director of Central Intelligence the use of the authority conveyed with respect to contract awards. In addition, we note that an exception is provided for compelling national security considerations.
I believe these provisions will address concerns which might otherwise be raised by the intelligence agencies.
With those understandings, we on this side of the aisle are prepared to accept the amendment, I say to the gentleman, and that we will do our level best, and I hope, frankly, this year we will be successful to keep the gentleman's language in in conference.
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. TRAFICANT. I am happy to yield to the gentleman from Illinois.
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I commend the gentleman. I think it is an excellent amendment. We are certainly happy to accept it on this side and pledge to fight for it in conference.
I have no illusions about how we will fare in conference, but I am ever optimistic. I intend to fight for the gentleman's amendment.
If it needs technical correction, we will get that. I think it is a good idea, and we are happy to accept the amendment.
Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate it. I would also like to say that I appreciate the support of the subcommittee chairman, the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. McCurdy], on the issue we have discussed and really want it to be known that whatever changes you make, as long as the integrity of the amendment is in there, I appreciate the support.
Mr. McCURDY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. TRAFICANT. I am happy to yield to the gentleman from Oklahoma.
Mr. McCURDY. Mr. Chairman, of all the agencies of the Federal Government, I believe the intelligence community is the one that probably could manage a buy-American amendment the easiest. I have no problem at all, whatsoever, with the amendment as long as those exceptions are provided in unique areas.
But, for the most part, the intelligence community is probaly personnel-driven more than capital, but we need to obviously focus on American-made products and help with competitiveness.
Mr. TRAFICANT. I appreciate the remarks of the gentleman.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Traficant].
The amendment was agreed to.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Are there further amendments to the bill.
Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The Clerk read as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. Dellums: at the end of the bill, add the following:
SEC. 601. DECLARATION THAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD NOT SUPPORT MILITARY OR PARAMILITARY OPERATIONS IN ANGOLA UNLESS SUCH SUPPORT HAS BEEN OPENLY ACKNOWLEDGED AND PUBLICLY DEBATED.
The Congress finds that the United States Government--
(1) should not provide `covert assistance' in support of military or paramilitary operations in Angola; and
(2) should provide assistance in support of such operations only if the provision of that assistance is the openly acknowledged policy of the United States.
It is, therefore, the sense of the Congress that the United States Government should not provide any such assistance until the President has publicly informed the Congress and the American people that United States Government support for military or paramilitary operations in Angola is important to the national security and the Congress has expressly approved such assistance.
SEC. 602. PROHIBITION ON COVERT ASSISTANCE.
(a) Any Support Must Be Openly Acknowledged: During fiscal year 1991, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, or any other agency or entity of the United States involved in intelligence activities may not obligate or expend any funds--
(1) to conduct, directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Angola, or
(2) to provide any financial, material, or other assistance, directly or indirectly, to any group engaged in military or paramilitary operations in Angola,
unless the use of funds for that purpose is the openly acknowledged policy of the United States Government, as determined in accordance with subsection (b).
(b) Presidential Request and Congressional Approval.--In order to ensure that any United States Government support for military or paramilitary operations in Angola is openly acknowledged, funds may be used for the purposes described in subsection (a) only if--
(1) the President determines that United States Government support for military or paramilitary operations in Angola is important to the national security and submits to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate a request that the Congress approve openly acknowledged United